WEST COAST DEBATE
WEST COAST DEBATE
MILITARY 2010-2011
NEGATIVE HANDBOOK
Edited by Aaron Hardy and Jim Hanson
with Matt Taylor
Researched by:
Brett Bricker, Chris Stone, Greta Stahl, and James Taylor
Articles by:
Jim Hanson and Aaron Hardy
WEST COAST DEBATE
MILITARY 2010-2011
NEGATIVE HANDBOOK
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.
Finding Arguments in this Handbook
Use the table of contents on the next pages to find the evidence you need or the navigation bar on the left. We have tried to make the table of contents as easy to use as possible. You’ll find affirmatives, disadvantages, counterplans, and kritiks listed alphabetically in their categories.
Using the arguments in this Handbook
We encourage you to be familiar with the evidence you use. Highlight (underline) the key lines you will use in the evidence. Cut evidence from our files, incorporate your and others’ research and make new files. File the evidence so that you can easily retrieve it when you need it in debate rounds. Practice reading the evidence out-loud; Practice applying the arguments to your opponents’ positions; Practice defending your evidence in rebuttal speeches.
Use West Coast Evidence as a Beginning
We hope you enjoy our evidence files and find them useful. In saying this, we want to make a strong statement that we make when we coach and that we believe is vitally important to your success: DO NOT USE THIS EVIDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR YOUR OWN RESEARCH. Instead, let it serve as a beginning. Let it inform you of important arguments, of how to tag and organize your arguments, and to offer citations for further research. Don’t stagnate in these files--build upon them by doing your own research for updates, new strategies, and arguments that specifically apply to your opponents. In doing so, you’ll use our evidence to become a better debater.
Copying West Coast Evidence
Our policy gives you the freedom to use our evidence for educational purposes without violating our hard work.
You may print and copy this evidence for those on your team.
You may not electronically share nor distribute this evidence with anyone other than those on your team unless you very substantially change each page that of material that you share.
For unusual situations, you can e-mail us at wcdebate@ and seek our consent.
Ordering West Coast Materials
1. Visit the West Coast Web Page at
2. E-mail us at wcdebate@
You can also call us at 888-255-9133; fax us at 877-781-5058; or write to West Coast Publishing; 2344 Hawk Drive; Walla Walla WA 99362
Copyright 2010. West Coast Publishing. All Rights Reserved.
Visit our web page!
Table Of Contents
Table Of Contents 3
Arguing Negative on the Military Topic 9
***Topicality Definitions*** 11
The 12
United States 13
Federal Government 14
Should 15
Substantially 16
Reduce 17
Its 18
Military And/Or Police Presence 19
In One Or More Of The Following 20
South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey 21
***Afghanistan Neg*** 22
Inherency Answers 23
AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key 24
AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key 25
AT: Stability Advantage – Alt Causes 26
AT: Hegemony Advantage – Link Turn 27
AT: Hegemony Advantage – No Impact 28
Negotiations Counterplan – 1NC Shell 29
Negotiations Counterplan – Solvency Ext. 30
Negotiations Counterplan – Solves Stability 31
Negotiations Counterplan – Terrorism Ext. 32
Negotiations Counterplan – Terrorism Ext. 33
NATO DA – 1NC Shell 34
NATO DA – Links 35
NATO DA – Afghanistan Key 36
CMR DA Links 37
Politics DA Links – Plan Popular 38
Politics DA Links – Plan Unpopular 39
***Iraq Militarism Neg*** 40
“Withdrawal” Is Not The Same As “Reduce” 41
Details Of Withdrawal Plans Are Key 42
Withdrawal Should Be Tied To A Strong Iraq 43
Vietnam Is A Poor Comparison To Iraq 44
Occupation Degrades US Imperialism/Hegemony 45
Occupation Degrades US Imperialism/Hegemony 46
Militarism Is Justified 47
Critical Pedagogies Are Failed Approaches 48
We Have An Ethical Obligation To Stay In Iraq 49
We Have An Ethical Obligation To Stay In Iraq 50
Withdrawal Undermines Democracy 51
Withdrawal Undermines US Leadership 52
Withdrawal Causes Major Regional Conflicts 53
Withdrawal Causes Genocide 54
Withdrawal Causes Genocide 55
Withdrawal Makes Iraq A Failed State 56
Withdrawal Makes Iraq A Failed State 57
***Japan Neg*** 58
Hegemony Disadvantage – Shell 59
Hegemony Disadvantage – Link Extension 60
Hegemony Disadvantage – Key to Power Projection 61
US-Japan Alliance Disadvantage – Shell 62
US-Japan Alliance Disadvantage – Extensions 63
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Shell 64
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Impact Overview 65
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Uniqueness 66
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Proliferation Impact 67
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Hegemony Impact 68
AT: Japan Won’t Nuclearize – Fissile Material 69
AT: Japan Won’t Nuclearize – F-22’s Impact 70
AT: Chinese Containment Bad Advantage 71
AT: Japanese Politics Advantage – No Set Agenda 72
AT: Japanese Politics Advantage – Dollar Turn 73
Consult Japan Counterplan – Shell 74
Consult Japan Counterplan – Extensions 75
***SK Neg*** 76
Plan Unpopular 77
Hegemony Disadvantage 1NC 78
Hegemony Disadvantage 1NC 79
Hegemony Disadvantage – Link Extension 80
North Korea Disadvantage – Bioweapons Shell 81
North Korea is a Threat – Bioweapons 82
North Korea is a Threat – US Posture is Key 83
Realism Good – Genocide 84
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Can’t Solve Root Cause 85
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Democracy Turn 86
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Colonialism Turn 87
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Hegemony Turn 88
AT: Structural Violence Outweighs 89
AT: Positive Peace 90
AT: No Great Power War – War is Possible 91
AT: No Great Power War – Even Small Wars Are Bad 92
AT: Kritik of Disadvantages 93
***Generic Advantage Core Neg*** 94
US Is Not Overstretched 95
US Recruitment Is High 96
US Will Withdraw Troops Now 97
Overstretch Is Not Key To Hegemony 98
Overstretch Is Not Key To Hegemony Cont’d 99
Hard Power Key Hegemony 100
Multipolarity Inevitable 101
Multipolarity Inevitable Cont’d 102
Soft Power Is Already High 103
Soft Power Is Already High Cont’d 104
The US Will Never Reinstate The Draft 105
Reinstating The Draft Is Good 106
Hegemony Bad – AT: Great Power Wars 107
Hegemony Bad – Entanglement Wars 108
Hegemony Bad – Entanglement Wars Cont’d 109
Offshore Balancing Good – War 110
Offshore Balancing Good – War Cont’d 111
Hegemony Bad – China 112
Rapid Proliferation Coming 113
Prolif Bad – Nuclear War 114
Prolif Bad – Nuclear War Cont’d 115
Prolif Bad – AT: Deterrence Solves 116
Prolif Bad – AT: Deterrence Solves Cont’d 117
Prolif Bad – Japan 118
***Prolif DA*** 119
Proliferation DA 1NC 120
Uniqueness – No Proliferation Now 121
Link – Perception of Retreat 122
Link – All Allies 123
Link – Laundry List of Allies 124
Link – Middle East Troops 125
Link – South Korea 126
Link – Japan 127
Link – Turkey 128
Link – Kuwait 129
Impact – Proliferation Bad – Leads to Nuclear Terrorism 130
Impact – Saudi Arabia Scenario 131
Impact – Japan Scenario 132
Impact – Japan Scenario – Asian Wars Impact 133
Impact – Turkey Scenario – Relations Impact 134
Impact – Turkey Scenario 135
Impact – Taiwan 136
AT: Proliferation Inevitable 137
AT: Deterrence Prevents Escalation 138
AT: No Wildfire Proliferation 139
***Hegemony DA*** 140
Hegemony DA 1NC 141
Hegemony DA 1NC 142
Hegemony DA 1NC Cont’d 143
Uniqueness – Hegemony High Now 144
Uniqueness – AT: Multipolarity Coming Now 145
Uniqueness – AT: Multipolarity Coming Now Cont’d 146
Links – General Withdrawal 147
Links – Afghanistan 148
Links – Japan 149
Links – Iraq 150
Links – Kuwait 151
Links – Kuwait Cont’d 152
Links - South Korea 153
Links – Turkey 154
AT: Link Turn – Soft Power 155
Hegemony Good – Conflict 156
Hegemony Good – Conflict Cont’d 157
Hegemony Good – Democracy 158
Hegemony Good – Free Trade 159
Hegemony Good – Proliferation 160
Hegemony Good – Proliferation Cont’d 161
Hegemony Good – Transition Impacts 162
Hegemony Good – AT: Multipolarity Better 163
Hegemony Good – AT: Counter-Balancing 164
Hegemony Good – AT: Terrorism 165
***Midterms DA*** 166
Midterms DA 1NC 167
Midterms DA 1NC 168
Uniqueness – GOP Win Now 169
Link – Generic 170
Link – Winner’s Win 171
Link – Reigning in Spending 172
Link – Japan 173
Link – South Korea 174
Link – Iraq 175
Link – Afghanistan 176
Internal – Obama Popularity Key 177
Impact – Economy 178
Impact – Wars 179
Impact – Warming Regulations 180
Impact – Card Check 181
AT: “Weak on Foreign Policy” Link Turn 182
AT: Health Care Outweighs 183
AT: Unemployment Outweighs 184
AT: Other Issues In the Interim 185
***Politics DA*** 186
Climate Bill – 1NC Shell 187
Climate Bill – 1NC Shell 188
Uniqueness - Yes Climate Bill 189
Uniqueness – Yes Political Capital 190
Links – Changing Military Policy 191
Links – Afghanistan Reductions Hurt Obama 192
Links – Iraq Reductions Hurt Obama 193
Links – Japan Reductions Hurt Obama 194
Links – Kuwait Reductions Hurt Obama 195
Links – South Korea Reductions Hurt Obama 196
Links – Turkey Reductions Hurt Obama 197
Internal Link – Obama Gets the Blame 198
Internal Link - Political Capital Key to Climate 199
Internal Link - Political Capital Finite 200
AT: Link Turn - Winners Don’t Win 201
AT: Link Turn – Popularity Not Key to the Agenda 202
Impact – US Competitiveness 203
Impact – Anti-Americanism 204
Impact – Warming Real/Fast 205
AT: Impact Turn - Climate Bill Helps the Economy 206
***Courts CP*** 207
Courts CP 1NC 208
Courts CP 1NC Cont’d 209
Courts CP 1NC 210
Courts CP 1NC Cont’d 211
2NC Impact – SOP - Hegemony 212
2NC Impact – Executive Power - Democracy 213
AT: Permutation – Do Both 214
AT: Permutation – Do Both Cont’d 215
AT: Permutation – Do the Counterplan 216
AT: Courts Not Perceived 217
AT: The President Will Ignore the Ruling 218
AT: Troop Deployment Not in Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction 219
AT: Troop Deployment Not in Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction Cont’d 220
Troop Deployment/War Powers Key to Separation of Powers. 221
AT: Obama Already Solved Executive Power 222
Deference Bad – Conflict 223
Deference Bad – Environment 224
AT: Deference Key to Hegemony 225
AT: Deference Key to Foreign Policy – Expertise/ Timing 226
AT: Deference Key to Foreign Policy – Pres Leadership Not Key 227
Courts Don’t Link to Politics 228
Courts Don’t Link to Politics Cont’d 229
***Recruitment CP*** 230
Child Care CP 1NC 231
Child Care Insufficient Now 232
Private Care Fails 233
Family Care Centers Are Key 234
CP is a Pre-Requisite to Retention 235
Child Care Key to Hegemony – Readiness/Retention 236
Child Care Key to Hegemony – Productivity 237
Child Care Key to the Economy 238
The CP Reinvigorates the Economy 239
Retention Key To Hegemony 240
Force Key To Hegemony 241
Forces Are The Only Way to Power Project 242
Forces are More Important Than Tech Investment 243
AT: Spending DA To CP 244
AT: DOD Tradeoff DA to CP 245
AT: DOD Tradeoff DA to CP 246
AT: Casualty Aversion Prevents Solvency 247
AT: Iraq Withdrawal is Key to Retention/Readiness 248
The CP Helps Obama’s Agenda 249
The CP Avoids the Political Capital DA 250
***Security K*** 251
Security K Explanation 252
Security K 1NC 253
Security K 1NC 254
Security K 1NC 255
The Word “Security” Is Security Logic 256
China Threat Claims Are Rooted In Security 257
China Threat Claims Are Rooted In Security 258
Russian Threat Discourse Securitizes 259
North Korea Arguments Are Rooted In Security 260
India-Pakistan Scenarios Are Securitizing 261
Afghanistan Is A Securitizing Mission 262
Realism Is A Flawed Understanding Of IR 263
Securitization Fosters Violence And Extinction 264
Securitization Denies A Value To Life 265
Rejecting Security Representations Solves 266
Rejecting Security Representations Solves 267
Permutations Do Not Break Down “Security” 268
Permutations Do Not Break Down “Security” 269
***Capitalism K*** 270
Capitalism K Explanation 271
Capitalism K 1NC 272
Capitalism K 1NC Cont’d 273
Capitalism K 1NC 274
Capitalism K 1NC Cont’d 275
Uniqueness – Capitalism Is Collapsing 276
Link – Anti-War 277
Link – Iraq 278
Link – Afghanistan 279
Link – Afghanistan Cont’d 280
Link – Hegemony 281
Link – Hegemony Cont’d 282
Link – Law 283
Capitalism Bad – War 284
Capitalism Bad – Genocidal Violence 285
Capitalism Bad – Environment 286
AT: Capitalism Good 287
AT: Capitalism Good Cont’d 288
Alternative Solves – General 289
Alternative Solves – Withdrawing 290
AT: Permutation 291
AT: Permutation 292
AT: Permutation Cont’d 293
Arguing Negative on the Military Topic
Aaron Hardy and Jim Hanson, Whitman College
Below you will find a general overview of the negative side of the 2010-2011 Military topic, as well as specific descriptions of responses to affirmative cases, disadvantages, counterplans, and critiques. You can argue that current plans to reduce forward deployments are sufficient and should not be accelerated. You can argue that reductions in military presence are actively harmful and would actually make problems worse. You can argue that the disadvantages of reduced military presence such as the cost or the political backlash would outweigh the benefits of the affirmative plan. You can argue that different agents could better implement reductions. Use this topic overview as a starting point for your research into the negative side of the Military topic.
Case Responses
Be prepared to defend the present system of forward military deployment. Research evidence and arguments that refute the harms that affirmatives are likely to present. Use the affirmative topic analysis included in this handbook to prepare for likely affirmative cases and research attacks against their solvency. Here are some of the many possible negative responses you can make to affirmative cases:
• Current plans for force drawdowns are adequate, especially with recent plans to reduce the number of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and transfer some troops from Japan and South Korea to places like Guam.
• The existence of US forward deployment is not the main problem with the military – structural factors with US hegemony, problems in host countries, or inadequate support for troops are more important
• Be prepared to really go after the solvency of affirmative plans. Remember, the topic only allows affirmatives to reduce military or police presence in specific countries – not eliminate the entire military, all forward deployment, or prevent redeploying troops freed up by the plan. The affirmative must defend that their plan will actually work at reducing the harms of forward military presence, and to solve many of the largest impacts, must win that the plan causes a major shift in US military practices. This also means that many of the problems with current deployments are also potential solvency attacks against affirmative plans. Failed redeployments and utilization of different bases to accomplish the same goals are just two examples of the types of evidence you can use to support your solvency arguments. Remember, you should both show why the affirmative proposal won’t work and why it will make things worse. This will make your solvency arguments as strong as possible.
As the year progresses, new affirmatives will emerge and you will need to research and strategize to defeat them. Use the arguments presented here to jumpstart your research. Against any new affirmative, be sure to defend the status quo, attack the significance of the affirmative’s harms, and attack the affirmative’s solvency. This strategy is sure to put you in a good position to win a debate over the affirmative’s case.
Disadvantages
Here are disadvantages you and others might prepare against reducing the US military presence:
• Hegemony disadvantage: reducing US forward deployments would negatively impact the ability fo the United States to respond to global challenges and win wars. Forward based military presence is a vital component of US leadership and global hegemony, and any reduction could both tangibly hamstring the military, as well as send a signal of weakness to potential and current adversaries that the US lacked the resolve necessary to win conflicts..
• Politics disadvantage: The plan could be argued to either help or hurt Obama’s political agenda. Reductions in forward deployment are frequently unpopular because they are perceived as “weak on defense” or “failing to support the troops.” On the other hand, reductions in forward deployment can be very popular when the conflict in question (such as Iraq or Afghanistan) is widely viewed as illegitimate or harmful. Passing popular or unpopular programs could give President Obama increased or decreased ability to pursue other, potentially harmful policies.
• Midterms disadvantage: The 2010 congressional midterm elections are shaping up to be extremely important politically, as they could impact whether Democrats maintain control of both houses of Congress, and in turn, whether President Obama can successfully pursue his agenda. For many of the same reasons mentioned above, the plan could have important political effects in how the electorate views Obama and the Democrats more broadly.
• Proliferation disadvantage: some people argue that reductions in US military commitments abroad would encourage both allies and rogue states to develop nuclear weapons. For example, if Japan lost faith in United States’ willingness to defend them from attack by China, they might feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons to ensure their own security. Many people view proliferation as potentially hazardous and risky for international security..
• Redeployment disadvantage: Since the affirmative cannot fiat what the US does with any troops or military assets reduced by the plan, the negative could argue that these resources will be redeployed to other areas, exacerbating those conflicts. For example, any troops reduced from South Korea could easily end up supporting the effort in Afghanistan, which could lend credence to the view that the US is too bogged down in the region or is pursuing a strategy of imperial conquest..
• Soft power disadvantage: forward military basing is frequently criticized by host nations as having negative impacts on their local populace and environment. More broadly, US military bases are a tangible symbol of coercive US power and influence abroad. This disadvantage argues that reductions in military deployments would greatly boost America’s soft power, which is actually a bad thing. Soft power causes backlash, and allows America to pursue ill-advised foreign policy goals with the sanction of other countries.
Counterplans
Here are counterplans on the Military topic:
• Executive order counterplan: instead of involving Congress in the affirmative plan, this counterplan carries out the mandates of the affirmative via an executive order. This counterplan has the benefit of avoiding politics disadvantages by excluding Congress.
• International counterplan: instead of reducing US military presence, this counterplan advocates some other country or countries (such as NATO) reduce their military deployments. These actors might avoid any disadvantage associated with reductions in US basing.
• Courts counterplan: This counterplan argues that instead of involving any of the elected branches in the plan, the Supreme Court should instead mandate the military reduce its presence in the relevant country. This has the added benefit of breaking the tradition of court “deference” to military decisionmaking, which many argue would be an important check on adventurism.
• Recruiting counterplans: instead reducing the size of US military presence, this counterplan would advocate doing something to boost the size of the military, providing more troops to the US. This could help remedy any reason why current deployments are causing the military to be overstretched, while avoiding any disadvantage from reducing forward deployment.
• Plan-inclusive counterplans: this is an entire category of counterplans, rather than one specific plan. These counterplans advocate part of the affirmative plan, while excluding the rest and claiming the benefit of excluding the parts of the plan that link to disadvantages. For example, a plan-inclusive counterplan against an Iraq affirmative could exclude reducing military training programs, and argue that leaving those programs in place is critical to a successful transition to Iraqi Security Forces.
Kritiks
What kinds of kritiks may be run on this year’s topic? Here goes:
• Security kritik: this kritik argues that affirmative plans which attempt to avoid “security” impacts such as wars are just contributing to a cycle of insecurity through threat construction. This might extend to criticizing representations of conflicts or security concerns. The kritik rejects this way of describing the world and says we should instead use more positive representations or discourse.
• Militarism kritik: This kritik argues that even though the affirmative ostensibly reduces the footprint of the military, this is done to provide a more benign face to the reality of US global coercive hegemony. It argues that only a totalizing rejection of the entire US military-industrial complex can address the root cause of militarism and prevent the US from enacting global violence against the periphery. The kritik rejects a militaristic way of viewing the world.
• Capitalism kritik: this kritik argues that the root cause of problematic US military deployments described by the affirmative is the existence of capitalism. It argues that policy proposals which attempt to put a “band-aid” solution on the problem will fail and be counterproductive, and that the only way to truly solve is to reject the whole capitalist system.
• Individual country kritiks – There will likely be specific critiques for each area of the topic, criticizing the way the affirmative understands those areas of the world, the discourse and representations used to describe them, or the implication of the United States in creating those harms in the first place.
***Topicality Definitions***
The
‘The’ Means Unique
Merriam-webster's online collegiate dictionary, 2007.
Accessed May 10, 2007,
b -- used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular member of its class
‘The’ Means All Parts
Merriam-webster's online collegiate dictionary, 2007.
Accessed May 10, 2007,
4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole
United States
The united states is the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
Princeton university wordnet 1997,
Online, accessed May 15, 2007,
united states: 2: the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the US
United states is the united states of america
The american heritage dictionary, 1983,
p. 857.
United States: Also United States of America. Country of central and NW North America, with coastlines on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic oceans. Cap. Washington, D.C. Pop. 226,504,825.
United states is the states within territorial bounds
American heritage dictionary, 2nd college edition, 1988.
United States: A federation of states, esp. one forming a nation within a definitely specified territory: politicians who proposed a United States of Africa.
United states means a union of states
The oxford english dictionary, 1989.
United States: The proper name or distinctive title of a confederacy, federation, or union of States.
United states means the united states of america
The oxford english dictionary, 1989.
United States: The Republic of North America. Abbrev. U.S. or U.S.A.
United states are a federation of states
Webster's ninth new collegiate dictionary, 1988.
United States: a federation of states esp. when forming a nation in a usually specified territory (advocating a United States of Europe)
The united states is the 48 states plus hawaii, alaska and d.c.
The oxford encyclopedic english dictionary, 1991.
United States of America: a country occupying most of the southern half of North America and including also Alaska in the north and Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean, comprising 50 States and the Federal District of Columbia.
Federal Government
Federal government is administered by a union or confederation of states
Black’s law dictionary. 1979,
Black, Henry Campbell. p. 550
Federal Government: The system of government administered in a nation formed by the union or confederation of several independent states.
Federal government is control and influence by the central government
Dictionary of american politics, 2nd edition, 1968.
Federal Government: In the United States: the Government which, from its capital in the District of Columbia, directly legislates, administers, and exercises jurisdiction over matters assigned to it in the Constitution and exerts considerable influence, by means of grants-in-aid and otherwise, over matters reserved to the State governments.
Federal government means the central government
Dictionary of american politics, 2nd edition, 1968.
federal government: In the United States: the Government which, from its capital in the District of Columbia, directly legislates, administers, and exercises jurisdiction over matters assigned to it in the Constitution and exerts considerable influence, by means of grants-in-aid and otherwise, over matters reserved to the State governments.
Federal government means the central government in washington dc
Dictionary of american politics, 2nd edition, 1968.
federal government: In the United States: the Government which, from its capital in the District of Columbia, directly legislates, administers, and exercises jurisdiction over matters assigned to it in the Constitution and exerts considerable influence, by means of grants-in-aid and otherwise, over matters reserved to the State governments.
Should
Should expresses obligation or desirability
Webster's new world dictionary, 3rd edition, 1988.
p.1242.
used to express obligation or duty, propriety, or desirability.
Should is different from would
Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary, 1983.
Should: 2b. expectation or probability: e.g., since they left Saturday they should be here by Monday: equivalent to ought to and replaceable by would.
Should can be replaced by would
Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary, 1983.
Should: 2d. futurity in polite or unemphatic requests or in statements with implications of uncertainty or doubt: replaceable by would: e.g., should (or would) you like some tea? I should (or would) think he’d like it.
Should means past tense of shall
Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary, 1983.
p. 1679.
1. past tense of shall.
Substantially
Substantial means “large”
Oxford english dictionary, 2nd ed, 1989.
[substantial:] Of ample or considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions. More recently also in a somewhat weakened sense, esp. ‘fairly large.’
Substantial means large
Webster’s new world dictionary, 1988.
p.1336
Substantial 4. considerable; ample; large
Substantial means considerable in quantity
Merriam-webster’s collegiate dictionary. 1993,
p. 1174
Substantial 2b. Considerable in quantity.
Substantially is considerable or large
The american heritage dictionary, 1983,
p. 678.
Substantially 5. Considerable; large; won by a substantial margin.
Substantially means truly, largely, essentially
Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary, deluxe second edition, 1983
Substantially: 2. to a substantial degree; specifically, a. truly; really; actually; b. largely; essentially; in the main.
Substantial means important
Black’s law dictionary. 1979,
p. 1280 Black, Henry Campbell.
Substantial Something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal.
Substantial means of real worth and importance
Black's law dictionary, 6th edition, 1990,
p.1428
Of real worth and importance.
Substantial means important
The american heritage dictionary. 1982, p. 1213
Substantial 5. Considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent.
Substantial means of considerable or vital worth
Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary, deluxe second edition, 1983
Substantial: 6. of considerable worth or value; vital; important; as, they agree on all substantial issues.
Substantially means in essence
Oxford english dictionary, 2nd ed, 1989.
[substantially:] In substance; in one’s or its substantial nature or existence; as a substantial thing or being. b. Essentially, intrinsically. c. Actually, really, 2. In a sound or solid manner; on a firm or solid basis; effectively, thoroughly, properly, soundly. a. qualifying verbs. b. qualifying adjs. and advs. 3. Of the construction of buildings, manufacture of fabrics, etc.: Solidly, strongly. 4. In all essential characters of features; in regard to everything material; in essentials; to all intents and purposes; in the main.
Reduce
General Definitions Of Reduce
, 2006,
Reduce –verb (used with object)
1. to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount, number, etc.: to reduce one's weight by 10 pounds.
2. to lower in degree, intensity, etc.: to reduce the speed of a car.
3. to bring down to a lower rank, dignity, etc.: a sergeant reduced to a corporal
4. to treat analytically, as a complex idea.
5. to lower in price.
6. to bring to a certain state, condition, arrangement, etc.: to reduce glass to powder.
7. to bring under control or authority.
Reduce is to change forms or express in different terms
CHAMBERS 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1983
(v.t.) to bring back (archaic): to restore to an old state (archaic): to bring into a new state (archaic): to put back into a normal condition or place, as a dislocation or fracture (surg.): to change to another form: to express in other terms: to range in order or classification: to adapt, adjust: to translate: to put into (writing, practice; with to): to break up, separate, disintegrate: to disband (mil., obs.):
Reduce is to lower in size, amount, degree, or intensity
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1991
--v.t. 1. to bring down to a smaller size, amount, price, etc. 2. to lower in degree, intensity, etc. 3. to demote to a lower rank or authority.
Reduce is to consolidate, diminish, or restrict
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1988
vt 1 a: to draw together or cause to converge: CONSOLIDATE (reduce all the questions to one) b: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number (reduce taxes) (reduce the likelihood of war) (add the wine and reduce the sauce for two minutes) c: to narrow down: RESTRICT (the Indians were reduced to small reservations d: to make shorter:
Reduce is to make smaller
THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1991
v. 1 tr. & instr. make or become smaller or less. 3. tr. convert to another (esp. smaller) form (reduced to a powder)
Reduce is to lessen in extent, number, or degree
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY. 1982, p. 1037
Reduce 1. To lessen in extent, amount, number, degree, or price.
Reduce is to narrow down or restrict
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY. 1993, p. 980
Reduce 1c. To narrow down, restrict.
Reduce is to lessen in any way
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 1988, p.1126
Reduce 1a. to lessen in any way, as in size, weight, amount, value, price, etc.; diminish
Its
“Its” is the possessive form of the pronoun “it”
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991)
Its: the possessive form of IT (used as an attribute adjective) The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late.
Its means of or belonging to the noun referenced as “it”
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed, 1989
Of or belonging to it, that thing.
Its is possessive or genitive of “it”
CHAMBERS 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY, 1983.
Its: possessive or genitive of it.
Its is of or relating to “it” as the subject or object of an action
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 1988.
Its: adj. of or relating to it or itself esp. as possessor, agent, or object of an action (going to its kennel) a child proud of its first drawings) (its final enactment into law).
Military And/Or Police Presence
Military means armed forces
American Heritage, 2009, “military,”
n. pl. military also mil·i·tar·ies 1. Armed forces: a country ruled by the military. 2. Members, especially officers, of an armed force.
Military presence means troops and bases
Anita Dancs, Economics Prof @ Western New England, 7-2-2009, “The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence,” Foreign Policy In Focus,
The U.S. military's global presence is vast and costly. More than one-third of U.S. troops are currently based abroad or afloat in international waters, and hundreds of bases and access agreements exist throughout the world. At the beginning of the 21st century, the government pushed to expand this presence through a variety of mechanisms. Yet the Department of Defense's budget presentations lack enough detail to make it possible to know the precise cost. The budgets don't break down the numbers, for example, on maintaining bases at home and overseas.
And/Or means what it means
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988)
used as a function word to indicate that two words or expressions are to be taken together or individually (punishable by a fine and/or a term in jail).
Police means law enforcement
American Heritage, 2000, “police,”
n. pl. police 1. The governmental department charged with the regulation and control of the affairs of a community, now chiefly the department established to maintain order, enforce the law, and prevent and detect crime. 2. a. A body of persons making up such a department, trained in methods of law enforcement and crime prevention and detection and authorized to maintain the peace, safety, and order of the community. b. A body of persons having similar organization and function: campus police. Also called police force.
Police presence means non-military law enforcement
World Tribune, 4-20-2009, “Iraq ups police presence,”
Iraq ups police presence to replace U.S. forces BAGHDAD — Iraq, under a deadline for a U.S. military withdrawal, has sought to accelerate police recruitment and training. Officials said the Interior Ministry has been recruiting thousands of cadets for the police in 2009. They said the recruits have been undergoing eight-week training courses for deployment as officers throughout Iraq. "More professionally trained officers are on the streets of Baghdad and throughout Iraq," U.S. Army Maj. Robert Arnold, a commander of a training team, said. "They are restoring a sense of normalcy to cities and towns around the country. They are the citizen's first line of security."
In One Or More Of The Following
In means included within a space
, 2010, “in,”
(used to indicate inclusion within space, a place, or limits): walking in the park.
One means single
American Heritage, 2009, “one,”
Being a single entity, unit, object, or living being.
More means greats
American Heritage, 2009, “more,”
adj. Comparative of many, much. 1. 1. Greater in number: a hall with more seats. 2. Greater in size, amount, extent, or degree: more land; more support.
Following means that which comes after
, 2010, “following,”
3. the following, that which comes immediately after, as pages, lines, etc.: See the following for a list of exceptions.
South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey
South Korea
Wordnet, 2010, “South Korea,”
(n) South Korea, Republic of Korea (a republic in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula; established in 1948)
Japan
Wordnet, 2010, “Japan,”
(n) Japan, Japanese Islands, Japanese Archipelago (a string of more than 3,000 islands to the east of Asia extending 1,300 miles between the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific Ocean)
Afghanistan
Wordnet, 2010, “Afghanistan,”
(n) Afghanistan, Islamic State of Afghanistan (a mountainous landlocked country in central Asia; bordered by Iran to the west and Russia to the north and Pakistan to the east and south) "Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979"
Kuwait
Wordnet, 2010, “Kuwait,”
(n) Kuwait, State of Kuwait, Koweit (an Arab kingdom in Asia on the northwestern coast of the Persian Gulf; a major source of petroleum)
Iraq
Wordnet, 2010, “Iraq,”
(n) Iraq, Republic of Iraq, Al-Iraq, Irak (a republic in the Middle East in western Asia; the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia was in the area now known as Iraq)
Turkey
Wordnet, 2010, “Turkey,”
(n) Turkey, Republic of Turkey (a Eurasian republic in Asia Minor and the Balkans; on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Young Turks, led by Kemal Ataturk, established a republic in 1923)
***Afghanistan Neg***
Inherency Answers
Withdrawal coming now – NATO commanders
RTT News, 04-23-2010, “NATO To Begin Transfer Of Command To Afghans This Year,” RTT News,
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said Friday the alliance planned to begin the gradual transfer of security responsibilities in Afghanistan to the country's government this year, signaling a move that would lead to the eventual withdrawal of international security forces from the war-torn country. "Our aims in 2010 are clear: to take the initiative against the insurgency; to help the Afghan Government exercise its sovereignty; and to start handing over responsibility for Afghanistan to the Afghans," Rasmussen told a press conference after a two-day meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in the Estonian capital Tallinn.
Agreement for withdrawal in the status quo
RTT News, 04-23-2010, “NATO To Begin Transfer Of Command To Afghans This Year,” RTT News,
"I expect that we will start handing over responsibility to the Afghans this year," Rasmussen said, adding that the "citizens in Afghanistan and in all troop contributing countries are demanding visible progress. And they are right to insist on that. "Today, we took an important decision to help make that happen," Rasmussen said. "We agreed the approach we will take to transition. We set out a process, the conditions that will have to be met, and what we will do to make those conditions happen." Without specifying details, Rasmussen said the Western alliance had reached an agreement on the basic guidelines for the gradual transfer of security and governance powers to the Afghan government, stressing that it would be a gradual process and not a "run for the exit." He said the prospective transition "must be not just sustainable, but irreversible."
Withdrawal now – the country is stabilizing
USA Today, 04-23-2010, “NATO to begin handing over Afghanistan to Afghan government,” USA Today,
NATO agreed Friday to begin handing over control of Afghanistan to the Afghan government this year, a process that if successful would enable President Obama to meet his target date of July 2011 for starting to bring U.S. troops home. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the 28-nation alliance is on track with its new strategy for winding down the war in Afghanistan, despite security setbacks and a continuing shortage of foreign trainers for the fledgling Afghan police and army. He said a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, agreed on what it will take to create conditions enabling Afghans to assume control of their own country. He was not specific about what those conditions will be, but said progress in that direction is important in order to avoid further erosion of public support for the war effort. "Where it occurs, the transition must be not just sustainable but irreversible," Fogh Rasmussen told a news conference at the conclusion of the two-day meeting. In earlier remarks, Fogh Rasmussen offered a mostly upbeat assessment to the gathering. "Increasingly this year the momentum will be ours," he said. Fogh Rasmussen asserted that the Afghan government, which has been hampered by a Taliban insurgency, political corruption, a dysfunctional economy and a dependence on foreign assistance, is starting to take more responsibility for running the country's affairs. "We are preparing to begin the process of handing over leadership, where conditions allow, back to the Afghan people," he said. "The future of this mission is clear and visible: more Afghan capability and more Afghan leadership."
AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key
Withdrawal emboldens terrorists – leads to new funding and recruitment
Mu Xuequan, Editor of Xinhua News Agency, 09-28-2009, “Pentagon opposes timeline to withdraw troops from Afghanistan,” China View,
The Pentagon on Sunday opposed setting timetable to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan as U.S. President Barack Obama is weighing on a decision whether to further increase troop levels there. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told CNN during an interview that setting such timelines or laying out an exit strategy would be a "strategic mistake" that could embolden al-Qaida and the Taliban. "The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States," he said, suggesting that a premature pullout would be perceived by the extremists as a victory over the United States, similar to the former Soviet Union's withdrawal from the country in 1989. "Taliban and al-Qaida, as far as they're concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, al-Qaida recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on," Gates said.
A strong US presence is key to prevent terrorist takeover in Pakistan and Afghanistan
John Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security, 08-31-2009, “Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?,” The Washington Post,
America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win. U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.
Strong US presence in Afghanistan key to prevent instability that would spread across the region
Erin Simpson, Former professor at the Marine Command and Staff College, 08-31-2009, “Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?,” The Washington Post,
The war is worth fighting, and it's worth fighting well. Years of strategic neglect and severely limited resources have seriously undermined U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan. In the last year we finally acknowledged that Pakistan is critical to the success of our efforts in Afghanistan. In the next year we must recognize the degree to which Afghanistan is key to Pakistan's future stability. A fragmented, war-torn, or Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would offer both al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban a plush sanctuary with greater freedom of movement than is currently enjoyed in Pakistan. It is the future stability of this nuclear-armed neighbor that demands our presence and our perseverance in Afghanistan. Some might argue for a quarantine strategy for Afghanistan, akin to previous counterterrorism missions. But this is not a war that can be meaningfully fought from stand-off range. The intelligence demands are daunting and cannot be met from either the Indian Ocean or satellites in orbit. And even if they could, given the distances involved, such information is perishable. Only people on the ground -- civilians and soldiers, Americans and Afghans -- can secure the population and deny our adversaries the sanctuaries they crave. Is the War in Afghanistan worth fighting? Yes, but we've really only just begun.
AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key
Withdrawal from Afghanistan causes massive regional instability and would inevitably draw us back in
Clint Douglas, Freelance writer and Afghanistan war veteran, 08-31-2009, “Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?,” The Washington Post,
It has become painfully difficult to continue to argue for a continued American occupation of Afghanistan. However, I can see no other realistic options. The war, odious and vicious as it is, must continue. The difficulty lies not with all of the tragically squandered blood and treasure, nor with the tenacity of the Taliban, but with the venality of the Karzai regime. The thuggish kleptocracy that passes for a government in Afghanistan does more to further the spread of the insurgency than any misguided air strike. If the Afghan government, which is propped up by both American guns and money, cannot provide some facsimile of a reasonably efficient rule, then the brutal but otherwise predictable alternative offered by the Taliban will prevail. There is no reason to believe that the government will improve any time soon, if the shenanigans surrounding these latest elections are any indication. And we have much less influence in domestic Afghan politics than we'd like to admit. However, we are far from powerless. We can continue to fund the expansion of the Afghan security forces, and we can enforce zones of relative stability that could facilitate the organic emergence of an Afghan leadership that can project both strength and integrity. All of which is a long shot, but a return to the status quo antebellum is impossible given the ever closer ties between the Taliban and the jihadist movement. An American withdrawal from Afghanistan now is not a move towards peace, but one that all but guarantees much greater instability and bloodshed in central and south Asia, which, let's face it, will inevitably draw us back into the region and on even less hospitable terms.
Withdrawal causes terrorism – undermines cooperation with Pakistan
Frederick Kagan, resident scholar at AEI, Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War, 03-23-2009, “Yes, We Can,” The Weekly Standard,
Those who answer in the negative point out that Afghanistan no longer hosts substantial concentrations of al Qaeda. They argue that it is these international terrorists who should be of concern to the United States and that we shouldn't waste our resources fighting the Taliban and assorted other local malefactors. It is true that today there are more al Qaeda fighters, to say nothing of leaders, in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. But the most effective steps we can take to target them, using Predators and other assets, are made possible by the coalition troop presence in Afghanistan. If coalition forces pull out of Afghanistan or substantially reduce their presence, the already limited willingness of the government of Pakistan to cooperate with the United States will evaporate. Pakistan will see that the Taliban are heading toward victory and will cut deals with them-something that is already happening but will accelerate if U.S. forces are seen as being on the way out.
Withdrawal causes Taliban fill-in and civil war
Vanda Felbab-Brown, fellow at the Brookings Institution, 12-02-2009, “President Obama’s New Strategy in Afghanistan: Questions and Answers,” Brookings Institution,
If the United States withdrew today, significant portions of the country, especially in the south and east, would fall into the hands of the Taliban. Other parts would either become engulfed in Taliban-generated and other local conflicts, or splinter into fiefdoms. Civil war à la the 1990s could easily be envisioned under such circumstances. At the same time, continuing with the current troop deployments would at best mean a stalemate, or at worst, a deepening of a quagmire.
AT: Stability Advantage – Alt Causes
Alt cause to instability – Pakistan
Shahid R. Siddiqi, co-founded the Asian American Republican Club, 04-26-2009, “Obama’s Options in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Journal,
Pakistan being central to any solution of the Afghanistan issue, its geopolitical sensitivities cannot be ignored. Increasing Indian engagement in Afghanistan that Pakistan deems hostile to its security will force Pakistan to rely on Taliban support to neutralise Indian threat. This necessitates international pressure to be brought upon India to accept the peace accord that Pakistan is agreeable to and that would resolve contentious issues like Kashmir, moving them both towards peaceful coexistence.
No solvency – support for Israel and Iranian intervention
Shahid R. Siddiqi, co-founded the Asian American Republican Club, 04-26-2009, “Obama’s Options in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Journal,
Iran must also be brought into the mix. Although Iran has been helpful in Afghanistan in the past, current tensions between the US and Iran will likely cause it to refrain from throwing its weight behind a multilateral arrangement. Engagement of Iran will have to be given serious attention and Israel will have to be kept on a tight leash. Similarly, Russian apprehensions about American intentions to marginalise it by gaining control over energy resources of Central Asia using Afghanistan as a conduit will have to be allayed too. Russia, India and Iran will also have to be brought on board to accept US-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia supported Taliban dominated government, owing to their past association with the Northern Alliance. And above all, American support to the biggest perpetrator of state terrorism – Israel, which in turn has fuelled terrorism around the world, will have to be rationalised.
Opium undermines stability
National Security Network, 05-13-2008, “AFGHANISTAN'S OPIUM CRISIS UNDERMINES ITS LONG-TERM STABILITY,” NS Network,
In plain view of the United States and the international community, the opium trade is overwhelming Afghanistan’s legitimate government. The facts are stunning: in 2001, after a Taliban ban on poppy cultivation, Afghanistan only produced 11 percent of the world’s opium. Today it produces 93 percent of the global crop; the drug trade accounts for half of its GDP; and nearly one in seven Afghans is involved in the opium trade. In Afghanistan, more land is being used for poppy cultivation than for coca cultivation in all of Latin America. The trade strengthens the government’s enemies and – unless its large place in the Afghan economy is permanently curtailed by crop replacements and anti-poverty efforts – poses a potentially fatal obstacle to keeping the country stable and peaceful. Afghanistan is caught in a vicious cycle. The fall of the Taliban brought the end of their highly coercive crop reduction program. A combination of U.S. inattention and widespread insecurity and poverty allowed poppy cultivation to explode. As the opium economy expanded, it spread corruption and empowered anti-government forces, undermining the Afghan state, leading to more poverty and instability, which in turn only served to further entrench the drug trade. Meanwhile the illicit activity has been a boon to the Taliban insurgency, which has traditionally used poppy cultivation as a lever to improve its own position. Today, the Taliban relies on opium revenues to purchase weapons, train its members, and buy support.
AT: Hegemony Advantage – Link Turn
Withdrawal undermines hegemony – multiple warrants
J Alexander Their, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 11-30-2009, “Afghanistan Is Still Worth the Fight,” Foreign Policy,
The final argument that compels continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is perhaps the most difficult for Obama to make: failure in Afghanistan will have broad and unpredictable implications for the U.S. role in the world. The United States and NATO would suffer a credibility crisis if the Taliban and al Qaeda can claim a full military victory in Afghanistan. On the heels of the disastrous U.S. experience in Iraq, the United States risks appearing feckless, unable to accomplish its highest priority national security objectives and perhaps unable to even define them. Where will its allies be willing to follow the United States next? If NATO is similarly unable to sustain commitment to its first-ever declaration of collective action in defense of a member, how will it respond to other challenges in the future? This is not a question of "saving face"-- the lifespan of al Qaeda and Talibanism will be determined by the perceptions of the region's populations about the strength and righteousness of the militants. In 2001, the Taliban were not just weakened, but discredited. In 2009, will the Taliban be seen as Afghanistan's (and Pakistan's) future? This malaise is likely to hit the United States at home, as well. Americans will grow increasingly skeptical of their ability to act effectively in the world, to deliver aid, to keep a difficult peace. Whatever happens in Afghanistan, U.S. engagement in the unstable corners of our world will remain an essential element of our security and prosperity in the next century. In that context, Afghanistan, beset by extremism, conflict, and poverty remains not only important in its own right, but a critical exemplar of the challenges we must meet in the decades to come.
No risk of the Vietnam scenario – plan undermines hegemony
Shahid R. Siddiqi, co-founded the Asian American Republican Club, 04-26-2009, “Obama’s Options in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Journal,
The sight of the American military giant limping back home, abandoning the much trumpeted war on terror, could signal American withdrawal from the world stage at a time when its monopoly on power is being challenged by other emerging power centres. This would badly compromise Obama’s ability to wield political and military influence in Europe and elsewhere and give Jihadi movements a shot in the arm. President Obama is acutely aware that he cannot allow Afghanistan to become another Vietnam, for then he stands no chance of winning back his office in 2012. He must, therefore, wrap up the war or come close to wrapping it up before the elections to avoid losing to rejuvenated Republicans and being shunned by war weary voters.
Withdrawal would undermine international cooperation – Pakistan proves
Wall Street Journal, 10-01-2009, “U.S. Credibility and Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal,
Mr. Qureshi's arguments carry all the more weight now that Pakistan's army is waging an often bloody struggle to clear areas previously held by the Taliban and their allies. Pakistan has also furnished much of the crucial intelligence needed to kill top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in U.S. drone strikes. But that kind of cooperation will be harder to come by if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and Islamabad feels obliged to protect itself in the near term by striking deals with various jihadist groups, as it has in the past. Pakistanis have long viewed the U.S. through the lens of a relationship that has oscillated between periods of close cooperation—as during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s—and periods of tension and even sanctions—as after Pakistan's test of a nuclear device in 1998. Pakistan's democratic government has taken major risks to increase its assistance to the U.S. against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Mr. Qureshi is warning, in so many words, that a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would make it far more difficult for Pakistan to help against al Qaeda.
AT: Hegemony Advantage – No Impact
Alt cause to collapse – budget deficits
Niall Ferguson, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, March/April 2010, “Complexity and Collapse,” Foreign Affairs, Academic Search Premier
IF EMPIRES are complex systems that sooner or later succumb to sudden and catastrophic malfunctions, rather than cycling sedately from Arcadia to Apogee to Armageddon, what are the implications for the United States today? First, debating the stages of decline may be a waste of time--it is a precipitous and unexpected fall that should most concern policymakers and citizens. Second, most imperial falls are associated with fiscal crises. All the above cases were marked by sharp imbalances between revenues and expenditures, as well as difficulties with financing public debt. Alarm bells should therefore be ringing very loudly, indeed, as the United States contemplates a deficit for 2009 of more than $1.4 trillion--about 11.2 percent of GDP, the biggest deficit in 60 years--and another for 2010 that will not be much smaller. Public debt, meanwhile, is set to more than double in the coming decade, from $5.8 trillion in 2008 to $14.3 trillion in 2019. Within the same timeframe, interest payments on that debt are forecast to leap from eight percent of federal revenues to 17 percent.
Collapse inevitable – multiple warrants
John Gray, formerly School Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics, 09-28-2008, “A shattering moment in America's fall from power,” The Observer,
Outside the US, most people have long accepted that the development of new economies that goes with globalisation will undermine America's central position in the world. They imagined that this would be a change in America's comparative standing, taking place incrementally over several decades or generations. Today, that looks an increasingly unrealistic assumption. Having created the conditions that produced history's biggest bubble, America's political leaders appear unable to grasp the magnitude of the dangers the country now faces. Mired in their rancorous culture wars and squabbling among themselves, they seem oblivious to the fact that American global leadership is fast ebbing away. A new world is coming into being almost unnoticed, where America is only one of several great powers, facing an uncertain future it can no longer shape.
Hegemony doesn’t solve anything
Nina Hachigian, a senior fellow at the California office of the Center for American Progress, and Mone Sutphen, a managing director at Stonebridge International LLC, Autumn 2008, “Strategic Collaboration: How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise,” The Washington Quarterly - Volume 31, Number 4, Autumn 2008, pp. 43-57
When U.S. interests frame the analysis, the benefits that the rise of these powers delivers for the United States become clear. Although the United States will hold predominant power for a long time to come, that power is no longer sufficient to keep Americans safe and prosperous. Primacy has not been the answer to stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, denuclearizing North Korea or Iran, defeating al Qaeda, addressing climate change, or resurrecting global trade. Only with other nations can the United States combat the true threats and best realize new opportunities. This new world is shaped most fundamentally by technology, not ideology. A truly global financial system now allows money, goods, and many people to cross borders nearly seamlessly. China, India, and Russia have embraced capitalism and this system, as the United States urged for many decades. As a result, their economies are now growing, as is their influence. At the same time, technology has empowered nonstate threats, such as terrorists and pathogens. Moreover, small countries such as North Korea are now able to wield the kind of destructive power that once was reserved only for the strongest states. In this new era, the greatest threats to the peace and prosperity that the pivotal powers want and need does not emanate from other strong powers but from these technologically empowered forces of chaos--the rotten fruit of globalization. Order-seeking nation-states must band together to combat these threats.
Negotiations Counterplan – 1NC Shell
Text: The United States federal government should enter into negotiations with the Taliban over whether or not the United States should substantially reduce its military presence in Afghanistan and should only do so if the Taliban agrees to abandon ties with Al-Qaeda.
The counterplan competes – a concession made cannot be used as a bargaining chip
Jagdish Bhagwati, University Professor at Columbia University, January/February 2004, "Don't Cry for Cancún," Foreign Affairs,
In fact, the most likely explanation for the failure of Cancún lies in a multitude of mistakes made by all parties. To begin with, Zoellick and the United States made two clear errors. First, although the most controversial items on the agenda at Cancún were TRIPS and agriculture, the United States made its concession on TRIPS before the conference started. It presumably hoped that the gesture would demonstrate Washington's eagerness to achieve accord at Cancún. But a concession made can no longer be used as a bargaining chip. Countries such as Brazil and South Africa, which had benefited from the TRIPS concession, nonetheless remained tough on agriculture -- to Zoellick's surprise and chagrin.
The Taliban will say yes and the counterplan avoids the terrorism disadvantage
Robert Dreyfuss, investigative journalist, 01-07-2009, “Hey Obama, Don't Let Afghanistan Be Your Quagmire,” The Nation, 't_let_afghanistan_be_your_quagmire/
"We need to recall the reason we went to Afghanistan in the first place," he says. "Our purpose was...to deny the use of Afghan territory to terrorists with global reach. That was and is an attainable objective. It is a limited objective that can be achieved at reasonable cost. We must return to a ruthless focus on this objective. We cannot afford to pursue goals, however worthy, that contradict or undermine it. The reform of Afghan politics, society and mores must wait." Meanwhile, the stage is set. The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan want peace talks with Islamist insurgents and the Taliban. Outside powers, led by Saudi Arabia and quietly supported by Britain and France, are facilitating behind-the-scenes contacts between the Taliban and key Afghan and Pakistani leaders. Neighboring states, including India, Russia and Iran, while hardly enamored of the Taliban, might underwrite a truce. And the possibility of a regional economic pact linking Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India could tie it all together. Al Qaeda, pushed into remote redoubts in Pakistan's mountains, is most certainly still plotting against the United States. But many, perhaps most, of its fair-weather allies on the Islamic right, including the Taliban, might very well be persuaded to make a final break with Osama bin Laden and his like if they can get a better deal, including a share of power in Kabul. Will President Obama seize the moment? Will he have the courage to offer an end to US occupation of Afghanistan if the Taliban-led movement abandons its ties to Al Qaeda?
The impact is nuclear retaliation by the United States
Thomas Barnett, Distinguished Scholar and Author at the Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy, 06-26-2007, “Afghanipakistan: The Ungovernable,” Esquire,
Wild Card: The next 9/11-like attack on American soil -- especially if WMD are involved -- could well trigger the gravest consequences for the Taliban's state-within-a-state. Americans might just countenance a limited nuclear strike in an eye-for-an-eye moment of unleashed fury and frustration. Unthinkable? We did it to Japan under far cooler circumstances but for similar reasons -- namely, a full-scale invasion seemed prohibitively costly in human life. Is nuking Afghanistan advisable? No, nuking is always a bad idea. But rubble, as they say, makes no trouble, and bombing them back to the Stone Age would be a very short trip.
Negotiations Counterplan – Solvency Ext.
The Taliban would say yes to the counterplan
Robert Dreyfuss, investigative journalist, 01-07-2009, “Hey Obama, Don't Let Afghanistan Be Your Quagmire,” The Nation, 't_let_afghanistan_be_your_quagmire/
The opportunity for a dialogue with elements of the Taliban and the possibility of a peace process between Pakistan and India constitute the true exit strategy for the United States in Afghanistan. But to nail down a deal with the insurgents, the United States will have to offer them what they most want, namely, a timetable for the withdrawal of US and NATO forces. "What the insurgents do seem to agree about is that foreigners shouldn't run their country, and that the country should be run according to the principles of Islam," says Chas Freeman.
Taliban would say yes – the US is the real power broker in the region
Federico Manfredi, specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, Winter 2008/2009, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, p. 23-30.
Karzai understands Afghanistan's predicament, and recently offered to "go to any length" to protect Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders if they agree to enter peace talks with the government. Unsurprisingly, the Taliban scorned the offer. Karzai currently is not in a position to initiate serious negotiations. The United States remains the real power broker in Afghanistan, and the Taliban are aware that, for the time being, Washington does not support peace talks and does not intend to withdraw its armed forces. Moreover, the Taliban suspect that Karzai may want to use his conciliatory overture to score political points ahead of the 2009 presidential elections. Given these premises, the Taliban have no reason to talk to Karzai. No meaningful peace talks can take place in Afghanistan unless the United States supports the initiative and puts the possibility of a phased withdrawal on the negotiating table. President Obama should talk openly with the Afghan people: the United States has no interest in occupying Afghanistan on a permanent basis. Its main concern is preventing international terrorists from reestablishing safe havens in the region. The United States and its allies would gladly withdraw all combat troops from Afghanistan, one province at a time, as long as the Taliban concomitantly disarm and expel Al Qaeda militants, one province at a time. The United States would also commit not to support any political party in Afghanistan, as long as the Taliban respect the will of the Afghan electorate and accept the fact that the ethnic makeup of the country will inevitably relegate them to minority status in the national legislature. Under these conditions, the United States would continue to support the consolidation of Afghanistan's democratic institutions and would also offer American aid to farmers who switch from poppy cultivation to legal crops. Of course, these objectives are not easy to achieve. But this would be the most reasonable path to pursue, and perhaps the only one that could reverse Afghanistan's downward spiral.
Taliban says yes
Federico Manfredi, specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, Winter 2008/2009, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, p. 23-30.
The new American president can still salvage the mission in Afghanistan. It is not too late to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. But the United States and its NATO allies must support the Afghan government in its efforts to engage the moderate faction of the Taliban movement. The concept of a moderate Taliban may sound like an oxymoron to those unfamiliar with Pashtun ways. But Taliban moderates do exist. They are Pashtun nationalists who detest the sight of foreign soldiers in their own communities, but would not dream of pursuing them abroad. The West's only chance of stabilizing Afghanistan rests on its ability to engage the Taliban nationalists, driving a wedge between them and those who support Al Qaeda. If the United States and NATO proposed a timetable for withdrawal, and offer it to the Taliban in exchange for a pledge to gradually disarm and join the political process, the nationalists might accept the offer.
Negotiations Counterplan – Solves Stability
Negotiations key to stability – ensure short-term effectiveness of the surge
Federico Manfredi, specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, Winter 2008/2009, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, p. 23-30.
President Obama should take note: the current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan is not working. It has failed to stabilize the country and to produce a viable government. In addition, the U.S Army and the NATO-led coalition are stirring popular anger and civil strife. Time is running out. NATO is not going to remain in Afghanistan forever, and the United States cannot afford to alienate its closest allies (not to mention the folly of going it alone in another counterinsurgency). Instead, the United States could agree with its NATO allies on a timetable for withdrawal. It could also spur the tentative negotiations between the Karzai government and the nationalist faction of the Taliban movement, and thus avert the impending slide towards another full-blown civil war. Mr. Obama promised that once he is sworn into office he will provide at least two additional combat brigades to support the coalition's efforts in Afghanistan. In the short run, this show of force may increase the coalition's bargaining leverage by proving that the United States is serious about Afghanistan. If accompanied by a commitment to direct peace talks with the Taliban, Obama's move could actually facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict. But unless the United States engages the Taliban, this surge is not going to work. The Taliban are not Al Qaeda--they are Afghans, and they will continue to fight an open-ended war until their country is free from foreign troops.
Counterplan key to stability – key to Pashtun self-determination
Federico Manfredi, specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, Winter 2008/2009, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, p. 23-30.
Pashtun nationalists are primarily concerned with keeping foreign armies out of their communities. They will support Al Qaeda as long as they face a common enemy. But if the West makes it clear that it has no intention of violating Pashtun self-determination, and that its armies would willingly depart from the region if only they--the Pashtun people--agreed to deny a safe haven to Al Qaeda, then the nationalists might decide to shift their alliances. Only Al Qaeda has an interest in pursuing this war. Pashtun traditional communities and the West have no reason to fight one another. In turn, if foreign troops were to withdraw, and if a new national unity government were to take credit for their departure, the pro-Al Qaeda Taliban would find themselves isolated, and it would become extremely difficult for them to recruit Afghan volunteers willing to fight and die for the benefit of a few Arab militants who fled their country in the early stages of the U.S. invasion.
Negotiations are key to stability – allow the Taliban to moderate
Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center at The Atlantic Council of the United States, 03-20-2009, “Six Experts on Negotiating with the Taliban,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Engaging with the Taliban in Afghanistan is certainly a viable option for the United States, since it allows the United States to help isolate the extremist elements from those who feel compelled to join the Taliban insurgency under threat or in return for favors and largesse. Importantly, by showing that it is willing to speak with the "enemy," the engagement could create a more positive view of the United States in local eyes. The United States must also try to separate the mujahadeen commanders, such as the Haqqanis and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from the Taliban of Mullah Omar, since they are potentially rivals for power in Kabul. This may involve use of tribal and Pakistani interlocutors who once worked with these commanders during the jihad against the Soviet Union.
Negotiations Counterplan – Terrorism Ext.
History proves – withdrawal leads to terrorism
Peter Bergen, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, July/August 2009, “Winning the Good War,” Washington Monthly,
Skeptics of Obama’s Afghanistan policy say that the right approach is to either reduce American commitments there or just get out entirely. The short explanation of why this won’t work is that the United States has tried this already—twice. In 1989, after the most successful covert program in the history of the CIA helped to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, the George H. W. Bush administration closed the U.S. embassy in Kabul. The Clinton administration subsequently effectively zeroed out aid to the country, one of the poorest in the world. Out of the chaos of the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s emerged the Taliban, who then gave sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2001, the next Bush administration returned to topple the Taliban, but because of its ideological aversion to nation building it ensured that Afghanistan was the least-resourced per capita reconstruction effort the United States has engaged in since World War II. An indication of how desultory those efforts were was the puny size of the Afghan army, which two years after the fall of the Taliban numbered only 5,000 men, around the same size as the police department of an American city like Houston. We got what we paid for with this on-the-cheap approach: since 2001 the Taliban has reemerged, and fused ideologically and tactically with al-Qaeda. The new Taliban has adopted wholesale al-Qaeda’s Iraq playbook of suicide attacks, IED operations, hostage beheadings, and aggressive video-based information campaigns. (The pre-9/11 Taliban had, of course, banned television.)
Withdrawal would undermine American credibility, encourage terrorism and collapses Pakistan
Frederick Kagan, resident scholar at AEI, Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War, 03-23-2009, “Yes, We Can,” The Weekly Standard,
A victory for the insurgents in Afghanistan would have baleful consequences on many levels. It would, first of all, be a major morale-boost to the terrorists and a devastating blow to American prestige and credibility. The mujahedeen victory over the Red Army led to the rise of al Qaeda and hastened the dissolution of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that al Qaeda would trumpet an insurgent victory in Afghanistan today as the defeat of another superpower by the jihadists. An insurgent victory would also surely lead to the establishment of major terrorist base camps in Afghanistan of the kind that existed prior to September 11, 2001. Finally, an insurgent victory in Afghanistan would significantly undermine the government in Pakistan. Many of the groups fighting in the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan and Pakistan are as eager to topple the government in Islamabad as the one in Kabul, and victory on one side of the border would accelerate their efforts on the other side. Conversely, if the coalition could stabilize Afghanistan, that would provide a major boost to the government of Pakistan in its efforts to police its frontier districts.
Withdrawal would cause terrorism – qualified experts agree
Sylvana Q. Sinha, attorney working in Afghanistan on development projects, 09-14-2009, “President Obama, don’t listen to the public on Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy,
To anyone who has been paying attention to the geopolitics of the region, the consequences of withdrawal of American and NATO troops from Afghanistan would be too dire to bear. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has urged that disengaging from Afghanistan could destabilize Pakistan and even "guarantee" a future attack on the U.S. from the region -- a sentiment that is shared by other regional experts, such as AfPak Channel editor Peter Bergen, who has said, "The United States can neither precipitously withdraw from Afghanistan nor help foster the emergence of a stable Afghan state by doing it on the cheap; the consequences would be the return of the Taliban and al-Qaeda." Likewise, over the weekend, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British foreign secretary's special representative for Afghanistan and a former British ambassador to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Israel, emphasized the crucial role of the U.S. and declared that "walking away would destroy everything that has been achieved. ... The pullout option is not one that any government could responsibly follow."
Negotiations Counterplan – Terrorism Ext.
Even if Al-Qaeda and the Taliban don’t come back, the plan sends a message to terrorists causing attacks
Sylvana Q. Sinha, attorney working in Afghanistan on development projects, 09-14-2009, “President Obama, don’t listen to the public on Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy,
The symbolism of ending our engagement in Afghanistan without concrete results would also send a dangerous message to the rest of the world, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by senior administration officials and other advisors. Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton asserted recently on MSNBC's Meet the Press: "To withdraw our presence or keep it on the low-level limited effectiveness...would have sent a message to al Qaeda and their allies that the US and our allies were willing to leave the field to them." Similarly, former CIA officer and leader of the Obama administration's Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy review Bruce Riedel insisted that the U.S. could not abandon Afghanistan because "the triumph of the jihadism of al Qaeda and the Taliban in driving NATO out of Afghanistan would resonate throughout the Islamic world."
Withdrawal creates a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
J Alexander Their, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 11-30-2009, “Afghanistan Is Still Worth the Fight,” Foreign Policy,
So what does this have to do with Afghanistan? Pakistan's stability is directly affected by Afghanistan's stability. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border (also known as the Durand Line) is 1,600 miles long. For long stretches, it cuts through territory in the Pashtun tribal belt where many of the local residents, and certainly the militants, don't recognize the border at all. Until October 2001, al Qaeda and the Taliban were primarily in Afghanistan, until the U.S. invasion drove them across the border into Pakistan. The failure of Pakistan to deal with those groups then allowed them to metastasize, fomenting the creation of the Pakistani Taliban. If the United States were to leave or cede territory in Afghanistan, these groups would undoubtedly flow back across the border again, providing a sanctuary for Pakistan militants and al Qaeda, just as Pakistan has provided a sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda since 2001.
Afghanistan is key to Al-Qaeda’s operations – withdrawal bolsters the terrorists
J Alexander Their, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 11-30-2009, “Afghanistan Is Still Worth the Fight,” Foreign Policy,
We continue to face a determined and resourceful enemy that sees this conflict in cosmic terms. Eight years after the September 11 attacks, top al Qaeda leaders have evaded capture and have managed to plan or at least inspire significant terrorist attacks and numerous other plots in major Western cities. Although the planning, funding, training, and recruiting for future attacks may not necessarily happen only in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, increased operating space for militants in that region will make it easier and more likely. This base remains practically and psychologically important to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was born in the Pashtun belt, and intermarriage and familiarity make this the "home field" -- far more than Somalia or Yemen. The jihads that drove out the "infidel" British and Soviet empires were launched here, and success in driving out the Americans would immeasurably bolster the reputation and fortunes of the militants.
NATO DA – 1NC Shell
NATO is strong now
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University, 10-17-2009, “An Agenda for NATO - Toward a Global Security Web,” Foreign Affairs,
NATO's 60TH anniversary, celebrated in April with pomp and circumstance by the leaders of nearly 30 allied states, generated little public interest. NATO's historical role was treated as a bore. In the opinion-shaping media, there were frequent derisive dismissals and even calls for the termination of the alliance as a dysfunctional geostrategic irrelevance. Russian spokespeople mocked it as a Cold War relic. Even France's decision to return to full participation in NATO's integrated military structures--after more than 40 years of abstention--aroused relatively little positive commentary. Yet France's actions spoke louder than words. A state with a proud sense of its universal vocation sensed something about NATO--not the NATO of the Cold War but the NATO of the twenty-first century--that made it rejoin the world's most important military alliance at a time of far-reaching changes in the world's security dynamics. France's action underlined NATO's vital political role as a regional alliance with growing global potential.
Abandoning Afghanistan would undermine the NATO alliance
Andrew Imbrie, BASIC, 03-25-2008, “NATO and the Afghan Insurgency: Looking ahead to Bucharest,” BASIC,
Setting a new course for Afghanistan will undoubtedly prove difficult, particularly in light of domestic opposition in many NATO countries. With death tolls rising and success elusive, Afghanistan has put enormous pressure on European governments to withdraw their troops or redeploy to concentrate on less risky tasks. Leaders in NATO countries must resist this temptation and reiterate to their publics the importance of the Afghanistan mission for the safety and security of the Euro-Atlantic community. Failure would pave the way for the Taliban’s return, provide al-Qaeda with safe haven, sow instability in Pakistan, and undermine the credibility of NATO as an expeditionary alliance. The international community abandoned Afghanistan once before. We must not let the temptations of political expediency allow us to do it again.
NATO is key to prevent nuclear use – prevents poor perceptions of the US
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University, 10-17-2009, “An Agenda for NATO - Toward a Global Security Web,” Foreign Affairs,
Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons - and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country’s political stability. These changes together reflect the waning of the post–World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power. Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The combination of Washington’s arrogant unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Islamophobic sloganeering weakened the unity of NATO and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally.
NATO DA – Links
Withdrawal undermines the NATO alliance
The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2009, “NATO's Survival Depends on Afghanistan,” Council of American Ambassadors,
Fourth, the European public is disconnected from the reality that the failure to deal with the al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan could destroy the historic transatlantic Alliance that helped prevent World War III. A recent poll showed that 58 percent of Europeans see NATO as being essential for security, but only seven percent support sending more troops to Afghanistan. The same poll showed that American support for closer transatlantic ties has dropped dramatically since 2004. Europeans must be convinced that without greater burden sharing in Afghanistan, the future of NATO is in doubt. As President Obama's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, has said, "Afghanistan represents the ultimate test for NATO." President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has also written that a NATO pullout from Afghanistan "would undermine NATO's credibility." This would be reminiscent of when the Vietnam failure undermined America's actions on the inter-national stage for decades. Such a development would undercut Europe by hastening the transfer of global power to Asia.
Withdrawal undermines NATO credibility
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University, 10-17-2009, “An Agenda for NATO - Toward a Global Security Web,” Foreign Affairs,
Theoretically, it is of course possible that NATO at some point will conclude (and some of its members privately talk as if they have already done so) that the effort in Afghanistan is not worth the cost. Individual allies could quietly withdraw, salving their consciences by urging that NATO issue a grave warning of its collective intent to strike back from a distance if al Qaeda uses either Afghanistan or Pakistan as a base for launching new attacks against targets in North America or Europe. However, a NATO pullout, even if not formally declared, would be viewed worldwide as a repetition of the earlier Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. It would almost certainly prompt bitter transatlantic recriminations, would undermine NATO’s credibility, and could allow Taliban extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to gain control over more than 200 million people and a nuclear arsenal.
Withdrawal kills the credibility of NATO
Łukasz Kulesa, Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2008, “ISAF Operation in Afghanistan and the Future of NATO – Time for Change,” Polish Institute of International Affairs, .../ISAF-Operation-in-Afghanistan-and-the-Future-of- NATO/
If the situation is not changed, in the next two or three years some of the ISAF’s most active participants might again use the threat of a de facto withdrawal from the operation, although such a move would likely be drafted in the face-saving language of a plan to shift to a ‘civilian presence’ in Afghanistan. If not persuaded to reverse their decision by offers of reinforcements, the governments of those countries would have no choice but to carry out the process of withdrawal. Such withdrawal(s) would probably not result in the breakdown of the ISAF mission, but its credibility, and the credibility of NATO as such would be seriously undermined. The void left by the pullout of major contingents (e.g. Canadian or Dutch) would need to be filled by the United States, as other remaining ISAF members are able to increase the number of their troops only modestly. Those who stay could also face a difficult situation at home, with opposition parties and public opinion demanding an explanation on the decision to stay in Afghanistan while other Allies are departing from the theater.
NATO DA – Afghanistan Key
Afghanistan is key – success is key to American perceptions of NATO
The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2009, “NATO's Survival Depends on Afghanistan,” Council of American Ambassadors,
Fortunately, dramatic leadership on both sides of the Atlantic can remobilize the most successful Alliance in human history. Members of Congress should tell their European counterparts that if NATO fails in Afghanistan, it will be increasingly difficult to convince Americans of the need for NATO.
Afghanistan is key to NATO – multiple warrants
SANA News, 04-05-2009, “Afghanistan likely to be Nato’s downfall,” South Asian News Agency,
As Afghanistan goes, so goes Nato. Interviews across the US foreign policy establishment reveal a unified belief that the authority of the transatlantic alliance will be won or lost in the Afghan war. Military issues rarely transcend ideological divisions within the US diplomatic class. Yet stateside, it’s now more than rhetoric to define Afghanistan as Nato’s existential test. There is an emerging US consensus that if Europe does not reverse itself and significantly reinvest in the war effort, the transatlantic military treaty will cease to matter. “Nato’s credibility is on the line,” said Sandy Berger, who served as national security adviser during the Clinton administration. “Nato needs to succeed in Afghanistan,” Berger added in an interview. “If it doesn’t, it really does undermine the vitality of the alliance.” Or as John Bolton put it: “Ironically, the risk here is that Afghanistan looked like the future of Nato. It could become its graveyard.” A former US ambassador to the United Nations for George Bush, Bolton added that, “It’s in our interest to keep Nato viable. But it’s not in our interest to keep Nato viable at any cost.”
Afghanistan is the key to NATO – failure causes a power shift to Asia
David Abshire, president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 12-17-2009, “In Afghanistan, NATO is fighting for its life,” Christian Science Monitor,
6. A reform effort disconnected from the current political reality. Many are complacently looking to the “strategic concept” exercise led by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to address NATO’s problems. This important restructuring will redefine NATO’s future role and missions. However it won’t report until 2011, which means its time clock is completely disconnected from the fast-ticking political time clock on Afghanistan. Alliance members must understand that the future envisioned by the strategic concept will never come into being if there is a breakdown over Afghanistan. European allies must step up In the United States, there is a growing perception that our European allies are becoming security consumers and not security providers. Waiting for the release of the strategic concept will undermine any immediate reform. Failure in Afghanistan will break the transatlantic alliance, hastening the rise of “the Pacific century” and the inevitable shift of US attention toward Asia.
CMR DA Links
Plan would upset the military – Obama campaigned in support of the Afghan war
Kori Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution and Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the US Military Academy, 09-04-2009, “So far so good for civil-military relations under Obama,” Foreign Policy,
Senator Feingold has argued in the Wall Street Journal that our mission in Afghanistan is undermining American national security. That's a serious charge, and he makes a defensible case for redirecting toward a level of engagement more proportionate to the terrorist threat, with a "focused military mission," increased pressure on the Karzai government to govern well, and a flexible timeline for withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan. In short, Feingold argues for doing in Afghanistan what the Obama administration has done in Iraq. Crucial to Feingold's argument is that the Afghan people resent our military involvement. Both McChrystal, and now Gates, are persuaded that is not true. They argue that how we operate in Afghanistan will determine Afghan support to a much greater degree than the size of the force. Gates for the first time yesterday signaled his support for further force increases on that basis, indicating he will not be a political firewall for the White House if McChrystal and Mullen advocate politically uncomfortable increases. Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary.
Removal of troops would undermine CMR – it’s the key issue
International Affairs Review, 03-07-2010, “COUNTERPOINT: When Questioning the U.S. Military is Wrong,”
Dr. Griffith argues that the politicization of the Afghanistan debate “damaged civil-military relations and in the long-run may have done more harm to the men and women in uniform than any delay”. The biggest threat to long-term civil-military relations is failure in Afghanistan linked to inadequate troop levels. Make no mistake, if the U.S. mission in Afghanistan fails during the Obama administration, it will do serious damage to the American military establishment and will severely undermine military trust in the Executive branch. There will be some portion of the most experienced, who have served multiple combat-tours, both officers and non-commissioned officers, who will resign from the military, unwilling to obey the orders of a President that ignores their informed advice and is viewed as wasting the blood sacrifices of friends and colleagues. The loss of that combat experience will undermine the national military strength at a time of growing threats from China, Iran, and others. There will also be a chasm of distrust and resentment between the military and the Executive that will take many years to bridge. These are the possible results of inadequate forces in Afghanistan. A failure caused by chronic doubt of the military, leading the President to ignore the careful analysis of a man with infinitely more experience, and relying instead on his own inexperience to form a judgment, All for the cost of two brigades.
Plan undermines CMR
Donald Douglas, Right Wing News columnist, 09-26-2009, “Success Matters: Public Opinion and the War in Afghanistan,” Right Wing News,
As noted by Gallup, the military wants more troops, and there's been speculation that the Obama administration is facing a crisis of civil-military relations over appropriate troop levels in Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal has asked from more troops and has stated that the U.S. will lose the war without them (and there's speculation that McChrystal will resign if the administration refuses to provide the necessary resources). This morning's papers report on the meeting Friday at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. See, the Wall Street Journal, "Afghan Troop Request Simmers," and the Washington Post, "U.S. Military Leaders Discuss Troop Needs for Afghanistan."
Politics DA Links – Plan Popular
Plan is popular with the public
Robert Naiman, Policy director of Just Foreing Policy, 09-15-2009, “Withdraw from Afghanistan with a Public, Negotiated Timetable,” Huffington Post,
Recent public opinion polls clearly indicate that the American public no longer supports the U.S. war in Afghanistan. When Americans are asked about sending more troops, as General McChrystal is expected to soon propose, the response is even more lopsided opposition. If General McChrystal says he needs more troops to accomplish the mission he has been assigned, and we aren't willing to send more troops, that suggests that the mission needs to change to one that can be accomplished with the number of troops that we are willing to send. If there is no worthwhile mission that can be accomplished with the troops that we are willing to send, then our troops should be withdrawn. I'm a firm believer in the idea that the United States should promote democracy by setting a good example. If the majority of Americans don't support the war, the U.S. prosecution of the war should not continue indefinitely. Some may say that such important decisions can't be made according to the vagaries of public opinion polls. But in a democracy, the most important decisions are the ones most important to be decided democratically. Moreover, on questions of war and peace, past experience indicates that public opinion is not very volatile in its overall direction. Once the American public has turned against a war, they are usually done with it for good.
The public opposes the US occupation of Afghanistan
Kenneth Theisen, Steering committee member of World Can’t Wait, 10-01-2009, “Commentary: The United States Must Withdraw from Afghanistan,” The Berkeley Daily Planet,
U.S. leaders are continuing a war that is now opposed by a majority of the American public. A CNN/Opinion Research Corporation survey released on Sept. 1 indicated that 57 percent of Americans questioned stated they oppose the Afghan war. The percentage in opposition to the war is the highest ever in CNN polling since the war began.
Continued military presence will undermine Obama’s agenda – it’s a key issue
John Ibbitson, Ottawa Bureau Chief for The Globe and Mail, 03-28-2009, “Obama now owns Afghan war and will be judged by it,” Globe and Mail,
For now, that is. If the war drags on throughout his first term with no visible improvement, if the Pakistani government proves unable or unwilling to root out the Taliban on its western frontier, if the Afghan army and Afghan government remain hopelessly inadequate to the task of protecting and running the country, if America's NATO allies, including Canada, decide that, now that this is a mostly American show, they can withdraw their troops and financial support - if, in other words Afghanistan goes south, then support for the war will collapse and Mr. Obama will face rebellion, starting from within his own Democratic caucus. Already, a group of 15 left-wing Democratic and anti-war Republican representatives have banded together to oppose the war. "A troop surge is not the answer," said Democratic congressman Dennis Kucinich, who ran unsuccessfully against Mr. Obama for his party's presidential nomination. "Afghan citizens and families do not need more destruction and violence. They need homes, jobs and education. They need security, the rule of law and opportunity. "And a continued U.S. occupation and, even worse, an escalation is not going to provide that for them," he said. If that sentiment spreads, it could imperil Mr. Obama's presidency, as Korea undermined Harry Truman's second term, Vietnam destroyed Lyndon Johnson's administration and Iraq made George W. Bush one of America's most unpopular presidents. Mr. Obama now owns this war. The American people and the world will judge him on how he runs it.
Politics DA Links – Plan Unpopular
Plan is unpopular – House votes prove
Jeff Smith, 03-12-2010, “US House of Representatives Votes Against Resolution to Withdraw Troops from Afghanistan,” Grand Rapids Institute for Information Democracy,
On Wednesday, the US House of Representatives had the first debate on the US Occupation of Afghanistan since they passed a resolution in 2001 giving then President Bush authorization to send troops. Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich introduced House Resolution 248, “directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.” The resolution was overwhelmingly defeated with of vote of 356 against the resolution and 65 in favor. Congressman Vern Ehlers voted against the resolution, as did most Michigan Representatives. The only Michigan member of the house who voted for the resolution was Bart Stupak. However, there were three Michigan Congressmen who did not vote; Conyers, Camp and Hoekstra.
The plan would be unpopular – there is bipartisan support for the Afghanistan war
Federico Manfredi, specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, Winter 2008/2009, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, p. 23-30.
A new U.S. president is about to inherit the deepening crisis in Afghanistan. As the war enters its eighth year, the United States is striving to regain momentum, increasing troop levels, and stepping up military operations to subdue a resurgent Taliban movement and stabilize the floundering Afghan government. These efforts enjoy solid bipartisan support. Indeed, the general consensus in Washington is that the war in Afghanistan remains a legitimate cause that is crucial to the U.S. national interest—a “good war” well worth a reinvigorated commitment. However, President Barack Obama should rethink the conventional wisdom. While the invasion of Afghanistan made sense in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the current nation-building-cum-counterinsurgency enterprise is an unnecessary burden that the United States can and should abandon.
There is strong opposition to the plan
Nicholas Zifcak, Epoch Times Staff, 03-11-2010, “Congress Rejects Early Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Epoch Times,
A resolution to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan within 30 days failed Wednesday in Congress. Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) sparked a debate on the issue when he introduced the resolution, which was cosponsored by 21 others. The nonbinding resolution failed with 356 voting against and 65 voting for. The debate was an opportunity to explore members’ views on the issue separately from discussion about spending or appropriations legislation.
The plan would be massively unpopular
Stephen Dinan, staff writer, 03-11-2010, “Bipartisan blowout blocks Afghanistan withdrawal,” Washington Times,
In an overwhelming show of bipartisan support for President Obama's surge in Afghanistan, the House on Wednesday soundly defeated a resolution setting a timetable for withdrawal. The vote, which marked the first time the House has had a full debate on Afghanistan since Mr. Obama announced his surge last year, unleashed years of pent-up frustration from liberal Democrats and a few conservative Republicans angry over the direction the nine-year-old conflict has taken. But the 356-65 vote against withdrawal was a dominant endorsement to give Mr. Obama the time he's asked for to stabilize the troubled nation.
***Iraq Militarism Neg***
“Withdrawal” Is Not The Same As “Reduce”
Force Reductions Are Distinct From Withdrawal
BBC News, September 6, 2009, “US 'must reduce presence in Iraq',” 6982732.stm
The panel's head, Gen James Jones, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "The force footprint should be adjusted in our view to represent an expeditionary capability and to combat a permanent-force image of today's presence. “Significant reductions, consolidations and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent... This will make an eventual departure much easier.”
In The Context Of Iraq, Withdrawal And Reduce Are Distinct
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, p. 30.
Finally, it is worth also considering the potential implications of this phenomenon for Afghanistan. The U.S.-led NATO forces are far from achieving in Afghanistan what the United States has accomplished in Iraq. If the United States, however, succeeds in achieving in Afghanistan what it did in Iraq, Kabul will most likely evince the same problematic civil-military relations that Baghdad is now confronting—and which has destroyed so many other nascent governments in the past. If so, the president’s notional timetable to begin withdrawal in June 2011 will have to be implemented as a reduction in U.S. troops, but by no means a complete withdrawal. Like Iraq, Afghanistan will require roughly 50,000 U.S. combat troops, probably rebadged as advisors, for many more years before it is able to stand on its feet.
Reduce Means To Decrease Quantitatively And Qualitatively
Words and Phrases, 2002, “Reduce,” Vol. 36B, p. 80.
The word “reduce” is its ordinary signification does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state. Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363
Withdraw Means To Pull Back Completely
WordNet, 2010, “Withdraw,”
(v) withdraw, retreat, pull away, draw back, recede, pull back, retire, move back (pull back or move away or backward) "The enemy withdrew"; "The limo pulled away from the curb"
Withdrawing Troops Means To Call Them Back
, 2010, “Withdraw,”
verb (used with object). 1. to draw back, away, or aside; take back; remove: She withdrew her hand from his. He withdrew his savings from the bank. 2. to retract or recall: to withdraw an untrue charge.
Withdrawing Troops Is Distinct From Ending Force Operations
Radio Free Europe, March 03, 2010, “U.S. Says Plans To Withdraw Troops From Iraq On Track,”
The Pentagon says it would consider slowing down its troop withdrawal from Iraq only if security there became "extraordinarily dire." The Pentagon comment came after 33 people were killed in suicide bombings in the Iraqi city of Baquba. The United States is now scheduled to end combat operations in Iraq by August, and withdraw troop levels to 50,000 by the end of that month.
Details Of Withdrawal Plans Are Key
The Particulars Of Withdraw Must Be Part Of The Discussion
George McGovern, former U.S. Senator from South Dakota and Jim McGovern, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts 3d Congressional District, June 6, 2005, “Withdraw from Iraq,” Boston Globe,
One thing, however, is clear: Washington cannot determine Iraq's destiny. It doesn't matter how many times Condoleezza Rice or Donald Rumsfeld visit. It doesn't matter how many soldiers we deploy. The myriad factions in Iraq themselves must display the political will to demand a system of government that respects the diversity that exists in their country. There are no easy answers in Iraq. But we are convinced that the United States should now set a dramatically different course -- one that anticipates US military withdrawal sooner rather than later. We should begin the discussions now as to how we can bring our troops home.
A Strict Timeline Incentivizes Moderates To Compromise, Adding Stability
Brett H. McGurk, International Affairs Fellow in Residence, Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2010, “Iraq: Struggling Through 'Highest Risk' Window,” %2Fregion%2F405%2Firaq
Indeed, there is a questionable assumption underlying the August timeline: that by withdrawing on a timeline we will "incentivize" the Iraqis to come together and settle their differences. There is no empirical evidence to support that assumption, and the precise opposite is probably truer: To convince moderates to make bold compromises, they must believe the United States will stick around. We know the argument, for example, that Iranians make to Shia parties when trying to convince them to act against our interests: "The Americans are leaving; we will be here forever--so why make your bed with them?" In short, nothing in Iraq gets easier if we are perceived as heading for the exits without regard to conditions on the ground or the wishes of Iraqi leaders. U.S. policies that reinforce that perception may well make the situation far more precarious.
Withdrawal Under A Clear Timetable Secures Military Readiness And Undermines Terrorists
Brian Katulis, director of democracy and public diplomacy at the Center for American Progress, March 19, 2006, “America in Iraq Three years later,” Center for American Progress, 03/b1493605.html
One effective way to get all sides to make a deal is to say we're going to leave Iraq -- and set a timetable for doing so. Such a plan has three other major advantages. It will take the strain off our ground forces, which have been pushed to the breaking point. It will allow the United States to redeploy many of the troops stationed in Iraq to long-neglected hot spots in the war on terror. And it will deprive terrorists worldwide of a rallying cry against the United States, which they have portrayed as an occupation force in a Muslim-majority country.
Withdrawal Should Be Tied To A Strong Iraq
We should withdraw as soon as possible, but not now. Withdrawal without success destroys u.s. Global leadership
Awadh Albadi, Research Director at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, October 12, 2006, “The third way out,” Middle East Roundtable, No. 38 Volume 4, bitterlemons-,
There can only be one answer to the question of whether the United States should withdraw from Iraq: a loud and clear yes and as soon as possible. This illegitimate war on Iraq and its consequent occupation should never have happened. The good news in this regard is that the call for a pullout is now not only a popular demand in Iraq and the Arab and Islamic world but also in the United States itself, according to public opinion polls. The failure of this war has now become apparent to everyone except the American administration. Any delay in dealing with this failure can only lead to the bloodshed of more innocent Iraqis and Americans. But the option of a quick and sudden pullout without first properly organizing conditions in Iraq may not be realistic. It will not be easy for the US to admit to its failure and immediately withdraw or flee after all it has endured in the past three years in terms of the human, financial, political and moral costs that such an admission would have at international and regional levels. This is particularly true in terms of the United States' credibility and international trust in its foreign policies, because an immediate pull-out would be seen as a military and political defeat of no less a magnitude than the Vietnam war. It would also be seen as a victory for America's enemies. This is a real fear that has persuaded the American administration to resist that option.
The war is not over! Withdrawing now causes new civil war
Stephen Biddle, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy February 5, 2010, “Unfinished Business in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Many Westerners now see Iraq as a solved problem. Conditions may be imperfect, it is thought, but the war is over, the country's fate is now in Iraqi hands, and the only job left for foreign forces there is to leave, in good order and as quickly as possible. This view is premature, however. Iraq is indeed far less violent than it was. But it is too early to judge this a permanent success. To leave Iraq to its own devices now is to court a serious risk that the country could slide back to the open warfare of 2007 or worse - with serious consequences for Westerners as well as Iraqis.
We Should Tie Withdrawal To Stronger Security Forces
Awadh Albadi, Research Director at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, October 12, 2006, “The third way out,” Middle East Roundtable, No. 38 Volume 4, bitterlemons-,
A practical withdrawal plan should be associated with the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi authorities. A plan has actually been agreed upon to gradually turn over security responsibility from the coalition forces to the Iraqi government. Security responsibility has already been transferred in two of the southern provinces, Muthana and Thi Qar, where coalition forces have pulled out of the cities and redeployed. As more Iraqi security forces are qualified they will take over security responsibility in additional provinces, thereby relieving more coalition forces, which will be pulled out. It is anticipated that the year 2007 will witness the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi authorities in at least the three provinces of the Kurdistan region and the remaining seven southern provinces. This will relieve significant numbers of troops and thus may be associated with a major US force reduction.
Vietnam Is A Poor Comparison To Iraq
Iraq is not vietnam. Global oil and terrorism is at stake
James Phillips, a research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, February 29, 2008, “Online Debate: When Should the U.S. Withdraw From Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations,
While Iraq is not Germany or Japan, neither is it Vietnam. It has much greater geopolitical importance due to its political weight in the Arab world and strategic location in the Persian Gulf, the center of gravity of world oil production. Instability in Iraq could easily spill over to disrupt oil exports from other gulf states, imposing significant long term economic costs on oil importers. Unlike Vietnam, Iraq would export suicide bombers, not boat people. Unlike the Vietnamese communists, al-Qaeda has global ambitions, not merely regional goals.
Their Vietnam Analogy Is Backwards
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, pp. 26-27.
Still, not all of the history suggests that a rapid withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq would be disastrous. An example that suggests greater confidence is furnished, ironically, by the Vietnam War during 1968—1972. Mistaken popular perceptions notwithstanding, the U.S.-led COIN campaign had largely succeeded in South Vietnam by 1972. The country was stable, albeit hardly democratic, the Viet Cong had been effectively defeated, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was increasingly demonstrating its ability to maintain the status quo with little more than material and advisory assistance from the United States. Even when North Vietnam shifted to conventional military invasions of the south (largely because the Viet Cong had been emasculated), the contribution of U.S. air power alone was adequate to allow the ARVN to hold its own. In the words of the renowned British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson, by December 1972 ‘‘you [Americans] had won the war: It was over!’’ Notably, all of this came about during the period 1968—1972, when General Creighton Abrams conducted a superb COIN campaign, one that has served as a model for General David Petraeus’s strategy in Iraq. Not only did Abrams succeed where his predecessors failed, but he did so while dramatically drawing down U.S. forces in Vietnam from the peak of 543,000 in 1969 to just 49,000 by 1972. This reduction in the number of troops did not, in itself, produce new instability in South Vietnam or the collapse of its government. Instead, what ultimately brought about the fall of Saigon was the U.S. decision to end military aid and combat support to South Vietnam following the Paris Accords in 1973. This enabled the North to conquer the South by mounting a conventional invasion in 1975. Thus, the Vietnam case suggests a potentially optimistic scenario for Iraq, and possibly Afghanistan, in which a similar (in fact, somewhat slower) drawdown in U.S. troops from a high of 160,000 in 2007 to a projected 35,000—50,000 in late 2010 may not necessarily result in any attenuation of Iraq’s stability gains.
Vietnam analogies are misapplied to iraq. History is on our side
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, p. 27.
The United States, however, needs to be careful with the Vietnam analogy. It rarely fits with Iraq. It is worth emphasizing a general problem with applying any ‘‘lessons’’ of counterinsurgency to the situation in Iraq, especially because Iraq was only partly a problem of insurgency. While it is true that there was a violent insurgency emanating largely from the Sunni Arab segments of Iraq’s population, this insurgency was only an exacerbating factor of Iraq’s other grave problems. Iraq also suffered from being a failed state that experienced a Congo-, Lebanon-, and Yugoslav-style ethno-sectarian civil war triggered by the breakdown of the central government and the ensuing power vacuum, both aggravated by the many failures of the United States.
Occupation Degrades US Imperialism/Hegemony
Their ciritical reflection and withdrawal only feeds u.s. Imperialism because we can claim success in iraq
Awadh Albadi, Research Director at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, October 12, 2006, “The third way out,” Middle East Roundtable, No. 38 Volume 4, bitterlemons-,
The regional pax-Americana will not be achieved by the occupation of Iraq. It is now an even more distant vision than it was before the war. Hence, the withdrawal from Iraq should be an opportunity to review the ideas and policies that got the United States into this historic mess, and an opportunity for the US to review policies that are at the root of much of the instability in this region, especially its policies regarding the Arab-Israel conflict and the case of Palestine. Reviewing these policies, combined with a sensible end to the occupation of Iraq, can create a regional environment that would allow Washington to achieve its declared goals for the war on terror and secure its long-term strategic interests. This can happen without resorting to force, issuing threats or setting up military bases in the region, but rather by taking into consideration the interests and aspirations of its peoples.
A quick withdraw from iraq will enhance u.s. Credibility
William E. Odom, Retired Army General October 3, 2005, “What's Wrong With Cutting and Running?,”
On credibility. If we were Russia or some other insecure nation, we might have to worry about credibility. A hyperpower need not worry about credibility. That's one of the great advantages of being a hyperpower: When we have made a big strategic mistake, we can reverse it. And it may even enhance our credibility. Staying there damages our credibility more than leaving. Ask the president if he really worries about U.S. credibility. Or, what will happen to our credibility if the course he is pursuing proves to be a major strategic disaster? Would it not be better for our long-term credibility to withdraw earlier than later in this event?
Continued occupation degrades u.s. Global leadership
George McGovern, former U.S. Senator from South Dakota and Jim McGovern, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts 3d Congressional District, June 6, 2005, “Withdraw from Iraq,” Boston Globe,
Our continuing presence in Iraq feeds the insurgency and gives the insurgents a certain legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. We know from our own history that armies of occupation are seldom welcome. There have been elections in Iraq, and yet it remains unclear whether the different political, ethnic, and religious factions want to work together. One thing, however, is clear: Washington cannot determine Iraq's destiny. It doesn't matter how many times Condoleezza Rice or Donald Rumsfeld visit. It doesn't matter how many soldiers we deploy. The myriad factions in Iraq themselves must display the political will to demand a system of government that respects the diversity that exists in their country.
Reductions In Iraq Will Get Redployed To Afghanistan
Bill Van Auken, staff writer, February 26, 2009, “Obama’s Iraq withdrawal plan sets stage for continued war,” Global Research,
In an important tactical change, it has opted for its own surge in Afghanistan, having announced the decision to send an additional 17,000 troops to combat the insurgency in that country. This deployment is seen as only the first installment on what will be a major escalation. The drawing down of US forces in Iraq is being driven in no small measure by the ratcheting up of the US intervention in Afghanistan. Two of the brigades that are being sent to Afghanistan had previously been slated for deployment in Iraq.
Occupation Degrades US Imperialism/Hegemony
Continued occupation would cripple the military-industrial complex and u.s. Global reputation
Raed Jarrar, Iraqi-born political analyst and a Senior Fellow with Peace Action, April 10, 2010, “Iraq: Seven Years of Occupation,”
While the Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan based on the mantra "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down," the withdrawal doctrine under Obama has been time-based, not linked to conditions on the ground. The main problem with a condition-based withdrawal plans is that it creates an equation where deteriorating conditions lead to an extension of the military occupation. Unfortunately, many groups would like to see the US occupation of Iraq continue. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe the occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United States by keeping it engaged in a conflict that is taking an enormous toll on human lives, money and global reputation. And still others, such as Iran and other regional players, fear the re-emergence of a strong independent and united Iraq that would change the power balance in the Middle East.
Staying in iraq tanks u.s. Diplomatic capital
Juan Cole, President of the Global Americana Institute, December 19, 2008, “Top 10 Reasons Obama Should Resist Military Plans for American Bases in Iraq,” Informed Comment,
The US military cannot stay in Iraq against the will of the elected government. Those who doubt this principle should look at what happened two decades ago in the Philippines. Or consider Uzbekistan's withdrawal of permission for US to use its bases, in 2005. The diplomatic cost of staying against a country's will is generally too high for Washington to take that risk. Gates can wish for a change of heart on the part of the Iraqi government, but it is highly unlikely to happen.
Democrats Will Push For Redeployment
BBC News, September 6, 2009, “US 'must reduce presence in Iraq',” 6982732.stm
The panel's head, Gen James Jones, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "The force footprint should be adjusted in our view to represent an expeditionary capability and to combat a permanent-force image of today's presence. “Significant reductions, consolidations and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent... This will make an eventual departure much easier.” Democrats welcomed the call for a reduction of presence as supporting their plans for US redeployment. But Gen Jones did not back their call for a deadline on US troop withdrawal.
U.s. Occupation fuels international resentment and degrades u.s. Influence
Matthew Duss, Research Associate at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, April 5, 2010, “Report: Iraq War Undercut U.S. Credibility, Hobbled Democratic Reform,” Huffington Post, matthew-duss/report-iraq-war-undercut_b_525859.html
Even though Iraq continues to endure a level of terrorism that any other country would consider a national crisis, and even though Republican Congressman Dana Rohrbacher acknowledged recently that "everybody I know thinks it was a mistake to go in" to Iraq, you can still find people -- usually people who worked in the Bush administration -- who continue to insist that the war was worth it, and that the decision to invade and occupy and attempt to remake Iraq at a cost of trillions of dollars will be vindicated by history. A recently published RAND study of the regional effects of the Iraq war should (but probably won't, as too many influential people have too much professionally and emotionally invested in the war being seen as a "success") put such claims to rest. The study finds that, in addition to facilitating the rise of Iranian power, undercutting perceptions of U.S. strength and influence, and increasing the profile of other actors like Russia and China, the war has seriously hurt the prospects for political reform in the region: On the domestic front, societal conflict in the broader region resulting from the war has not yet materialized to the extent forecast; rather, state power has strengthened and tolerance of domestic political opposition has decreased.
Militarism Is Justified
Militarism Is Essential To Avoid Extinction
Walter Williams, PhD in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles, August 25, 2004, “The Appeasement Disease,” Capitalism Magazine,
President Bush's foreign-policy critics at home and abroad share characteristics and visions that have previously led to worldwide chaos and untold loss of lives. These people believe that negotiation, appeasement and caving in to the demands of vicious totalitarian leaders can produce good-faith behavior. Their vision not only has a long record of failure but devastating consequences. During the late 1930s, France and Britain hoped that allowing Adolf Hitler to annex Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia would satisfy his territorial ambitions. This was after a long string of German violations of the terms of the Versailles Treaty ending World War I. Appeasement didn't work. It was seen as weakness, and it simply emboldened Hitler. At the Yalta Conference, near the end of World War II, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt thought they could appease Josef Stalin by giving away Eastern Europe and making other concessions that ultimately marked the beginning of the nearly half-century Cold War and Soviet/China expansionism. War-weary Westerners hoped that brutal tyrants would act in good faith. Failing to stand up to Stalin resulted in unspeakable atrocities, enslavement and human suffering. Quite interestingly, Western leftist appeasers exempted communist leaders from the harsh criticism directed toward Hitler, even though communist crimes made Hitler's slaughter of 21 million appear almost amateurish. According to Professor R.J. Rummel's research in "Death by Government," from 1917 until its collapse, the Soviet Union murdered or caused the death of 61 million people, mostly its own citizens. Since 1949, communist China's Mao Zedong regime was responsible for the death of 35 million of its own citizens. History never exactly repeats itself, but the vision of earlier appeasers was part of the West's vision of how to deal with Saddam Hussein. After devastating defeat in the first Gulf War, Iraq agreed to coalition peace terms. After documents were signed, every effort was made by the Iraqis to frustrate implementation of the terms, particularly U.N. weapons inspections. Western appeasers, most notably Europeans, were quite willing to respond to Saddam Hussein's violation of peace terms in a fashion similar to their earlier counterparts' response to Hitler's violation of the peace terms of the Versailles Treaty. Had Britain or France launched a military attack on Germany between 1934 and 1935, when Hitler started his arms buildup in violation of the Versailles Treaty and before he fully developed his military capability, he would have been defeated and at least 50 million lives would have been spared.
Even Though It Is Imperfect, The Alternative To Militarism Is A World Full Of Open Weapons Of Mass Destruction Conflicts
Campbell Craig, chair of International Relations at the University of Southampton, U.K, 2004, “Review
Article; American realism Versus American Imperialism,” World Politics Volume 57.1, pp. 143-171.
If we are to lament American unipolaritv, let us consider real-world alternatives to it. Today, there is onlv one meat power. Neither Russia, the European Union, China, nor any other foreseeable entity is anywhere close to being able to contend with the United States in military terms, and, so far, none of these states or unions appears very interested in even attempting to do so. Because international politics is so heavily dominated by America, a unilateral decision by the United States to relinquish its power in a world in which no other entitv possessed the means to replace it, could usher in an extremely violent and turbulent period in international affairs. What would become of the ginantic American militarv arsenal and force structure? Could it be peacefully dismantled and returned home safely? What would happen in regions of severe political grievance in failed states, in areas of border disputes and national confrontations? Would Pakistan and India keep their fingers of f the nuclear button without a United States to worn about? Would Israel? Power abhors a vacuum, and the largest vacuum in recorded historv would result from a rapid departure by the United States h m international politica1 predominance. As corrupt, brutal, and venal as the Roman Empire became in its dying days, life in the Mediterranean world was not ideal after its fall and that was before the days of weapons of mass destruction.
Pacifism Creaters Even Worse Violence
Laren, Carter, part-time free-lance writer and Producer Advocate, October 4, 2001, “Pacifism Empowers Terrorism.” Capitalism Magazine,
On the day that the United States drops the first bomb in retaliation for the World Trade Center attacks, pacifists are planning to meet at locations in several cities around the country at 5:00 p.m. When they hold-up their "Global peace and unity" signs, remember that their version of "peace" means standing in a circle singing "kum ba yah" while terrorists murder your loved ones. When they shout, "War and racism are not the answer," remember that they are willing to label you "racist" just to promote their demented agenda. When you see a banner proclaiming, "Love is stronger than hate," remember that they are asking you to love a murderer. And when they warn, in their condescending sneers, "Don't turn tragedy into a war," imagine that it is 1939 and you are a Jew in Poland.
Critical Pedagogies Are Failed Approaches
Critical pedagogies embraces anti-politics. Only a counter-education srategy can open up space and avoid dogmatism
Jaime Alanís, doctoral student in educational policy studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, February 2006, “How Much are You Willing to Risk? How Far are You Willing to Go”? Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies, 2006; 6; p. 176
Another set of critiques of critical pedagogy have come from a variety of critics who take issue with the idea of positive utopia or romantic possibilitarian notions in favor of philosophical negativism (negative utopianism) or tactical analysis of gritty materialities (Ellsworth, 1989). Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (2000) argues that if critical pedagogy is to become a nonrepressive theory and practice, it must reassume the negative philosophy of the early Frankfurt School and fundamentally shift its position toward what he refers to as a countereducation. Gur-Ze’ev understands countereducation as grounded in philosophical negativism, which he perceives as a particular stance or sensibility in relation to where and how educators locate themselves (in this case) in the context of the classroom. What Gur-Ze ’ev points out is that countereducation as negative dialectics opens a space that moves beyond “dogmatic idealism” and “vulgar collectivism.” For instance, he suggests that the knowledge of oppressed peoples should not be simply viewed as self-evident but complicated instead.
The mere act of agency fetishizes breaking the silence. This makes dissent a tool of domination
Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, 2005, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, p. 84
But while the silences in discourses of domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, while they are the corridors to be filled with explosive counter tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of breaking silence. It is possible as well that this ostensible tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation—that it converges with unemancipatory tendencies in contemporary culture, establishes regulatory norms, coincides with the disciplinary power of ubiquitous confessional practices; in short, it may feed the powers it meant to starve.
Classrooms Are The Wrong Site For Emancipation
Jaime Alanís, doctoral student in educational policy studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, February 2006, “How Much are You Willing to Risk? How Far are You Willing to Go”? Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies, 2006; 6; pp. 180-181.
Accordingly, schools alone cannot be called on to be the major sites of social transformation. Spending much time on brilliant analysis and impenetrable theorizing about contemporary political and economic disasters will accomplish little without political action. Praxis must somehow be linked to active participation to actual social movements. If social movements do not presently exist, then popular movements of opposition need to be created. The political Right, which has dominated the political agenda in the United States, has to be challenged. For instance, in what ways can progressive educators influence the political process? Perhaps they can form a formidable political action committee to fund candidates who will be sympathetic to their positions (this may be one way, to contest the No Child Left Behind initiative). Or critical educators lobbying, forming solidarity networks with community organizations throughout civil society.
We Have An Ethical Obligation To Stay In Iraq
We caused the current situation in iraq. Even kindergartners know this constitutes an ethical obligation
Jason Lee Steorts, staff writer, July 9, 2007, “The Ethical Case Against Withdrawal from Iraq,” National Review,
This is so, first, because America is the cause of the Iraqi maelstrom. No matter what good — strategic or moral — has come or may yet come from toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, one cannot dispute that our decision to do so, and our subsequent mishandling of the occupation, created the vacuum into which Salafist and Khomeinist extremisms have been drawn, bringing with them an access of barbarity. This obvious fact implies a specific and narrow duty to repair the damage we have done. The average kindergartner could give a perfectly intelligible account of the operative moral principle here: When you make a mess, you clean it up; when you break something, you fix it; etc. The average congressman’s capacity for moral reasoning may well be less developed.
We Have A Moral Obligation To Stay In Iraq To Defeat Al-Qaeda
James Phillips, a research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, February 29, 2008, “Online Debate: When Should the U.S. Withdraw From Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations,
If U.S. troops are yanked out, the hard-won progress in Iraq will rapidly evaporate, al-Qaeda [AQI] will regroup and reinvigorate its efforts to provoke a civil war and transform Iraq into an incubator for jihadist terrorism. Rather than jettisoning our Iraqi allies, the U.S. has a moral obligation and a vital national interest in helping them to defeat our common enemies.
An Ethical Withdrawal Must Satisfy Two Criteria: Governement Stability And Protecting The People
Michael Walzer, professor emeritus of social science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, and Nicolaus Mills, professor of American studies at Sarah Lawrence College, September 25, 2009, “A Just Withdrawal, Our moral obligation to the Iraqis we leave behind,” The New Republic, politics/just-withdrawal
In practice, withdrawal can involve all sorts of difficulties. As in Algeria and Gaza, the occupying power may even have to battle its own colon or settler population, which does not want to depart--putting its own soldiers at risk to produce a decent ending to the occupation. But in all cases, an ethical withdrawal requires an occupying power to adopt two fundamental guidelines: First, make a good-faith effort to leave a stable government behind. Occupiers commonly claim that they are acting for the benefit of the country they are occupying. But even if they can't make good on that claim, they must try to leave the country no worse off than it was before they came. They don't have to, and often can't, establish a liberal or social democracy, but they should aim for a government that is legitimate in the eyes of its own people and that is capable of providing basic services--including law and order. And for the sake of that, they should be willing to offer ongoing financial and technical aid after they leave, even if the country they are leaving is not likely to be a reliable ally in the future. Second, do whatever is possible to safeguard the people most at risk in the country now on its own. Years ago, the philosopher John Rawls argued that distributive justice requires paying close attention to the least well-off people in your society. By analogy, justice in withdrawing requires paying close attention to the safety of the most vulnerable people who remain behind. This clearly wasn't the policy of the French in Algeria or of our own country in Vietnam. Careless exits leave many people at risk, who are killed, like the Algerian Harkis, or forced to flee, like the Vietnamese “boat people.” Departing powers must help such people restart their lives in safety, enabling them to re-establish themselves at home or providing neighboring countries with subsidies to shelter them.
We Have An Ethical Obligation To Stay In Iraq
Their call for withdrawal evades an ethical understanding of politics. Leaving iraq would be disastrous
Michael Walzer, professor emeritus of social science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, and Nicolaus Mills, professor of American studies at Sarah Lawrence College, September 25, 2009, “A Just Withdrawal, Our moral obligation to the Iraqis we leave behind,” The New Republic, politics/just-withdrawal
In the same way that we think of just and unjust wars, we need to think of just and unjust withdrawals. Ethical understanding and historical reflection have too often been the exception rather than the rule when great powers withdraw from the countries they occupied. Nations carefully plan for wars. They mobilize support for them. But typically they rush into withdrawals, which they commonly see as signs of failure. Think, for example, of Great Britain's hasty retreat from India in 1947 and the estimated one million people who died following partition. Occupying powers typically behave as the British did, putting the safety of their own troops and civil servants, and the reputations of their political leaders, before any other considerations. There is good reason to challenge this historical pattern, especially when we think of the stakes in the Middle East today. We need to acknowledge that when one country occupies another, it acquires obligations--and this is true whether the initial occupation was a good idea or a bad one. In either case, social life has been disrupted. Even the displacement of a brutal and repressive regime brings death and destruction in its wake, uproots many people, damages the economy, shuts down schools and hospitals, subjects the local population to foreign rule, if only for a time. When foreigners depart, they must make sure that their departure doesn't produce further disastrous disruptions.
Abandoning Iraq Is Unethical
Lawrence Kaplan, Editor of World Affairs, October 12, 2006, “Absent US forces, Iraq will lurch into greater chaos,” Middle East Roundtable, No. 38 Volume 4, bitterlemons-,
Whatever its political uses, Bush's new argument happens to be true. Yet the moral cost of abandoning a country America has turned inside out seems not to have made the slightest impression on US opinion-makers. To the extent that ethical considerations factor into the debate at all, it's usually in favor of a rapid withdrawal from Iraq. Mostly, though, the debate over leaving has been conducted in the sterile language of geopolitics, credibility, and "misallocated" resources. This heartlessness of the withdrawal argument responds to multiple needs that are largely unrelated to Iraq. It comforts the sensibilities of opinion-makers who have a distaste for this administration's foreign policy and so don't seem to feel much stake in its human consequences. It testifies to the consistency of those who, having opposed sending US forces to Iraq in the first place, see nothing problematic about pulling them out today. And it offers assurance that, but for the bungled US occupation, Iraq can only be better off. No one has espoused this last view more vigorously than Democratic Representative John Murtha. His summary of the situation in Iraq amounts to this: America is the problem.
A Cut-And-Run Strategy Devalues The Sacrifices Troops Made For Freedom
Steve Stephens, staff writer, February 22, 2007, “A Surefire Way to Cause Instability in the Middle East,” Associated Content, id=151144
Pulling our troops out before the Iraqi government is strong enough to assure democracy would be an admission of failure. It would also be a huge injustice to, and dishonor the memories of the courageous men and women who have already paid the ultimate price for the freedom of the Iraqi people. Over three thousand of this country's precious sons and daughters will have died for nothing.
Withdrawal Undermines Democracy
Withdrawal Collapses Iraqi Democracy
A. Zaid, J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, 2007, “(Review) Do We Still Owe Iraq? What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building. By Noah Feldman,” The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy Harvard Law & Policy Review, Vol. 1, p. 294.
Rather than shrinking from this obligation, Feldman makes it clear that he believes American troops will have to stay in Iraq for years to come: “Foreign troops . . . will undoubtedly have to remain in Iraq for some time . . . . The United States should be prepared, if necessary, to intervene in Iraq’s internal affairs to preserve the arrangements that Iraqis themselves have democratically reached” (p. 86). This is a forceful contention, especially since one of the goals of the CPA (and now the U.S. Embassy) was to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the Iraqi government controlled the country. “When things are running suitably smoothly and an international or, better, an Iraqi security force can guarantee the peace, we will be entitled—indeed obligated—to leave” (p. 86). Things in Iraq are not running smoothly—far from it, many Iraqis view their security as depending on the United States’ continued presence—and Feldman’s standard for withdrawal is therefore in conflict with the U.S. goal of demonstrating the Iraqi government’s control.
Peacekeeping Forces Are Essential To Democratic Transition
Steve Stephens, staff writer, February 22, 2007, “A Surefire Way to Cause Instability in the Middle East,” Associated Content, id=151144
The Iraqi people have never enjoyed the freedom of democracy that most Americans take for granted. There is a steep learning curve to overcome, especially for a people with such deep rooted religious differences. It will take time for them to learn to be tolerant of each other and co-exist within the same borders. During this transition, a peace keeping force needs to be in place.
Withdrawal Collapses Democracy And Escalates Rape And Gender Violence
Ryan Mauro, geopolitical analyst of the Northeast Intelligence Network, May 7, 2007, “The Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq,” Global Politician,
Advocates of withdrawal also must be willing to sacrifice the potential for freedom-loving people in the region. Democratic success in Iraq threatens nearby tyrannies and empowers those fighting them. Women who aren’t allowed to drive and are persecuted for showing skin, young girls who are stoned for being raped, homosexuals who are hung for their relationships, student activists who are tortured in jail for criticizing their leader must be looked in the face and be told, “The Americans didn’t feel your plight was a high enough priority. We wish you success in the future, but this superpower won’t be around to help you.”
Iraqi Democracy Is Doomed Regardless Of Withdrawal
Fawaz Gerges, staff writer, March 19, 2010, “Iraq's delayed democracy,” The Guardian,
For the foreseeable future, Iraqi politics will be toxically fragmented along sectarian, ethnic, and personality lines, though fear of all-out civil war is unwarranted. A week after the balloting, prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition and the cross-sectarian Iraqiya coalition, headed by ex-premier Iyad Allawi, were projected to win roughly the same number of seats – about 87 each – in Iraq's 325-member parliament. The Iraqi National Alliance (INA), a grouping of Shia religious parties closely linked to Iran, is set to come a close third with 67 seats, while the powerful main Kurdistan alliance of President Jalal Barzani and Massoud Talabani led as expected in Erbil, the autonomous Kurdish region, with 38. Far from a triumph for democracy, the results threaten to plunge Iraq into a constitutional and leadership vacuum. With Maliki and his main rival, Allawi, falling short of the 163 seats needed to govern alone, they will probably need to ally with one or two blocs to form a coalition government – a complicated negotiating process fraught with security risks and that might last months, putting sectarian leaders back in the driving seat.
Withdrawal Undermines US Leadership
Withdrawal sends a signal of weakness that undermines u.s. Leadership
Steve Stephens, staff writer, February 22, 2007, “A Surefire Way to Cause Instability in the Middle East,” Associated Content, id=151144
Leaving Iraq now, would send the message to the world that this great nation, a supposed economic and military super-power, failed to finish a job that it started. This would also make it clear to the terrorists of the world that they can have their way with Americans, and as long as they can evade us for a time while inflicting huge casualties, the United States will eventually turn tail and run home.
We Should Retain Troops For Training To Maintain Readiness
Harry van der Linden, Butler University, 2009, “Questioning the Resort to U.S. Hegemonic Military Force,”
The recommendations of the recent bipartisan The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach illustrate this last point. What partly motivates the Iraq Study Group to recommend that the “way forward” in Iraq might mean ending U.S. combat in Iraq is its fear that continued U.S. presence might seriously undermine U.S. military hegemony in the long run. Accordingly, the Report proposes in Recommendation 47: “As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to ‘reset’ the force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.” In the same vein, the Report calls for increased funds for equipment renewal and, if necessary, also for recruitment, personnel retention, and the like (recommendations 48 and 49).
Staying In Iraq Is Crucial To Hegemony
Jonathan Foreman, staff writer, March 21, 2006, “Symposium: Iraq,” National review, ,
American successes in combat and in the battle for hearts and minds continue to be undermined by a Pentagon that still doesn't understand the importance of perception and prestige in the Middle East and the Global War on Terror. If we seem to be fearful because of domestic politics, or because our military doctrines emphasize "force protection" over victory, then our enemies will grow stronger, bolder, and more popular. That is why after three years, the stakes in Iraq are higher than ever. Though it is impossible for the insurgents to restore Saddam's Sunni tyranny in Iraq, we could still suffer a self-inflicted defeat that would herald the beginning of the end of America's global hegemony.
Withdrawal Collapses Troop Morale And Fosters Terrorism
Ryan Mauro, geopolitical analyst of the Northeast Intelligence Network, May 7, 2007, “The Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq,” Global Politician,
Senator John McCain, a former POW in Vietnam, said it best this week when he stated that “the only thing worse than a stressed military, is a broken and defeated military.” Withdrawal would mean the complete collapse of morale in the military and a reluctance to support a responsible military budget. Failing to support and fund our military leaves our troops without the armor they need and our political leaders without the option of force in dealing with foreign enemies. Advocates of a withdrawal think it will end the war, but it will not. The disastrous security situation in Iraq will lead to a terrorist sanctuary that the United States will then have to confront. Our uniformed men and women who came home the first time will have to enter again under much harsher and costlier conditions.
Withdrawal Causes Major Regional Conflicts
Iraq is a major flashpoint for violence. U.s. Withdrawal ignites multiple conflicts and renewed terrorism
Stephen Biddle, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy February 5, 2010, “Unfinished Business in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Signs of continuing ethno-sectarian tension are not hard to find in Iraq today. Kirkuk is a potential flashpoint with Kurdish Pesh Merga militia and government soldiers eyeing one another in a nervous standoff; either accident or deliberate provocation could easily spur violence. Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has never really accepted the Sunni SOI movement, and has periodically cracked down on individual faction leaders as opportunity permits, arresting them and disbanding their followers. The Iraqi Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice, led by Shiite Ahmed Chalabi, recently banned 511 mostly Sunni candidates from standing in Iraq's forthcoming Parliamentary campaign, spurring widespread concerns over sectarianism and reinforcing Sunni fears of Shiite intentions. Terrorist bombings, never wholly absent in Iraq, have recently increased in frequency, with Sunni extremists targeting Shiite civilian and government facilities and allied Western interests. None of this has yet reached crisis proportions. But this is a dangerous situation. Where civil war settlements such as Iraq's have held, it is usually because substantial foreign peacekeeping forces combine with active political engagement by outsiders to stabilize a volatile situation. Few would have expected Bosnia or Kosovo, for example, to be able to sustain peace among wary, fearful former combatants without Western troops to keep the peace and Western political intervention to manage disputes. Yet we are now embarked upon a withdrawal process in Iraq that could yield complete removal of all foreign troops by 2011 if current agreements between the United States and the Iraqi government are implemented. This withdrawal schedule would produce a much faster removal of foreign troops from Iraq than ever happened in the Balkans - 16 years after Dayton and 11 years after the Kosovo settlement there are still thousands of foreign peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo today.
Renewed Violence In Iraq Would Spill Over To Destabilize The Entire Region
Stephen Biddle, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy February 5, 2010, “Unfinished Business in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations,
A return to mass violence in Iraq would be a humanitarian disaster for Iraqis - and it would pose serious risks to Western security interests as well. Civil wars often spill over their borders to embroil their neighbors: of the 142 civil wars fought between 1944 and 1999, forty-eight saw major military intervention by the regular armed forces of neighboring states at some point in the fighting. In Lebanon, for example, civil warfare eventually brought Syrian and Israeli state intervention. In Congo, the recent civil war became a region-wide conflagration involving eight foreign state militaries and causing over 5.4 million fatalities to date. Renewed warfare within Iraq's borders would be bad enough; a region-wide war in the heart of the Persian Gulf would be far worse. Such perils are not certainties, but neither can they be excluded. And if we persist in viewing Iraq as a solved problem, the solution could easily unravel.
Decentralized Cease-Fires Make Iraq A Flashpoint For Renewed Violence
Stephen Biddle, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy February 5, 2010, “Unfinished Business in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Renewed sectarian violence remains a serious threat in this environment. Parties to intense ethno-sectarian warfare do not just forget the mass violence of the past overnight. Rarely can they simply live together without fear in the immediate aftermath, and the cease-fires' decentralized nature creates many independent actors and many potential flashpoints for violence among wary and distrustful former combatants.
Withdrawal Causes Genocide
Withdrawal Without Strong Institutions Obliterates The Kurds
Khaled Salih, former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, October 12, 2006, “Stay the course?,” Middle East Roundtable, No. 38 Volume 4, bitterlemons-,
An American withdrawal before Iraq's political, military, security and economic institutions can survive on their own would invite extremist groups to penetrate Iraq's borders and cause more destruction than we have seen. Kurdistan is particularly vulnerable in such a scenario because of its geographic location and in view of the difficulties implied in controlling the region's mountains. If extremist groups managed to survive in Afghanistan, create a rule of horror and extend their influence across continents before they were confronted militarily, Kurdistan can potentially function in the same way for anti-Kurdish, anti-US, anti-western and anti-democratic forces.
U.s. Withdraw would spur a kurdish genocide
Peter Beinart, Associate Professor of Journalism and Political Science at the City University of New York, June 7-June 14, 2004, “Minority Report,” New Republic, p. 6.
It's not hard to understand why. If the United States leaves, the two most likely outcomes are an Iran-style Shia theocracy or a Lebanon-style civil war between ethnic militias. Either one would be disastrous for the Kurds. Iraq's Shia Islamists do not exactly welcome cultural diversity, especially when it is secular, liberal, and non-Arab. The leading Shia parties have never truly accepted the provision in the Transitional Administrative Law guaranteeing Kurdish voters an effective veto over a permanent Iraqi constitution. According to the ABC Poll, only 5 percent of Arabs, compared with 58 percent of Kurds, want a federal political system; 90 percent want to centralize power in Baghdad. If Shia Islamists took power, one of the first things they would likely do is secure control of Kirkuk, the oil-rich city Kurds call their "Jerusalem." Kurds share the city with largely Shia Turkmen and with Arabs, some of whom were given Kurdish land by Saddam. Last August, after fighting between Kurds and Turkmen left a dozen dead, Shia in Baghdad angrily marched on the offices of a Kurdish party. This March, with tensions rising again, fighters from four Shia militias took up positions in Kirkuk. Two thousand members of Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army marched through the streets. To gauge how Sadr's forces might treat Kurds in the event of a U.S. withdrawal and a fight for Kirkuk, consider what they did to another non-Arab minority four months ago in the gypsy town of Qawliya: They burned it to the ground. To be sure, the Kurds have their own militia, the peshmerga. But Shia militias enjoy the backing of Iran; Sunni groups can expect help from Saudi Arabia or Syria. The Kurds, by contrast, have no regional allies. Whether a post-occupation Iraq turned to theocracy or plunged into civil war, Iraq's Shia and Sunni would not let Kurdistan secede--it contains too many Arabs and too much oil. And Iraq's neighbors, particularly Turkey, which has its own restive Kurdish minority, would not either. Some in the withdrawal camp suggest replacing U.S. troops with a U.N. force. But anyone who thinks U.N. peacekeepers can protect Kurds against armed fundamentalist militias should do a Google search with the terms "Rwanda, 1994" or "Srebrenica, 1995." A U.S. withdrawal would mean, in other words, the likely destruction of the decent, liberal society the Kurds have created under U.S. protection for the last 13 years. And that could well leave thousands more dead Kurds on America's conscience. Whatever you think about America's unhappy Iraq adventure, nothing we have so far done--including Abu Ghraib--would be as shameful as that. Before the percentage of Americans advocating withdrawal tops 50 percent, mainstream politicians need to say so.
Withdrawal Abdicates Our Ethical Responsibility, Causing Genocide
Jason Lee Steorts, staff writer, July 9, 2007, “The Ethical Case Against Withdrawal from Iraq,” National Review,
It is ethically irrelevant whether the violence that Saddam’s overthrow unleashed would have happened sooner or later anyway (for example, following an Iraqi coup). This is irrelevant for the same reason that it does not matter, when I burn your house down today, that a lightning strike would have turned it to ash tomorrow. Nor is our responsibility for the state of affairs in Iraq simply absolved if the war was a justified response to an intolerable threat. In no case does the justification of a war indemnify one against all moral considerations, and the relevant considerations at this stage of this war compel us to ask whether it is right for America to midwife a genocide (or, at the very least, to risk doing so).
Withdrawal Causes Genocide
Withdrawal would precipitate genocide in iraq. We have an ethical duty to stay
Jason Lee Steorts, staff writer, July 9, 2007, “The Ethical Case Against Withdrawal from Iraq,” National Review,
Debate over whether America should withdraw from Iraq has turned primarily on strategic questions. But one need not be a utopian — or, more dreaded still, a “Wilsonian” — to see that not all foreign-policy questions are strategic. Almost everyone, conservative or liberal, believes that ethical claims restrict to one degree or another the means by which a government may pursue its foreign-policy ends. (If not, the massive and indiscriminate slaughter of civilians would be morally permissible in the pursuit even of non-vital interests.) There may also be cases — though this is more controversial — in which ethical claims are sufficient in their own right to decide a policy. So it is, I believe, with Iraq. Withdrawal of U.S. forces would in all likelihood be a strategic disaster. But a powerful case can be made that it would also violate a duty America owes Iraq; that the duty alone gives us reason enough to stay; and that conservatives and liberals should be able to agree on this point. As prediction, this warning is highly plausible, given the incipient balkanization of mixed Iraqi neighborhoods and the great profusion of blood let therein. As ethics, the warning rests on an unstated premise that America has an obligation not to abandon Iraq to genocide.
Withdrawal collapses iraq. Neighbors invade and exact revenge causing genocide in kurdistan
Khaled Salih, former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, October 12, 2006, “Stay the course?,” Middle East Roundtable, No. 38 Volume 4, bitterlemons-,
Inevitably, more violent killings would follow as a consequence of haphazardly abandoning the emerging political arrangements based on Iraq's negotiated constitution under US and coalition protection. The idea of a federal, democratic and pluralistic Iraq can hardly survive without long-term American military, political and security commitments. On the contrary, a more likely outcome would be intervention by neighboring countries and terrorist groups to promote their own interests, exact revenge or punish those who sided with the Americans against Saddam Hussein's regime or dared to dream of a better and democratic future. In such circumstances, Kurdistan would pay a much higher price than we can anticipate: not only is the Kurdish leadership seen to be actively supporting redrawing Iraq's political system, but the entire population is viewed as supporting foreign forces, ideas and values.
Millions of iraqis would be slaughtered. Hundreds of thousands of children would die from disease alone
Ryan Mauro, geopolitical analyst of the Northeast Intelligence Network, May 7, 2007, “The Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq,” Global Politician,
There are 25 million Iraqis engaged in the battlefield of Iraq, and hundreds of millions of Arabs and other Muslims whose fate will be decided by Iraq and the region’s future. There can be no more selfish act than to deny the Iraqis, who have fought and died along our side, the security, freedom and optimistic future for their families which we so cherish. Withdrawal would mean watching by as millions of Iraqis were slaughtered by terrorists, insurgents, militias, and neighboring states as each struggles to take the spoils. We would also have to watch as hundreds of thousands of children die from treatable diseases, as any humanitarian effort would fail due to the violence.
Withdrawal Makes Iraq A Failed State
Withdrawal means iraq becomes a failed state. This bolsters al-qaeda and syrian-iran axis to destabilie the entire region
James Phillips, a research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, February 29, 2008, “Online Debate: When Should the U.S. Withdraw From Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Without U.S. troops, Iraq likely would become a failed state, which AQI and other groups would exploit to launch attacks against Iraq’s neighbors and perhaps the United States. Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia would face the most immediate threat, but Turkey, Egypt, and Israel would also face growing threats from Iraq-based terrorists. The big winners would be Iran and Syria, the world’s two leading state sponsors of terrorism, which would seek to turn Iraq into a stronghold for their terrorist surrogates, as they have done in Lebanon.
A Premature Withdrawal Would Collapse Iraq
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, p.18.
Indeed, candidate Obama correctly argued that when the United States prematurely turned away from Afghanistan to focus on Iraq in 2002—2003, the result was the near collapse of the new Afghan government and the resumption of widespread civil strife. Even if it is to focus on Afghanistan, if the United States turns away from Iraq prematurely, it would have dire consequences for Iraq, whose fragile government will be more likely to fail, and for the United States, because success in Iraq is vital to U.S. interests.
Iraqi Security Forces Would Crumble Under Withdrawal
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, p. 18.
One of the least acknowledged problems with the ongoing transition of the U.S. mission in Iraq is the potential for problems to arise between the Iraqi military and the civilian government. The increase in the size, capabilities, and political reliability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were important elements in the turnaround in Iraq in 2007—2008. Today, the ISF are so large (roughly 650,000 in early 2010) and relatively capable that many Iraqis and Americans believe that the U.S. military presence has become superfluous. In Baghdad and Washington, there is a growing consensus that the Iraqis can handle their internal security and the residual insurgency threat by themselves, and as a result, the United States can pull out its troops quickly. This notion is dangerously mistaken. There are many things that could still tear Iraq apart, and the future of the Iraqi security forces themselves are among those at the top of the list.
Abandoning Iraq Destabilizes The Entire Country
James Phillips, a research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, February 29, 2008, “Online Debate: When Should the U.S. Withdraw From Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations,
The weakening appeal of radical Islamists on both sides is a positive development that has opened the door to greater political progress. The security gains attributable to the surge have made this possible and helped to amplify this trend. If the U.S. walks away from Iraq now, the Iraqis who have taken risks to fight our common enemies will face a devastating defeat. Abandoning Iraq would make a bad situation much worse.
Withdrawal Makes Iraq A Failed State
Absent Troops, Civil War Will Resume In Iraq
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, p. 17.
Iraq has made remarkable progress since the worst days of its civil war in 2006. Security has improved enormously, democratization has gained a foothold, and democratic pressures have forced Iraqi politicians to change their methods, if not necessarily their goals. Iraq’s micro economies have begun to revive and foreign investment is beginning to pick up. But as countless policymakers and commentators have pointed out, these gains are fragile and reversible. All of the tensions that propelled the country into the maelstrom of civil war during the initial years of bungled reconstruction remain, as do the memories of the many horrific acts committed. As numerous scholars of civil war have noted, these lingering fears typically make the resumption of civil war uncomfortably likely in cases like Iraq, unless an external great power is willing to serve as peacekeeper and mediator during the critical early years when the new, fragile state must build institutions capable of providing effective governance and public safety.
Abandoning Iraq Would Be A Humanitarian Disaster, Bolsteres Al-Qaeda And Destabilizes The Elected Government
James Phillips, a research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, February 29, 2008, “Online Debate: When Should the U.S. Withdraw From Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations,
The surge has been a military success and has paved the way for an Iraqi political surge. In the last month, Iraq’s parliament has passed four laws that advance national reconciliation: de-baathification reform, a limited amnesty for detainees, provincial powers, and a budget that gives Iraq’s diverse constituencies an equitable share of oil revenues. Now that Iraq’s government is making progress, it would be a tragic mistake to abandon it and risk creating a much greater humanitarian catastrophe and a failed state that would serve as a springboard for exporting Islamic revolution and terrorism.
U.s. Troops are the only thing preventing a civil war
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Irena L. Sargsyan, research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, April 2010, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:2, p. 19.
Today, the surest guarantee that the Iraqi military will not move against the civilian leadership, and that the civilian leadership will be limited in its ability to emasculate the military-either of which could trigger a new civil war-is the presence of almost 100,000 U.S. troops. When that presence is removed in December 2011, that guarantee will depart with them. Since history in similar circumstances elsewhere warns of the risk of catastrophically bad civil-military relations, unless large numbers of the departing great power’s combat troops remain behind for years or decades, the United States may be committing de´ja` vu all over again in Iraq.
Abandoning Iraq Destabilizes The Entire Country
James Phillips, a research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, February 29, 2008, “Online Debate: When Should the U.S. Withdraw From Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations,
The weakening appeal of radical Islamists on both sides is a positive development that has opened the door to greater political progress. The security gains attributable to the surge have made this possible and helped to amplify this trend. If the U.S. walks away from Iraq now, the Iraqis who have taken risks to fight our common enemies will face a devastating defeat. Abandoning Iraq would make a bad situation much worse.
***Japan Neg***
Hegemony Disadvantage – Shell
US troop movements in Asia trigger a vacuum of power that triggers regional war
The Daily Yomiuri, 8/18/2004, pg. n/p
In Asia, 12,500 U.S. troops will be removed from South Korea. Some of the about 40,000 troops stationed in Japan might also be slashed. It is of utmost importance, however, that the realignment does not lead to a power vacuum or a decline in deterrence. In East Asia, several regions are potential flashpoints, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. If a power vacuum is created, regional stability will be threatened. The greatest security threat for Japan is North Korea, which has been developing nuclear arms and has deployed ballistic missiles that can reach the nation. The reorganization of U.S. forces in this region must not send Pyongyang the wrong signal. The United States calls the area ranging from Northeast Asia to the Middle East the "arc of instability" of the Eurasian Continent. In this arc, India and China, among others, are rising regional powers. The political and social systems of many of the countries in the arc are still unstable. China is well on its way to becoming a military superpower.
Forward basing in Japan key to logistical support for key military operations throughout the Pacific and reassures all allies
Global Security, Think-tank focusing international military issues, 2005, U.S. Army Japan (USARJ),
The strategic geographic location of Japan provides the U.S. an excellent location for forward-basing, enabling power projection forces in the event of contingencies. Combined with the current agreements the U.S. has with Japan for basing rights for both air and sea forces, the U.S. Army in Japan is capable of a greatly expanded logistical support role throughout the Pacific theater. Japan occupies a key strategic location in the Pacific, which is vitally important to the U.S. both economically and militarily. U.S. forward presence in Japan is vital to ensuring access to this strategic location. The U.S. Army's forward presence in Japan enables it to meet U.S. bilateral engagement responsibilities under the Mutual Security Treaty and the Defense Guidelines to defend Japan from outside aggression in wartime, and to provide deterrence and stability in peacetime. It also demonstrates the U.S. commitment to other allies and friends in the Pacific. Being in Japan, approximately 5,000 nautical miles closer to potential trouble spots than the West Coast of the U.S., means USARJ & 9th TSC can respond to crises and support regional contingencies as a strategically located base and staging area.
Japanese basing is key to power projection, solving terrorism and ethnic conflict
Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow @ Institute for International Studies, 1998, “The Japan America Security Alliance,”
More costly perhaps in terms of power projection would be the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Okinawa. If North Korea ceases to pose a threat, political pressures to remove U.S. Marines from Okinawa will mount in Japan as well as in the United States, because the rationale for their overseas deployment—namely, early engagement in a war—will have disappeared. Outside of the Korean peninsula, it is hard to identify a place where U.S. amphibious forces might get involved. Not Taiwan. Not the Spratley Islands. A land battle in Japan? Far-fetched. To maintain Marines in Okinawa, a new rationale would have to be found.55 Perhaps that rationale might be to deal with low-intensity conflicts.56 In the post–Cold War world, a variety of low-level contingencies will arise, such as disaster relief, civilian rescue operations, citizen evacuation in ethnic wars, and anti-terrorist activities. Such contingencies cannot be handled easily by traditional forms of naval and air power. Low-intensity conflicts are more likely to happen than high intensity wars. Indeed, the lower the intensity of conflict, the higher the likelihood of occurrence. U.S. Marines also have the capacity to play a key role in military-to-military training and joint exercises with counterpart services throughout Asia. The benefits of such interaction are substantial. They go beyond operational readiness. What military-to-military contacts provide is an effective means of strengthening bilateral ties with states outside America’s global alliance network (such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand). If the idea of serving new missions is accepted, the U.S. marines might be able to stay in Okinawa, but probably in smaller numbers and with a contraction in base facilities.
Hegemony Disadvantage – Link Extension
US presence in Japan is key to war-fighting capability
Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow @ Institute for International Studies, 1998, “The Japan America Security Alliance,”
JASA was signed in 1951 when the Korean War was raging, and the United States needed to have assurances that it could continue to stage combat missions and carry on logistical operations from nearby bases in Japan. In successfully conducting and concluding the Korean War, U.S. bases in Japan were indispensable. The same holds true today. If a war broke out tomorrow, JASA would be put into operation instantly to prosecute the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.
Okinawa is the linchpin of US power in East Asia and protects the Straits stability
Declan Hayes, Assoc. Prof. of Finance @ Sophia University, 2001, Japan: The Toothless Tiger, p. 7-8
Currently, only the American bases in Okinawa maintain the polical tranquility of the South China Sea, and even they are no panacea. Roughly 20,000 of the 29,000 troops on Okinawa are Marines attatched to the Seventh Fleet, and they are routinely deployed any, in the Seventh Fleet's sprawling operating areas of the Western W and Indian Oceans. Okinawa is, in other words, merely a convenient_a parking lot; the fact that it is on Japanese soil is secondary to the policing mission. These U.S. Marines have nothing to do with defense of Okinawa-or the rest of Japan for that matter. Recent revelations of U.S. plans to blast the island and its inhabitants to -smithereens in the event of a Soviet attack have not endeared U.S. forces to the locals, who remember how the Japanese Imperial Army wantonly sacrificed them as literal cannon fodder in their battles against the Americans in 1945. On the positive side, the bases do show Okinawa's continuing strategic importance. The United States did not want the island falling into enemy hands. Cold consolation to the Okinawans, but consolation nonetheless. The fact is that Okinawa's strategic position gives it immense value to the United States and her allies, a value that the opponents of the American alliance downplay, when they don't dismiss it out of hand. Okinawa remains the linchpin of American military power in the Asian arena. Okinawa is America's front line in the South China Sea. The joint American and Japanese forces stationed there prevent China's navy from asserting itself in the South China Sea. Okinawa is the fallback position if America and her allies are ever again pushed off the Korean peninsula. Okinawa is the base from which American reinforcements will be rushed to Taiwan in a doomsday situation. Okinawa keeps the sea lanes open; it preserves the status quo, the Pax Americana that has been so good to Japan. And therein lies the rub. It keeps a non-Asian power, the United States, at the helm of Asia and therefore keeps a major Asian nation, China, down. China is quite understandably peeved at this attempt to corral her. In as much as Japan is parry to this arrangement, China is peeved at Japan. China may well be prepared to do something to remedy the situation eventually-and China has plenty of time.
Withdrawal from Japan is perceived by all other allies and tanks US credibility
Soyoung Ho, editor of The Washington Monthly, 5/1/2005, Washington Monthly, pg. np
The present drawdown of U.S. troops may be the best ultimate outcome. Although phasing out all the troops in the far future may make sense, it does not in the near-to mid-term. If the United States scrapped the 50-year-old alliance and pulled out its troops now, when all Asian nations look to America for leadership, this would pose a fundamental risk to U.S. credibility; i.e., if you don't support an ally, there is a grave implication that you will not support other allies, either. An American presence in Korea is important to balance Chinas growing regional ambition. Moreover, the alliance benefits America, giving it access to much of Asia while at the same time reducing pressure on other U.S. military bases in the region.
Hegemony Disadvantage – Key to Power Projection
US forward power presence is key to Asian power projection
Yukio Okamoto, special adviser to Japan’s task force on International Relations, 2002, “Japan and the US,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np
The alliance between Japan and the United States represents the primary bilateral security relationship for both governments. For the United States, the alliance anchors U.S. power projection in the region surrounded by the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. Bilateral ties with other Pacific nations such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, though significant, are national in character, not hemispheric. Neither involves the permanent stationing of U.S. naval fighting forces within the country. Japan hosts the only U.S. carrier battle group homeported outside the United States as well as a complete amphibious attack group, including a full Marine Expeditionary Force. Of the 19 U.S. Navy ships with home ports between Honolulu and the Mediterranean, 18 called Japanese ports home in August 2001. 1 Japan plays host to a significant mass of U.S. airpower, including F-15 and F-16 fighter wings. Additionally, Japan provides facilities support to a vast array of U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering resources, as was amply demonstrated when a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter downed a U.S. Air Force E-3 flying out of Okinawa.
US basing is necessary for power projection globally
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power,” p. 147
Japan's decision to lock itself into the US-Japan alliance will have wider effects on global security. Japanese Support for the Afghan campaign and Iraq has shown that the US -Japan alliance is no longer just an East Asian or Asia-Pacific alliance, but one that functions to reinforce the US's global military reach. Japan is crucial to US global military hegemonv not only in the provision of key bases for the projection of military power from the Asia-Pacific to the Middle Last, but also is a provider of boots on the ground for militarv coalitions. Finally Japanese devotion to the alliance will affect global security by adding one more large militarv power to the mix, while lessening Japan’s interest in making a difference using economic power. As a result Of this trade-off, and Japan’s finl abandonment of it, position as an exemplar of non-military approaches to security, the world may be he poorer.
Japanese bases are crucial staging grounds for US troops and power projection
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power,” p. 106-107
Whatever the outcome of ongoing Japan-U5 Consultations on the realignment and funding of bases, it seems certain that facilities in Japan will become ever more central to US regional and global strategy. The US utilised its bases in Japan to deploy forces in the Gulf War; the carrier Kitty Hawk home-ported in Japan participated in the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq; fighter aircraft from Misawa in Aomori Prefecture and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa participated in the Iraq war; US Marines in Okinawa were sent as reinforcements to Iraq in January 2004; and Okinawa, in particular, remains crucial as a staging post for the US to project power across the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. Consequently, it is not surprising that the US 2004 Global Posture Review (GPR) looks set to maintain or even boost the US presence in Japan, whereas other allies, including South Korea, face sizeable reductions of US forces. In recent talks, the US appears to have reassured Japan that it intends to preserve current troop levels in Japan of around 58,00o servicemen (including around 14,000 of the US 7th Fleet). The US is also looking to strengthen the importance of its bases in Japan, proposing that the command functions of the US Army I Corps, a rapid-deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific, be relocated from Washington State to Army Camp Zawa in Kanagawa Prefecture. In addition, the US has proposed that the command operations of the 13th Air Force headquartered in Guam, a key base for long-range bombers and tanker aircraft often deployed in the Middle East, should be integrated with those of the 5th Air Force Command at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo." The ramifications of this would be that Japan would essentially serve as a frontline US command post for the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
US-Japan Alliance Disadvantage – Shell
Withdrawal of US troops triggers a broader abandoning of the US-Japan alliance
Anthony DiFilippo, Sociology Professor at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the US-Japan Military Arrangement, pg. 21-22
First, because the bases issue in Okinawa is an ever-present political cauldron linked to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, it could very quickly become heated to the point where residents are unrelenting in their demands that American military installations and troops be removed from their prefecture. The removal of U.S. troops from Okinawa could persuade either Washington or Tokyo or both that major revisions are needed in the bilateral security alliance. Thus, it is conceivable that without bases in Okinawa, Washington would abandon the security alliance or Tokyo would decide that without the presence of American troops it might be better to rely completely on its own forces for defense.
The plan spills over and prevents cooperation in other areas
Tobias Harris, PhD student at MIT, 1/13/2010, A new US-Japan Alliance in the Making,
The question for the US and Japan going forward is what role the alliance can play in this more fluid regional environment. The hope that the US and Japan, along with other democracies, could present a united front tasked with integrating China peacefully has proven unrealistic. Instead the most salient division in the region may be that separating the US and China from the region’s middle and small powers. Accordingly, the security relationship will be scaled back (as discussed here), making the dispute over Futenma that much more of a distraction. The future of the US-Japan relationship may be a hard security core linked to the defence of Japan and some form of US forward presence in Japan (in the same way that Singapore has facilitated the US forward presence in the region), looser political and economic cooperation in the region, and closer cooperation on global issues like climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and the like.
Withdrawing troops freaks out Japan and triggers regional instability
William Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 2005, Journal of World Affairs 29.1, pg. 51
The U.S. Defense Department’s plan for the “transformation and realignment” of U.S. forces worldwide has created some nervousness in both Japan and South Korea despite the potential domestic political benefits of reducing the burden of U.S. bases on local communities. The main concern of Japan, which is shared by some in the South Korean government, relates to rumors of American force reductions that could signal a shift of focus away from the longstanding U.S. role of deterring conflict and reinforcing security in Northeast Asia. U.S. officials and senior military officers insist that any force reductions will be more than compensated for by increasing the mobility and lethality of remaining forces. Some Japanese officials and commentators, however, are not completely persuaded by these reassurances. Analysts have noted that unlike in Europe, where the Pentagon is drawing down and realigning forces that are no longer relevant in a post-Cold War environment, potential flash points such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits continue to represent active threats to peace. These observers note that given the lack of any collective security framework in Asia, the U.S. bilateral alliance system remains the lynchpin of regional stability and security.
US-Japan Alliance Disadvantage – Extensions
US-Japan relations are strong now
Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow in Asian studies, and Gary Schmitt, resident scholar in strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 8/17/2009, Wall Street Journal, pg. np
However, senior DPJ party officials such as Ichiro Ozawa have a reputation for being ruthlessly pragmatic. They will be aware that polls show most Japanese voters still support the LDP's policy of close ties with the U.S. and that, if the DPJ is elected, it will be primarily because of dissatisfaction with the LDP's domestic and economic policies. Japan's national security bureaucracy still holds a powerful grip on the levers of policy making and tends to be pro-alliance. And many younger but important DPJ party members, such as Seiji Maehara, are conservative and hawkish. So as election day and the realities of actual governance draw near, the DPJ has modified its policy positions. The most recent DPJ pronouncements on security matters have avoided the more strident positions of the past, with the party platform now stating that it wants to "build a close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship." Although Tokyo should not "just rely on the United States," DPJ leader Yuko Hatoyama has said that the party "places top priority on the Japan-U.S. alliance." In short, Tokyo's foreign policy is unlikely to change drastically.
Security alliance key to solving multiple crises, including terrorism, war and proliferation
James Leach, representative in Congress, 4/20/2005, Congressional FDCH Testimony, pg. np
At the same time, Japan is becoming ever more important to advancing a panoply of American foreign policy interests around the globe. From supporting counterterrorism operations in the Indian Ocean to contributions to humanitarian assistance in Iraq to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to working with the U.S. and others in seeking a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear challenge. For many years, Japan has also been deeply engaged with U.S. and other industrialized democracies as a leader at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions.
Only the US-Japan alliance can ensure Asian stability
Bruce Klinger, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 8/26/2009, Asia And the Pacific, .
Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world.
The US-Japan alliance solves a laundry list of global threats
Joseph Nye, Professor @ Harvard, 7/19/2009, Real Clear World,
Third, the US-Japan alliance will have to face a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming, with China having surpassed the US as the leading producer of carbon-dioxide emissions (though not in per capita terms). Fortunately, this is an area that plays to Japan's strengths. Although some Japanese complain about the unequal nature of the alliance's security components, owing to the limits that Japan has accepted on the use of force, in these new areas, Japan is a stronger partner. Japan's overseas development assistance in places ranging from Africa to Afghanistan, its participation in global health projects, its support of the United Nations, its naval participation in anti-piracy operations, and its research and development on energy efficiency place it at the forefront in dealing with the new transnational challenges.
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Shell
Japan won’t nuclearize now, US withdrawal triggers nuclear rearmament
Yukio Satoh, Former President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, 3/5/2009, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament,” .
For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, given Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile programs and China's growing military power, ensuring American commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo. Japan has long been committed to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country. A prevalent and strong sentiment against nuclear weapons among the Japanese people lies behind the policy to deny themselves the possession of nuclear weapons in spite of the country's capabilities to do otherwise. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain vivid national memories. Yet, strategically, Japan's adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, upon the credibility of the Japan-US Security Treaty, or more specifically, that of the United States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats. In response, the US government has been steadfastly assuring the Japanese in an increasingly clear manner of American commitment to provide deterrence for Japan by all means, including nuclear. Against this backdrop, the argument made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article published in The Wall Street Journal of January 4, 2007, that "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete", was received with mixed reactions in Japan: welcome for the sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. As depending upon the US' extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan's only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence.
That leads to nuclear conflict
Ellen Ratner, White House correspondent and bureau chief for the Talk Radio News service, 1/17/2003, “Engage North Korea,”
That is now threatened by North Korea's brazen stupidity. By rattling the nuclear saber, withdrawing from non-proliferation treaties and tossing out U.N. inspectors, the North Koreans are on the verge of making one of the colossal blunders of world history. If North Korea is not reined in, then it is likely that Tokyo will rearm – and experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race – for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.
Japan prolif would destroy the NPT, the Japanese economy, and cause arms races
Takashi Yokota, Associate Editor at Newsweek Japan, 6-22-2009, “The N Word,” Newsweek,
Japan, moreover, now occupies the nuke-free high ground and would risk losing its innocence if it went nuclear. According to an internal 1995 study by Japan's defense establishment, reversing the country's no-nukes policy would trigger the collapse of the Nuclear Non--Proliferation Treaty regime, as the withdrawal of the world's only nuclear victim could fatally undermine confidence in the system. Such a move would also severely damage relations with Washington—Tokyo's most important ally—and the alarm in Beijing and Seoul could set off a nuclear race across East Asia. Japan would get the blame. The consequences for Japan's energy supplies and economy could be equally catastrophic. If Japan broke out of the NPT, the countries that now supply it with nuclear fuel, including Canada, Australia and the United States, would surely hold back their shipments, which are currently conditioned on the fuel's peaceful use. That would be a nightmare for Japan, which relies on nuclear energy for nearly a third of its electricity.
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Impact Overview
The disad outweighs the case. There is a high probability, quick time frame and large magnitude for Asian wars
Bill Emmott, former editor of the Economist, 6/4/2008, “Power rises in the east,” The Australian, pg. np
The rise of Asia is not just, or even mainly, going to pit Asia against the West, shifting power from the latter to the former. It is going to pit Asians against Asians. This is the first time in history when there have been three powerful countries in Asia at the same time: China, India and Japan. That might not matter if they liked each other, or were somehow naturally compatible. But they do not, and are not. Far from it, in fact. Asia is becoming an arena of balance-of-power politics, with no clear leader, rather as Europe was during the 19th century. China may emerge as the most powerful of the three, but as with 19th-century Britain it is unlikely to be capable of dominating its continent. A new power game is under way, in which all must seek to be as friendly as possible to all, for fear of the consequences if they are not, but in which the friendship is only skin deep. All are manoeuvring to strengthen their positions and maximise their long-term advantages. The relationship between China, India and Japan is going to become increasingly difficult during the next decade. An array of disputes, historical bitternesses and regional flashpoints surround or weigh down on all three. Conflict is not inevitable but nor is it inconceivable. If it were to occur -- over Taiwan, say, or the Korean Peninsula, or Tibet or Pakistan -- it would not simply be an intra-Asian affair. The outside world inevitably would be drawn in, and especially the US, given its extensive military deployments and alliances in Asia. Such a conflict could break out very suddenly. Managing the relationship between China, India and Japan promises to be one of the most important tasks in global affairs during the next decade and beyond, comparable to the need to find peaceful ways to manage the relationships between Europe's great powers during the 20th century. The opportunity, in terms of commerce and of human welfare, is tremendous, if the relationship is handled well. But so is the danger if the relationship goes wrong.
Japanese nuclearization will be fast
Frank Barnaby, Nuclear physicist and consultant to the Oxford Research Group on nuclear issues, 5/14/2009, “Will Japan React to North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear programmes?,”
If Japan, at some future date, takes the political decision to acquire nuclear weapons, how quickly could it do so? The technology needed to produce nuclear weapons is the same as civil nuclear technology. Japan has a very advanced civil nuclear technology – one of the world’s most advanced. It has, therefore, the fissile materials, highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, and the nuclear physicists and engineers needed to produce nuclear weapons in a short time – months rather than years. Japan is, therefore, regarded as a latent nuclear-weapon country, which could relatively quickly become an actual nuclear-weapon power.
Deterrence theory doesn’t apply outside of Europe
Stephen Cimbala, Ph.D. Distinguished Professor, Political Science @ Penn State, 2008, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy, 27, pg. 113
These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Uniqueness
Status quo threats not enough to cause nuclearization
Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asian affairs, and Mary Beth Nikitin, analyist in nonproliferation, 2/19/2009, “Japan’s nuclear future: policy debate, prospects, and US interests,” Congressional Research Service, pg. np
Today, Japanese officials and experts remain remarkably uniform in their consensus that Japan is unlikely to move toward nuclear status in the short-to- medium term. However, as the security environment has shifted significantly, the topic is no longer toxic and has been broached by several leading politicians. North Korea’s test of a nuclear device in 2006 and China’s military modernization have altered the strategic dynamics in the region, and any signs of stress in the U.S.-Japan alliance raises questions among some about the robustness of the U.S. security guarantee. An ascendant hawkish, conservative movement — some of whom openly advocate for Japan to develop an independent nuclear arsenal — has gained more traction in Japanese politics, moving from the margins to a more influential position. In addition, previous security-related taboos have been overcome in the past few years: the dispatch of Japanese military equipment and personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, the elevation of the Japanese Defense Agency to a full-scale ministry, and Japanese co-development of a missile defense system with the United States. All of these factors together increase the still unlikely possibility that Japan will reconsider its position on nuclear weapons.
China and North Korea won’t spur nuclear rearmament
Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asian affairs, and Mary Beth Nikitin, analyist in nonproliferation, 2/19/2009, “Japan’s nuclear future: policy debate, prospects, and US interests,” Congressional Research Service, pg. np
Japan, traditionally one of the most prominent advocates of the international non-proliferation regime, has consistently pledged to forswear nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, evolving circumstances in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 and China’ s ongoing military modernization drive, have raised new questions about Japan’s vulnerability to potential adversaries and, therefore, the appeal of developing an independent nuclear deterrent. The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus — both in Japan and among Japan watchers — remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term.
Collapse of US deterrence is not inevitable
Joseph Nye, Professor @ Harvard, 6/25/2009, Federal News Service, pg. np
MR. NYE: Well, having once worked on nonproliferation way back in the Carter administration, it's worth recalling that we're not doing quite as badly as the daily headlines would imply. John F. Kennedy expected there to be 25 countries with nuclear weapons by the 1970s; there are nine. That's better than was expected. So the nonproliferation regime -- the treaties and so forth -- have had some beneficial effect. Though, they there are now severely challenged by both North Korea and Iran. I think the important thing to realize is that there's an inherent dilemma in nonproliferation, which is that as you approach zero nuclear weapons, things may become more unstable rather than more stable, because a little bit of cheating can go a long way, whereas, when you have larger numbers, a little bit of cheating probably doesn't matter as much. And this raises the following paradox, which is that part of the reason that there hasn't been more proliferation is because we have been able to extend guarantees of our nuclear umbrella over others. Japan obviously has the capacity to go nuclear if it so wished. It hasn't felt the need because we've extended deterrence. So the dilemma is that if we were to go too fast, too hard, too close to zero, we would bring nuclear deterrence -- extended deterrence into question. And I think that's why I said in my testimony -- important to focus on the fact that extended deterrence rests very heavily on credibility, not just capability. In other words, the fact that there are 50,000 American troops forward based in Japan is tremendously important, just like the presence of American troops in Berlin allowed us to defend Berlin in the Cold War in situations when the Soviets had local superiority.
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Proliferation Impact
Japanese proliferation destroys the NPT sparking an arms race
Frank Barnaby, Nuclear Issues Consultant @ Nautilus and Shaun Burnie, Non-proliferation Activist, 8/1/2005, “Thinking the Unthinkable,”
“Treat nothing as inevitable” is a good principle to live one’s life by. Unfortunately, in the case of Japan’s nuclear development, it may not be sufficient. The international community - read governments - will learn to live with Japanese nuclear weapons if that occasion arises. The consequences would of course be terrible for Northeast Asia. Pressure in South Korea to respond would be huge, relations with China could become disastrous, and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime centred around the NPT reduced to a historical footnote. Japan’s existing plutonium programme is a driver for nuclear proliferation in the East Asian region and further afield. For example, Iran has cited Rokkasho to support its case for being permitted to complete its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.
East Asia arms racing destroys global economy
Lee Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson Institute Director, 5/1/2005, “China’s Modernizing Military,” Tulsa World, pg. np
So much of our attention is trained on the Middle East these days, but we cannot ignore East Asia. Recent weeks have brought troubling demonstrations of Chinese and Japanese nationalism; territorial disputes among China, Japan and South Korea; and the persistence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The United States must use its power and influence to work for an Asia where China, Taiwan, Japan and the Koreas can peacefully coexist and develop at the same time. Arms-races, nuclear proliferation and heated rhetoric in East Asia threatens the lives of tens of thousands of American soldiers stationed in South Korea and Japan, and the stability of the global economy
Rearmament triggers nuclear conflict
Morton H. Halperin, Director of Policy Planning at State Department, 2000, “The Nuclear Dimension of the US-Japan Alliance,”
However, any realistic appraisal of nuclear dangers would suggest that neither rogue states/terrorist groups nor a deliberate Russian attack is the right focus if the goal of U.S. national security policy is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. The most immediate danger is that India and Pakistan will stumble into a nuclear war following their nuclear tests and their apparent determination to deploy nuclear forces. A second danger will continue to be that Russian missiles will be fired on the United States by accident or as a result of unauthorized action. Over the longer run, these threats will be eclipsed by the danger that the non-proliferation regime will collapse and other states will develop nuclear weapons. A terrorist threat should, in my view, become a matter of serious concern only if there is much wider dispersal of nuclear weapons among states stemming from an open collapse of the nonproliferation regime.
Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Hegemony Impact
Japanese armament leads to Asian arms races
Shinichi Ogawa, director of the research department of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, 2003, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited”, The National Institute for Defense Studies News, pg. np
One likely consequence of a Japanese decision to go nuclear would be reinforcement of Chinese and Russian nuclear forces. Even though Japanese development of nuclear weapons would be for the limited defensive purpose of deterring a nuclear North Korea, Chinese and Russian suspicion of Japan would undoubtedly increase for historical reasons. This would not only have the effect of providing China and Russia with an incentive for increasing their retaliatory nuclear forces; it would also provide them with a clear reason for adopting a nuclear deterrence strategy targeting Japan. Therefore, Japan would have no choice but to consider Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals as objects of deterrence. In short, if Japan were to pursue nuclear weapon development, it would have to develop and deploy a considerable number of longer-range nuclear delivery systems, a strategic nuclear force, that would enable it to practice deterrence vis-à-vis China and Russia.
The resulting arms race collapses US hegemony
Zalmay Khalilzad, former UN ambassador and counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Ian Lesser, PhD and Fellow @ the German Marshall Fund, 1998, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, pg. 31
China in world III eschews democratization and normalization for an accelerated program of military modernization, especially air and naval power-projection capabilities (Tellis et al., 1996). Japan might choose to go in one of several directions in the face of China’s drive for regional superiority. Tokyo might decide to ally itself with Beijing; it might seek U.S. support in balancing China; or it might compete with China for Asian leadership. In the worst case—our world III—Japan loses faith in U.S. security guarantees and chooses the latter path. Tokyo begins converting its economic power into military strength and deploys a small nuclear arsenal to defend itself and its interests against what it perceives as malign Chinese designs. In the rest of Asia, the second-tier powers jockey for position alongside one or another of the competitors within a complex context of border and resource disputes. In this world, NBC proliferation proceeds at a rapid clip, as actors see nuclear weapons in particular as insurance policies against the dangers around them. Power relations are fluid to the point of instability as small countries seek protectors and larger powers recruit clients. And in this world, it seems likely that a global competitor to the United States could emerge, perhaps as a result of an alliance of convenience between one of the Asian competitors and Russia.
Wildfire arms races lead to nuclear war
Eugene Matthews, Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, 12/2003, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, pg. np
Having said that, Washington must persuade Tokyo not to acquire nuclear weapons. A nuclear Japan would make' Asia a more dangerous place, starting an arms race unlike any the region has ever seen. China would increase its nuclear stockpile and seek more military resources, particularly nuclear submarines. Asia would suddenly have five nuclear powers--China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and North Korea--and South Korea would quickly follow, raising the potential for disastrous conflict. To help prevent such a scenario, the United States should redouble its efforts to solve the North Korea problem. And it must do so fast, for North Korea could have a critical mass of nuclear weapons within six months. Any American solution should involve consultations with South Korea and Japan, followed by bilateral talks with North Korea and, immediately following, a multilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea to establish a framework for dialogue that could, after 24 months, lead to a new regional security arrangement. The recent, Chinese-hosted multilateral talks on North Korea were a positive step in this direction. Washington, however, must engage Pyongyang directly. Americans should remember that their interests and Chinas are not the same when it comes to North Korea--if for no other reason than because in the worst-case scenario of a war, Beijing would surely stand with Pyongyang.
AT: Japan Won’t Nuclearize – Fissile Material
Japan has the plutonium stockpiles necessary to nuclearize
Frank Barnaby, Nuclear Issues Consultant @ Nautilus and Shaun Burnie, Non-proliferation Activist, 8/1/2005, “Thinking the Unthinkable,”
To date most of this plutonium has accumulated in overseas reprocessing plants in France and the UK under contracts signed with Japan. However, with plans to start up the US$21 billion Rokkasho plant, Japan will have a reprocessing capacity only equalled by the world’s largest nuclear weapons states.
Japan has excess plutonium
Frank Barnaby, Nuclear Issues Consultant @ Nautilus and Shaun Burnie, Non-proliferation Activist, 8/1/2005, “Thinking the Unthinkable,”
In response to political pressure over its plutonium programme, the Japanese government declared in the early 1990’s that it would not hold more plutonium than was necessary for commercial use. The government’s ‘no plutonium stockpile’ policy and their declared supply and demand figures for plutonium, were meant to reassure the international community, particularly in East Asia, that Japan would only possess sufficient plutonium to meet commercial requirements. However, almost from day one, Japan has possessed well in excess of its requirements, and as the 1990’s unfolded the excess stock has increased.
International safeguards fail- a scientist could easily nuclearize with Japan’s stockpiles
Frank Barnaby, Nuclear Issues Consultant @ Nautilus and Shaun Burnie, Non-proliferation Activist, 8/1/2005, “Thinking the Unthinkable,”
A good nuclear-weapons designer could construct a nuclear weapon from three or four kilograms of the plutonium produced by the Rokkasho-Mura reprocessing plant. To ensure the timely detection of the diversion of such a small amount of plutonium in a plant where so much plutonium is handled requires very precise safeguards techniques, requiring significantly more precision than is currently achievable. Even with the best available and foreseeable safeguards technology it is not possible to get the precision necessary.
Norms have no effect on Japanese arming policy- their effect is overstated
Jennifer Lind, Visiting Professor of International Relations @ Dartmouth, 2004, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck,” International Security 29.1, pg. np
Although antimilitarist norms are widespread in Japan, they have not constrained Japanese security policy. They have not prevented it from building one of the most powerful military forces in the world, with potent offensive and defensive capabilities. And, as Japan's leaders have said repeatedly, if Japan felt threatened, these norms would not even prevent Japan from building nuclear weapons. Since World War II, Japan has followed a highly restrained foreign policy, but this restraint is explained by a strategy of buck-passing rather than by antimilitarist norms. One implication of this analysis is that the emphasis on Japanese antimilitarism—by scholars and policymakers—overstates the constraints that domestic norms impose on Japanese leaders. For example, claims that Japan would like to contribute more to the U.S.-Japan alliance, but is constrained by the peace constitution, are essentially bargaining rhetoric; the pacifist article 9 has proven to be as malleable as Tokyo wants to make it. Because many Japanese people hold deeply antimilitarist views, U.S. leaders should be cognizant of the sensitivity of military issues in Japanese society. Nevertheless, Tokyo can bring its public along when it wants to.
AT: Japan Won’t Nuclearize – F-22’s Impact
Even absent nuclearization, the US will sell F-22s to Japan to shore up the alliance
Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asian affairs, and Mary Beth Nikitin, analyist in nonproliferation, 2/19/2009, “Japan’s nuclear future: policy debate, prospects, and US interests,” Congressional Research Service, pg. np
Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Congressional leaders could face pressure to re-consider allowing the sale of the F-22 Raptor aircraft in order to bolster trust in the alliance.28
F-22 exports spark a regional arms race and mass conflict
Christopher Bolkcom, Specialist in Military Aviation and Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 3/11/2009, “Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan,” Congressional Research Service,
China and South Korea have voiced concern about Japan’s intention to upgrade its military capabilities, largely grounded in suspicions that Japan will inch toward returning to its pre-1945 militarism. Some analysts caution that selling the F-22s to Japan could destabilize the region, possibly even sparking an arms race, and contribute to an image of Japan becoming America’s proxy in the region. The sale could complicate the U.S. effort to manage its relationship with China. South Korea has already registered its unease at Japan acquiring F-22s, and at one point suggested that it may seek a deal to purchase the aircraft in order to match Japan’s capabilities.10 Although the Lee Myung-bak government has made moves to strengthen U.S.-South Korean alliance, the Seoul-Washington relationship has been strained at times over the past several years, and some South Koreans chafe at indications that the United States prioritizes defense ties with Japan above those with Korea. Japanese defense officials have pointed to China’s acquisition of increasingly sophisticated air capabilities to justify their request for the F-22s, asserting that China’s modern air fleet will soon dwarf Japan’s. Despite the relatively strong state of relations between Tokyo and Beijing, the two nations remain wary of each other’s intentions. Although the risk of military confrontation is considered small, there is the potential that territorial disputes over outlying islands could escalate into armed clashes, or that conflict could break out in the Taiwan Strait between the United States and China, which could involve Japan. For this reason, some U.S. and Japanese commentators have supported the sale of F-22s to Japan as necessary to maintain the “Taiwan balance.”
F-22 exports cause tech proliferation and a shift to offensive capabilities
Christopher Bolkcom, Specialist in Military Aviation and Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 3/11/2009, “Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan,” Congressional Research Service,
A second proliferation issue relates to the effect an F-22 sale could have on other countries. Other countries in the region could perceive the F-22 as causing an imbalance of military power in favor of Japan, and inciting them to seek their own advanced aircraft or defensive systems. Once Japan sets the precedent of F-22 export, other countries might pressure U.S. policy makers to sell them F-22s. Israel, for example, has reportedly expressed interest in the F-22.
AT: Chinese Containment Bad Advantage
US-Japan alliance deters conflict over Taiwan
Ted Osius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002, The US Japan Security Alliance, p. 23
To deter conflict, the United States discourages Taipei from declaring independence and Beijing from forcibly attempting to unite Taiwan with the mainland. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States supplies Taiwan with weapons necessary for defense against the mainland.3 Given China's size and resources, however, Taiwan cannot achieve security based solely on independent militarv capabilities. Taipei relies on Beijing's fear that the United States would defend it in the event of a cross-strait conflict. Because U.S. .forward-deployed forces are in Japan, Taiwan also depends on a strong and stable U.S.-Japan alliance.
US-Japan coordination over Taiwan is the only way to deter conflict
Declan Hayes, Professor of Finance @ Sophia University, 2001, Japan: The Toothless Tiger, p. 63
In order for an invasion to ultimately succeed, Beijing would have to conduct a multifaceted campaign, including air assaults, airborne incursions into Taiwanese space, special operations raids behind Taiwanese lines, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations, and conventional missile strikes. Although the PLA would currently encounter great difficulty in conducting such a sophisticated campaign, over the next decade, it will improve its capability. Time is, after all, on its side. So too are the numbers-and the world's diplomatic community. Eventually, only Japan and the United States could stop the takeover. Taiwan could not hope to survive alone. Taiwan's air force has over 500 combat aircraft, and these include top of the line U.S. F-16s and French Mirage 2000-5s. Taiwan's air defenses are so strong that China could not hope to launch an effective air campaign in the near future. Taiwan's 68,000 strong navy has more than thirty-six frigates and destroyers as well as four submarines, and it would wreak havoc on a Chinese invasion armada under current conditions. Behind Taipei's well-honed forces stands the awesome armada of the Japanese-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, together with its carrier battle Groups, which can be quickly deployed into Taiwanese waters. China is currently powerless against the Seventh Fleet. Therefore, as long as America continues to underwrite Taiwan's security, a direct invasion is not a credible possibility. However, the continued presence of the Seventh Fleet cannot be taken for granted. When the Seventh Fleet goes, so too will Taiwan, Asia's key buffer state.
US-Japan security cooperation precludes the rise of challengers in Asia
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power,” p. 146
The tightening of US-Japan security cooperation means that there is unlikely to be any return to a system of bipolaritv or tripolarity in East Asia.} China, despite its phenomenal economic growth and the continued upgrading of its military, is highly unlikely to be able to rise to the position of a `counter pole' to the combined strength of the US and a remilitarising Japan. Japan's continued close attachment to the US in security terms, despite its economic gravitation towards China, means that it is improbable that Japan would seek to form a third pole in regional security. Moreover, its continued subordinate and dependent position on the US in the bilateral alliance rules out a US-Japan joint partnership, or 'bigemony', in managing security affairs in the region, as 'Japan handlers' in the US would like to argue.
The US-Japan alliance solves Chinese paranoia
Mark Roth, Department of the Air Force, National Defense University, 2000, National War College,
Alliances with other Asian countries contribute to United States objectives for a non-aggressive China. For example, the US-Japan security alliance eliminates any need for China to feel threatened by Japan. So long as the United States maintains its military presence in Japan, Beijing will have no fears about a revival of Japanese militarism or that Tokyo would acquire nuclear weapons.
AT: Japanese Politics Advantage – No Set Agenda
Hatoyama has already given up on campaign promises – don’t trust their evidence
Aki Ito and Mayumi Otsuma, 1/27/2010, “Hatoyama Faces Pressure to Fix Deficit,” Bloomberg,
Hatoyama has been forced to break campaign promises to secure revenue. He kept a gasoline tax that he had pledged to abolish after the Finance Ministry projected that tax revenue will fall below bond sales for the first time in 63 years. Other promises remain intact. Hatoyama said this month that the country’s sales tax won’t be raised from the current 5 percent for four years. Kan repeated yesterday that cutting costs remains the government’s top priority, and he won’t debate changes to the tax code until all “wasteful” spending has been eliminated.
The government strategy will fail to help the economy, other alternate causes outweigh
Aki Ito and Mayumi Otsuma, 1/27/2010, “Hatoyama Faces Pressure to Fix Deficit,” Bloomberg,
Nouriel Roubini, the New York University professor who predicted the global financial crisis, said he was “worried” about the Japanese economy as its debt mounts, deflation returns and population ages. While Japan can currently finance itself thanks to domestic savers, at some point they may “flee the yen,” pushing up borrowing costs and crippling the economy, he said in an interview on Bloomberg Radio. Japanese have funded state spending through their more than 1,400 trillion yen in savings. The outlook downgrade came a day after the government said public debt will probably spiral to 973 trillion yen in the year starting April 1, almost double gross domestic product and the equivalent of 7.7 million yen for each citizen. Japan lacks a “credible” strategy to fix its finances, Andrew Colquhoun, a member of the sovereign rankings group for Asia and the Pacific at Fitch Ratings, said on Bloomberg Television today.
Hatoyama doesn’t have specific goals
Paul Scalise, former Tokyo-based financial analyst and currently an adjunct fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, 4/1/2010, “Promises, Promises: The Two Faces of Japan's New Government,”
And by avoiding policy specifics—by failing to provide a cogent and transparent explanation of what the government is doing and why they are doing it in this fashion—Hatoyama has left independent voters confused about his goals. Without a coherent DPJ narrative, these voters are open to a counter-narrative blaming DPJ ineptitude for burgeoning deficits, high unemployment, and on-going deflation.
Hatoyama leadership causes a run on the dollar
Economic Analyst, 9/27/2009, “Japan to Dump the US Dollar?,”
Yukio Hatoyama is Japan’s new leader. He officially took office last Wednesday, and he is already threatening to split with the United States. Hatoyama blames America for the global economic crisis and says that the U.S. is responsible for “the destruction of human dignity.” He campaigned on protecting traditional Japanese economic activities and reducing U.S.-led globalization. During the run-up to the election, Hatoyama’s finance minister told the bbc he was worried about the future value of the dollar, and that if his party were elected in the upcoming national elections, it would refuse to purchase any more U.S. treasuries unless they were denominated in Japanese yen. Japan is the world’s second-largest economy. It is also America’s second-most-important creditor. The U.S. government owes Japan over $724 billion! The only nation America owes more money to is China ($800 billion). The U.S. also imports $140 billion worth of goods from Japan each year. If Japan were to follow through with its threat to only lend in yen, the dollar would probably fall hard. What would that mean? America gets more expensive consumer goods, higher unemployment, and currency inflation. If other nations like China follow suit, we would be looking at a currency crisis—Zimbabwe-style.
AT: Japanese Politics Advantage – Dollar Turn
Dollar hegemony is the root cause of US protectionism
Ron Paul, America's leading voice for limited constitutional government, low taxes, free markets, and a return to sound monetary policies, 2006, Before the US House of Reps, “The End of Dollar Hegemony,”
Even with all the shortcomings of the fiat monetary system, dollar influence thrived. The results seemed beneficial, but gross distortions built into the system remained. And true to form, Washington politicians are only too anxious to solve the problems cropping up with window dressing, while failing to understand and deal with the underlying flawed policy. Protectionism, fixing exchange rates, punitive tariffs, politically motivated sanctions, corporate subsidies, international trade management, price controls, interest rate and wage controls, super-nationalist sentiments, threats of force, and even war are resorted to – all to solve the problems artificially created by deeply flawed monetary and economic systems. In the short run, the issuer of a fiat reserve currency can accrue great economic benefits. In the long run, it poses a threat to the country issuing the world currency. In this case that’s the United States. As long as foreign countries take our dollars in return for real goods, we come out ahead. This is a benefit many in Congress fail to recognize, as they bash China for maintaining a positive trade balance with us. But this leads to a loss of manufacturing jobs to overseas markets, as we become more dependent on others and less self-sufficient. Foreign countries accumulate our dollars due to their high savings rates, and graciously loan them back to us at low interest rates to finance our excessive consumption.
Strong dollar hurts long-term economic growth
Vincent Fernando, Economist @ Business Insider, 12/9/2009, “PIMCO: Strong Dollar Supporters Will Create The Next Crisis,”
Blindly supporting a strong dollar hurts the U.S.. Thus arguing for a strong dollar is to prolong America's economic problems: Arguments for a renewed commitment to a strong U.S. dollar are equivalent to suggesting that the imbalances that helped bring about the economic crisis should be further encouraged and that U.S. indebtedness should continue to expand. This would further promote an economy based on consumption and unsustainable indebtedness rather than one balanced with an appropriate amount of production and saving.
Run on the dollar solves US job and wage pressure
Thomas Palley, runs the Economics for Democratic and Open Societies Project, and is the former chief economist of the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 2006, “Why Dollar Hegemony is Unhealthy,” Yale Global Online,
However, none are well served by this co-dependence. Other countries resent the special situation that exempts the US from trade-deficit discipline. Side by side, the long-term economic prospects of the US are undermined by the erosion of the manufacturing sector, while US workers face wage and job pressures from imports that are advantaged by the dollar’s overvaluation. Moreover, all are vulnerable to a sudden stop of the system resulting from financial overextension of the US consumer. This suggests that the rest of the world needs to develop an alternative to the US consumer. That will require raising wages in developing economies, and encouraging consumption in Europe and Japan. Such measures would stabilize the global economy by providing a second engine of growth, and it would also correct the large global financial imbalances that have developed as a result of over-reliance on the US consumer.
Consult Japan Counterplan – Shell
The executive branch should enter into a process of prior, binding and genuine consultation with the government of Japan over whether or not the executive branch should substantially reduce United States’ military presence in Japan. The executive brach should implement Japan’s decision.
Prior, binding consultation over troop movements in Japan is key to the US-Japan alliance
Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, 1997, Toward a True Alliance, p. 35-36
As the alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two countries agreed to prior consultation when they signed the 1960 security pact, the mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict criteria for times when Washington would have to consult that the U.S. government has never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. Indeed, Japan has given the United States freer rein on the use of over seas bases than America's European allies have, even though Japan has projected a much stronger pacifist image.4° Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust about bilateral defense cooperation. A healthier alliance demands that the concept of prior consultation be resuscitated. As Japan musters the courage to say yes to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say no to the United States when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve toward something akin to America's strategic relationships with the major west European allies.
The impact is US leadership – only consultation can ensure global burden sharing
Ted Osius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002, The US Japan Security Alliance, pg. 75-76
Armitage's actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursuing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the autumn presidential campaign: "Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership.... To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretentions.-The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder in wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the globe. The United States regularly takes British views into account when dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship reaches that level of trust, Japan is the world's second-largest economy and a nation that shares America's commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia, and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind. Although it is difficult to imagine as effective a foreign policy partner as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an Asian partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role. Consultation, according to the Brookings Institution's lvo Daalder, implies "give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement is a way forward that satisfies both sides.... Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you're willing to talk to people. It's whether you're willing to take their views into account." Japan can help the United States deal with its challenge, as the world's only superpower, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage in real consultation and to build coalitions to address today's complex global issues. Watching America's contradictory impulses, and its oscillations between support for multilateral solutions and unilateral approaches, gives Tokyo an excuse to hesitate about tightening the alliance. However, America's historical pattern as part of collective security and collective economic arrangements should provide significant reassurance. The United States led the way in building the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, APEC, and other regional and global institutions.
Consult Japan Counterplan – Extensions
US credible leadership is key to solve global conflicts
Robert Knowles, Acting assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, pg. np
All three IR frameworks for describing predominant states—although unipolarity less than hegemony or empire—suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability and durability of the system. Although empires and predominant states in unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use of force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control.384 Legitimacy as a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient. The hegemonic model generally values courts’ institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model. The courts’ strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy. This means that courts’ treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this “domestication” reduces uncertainty. The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different.
Nearly all regions and hot spots are at risk
William E. Rapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004, “Paths Diverging?,”
Both Japan and the United States must move out of their comfort zones to create a more balanced relationship that involves substantial consultation and policy accommodation, a greater risk-taking Japanese role in the maintenance of peace and stability of the region, and coordinated action to resolve conflicts and promote prosperity in the region. Because neither country has a viable alternative to the alliance for the promotion of security and national interests in the region, especially given the uncertainties of the future trends in China and the Korean Peninsula, for the next couple of decades the alliance will remain central to achieving the interests of both Japan and the United States. A more symmetrical alliance can be a positive force for regional stability and prosperity in areas of engagement of China, proactive shaping of the security environment, the protection of maritime commerce routes, and the countering of weapons proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Without substantive change, though, the centrality of the alliance will diminish as strategic alternatives develop for either the United States or Japan
The US-Japan alliance is key to global democracy
William E. Rapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004, “Paths Diverging?,”
Finally, the alliance can provide the continuity of peace and trust necessary for the growth of liberalism throughout the region. Success for the United States and Japan will increasingly be measured in terms of an increased community of vibrant, pacific, free-market democracies in Asia. Making the two publics aware of the idealistic benefits of the alliance will make more headway toward acceptance of a deepening partnership than simply focusing on the alliance’s role in power politics in the region. Creating the conditions for that liberal development and tamping down the anticipated frictions that will arise along the way can best be accomplished in tandem. In the long run, this liberalism backed by the concerted power of the United States and Japan will bring lasting stability to the region.
***SK Neg***
Plan Unpopular
Military lobbyists oppose the plan
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2003, “The Mythical North Korean Threat,”
If the US military pulled 17,000 soldiers out of Korea, there is no reason why this contribution must shrink. South Korea spends less of it’s GDP on its military each year than the United States. The US Army has complained about maintaining Patriot missile batteries and Apache attack helicopters in South Korea; a burden it imposed on itself in 1994. Meanwhile, South Korea has refused to purchase these advanced weapons with the billions of dollars in annual trade surpluses with the United States. If South Korea is truly concerned about the North Korean threat, it has the resources to expand its military and buy the latest military equipment from the United States. The Center for Defense Information estimates that US military business injects almost $5 billion a year into the South Korean economy. Shifting some of this activity to Fort Lewis would spur economic activity in Washington State. Closing unneeded overseas bases is far cheaper than domestic bases and the economic impact is actually positive as spending shifts to American communities. However, this will be opposed in Washington DC as lobbyists representing Korea and certain corporations politic to keep “their” bases open, and by Army Generals seeking to retain an outdated mission.
US troop presence in South Korea is a military “sacred cow”
John Feffer, member of FPIF's Advisory Committee, 2000, “Korea: Liberation and Self-Determination,”
Several presidents have supported reducing the U.S. "footprint" in Korea (Nixon, Carter, Bush Sr.). In the 1990s, however, the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea has attained the status of a sacred cow, with several top officials insisting that U.S. troops will remain on the peninsula even after unification (i.e.: after the disappearance of any North Korean "threat"). And the Bush Jr. administration has aggressively pushed missile defense rather than seriously pursuing the threat reduction package that the Clinton administration was on the verge of negotiating with North Korea.
Big business opposes base withdrawal
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2009, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan,”
The irony is that closing or downsizing some of these bases would save the USA millions of dollars a year and shift thousands of jobs to the U.S. economy. However, many powerful Japanese and American corporations support the status quo from which they profit. They work with American Generals and Admirals to argue that Japan helps defray the cost of U.S. bases in Japan by paying for some utilities and the salaries of some Japanese workers. In reality, Japan never pays one cent to the U.S. military, and most of the claimed contributions are artificial. For example, goods imported for sale at U.S. military stores are not taxed by the Japanese government, so this is counted as a financial contribution. Another major "contribution" is rent paid to Japanese landowners. Cost sharing contributions have been reduced in recent years, and further cuts have been promised to prod the American military to reduce its presence.
Hegemony Disadvantage 1NC
Removal of troops from South Korea triggers a vacuum of power, arms races, nuclear war and collapse of Asian democracy
Larry Wortzel, PhD, 1-30-2003, “Why the USA is OK in the ROK,”
Speaking as a former Army officer stationed in Korea, I can say this: It would be a grave error to leave South Korea. For one thing, our presence there is a major reason why there has been peace in the region since the end of the Korean War in 1953. If Americans troops left, deep historical animosities and territorial disputes among Russia, China, Japan and the two Koreas would lead to a major arms race for territory and military dominance. This is not something to brush off, considering three of the five nations have nuclear weapons, and, in the case of North Korea, seem willing to use them. But protecting the peace isn't the only reason the United States is in Korea. We're there to protect the principles of democracy, too. Thanks largely to an American presence in the Asian region, the democracies of South Korea and Taiwan are protected from hostile threats by dictatorships in North Korea and China.
Proliferation leads to miscalculation and escalating conflict, ends in nuclear wars
Gareth Evans, Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne, and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 12-15-2009, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” reference/reports/ent/ downloads.html
Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear-armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.
Hegemony Disadvantage 1NC
Asian war goes nuclear
Michael May, Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, 1997, Washington Quarterly, pg. np
The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development --leave most of the civilized world devastated.
Specifically, war on the peninsula leads to extinction
Africa News, 10-25-1999, “Third World War: Watcth the Koreas,” pg. np
If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.
Hegemony Disadvantage – Link Extension
Pullout of US troops from South Korea leads to a vacuum of power and Asian conflict – Even North Korea agrees
Jane Perlez, Time Foreign Contributor, 9-11-2000, “South Korean Says North Agrees U.S. Troops Should Stay,” NY Times, Factiva
The most important outcome of his summit conference with North Korea in June, President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea says, was a common understanding that American troops must stay in South Korea to prevent a vacuum on the Korean peninsula that would be inviting to its neighbors. ''We are surrounded by big powers -- Russia, Japan and China -- so the United States must continue to stay for stability and peace in East Asia,'' he said. Mr. Kim said he was recounting almost the exact words of his counterpart, Kim Jong Il, in North Korea during their meetings in Pyongyang. The Communist government in North Korea, whose hostility has been cited by the Clinton administration as a major reason for pursuing a missile defense system, wants normal relations with United States, Kim Dae Jung said. ''I believe that North Korea wants improved relations with the United States,'' Mr. Kim said on Saturday in an interview at his Manhattan hotel at the end of the gathering of world leaders at the United Nations. ''That is their basic goal. If it is not their basic goal, there is no reason why they should change their position on American forces.'' The mantra of Communist propaganda since the end of Korean War has been that American troops must leave South Korea. So the North Korean leader's support of their staying is a reversal of position -- albeit one that Pyongyang has not yet acknowledged in public.
US pullout makes North Korean takeover inevitable
TD Flack, Stars and Stripes Staff and Hwang Hae-rym, Foreign Correspondent, 5-13-2006, “Protesters: Wartime control of ROK forces should stay with U.S.,”
“This is not the right time” for South Korea to take independent control of its military, said S.K. Ai, who attended the rally with his daughter. “Maybe after 20 years.” Ai said he joined U.S. Army’s 7th Infantry Division during the Korean War and took part in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s Inchon landing. He said he’s since experienced more than a half-century of tension between the Koreas. Like many of the attendees who talked to Stripes at the rally, Ai said he believes Roh’s request is part of a bigger Communist plan to get the U.S. military out of South Korea. Won Kee-chol, 70, said that 36,000 Americans sacrificed their lives during the Korean War and he doesn’t want to see that effort wasted. The U.S. military “should stay until unification of the Koreas under a flag of peace,” he said. “If the U.S. troops withdraw from South Korea, we will be under the North’s control,” he said.
South Korean support US military presence
Larry Wortzel, PhD, 1-30-2003, “Why the USA is OK in the ROK,”
And, despite the recent protests, South Korea seems to understand this. The country of 48 million recently elected a candidate who ran on a platform that emphasized a policy of engaging North Korea regardless of North Korea's reactions or reciprocity. President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun was elected with about 48 percent of the vote. His rival, Lee Hoi Chang, who advocated a firmer policy toward the North seeking reciprocity and a reduction in North Korea's hostile security posture, won 46 percent. Both candidates, and the majority of the citizens of South Korea, continue to recognize the stability and security that the U.S. presence in Korea provides, and they support a continued American presence.
North Korea Disadvantage – Bioweapons Shell
Stable US deterrence prevents a bioweapons attack
Susan Martin, Visiting Assistant Professor at Florida Atlantic University, 2001, “Responding to Chemical and Biological Threats,” International Security 25.4. pg. np
A proper assessment of this choice requires distinguishing between chemical and biological weapons. 5 I agree with Sagan that the policy of calculated ambiguity should not apply to chemical weapons. A nuclear threat is not necessary to deter the use of chemical weapons--they simply do not pose that great of a threat. Chemical weapons have not proved decisive on the battlefield, and chemical warfare defenses serve both to limit their effectiveness and to deter their use. Furthermore, because chemical weapons do not have great destructive power, they do not pose much of a strategic, countervalue threat, even when married to ballistic missiles. 6 Because the potential benefits of a strategic use of chemical weapons can be easily outweighed by the damage that could be inflicted by U.S. conventional forces, a conventional retaliatory threat will be adequate to deter their use. In this case, calculated ambiguity and the extra risk of nuclear use that the doctrine may create are unnecessary. In the case of a biological attack, however, significant damage could be done to U.S. interests. Although the general use of biological weapons on the battlefield is unlikely given the difficulties involved in their use, an attack on the rear areas of a battlefield could have a devastating effect on American troops as well as on U.S. allies, while a strategic biological attack on the continental United States could be catastrophic. In the case of biological weapons, therefore, the cost of a failure to deter the use of these weapons could be extremely high, and the extra risk of nuclear use that may follow from the policy of calculated ambiguity is well worth it. Here it is important to examine how both the policy of calculated ambiguity and Sagan's recommended policy of conventional deterrence interact with existential nuclear deterrence. Sagan and I agree, I think, that existential nuclear deterrence helps to protect the United States from attacks--including those with biological weapons--on its vital interests.
An attack on US cities would kill hundreds of thousands and collapse the economy
James Davis, Colonel and PhD, 2003, “The Looming Biological Warfare Storm,” Air & Space Power Journal,
The American public learned to fear anthrax after letters containing the substance had been sent via the US Postal Service to senators and various news agencies shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The resultant deaths and the discovery that some al Qaida terrorists had explored renting crop dusters caused the US government to temporarily ground these important agricultural aircraft. The news media, in turn, informed the public that biological attacks were possible Similar to the 11 September attacks, a BW attack might be a coordinated attack and take place in several major US cities. Anthrax would probably be the agent of choice in a mass-casualty attempt since it is not contagious and the perpetrators would not have to worry about the disease getting back to their country. Five 100-pound bags of anthrax could easily be smuggled into the United States using one of the many shipments of grain that arrive at US ports every day. These bags could be made to blend in with the shipment and lined with plastic so that no powder would be prematurely released. Three to five major cities, on the order of Houston or Los Angeles, could be targeted and would require only a 100-pound bag each. An appropriate aerosolizing device, easily procured in the United States, could be mounted on an automobile, airplane, or boat. The terrorists that perpetrate this attack would not have to die because they could be vaccinated and treated with antibiotics prior to delivering the agents, which would protect them even if they were exposed. They could also easily depart the country before the first symptoms appeared and defeat the ability of federal authorities to respond and arrest them. Hundreds of thousands of American citizens could potentially become infected and die if the agent were correctly manufactured and employed and if optimal climatic conditions were present during the attack. Such a mass-casualty attack would overwhelm the US medical system and a human, economic, and political catastrophe would result.
North Korea is a Threat – Bioweapons
North Korea is a threat – they are actively pursuing biological weapons
Simon Cooper, Staff, 2-2007, “North Korea's Biochemical Threat, Popular Mechanics,” pg. np
But, according to intelligence reports, something precious to the North Korean regime may be under cultivation in Chongju. Beyond the shacks stands an installation suspected of being a component in North Korea's bioweapons (BW) research and development program. The effort is steeped in a level of secrecy possible only in a totalitarian state, but it is thought to encompass at least 20 facilities throughout the country. Another 12 plants churn out chemical weapons. In late November, delegates of the signatory countries to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) met at the United Nations office in Geneva for the sixth review of the treaty since its inception in 1972. The meeting took place just weeks after North Korea publicly added the third prong to its capacity for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by testing a nuclear device. On day one, the U.S. delegate, Assistant Secretary of State John C. Rood, charged North Korea, along with Iran and Syria, with violating the ban on researching and developing biology for war. "We have particular concerns with the activities of North Korea ... in the biological weapons context, but also because of their ... support for terrorism and their lack of compliance with international obligations," Rood said. Internationally, it is widely agreed that the country is aggressively developing several weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea can grow several biological agents that risk mass casualties
Simon Cooper, Staff, 2-2007, “North Korea's Biochemical Threat, Popular Mechanics,” pg. np
Intelligence reports from the United States and South Korea list anthrax, smallpox, pneumonic plague, cholera and botulism toxins as leading components of North Korea's bioweapons projects. "Information from U.S. government sources indicates that North Korea is capable of growing several biological agents," says Michael Stebbins, head of Biology Policy at the Federation of American Scientists. And, he says, the country "has the infrastructure to weaponize them." Anthrax is believed to be one of North Korea's most fully developed biological weapons. Growing anthrax on a large scale is relatively easy: It can be done with basic brewing equipment. Sources indicate that North Korea also has developed the ability to mill anthrax (grinding the cake into microscopic powder), and to treat it to form a lethal and durable weapon. An attack might use a modified missile that cruises at low altitude to spray a fine mist of weaponized germs over its target area. The resulting deaths and injuries could number in the thousands.
Bioweapon use leads to extinction
John D. Steinbruner, senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 1997, Foreign Policy, pg. 85
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.
North Korea is a Threat – US Posture is Key
Credible US deterrent is key to prevent North Korean aggression
Goh Chok, Senior Minister of Singapore, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 6-4-2004, Shangti Keynot Address from the Prime Minister,
In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America’s overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability. No matter what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed the US on Iraq. There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq now is the credibility and resolve of the US. This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir, North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things go terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is central to the management of all three potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct impact on the global struggle against terrorism. Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each. Potential Flashpoints in Asia The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theatre for jihad and a fertile ground for breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating consequences for each other and the entire South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it exercised in 2001 to avert a possible nuclear war. North Korea is another potential trouble spot. The terrorists could try to exploit the situation to acquire materials for WMD. Fortunately, the six-party talks have lowered tensions and the issue is being managed.
US military option is necessary to deter Jong Il from starting conflict
Goh Chok, Senior Minister of Singapore, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 6-4-2004, Shangti Keynot Address from the Prime Minister,
Whatever their differences, the key actors share a common interest in the peaceful containment of the issue. I have been told by several leaders who have met Kim Jong Il that he is a rational, well-informed man who calculates his moves. He must know that an outbreak of conflict with the US will lead to the very outcome that he fears most: regime change or even the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. He may go to the brink but not step over the edge. The credibility of the US military option is vital to maintaining peace.
Military posture is a key variable in determining North Korean aggression – the impact is short-term conflict
Zalmay Khalilzad et al, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, 2001, “The United States and Asia,”
To help shape events in Asia in the interests of ensuring peace and stability, the United States must successfully manage a number of critical challenges. Among these—the one that must occupy the immediate attention of the United States—is Korea. The U.S. military posture in Northeast Asia must continue to deter and defend against North Korea. Over the longer term, however, it is possible that the North Korean threat will disappear as a result of the political unification of the Korean peninsula, an accommodation between North and South, or a collapse of the North Korean regime. The June 2000 summit meeting between South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il offers evidence that the political-military situation in Asia may change much more quickly than had once been thought.
Realism Good – Genocide
The alternative to realism is an idealism that results in morally grounded intervention- this inevitably leads to genocide and instability
Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, 11-6-2005, “The Realist Persuasion,”
In fact, when it comes to moral issues, realism has gotten a bum rap. As the events of the post-Cold War era have reminded us, idealism-whether the left liberal variant that emphasizes humanitarian interventionism or the neoconservative version that urges using American power to promote American values-provides no escape from the moral pitfalls of statecraft. If anything, it exacerbates them. Good intentions detached from prudential considerations can easily lead to enormous mischief, both practical and moral. In Somalia, efforts to feed the starving culminated with besieged US forces gunning down women and children. In Kosovo, protecting ethnic Albanians meant collaborating with terrorists and bombing downtown Belgrade. In Iraq, a high-minded crusade to eradicate evil and spread freedom everywhere has yielded torture and prisoner abuse, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and something akin to chaos. Given this do-gooder record of achievement, realism just might deserve a second look.
Realism best preserves hegemony, solves overstretch, and avoids conflict – it avoids war except as a last resort
Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, 11-6-2005, “The Realist Persuasion,”
Realists in the American tradition are similarly circumspect when it comes to power. On the one hand, they prize it. On the other hand, they view it is a fragile commodity. The prudent statesman deploys power with great care. These realists appreciate that ''greatness'' is transitory. The history of Europe from 1914 to 1945 testifies to the ease with which a few arrogant and short-sighted statesmen can fritter away advantages accumulated over centuries, with horrific consequences. Determined to husband power, realists cultivate a lively awareness of what power-especially military power-can and cannot do. They agree with Kennan, principal architect of the Cold War strategy of containment, who wrote in his book ''American Diplomacy'' (1950), that ''there is no more dangerous delusion...than the concept of total victory.'' At times, war becomes unavoidable. But realists advocate using force as a last resort-hence, the dismay with which they view the Bush doctrine of preventive war. To the extent war can be purposeful, realists see its utility as almost entirely negative. War is death and destruction. Politically, it can reduce, quell, eliminate, or intimidate. But to wage war in order to spread democracy, as President Bush says the United States is doing in Iraq, makes about as much sense as starting a forest fire to build a village: It only gets you so far, and the costs tend to be exorbitant. Costs matter because resources are finite.
Responding to threats is necessary – the alternative is isolationist pacifism
Randall Schhweller, Professor of Political Science @ The OSU, 2004, “Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of power,” pg. np
Developing such a consensus is difficult, however, because balancing, unlike expansion, is not a behavior motivated by the search for gains and profit. It is instead a strategy that entails significant costs in human and material resources that could be directed toward domestic programs and investment rather than national defense. In addition, when alliances are formed, the state must sacrifice some measure of its autonomy in foreign and military policy to its allies. In the absence of a clear majority of elites in favor of a balancing strategy, therefore, an alternative policy, and not necessarily a coherent one, will prevail. This is because a weak grand strategy can be supported for many different reasons (e.g., pacifism, isolationism, pro-enemy sympathies, collective security, a belief in conciliation, etc.). Consequently, appeasement and other forms of underbalancing will tend to triumph in the absence of a determined and broad political consensus to balance simply because these policies represent the path of least domestic resistance and can appeal to a broad range of interests along the political spectrum. Thus, underreacting to threats, unlike an effective balancing strategy, does not require overwhelming, united, and coherent support from elites and masses; it is a default strategy.
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Can’t Solve Root Cause
Even withdrawing US troops can’t solve gendered violence – poverty is the underlying factor
Gwyn Kirk, Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies, and Carolyn Francis, founding member of the East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism, 2000, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice in East Asia, Berkeley Women’s Law Journal, pg. np
The East Asian and U.S. governments attempt to limit the sexual demands of U.S. military personnel to specific locations and specific women--the "bad" women who are available for sexual servicing, as opposed to the "good" women back home (mothers, sisters, wives). For many people in the host communities, military prostitution is a national disgrace. Despite the low opinion many people have of bar women, their work is the lynchpin of the sub-economy of the GI Towns. Many others, including store owners, salespeople, bar owners, restaurateurs, cooks, pimps, procurers, cab drivers, and security men are in business as a result of their work. If the United States were to withdraw from these East Asian countries, many people would be left unemployed. This was the case when the U.S. military withdrew from the Philippines. Women who worked in the GI Towns had to find alternative sources of income, with no help from the government. Some women went to South Korea or Guam to continue to service U.S. troops; others moved to bars and clubs patronized by Filipino men; still others tried to make a go of small businesses.
The plan’s focus on South Korea is unhelpful – all military activities must be criticized
Gwyn Kirk, Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies, and Carolyn Francis, founding member of the East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism, 2000, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice in East Asia, Berkeley Women’s Law Journal, pg. np
Underlying these grassroots activities is a desire for genuine security for ordinary people of host countries. While the host governments often center their attention on military security, causing enormous resources that could be allocated to useful social programs to be absorbed by U.S. military operations, local activists focus on the people living in the host communities. Women from East Asia have built upon the work of U.N. conferences in Vienna and Beijing that began to address military violence against women in war and armed-conflict situations as a human rights issue. They argue that military violence against women also occurs in situations of military occupation, colonial domination, military political control, and even U.N. military forces' peacekeeping activities, and that all military activity must be analyzed and challenged from a gendered perspective.
Single reforms can’t solve gender inequality
Laura Miller, National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute, December 1995, “Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military-Relations,” The Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, pg. np
In this paper I explore the parallel yet sometimes divergent histories of feminism and women's military service, and explain the gap between the two that exists today. I find it problematic, yet understandable, that feminist activists choose an agenda that achieves consistency yet fails to convey the preferences of the women for whom they claim to speak. Here activists must choose between the competing goals of creating a debatable rhetoric, versus representing the sometimes contradictory wishes of women. Yet, when only one feminist agenda has the floor, women whose views are ignored may become alienated from the very feminist movement that struggles to reach them.
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Democracy Turn
US military imperialism is key to spread democracy globally
Max Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 5/5/2003, “American imperialism? No need to run away from label,” USA Today, pg. np
Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice.
Democracy acts as a backstop against all of their impacts – no democratically elected leader will allow policy disasters
John MiGinnis, Professor of Law @ Northwestern, and Ilya Somin, Professor of Law @ Georgetown, 2007, “Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?,” Stanford Law Review, Questia
Finally, democratic accountability also plays a crucial role in preventing major public policy disasters, since elected leaders know that a highly visible catastrophic failure is likely to lead to punishment at the polls. For example, it is striking that no democratic nation, no matter how poor, has ever had a mass famine within its borders, (96) whereas such events are common in authoritarian and totalitarian states. (97) More generally, democracy serves as a check on self-dealing by political elites and helps ensure, at least to some extent, that leaders enact policies that serve the interests of their people.
Global democratic consolidation prevents many scenarios for war and extinction
Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1995, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,”
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Colonialism Turn
Criticizing US power distracts from deterring global imperial powers that actually trigger the impact
Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, 4/7/2002, “Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era,”
It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states.
US “imperialism” is not really imperialism at all – overstating the West’s drive to dominate justifies actual authoritarianism and imperialism by developing countries
Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, 4/7/2002, “Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era,”
Late twentieth-century anti-imperialists have struggled with the problem that modern Western power has almost entirely abandoned formal empire. Hence the idea of neo-imperialism, rooted in economic exploitation buttressed only by indirect political dominance, has already a history of half a century. The problem that these critics have faced is that their chosen concept has become more and more abstracted from the real politics of empire. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.
AT: Colonialism Advantage – Hegemony Turn
Absolute rejection of forward presence leads to global injustices – only US forces can prevent global violence
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, 2003, Just War Against Terror, pg. np
All violence, including the rule-governed violence of warfare, is tragic. But even more tragic is permitting gross injustices and massive crimes to go unpunished. Just war stipulates that the goods of settled social life cannot be achieved in the face of pervasive and unrelenting violence. The horror of today’s so-called failed states is testament to that basic requirement of the “tranquility of order.” In Somalia, as warlords have jostled for power for more than a decade, people have been abused cynically and routinely. Anyone at anytime may be a target. The tragedy of American involvement in Somalia is not that U.S. soldiers were sent there, but that the American commitment was not sufficient to restore minimal civic peace and to permit the Somalian people to begin to rebuild their shattered social framework. Can anyone doubt that a sufficient use of force to stop predators from killing and starving people outright would have been the more just course in Somalia and, in the long run, the one most conducive to civic peace?
US securitization and focus on conflict is key to solve global wars
Yaseen Noorani, Assistant Professor in Near Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona, 2005, “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review, pg. 13
Any threat to the existence of the United States is therefore a threat to the existence of the world order, which is to say, the values that make this order possible. It is not merely that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the free world, is the most capable of defending it. It is rather that the United States is the supreme agency advancing the underlying principle of the free order. The United States is the world order's fulcrum, and therefore the key to its existence and perpetuation. Without the United States, freedom, peace, civil relations among nations, the possibility of civil society are all under threat of extinction. This is why the most abominable terrorists and tyrants single out the United States for their schemes and attacks. They know that the United States is the guardian of liberal values. In the rhetoric of security, therefore, the survival of the United States, its sheer existence, becomes the content of liberal values.
We access our impacts, but they don’t access theirs – the US won’t use forward military presence to dominate the world
Barry Rubin, professor at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel, the Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the IDC, and, Judith Rubin, a senior fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center's International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2004, Hating America, pg. np
Whatever America's faults, its unique characteristics point to one im- portant conclusion that runs in the opposite direction from what anti- Americans claim: this is not a country that wants to rule the world. And yet such a claim is the mantra of anti-Americanism. Thus, to cite one example among millions, France's respected Ie Monde Diplomatique published articles purveying conspiracy theories that identified globalization as an American attempt at world conquest, making the United States at least as bad as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia and worse than bin Ladin. The real axis of evil is said to be a U.S.-dorninated economic system, an ideological "dictatorship" of Amer- ican media and think tanks, and a post-September 11 military offensive that treats Europeans as "vassals" that are ordered "to kneel in suppli- cation {as] the United States aspires to exercise absolute political power."
AT: Structural Violence Outweighs
Their claim that American hegemony is the root cause of backlash is merely a conspiracy theory – a confluence of events require US power projection
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, 2003, Just War Against Terror, pg. np
But the difficulty and desperation of post-World War I conditions – runaway inflation, a war-torn economy, and war reparations, all of which Germany faced – do not add up to the inevitability of the evil that was Nazism. To claim such is to set in motion an exculpatory strategy that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, rationalizes political pathology. The overriding truth and most salient fact of National Socialism is simply stated: A group of people took over state power, aimed to expand an Aryan Empire through ruthless force, and, as dictated by their ideology of biological racism, murdered whole categories of people not because of anything they had done but because of who they were. Why, then, in the context of America’s war against terrorism, do so many tick off a list of American “failures” or even insist that America brought the horrors of September 11, 2001, on herself? Let me be clear that I exempt from this mode of argument the ludicrous claims that have arisen since that day, such as the slander that Israel carried out the attacks after having first warned Jews who worked in the New York’s World Trade Center towers to stay home that day, or the preposterous charge that American officials, up to and including the president of the United States, engineered the attacks to bolster their popularity. This sort of inflammatory madness exists outside the boundary of political debate and festers instead in the fever swamps of conspiracy theory.
Direct violence, not structural oppression, causes war
William Thompson, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of International Relations at Indiana University, 2003, “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures,” International Studies Quarterly, pg. 10
Richard Ned Lebow (2000–2001) has recently invoked what might be called a streetcar interpretation of systemic war and change. According to him, all our structural theories in world politics both overdetermine and underdetermine the explanation of the most important events such as World War I, World War II, or the end of the Cold War. Not only do structural theories tend to fixate on one cause or stream of causation, they are inherently incomplete because the influence of structural causes cannot be known without also identifying the necessary role of catalysts. As long as we ignore the precipitants that actually encourage actors to act, we cannot make accurate generalizations about the relationships between more remote causation and the outcomes that we are trying to explain. Nor can we test the accuracy of such generalizations without accompanying data on the presence or absence of catalysts. In the absence of an appropriate catalyst (or a ‘‘streetcar’’ that failed to arrive), wars might never have happened.
Focus on large-scale wars should be our first priority
Mohamed Rabie, professor of International political economy, 1994, “Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity”, Questia
Thus, to the proponents of positive peace, the elimination of hunger and poverty and the establishment of justice are the true conditions of real peace and the most effective social measures to reduce the threat of war and undermine the causes of serious conflict. For such a peace to become a reality, they advocate, among other things, the creation of international superstructures to deal with regional and interstate conflict and limit the powers of the nation-state. In addition, they call for the establishment of a new international economic order that guarantees a more balanced distribution of global resources among nations, and effects the restructuring of trade relations between the industrialized and the developing countries on more equitable terms. However, proponents of passive peace argue that the order of priorities should be reversed. They maintain that the tendency to commit mass violence, which characterizes many intergroup and international relations, is in itself a primary obstacle to the establishment of justice and the fulfillment of human goals. Thus, as Robert Pickus says, "establishing the minimum conditions for the non-violent resolution and prosecution of political conflict becomes the first objective.”
AT: Positive Peace
Embracing positive peace allows us to stand by and watch wars proliferate throughout the globe
Peter Suedfeld, professor of psychology @ the University of British Colombia, 2000, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, Volume 6, Issue 3, pg. np
Like many intellectuals, Boulding confuses words with reality. Government officials delivering public apologies do not always really regret the actions they are apologizing for (much less do they necessarily reflect the feelings of their citizenry). Organizations with the word “peace” in their name don’t always support peace, and have sometimes been unwitting or even knowing fronts for bellicose governments or NGOs. Regardless of what treaties are signed, neither land mines nor nuclear weapons are likely to disappear as long as they are useful. In fact, the latter are becoming available to more and more governments and, even more scarily, to some NGOs. A UNdeclaration of years and decades for peace education will not abolish the military drill undergone by school children in the People’s Republic of China, in North Korea, in Palestine, and many other places around the globe; and it will not stop the conscription of children and adolescents into both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary armed forces.
Focus on war doesn’t trade off with focusing on positive peace
Peter Lawler, lecturer in international relations and director of the Centre for International Relations in the Department of Politics, 2002, Monash University, Peace Review, 14:1, pg. 7
Of course, a would-be just war theorist cum peace researcher might find refuge in the adage, most famously associated with the Red Cross, that if wars must be fought at all it is better that some sense of humanity is retained on the battle field. In other words, the philosophical minefield of jus ad bellum (the justice of war itself) is to be sidestepped in favor of a more praxeological concern with jus in bello (justice in war), that is, trying to reduce the harm caused by wars. There seems to be no logical reason why such a concern could not coexist with a commitment to pursuing the ultimate eradication of war or other forms of large-scale violence. Yet, peace researchers have, by and large, remained silent with regard to the questions of justice in war.
We have to solve large-scale violent conflicts before we can focus on everyday forms of violence – they’re a key barrier to peace
Joshua Goldstein, Int’l Relations Professor @ American University, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.
AT: No Great Power War – War is Possible
A majority of political scientists conclude war could still happen
John Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science @ U Chicago, 1999, “Is Major War Obsolete?,”
My third and final point here is, the fact of the matter is, that there’s hardly anybody in the national security establishment-and I bet this is true of Michael-who believes that war is obsolescent. I’m going to tell you why I think this is the case. Consider the fact that the United States stations roughly 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 troops in Asia. We spend an enormous amount of money on defense. We’re spending almost as much money as we were spending during the Cold War on defense. We spend more money than the next six countries in the world spend on defense. The questions is, why are we spending all this money? Why are we stationing troops in Europe? Why are we stationing troops in Asia? Why are we concentrating on keeping NATO intact and spreading it eastward? I’ll tell you why, because we believe that if we don’t stay there and we pull out, trouble is going to break out, and not trouble between minor powers, but trouble between major powers. That’s why we’re there. We know very well that if we leave Europe, the Germans are going to seriously countenance, if not automatically go, and get nuclear weapons. Certainly the case with the Japanese. Do you think the Germans and the Japanese are going to stand for long not to have nuclear weapons? I don’t think that’s the case. Again, that security zone between the Germans and the Russians-there’ll be a real competition to fill that.
War could still happen- litany of conflicts could go global
Niall Ferguson, Senior fellow @ the Hoover Institute and professor of History @ Harvard, 2008, Hoover Digest, pg. 43
The risk of a major geopolitical crisis in 2007 is certainly lower than it was in 1914. Yet it is not so low as to lie altogether beyond the realm of probability. The escalation of violence in the Middle East as Iraq disintegrates and Iran presses on with its nuclear program is close to being a certainty, as are the growing insecurity of Israel and the impossibility of any meaningful U.S. exit from the region. All may be harmonious between the United States and China today, yet the potential for tension over trade and exchange rates has unquestionably increased since the Democrats gained control of Congress. Nor should we forget about security flashpoints such as the independence of Taiwan, the threat of North Korea, and the nonnuclear status of Japan. To consign political risk to the realm of uncertainty seems almost as rash today as it was in the years leading up the First World War. Anglo-German economic commercial ties reached a peak in 1914, but geopolitics trumped economics. It often does. The closure of the New York Stock Exchange and federal bailouts for the likes of Goldman Sachs may seem unimaginable to us now. But financial history reminds us that ten-sigma events do happen. And, when they do, liquidity can ebb much more quickly than it previously flowed.
Even a low probability of a great power war outweighs
Robert Art, professor of IR at Brandeis University, 2003, A Grand Strategy for America, p. 212-213
Fourth and finally, great-power wars are highly destructive, not only to the participants and their immediate neighbors, but also to world order and stability. Today, they may be low-probability events, but their costs may be extremely high. In this regard, we should treat Eurasian great-power wars the same way we do NBC terrorism, and the same way we treated the possibility of a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War: we should take multiple measures to prevent them and to limite them if they should break out. Great-power wars are potentially too destructive not to do everything possible to avert them; great-power peace shousld be over-determined, not left to chance.
AT: No Great Power War – Even Small Wars Are Bad
Regional nuclear use still triggers extinction
Ian Hoffman, citing a Rutgers scientist, 12-12-2006,
With superpower nuclear arsenals plummeted to a third of 1980s levels and slated to drop by another third, the nightmarish visions of nuclear winter offered up by scientists during the Cold War have receded. But they haven't gone away. Researchers at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting warned Monday that even a small regional nuclear war could burn enough cities to shroud the globe in black smoky shadow and usher in the manmade equivalent of the Little Ice Age. "Nuclear weapons represent the greatest single human threat to the planet, much more so than global warming," said Rutgers University atmospheric scientist Alan Robock.
Regional nuclear use sets an example for other powers- causes nuclear wars throughout the globe
Paul Rogers, professor of peace studies @ Bradford U, 6-1-2008, New Internationalist, pg. np
The risk is that some time in the next couple of decades, a regional crisis will 'go nuclear', with two possible outcomes. One is that it might escalate to a global nuclear war. Even if we are down to a few thousand warheads instead of the tens of thousands of the Cold Warera, just a fraction of them would cause utter devastation across much of the world. The other outcome is that a nuclear war stays within a particular region, killing hundreds of thousands or even millions of people but not escalating to a global catastrophe. Apart from the dreadful immediate consequences, that could mean that we become accustomed to usingnuclear weapons as instruments of warfare. The taboo that has held since Nagasaki will have been broken, leading to a formidably more insecure world.
Empirical data proves nuclear weapons won’t deter escalation
Patrick Morgan, professor of political science @ UC-Irvine, 2003, Deterrence Now, pg. 133
Thus nuclear weapons also offer scant political leverage since nuclear threats lack credibility. Geller studied almost 400 militarized disputes in 1946—76 and found that nuclear weapons did not prevent escalation. What does this tell us? It confirms that nuclear weapons scare the daylights out of governments, but can lead one to ask why nuclear deterrence ever works, except perhaps against a possible nuclear attack.
Small wars easily escalate
David Bosco, senior editor @ FP magazine, 7-23-2006, LA Times,
Some see the start of a global conflict. “We’re in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War,” former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said last week. Certain religious websites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it’s not hard to conjure ways that today’s hot spots could ignite.
AT: Kritik of Disadvantages
Epistemological questions should be disregarded in the face of specific evidence- if we have evidence it proves our claim didn’t come out of thin air
David Patrick Houghton, professor of political science @ the University of Central Florida, 2008, International Politics, March, Volume 45, Issue 2, pg. 115
This essay takes issue with the position that epistemology matters in such a fundamental way. The reasoning offered is as follows: it is not clear whether there exists any real alternative to the kind of 'observation' beloved by positivists, denigrated by postpositivists, but engaged in by both. While doing empirical work does not make one an empiricist in the philosophical sense of that term, it is far from clear that the epistemological position one adopts has much effect on the kind of truth claims one makes. The adoption of postpositivist epistemologies has not meant that 'anything goes' in the new postpositivist scholarship; every example in the growing body of that literature, which illustrates (or is intended to illustrate) a theoretical point is drawn from experience and observation, and is surely 'empirical' in nature. This raises the question of whether it is possible to be genuinely postpositivist at all. I argue here that ultimately it is not, for observations cannot be plucked out of thin air; one's truth claims about the world have to come from somewhere.
Prefer empirical evidence – especially with regards to non-violent movements
Don Feder, Staff, 8-31-2006, “Fighting Terror With Estrogen,”
And now, let us say a few good words for warfare and violence. Those whose mantra is violence-never-solved-anything, are dogma-blinded, historical illiterates who would lead us down the soft path to national suicide. Without warfare and violence, we would have no country. America was born on the battlefield. (George III would never have let us go without a fight.) The Declaration of Independence was noble words penned on paper. It was the sword that gave them a reality. In this instance, the perpetrators of revolutionary violence included John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington – men of learning and ability all. Without warfare and violence the 11 states of the Confederacy would have successfully seceded in 1861, leaving us with two truncated nations. And the slaves would have been pickin’ cotton for ‘ole massah for at least a few decades more. Without warfare and violence in 1939-1945, today, half the world would be singing "Deutschland uber Alles," while the other half bowed to the honorable emperor of Japan. And without warfare and violence during the Cold War, the world would have been swallowed up by a monstrous ideology responsible for 100 million deaths in the 20th century.
Focusing on low probability high impact events is key to effective policymaking
Cynthia Wagner, managing editor of the Futurist, 2-2008, The Futurist, Vol. 42, Iss. 1, pg. 6
Sensing the forces of change underlying potential strategic surprises is something everyone can do-if they make it a priority and commit themselves to a systematic approach, advise Schwartz and Randall. They recommend being imaginative and systematic: "It is important to look for events that seem to have a low probability of happening but that would have a high impact if they were to occur." The authors encourage leaders to go on "learning journeys" that explore areas outside their specialties and to role-play in order to understand other points of view. Using multiple filters helps compile seemingly unrelated information. Instead of departmentalizing the types of intelligence that your organization reviews-such as market research or financial research-Schwartz and Randall recommend creating a portfolio of databases that can "capture and relate varied information like data on demographics, economics, and energy use." Information can also be processed in new ways. Trend analysis-the study of social, technological, economic, and political forces-allows the strategic decision maker to make connections among data from multiple sources.
***Generic Advantage Core Neg***
US Is Not Overstretched
US isn’t overstretched – can still meet all challenges
Sara Wood, Sgt., 8-28-2006, “Military Capable of Meeting All Its Challenges,” US DOD,
The U.S. military is capable not only of winning the war on terror, but also of fulfilling its other commitments around the world and dealing with unforeseen circumstances, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told a group of sailors and Marines here today. “It would be unfortunate if other countries thought because we had 136,000 troops in Iraq today that therefore we are not capable of defending our country or doing anything that we might need to do,” Rumsfeld said at a town-hall meeting.
US isn’t overstretched – large reserve and empirically proven
Sara Wood, Sgt., 8-28-2006, “Military Capable of Meeting All Its Challenges,” US DOD,
Rumsfeld noted that the U.S. has a large active and reserve force, as well as the Individual Ready Reserve, and has many allies that provide support to the war on terror. No country can do everything at once, he acknowledged, but the United States has proved its readiness by responding to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Pakistan, evacuating American citizens from Lebanon, and sending National Guard troops to fortify the southwestern U.S. border – all while maintaining troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. America is fully capable of winning the war on terror as long as it keeps its resolve in the face of a ruthless enemy, Rumsfeld said. The intentions of terrorists groups were made clear once again this month when a plot was uncovered to attack commercial flights between Britain and the United States, he said. Incidents like that serve as a reminder that Americans and people in free countries everywhere should have the same sense of concern and urgency as they did on Sept. 12, 2001, right after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, he said. “It should be a powerful reminder to everyone – free people – (the terrorists are) serious, that they’re determined, and that they’re not going to go away,” he said.
US is still a superpower, despite Iraq and Afghanistan – hasn’t declined yet
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, profs and Dartmouth, 4-24-2009, “Reshaping the world order,” .
So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its polities in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today.
US Recruitment Is High
US military recruitment is high
Mike Cronin, 5-5-2010, “Military recruits get big-league treatment,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review,
The threat of dying in combat hasn't hurt Department of Defense recruitment efforts, according to the Pentagon. Only once between 2004 and 2009 has the Department of Defense not met or exceeded its recruitment goals, said Eileen M. Lainez, a Pentagon spokeswoman. In 2005, the Army achieved 92 percent of its goal of 80,000 enlistees. Also that year, the Department of Defense reached 96 percent of its goal of 169,452 "Fiscal year 2009 was a banner year for recruiting," Lainez said. "Not only did all four services in the active force meet or exceed their numerical recruiting goals, as well as meet or exceed their quality goals, but all six reserve components did the same." That's the first time that has happened since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973, Lainez said.
The military has exceeded its recruitment goals recently
Marc Heller, Times Washington Correspondent, April 13, 2009, Watertown Daily Times, Accessed April 18, 2009
The armed services once again beat monthly recruitment and retention goals in March, with the Marine Corps and Army Reserve posting the strongest percentages. The active-duty Army recorded 6,548 accessions, exceeding a goal of 6,425, the Pentagon reported. Military services have reached or exceeded goals for months, which officials attribute, in part, to the recession. When other jobs are scarce, more people tend to sign up for the military, officials say. The Marine Corps hit 143 percent of its recruitment goal, best among the services, signing 2,017 recruits on a goal of 1,411. The Army Reserve recruited 4,771, or 138 percent of its goal of 3,445. Last week, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates indicated the department will continue with plans to expand the Army to 547,000 active-duty soldiers by next year, although the number of combat brigade teams will be 45, rather than the 48 recently planned. All branches met or exceeded retention goals as well, the Pentagon reported, although it did not post those numbers.
Military recruitment has been on the rise
Greg Angel, March 31, 2009, Up North News, , April 18, 2009
As some people have come to learn, it is no doubt getting harder to find a job, which may be the reason why military recruiters are seeing a rise in applications. "We're right on where we need to be, actually this area stays above what our expectations are," said Chief Dave Waddle, zone 5 supervisor for the United States Navy in the recruitment area that covers northern Michigan. Facing an uncertain future and hard pressed to pay for college, Gaylord High School senior Holly Hensley says that's why she decided to turn to the Navy. "I hadn't really thought about what I was going to do, I really don't know what I want to do after high school," Hensley said. "I don't really have money to go to college next fall so this will offer the assistance and more career opportunities." Others like Hensley are doing the same. Chief Waddle says numbers are remaining steady when it comes to high school seniors, but they are seeing more people between the ages of 21 to 25. "The stability is there as far as finances, as far as health insurance, and with the economy and with the way the jobs are out in the civilian world, you don't know day to day if you're going to have a job or not and that's one of the things you're looking for," Waddle said. In the month of February, every branch of the U.S. military either reached or exceed their recruitment goals.
US Will Withdraw Troops Now
Afghanistan security is improving – draw down will start next year
Reuters, 5-7-2010, “U.S. general tells Obama progress,”
The U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan told President Barack Obama on Thursday that progress was "slow but steady" in the counterinsurgency campaign, the White House said. Obama met his war cabinet for 75 minutes to discuss military efforts in Afghanistan, where the next big push will be an offensive in the southern area of Kandahar. "The phrase that General (Stanley) McChrystal specifically used (in the meeting) was that progress has been slow but steady. I anticipate that is likely what we will see for the rest of the year," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said. Asked whether Obama was satisfied with progress so far, Gibbs replied: "Yes." "I think the president was under no illusions that what we have been involved in for many, many years in Afghanistan is going to take some time. There are a whole host of issues, not just military, but issues surrounding governance that we are working through," he added. Last December, Obama announced 30,000 more troops would be sent to Afghanistan to implement the counterinsurgency strategy which is focused on securing key population centers like Kandahar. He also announced that U.S. forces would start to withdraw from July 2011 if conditions were right.
Iraq withdrawal will be complete by 2011
VOA News, 4-18-2010, “Odierno Says US Withdrawal From Iraq on Track,”
The commander of U.S. forces in Iraq says the planned withdrawal of American troops is on schedule despite ongoing political uncertainty in Baghdad, and an increase in attacks by militants. General Ray Odierno talked about the situation on the ground during an interview broadcast Sunday on American television. General Odierno says progress has been made in Iraq, but acknowledges much more must be done. He says political parties must sort out the results of recent elections and form a government, and Iraqi forces still require U.S. military training and support. But he says he remains confident that the timetable for a U.S. military withdrawal can and will be met. Odierno told the Fox News Sunday television program there are about 95,000 American troops in Iraq. He said almost half will be pulled out during the coming months as U.S. combat operations draw to a close. "Our plans are intact. I feel very comfortable with our plan," he said. "And unless something unforeseen and disastrous happens, I fully expect us to be at 50,000 by the first of September." The remaining troops will support the Iraqi military, and take part in counter-terrorism efforts, with a complete withdrawal planned by the end of 2011.
Momentum is growing for pulling troops out of Japan and South Korea
Daniel Blumenthal, 4-29-2010, “China’s Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy,
Second, Kaplan seems to endorse the "Garret plan" that is making its way around the Pentagon, a plan which, in the context of America's regional political objectives, seems wrongheaded. The basic idea is to "do away with master bases" in Japan and South Korea and instead strengthen the U.S. presence in Oceania -- on Guam and the Caroline, Northern Mariana, Solomon, and Marshal islands -- while at the same time vastly expanding America's naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This strategy would require Washington to upgrade defense relations with India-to use some of its outer islands-well as with Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore. The U.S. navy would still cooperate with the Japanese maritime self-defense force as well. This plan, according to Kaplan, would be less provocative to China while at the same time still allow the United States to play something more than the role of offshore balancer. There are a number of problems with this plan. It is not clear that some of the countries that we would need for the plan to work would cooperate, especially after we pulled out of Japan and South Korea. A withdrawal from the "master bases" would be seen as a waning U.S. commitment to its allies. And, while it is true that the "first island chain" is becoming less defensible, it is not too late to take prudent steps to reverse this dangerous trend. We have not yet hardened air bases in Japan, stepped up efforts at missile defense, or sought better options for countering China's missile force (How about the deployment by Japan of cruise and ballistic missiles along the Ryukus to target Chinese launchers?).
Overstretch Is Not Key To Hegemony
( ) Overstretch doesn’t hurt US hegemony – the US has overwhelming power
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University. 2007. American Empire: A Debate. Pg. 24-25.
Thus, the economy is well placed to be the engine of the American Empire. Even the leading proponent of the “imperial overstretch” argument, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy, has acknowledged this. Imperial overstretch occurs when an empire’s military power and alliance commitments are too burdensome for its economy. In the 1980s, there was much concern among academics that the United States was in danger of this as its economy strained to fund its military operations and alliance commitments abroad. However, Kennedy now acknowledges that he was wrong when he made that argument in his famous book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, because of the robustness of American economic and military power. Indeed, if there is any imperial overstretch, it is more likely to be by China, France, Britain, India, Russia, or the EU—not the United States. Reflecting on the history of world politics, Kennedy submits that the United States not only has overwhelming dominance but possesses such power so as to be a historically unique condition: “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close,” not even an empire as great as the British, because “even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies. Right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy.”32 Moreover, Kennedy recognizes that the steady economic growth of the American economy, and the curbing of inflation, means that “America’s enormous defense expenditures could be pursued at a far lower relative cost to the country than the military spending of Ronald Reagan’s years,” and that fact is “an incomparable source of the U.S. strength.”33 When Kennedy, who was perhaps the strongest skeptic of the economic foundation of America’s power, comes to acknowledge, first, that no previous empire has been as powerful as America is now; and, second, that its strength will last because of the fundamental soundness of its economy, then, as Jeff Foxworthy would say, “You might be an empire....” And it is one that will last a considerable amount of time. As with its military might, the economic foundation of the American empire is sound for the projected future.
US has overwhelming hard power with or without troops – massive defense spending
Stephen Brooks, Assistant Prof of Govt at Dartmouth, and William Wohlforth, Associate Prof, Dept Govt Dartmouth College, 2008, “World Out of Balance,” p. 27.
“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in the The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United States spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting than the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American.11 And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D.
Overstretch Is Not Key To Hegemony Cont’d
Strong economy and control of the commons ensures US heg – overstretch irrelevant
Stephen Brooks, Assistant Prof of Govt at Dartmouth, and William Wohlforth, Associate Prof, Dept Govt Dartmouth College, 2008, “World Out of Balance,” p. 27.
These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally.0 This capacity arises from “command of the commons”—that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance. Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than, any other offshore power has ever had.° Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system (fig. 2.1). Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S. economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1 950—70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past.’5 As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”
Hard Power Key Hegemony
Unipolarity now because of hard power – military spending, and basing.
Robert Kagan, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008 “End of Dreams, Return of History,” p. 40.
The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the inure striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion, even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $5oo billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $1oo billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. AS the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy, if only as a protection against more worrying foes
Naval power ensures US hegemony
Robert Kaplan, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 12-17-2008 “A Gentler Hegemony,” p. np
That is akin to where we are now, post-Iraq: calmer, more pragmatic and with a military -- especially a Navy -- that, while in relative decline, is still far superior to any other on Earth. Near the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had almost 600 ships; it is down to 280. But in aggregate tonnage that is still more than the next 17 navies combined. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations. Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy. Sure the economic crisis will affect shipbuilding, meaning the decline in the number of our ships will continue, and there will come a point where quantity affects quality. But this will be an exceedingly gradual transition, which we will assuage by leveraging naval allies such as India and Japan. Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the world that the U.S. military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week. We are all over Africa, Asia and Latin America with these small missions that increase America's diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the world is generally light, lethal and highly mobile.
Economic decline hurts rival great powers more
Niall Ferguson, Prof of History at Harvard, 9-30-2008, “Geopolitical Consequences of the Credit Crunch,”
But commentators should always hesitate before they prophesy the decline and fall of the United States. America has come through disastrous financial crises before -- not just the Great Depression but also the Great Stagflation of the 1970s -- and emerged with its geopolitical position enhanced. Such crises, bad as they are at home, always have worse effects on America's rivals. The same is proving to be true today. According to the Morgan Stanley Capital International index, the U.S. stock market is down around 18 percent to date this year. The equivalent figure for China is 48 percent, and for Russia -- the worst affected of the world's emerging markets -- it is 55 percent. These figures are not very good advertisements for the more regulated, state-led economic models favored in Beijing and Moscow. Moreover, because investors continue to regard the U.S. government's debt as a "safe haven" in uncertain times, the latest phase of the financial crisis has seen the dollar rally, rather than sag further.
Multipolarity Inevitable
Multipolarity with China is inevitable – will cause great power conflicts, but war depends on US strategy
Christopher Layne, Prof @ Texas AM, January 2008, “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony,” Current History,
There is mounting evidence, however, that this view is mistaken, and that, in fact, the era of American hegemony is drawing to a close right before our eyes. The rise of China is the biggest reason for this. Notwithstanding Washington’s current preoccupation with the Middle East, in the coming decades China’s great power emergence will be the paramount issue of grand strategy facing the United States. Whether China will undergo a “peaceful rise”—as Beijing claims—is doubtful. Historically, the emergence of new poles of power in the international system has been geopolitically destabilizing. For example, the rise of Germany, the United States, and Japan at the end of the nineteenth century contributed to the international political frictions that culminated in two world wars. There is no reason to believe that China’s rise will be an exception. However, while it is certainly true that China’s rise will cause geopolitical turmoil, a Sino-American war is not inevitable. Whether such a conflict occurs will hinge more on Washington’s strategic choices than on Beijing’s.
Multipolarity is totally inevitable due to global economic shifts
Christopher Layne, PhD and Research Fellow @ Center on Peace and Liberty, and Benjamin Schwarz, ed. The Atlantic, 9-29-2009, “Twilight of Pax Americana,” LA Times,
Since the end of WWII, the world has depended on the United States for stability. But with American military and economic dominance waning, capitalism and global security are threatened. The international order that emerged after World War II has rightly been termed the Pax Americana; it's a Washington-led arrangement that has maintained political stability and promoted an open global economic system. Today, however, the Pax Americana is withering, thanks to what the National Intelligence Council in a recent report described as a "global shift in relative wealth and economic power without precedent in modern history" -- a shift that has accelerated enormously as a result of the economic crisis of 2007-2009. At the heart of this geopolitical sea change is China's robust economic growth. Not because Beijing will necessarily threaten American interests but because a newly powerful China by necessity means a relative decline in American power, the very foundation of the postwar international order. These developments remind us that changes in the global balance of power can be sudden and discontinuous rather than gradual and evolutionary. The Great Recession isn't the cause of Washington's ebbing relative power. But it has quickened trends that already had been eating away at the edifice of U.S. economic supremacy. Looking ahead, the health of the U.S. economy is threatened by a gathering fiscal storm: exploding federal deficits that could ignite runaway inflation and undermine the dollar. To avoid these perils, the U.S. will face wrenching choices. The Obama administration and the Federal Reserve have adopted policies that have dramatically increased both the supply of dollars circulating in the U.S. economy and the federal budget deficit, which both the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office estimate will exceed $1 trillion every year for at least the next decade. In the short run, these policies were no doubt necessary; nevertheless, in the long term, they will almost certainly boomerang. Add that to the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the enormous unfunded liabilities for entitlement programs and the cost of two ongoing wars, and you can see that America's long-term fiscal stability is in jeopardy. As the CBO says: "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." This spells trouble ahead for the dollar.
Multipolarity Inevitable Cont’d
Financial crisis ensures multipolarity is coming
Christopher Layne, PhD and Research Fellow @ Center on Peace and Liberty, and Benjamin Schwarz, ed. The Atlantic, 9-29-2009, “Twilight of Pax Americana,” LA Times,
Financially, the U.S. has been responsible for managing the global economy by acting as the market and lender of last resort. But as President Obama acknowledged at the London G-20 meeting in April, the U.S. is no longer able to play this role, and the world increasingly is looking to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the locomotives of global recovery. Going forward, the fiscal crisis will mean that Washington cannot discharge its military functions as a hegemon either, because it can no longer maintain the power edge that has allowed it to keep the ambitions of the emerging great powers in check. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 -- the Pax Americana -- rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. Remove the foundation and the structure crumbles. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world powers. The result will be profound changes in world politics. Emerging powers will seek to establish spheres of influence, control lines of communication, engage in arms races and compete for control over key natural resources. As America's decline results in the retraction of the U.S. military role in key regions, rivalries among emerging powers are bound to heat up. Already, China and India are competing for influence in Central and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Even today, when the United States is still acting as East Asia's regional pacifier, the smoldering security competition between China and Japan is pushing Japan cautiously to engage in the very kind of "re-nationalization" of its security policy that the U.S. regional presence is supposed to prevent. While still wedded to its alliance with the U.S., in recent years Tokyo has become increasingly anxious that, as a Rand Corp. study put it, eventually it "might face a threat against which the United States would not prove a reliable ally." Consequently, Japan is moving toward dropping Article 9 of its American-imposed Constitution (which imposes severe constraints on Japan's military), building up its forces and quietly pondering the possibility of becoming a nuclear power. Although the weakening of the Pax Americana will not cause international trade and capital flows to come to a grinding halt, in coming years we can expect states to adopt openly competitive economic policies as they are forced to jockey for power and advantage in an increasingly competitive security and economic environment. The world economy will thereby more closely resemble that of the 1930s than the free-trade system of the post-1945 Pax Americana. The coming end of the Pax Americana heralds a crisis for capitalism. The coming era of de-globalization will be defined by rising nationalism and mercantilism, geopolitical instability and great power competition. In other words, having enjoyed a long holiday from history under the Pax Americana, international politics will be headed back to the future.
Soft Power Is Already High
Obama is already improving US soft power
Jon Taplin, 4-24-2010, “Obama’s Soft Power Effect,”
I was on a panel on Friday at the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. There is both good news and bad news in this critical area of the use of soft power. The good news is that after only a year in office, the Obama Administration has greatly improved the world’s view of America. The BBC interviewed 30,000 people in 28 countries about their attitudes towards different countries. The Poll shows that President Obama has made a huge difference in the way other countries regard us. My colleague Nick Cull pointed out that the world in general tends to recoil from countries that could be characterized as “aggressive”; either towards other countries or their own citizens. So perhaps the twin poles of our planned withdrawal from Iraq and our own financial crisis may have softened the American image as much as the election of a man of color to our Presidency in this multicultural world. Obviously both China and Iran suffer from the aggressiveness towards their own people in this poll.
Obama already solved soft power
Ronald Asmus, executive director of German Marshall Fund in Brussels, 9-10-2009, “Europe and the Obama bounce,” International Herald Tribune, ln
European attitudes toward the United States have experienced up and downs during past decades - with significant drops in support during the Vietnam war, the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s or the war in Kosovo in 1999. But never before in the history of trans-Atlantic polling have we seen the kind of plunge that took place under George W. Bush. That drop occurred during the president's first term and the Iraq war - and Mr. Bush never recovered. European publics had essentially made up their mind that they didn't like the president or trust American leadership - and those views basically didn't budge throughout his years in office. Policymakers wondered - and at times despaired - over whether America had witnessed a permanent structural shift in European attitudes or merely a cyclical pattern tied to an unpopular president. It was thus with great anticipation that the German Marshall Fund went into the field this summer for our annual Trans-Atlantic Trends survey to test how Europeans were assessing President Obama after some six months in office. While it was hardly a secret that Mr. Obama is popular in Europe, the numbers of this year's poll are nevertheless eye-popping. If Mr. Bush experienced an unprecedented drop in public support, Mr. Obama has produced a bounce not seen in trans-Atlantic polling on U.S. presidents since the 1950s. President Obama's popularity is almost stratospheric. He has essentially reversed the loss to America's image that accrued during the Bush years. Mr. Obama made his greatest gains in precisely those countries where Mr. Bush had lost the most ground - Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy. The most Obama-crazed country was Germany, where his popularity is some 80 percentage points higher than the level of support Mr. Bush enjoyed in 2008. Indeed, President Obama is far more popular in Europe than he is at home. Europeans have more confidence than Americans do in his ability to deal with international issues ranging from terrorism to Russia to the Middle East. Europeans trust Mr. Obama to handle such issues more than they do their own leaders.
Soft Power Is Already High Cont’d
The symbol of Obama as president boosts US soft power
Nancy Snow, staff writer, 1-21-2009, “Obama Soft Power, Smart Power II,” Huffington Post,
The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to do what you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten them with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be attracted to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks.--Joseph Nye We have left the Age of Bush, which emphasized the sticks approach to power and entered the Age of Obama, the age of attraction and cooption, more popularly known these days as soft power. Can we now officially release ourselves from the post-9/11 era? Despite the global economic woes, I sense that America has found her footing again. We still have that pull factor in respect to our experimental, innovative, risk-taking values. We don't guarantee that everyone rises equally but we do offer opportunities to pursue our dreams and goals that are almost unparalleled. This is not an endorsement of the "greatest country on earth" mantra, mind you. In November 2008 I was invited to the downtown Washington, D.C. headquarters of Voice of America Television. The topic was Obama's use of soft power in his new administration. Word on the street was that Mr. Soft Power himself, Joseph Nye Jr., would be commenting on the subject for the same TV package. You can read the accompanying article and watch the piece online here Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton has said she would employ smart power in her management at the State Department by seeking "more partners and fewer adversaries." She even put a little gender flourish on the matter: I believe that American leadership has been wanting, but is still wanted. We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural, picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of our foreign policy. This is not a radical idea. The ancient Roman poet Terrence declared that in every endeavor, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first. The same truth binds wise women as well. Dean Nye today published a piece in the LA Times about this resurgence of soft power/smart power in the Obama administration, a move away from fear and domination to inspiration and hope, clichés though they may be. There is no question that just the symbolic presence of Obama as American President is a trust-infusing and credibility-building move in the world. Nye again: If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place -- in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction -- soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency -- not force, not money -- to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.
The US Will Never Reinstate The Draft
Absolutely no support for reinstating the draft
Donald H. Rumsfeld, former defense secretary, 10-29-2004, “Debunking an election-season myth,”
The peculiar thing about myths is that even the most far-fetched can be nearly impossible to extinguish. This is especially so when there is a vested interest in some quarters in keeping them alive.
Like many Americans, I have recently heard a great deal of misinformed talk about a so-called "secret plan" to bring back the draft. This plot is so secret that it doesn't exist. Neither our commander-in-chief nor the secretary of Defense know anything about it. That's because it simply is not true. Let me be even more emphatic on that point. To my knowledge, in the time I have served as secretary of Defense, the idea of reinstating draft has never been debated, endorsed, discussed, theorized, pondered, or even whispered by anyone in the Bush administration. When asked about it, the president has flatly rejected the idea. Similarly, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said a draft is not needed or desirable. And the U.S. House of Representatives voted down a bill, offered by several Democratic congressmen, to reinstate the draft by a resounding 402-2 just two weeks ago. Yet based on absolutely no actual evidence, partisans, conspiracy mongers, and troublemakers are attempting to scare and mislead young Americans by insisting that a draft is coming. This is mischief-making masquerading as a serious policy debate. It is shameful.
No shot of reinstating the draft – just an urban legend
WatchBlog, 9-30-2004, “The Draft Myth,”
Another day, another political chain letter. The Draft. They’re coming for us. They’re coming for our children!!! They’ll need more people for the “illegal” war in Iraq and for the war in Afghanistan! Quick, everyone Rock the Vote and support Kerry! Too bad its all hogwash. But you wouldn�t know it from the media. There’s been very little coverage of this very widespread urban legend, a myth that some forces in the Democratic Party have been trying to employ to rally support for John Kerry. The theory goes something like this: Republicans want to wage war. They’ll need more troops. They’ll need YOU. They want to bring back the draft. We have to stop them! (A message brought to you by a completely non-partisan political organization, of course.) Sigh. It’s amazing that this kind of fear tactic actually works. Never mind that both major parties and both Presidential candidates oppose the draft.
Their evidence is just internet propaganda
Charles Pope, 10-2-2004, “No plans for a draft,” Seattle PI,
On it goes in what has evolved into the latest urban myth -- that the nation is on the verge of reinstituting the military draft for the first time in three decades. It is spawned by a loose collection of facts, propelled by the Internet and a war that has divided the nation. With students back on campuses, it also has been given wide attention in college newspapers, which in some cases have perpetuated the myth. "George W. Bush is planning to reinstate the military draft by June 15, 2005," began a Sept. 8 story in the Daily Kent Stater at Kent State University in Ohio. "Is it true that by as soon as June 2005, the draft can be reinstated?" a Seattle resident wrote to Cantwell. "I don't feel that the people are being heard. I have six nieces and nephews who show great potential with their lives and interests. I do not want them to have to put their plans on hold while we fight wars that we shouldn't be in. I am totally against the draft, I am against war." But it isn't true. There are no plans to reinstate the military draft. None. The official denials have come fast and furious from President Bush and his most senior advisers. "It is absolutely false," an exasperated Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld answered last week when asked about the rumor. "It's nonsense."
Reinstating The Draft Is Good
Military adventurism is impossible under a draft – the status quo is political acquiescence
The Black Commentator, January 9, 2003, “No Draft, No Peace,” Issue 24, accessed 9/1/08,
Not entirely true, of course. As Rep. Rangel pointed out, of the members of Congress who voted for Bush's war against Iraq, only one has a child in the enlisted ranks. A few other congressional children are officers. The scarcity of uniforms is reflective of the classes from which the Congress is drawn. What the generals really mean is that today's military is whiter than the Vietnam-era ranks, is largely disconnected from important sectors of civilian society, and will do as it is told without political or moral qualms. The very utility of this force encourages its use. The same qualities that recommend the volunteer force to war planners, also make endless aggression thinkable. Bush's Permanent War envisions multiple military engagements at any given time, anywhere on the globe, until the entire planet submits to an American-imposed order. (See "Permanent War, Permanent National Emergency," October 17.) Such a strategy is inconceivable under a citizen soldier - universal service - regime, which is why a recall of the draft is anathema to the War Party. Permanent War requires the political acquiescence of broad sections of the middle and upper middle classes. Immunity from conscription guarantees a high level of acceptance of the current rulers' global military ambitions.
Instituting a draft is a moral necessity to check militarism
The Black Commentator, January 9, 2003, “No Draft, No Peace,” Issue 24, accessed 9/1/08,
The generals have good reason to be confident that they will enjoy free rein abroad. Americans don't care who they kill. "As far as I can see, Americans don't care about foreign casualties," said John Mueller, an expert on U.S. public opinion about war. "When we ask people point-blank in polls, they say it does matter. But the polling evidence suggests it really doesn't in the end," said the Ohio State University political scientist. For example: "How many American lives is worth one Somali life? Not one." No, the bulk of this cocooned population, which has the power to extinguish the species, cares only about itself. Before they will embrace humanity, they must first be given cause for personal anxiety. A draft is both moral and a practical necessity, if there is to be any impediment to Americans' second-hand, long-distance, mass killing sprees - crimes that we will all pay for, eventually, in poisoned water, irradiated cities, crippled communications or any other vengeance that aggrieved foreigners can inflict against the people behind the war machine: us.
Only a draft can ensure military effectiveness
Philip Carter, Former Army Captain, and Paul Glastris, editor in chief of Washington Monthly, May 3, 2005, “The Case for the Draft,” Washington Monthly, accessed 9/1/08,
But there's a deeper problem, one that any president who chose to invade a country the size of Iraq would have faced. In short, America's all-volunteer military simply cannot deploy and sustain enough troops to succeed in places like Iraq while still deterring threats elsewhere in the world. Simply adding more soldiers to the active duty force, as some in Washington are now suggesting, may sound like a good solution. But it's not, for sound operational and pragmatic reasons. America doesn't need a bigger standing army; it needs a deep bench of trained soldiers held in reserve who can be mobilized to handle the unpredictable but inevitable wars and humanitarian interventions of the future. And while there are several ways the all-volunteer force can create some extra surge capacity, all of them are limited.
Hegemony Bad – AT: Great Power Wars
Globalization prevents great power wars
Stephen Brooks, Prof of Gov at Dartmouth College, 2005, “Producing Security,” Princeton University Press, p. 214-7.
The point is that even if a risk-acceptant or blundering leader of a great power does not face or overruns these constraints on war, waiting in reserve would be a constraint that no leader or country can disregard or circumvent: the globalization of production has shifted the scales against great power revisionism. By making it structurally harder for any great power revisionist to succeed, the globalization of production now serves as a powerful "reserve stabilizer." Of course, the peace between the great powers in the decades after World War II itself created a favorable environment for the globalization of production to emerge. The key point is that now that the globalization of production exists, it presents states with a structural fact on the ground-one that independently reinforces great power stability in a positive feedback loop. Individual states can isolate themselves from the globalization of production, but they cannot summarily end it on their own. Moreover, great powers that isolate themselves still will find it just as difficult to run the tables-indeed, it will be harder because they will be less strong militarily. Of course, the largest most advanced states arguably have the most to gain from participation in geographic dispersion of MNC production, and hence it is unlikely that any of them would, in fact, seek to take this self-isolation route. Pursuing independence is simply no longer an attractive option. The globalization of production is consequential not only because it cannot be abruptly shut down or ignored by a revisionist great power. Also significant is that great power leaders do not have to understand the geographic dispersion of MNC production, or how it changes the prospects for revisionism, for it to have a stabilizing effect on great power security relations.
Global production shift discourages great power transition wars
Stephen Brooks, Prof of Gov at Dartmouth College, 2005, “Producing Security,” Princeton University Press, p. 214-7.
Leaders also need not calculate costs and benefits in a rational manner, or have a particular set of preferences, for this global production shift to act as a stabilizer. As long as the globalization of production exists, it will be harder for a great power to run the tables no matter how leaders understand the global economy, how they make decisions, or what ideas they have. For the foreseeable future, nothing will change this. Ultimately, therefore, the globalization of production is a structural constraint on great power revisionism different from, say, nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons do not necessarily operate as a stabilizer since not all great powers have them, they are subject to potential accidents, and they also may be controlled by leaders who do not make decisions using standard conceptions of rationality.'' In addition, if nuclear deterrence fails, the negative consequences would be enormous; the globalization of production carries with it no such risks. The bottom line is that this global production shift is very consequential. Had the globalization of production existed at the time of World War II, Germany would have been much less successful since it would not have been able to effectively seize resources from the advanced societies it conquered while also being able to produce competitive military technology under a cutoff of supplies.
Heg makes transition wars more likely
Christopher Layne, Professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami. World Policy Journal. New York: Summer 1998. Vol. 15, Iss. 2; pg. 8, 21 pgs. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?”
In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics does not take place in a political vacuum. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the emergence of new great powers. The resulting "power transition," which occurs as a dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually climaxes in great power wars. 24 Because great power emergence is driven by uneven growth rates (that is, some states are growing faster economically than others), there is little, short of preventive war, that the United States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But U.S. grand strategy, to some extent, can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America's relative power decline.
Hegemony Bad – Entanglement Wars
US alliance commitments ensure entanglement wars
Ted Galen Carpenter, VP Foreign Policy @ Cato, 9-3-2008, “The Limits of Deterrence,”
The importance of those states to Washington is simply not comparable to Western Europe's importance to America during the Cold War. Conversely, Russia's quarrels with several countries on its borders involve an array of potent ethnic, economic, and strategic considerations. To be blunt, the NATO commitment to small, vulnerable countries in Russia's immediate neighborhood looks like a bluff — and not a very credible one at that. U.S. policymakers have to hope that Putin or some future Russian leader doesn't decide to call that bluff. If Moscow ever challenges Washington's commitment, the United States will be left with a choice between a bad outcome and a worse one. The bad outcome is that U.S. leaders face the reality that it would be reckless to risk a major war to protect a client that is of little strategic or economic relevance to America — even though a retreat would raise serious questions about the credibility of other U.S. commitments. The worse outcome would be to actually try to fulfill the security pledge and risk a war with nuclear implications. The conflict in Georgia torpedoed the arrogant assumption that mere expressions of U.S. support for client states would deter other major powers. Washington suffered a blow to its pride and prestige, but the episode may have been a blessing in disguise. U.S. leaders need to understand that they have made a host of security promises that America probably cannot redeem. In essence, U.S. leaders have written security checks on a bank account with insufficient funds. They ought to rescind such unwise and unsustainable commitments before the next foreign policy train wreck.
Hegemony doesn’t deter regional conflicts – but ensures the US gets sucked in
Christopher Layne, Prof @ Naval Postgrad, Summer 1998, “Rethinking American grand strategy,” World Policy Journal, v. 15, iss. 2, p. np
Notwithstanding its perceived complexities, it appears that extended deterrence "worked" in Europe during the Cold War and was easier to execute successfully than generally was thought. One should not assume, however, that extended deterrence will work similarly well in the early twenty-first century. If extended deterrence indeed worked during the Cold War, it was because of a set of unique conditions that are unlikely to be replicated in the future: bipolarity; a clearly defined, and accepted, geopolitical status quo; the intrinsic value to the United States of the protected region; and the permanent forward deployment by the United States of significant military forces in Western Europe. The number of great powers in the system affects extended deterrence's efficacy. During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe stabilized the superpower relationship by demarcating the continent into U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence that delineated the vital interests of both superpowers. Each knew it courted disaster if it challenged the other's sphere. Also, during the Cold War, the superpowers were able to exercise control over their major allies to minimize the risk of unwillingly being dragged into a conflict by them. In the early twenty-first century, however, the international system will be multipolar and, arguably, less stable and more conflict-prone than a bipolar international system. Spheres of influence will not be delineated clearly. And because other states will have more latitude to pursue their own foreign and security policy agendas than they did during the Cold War, the risk will be much greater that the United States could be dragged into a conflict because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. Extended deterrence is bolstered by a clearly delineated geopolitical status quo and undermined by the absence of clearly defined spheres of influence. The resolution of the 1948-49 Berlin crisis formalized Europe's de facto postwar partition. After 1949, the very existence of a clear status quo in Europe itself bolstered deterrence. In deterrence situations of this type, the defender enjoys two advantages: the potential attacker must bear the onus (and risk) of moving first and the defender's interests generally outweigh the challenger's (hence the defender is usually willing to run greater risks to defend the status quo than the challenger is to change it). In the post-Cold War world, however, the number of political and territorial flash points where the status quo is hotly contested--the Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, Tokdo/Takeshima, and in a host of potential disputes in East Central and Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia--is on the rise.
Hegemony Bad – Entanglement Wars Cont’d
Hegemony can’t prevent prolif in the long term – regional security concerns outweigh, which means it can only raise the risk of great power entanglement wars
Christopher Layne, CATO, 1999, “Adjusting to Nuclear Proliferation,” Handbook for 106th Congress,
In addition, because other countries will have more latitude to pursue their own foreign and security policy agendas than they did during the Cold War, there will be a greater risk that the United States could be dragged into a conflict because of a protected country’s irresponsible behavior. Moreover, a crucial factor in weighing the credibility of a defender’s commitment is the degree of its interest in the protected area. Had the Soviets seriously contemplated an attack on Western Europe, they almost certainly would have drawn back from the brink. In a bipolar setting, Western Europe’s security was a matter of considerable importance to the United States for both strategic and credibility reasons. In the early 21st century, however, the intrinsic value of many of the regions to which the United States may wish to extend deterrence will be doubtful. Indeed, as political scientist Robert Jervis observes, in the post–Cold War world, ‘‘few imaginable disputes will engage vital U.S. interests.’’ It thus will be difficult to convince a potential attacker that U.S. deterrence commitments are credible. It is doubtful, for example, that the United States could deter a Russian invasion of the Baltic republics or Ukraine or, several decades hence, a Chinese assault on Taiwan. To engage in such actions, Moscow or Beijing would have to be highly motivated; conversely, the objects of possible attack are unimportant strategically to the United States, which would cause the challenger to discount U.S. credibility. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan suggests the difficulties U.S. extended deterrence strategy will face in coming decades. During the crisis, a Chinese official said that China could use force against Taiwan without fear of U.S. intervention because American decisionmakers ‘‘care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.’’ Although empty today, as China becomes more powerful militarily and economically in coming decades, threats of this nature from Beijing will be more potent.
Offshore Balancing Good – War
Maintaining predominance ensures great power wars – moving towards offshore balancing can ensure peaceful transition
Christopher Layne, Prof @ Naval Postgrad, Summer 1998, “Rethinking American grand strategy,” World Policy Journal v. 15, iss. 2, p. pq
The strategy of preponderance incorporates contradictory assumptions about the importance of relative power. On the one hand, the strategy seeks to maximize America's military power by perpetuating its role as the predominant great power in the international system. Yet, the strategy's economic dimension is curiously indifferent to the security implications of the redistribution of power in the international political system resulting from economic interdependence. Nor does the strategy resolve the following conundrum: given that economic power is the foundation of military strength, how will the United States be able to retain its hegemonic position in the international political system if its relative economic power continues to decline? In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics does not take place in a political vacuum. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the emergence of new great powers. The resulting "power transition," which occurs as a dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually climaxes in great power wars. 24 Because great power emergence is driven by uneven growth rates (that is, some states are growing faster economically than others), there is little, short of preventive war, that the United States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But U.S. grand strategy, to some extent, can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America's relative power decline. A crucial relationship exists between America's relative power and its strategic commitments. The historian Paul Kennedy and the political economist Robert Gilpin have explained how strategic overcommitment leads first to "imperial overstretch," and then to relative decline. 25 Gilpin has outlined succinctly the causal logic supporting this conclusion. As he points out, the overhead costs of empire are high: "In order to maintain its dominant position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the international economy. These protection and related costs are not productive investments; they constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominant state." 26 Ultimately, the decline in its relative power leaves a waning hegemon less well placed to fend off the challenges to its system-wide strategic interests.
Offshore Balancing Good – War Cont’d
Offshore balancing is better at keeping the US out of nuclear conflicts
Christopher Layne, Prof @ Naval Postgrad, Summer 1998, “Rethinking American grand strategy,” World Policy Journal v. 15, iss. 2, p. np
In short, the historical record does not support the claim that European and Asian wars invariably compel the United States to intervene. Wars are not a force of nature that magnetically draws states into conflict. States, that is policymakers, have volition; they decide whether to go to war. The insurance argument advanced by proponents of the strategy of preponderance is also problematic. Great power war is rare because it is always an uncertain undertaking: war is, therefore, to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, an imperfect deterrent: great power wars do happen and they will happen in the future. Although the likelihood of U.S. involvement in future great-power conflict may be small, in a world where nuclear weapons exist the consequences of U.S. involvement in such a conflict could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports to ensure the United States against the risk of war. If extended deterrence fails, however, the strategy actually ensures that America will be involved in war at its onset. As Californians know, there are some risks (earthquakes, for example) for which insurance is either prohibitively expensive or not available at any price because, although the probability of the event may be small, if it occurs, the cost to the insurer is catastrophic. Offshore balancing has the considerable advantage of giving the United States a high degree of strategic choice and, unlike the strategy of preponderance, a substantial measure of control over its fate.
Failure to shift to offshore balancing makes war inevitable
Christopher Layne, Prof @ Texas AM, Fall 2006, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” International Security, v. 31, no. 2
If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America’s next grand strategy.
Hegemony Bad – China
Heg causes US china war
Christopher Layne, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami. 2007. American Empire: A Debate. Pg. 75-76
So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino—American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States’ desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia’s political and security order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing.
Offshore balancing solves hegemony inspired conflict with China
Christopher Layne, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami. 2007. American Empire: A Debate. Pg. 75-76
Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China’s rise. The key component of a new geopolitical approach by the United States would be the adoption of an offshore balancing strategy. Under this approach, a regional East Asian power balance would become America’s first line of defense against a rising China and would prevent Beijing from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in Asia—Japan, Russia, India—have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States, and it is money in the bank that they will step up to the plate and balance against a powerful, expansionist state in their own neighborhood. It is hardly surprising (indeed, it parallels in many ways America’s own emergence as a great power) that China—the largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia—is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even challenging America’s present dominance in East Asia. This poses no direct threat to U.S. security, however. Doubtless, Japan, India, and Russia (and, perhaps, Korea) may be worried about the implications of China’s rapid ascendance, because a powerful China potentially would be a direct threat to their security. This is precisely the point of offshore balancing: because China threatens its neighbors far more than it threatens the United States, these neighbors—not the United States—should bear the responsibility of balancing against Chinese power.
Global nuclear war
Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor for Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy March, 2000. “Has Beijing Resolved To Go To War?”
Under such circumstances, the Haowangjiao article explains, Beijing anticipates the US intervention to escalate into a nuclear war ultimatum. The PRC is ready for that confrontation as well. For more than 10 years now, the PLA has been working on "a new generation of nuclear weaponry based on a new theory of nuclear physics" which presently enable the PLA to implement "a step-by-step strategy" in order to escalate a regional conflict and "threaten America with nuclear war." Among these weapons are "new, multiple-warhead long-range missiles". At the regional level, the PLA could also strike "US satellites and military bases in the Pacific". The nuclear war anticipated by the PLA might include "a neutron bomb attack on Taiwan and a nuclear showdown with the United States. The United States will not sacrifice 200-million Americans for 20-million Taiwanese." The Haowangjiao article asserted that Beijing might even unilaterally threaten the United States with a nuclear attack if US troops and presence were not withdrawn from the straits of Taiwan.
Rapid Proliferation Coming
( ) NPT is on the verge of collapse, causing rapid prolif breakout
Asian News International, 5-15-2009, “Mohamed ElBaradei,” ln
The IAEA director general is the custodian of a global arms control regime that is increasingly beleaguered. It was built around the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the goal of restricting membership of the nuclear club to five post-war powers. It has been under strain in the last four decades, with Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea developing weapons outside the NPT. But now ElBaradei says the system is in danger of collapse, with an abrupt spread in nuclear weapons technology. "We still live in a world where if you have nuclear weapons, you are buying power, you are buying insurance against attack. That is not lost on those who do not have nuclear weapons, particularly in [conflict] regions," he said, and predicted that the next wave of proliferation would involve "virtual nuclear weapons states", who can produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium and possess the know how to make warheads, but who stop just short of assembling a weapon. They would therefore remain technically compliant with the NPT while being within a couple of months of deploying and using a nuclear weapon. He argued that the only way back from the nuclear abyss was for the established nuclear powers to fulfill their NPT obligations and disarm as rapidly as possible. He said it was essential to generate momentum in that direction before the NPT comes up for review next April in New York. "Slash the 27,000 warheads we have, 95 percent of which are in Russia and the US. You can easily slash [the arsenals] to 1,000 each, or even 500," El Baradei said. "If some of this concrete action is taken before the NPT [conference], you would have a completely different environment. All these so-called virtual weapons states, or virtual wannabe weapons states, will think twice ... because then the major powers will have the moral authority to go after them and say: 'We are doing our part of the bargain. Now it is up to you.' ", he said.
( ) NPT collapse is inevitable and will cause rapid proliferation breakout
Robert G. Gard, Lt. General, Chair CACNP, Atlantic Community, 8-25-2009, “Zero Nuclear Weapons,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,
There are ominous signs that the NPT is unraveling. Israel, India, and Pakistan, the only states that declined to ratify the NPT, now possess nuclear arsenals. North Korea withdrew from the treaty and detonated a nuclear device in 2006. Iran continues to enrich uranium, ostensibly as fuel for nuclear power reactors; but with minor modifications, the enrichment process can produce highly enriched uranium that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Now that nuclear power is back in fashion, there is general agreement that the world faces another tipping point, similar to the 1960s, that requires major initiatives to prevent an extensive proliferation of states able to produce nuclear weapons in a short space of time. Mohammed El Baradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has estimated that some 50 states have what he terms "breakout" capability. The NPT specifies that all states have an "inalienable right" to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The treaty does not prohibit states from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent reactor fuel to produce plutonium, the fissionable materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, the NPT permits member states to withdraw from the treaty with three months notice that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized their "supreme interests." El Baradei warns that there soon could be more than 25 states with nuclear weapons, many unstable and prone to takeover by extremists.
( ) Proliferation would be rapid – nuclear hedging
Mitchell Reiss, fmr director of the Reves Center for International Studies, 2004, “The Nuclear Tipping Point”
Or it may be that countries would not sprint to cross the nuclear finish line but rather hedge their bets by working quietly and methodically to acquire the technology and materials necessary to build nuclear bombs on short notice once a political decision was made. Today, many of the building blocks for a nuclear arsenal—the scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, computer software, and nuclear design information—are more readily available than ever before. And what is unavailable on the open market can be purchased on the black market due to the flourishing illicit trade in nuclear technology and materials between and among rogue (or what used to be termed pariah) states. A hedging strategy would allow a state to gradually increase its nuclear competence and shrink the period of its greatest strategic vulnerability: the time between a decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the actual possession of a usable nuclear arsenal. States that adopt this approach could remain poised on this non-nuclear precipice for months or even years, awaiting a political decision to tip them over the edge.
Prolif Bad – Nuclear War
Proliferation would be rapid and lead to nuclear war
Theodore Taylor, fellow of the American physical society, no date, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,”
Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of “latent proliferation,” finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war. A sudden rush of nuclear proliferation among nations may be triggered by small nuclear wars that are won by a country with more effective nuclear forces than its adversary, or by success of nuclear terrorists in forcing adherence to their demands. Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations could spread at an awesome rate in such circumstances, since “latent proliferation” is far along in at least several dozen nations, and is increasing rapidly as more nuclear power plants and supporting facilities are built in more countries. In summary, much more serious international attention than is now
New nuclear states lead to instability
Michael Horowtiz, Dept of Political Science @ UPenn, 2-10-2009, “The Spread of nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, SAGE
The hypotheses above are compared to a null hypothesis predicting no effect between time and behavior. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the most appropriate statistical model is logistic regression.18 These tests include Huber-White robust standard errors and control for the possibility of fixed time effects with peace-year splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).19 Table 1 presents initial statistical representations of the relationship between MID reciprocation and the possession of nuclear weapons, building from a simple model without any control variables to larger models including relevant controls. The results show a clear and consistent statistically significant impact to learning over time with nuclear weapons. The control variables behave in the predicted directions. As Schultz finds, reciprocation is less likely when a challenger is democratic. Interestingly, as the relative power of Side A in a dispute increases, reciprocation appears more likely. This suggests that the general relationship between power and dispute reciprocation is not necessarily linear. Neither the dyadic-satisfaction variable nor the joint-nuclearpossession variable, measuring whether both sides have nuclear weapons, is significant. 20 In general, the significance of the Side B nuclear-weapons variable suggests there is something inherent about nuclear capabilities that influences militarized behavior, although the nuclear variable for Side A is not significant. However, the results show that nuclear experience matters as well. The Side A nuclear-experience variable is –0.024 and significant at the .05 level. Given the caveats above about the indirect nature of these tests, the nuclear-learning argument seems clearest in explaining the results for challengers. The negative and significant coefficient for Side A shows that the challenges of older nuclear states are reciprocated significantly less than the challenges of younger nuclear and nonnuclear states.
Prolif Bad – Nuclear War Cont’d
New nuclear states lead to instability
Michael Horowtiz, Dept of Political Science @ UPenn, 2-10-2009, “The Spread of nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, SAGE
This article finds that there are important consequences for international politics as states gain experience with nuclear weapons. The initial evidence, while tentative, suggests that new nuclear states are especially risky—their challenges are reciprocated more often, while their desire to demonstrate their nuclear clout makes them substantially less likely to concede when facing a challenge. However, it is difficult to tell whether it was the logic of inexperience or the logic of uncertainty driving the results. The behavior of defending states over time is harder to unravel. One possibility is that as defending states gain experience with nuclear weapons, they reconceptualize the way they think about national security. Instead of viewing all challenges as potentially risky for the survival of the state, nuclear-armed defenders come to rely on their nuclear arsenals as guarantors of security, making it more acceptable to make concessions on issues unrelated to core national interests. However, the evidence does not yet support going that far. These results indicate that nuclear learning is an issue worth studying both in academic and military settings. More detailed tests building on this research are necessary to clarify this issue and determine the actual reasoning driving nuclear learning, keeping in mind that learning may work differently for different states at different times. As we consider how possession of nuclear weapons affects the capabilities and resolve of states involved in crisis-bargaining situations, learning over time may be an important part of the process.
Prolif Bad – AT: Deterrence Solves
Their assumptions are essentialist – deterrence won’t always work
Dale Walton, assistant professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, Winter/Spring 2006, “Navigating the Second Nuclear Age: Proliferation and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” Global Dialogue, Volume 8, Number 1–2
It would be inaccurate to claim that nuclear deterrence is either easy or outmoded and irrelevant in the twenty-first century. Deterrence concepts developed during the Cold War continue to be useful when discussing today’s challenges, but it is dangerously naive to assume that twenty-first century actors—particularly, but not only, “roguish” states such as Iran and North Korea—will act in a manner consistent with the assumptions of Cold War deterrence theory. The assumptions regarding behaviour that underpin the body of deterrence theory are simply not universally applicable; every political culture is unique (indeed, every leader is unique), and it should not be expected that states will always act in a manner consistent with deterrence theory.
Cold War examples aren’t effective – it’s only one example and it might not have been effective
Dale Walton, assistant professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, Winter/Spring 2006, “Navigating the Second Nuclear Age: Proliferation and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” Global Dialogue, Volume 8, Number 1–2
There are still a great many outstanding controversies concerning the reliability of deterrence during the Cold War. To claim that deterrence theory was proven to have worked because there was no United States–Soviet military conflict, much less a general nuclear war, is to assume a causal relationship which may or may not exist. Certainly, the United States attempted to deter Soviet military aggression, but whether American deterrence actually prevented war between the two powers is unknown and, ultimately, unknowable. History, unlike a laboratory experiment, cannot be repeated, and we have no “control Cold War” to compare with the real Cold War. If American strategists had not developed a sophisticated body of deterrence theory, perhaps a nuclear conflict would have occurred—or perhaps it would not. Similarly, perhaps a US–Soviet nuclear conflict would have occurred despite American deterrence if not for historical happenstance. Notably, in recent years some scholars, taking advantage of access to previously unavailable Soviet archives, have argued that at the time of his death Stalin may have been seriously contemplating a war against the West; it could be that a well-timed stroke (or poisoning) saved the world from nuclear war in the 1950s.1
Prolif Bad – AT: Deterrence Solves Cont’d
Deterrence fails – empirics prove miscalc inevitable
Marianne Hanson, Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics at Magdalen College, Oxford University, 2002, “Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security,” International Relations, 16;361
A final argument presented here in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons concerns the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence involved the strong perception that the possession of nuclear weapons deterred their use by others. It is conceded here that this might represent a utility for nuclear weapons, but as the Canberra Commission also concludes, such a utility implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons; any such utility would disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated. Moreover, the risks and dangers inherent in relying on rational deterrence have long been evident.30 This is not a new reason for arguing against nuclear policies, but it is one worth re-stating here. With its assumption of the rationality of actors, deterrence cannot be seen as a reliable instrument for preventing a nuclear strike. Unexamined assertions that nuclear weapons must be retained to deter attack, either from another nuclear weapon state or because of a vague and undefined necessity – what Michael MccGwire describes as a wish for an ‘all-purpose security blanket’31 – not only gloss over the huge problems associated with nuclear weapons’ use but also risk perpetuating a nuclear weapons culture in which the very existence of nuclear arsenals increases the risk of accidental or ‘irrational’ use. Moreover, it is by no means accepted universally that it was nuclear weapons and their deterrent qualities that kept the peace between the Great Powers after 1945. The avoidance of war between those states can be attributed to a number of factors other than deterrence.32 It is salutary also to remember that there are numerous documented instances during the Cold War period which record a perilously close descent into a nuclear exchange because of miscalculation or misperception. There is no guarantee that we will be as lucky in preventing accidental war in the future. To use the Cold War experience to argue a usefulness of nuclear weapons at once attributes too much to their deterrent qualities and pays not enough attention to the dangers attendant on their very existence. As the above points have argued, nuclear weapons would appear to have no real utility in the maintenance of international security. When considered against the range of threats facing national, regional and global actors today, it is hard to find a compelling reason for their continued retention that outweighs the moral costs, strategic limitations, the danger of accidental use or the growth of nuclear proliferation. As the Canberra Commission has pointed out, nuclear weapons have no relevance in a world where threats to security increasingly come in the form of ethnic conflict, weak or failed states, humanitarian disasters, economic crises, environmental degradation or, as we saw in 2001, terrorism. Given this, international security can best be served by their elimination.
Prolif Bad – Japan
Japanese prolif would lead to a rapid destabilizing arms race
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Mary Beth Nikitin, Nonproliferation analyst, 2-19-2009, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service
To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.
Japan rearm would cause a regional arms race
Richard Halloran, staff writer, 5-24-2009, “The Dangers of A Nuclear Japan,” RealClearPolitics,
That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own and reduce its reliance on the US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity, and skilled personnel to build a nuclear force, although it would be costly and take many years. The consequences of that decision would be earthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almost certainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble its nuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter the already fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Japan rearm leads to East Asian arms race, kills the alliance, and hurts the Japanese economy
Shinichi Ogawa, National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan), April 2003, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited,”
Likewise, the political and security repercussions of Japanese nuclear weapon development would be very negative indeed. Most worrisome would the reaction of Japan’s neighboring countries. Japanese nuclear weapon development, even its intention were totally defensive, would be likely to invite caution and countermeasures from China, Russia, and South Korea even in its early stages. As a result, Japan might face a serious security problem before it succeeded in attaining the necessary SSBN/SLBM force. Although nuclear weapons, depending on their survivability and capability, can have a positive effect in helping prevent war among nuclear powers, Japan’s nuclearization may invite a serious security threat well before a strategically meaningful nuclear force can be built and deployed. Similarly, given that there are few international scenarios in which the United States benefits strategically and militarily from Japanese nuclear weapon development, a decision to develop indigenous nuclear weapons is likely to elicit a negative American response. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is one of the top priorities of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. More than this, considering that Japan has been the victim of U.S. nuclear attack and that Japan’s nuclearization would inevitably lead it to develop a sizable strategic nuclear force, it is unrealistic to believe that the United States would stand by and watch Japanese nuclearization. In addition, Japan suffers from a lack of the natural resources requisite for producing nuclear weapons. By concluding agreements with Australia, Britain, Canada, China, France, and the United States, Japan imports uranium ore and enriched uranium from these countries. Each of these agreements limits the use of imported uranium and nuclear materials to nonmilitary and peaceful purposes. A Japanese decision to use imported uranium for nuclear weapon development would certainly invite an embargo by the traditional suppliers. Unless Japan succeeds in making a fast breeder reactor fit for practical use and achieves a nuclear fuel cycle, such a halt of nuclear material imports would have a significant impact on the Japanese economy, considering that about 35 to 40 percent of all Japan’s electricity is generated by nuclear power.
***Prolif DA***
Proliferation DA 1NC
Withdrawal of US forces causes quick allied and rogue proliferation
Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security at Harvard, Spring 2003, “An Empire if you can Keep it,” National Interest, pg. np
Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.
Proliferation leads to miscalculation and escalating conflict, ends in nuclear wars
Gareth Evans, Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne, and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 12/15/2009, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” reference/reports/ent/ downloads.html
Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear-armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.
Uniqueness – No Proliferation Now
No widespread proliferation now – US credible deterrent is the decisive factor
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 28-29
None of these conditions necessarily indicates an impending breakout by any current non-nuclear country. Indeed, what is perhaps most notable about the international environment in this respect is how few countries have openly reconsidered earlier decisions to forgo nuclear development. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the particular influences that affect a given nation's calculations regarding its nuclear status. While the inhibitions that have stopped the nuclear club from growing have been preserved thus far, no one can be certain how long the systemic disincentives, the still powerful taboo associated in many quartets with things nuclear, the strong internal restraints, or simply the old patterns of think- ing involving nuclear weapons will hold sway. Misgivings and concerns about the long-term direction of U.S. policy on global strategy and nuclear policy are, and will continue to be, the single most decisive factor guiding the direction of would-be proliferators- both rogue and responsible. Washington has the power to shape the future of nuclear nonproliferation; whether this is a blessing or a burden is yet to be determined.
No proliferation risk now
William Potter, Director at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2010, “The NPT and Sources of Nuclear Restraint,” Daedalus, pg. np
One of the difficulties in making accurate prognoses about the future of nonproliferation is the underdeveloped state of research on foreign policy forecasting in general and nuclear decisionmaking in particular. Also contributing to the problem is the paucity of relevant theory with predictive value. In an effort to remedy this proliferation-knowledge deficit and to better gauge the prospects for nuclear weapons spread during the next decade, CNS undertook a study of the proliferation propensity of 13 countries from different regions of the world.34 The project also sought to assess the impact of various trigger events, including defections from the NPT, on national nuclear decisions. The project’s most significant and unanticipated finding with respect to proliferation propensity, and one that was evident across all of the case studies, is the relatively low expectation of proliferation during the next 10 years. This prognosis holds regardless of the theoretical approach and level of analyses favored by the analyst, and appears to be largely insensitive to the geographic location of the countries, their level of economic development, government type, and perceived external security environment.
Proliferation likelihood decreasing now
Frank Miller, Senior Counselor @ Cohen Group, February 2009, “Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioners’ View” – Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,”
A Rationale for Abolition? At the outset, the authors indicate that the primary reason for abolishing the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the five nuclear-weapon states and the other nuclear-armed powers is halting nuclear proliferation. “[T]he problem [is] of states resisting strengthened non-proliferation rules because they say they are frustrated by the nuclear-weapons states’ refusal to uphold their side of the NPT bargain .…”1 While it is true that such protests are often made by the professional rhetoricians (many times without their capitals’ knowledge, by the way) in the Conference on Disarmament and in Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, a dispassionate look at the facts suggests that the nuclear-weapon states are indeed fulfilling their NPT commitments. First, even using as a baseline the number of nuclear weapons that existed at the time the NPT entered into force (let alone the size of the U.S. and Soviet arsenals at the height of the Cold War), the nuclear-weapon states have been steadily reducing their nuclear forces and stockpiles. The U.S. nuclear arsenal today, for example, is 90 percent smaller than it was in 1972, and, it will be reduced by an additional 15 to 30 percent (relative to its current size) by 2012. Second, “the nuclear arms race,” whose end is called for by Article VI of the NPT, was, for all intents and purposes, halted in the late 1980s
Link – Perception of Retreat
Perceptions of US strategic reliability is the most important factor security calculation for allied proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 20
Perhaps the most important ingredient in a new international calculation of the attractiveness-or perceived necessity-of acquiring nuclear weapons is the questions of the future direction of U.S. foreign and security policy. For decades U.S. friends and allies-such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Egypt, and others- have come to depend on several aspects of American policy when making calculations about their own security and the question of forswearing nuclear weapons. These aspects include the stability of the American nuclear deterrent and U.S. security guarantees; U.S. rhetorical commitment to, active pursuit of, and participation in global non-proliferation policies and regimes; Amer- ican restraint in publicly contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, par- ticularly against a state that does not possess weapons of mass destruction; and U.S. commitments not to decouple U.S. security from that of its allies through the development of defensive systems. A number of recent developments may suggest directional changes in some of these areas. And indeed, it is precisely the anxieties associated with such new directions in American security policy that potentially could spur some serious reconsideration of formerly forsworn nuclear options.
Credibility and reliability of US security guarantees are key
Paul Brown, Colonel in the US Army, 2008, U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY: DO WE HAVE IT RIGHT?,
The NPR introduces four defense policy goals (ends) to our nuclear strategy. Those objectives are first, to assure our friends and allies that the U.S. nuclear capability is a deterrence measure for their security as well as ours. The desire of this goal is to reduce incentives for our non-nuclear allies to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. The credibility and reliability of U.S. nuclear assurances are necessary to keep countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey from reconsidering their decisions to be non-nuclear states. The second goal is to deter aggressors from attacking the U.S. or our allies with WMD. The third goal is to dissuade competitors from acquiring WMD, and the fourth goal is to defeat our enemies decisively. The 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (NMS-WMD) gives additional indication as to our nuclear weapons strategy. It states that we may use both conventional and nuclear responses to deter or defeat a WMD threat or subsequent use of WMD. The objective in the NMS-WMD expands the NPR by stating that the Military Strategic Objectives are to Defeat, Deter – Protect, Respond, Recover – Defend, Dissuade, Deny – Reduce, Destroy, and Reverse. It adds goals to respond and recover from attacks and includes objectives to prevent enemies from gaining materials to acquire WMD.
Even small changes are widely perceived and incorporated into proliferation decisions
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 23
Certainly, the United States is not the only factor in the calculations countries make about their own security, but it is a major one. The poli- cies and actions of the most powerful and influential country in the world affect every nation and have an impact on everything from global and regional security to economic stability, international norms and practices, and the sustainability of whatever global consensus exists. Much like the brilliant (or simply martinet) professor whose students write down his every sneeze or cough lest they miss something that will be on the final exam, U.S. actions are closely observed, noted, and inter- preted by states around the world. American policy can, sometimes inadvertently, increase or decrease confidence substantially -a key component in any country's evaluation of whether--or when-a nuclear capability is required.
Link – All Allies
Perceived decrease in US deterrence credibility causes fast proliferation in multiple hotspots – no risk of a turn from rogue proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 321
Given the unprecedented power and influence of the United States today, what it says and does will have a significant impact on the nuclear behavior of individual countries. For example, although a severe new security threat (especially a new nuclear threat) would strongly motivate a country to reconsider its nuclear renunciation, such a threat probably would not be sufficient to elicit this reaction if the country has an American security guarantee that is not perceived to be weakening. Thus as long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains credible and U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea remain strong, even a nuclear-armed North Korea would not necessarily lead these two countries to decide to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options. It is noteworthy that both Taiwan and South Korea became most interested in pursuing nuclear weapons pro- grams in the mid-to-late 1970s, a time when the United States appeared to have adopted a pot icy of security disengagement or detachment from East Asia following the huml1iation of the Vietnam War. (Germany, which currently does not face a serious threat to its security, has the lux- ury of having both a U.S. nuclear guarantee and dose ties with other nuclear weapons states through NATO and the EU.)
Decreased US commitments triggers quick and widespread proliferation
Marc Dean Millot, Senior Social Scientist @ RAND, 1994, “Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np
If the allies of the United States come to believe that it no longer shares their view of regional security, is no longer automatically committed to their defense, can no longer be counted as prudent, and may suffer from a paralytic fear of nuclear conflict, the burden of proof in any debate over national security in any allied capital will shift to those who argue for continuing to rely on U.S. security guarantees. Decisions to pursue national nuclear weapons programs may not be far behind.
The Disintegration of U.S. Alliances Will Exacerbate Regional Military Instability
The lack of credible security assurances will push allies of the United States toward nuclear arsenals of their own to restore the military equilibrium upset by their local nuclear adversaries or by more general regional nuclear instabilities. These allies may well see a realization of their virtual nuclear arsenal as the only alternative to losing all influence over their own national security. This development, however, would lead down a worrisome path, with dangerous implications for regional stability and ultimately for the security of the United States itself.
There is an invisible threshold to fast proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 346
We can take some comfort in the study's conclusion that while the tipping-point phenomenon may be an apt metaphor for the process of pro- liferation, we are neither at the tipping point nor destined to reach it. But there is something very troublesome about this metaphor: movement toward the tipping point starts very slowly, picks up speed, and then becomes swift and irresistible. At the earliest stages, movement is barely discernible. By the time the tipping process becomes readily identifiable, it may be very difficult to stop. So are we now in a state of proliferation equilibrium, with the balance level and stable? Or are we sliding imper- ceptibly toward the tipping point? We honestly do not know. What we do know is that keeping safely away from the tipping point will require the international community to act with unity, imagination, and strength. And it should act now, before it's too late.
Link – Laundry List of Allies
The plan is perceived as the United States lacking the will to lead; that encourages allied proliferation
Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np
Maintaining the zone of peace requires, first and foremost, avoiding conditions that can lead to renationalization of security policies in key allied countries such as Japan and Germany. The members of the zone of peace are in basic agreement and prefer not to compete with each other in realpolitik terms. But this general agreement still requires U.S. leadership. At present there is greater nervousness in Japan than in Germany about future ties with Washington, but U.S. credibility remains strong in both countries. The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies such as Germany and Japan believe that the current arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as either lacking the will or the capability to lead in protecting their interests.
Perceptions of US security decline encourages allied proliferation
Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998, pg. 54-55
The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies— critical for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase—to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up, especially of maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange power-projection capability possessing offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war.
Unpredictable change in policy freaks out our allies – causes proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 22
It is worth pointing out that perceived U.S. unilateralismn could cut both ways. If U.S. actions are seen as necessary to cope with perceived lnterna.tlonal security threats, Such efforts could allay Concerns of friends and allies and demonstrate that the U.S. is willing to tackle tough security problems. Strong action against North Korea for example will reassure Asian .friends, most notably Japan and South Korea. Still, 'predictability over time is key-you never know when the unilateralism will break for or against you. So the United States must be careful to balance a tough stance with international norms; even subtle changes in nuclear doctrine and deployments can have dramatic unintended consequences among U.S. allies and friends.
Link – Middle East Troops
Perceived decrease in US commitment to allies leads to a laundry list of regional and escalatory global conflicts
Robert Lieber, Prof. Gov and Int’l. Affairs @ Georgetown U, 2005, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century”, pg. 53-54
Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit-tingly observed, "If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive."2z Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson's warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, "apolarity," could bring "an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.
Allied proliferation causes nuclear war
Steven Lee, Professor of Ethics @ Hobart and Smith College, 1993, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, p. 299
First, nuclear war could result from the behavior of other states, especially those that had formerly seen themselves as receiving protection from the nation's opponent under the nuclear umbrella. Some of theses states might well seek to acquire nuclear weapons, or to enlarge their arsenals if they were already nuclear powers, in order to provide better protection of their own against the opponent. Were such armament to occur, the uncertainties on all sides may make major nuclear war more likely that it was prior to the nation's unilateral nuclear disarmament.
Link – South Korea
Only force presence can prevent South Korean proliferation
Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, 12/18/2005, “Future of U.S.-Seoul Ties,” Washington Times, pg. np
There are many benefits to an ongoing formal alliance solidified by an ongoing American military presence on the peninsula. A U.S. military presence there could, as an insurance policy, help deter any untoward Chinese actions against Korea and damp tensions in the Japan-Korea relationship. More concretely, it would provide a regional hub for military activities against other threats, such as pirates, terrorists and possible instability in the waterways of Southeast Asia. In each case, stationing U.S. forces in Korea would produce a much more credible security commitment than simply retaining a formal alliance agreement. Only the presence of U.S. forces would guarantee immediate involvement of Americans in any conflict an outside country might wage against the Republic of Korea; only that would demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the seriousness and military readiness of the alliance.
Credible United States assurances are necessary to prevent South Korean nuclear proliferation and Asian conflict
Christian Jung, Op-ed contributor, 6/24/2009, The Nuclear Non-Option, Korea Times, pg. np
Acquiring a nuclear weapon to balance the ostensible South-North power asymmetry may provide immediate relief and perhaps a thinly veiled sense of security, but it would nonetheless be devastating to the South's long-term interests in a number of ways.
The most obvious result of the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be further regional destabilization. It would needlessly flare up tensions between the South and its neighboring countries, particularly China and Japan.
More significantly, a nuclear South would aggravate tensions with the North, and may culminate in a North-South arms race in a worst-case scenario.
None of these outcomes would be conducive to any of the goals that the South wishes to achieve, both within the peninsula and throughout the greater Northeast Asian region.
From a more global perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would undermine the international status that the South has built as a non-nuclear weapon state.
US credible assurance to South Korea deters war
Christian Jung, Op-ed contributor, 6/24/2009, The Nuclear Non-Option, Korea Times, pg. np
Combined with the assurances of protection under Washington's nuclear umbrella, we can therefore be reasonably confident that no direct existential threat exists.
Finally, there is always the classic concern over human error. As history attests, humans are particularly prone to blunders involving judgment on delicate issues.
Obviously, the only way to guarantee that no nuclear mishaps occur is to deny their possession; once a nation acquires nuclear weapons, there will always be an infinite number of opportunities for error and misuse.
And this should be at the heart of South's pursuit to dismantle the North's capabilities ― the potential for error is always too large.
South Korea possesses globally competitive nuclear power plant construction technology, and the country could easily exploit this expertise to develop its own nuclear weapons program.
To do so would be tragic, however. Such technology should remain a force for good ― as an invaluable tool to export peaceful nuclear energy use worldwide, especially in high-risk areas ― and must not be abused as a means to satisfy a myopic desire for power.
Instead of wringing hands over whether the South should or shouldn't acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear acquisition card should be pushed aside in favor of those more in harmony with its long-term interests.
One card off the table will help the South's decision over the North, if even marginally.
Link – Japan
Perceptions of a weakening US security commitment leads to Japanese proliferation
Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998, pg. 54-55
Despite such limitations, Japan nevertheless has the financial, industrial, and technological resources to become a major military power should its regional security environment worsen, international economic institutions collapse, and the alliance be abrogated. Japanese hedging against the possibility of a more hostile regional security environment and abrogation of the alliance can be seen in recent plans: (1) to improve the intelligence capabilities of the SDF, including the use of satellites; (2) to procure transport aircraft that can fly greater distances and carry more than existing C-1 and C-130 aircraft; (3) to acquire air-refueling tankers for patrol planes; and (4) to perhaps acquire “defensive” aircraft carriers. Moreover, Japan possesses stockpiles of near-weapons-grade plutonium. It could, therefore, become a nuclear superpower quickly, if it had the political will to do so. Choice of the nuclear card will remain unlikely, however, given the legacy of World War II, the enormous benefits Japan currently derives from maintenance of the status quo, and the continued willingness of the United States to extend a nuclear umbrella over Japan.
Removal of US troops cause Japanese and South Korean proliferation
Zalmay Khalilzad et al, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, “The United States and Asia,” 2001,
At the same time, it is not clear whether these policies would in the long run be in China’s interests. Weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance, for example, could easily lead Japan to pursue a more independent geopolitical course. If deprived of U.S. support, Korea too could increase its military power, perhaps to include the acquisition of nuclear weapons. More generally, multipolarity would imply that both India and, if it recovers, Russia would become potential rivals of China. India has, in fact, already embarked on a course of pursuing great-power status—and although Chinese observers do not list India among the “poles” of a future multipolar system, it is hard to see how China could prevent that from occurring. In a similar manner, the current era of good Sino-Russian relations rests both on Russian weakness and on Russia’s and China’s common opposition to U.S. “hegemony.” Yet in a multipolar setting, a revived Russia and China could easily become competitive. The possible risks of a multipolar world thus suggest that the alternative option of a “strategic partnership” with the United States might have its attractions for China.19 At the moment, however, China’s preference for multipolarity and hence for bringing the United States down in power terms from superpower to great-power status appears to remain firm.
Link – Turkey
Forward military presence prevents Turkish threat perception
Department of Defense, 1995, Security Strategy for Europe and NATO,
U.S. forward military presence in Europe is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed conventional and nuclear forces are the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in Europe. Simultaneously, the presence of overseas forces strengthens the U.S. leadership role in European affairs and supports our efforts to extend stability to the developing democracies to the East. Overall, the presence of U.S. forces deters adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassures friends, enhances regional stability, and underwrites our larger strategy of engagement and enlargement. The forward stationing of these forces in Europe and the day-to-day interaction of our forces with those of our European allies helps to build and maintain the strong bonds of the Alliance. Our forces train with the forces of our NATO allies on a daily basis, creating a degree of interoperability among NATO forces that we do not share with most other militaries of the world. As a result of these routine interactions, we have the ability to conduct high-intensity joint and combined military operations with our NATO allies both in Europe and in other areas of common interests. The successful DESERT STORM operation to expel Iraqi invaders from Kuwait in 1991 provides the best example of the tangible benefits of forward stationing U.S. forces in Europe to the defense of Western interests beyond Europe. Because of our close cooperation with the NATO militaries in Europe, we were able to conduct sophisticated, large-scale military operations with the forces of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey. These operations were conducted using NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) for everything from doctrine for land warfare to specifications for refueling nozzles for fighter aircraft. The routine military interaction and habits of cooperation facilitated by forward stationing a sizable operational force in Europe made all this possible.
That leads to Turkism proliferation
Oliver Thranert, Professor of International Affairs in Germany, 2008, “U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet,”
Second: Nonproliferation within NATO. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to prevent nuclear proliferation within the Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security. Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATO’s nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkey could seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.
Turkish proliferation devastates US-Turkish relations
Ibrahim Al-Marshi, PhD in History from Oxford and, Nishu Goren, Fellow at Monterrey Institute for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2009, “Turkish Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation,”
As official state policy, Turkey complies with the Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, Comprehensive test-ban Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Even if Turkey were to build a nuclear arsenal it would not be able to deploy nuclear weapons without disrespecting the rule of international law, i.e. noncompliance with the international regimes it has adhered to. In this case, the benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons do not outweigh the costs of economic and political sanctions that the country would face leaving the NATO umbrella and breaking its strategic alliance with United States.
Link – Kuwait
Kuwait basing is key to warfighting readiness
Sandra Jontz, Middle East Correspondent, 4-11-2005, “Army Preparing to Close Camp Doha, Shift Operations to Other Kuwait Bases,”
Even if the country were not at war, the United States wants to keep bases in U.S.-friendly Kuwait as training sites, giving troops an opportunity to drill in the harsh heat and dusty environment that mirror battlegrounds in the region, said Sgt. Maj. Michael Phoenix, Camp Doha's command sergeant major. “Units will be coming here to train, whether they're going to war or not,” he said.
Kuwait basing is necessary for success in Iraq
Lionel Beehner, Senior Writer @ the Council on Foreign Relations, 12-9-2005, Long-Term Prospects for the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf Region, Council on Foreign Relations, pg. np
As the debate over drawing down U.S. forces from Iraq continues, questions have arisen about the likely configuration of a long-term U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Experts agree some kind of U.S. military footprint will remain in the region. The most likely scenario involves a redeployment of troops from Iraq to form a so-called quick-reaction brigade based in Kuwait or another neighboring country, enabling the U.S. to rapidly reenter and support Iraqi forces if the security situation were to deteriorate. "Kuwait's become a place d'armesfor us," says Barry Posen, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Seymour Hersh, writing in a recent New Yorker piece, quotes U.S. officials as saying the presence of a "special-mission unit" in the region could also be aimed at striking insurgents crossing the Syrian-Iraqi border.
Kuwait basing is necessary to prevent conflict escalation in the Middle East
Lionel Beehner, Senior Writer @ the Council on Foreign Relations, 12-9-2005, Long-Term Prospects for the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf Region, Council on Foreign Relations, pg. np
Two brigades, from Kansas and Kuwait respectively, were scheduled to be sent all at once to Iraq after the elections. Instead, as Pentagon officials told the New York Times, the brigade from Kansas, comprising some 5,000 troops, will be sent to Iraq in smaller units to help train Iraqi security forces and guard important facilities. The latter brigade is expected to remain in Kuwait as a "quick-reaction brigade," though if the security situation in Iraq stabilizes after the election, soldiers may be sent home. Officials expect by the latter half of 2006 that there should be roughly 100,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.
Failure in Iraq leads to allied proliferation
Ryan Mauro, author of Death to America, geopolitical analyst for Tactical Defense Concepts and for the Northeast Intelligence Network, 1-25-2007, Front Page Mag, pg. np
The success of democracy in Iraq threatens nearby tyrannies and empowers those fighting within them. On the other hand, withdrawal would lead to a collapse of the elected Iraqi government, and all the work done to bring democracy to Iraq would be in vain. In southern Iraq, the “Islamization” process would accelerate and sharia law would most likely be implemented, stripping away individual rights, particularly for women. As Iran would grow more powerful, the chances of a radical Shiite state being created in Iraq would also increase. Such a state would oppress its own citizens and pose a regional threat. Sectarian violence would spiral out of control, killing millions of Iraqis, both Sunni and Shiites. Many Iraqis would be forced to flee their homes as radical militias would seek to create homogenous regions. Shiite terrorist groups like Hezbollah would likely find safe haven and support. Abandoning Iraq, therefore, means watching from the sidelines while Iraqis are slaughtered and neighboring states -- including Iran -- divide the spoils. If such a scenario were to take place, Iran -- the main sponsor of terrorism and a home to numerous al-Qaeda leaders -- would grow in power and become the leader of the region. It would become easier for Iran’s government, which denies the Holocaust and has repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel and the United States, to obtain nuclear weapons. The West would also find its options to affect Iran’s behavior increasingly limited. In response to the growth of Iran’s power, countries in the region like Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Gulf states would seek nuclear weapons (in fact, many of these states already indicate that they plan to develop nukes). Already, Iran’s leadership has expressed willingness to share its nuclear technology with other rogue states like Syria and Venezuela.
Impact – Proliferation Bad – Leads to Nuclear Terrorism
We are at the nuclear tipping point – further proliferation leads to nuclear terrorism
John Farrell, Political Analyst, 6/2/2009, “Experts Sober on Nuclear Risks,” .
In the last few weeks, Iran has reaffirmed its intention to develop a nuclear capability. North Korea tested a nuclear device last week, and test-fired ballistic missiles, and U.S. and South Korean armed forces were put on high alert. The nuclear-armed Pakistani state, meanwhile, continued with its war against Taliban extremists.
The actions of these nations alarm their neighbors, many of whom — Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to name a few — have the economic and technological resources to become nuclear powers themselves. "There is concern that we may be reaching a so-called nuclear tipping point," said Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
And if the number of nuclear-armed states increases — to potentially as many as 30 or 40 nations — so will the likelihood that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon, or the enriched uranium needed to build such a device.
"Nuclear terrorism is a very serious threat," said former Defense Secretary William Perry, at a Council on Foreign Relations forum Thursday. "It is the most likely way a nuclear bomb will end up being detonated in one of our cities."
Nuclear terrorism leads to a proportional response – escalates to interstate nuclear conflict
Jasen Castillo, Associate Political Scientist @ RAND, 2003, Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters, Current History, 102, 668, pg. 426
If terrorist groups attacked the American homeland or its interests abroad with nuclear weapons, the US government would face strong incentives to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the country that provided the nuclear capabilities. Public pressure and worries would persuade American officials to identify a state sponsor and make it the target of a nuclear reprisal. In the past, the American public has shown little reluctance to inflict casualties on foreign civilians and it would appear that a nuclear attack would demand a proportional response. Thus, a clandestine nuclear strike by terrorists would likely provoke the United States to find those states that aided the attackers and make them suffer an equal if not greater amount of pain.
Deterrence doesn’t apply to terrorists
William Perry, professor at Stanford University, and Brent Sowcroft, resident trustee of the Forum for International Policy, 2009, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy.” Council on Foreign Relations, pg. np
This report primarily addresses three principal challenges that confront the United States: first, the risks of dangerous misperceptions or miscalculations between the United States and Russia; second, the emergence of more nuclear weapons-capable states; and, third, nuclear terrorism. On the threat of nuclear terrorism, traditional deterrence would not work, because stateless terrorists have no national territory that the United States could threaten to target to deter them from using nuclear weapons, though it might be able to deter the state sponsors of these groups if there were any. Another challenging issue is the availability of nuclear weapons and materials manufactured by states to terrorist groups, either through deliberate action or negligent security. The likelihood of nuclear terrorists acquiring the capability to produce weapons-usable fissile material is extremely low. They would, instead, have to acquire this material from state stockpiles.
Impact – Saudi Arabia Scenario
No Saudi proliferation now – change in security alliance can force acquisition
Kate Amlin, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 2008, “Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?,” Monterrey Institute for Int’l Studies,
After outlining past claims that Saudi Arabia has sought nuclear weapons, this issue brief with provide an overview of Saudi Arabia’s technical capabilities related to nuclear weapons development will be given. Next, potential motivations and disincentives behind Saudi Arabia’s proliferation decisions will be discussed. The issue brief will conclude by highlighting several issues that could alter Saudi Arabia’s proliferation calculus in the future. This issue brief finds that it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia would seek nuclear weapons capacity under current security and economic circumstances, due to a combined lack of technical capabilities and a desire to maintain friendly relations with other countries. However, in the event that Iran develops working nuclear weapons or the U.S.-Saudi relationship significantly deteriorates, Saudi nuclear weapons development would become more likely in the future.
Iranian proliferation won’t cause trigger Saudi proliferation as long as US guarantees are viewed as credible
Kate Amlin, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 2008, “Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?,” Monterrey Institute for Int’l Studies,
Another potential motivation for Saudi proliferation is the souring of U.S.-Saudi relations, especially when such a scenario is combined with Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia has long been a critical U.S. ally in the Middle East, and the countries share an interest in containing militant Middle Eastern regimes such as Iran and maintaining the export of Saudi oil supplies to the rest of the world.[33] The Saudis currently rely on the United States for security assurances, and would expect the United States to defend them from a regional aggressor. Yet, Riyadh has reservations about the nature of U.S. support, and worries that a divergence in national interests would prevent the United States from fully protecting Saudi Arabia in a future crisis.[34] In a notable example of this concern, U.S. President Jimmy Carter sent F-15 fighter aircraft to the Persian Gulf to protect the Saudis when war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980. However, Carter demonstrated that U.S. support for the Saudi kingdom had its limits when he announced that the aircraft were sent to the Gulf unarmed.[35] More recently, in 2003, the U.S. government reduced the number of forces that it had stationed in Saudi Arabia from 5,000 to 400 troops.[36] Worry that the United States would provide similarly weak support for their Kingdom in a future crisis, for instance if Iran invaded, may drive Saudi Arabia to build a nuclear arsenal to deter aggression autonomously. This scenario would become more likely in the future if Iran demonstrates a desire to build nuclear weapons, as Saudi Arabia would be vulnerable to an aggressive, stronger neighbor without the assurance of U.S. support.
Saudi proliferation collapses the global economy
Steven McDowell, Lt US Navy, Post Graduate Thesis, 2003, “Is Saudi Arabia A Nuclear Threat?,”
The security umbrella provided by the U.S. military has enabled the United States to maintain a level of influence with Saudi Arabia, which often exercises predominant influence on the global supply of oil. If the Saudis replace their CSS-2 missile system with a more modern, nuclear missile system, the region could spiral into a new arms race at a time when one of the region’s primary proliferators [Iraq] has been suppressed. A new arms race could potentially destabilize the global supply of oil just as the United States and the global economy are rebounding from the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Impact – Japan Scenario
US removal of troops triggers Japanese proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 218
Japan represents the ultimate contradiction among the potential nuclear aspirants explored in this volume. Its standing as a non-nuclear nation is a virtual bedrock of the nonproliferation regime, the inspiration and example of the early era of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Having experienced the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's political structures and national psyche have engendered a deeply enshrined cultural taboo (until very recently) against even public discus- sion of the nuclear option. In addition, Japanese leaders have repeatedly expressed their confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella provided by the Japanese-American defense treaty and reinforced by the deployment of substantial U.S. military forces on japanese territory. Indeed, the Japan- ese case is often seen as the model of how extended deterrence guarantees serve to curb incentives for nuclear proliferation.
US deterrence credibility is the underlying factor that prevents Japanese proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 236
Although the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrence guarantee has never been tested (in the form of actual nuclear use) in the case of Japan, or any other country, it continues to lie at the heart of the security relationship between the United States and Japan. Indeed, the guarantee, and the japanese-American security alliance in which it is embedded, pro- vides the most important reason why Japan has not sought to develop an independent nuclear weapons capacity. Thanks to their continued faith in American foreign and security policy, Successive Japanese administra- tions have refrained from fully developing the military potential corn- monly associated with a "normal" state (that is, having the potential to wage war for both offensive and defensive purposes).
Collapse of US deterrence credibility leads to Japanese proliferation – even small issues can lead to large doubts
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 345
First, American officials must overcome any doubts among the Japanese about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee. As former japanese prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa observes, "It is in the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan Withdraw from the NPT and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear umbrealla. U.S. officials should reaffirm at every opportunity Washington's willingness to defend Japan against external threats.
Impact – Japan Scenario – Asian Wars Impact
Us retrenchment from Asia triggers allied and rogue proliferation
George Perkovich, vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, “Keeping up with the nuclear neighbours,” Nature 458, 574-575
Doubts about the credibility of extended deterrence were much greater during the cold war, as Green and Furukawa and Choi and Park document. Still, policy-makers in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing must undertake concerted diplomacy to instil political-strategic confidence in the region in ways that reduce rather than raise the salience of nuclear weapons. The Long Shadow offers useful guidance to this end. None of the authors urges US retrenchment from the region or rethinking of Japanese, South Korean or Taiwanese nuclear abstinence. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by these countries would only exacerbate insecurity and reduce US commitments to act to defend peace and stability there. Instead, greater effort must be made to enhance the transparency of intentions and capabilities, bolster conventional deterrence and foster unity in dealing with North Korea.
Asian war goes nuclear
Michael May, Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, 1997, Washington Quarterly, pg. np
The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development --leave most of the civilized world devastated.
Despite their current anti-nuclear stance, Japan could reconsider nuclear development
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 218
At the same time, suspicion and speculation have persisted that, given the right set (really the wrong set) of international and domestic condi- tions, japan might seriously consider the nuclear option. Recently, prominent Japanese have openly broached the issue of japan's acquiring a nuclear arsenal to help manage what many in Japan see as severely untoward developments in the regional and international security envi- ronment. japan is one of the most technologically advanced countries, relies heavily on nuclear power for its domestic energy consumption, and has vast stores of plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons. If it ever did cross the Rubicon into the realm of the atomically armed, there is near-universal recognition that the potential consequences would be enormous and unpredictable-and quite possibly extremely dangerous .
Public opposition doesn’t prevent proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 243
Finally, although public sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its ability to fully inhibit the decisions of japanese leaders should not be exaggerated. For many decades, despite its government's pro- fessed policy of nuclear disarmament, japan has relied on the United States to defend japan, even with nuclear weapons if necessary. Antimil- itarism in Japan has not prevented the country from becoming the fourth-highest military spender in the world. Nor have antinuclear senti- ments impeded Japan's extensive reliance on civilian nuclear power. Just as the Japanese people today appreciate that Japan has no choice but to rely on nuclear power to meet its energy needs, so in the future they might accept that international threats left japan with no choice but to develop nuclear weapons.
Impact – Turkey Scenario – Relations Impact
US-Turkish relations are key to democracy
Orhan Kaymakcalan, MD, President of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 4/21/2002, Washington Times, pg. np
Turkey gives lie to the proposition that Islam and democracy are doomed to clash. That message is a tonic to the United States campaign for democratic regimes in Muslim nations - not only in the Middle East but in the Balkans, Central Asia and Asia. The national security interests of the United States and Turkey generally overlap. Turkey proved a stalwart ally during the United States military interventions in Bosnia and Kosova to foil the villainies of indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic and his henchman. Turkey's cooperation with the U.S. has contained Saddam Hussein's regime and its would-be repression of Iraqi Kurds. Both nations have worked hand-in-glove to promote pipelines transiting the Caucasus and Turkey to carry coveted oil and natural gas supplies to Western markets in the Mediterranean Sea without hazarding Black Sea pollution. A thickening United States alliance with Turkey will be worth substantially more than the price of admission in fighting terrorism, promoting democracy, and spreading human rights.
Global democratic consolidation prevents many scenarios for war and extinction
Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
US-Turkish relations key to Balkans stability
Soner Cagaptay, senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Turkey Time,” 6/20/2003, National Review, pg. np
If Ankara were to study Turkish-American relations over the past decade, it would find much worth noting. In the 1990s, the underlying foundation of the bilateral relationship was Turkey's geostrategic importance. Turkey's position between southeastern Europe, the Near East, and the Caucasus made the country an irresistible strategic asset. Without Ankara, America could not stabilize the Balkans, tap Caspian oil, or hope to settle the Middle East conflict. At the nexus of Europe and Asia, Turkey proved a great help to America. In return, Washington looked after Turkey's global interests in Central Asia, Europe, and the Mediterranean. During the Iraq war, though, this partnership collapsed as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) failed to make Turkey's geostrategic importance — its most valuable possession — available to Washington.
Impact – Turkey Scenario
US-Turkish relations key to power projection in the Middle East
John Shattuck, fourth President and Rector of Central European University, 9/26/1995, Federal News Service, pg. np
Turkey, as both you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Hoyer have indicated, is a long-time friend and strategic ally that serves important U.S. interests in a vital yet troubled region of the world. Geographically, economically, politically, and culturally, Turkey stands at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. It is a democratic, secular, Muslim country in a region with little in the way of democratic tradition. Turkey provides valuable support for U.S. policy in the region. As a committed member of NATO, Turkey strengthens Western defenses and extends the reach of the West into an unstable part of the world. It participated on the side of the U.N. coalition in the Gulf War, continues to support Operation Provide Comfort and the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on Iraq, and has been a significant contributor to UNPROFOR, the U.N. force in the former Yugoslavia and humanitarian assistance in Bosnia.
The impact is super-power conflict
Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1/1/2008,
The end of America's ability to safeguard the Gulf and the trade routes around it would be enormously damaging--and not just to us. Defense budgets would grow dramatically in every major power center, and Middle Eastern politics would be further destabilized, as every country sought political influence in Middle Eastern countries to ensure access to oil in the resulting free for all. The potential for conflict and chaos is real. A world of insecure and suspicious great powers engaged in military competition over vital interests would not be a safe or happy place. Every ship that China builds to protect the increasing numbers of supertankers needed to bring oil from the Middle East to China in years ahead would also be a threat to Japan's oil security--as well as to the oil security of India and Taiwan. European cooperation would likely be undermined as well, as countries sought to make their best deals with Russia, the Gulf states and other oil rich neighbors like Algeria. America's Persian Gulf policy is one of the chief ways through which the U.S. is trying to build a peaceful world and where the exercise of American power, while driven ultimately by domestic concerns and by the American national interest, provides vital public goods to the global community. The next American president, regardless of party and regardless of his or her views about the wisdom of George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, will necessarily make the security of the Persian Gulf states one of America's very highest international priorities.
Impact – Taiwan
Decreased US deterrence credibility leads to Taiwanese proliferation
Derek Mitchell, senior fellow and director for Asia in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 307
As this military gap widens, Taiwan may feel increasingly vulnerable and unable to count on U.S. protection during the critical early stages of a conflict. It may decide that it needs its own decisive weapon to even the balance. Indeed, even short of nuclear weapons, Taiwan strategists today are increasingly considering the need to develop an "offense defense plan----enrailing deployment of surface-to-surface missiles capable of striking the mainland-to serve as a partial deterrent (and cocnterstriks force) to a Chinese attack. The addition of a nuclear component to this strategy is not necessarily an illogical extension of this independent deterrent concept. Furthermore, as China's economy continues to grow rapidly and Taiwan's slows, a nuclear weapon may be a more cost-effec- tive (if risky) option when compared with the expense of the myriad conventional weapons, such as submarines and missile defense, that Taiwan will need to consider over time. A related scenario would be a perceived reduction in the overall U.S. defense commitment to the island. As indicated, the United States remains unique in its commitment to Taiwan's defense. Should such a commitment recede-or be perceived as receding-dramatically, Taiwan authorities, as they have in the past, may feel they have little choice but to consider drastic options, including the nuclear one.
Taiwanese proliferation triggers an Asian arms race
Ogu Eji Ofo Annu, Political commentator, 9/3/2004, “The Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Arms Race and World Insecurity,” Africa Resource,
Taiwan will get more alarmed at all these developments and seek its own “laser-driven”? nuclear technology from the Americans or one of their allies such as South Korea. This will madden the Chinese and I would not want to hazard on the counter moves of the Chinese government. Since the “one China”? policy cannot condone two Chinas, the introduction of nuclear technology into the Taiwanese peninsula, which could irreversibly create two Chinas, would have far reaching impact. All these posturing will mean that India and Pakistan would have to refurbish their weapons program and occasionally rattle their saber for those whom it may concern. And North Korea will carry on its mission of proliferating nuclear technology for money to emerging nations and perhaps rich organizations. And Pakistan too might find a similar vocation gripping. In a world where nuclear weapon technology becomes as common as the Kalashnikovs or Uzis, no one will be too far from apocalypse.
Taiwan non-proliferation commitments aren’t inevitable
Derek Mitchell, senior fellow and director for Asia in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 309
Although Taiwan is not developing nuclear weapons and has appar- ently dismantled the physical, if not the human, infrastructure with which it sought to develop them in the past, it would not take long for this island nation to resume the development process should internal or external conditions prove compelling. Taiwan's nuclear expertise is dor- mant but advanced and may be reengaged, given a political consensus.
AT: Proliferation Inevitable
Proliferation is not inevitable
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 328
Whatever path countries may take toward the tipping point, we are almost certainly not there yet-in fact, we do not appear to be close. Indeed, a welcome overall conclusion from the case studies explored in this volume is that the global nonproliferation regime may be more durable and less fragile than has sometimes been suspected or feared. Worrisome developments in recent years have given rise to a widespread concern that a world of more and more nuclear powers is essentially inevitable-that JFK's nightmare vision had only been postponed, not avoided. To be sure, the risks of further proliferation are very real. But despite widely held feelings of pessimism about the regime itself, our focus on the individual cases in the study reveals that it is not so easy to reverse longstanding decisions to forswear nuclear weapons. The evi- dence suggests that there is a hidden robustness in the fraying fabric of the global non-nuclear compact.
US can constrain wildfire proliferation
Kenneth Bialkin et al, Trustee National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 4/29/2009, “The Greater Middle East: Is Nuclear Proliferation Inevitable?,” pg. 4
Perhaps another conference of a similar title will be held next year to discuss one such question. If so, the contents if not the title is certain to connote the perverse actions of Iran. Meanwhile, though offering no cause for optimism, the answers given by the experts provide assurance that nuclear proliferation is not inevitable. Reinforcing that assurance is the grand diplomatic return of the United States to the region and its commitment to match deceitful deeds with tough sanctions and reduce U.S. nuclear weapons arsenals in consort with Russia. A small start toward achieving nonproliferation, it can be said, has been made.
Strong US action can prevent proliferation, it’s not inevitable
Jon Wolfsthal, co-author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction and a former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy, 2004, The Key Proliferation Questions,
Lastly, the United States needs to do more hard work in addressing proliferation threats. Washington must reconfigure our policies to demonstrate it understands the nature of this threat and ensure that it takes priority over almost all other security considerations. This includes how the U.S. handles its own nuclear facilities and weapons, the support it provides to organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, how it invests its defense and security budgets, and how the United States prioritizes its relations with other countries. Despite the challenges we face, proliferation is not inevitable and our knowledge of how and where proliferation takes place is better than most people think. The problem is that officials may not always make non-proliferation the priority it deserves to be.
AT: Deterrence Prevents Escalation
Rationality doesn’t prove deterrence – rationality of organization is bounded and conflicts drive irrational choices
Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University and Co-Director, 2003, Center for International Security and Cooperation, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed with Kenneth N. Waltz, pg. 50
The assumption that states behave in a basically rational manner is of course an assumption, not an empirically tested insight. Political scientists often assume high degrees of rationality, not because it is accurate, but because it is helpful: it provides a relatively simple way of making predictions, by linking perceived interests with expected behavior. The rational-actor view is clearly not the only one possible, however, and it is not the only set of assumptions that leads to useful predictions about nuclear proliferation. An alternative set of assumptions views government leaders as intending to behave rationally, yet sees their beliefs, the options available to them, and the final implementation of their decisions as being influenced by powerful forces within the country. If this is the case, organization theory should be useful for the study of the consequences of proliferation. This is important, since such an organizational perspective challenges the central assumption that states behave in a self-interested, rational manner.
New states won’t build survivable forces, prevents deterrent success
Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University and Co-Director, 2003, Center for International Security and Cooperation, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed with Kenneth N. Waltz, pg. 63-65
Why would professional militaries not develop invulnerable nuclear forces if left to their own devices? Five reasons emerge from the logic of organizational theory. First, military bureaucracies, like other organizations, are usually interested in having more resources: they want more weapons, more men in uniform, more of the budget pie. This could obviously lead to larger than necessary nuclear arsenals. Yet programs for making nuclear arsenals less vulnerable to attack (for example building concrete shelters or missile-carrying trains) are very expensive, and therefore decrease the resources available for the military hardware, the missiles or aircraft, that the organization values most highly. Military biases can therefore lead to more weapons but not necessarily more survivable weapons. Second, militaries, like other organizations, favor traditional ways of doing things and therefore maintain a strong sense of organizational "essence." Since efforts to decrease the vulnerability of nuclear forces often require new missions and weapon systems-and, indeed, often new organizational units-one would expect that the existing organizations would be resistant. Third, if organizational plans for war and conceptions of deterrence do not require invulnerable forces, militaries will not have incentives to pursue building them. Thus, if military officers believe that they are likely to engage in preventive war, preemptive attacks, or even launch-on-warning options, then survivability measures may be perceived as simply unnecessary. Fourth, military organizations inevitably develop routines to coordinate actions among numerous individuals and subunits, and such routines are commonly inflexible and slow to change. Even if the technical requirements for invulnerability are met, however, poorly designed standard operating procedures and military routines can undermine a survivable military force. In particular, organizational routines of military forces can produce "signatures" to enemy intelligence agencies; these signatures can inadvertently reveal secret information and the location of otherwise "hidden" military units. Fifth, organizational leaming tends to occur only after failures. Military organizations, like other organizations, have few incentives to review and adjust operations when they believe they are successful. Thus, if the first four problems create an undesirable survivability problem with nuclear forces, military organizations are unlikely to fix the problem until after an attack has revealed how vulnerable their forces really were.
AT: No Wildfire Proliferation
Proliferation snowballs and escalates
Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, 2002, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Survival, v. 44, pg. np
As proliferation continues, it generates increased pressures for further proliferation. For example, some states may be discouraged by each failure of international efforts to limit proliferation and come to see runaway proliferation as inevitable. Accordingly, such states may feel it prudent to make contingency preparations to become nuclear powers themselves, in turn causing other states to do the same. In addition, states may feel encouraged to develop WMD by the extra attention and other types of political and economic gains won by states that have previously done so. Indeed some states will feel that they must have their own nuclear deterrent forces simply because their spread ultimately makes them a key symbol of a modern state. The strongest increases in pressures to proliferate are felt by states that see themselves as potential targets of aggression by those who have gone nuclear or are about to. Prospective victims cannot expect to counter an opponent’s nuclear weapons solely by increases in their own conventional forces.
This is especially true of the United States reneges on commitments
Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, 2002, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Survival, v. 44, pg. np
What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint.
Absent US credibility, rogue proliferation spills over
Kurt M. Campbell, Senior Vice President and Kissinger Chair in Naitonal Security, CSIS, 2003, “National Proliferation Beyond Rogues,” The Washington Quarterly, p. 10-11.
One of the primary reasons for seeking to block various states, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from achieving nuclear status has long been the concern about how such a capacity would affect neighboring states. A rogue state’s successful acquisition of a nuclear weapon could trigger a range of potentially destabilizing regional responses, including the further proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the rogue state and the prospect of exacerbated regional rivalries. This central concern has been one of the driving factors behind U.S. diplomacy in the recent past, including the protracted negotiation of the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994. This issue is also arguably one of the animating features behind the “axis of evil” phrase in the president’s State of the Union address and the harder U.S. line toward Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—all states seeking to acquire, or which have already begun to develop, nuclear weapons. U.S. approaches to countering rogue-state proliferation range from more intensive efforts at diplomacy to threats of the use of force. Nevertheless, the underlying goal is the same: to prevent an unsavory regime from acquiring the mantle of new nuclear power.
***Hegemony DA***
Hegemony DA 1NC
US maintaining global hegemony – financial crisis hasn’t shifted relative power.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, 5-18-2009, H-Diplo Roundtable Review,
We certainly have no reason to assume that America will founder while its major competitors prosper, particularly as this crisis has revealed that the U.S. remains central enough in the global economy to reinforce the saying “when America coughs, the world gets a cold.” What we know for certain is that America’s lead over its competitors is very, very large. The financial crisis does not change this. Relative power is the bread and butter of international politics, and it shifts slowly. Indeed, the economic crisis has already harmed one would-be competitor — Russia, whose economy, state budget, stock market, and massive foreign currency reserve have all taken major hits — far, far harder than the United States.
Global deployments are effective in the status quo – US has transitioned forces to preserve leadership.
Robert D. Kaplan, National correspondent for the Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 12-17-2008, “A Gentler Hegemony,” Washington Post,
Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the world that the U.S. military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week. We are all over Africa, Asia and Latin America with these small missions that increase America's diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the world is generally light, lethal and highly mobile. We have been quietly reducing land forces in South Korea while compensating with a more effective air and naval presence. In Colombia, platoon-size numbers of Green Berets have been instrumental in fighting narco-terrorists; in Algeria, such training teams have helped improve our relationship with that formerly radical Arab country. Such stripped-down American military deployments garner no headlines, but they are a formula that works.
Forward deployment crucial to the maintenance of US hegemony.
Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, “The World in 2020: Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,”
The cornerstone of America's continued military preeminence is our ability to project combat power rapidly and virtually unimpeded to widespread areas of the globe. Much of our power projection capability depends on sustained access to regions of concern. Any number of circumstances might compromise our forward presence (both bases and forward operating forces) and therefore diminish our ability to apply military power, reducing our military and political influence in key regions of the world. For political (domestic or regional) reasons, allies might be coerced not to grant the United States access to their sovereign territory. Hostile forces might threaten punitive strikes (perhaps using weapons of mass destruction) against nations considering an alliance with the United States. Thus, the fostering and nurturing of allies and alliances, as well as our ability to protect our allies from such threats, will be an important factor in our future ability to project combat power anywhere in the world.
Hegemony DA 1NC
The magnitude of the link is huge - Shifts in deployment spill over to other key components of hegemony.
Overseas Basing Commission, 5-9-2005, Report of the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States,
A shift of this magnitude affects significantly the overall strategic posture of the United States — political relations with allies and friends, deterrence of aggression against U.S. interests, conduct of military operations, shaping of the international environment in ways favorable to the United States, and so on. Thus, any assessment of basing cannot be separated from its related parts (e.g., domestic as well as overseas basing, alliance relationships, mobility lift capabilities, access to energy sources, etc.) nor from broader considerations of security strategy (e.g., the likely nature of current and emerging threats, economic impacts, political and policy implications, and so on). Accordingly, we determined that fulfillment of our duties demanded more than a mere critique of the proposed overseas basing posture. Mindful of the emphasis in the directive of PL 108-132 to consider “...any other issue related to military facilities overseas...” the Commission elected to cast its review in the context of overseas basing as it relates to the totality of U.S. security strategy.
Decline of US hegemony causes apolarity, terrorism, economic collapse, and nuclear wars.
Niall Ferguson, professor of history at NYU and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, 6-21-2004, “The End of Power,” Wall Street Journal,
Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for.
Hegemony DA 1NC Cont’d
They can’t win an impact turn – alternatives to US hegemony more likely to cause great power war.
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” RealClearPolitics,
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world 's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value.
Uniqueness – Hegemony High Now
US will maintain hegemony – military power and cultural appeal.
Tommy Koh, chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, 10-7-2009, “Why the US Will Still Be No.1 in 2039,” The Straits Times,
Fourth, America's hard power or military power is unmatched. Its defence budget is the largest in the world. Its military technology - on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in cyberspace - is probably a generation ahead of its nearest rivals. America continues to lead the world in research and development, and in revolution in military affairs. I expect the US will remain the world's No. 1 military power in 2039. A country's total power can be either greater or less than the sum of its parts. In the case of the US, I would argue that it is greater than the sum of its parts. Why? Because the US, as a country, is blessed with the 'X' factor. It has an allure that adds to the sum of its military, economic, intellectual, diplomatic and cultural power. It has a youthful, optimistic and joyful attitude towards life that inspires admiration. For all these reasons - and in spite of its present travails and challenges - I believe that the sun is not setting on America.
Economic crisis won’t undermine hegemony.
Tommy Koh, chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, 10-7-2009, “Why the US Will Still Be No.1 in 2039,” The Straits Times,
Until recently, no one doubted that the US was the world's sole superpower and the unquestioned leader of the world. A series of reverses and self-inflicted wounds have, however, caused thoughtful individuals, in Asia and elsewhere, to ask whether the US is a declining power. At a recent meeting in Japan, a respected Japanese public intellectual asked whether we were witnessing the end of Pax America and the beginning of Pax Sinica. I would argue that such scepticism about the US is mistaken. In my view, the US will remain No. 1 in 2039, 30 years from now. My optimism is based upon the following reasons. First, I believe that the US economy will bounce back from the current downturn and remain the most vibrant and competitive economy in the world in 2039. The US economy was on the brink of disaster last year. Decisive action by two consecutive administrations as well as Congress saved the economy from collapse. It is in the American tradition to face up to problems, accept the painful medicine of reform and bounce back. The US was prepared to allow two American icons, Lehman Brothers and General Motors, to fail. Post-crisis, I expect that Wall Street will be better regulated, that Detroit will produce more energy-efficient and environmentally friendly automobiles, that the US will become a world leader in clean and renewable energy technology and businesses, and the American people will spend less and save more. Economic competitiveness in the 21st century will be increasingly driven by innovation, creativity, design, marketing, information technology and talent. These are areas in which the US excels. It is likely to continue to do so in 2039.
US will continue to pursue hegemony – Obama hasn’t changed grand strategy.
Ronald Grigor Suny, Professor of Social and Political History at the University of Michigan, 2010, “The Pawn of Great Powers: The East–West Competition for Caucasia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, p.14
The United States is unlikely, even under President Obama, to give up, or even acknowledge, its global hegemonic ambitions. For one thing, others, even considerable powers like Britain, do not want the Americans to give it up. But being a more benign, less self-interested global hegemon would mean taking more seriously the interests and preferences of others – the new leftist governments in Central and South America, the Iranians in the Middle East and Central Asia – and act more like an honest broker than parti pris usually taking the side of the most conservative forces. It would mean no more ultimata, less stringent preconditions before negotiations, no more preventive wars or calls for regime change with states with which you are trying to deal, and no more calling the opponent of American policies appeasers or imperialists or terrorists. Less bellicose rhetoric and more openhanded diplomacy will likely enhance American, and international, security than the swaggering, boastful policies of the previous administration.
Uniqueness – AT: Multipolarity Coming Now
US relative decline hasn’t led to major structural change.
Joan Johnson-Freese and Tom Nichols, chair of the Naval War College’s National Security Decision Making program and professor at the Naval War College, 11-25-2009, “US Less Dominant But So What,” DOD Buzz,
Saying that power is shifting away from the United States is true but misleading: it is another way of saying that America was once vastly more powerful than any possible coalition of states it faced, but now it is only immensely more powerful than other states, and is likely to remain so for decades to come. (The Soviets, in their day, did have a chance to defeat us, but only because of their huge nuclear arsenal, and their “victory” would have lasted for about 28 minutes.) Recognition of that relative difference has been reflected in recent years in military posture statements seeking, for example, space dominance rather than the space superiority of the past. But nobody has been able to explain what space dominance really means or how to achieve it without perpetuating a constant arms race–either with real competitors or, in the absence of actual challenges, with ourselves. Our military strength, we are warned, is declining. But is it? In the end, it is important to remember that there is no objective limit to the size or power of the U.S. armed forces; they are as strong as Americans are willing to pay for. And in a country where personal spending exceeds 4 billion dollars a year on cat food and another 6 billion or so on potato chips, that is a huge amount of military potential. America is a land of choice, and right now Americans are worrying more about their homes, schools, health care and jobs than whether the U.S. government spends more on its military than the next fifteen countries, or just the next ten (including multiples of the Chinese military budget), even considering the well-earned personnel and health care costs that makes our military budget seem so much larger than so many others. If “Support the Troops” bumper stickers cost $100, with proceeds donated directly to the Pentagon, it would be interesting to see sales if went up or down.
US will maintain predominance.
Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Spring 2009, “Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States,” Global Asia,
The US experience of hegemony in global politics is still very young. Although the United States entered the international system as a great power early in the twentieth century, its systemic impact was not felt until World War II and, soon thereafter, its power was constrained by the presence of another competitor, the Soviet Union. Only after the demise of this challenger in 1991 has the United States been liberated in the exercise of its hegemonic power but — as has become quite evident in the past two decades — this application of power, although potent in its impact when well exercised, is also beset by important limitations. In any event, the now significant, century-long, involvement of the United States in international politics as a great power tends to obscure the reality of how short its hegemonic phase has actually been thus far. This hegemony is by no means fated to end any time soon, however, given that the United States remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future will thus remain an issue of concern both within the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the juvenescence of the United State’s “unipolar moment,” combined with the disorientation produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to restrain any premature generalization that the imperial activism begun by the Clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some way come to define the permanent norm of US behavior in the global system. In all probability, it is much more likely that the limitations on US power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a preponderance of power, neutralize threatening challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals that go back to the foundations of the republic — is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon.
Uniqueness – AT: Multipolarity Coming Now Cont’d
Unipolarity is sustainable.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, 2008, “Introduction,” World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy,
What accounts for this sudden shift in assessments of American power? For most observers, it was not new information about material capabilities. As Robert Jervis observes, “Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history.” That statement was as accurate when it was written in 2006 as it would have been at any time after 1991, and the primacy it describes will long persist, even if the most pessimistic prognostications about U.S. economic, military, and technological competitiveness come true. For most scholars of international relations, what really changed after 2003 were estimates of the political utility of America’s primacy. Suddenly, scholars were impressed by the fact that material preponderance does not always translate into desired outcomes. For many, theories of international relations (IR) that explain constraints on the use of power were vindicated by American setbacks in Iraq and elsewhere.
Links – General Withdrawal
Cost of withdrawing troops trades off with military effectiveness.
Overseas Basing Commission, 5-9-2005, Report of the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States,
Additionally, the costs associated with rebasing forces within CONUS have not been fully analyzed. Over and above overseas relocation costs will be bills for service transformation, purchase of strategic and intra-theater lift, resetting of units and their equipment sets in the active and reserve forces, replacement and expansion of stocks, new weapons and systems purchases, and continued force modernization. The sum total is enormous. Moreover, many of the costs are unprogrammed and will be drawn from individual service operating budgets planned for other uses. We are in danger of robbing from operations and maintenance accounts to meet even minimal levels of construction and quality of life concerns. The Commission gives a strong caution that global restructuring and transformation ambitions may be bigger than our wallet.
Changing deployment postures during ongoing conflicts undermines military effectiveness.
Overseas Basing Commission, 5-9-2005, Report of the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States,
Our military forces must be able to meet the force projection demands placed on them under existing strategies and plans. Their training and equipment must be adequate to the task, access to key locations assured, and units and bases protected to the degree commensurate with the risks we ask our service men and women to undertake. It is not clear that all of these concerns have been addressed. Moreover, to launch major realignments of bases and unit configurations at a time we are in the midst of two major conflicts (Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom) takes us to the edge of our capabilities. Many of our active and reserve forces need to reset in light of the strain these operations have put on their equipment and support systems. The intercontinental (in some cases) and intra-theater movement of operational units will impact force readiness for a period of time. Simultaneous transformation of unit types and subsequent demands incurred by rotational cycles will further stretch capabilities.
Overseas withdrawals spill over – affects entire US grand strategy.
Overseas Basing Commission, 5-9-2005, Report of the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States,
At the same time, however, the Commission must emphasize that considerations of rebasing cannot be seen as an aside from these major strategic deliberations. It cannot be merely a consequence of domestic political tradeoffs. Nor can it be the fallout of diplomatic compromise, the appeasement of an ally here, a quid pro quo for a bilateral arrangement there. The entire basing structure of the United States, both domestic and international, must be an integrated whole and must relate directly to the national security strategy of the United States. Admittedly, real world tradeoffs must come into play. It is the nature of both our own political system and the international order that they do. But they must not be seen as an aside of strategy, pawns to be used to serve some other purpose. Our base structure is not merely a derivative of strategy; it is a driver in its own right. It must, therefore, be fully integrated with every other facet of strategy before it can be properly affixed. It is our opinion that the enormity of this point, and the discussion that it demands, has not been taken into account to the degree that it merits. Let us elaborate.
Links – Afghanistan
Withdrawing from Afghanistan destroys US leadership – shatters credibility and undermines alliances.
George Friedman and Reva Bhalla, chairman and CEO of Stratfor and Stratfor’s South Asia analyst, 10-21-2009, “The Afghanistan Challenge,” Stratfor,
The best argument for fighting in Afghanistan is powerful and similar to the one for fighting in Iraq: credibility. The abandonment of either country will create a powerful tool in the Islamic world for jihadists to argue that the United States is a weak power. Withdrawal from either place without a degree of political success could destabilize other regimes that cooperate with the United States. Given that, staying in either country has little to do with strategy and everything to do with the perception of simply being there. The best argument against fighting in either country is equally persuasive. The jihadists are right: The United States has neither the interest nor forces for long-term engagements in these countries. American interests go far beyond the Islamic world, and there are many present (to say nothing of future) threats from outside the region that require forces. Overcommitment in any one area of interest at the expense of others could be even more disastrous than the consequences of withdrawal. In our view, Obama’s decision depends not on choosing between McChrystal’s strategy and others, but on a careful consideration of how to manage the consequences of withdrawal. An excellent case can be made that now is not the time to leave Afghanistan, and we expect Obama to be influenced by that thinking far more than by the details of McChrystal’s strategy. As McChrystal himself points out, there are many unknowns and many risks in his own strategy; he is guaranteeing nothing.
Withdrawing now will shatter US alliances – success in Afghanistan is key.
William Drozdiak, former foreign editor and chief European correspondent for the Washington Post and is president of the American Council on Germany, January-February 2010, “NATO’s Last Stand,” IP Global,
President Obama’s decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan—in hope that this surge will reverse Taliban gains and allow an American withdrawal to commence in July 2010—looms as the boldest gamble of his presidency. The future cohesion of NATO and the viability of American leadership of the Atlantic alliance may hinge on whether the Afghanistan conflict can be turned around—even if the Western allies return home with something short of victory.
Afghanistan exit emboldens enemies to challenge US leadership.
Fouad Ajami, a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, 4-9-2010, “Afghanistan and the Decline of American Power,” Wall Street Journal,
Granted, Mullah Omar and his men in the Quetta Shura may not be seasoned observers of Washington's ways. But they (and Mr. Karzai) can discern if America is marking time, giving it one last try before casting Afghanistan adrift. It is an inescapable fact that Mr. Obama hasn't succeeded in selling this Afghan venture—or even the bigger war on terror itself—to his supporters on the left. He fights the war with Republican support, but his constituency remains isolationist at heart. The president has in his command a great fighting force and gifted commanders. He clearly hopes they will succeed. But there is always the hint that this Afghan campaign became the good, worthwhile war by default, a cause with which to bludgeon his predecessor's foray into Iraq. All this plays out under the gaze of an Islamic world that is coming to a consensus that a discernible American retreat in the region is in the works. America's enemies are increasingly brazen, its friends unnerved. Witness the hapless Lebanese, once wards of U.S. power, now making pilgrimages, one leader at a time, to Damascus. They, too, can read the wind: If Washington is out to "engage" that terrible lot in Syria, they better scurry there to secure reasonable terms of surrender. The shadow of American power is receding; the rogues are emboldened. The world has a way of calling the bluff of leaders and nations summoned to difficult endeavors. Would that our biggest source of worry in that arc of trouble was the intemperate outburst of our ally in Kabul.
Links – Japan
Japanese deployments critical to US power projection – necessary to global commitments and countering China and North Korea.
Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 4-2-2010, “Three Strikes Against US Global Presence,” Fox News,
Decisions by the governments of Japan and Great Britain and the passage of the bankrupting health care bill in the US spell the coming end of America's overseas basing and ability to project power. Should these trends continue, the US military will lose its European and Asian strategic anchors, hastening America's eventual withdrawal from its global commitments and leaving the world a far more uncertain and unstable place. The first strike comes from Asia. For the past six months, the new government of Japan has sought to revise a 2006 agreement to relocate a Marine Corps Air Station from one part of Okinawa to a less populated area. Though the agreement was reached only after a decade of intense negotiations and with Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government has instead suggested numerous alternative sites for the base, most of which were rejected during the previous negotiations and none of which would allow the same type of training and operations necessary for the Marine Corps' air wing. Now, American officials are privately wondering whether the ruling Democratic Party of Japan wants to allow the US the same level of access to bases in Japan, without which America would be incapable of providing regional security guarantees and serving as a force for stability in Asia amidst the growth of China's military capacity and North Korea's continuing nuclear developments. Indeed, the former head of the Democratic Party of Japan has publicly mused whether the US 7th Fleet is sufficient for alliance purposes, thus raising the specter of the withdrawal of US Marines and Air Force from Japan.
Japanese basing key to US power projection and Asian stability.
James J. Przystup, Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, April 2009, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: National Interests and Strategic Imperatives,” Strategic Forum,
The United States bilateral alliance structure remains the foundation of regional stability and prosperity and the starting point for U.S. security engagement with the region. The alliances allow the United States to maintain a significant forward-deployed presence, and the basing structure in Japan and South Korea, reinforced by access agreements with nonallied Asian friends, makes credible the U.S. security commitment to the region. Operating from bases in Asia, U.S. forces are able to extend their operational reach to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy to recall that the first U.S. forces to reach the Persian Gulf in 1991 and in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 were based in Japan. During the Cold War, the alliance structure stood as a vital link in the U.S. global containment strategy. Success in the Cold War did not put an end to interstate tensions and rivalries in East Asia. In the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the area experienced a series of challenges to regional stability and security—the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, and North Korea’s Taepo Dong missile launch over Japan in 1998—that affected the security interests of the United States, its allies, and friends. Today, Cold War legacy issues in East Asia—China-Taiwan relations and a divided Korean Peninsula, with North Korea now possessing a demonstrated nuclear capability—continue to pose challenges to U.S. security interests and commitments. In dealing with the hard security challenges facing the region, the alliance structure is irreplaceable. This will remain true for the foreseeable future.
Okinawa base is key to US power projection and deterrence.
Yuka Hayashi and Yochi Dreazen, Staff Writers at the Wall Street Journal, 11-10-2009, “Japan's Mixed Signals Add to Uncertainty Over U.S. Installations,” Wall Street Journal,
American military strategists say that the Marine bases in Okinawa help the U.S. project its power into the Far East, primarily because of the island's proximity to mainland Japan, China, Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. The strategists argue that the presence of so many armed Marines on the island has kept vital trade routes open while also serving as a deterrent of sorts to China and North Korea. "If you think of the security issues that the U.S. and Japan are grappling with, from the Chinese military buildup to the uncertainty on the Korean peninsula, having bases on Okinawa is extremely valuable," said Nicholas Szechenyi, a Japan expert at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, a Washington think tank.
Links – Iraq
Maintaining military presence in Iraq key to counter-balance challengers and project US influence.
Wall Street Journal, 3-9-2010, “Iraq’s Remarkable Election,”
Too much blood and treasure have been spent there to make the mission hostage to a political calendar. The nature of America's engagement will change in Iraq, but it needs to be sustained and robust. Imagine if the GIs had left Germany eight years after World War II or abandoned the DMZ in Korea prematurely. There are dangers ahead in Iraq, including violence in the immediate post-election period. The neighborhood is still dangerous as well. The Iraqis aren't going to subject themselves to Iranian dominion, but a senior military official tells us that the U.S. now worries greatly about the "Hezbollah-ization of Iraq." Tehran gained experience exploiting sectarian divisions to make trouble in Lebanon. It has brought that to bear in Iraq, supporting Shiite extremists with arms and money, and their influence needs to be countered. Free Iraq also represents a great U.S. strategic opportunity. As Turkey turns away from Europe (in part after having been turned away) and Iran pushes for regional hegemony, Iraq can now become a strong U.S. ally in the region if we don't abandon the field. A strong presence in Iraq gives the U.S. important leverage against a rogue regime in Tehran bent on acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Forward presence in Iraq key to power projection in the Middle East.
Catherine Lutz, professor of anthropology at Brown University and the Watson Institute for International Studies, July-August 2008, “Catherine Lutz on Iraq Military Bases,” Extra!,
CL: Yeah, absolutely. I think when people learn about the scale of the U.S. military presence overseas, they’re often surprised that it’s that large, but they accept it, often with the notion that this is a security service that we’re providing to those countries. The military bases are advertised by the Pentagon as gifts that are given to the countries in which they’re located, helping to protect them from outside aggression, for example. But, in fact, Pentagon documents indicate that these are in fact seen as military assets for power projection in the region in which they’re located. So that Iraq bases, for example, are seen as resources for potential future attacks elsewhere in the Middle East.
Withdrawal from Iraq cedes the Middle East to Iran – undermines US leadership.
Stratfor, 3-5-2010, “Special Report: The US Withdrawal from Iraq,”
U.S. drawdown plans are jeopardized not only by events and players within Iraq. One result of the U.S. move to effect regime change in Baghdad has been the rise of Iran. The Islamic republic, through its Shiite allies, has gained a disproportionate amount of influence in Iraq, which it is using to project power into the region. The dominant presence of the U.S. military in Iraq and the U.S. hand in the political system has thus far served as a counterweight. A U.S. withdrawal will give Iran an opening to enhance its position in the country.
Links – Kuwait
Deployments in Kuwait key to deter Middle East rivals.
Peg Mackey and Peter Kemp, Senior Correspondent for Energy Intelligence and Editorial Director at Energy Intelligence, 2-12-2010, “Iraq: Fearing the Phoenix?” Energy Compass,
That seems improbable. Petty disputes apart, Baghdad has no fundamental conflicts with any of its neighbors, who, given Iraq's belligerent past, would react swiftly to serious incitement. In practice, Iraq has no capacity for conventional warfare and its Saddam-era military machine is destroyed. Among the historic rivals for Gulf hegemony, Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia is impressively equipped and Shiite Iran is on the verge of nuclear breakout capability, while US bases in Kuwait are "a fundamental deterrent to both Iran and Iraq," notes Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Defense cooperation expanding with the GCC – forward deployment crucial.
Patrick Knapp, second lieutenant in the Minnesota Army National Guard, Winter 2010, “The Gulf States in the Shadow of Iran,” Middle East Quarterly,
The collective nature of the dialogue is also important because these arms sales are wasteful if Washington does not use its political capital to demand interoperable systems and joint-training programs. Three years into the Gulf Security Dialogue, there are signs that joint defense cooperation is taking root. In June, Gates praised "the unprecedented cooperation between the nations of the gulf." Indeed, GCC states are pursuing shared early warning and active defense systems, increasing membership in U.S.-backed nonproliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, signing energy memoranda of understanding, and building on joint exercises like January's joint combined security exercise in Kuwait. Another key component of the dialogue is psychological. The Bush administration used the Gulf Security Dialogue "to convey the U.S. commitment to the peace and security of our GCC allies as well as encourage regional partners to take the steps necessary to address regional challenges."Reinforcing U.S. commitment to defense of the GCC would cement alliances and give the regional Arab leaders the security to side with the United States. As President Bush explained in his 2008 state of the union address, "We will stand by our allies, and we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf."These vital interests are collective. Just as Bush declared a free Iraq to be "a friend of America, a partner in fighting terror, and a source of stability in a dangerous part of the world,"so too is a GCC united against Iranian schemes on the Persian Gulf. Such moral clarity helps dispel the competitive monarchies' natural aversion to defense cooperation. Al-Ubeid air base in Qatar and its logistics hub in Kuwait, for example, are crucial for operations in Iraq but would not exist if their host states did not sense a U.S. commitment to solidarity against mutual threats. Bilateral arms deals, too, are precursors to multilateral cooperation: "We sell stuff to build relationships," said Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa, head of the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency.Iran increasingly meddles in the region, trust-building between the United States and its GCC allies grows even more important.
Links – Kuwait Cont’d
Military bases in Kuwait key to effective US deployments and deterrence in the Middle East.
John Pike, Director of Global , No Date (copyright 2000-2010), “Camp Doha,”
Camp Doha is a warehouse complex north of Kuwait City which has been a major US base since the Gulf War. The Army uses Camp Doha, a former industrial warehouse complex converted to an Army installation after Kuwait's liberation from Iraq. Army Forces Central Command-Kuwait (ARCENT-Kuwait), headquartered at Camp Doha, is responsible for RSOI and administrative support of Army forces deploying to Kuwait, oversight of the contract that maintains the brigade prepositioned fleet, and installation support for Camp Doha. Coalition/Joint Task Force-Kuwait (Forward) (C/JTF-KU (Fwd)) is also based on Camp Doha. Established during Operation DESERT THUNDER I and continuously manned since February 1998, C/JTF-KU (Fwd) provides a forward command and control headquarters capable of rapid expansion to execute joint, combined, and coalition combat operations and maintains area situational awareness by daily coordination with the Air Force and Navy Joint Task Forces in Saudi Arabia and Baharain, respectively. C/JTF-KU (Fwd) also has tactical control of all Army forces deployed in Kuwait and US Marine forces when ashore in Kuwait. On January 21, 2003 an American civilian was killed and another wounded in an ambush near Kuwait City. The two American men were civilian contractors working for the U-S military in Kuwait, according to a U-S embassy spokesman (John Moran) in the emirate. The shooting occurred about nine o'clock in the morning, local time, just north of Kuwait City, at an intersection several kilometers from Camp Doha, where as many as ten thousand U-S troops are stationed to prepare for a possible attack on neighboring Iraq. The two men were in a Toyota Landcruiser that was struck several times by gunfire. The driver was shot in the shoulder and the leg and is said to be in stable condition at a local hospital. His passenger was shot several times and died as a result of his wounds. Authorities say it appears the gunman or gunmen may have been laying in wait in a nearby agricultural area, and ambushed the car as it was driving by. No one has claimed responsibility for the shooting. A manhunt is underway. The ARCENT-KU presence in Kuwait remains a deterrent to aggression and helps preserve peace in the region. ARCENT-KU serves as the forward-deployed base for Joint Task Force-Kuwait (JTF-Kuwait), providing command and control over all US Forces that deploy into Kuwait during a contingency.
Links - South Korea
Korean deployments key to global military reach – it’s at the heart of Pentagon transformations.
Jae-Jung Suh, Associate professor and director of Korean Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 3-31-2008, “Korean Bases of Concern,” Foreign Policy in Focus,
Nowhere is the trinity of transformation, realignment, and restructuring more vividly demonstrated than in South Korea. There U.S. bases are being consolidated to facilitate the “strategic flexibility” of the U.S. forces. With this flexibility, various U.S. forces can be flown in from outside the region and assembled into a lethal force, and U.S. forces in Korea can be projected out of Korea and Asia to be parts of a larger force. According to the Pentagon plan, the new bases will function as lily pads on which new high-tech forces will land to jump off to far away places. Welcome to the Pentagon’s new world.
Korean deployments have global reach – key to effective military deployments.
Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Spring 2006, "Transforming the U.S. global defense posture." Naval War College Review, p.27
Our current ground, air, and naval access throughout the Asia-Pacific region serves as a basis for a long-term presence that will be better structured for more effective regional and global action. For example, the Army's modular transformation will streamline headquarters elements and strengthen joint capabilities. The forward-deployed Air Force Strike ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) task force in the Pacific will also enable greater regional and global reach. We also are establishing a network of forward operating sites and cooperative security locations to support better the war on terror and to provide multiple avenues of access for contingency operations. Such facilities will serve to expand U.S. and host-nation training opportunities, helping our partners build their own capacities in areas such as counterterrorism. On the Korean Peninsula, our planned enhancements and realignments are intended to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the combined defense of the Republic of Korea. Stationed forces are relocating away from the increasing congestion and sprawl of the greater Seoul area and consolidating into two major hubs in the central and southern sections of the country. Rotational and rapidly deployable combat capabilities such as Stryker units and air expeditionary forces will complement these permanently stationed units. We seek to retain a robust prepositioned equipment capability in Korea to support rapid reinforcement.
They can’t win offense – the nature of our Korean deployment has changed to meet new threats – and this has resolved South Korean opposition.
Seongho Sheen, Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University, Summer 2003, “GrudgingP artner:S outh Korea,” Asian Affairs, p.102
In an effort to quell public anger over basing issues, the South Korean government and USFK decided to go ahead formally with the relocation process. South Korea agreed to pay most of the expenses, although it will take up to ten years to complete. In March 2002, USFK announced plans to consolidate the forty-one military bases scattered around South Korea into twenty locations, in accordance with the new U.S. military strategy. According to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), USFK would return more than 50 percent of real estate currently occupied by the U.S. bases (potentially about 32,000 acres of commercial and agricultural and) to South Korea. This will help the South Korean government alleviate public criticism of the U.S. military presence on Korean soil. Indeed, the new U.S. military strategy focusing on forward deployment with smaller, lighter, and more mobile forces may prove to be a win-win strategy for both governments. Such a strategy would help to meet the growing public uneasiness with U.S. military forces by reducing the burden of maintaining a heavy military presence. USFK may take a bold initiative to resolve controversial basing issues by moving Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul, along with base consolidations in other areas with help from the South Korean government. Such a move, however, should not be regarded as a weakening U.S. commitment to the alliance or the region.
Links – Turkey
Incirlik air base crucial to US power projection – Iraq and Afghanistan prove.
Graham E. Fuller, adjunct Professor of History at the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, 2008, The new Turkish republic: Turkey as a pivotal state in the Muslim world, p.82
The Turkish airbase at Incirlik has been particularly vital to NATO and U.S. power projection into the Middle East, most importantly during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. Although Ankara denied the use of its soil as a land base for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Incirlik is used by the United States to support military and logistical needs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Turkish forward deployment key to power projection in global hotspots.
Ian O. Lesser, senior policy analyst at RAND, 2000, “Western Interests in a Changing Turkey,” The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan,
Ankara is, unusually, an attractive international partner for multilateralists and unilateralists alike. For the former, Turkey’s NATO role, growing potential for regional action (diplomatic, economic, and military), and coalition approach to critical regions such as the Balkans is attractive. For the latter, selective cooperation with capable partners remains useful, and Turkey’s ability to facilitate U.S. power projection and preference for close bilateral ties count heavily. Skeptics with regard to European defense initiatives tend to see Turkey as one of the few “serious” security partners for contingencies outside the center of Europe. Moreover, U.S. interests in adjacent regions are hardly transient, and are among the most durable in U.S. foreign policy. Turkish strategists periodically worry about the potential for declining interest in Turkey as a result of the resolution of regional problems. It requires extraordinary optimism to imagine the confluence of a smooth transition to a reformed, benign Russia; the absence of instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans; the full resolution of Arab-Israeli disputes; the disappearance of interstate frictions in the Gulf; and the end of Greek-Turkish conflict. Some of these transitions are attainable (and, in the case of Greek-Turkish relations, are arguably under way). But the multiple sources of instability on Turkey’s borders argue for a continuing U.S. stake. Moreover, the U.S. stake in Turkey is a product of opportunities as well as challenges. These may expand to the extent that long-standing regional problems are resolved (e.g., the potential for Turkey to play a key role in regional development and reconstruction in the Balkans or the Middle East).
Military relations with Turkey crucial to US strategic objectives in Russia and the Middle East.
David M. Giachetti, Lt. Col in the US Air Force, 2-15-2008, “United States Military Relations with Turkey,”
The relationship between the United States and Turkey has been an enduring and at times tumultuous one wherein the United States has long considered Turkey a critical strategic ally. Many factors have influenced the nature of this sometime fragile relationship since the formation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 through his vision of a strong secular nationalist state. Turkey emerged from World War II as a critical geostrategic and geopolitical world player and soon held key importance as a NATO member and anchor of NATO’s strategic southern flank and a hedge against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Recently, Turkey has emerged as a vital partner in the war on terror and it continues to play an important role in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy vis-à-vis Russia and the Middle East. Although at times fraught with differences and difficulties, from its basing support for troop rotations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Turkey’s geographical location straddling Europe and Asia and political position at the crossroads of Islam and democracy, this pivotal state is and will continue to be an ideal military and strategic political partner.
AT: Link Turn – Soft Power
Soft power not key to hegemony.
Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas
A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Summer 2009, “The Waning of US Hegemony—Myth or Reality?” International Security, pp.165-166
Preservation of American hegemony with soft power. Like many U.S. international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts, Zakaria believes that by using its soft power the United States can preserve its “pivotal” status in international politics. As the NIC and Mahbubani argue, however, soft power may be significantly less potent a force for bolstering U.S. preponderance than Zakaria (and others believe). This is so for two reasons. First, the global financial and economic crisis has discredited one of the pillars of U.S. soft power: American free-market capitalism and, more generally, liberalism itself (economically and institutionally). As former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman puts it, the meltdown has “put the American model of free market capitalism under a cloud.” Second, as Mahbubani rightly notes, the United States is not the only country that possesses soft power. China, especially, has become increasingly adept in this regard. If China weathers the economic storm better than the United States, it will be in a position to expand its role in the developing world. Even before the meltdown, China was taking advantage of the United States’ preoccupation with the “war on terror” to project its soft power into East and Southeast Asia. China also is making inroads in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia, by providing development assistance without strings and increasing its weapons sales. Similarly, China is using its financial clout to buy up huge quantities of raw materials and natural resources worldwide, thereby bringing states into its political orbit.
Soft power high now – Obama election and cultural values.
Tommy Koh, chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, 10-7-2009, “Why the US Will Still Be No.1 in 2039,” The Straits Times,
Third, America has the world's most attractive soft power. The young of the world listen to American music, watch American movies, wear American fashion and enjoy American food. The founders of Microsoft, Apple, YouTube and Twitter are all Americans. At a deeper level, there is great admiration for American ideals and values. The three American values that resonate most with Asians are equality, meritocracy and opportunity. The election of Mr Barack Obama, as the 44th president of the United States, has done more to restore the world's faith in American values and ideals than any amount of public diplomacy could have. His eloquence, his humble tone and inclusive attitude, his appeal to the Islamic ummah and his willingness to adopt fresh diplomatic approaches to seemingly intractable problems, have greatly strengthened the appeal of American soft power.
The plan can’t boost soft power – and it’s not enough to solve hegemony.
Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Winter 2004, “Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics.(Book Review),” Political Science Quarterly, p.681
Joe Nye is correct. Soft power contributes importantly to the nation's ability to achieve its goals in the world. But I don't think Professor Nye would disagree that soft power also has its limitations. U.S. attractiveness to others will never be shaped fundamentally by the government, nor can it be tapped for use in particular situations. Nor will soft power be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.
Hegemony Good – Conflict
Collapse of US hegemony causes global nuclear wars.
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” RealClearPolitics,
The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.
US leadership is key to prevent global nuclear war.
Zalmay Khalilzad, Program director for strategy, doctrine, and force structure of RAND's Project AIR FORCE, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?” Washington Quarterly, p.84
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Hegemony Good – Conflict Cont’d
Maintaining US hegemony key to prevent global conflict and economic decline.
Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 4-2-2010, “Three Strikes Against US Global Presence,” Fox News,
For the past six decades, global stability was assured in large part by an expensive US commitment to maintain credible forces abroad, forge tight alliances with key strategic countries, and devote a significant, though not onerous, part of national treasure to sustaining a military second to none. Rarely in history has a country shouldered such burdens for so long, but the succeeding decades of growth and avoidance of systemic war proved the wisdom of the course. Are these three strikes the writing on the wall, the blueprint for how American power will decline in the world, with a whimper and an empty purse? The choice to reverse these trends will grow increasingly difficult in coming years, until we reach a point of no return, as did Great Britain and Rome. The result, unhappily, will not be a replay of the 20th century, when Washington stepped up after London's decline. It will almost certainly be the inauguration of decades, if not centuries, of global instability, increased conflict, and depressed economic growth and innovation. Such is the result of short-sighted policies that reflect political expedience, moral weakness, and a romantic belief in global fraternity. Happily for us, perhaps, is that the lessons of history still hold, and that we can chose to fight the dimming of our age if we but understand the stakes at hand.
Hegemony Good – Democracy
US leadership key to global democracy – multipolarity fails.
James Coady, European Union Section Director at the Henry Jackson Society, 10-20-2009, “The Bush Doctrine in Perspective,”
President Bush’s foreign policy was deeply unpopular. And it cannot be denied that his administration made serious mistakes in the foreign policy sphere, the lack of post-war planning in Iraq perhaps being the most obvious example. But the Bush doctrine’s aim of maintaining America’s global geopolitical superiority is one that should be welcomed. The editors of Foreign Policy succinctly summed up attitudes to US hegemony when they stated, “Either you believe that Uncle Sam is a benevolent bulwark against chaos or you see him as the all-powerful root of evil.” Those who subscribe to the latter view should consider the alternatives to assertive American global leadership. It is fashionable to label foreign policy during the Bush years as arrogant and hubristic. Yet a return to multipolarity would signify the emergence of a more volatile and dangerous international system hostile to democratic values. Resolute American leadership was invaluable in defeating the two greatest evils of the twentieth century in German National Socialism and Soviet Communism. It will be equally instrumental in managing the current and future threats of this century.
Democracy solves extinction.
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, )
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
Unipolarity critical to democracy promotion – only way to leverage US influence.
Jack Santucci, MA in Democracy and Governance Program and currently at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems , Winter 2010, “What is the Future of Democracy Promotion?” Democracy & Society,
With the end of superpower rivalry, the United States realized it could invest less in foreign countries and attach that investment to high moral ends. Governments in poor countries no longer could turn to the Soviets for subsidies. The Castro government in Cuba, for example, decided that the end of the Comecon necessitated a ``special period'' of national austerity. If a leader wanted foreign cash, he now had to govern the American way. Democracy promotion as we know it grew out of the unipolar moment. Sensing the untenable contradictions in state socialism, US decision-makers set up the National Endowment for Democracy and its ancillary party institutes. Francis Fukuyama declared ``the end of history,'' arguing the process of dialectical materialism had culminated in liberal democracy. With social evolution having selected out all other regime types, all that remained was to kill off the laggards. This was democracy promotion's theoretical mooring.
Hegemony Good – Free Trade
US hegemony key to free trade – enforces international laws and cooperation.
David Brooks, co-founder of Politablog, 1-8-2010, “Realism and US Hegemony,” Politablog,
Realist thought has become commonplace among the policy makers in the United States. One of the central thoughts that run parallel to realist thought is hegemonic stability theory. This theory asserts that for the international system to function properly there must be a hegemon. The hegemon must be able to create and enforce international law and norms, set precedent in technological and military prowess and be willing to assume the role of world power. The world system will suffer without a hegemon because international laws cannot be enforced, trade slows down and financial centers collapse. The United States has assumed the role of hegemon since the collapse of the Soviet Union, since then there has been unprecedented economic cooperation, growth and security. With rational policy makers and sound economic policy the United States will remain the hegemon for many more years.
That’s key to prevent nuclear wars.
Michael Spicer, economist and member of the British Parliament, 1996, The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121
The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won't hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that he consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.
Their unipolarity turns are wrong – US will use its hegemonic status to pursue multilateral institutionalism.
G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 2005, “Power and liberal order: America’s postwar world order in transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, p.136
Finally, despite Washington's imperial temptation, the United States is not doomed to abandon rule-based order. This is true if only because the alternatives are ultimately unsustainable. A neo-imperial system of American rule – even the ‘hub and spoke’ version that currently holds sway in East Asia – is too costly, fraught with contradictions, and premised on an inflated accounting of American power. Likewise, there are an array of incentives and impulses that will persuade the United States to try to organize unipolarity around multilateral rules and institutions. The United States may want to renegotiate rules and institutions in some global areas, but it ultimately will want to wield its power legitimately in a world of rules and institutions. It will also have incentives to build and strengthen regional and global institutions in preparation for a future ‘after unipolarity’. The rising power of China, India, and other non-Western states presents a challenge to the old American-led order that will require new, expanded, and shared international governance arrangements.
Hegemony Good – Proliferation
Collapse of US hegemony causes global arms races and WMD proliferation.
Stephen Rosen, Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University, 3-1-2003, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It,” National Interest,
Rather than wresde with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also b e very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.
Every new nuclear state increases the risk of nuclear war.
ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament), 2009, Eliminating Nuclear Threats,
3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non‑state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.
Hegemony Good – Proliferation Cont’d
Unipolarity key to contain the spread of WMD.
Charles Krauthammer, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for commentary and syndicated columnist for the Washington Post, Winter 2002/2003, “The Unipolar Moment Revisted,” The National Interest, p.17
The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up—either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.
Hegemony Good – Transition Impacts
Decline of US hegemony causes a power vacuum – guarantees conflict and economic collapse.
Niall Ferguson, professor of history at NYU and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, 6-21-2004, “The End of Power,” Wall Street Journal,
But what if this view is wrong? What if the world is heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Though the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers--whether civilizations, empires or nation states--they have not wholly overlooked eras when power has receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, instead of a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to it. This could turn out to mean a new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic rapine in the world's no-go zones; of economic stagnation and a retreat by civilization into a few fortified enclaves.
Withdrawal of American conflict only causes new great power competition, conflict, and American re-engagement.
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” RealClearPolitics,
The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
Transition to multipolarity risks Middle East conflict – even US opponents agree.
Dmitry Shlapentokh, Associate Professor of History at Indiana University at South Bend, 7-15-2009, “China, Russia, and the Risk of Explosion in Central Asia,” CACI Analyst,
The consensus among the Russian and Chinese elites seems to be that a weakening of the U.S. would lead to a much-desired “multi-polarity”, beneficial for both Russia and China. The weakening of the U.S., increasingly clear since the end of the Bush administration, seems to confirm Russia’s and China’s anticipation of the emerging “multipolarity”. Still, it is becoming clear to the elites of both countries that a weakening of the U.S. could also bring serious problems for both Russia and China. For a long time, the Russian elite in many ways related American might, in the holistic meaning of the word, with the U.S. economic standing. This was especially clear during the Yeltsin era when the dollar ruled supreme in Russia. The decline of the dollar in the late Putin era was a huge blow to the image of the U.S., regardless of the dollar’s recent rise vis-à-vis the ruble. In the beginning of the U.S. troubles, the Russian elite were quite pleased with the American decline. The assumption was that Russia would benefit from the U.S. predicament. Still, the crisis spilled over into Russia and reinforced in the minds of the Russian elite the notion that not only is the U.S. weak but its weakness could be a source of trouble to others. This change of paradigm, from the idea that the U.S. should be a cause for concern because of its strength to the notion that it should be feared because of its weakness, could be seen in the minds of the Chinese elite as well. Indeed, China recently expressed concern that Obama’s spending spree could undermine the value of the dollar and T-bills that China holds. This change of paradigm clearly indicates that the U.S. decline is not always seen as beneficial for either China or Russia and that the transition to “multi-polarity” entails not just benefits but also dangers. And developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are among these potential dangers.
Hegemony Good – AT: Multipolarity Better
Multipolarity comparatively increases conflict – history proves.
William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, p.56
The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict.
Unipolarity key to reduce great power competition and conflict.
William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, p.52
As Figure 1 in the introduction to this issue illustrates, the great power subsystem is currently stratified at the top to a degree not seen since the modern international system took shape in the seventeenth century. The foregoing analysis suggests a plausible answer to the question of unipolarity’s implications for great power conflict: that a symmetrically top-heavy distribution of capabilities will dampen status competition, reducing or removing important preconditions for militarized rivalry and war. A unipole will provide a salient out-group comparison for elites in other major powers, but its symmetrical material preponderance will induce them to select strategies for identity maintenance that do not foster overt status conflict. And because its material dominance makes its status as number one relatively secure, the unipole itself has the option to adopt policies that seek to ameliorate status dissonance on the part of second-tier powers.
Unipolarity is comparatively less conflict-prone – no incentive for costly competition.
William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, p.30
Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others. “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.” While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.
Hegemony Good – AT: Counter-Balancing
No evidence for counter-balancing – even soft-balancing is overblown.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, Summer 2005, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security,
We conclude that although states do periodically undertake actions that end up constraining the United Sates, the soft-balancing argument does not help to explain this behavior. There is no empirical basis for concluding that U.S. power, and the security threat that potentially inheres in it, has influenced recent constraint actions undertaken by the other major powers. Our examination therefore provides further confirmation of the need for analysts to move beyond the familiar but misleading precepts of balance of power theory. Instead, new theorizing is needed that is more appropriate for understanding security relations in today’s unipolar era.
US hegemony not causing balancing – decreased US power will causes other states to build up capabilities.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, Summer 2005, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security,
Although this incentive for enhancing capabilities concerns security and is directly connected to U.S. policy, it has nothing to do with balancing. Balancing, whether hard or soft, is about protection from the security threat emanating directly from a potential hegemon. If it means anything, the soft balancing argument must predict that less U.S. power and lower involvement will reduce incentives for other states to gain relative power. If bargaining rather than balancing is in play, however, then there is no reason to believe that shrinking either U.S. power or the level of its global engagement would reduce other states’ incentives to build up their capabilities. On the contrary, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the world—as neo-isolationists are now calling for—could generate new security dynamics that produce much greater incentives for other powers to increase their capabilities.
Unipolarity solves the impact to counter-balancing – US will de-escalate conflicts.
William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, pp.53-54
Given its material dominance and activist foreign policy, the United States is a salient factor in the identity politics of all major powers, and it plays a role in most regional hierarchies. Yet there is scant evidence in U.S. foreign policy discourse of concerns analogous to late cold war perceptions of a Soviet “thrust to global preeminence” or mid-nineteenth century British apprehensions about Tsar Nicholas’s “pretensions to be the arbiter of Europe.” Even when rhetoric emanating from the other powers suggests dissatisfaction with the U.S. role, diplomatic episodes rich with potential for such perceptions were resolved by bargaining relatively free from positional concerns: tension in the Taiwan Strait and the 2001 spy plane incident with China, for example, or numerous tense incidents with Russia from Bosnia to Kosovo to more recent regional disputes in post-Soviet Eurasia. On the contrary, under unipolarity U.S. diplomats have frequently adopted policies to enhance the security of the identities of Russia, China, Japan, and India as great (though second-tier) powers, with an emphasis on their regional roles. U.S. officials have urged China to manage the six-party talks on North Korea while welcoming it as a “responsible stakeholder” in the system; they have urged a much larger regional role for Japan; and they have deliberately fostered India’s status as a “responsible” nuclear power. Russia, the country whose elite has arguably confronted the most threats to its identity, has been the object of what appear to be elaborate U.S. status-management policies that included invitations to form a partnership with NATO, play a prominent role in Middle East diplomacy (from which Washington had striven to exclude Moscow for four decades), and to join the rich countries’ club, the G7 (when Russia clearly lacked the economic requisites). Status management policies on this scale appear to be enabled by a unipolar structure that fosters confidence in the security of the United States’ identity as number one. The United States is free to buttress the status of these states as second-tier great powers and key regional players precisely because it faces no serious competition for overall system leadership.
Hegemony Good – AT: Terrorism
Unipolarity best solves terrorism – transition won’t solve, leadership key to effective solutions.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, July-August 2002, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, p.30
Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.
Reducing hegemony won’t prevent terrorism.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2002, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone, p.x-xi
Some Americans are tempted to believe that we could reduce these hatreds and our vulnerability if we would withdraw our troops, curtail our alliances, and follow a more isolationist foreign policy. But isolationism would not remove our vulnerability. Not only are the terrorists who struck on September 11 dedicated to reducing American power, but in the words of Jordan’s King Abdallah, “they want to break down the fabric of the U.S. They want to break down what America stands for.” Even if we had a weaker foreign policy, such groups would resent the power of the American economy, which would still reach well beyond our shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some.
Hegemony doesn’t discourage cooperation against terrorism.
Stephen Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard University, January 2009, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, p.114
Last but not least, the heightened fear of international terrorism in the wake of September 11 provides smaller states with yet another incentive for close collaboration with the world’s most powerful country. Whatever their other differences may be, most governments are understandably hostile to nonstate movements whose avowed aim is to overthrow existing regimes and foment international conflict and whose preferred tactic is mass violence against innocent civilians. Cooperation against al-Qaeda or its affiliates may fall well short of full alignment, but the shared fear of terrorism does provide another reason for states to overlook their concerns about U.S. power and their reservations about U.S. policies and instead to collaborate with Washington against the shared terrorist danger
***Midterms DA***
Midterms DA 1NC
The GoP will take back control of Congress now, but it’s not a foregone conclusion
Fred Barnes, Executive editor for the Weekly Standard, 04/02/2010 “All-Star Panel Projects How Republicans Will Do in the Midterm Elections,”
It looks like it could be 1994, a big election like that, a sweep for Republicans, a landslide, but not necessarily. Republicans will have to have things they have to do. Remember what midterm elections are about. They're not about persuasion, and I think the lines are set. People won't warm up to Obama- care and independents won't sweep the Democrats all of a sudden. It's not about persuasion; they're about turn-out. So the Republicans have a majority out there, but they have to keep up the fervor and excitement all the way to November 4, 5, early November. Anyway, that is a long time off in political time. And so what I think they need to do is they can't just assume that because everybody hates Democrats, or at least they think so, that that is going to help them. That is never enough. It makes a big difference if they win 20 seats, which they'll win easily, or 40 seats or 41 to let them capture the House. So what I think they need to do is show daylight between themselves and the Democrats, a lot of it. This is what the Republicans did in '78 and '80 with the tax cut and '94 with the contract with America. Both things, the Democrats said those are too radical. They attacked them. They thought by attacking them it would help the Democrats. They helped Republicans.
The plan is wildly popular with the public
Jules Dufour, Professor of Geography, 7/1/2007, “The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases,”
The network of US military bases is strategic, located in proximity of traditional strategic resources including nonrenewable sources of energy. This military presence has brought about political opposition and resistance from progressive movements and antiwar activists. Demonstrations directed against US military presence has developed in Spain, Ecuador, Italy, Paraguay, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria and in many other countries. Moreover, other long-termer resistance movements directed against US military presence have continued in South Korea, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Cuba, Europe, Japan and other locations.
Obama’s popularity limits GoP gains in the midterm election
Andrew Kohut, director @ the Pew Research Center, 2/12/2010, “Public Anger on the Rise as Focus Turns to Midterm Race,”
One of the real issues here is Barack Obama. His approval ratings are still reasonably high, given all of the frustration with him. We have had him at about 50 percent for a very long time, even though most people now say they don't think he's trying hard enough on the economy. The number who say he is doing -- making things better is equal to the number who say he is making things worse. As long as his numbers stay up, the Democrats have a chance of avoiding a major calamity.
Midterms DA 1NC
GoP win creates a perception of gridlock – key to the economy
Chris Panteli, Commissioning editor, 3/15/2010, “Wirtz eyes US capital market rally after mid-term elections,” Investment Week,
Fifth Third Asset Management president and CIO Keith Wirtz believes the US capital markets will enjoy a late rally following the mid-term elections in November. Wirtz, whose firm took on management of Skandia Investment Group’s $80m US Large Cap Growth fund, says the prospect of a hung parliament, which is currently hitting sterling badly, would have the opposite effect across the Atlantic. He predicts the Democrats will lose seats in both the house and the senate in the mid-terms, resulting in congressional gridlock, which in turn will lead to a rally in the markets. “The US markets would cheer for a divided government,” Wirtz says. “The markets will perceive less risk coming from congress and less damage to the American taxpayer and that may lead to a pretty nice rally late in the year. “The markets respond quite favourably to congressional gridlock and I have every hope and expectation our congress is going to lock up in November.” Wirtz believes the US equity markets will lead equity markets across the world in 2010. He says quality, which can now be bought cheaply in the US, will be the key theme in the SIG portfolio. As opposed to last year, returns will be sourced from quality larger-cap stocks, he adds, with pharmaceutical and technology stocks being favoured in the portfolio. “Financial quality is now the important theme. Earnings, margins, balance-sheet condition – those kinds of measures of quality to us look particularly attractive and cheap to us now,” Wirtz says. “You can buy quality fairly inexpensively in the US relative to other factors. “We have raised the capitalisation structure and have been moving towards areas which have been somewhat out of favour such as healthcare, where stocks look cheap to us right now. “We think technology still looks attractive to us because of the fundamentals we see over the next two years and we also want to re-expose to the energy areas of the US economy.”
Economic growth is key to avoid global conflict
Earl Tilford, PhD in history from George Washington University and served for thirty-two years as a military officer and analyst with the Air Force and Army, 2008, “Critical Mass: Economic Leadership or Dictatorship,” The Cedartown Standard, Lexis
Could it happen again? Bourgeois democracy requires a vibrant capitalist system. Without it, the role of the individual shrinks as government expands. At the very least, the dimensions of the U.S. government economic intervention will foster a growth in bureaucracy to administer the multi-faceted programs necessary for implementation. Bureaucracies, once established, inevitably become self-serving and self-perpetuating. Will this lead to “socialism” as some conservative economic prognosticators suggest? Perhaps. But so is the possibility of dictatorship. If the American economy collapses, especially in wartime, there remains that possibility. And if that happens the American democratic era may be over. If the world economies collapse, totalitarianism will almost certainly return to Russia, which already is well along that path in any event. Fragile democracies in South America and Eastern Europe could crumble. A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations—the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia—need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.
Uniqueness – GOP Win Now
GoP ahead now among likely voters
Lydia, Saad, Race for Control of Congress Remains Close, 3/16/2010, “Race for Control of Congress Remains Close,”
Gallup's weekly read on the race for Congress shows Democrats with a 47% to 44% edge over Republicans among registered voters, unchanged from last week. However, this represents a significantly smaller margin for the Democrats than the final Gallup estimate before the last midterm elections, in 2006. Gallup polls since October 2009 have consistently found the two major parties closely matched in voter preferences for the 2010 midterm congressional elections. This is a significant departure from 2006 -- the year the Democratic Party regained majority control of the U.S. House of Representatives. In the two prior midterm elections (1998 and 2002), while Democrats also held the upper hand among registered voters, they trailed among likely voters -- and ultimately failed to win control of the House. Essentially, not since 1994 (when Republicans won control of the House for the first time in 40 years) have the two major parties been as competitive in Gallup's final pre-election polling among registered voters as they are in the early 2010 polling. Historically, Gallup has found Republicans more likely than Democrats to vote in midterm elections, meaning their electoral strength is typically underestimated in survey results based on all registered voters. Gallup will institute its traditional "likely voter" model closer to Election Day (narrowing the sample of voters to the subset deemed most likely to vote). Until then, historical trends would indicate that the Democrats need to hold a better-than four percentage-point advantage among registered voters nationally in order to have a reasonable chance of leading among likely voters and, ultimately, in House seats. Democratic Support Sagging in the South The Democratic Party currently leads the Republican Party in voter preferences for Congress only in the East. Elsewhere, the party-preference differences are too small to be significant. (Regional data are based on March 1-14 Gallup Daily tracking, spanning weeks when the overall vote for Congress was identical.) Across most regions, Democrats are weaker today than they were in the final days of the 2008 elections -- the elections that determined the composition of the current 111th Congress. Only the slight, four percentage-point drop in the West is not significant. Bottom Line Gallup trends suggest that the Democrats' current three-point advantage among registered voters would probably translate into a Republican lead among likely voters, pointing to a highly competitive election this fall for majority control of Congress. Support for Democratic candidates is down moderately from 2008 in all regions but the West.
GoP win now because of voter anger at democratic policies
The Hill, 2/11/2010, Democrats must work to avoid '94 repeat, pg. n/p
If the midterm election was held tomorrow, Republicans would retake control of Congress, Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said Wednesday. “If the 2010 election were held now it would look like 1994,” he told reporters at a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor. Voters are angry about the economy and the Democrats’ infighting in Congress, Greenberg said. “Right now they are just interested in punishing Democrats for not getting the job done, and in some cases getting it done badly. They [are] relishing an opportunity to bloody the Democrats.”
GoP will take control now
Chuck Raasch, Gannett National Writer, 2/27/2010, Will Democrats' damage control be enough to save the House?,
The question, will the damage be so severe that President Barack Obama will be forced to deal with a Republican majority? Republicans need to gain 40 seats to take control, a bridge widely seen as too far until recently. But given retirements, rising public anger at Congress, and normal historical trends, it's difficult to overestimate the Democrats' challenges in 2010. Politically and demographically, the playing field is heavily tipped against them, although it's a long way until November.
Link – Generic
The public supports the plan – their support for the military is waning
RAND Institute, 1996, “Public Support for U.S. Military Operations,”
When political and other opinion leaders fail to agree with the president that much (or any) good is likely to come of an intervention, the public also becomes divided. The potential consequences of these recurring disagreements are quite sobering. They can lead to enduring divisions in the public and to support that is brittle and easily exploited by adversaries, thereby leading both to failed interventions and incorrect lessons for the future. Ultimately, such divisions may erode the credibility of threats of force to protect important U.S. interests. The irony, of course is that when deterrence and coercive diplomacy fail, the costs to the nation may turn out to be even higher. The historical record suggests that the public's tolerance for casualties, and its support of U.S. wars and military operations, will continue to be based on a sensible assessment of normative and pragmatic considerations, more fully informed by national leaders. When such an assessment leads to broad recognition that important national interests are engaged, important principles are being promoted, and the prospects for success are high, a majority of the American public is likely to accept costs that are commensurable with the perceived stakes. However, when such agreement is missing, even low costs will often be sufficient to erode public support for the intervention. Until such time as U.S. leaders arrive at a new bipartisan consensus on the role of military force in the post-Cold War world, we should expect disagreements among them whenever the country deploys its forces, and these disagreements will continue to promote divisions among the public. This absence of a larger foreign policy consensus will foster support that is often shallow and highly responsive to the costs in terms of casualties. However, as the historical record shows, attributing declining public support for military interventions solely to casualties misses the real story.
Following through on Obama’s liberal campaign pledges are key to democrat success in the midterm elections
Edward Harrison, Banking and finance specialist at the economic consultancy Global Macro Advisors, Former diplomat in the foreign service, "Obama: knowing when to be an asshole,” Credit Writedowns, 18 August 2009, pg. . com/2009/08/obama-knowing- when-to-be-an-asshole.html
So, from a purely Machiavellian perspective, Obama needs to jettison the professorial above-the-fray coolness and get down in the trenches and fight for what he believes in. And that means he is going to have to run roughshod over his enemies. Mark Thoma pointed me to a quote that gets the essence of this argument: A lot of what our job is about is understanding the point of view of others, even when we disagree with them. A lot of our job is explaining to students a wide variety of viewpoints, and allowing them to choose from among them. I don’t think FDR worried so much about the point of view of others–Doris Kearns Goodwin said he “gloried in his enemies.” FDR also largely got what he wanted. So, when pundits debate where Obama is losing hearts and minds, it has as much to do with style as substance. For instance, Patrick Buchanan says Obama is losing the center because he’s running left. He would say that. Robert Kuttner says Obama is losing the left because he is running center. He would say that too. But Nate Silver’s critique in his Grand Unified Obama Critique is more on the mark. If liberals are convinced that the President is too conservative and conservatives are convinced that he’s too liberal then either the President must be doing everything right or everything wrong. Lately, granted, it has seemed more like the latter… What I think people were hoping for is that Obama would, somehow or another, be able to overcome the institutional barriers to change, probably through a hands-on approach involving a lot of public persuasion. Put bluntly, Obama needs to be an asshole. Right now it looks like he is willing to compromise on any and every issue. Yes, compromise is an integral part of leadership and governance. But, there is a time for compromise and a time to fight. For which specific issues is Obama really willing to fight and lose? He is not saying, “Give me Liberty, or give me Death!” Americans still have no clue what his core beliefs are. And, they are losing respect. That gives demagogues an opening and is the main reason Obama’s grass roots support has evaporated when he needs it most. Look, if the economy regains solid footing by mid-2010, these issues will go away and Obama’s political party will benefit in the mid-term elections. He might even get the Roosevelt treatment for bringing us out of a deep economic contraction. However, if the economy remains fragile, as I believe it will, this lack of fight will become a true liability for the President.
Link – Winner’s Win
Unilateral presidential changes send a signal of strength to Congress and the public
William G. Howell, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume: 35, Issue: 3, Publication Year: 2005, pg. np
By issuing a unilateral directive, however, presidents do more than capture the attention of members of Congress. They also reshape the nature of the discussions that ensue. The president's voice is not one of many trying to influence the decisions of legislators on committees or floors. The president, instead, stands front and center, for it is his order that motivates the subsequent debate. When members of Congress consider whether or not to fund a unilaterally created agency or to amend a newly issued order or to codify the president's action in law, discussions do not revolve lazily around a batch of hypotheticals and forecasts. Instead, they are imbued with the urgency of a world already changed; and they unavoidably center on all of the policy details that the president himself instituted. And because any policy change is difficult in a system of separated powers, especially one wherein transaction costs and multiple veto points line the legislative process, the president is much more likely to come out on top in the latter debates than in the former.
New initiatives are the only way for Democrats to win in November
Washington Monthly, 2/16/2010, “Dems, Stop Freaking Out About the Midterm Elections and Pass Some Policy,”
It’s not exactly a secret that congressional Democrats, predisposed to panic, are feeling an overwhelming sense of dread right now. But elections aren’t decided in February, and it’s not entirely fanciful to believe some key accomplishments over the next several months can prevent an electoral disaster. Senator Evan Bayh’s abrupt announcement on Monday that he will retire at the end of his term has further united disparate voices within the Democratic Party behind the idea that legislative action is the only remedy to avoid future political calamity. In the wake of the Indiana Democrat’s announcement, a host of figures — from the progressive wing of the party to devout centrists — have chimed in to warn that failure in jobs and health care legislation have sapped the party’s momentum and fortunes. Markos Moulitsas, the founder of the blog Daily Kos, said that the best way for Democrats to salvage the fate of the party before the 2010 elections is clear: “Deliver on their campaign promises.” For all the palpable anxiety in Democratic circles, there’s still time. Sinking poll numbers are largely the result of inaction — Americans want to see results, and they’re not getting any. If Dems run for the hills, matters will only get worse.
Angering the GoP reframes the current debate – gets some republicans and public on board for Obama
Chris Weigant, Author and political commentator, 2/12/2010, “Friday Talking Points [111] -- Use It Or Lose It,”
This is called using political leverage. And it is what a lot of people have been waiting for -- for a long time, now. From Obama, from Democrats in general. The Democrats have an enormous majority in both houses of Congress, and it is about time they started acting like it, instead of behaving as if they're still somehow in the minority. This means threatening Republicans. It means scaring them, using the "Party of No" label like a hobnailed club. The new message from Democrats, following Obama's lead, should be: "Obstructionism will no longer be allowed to happen outside the spotlights." It is one of the strongest political cases the Democrats have to make right now, and they should not be afraid to let the Republicans know that they're ready and eager to do so. This is called driving the debate, or framing the discussion, and -- again -- it's about time. Because political capital falls into the "use it or lose it" category. The more you use political capital to get good things done, the more goodwill and political capital you will reap from the voters. The less you use it when in power, the less you will have on election day.
Link – Reigning in Spending
The plan would be perceived as reigning in wasteful spending
Anita Dancs, Research Director for the National Priorities Project, 7/3/2009, “The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence,” Foreign Policy in Focus, pg. np
The Unified Security Budget conceptualizes security spending as that for the military (including nuclear weapons that are in the Department of Energy and other spending not within the Department of Defense), international affairs, and homeland security (outside of overlaps). For 2010, the unified security budget would be $782.4 billion. In this case, spending on the military overseas presence is at least 34% of total security spend- ing, as shown in Table 3. Scaling back the military and its overseas presence can result in freeing up funds for other priorities or deficit reduction, but it can also result in a change in security strategy as opposed to a decline in security.
Spending is the key issue holding a fragile party in support of the GoP
Citing Armey, Fmr. House Majority Leader (R-Tex.), 2/5/2010, “Chairman of Freedom Works and Leader in Tea Party Movement,”
Mr. Armey, how do you rationalize the worst elements of the GOP, the racists, the white anti-immigrationists, the anti-government militia recruits, coming together to force the GOP further to the right? At what point does common sense and winning majorities in the middle come into play? And for the record I'm a fiscally conservative socially anarchist voter, not loyal to either party. The GOP already has a severe image problem, to the educated, the Tea Baggers and their behavior (interrupting town halls, racist Obama signs, Nazi comparisons) only make it that much worse. Seriously, how do you fix your party? Dick Armey: The issue that holds the movement together is fiscal conservatism. That is how you keep libertarians and social conservatives in the same room. Even the security conservatives understand you cant have a strong military if you are broke and borrowing form potential adversaries. My guess is the hot rhetoric demagogues will marginalize themselves.
Dems adopting tea party policies is key to their support
Charles Dunn, dean of the School of Government at Regent University in Virginia Beach, Va, 2/25/2010, “History, time run out on The Tea Party,”
“The Tea Party” is running against history and time, and neither favors “The Tea Party.” If history is the best predictor of the future, and it usually is, “The Tea Party” will have a short shelf life. Beginning well before the Civil War, such movements have come and gone, including the Locofocos, Barnburners, Free Soil, Anti-Masonic, Know-Nothing, Populist, Progressive and a host of others. In 1948 it was Strom Thurmond’s Dixiecrats; in 1968, George Wallace’s American Independent Party; and in 1992, Ross Perot’s Reform Party. History says that like all of those movements “The Tea Party” will have “one day in the sun.” These movements have lacked staying power, because America has a large, broad-based two-party system that absorbs them by adapting to their demands. For example, the Republicans and Richard Nixon captured George Wallace’s movement by adopting a “Southern Strategy.” So the key to the success of “The Tea Party” rests not in its continuous existence, but in convincing one or both of the major parties to adopt most, if not all, of its policy objectives. George Wallace’s movement contributed significantly to the rightward move of the Republican Party, strengthening the hand of Republican conservatives against liberal Eastern Establishment Republicans.
Link – Japan
Japanese oppose US military basing
Daily Mail Reporter, 1-30-2010, “Thousands protest in Tokyo against U.S. military presence in Japan,” Daily Mail Online, pg. np
Thousands of protesters from across Japan marched today in Tokyo to protest against U.S. military presence on Okinawa, while a Cabinet minister said she would fight to get rid of a marine base Washington considers crucial. Some 47,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan, with more than half on the southern island of Okinawa. Residents have complained for years about noise, pollution and crime around the bases. Japan and the U.S. signed a pact in 2006 that called for the realignment of American troops in the country and for a Marine base on the island to be moved to a less populated area.
A new mayoral poll proves the Japanese public opposes US basing
BBC News 1-25-2010, “Japan 'may rethink' US Futenma air base after poll,”
Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has said the result of a weekend mayoral poll could fuel a major rethink about US military bases in Japan. Residents of the Japanese city of Nago, on Okinawa, chose a candidate opposed to the hosting of an American air base. The Futenma base was originally scheduled to move to Nago from a more crowded part of Okinawa. Talk of moving the base out of Japan altogether has threatened the long-standing US-Japan security alliance. Mr Hatoyama said the results of Sunday's election reflected the will of the people, and that Japan will continue to re-examine its commitment to relocate the air base.
Diaspora groups in the US are widely influential
Kathleen Newland, co-founder of the Migration Policy Institute, 1995, “The Impact of U.S. Refugee Policies on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog?” in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy, pg. np
The impact of refugee policy on broader US foreign policy objectives is often magnified -- and in some cases virtually created -- by concerted political action on the part of refugee communities resident in the United States. A number of diaspora groups have developed sophisticated political lobbyists, with strong influence on politics and policies in the countries where they or their forebears found refuge. The word "refugee" invokes visions of despair, displacement, powerlessness. The political vitality of refugee communities is often overlooked, and their political activism discounted, because of this passive image -- and because new refugees lack the power to vote. But many refugees have acquired that status precisely because of their political activity, and are likely to continue their political activism in exile. Among them, foreign policy has a high priority, since it has defined their current exile and is likely to be shaping the lives of family and friends left behind in the home country. Many refugee groups focus their political energies on developments in the country of origin or within the expatriate community. They may support parties, candidates, or clandestine organizations at home. Some devote themselves to preparing for return, or to establishing support for political movements in exile -- the Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris and Benito Aquino in Boston being two prominent examples. Refugees often have a strong impact on political events in their home countries, whether through direct action or through "political remittances" -- the transmission of values, experiences with democratic institutions, habits of loyal opposition and appreciation of a free press.
Link – South Korea
The United States military supports bringing home troops from South Korea
Jon Klaus, National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 11-17-2004, “U.S. Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” pg. np
Bringing forces that are permanently stationed in Europe and South Korea back to the continental United States (CONUS) and maintaining a presence in those regions through unit rotations would reduce the need for infrastructure overseas. It would also reduce instability in Army units by lessening the extent to which soldiers come and go, thus potentially enhancing unit cohesion. But maintaining the current level of overseas presence with unit rotations would limit the forces available for other operations — including the occupation of Iraq — and could hurt retention in the Army by increasing family separation.
The US military wants to cut troops from South Korea, even though other troop increases are popular
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power,” p. 106-107
Whatever the outcome of ongoing Japan-U5 Consultations on the realignment and funding of bases, it seems certain that facilities in Japan will become ever more central to US regional and global strategy. The US utilised its bases in Japan to deploy forces in the Gulf War; the carrier Kitty Hawk home-ported in Japan participated in the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq; fighter aircraft from Misawa in Aomori Prefecture and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa participated in the Iraq war; US Marines in Okinawa were sent as reinforcements to Iraq in January 2004; and Okinawa, in particular, remains crucial as a staging post for the US to project power across the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. Consequently, it is not surprising that the US 2004 Global Posture Review (GPR) looks set to maintain or even boost the US presence in Japan, whereas other allies, including South Korea, face sizeable reductions of US forces. In recent talks, the US appears to have reassured Japan that it intends to preserve current troop levels in Japan of around 58,00o servicemen (including around 14,000 of the US 7th Fleet). The US is also looking to strengthen the importance of its bases in Japan, proposing that the command functions of the US Army I Corps, a rapid-deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific, be relocated from Washington State to Army Camp Zawa in Kanagawa Prefecture.
The military lobby is key to the agenda
Charles J. Dunlap, Colonel in the Military, 1994, Wake Forest Law Review, pg. np
In addition, the military undermines the fiscal check because it is a particularly effective lobbyist. Like other agencies of government, the armed forces are technically proscribed from lobbying, although they may "communicate" with Congress. Nevertheless, the military services employ a number of imaginative techniques to influence legislation. According to Hedrick Smith, they "unabashedly lobby senators and House members" by flattering them "with courtesies and perquisites" such as domestic and foreign trips. More disturbing, the military often will ensure support by spreading the procurement of expensive weapons systems over scores of congressional districts. Smith also insisted that the "military can turn off the faucet" when displeased with a legislator. Even the most vociferous military critic is subject to pressure when the economic livelihood of constituents is at stake. Armed Forces Journal alleged that Congressman Ron Dellums "was probably right" when the military critic charged that the closing of four military bases in his district was politically motivated. The magazine blamed the Pentagon, claiming its "temptation to deal poetic justice was likely more than it could resist."
Link – Iraq
Opposing the war in Iraq gets democrats vote in the midterm
Angie Holan, St. Petersburg Times Staff Writer, 10/1/2007, Democrats race to oppose Iraq most,
Opposing the war in Iraq is easy for Democrats looking for votes. The hard part is finding a way to sound different from your rivals. The Democratic candidates for president talk a lot about what they call the misguided policies of President Bush in Iraq. It comes up at almost every debate and gets addressed in forums, advertisements and letters to voters. Mostly, it's an easy position to take as polls show voters increasingly unhappy with the war. The problem comes when the Democratic candidates try distinguishing their Iraq positions from one another.
Liberal democrats support drawdown from Iraq
Daniel Merkle, Congressional Staff Writer, 2/9/2003, “Support for War Against Iraq Drops Public Divided on Whether or Not Attack Would Create Terror Risk,”
A critical factor in support for military action is a sense of threat. Support for attacking Iraq is highest (80 percent) among Americans who see inaction as the greater peril. That dives to 33 percent among those who think military action poses the greater risk of further terrorism. Having a clear policy also matters. Attacking Iraq to oust Saddam is favored by 72 percent of those who think Bush has a clear policy, compared to 44 percent of those who don't. And it's favored by 78 percent of those who think it's "very important" to force Saddam from power, compared to just 41 percent of those who call it "somewhat important." The decline in support for military action comes only among Democrats and independents, introducing partisan divisions on the issue.
Public support for the war on Iraq is declining
Daniel Merkle, Congressional Staff Writer, 2/9/2003, “Support for War Against Iraq Drops Public Divided on Whether or Not Attack Would Create Terror Risk,”
[pic]Public support for military action against Iraq has dropped to its lowest level since the war on terrorism began, with the public closely divided on whether or not such an attack would create a greater risk of terrorism. Fifty-six percent of Americans in this ABCNEWS Nightline poll favor military action to force Saddam Hussein from power, still a majority but down sharply from 69 percent in the last few weeks. Support drops further to a 39 percent minority if U.S. allies oppose it. Earlier last month it was a 54 percent majority.
The liberal public wants out of Iraq quickly
Bill Schneider, CNN Senior Political Analyst, 3/28/2009, “Americans wary about war in Afghanistan,”
The anti-war movements in Vietnam and Iraq helped define what the Democratic Party stands for. "If we don't learn from our Iraq experience, we are doomed to repeat it," Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-California, said on the House floor Thursday. Why are Americans wary about Afghanistan? The recession. Iraq War fatigue. And frustration. Only 31 percent of Americans believe the United States is winning the war in Afghanistan. Fifty percent believe the United States is winning in Iraq -- the highest number in at least five years. But Americans still want to get out of Iraq.
Link – Afghanistan
The public opposes the war in Afghanistan, and would love the plan
Bill Schneider, CNN Senior Political Analyst, 3/28/2009, “Americans wary about war in Afghanistan,”
How does the American public feel about the war in Afghanistan? In a word, wary. President Obama on Friday announced his strategy to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a plan that includes more troops, new legislation, improved troop training and added civilian expertise. "The United States of American did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. Nearly 3,000 of our people were killed on September 11, 2001,"Obama said Friday. "We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan," he said. Stressing that "the safety of people around the world is at stake," Obama said the "situation is increasingly perilous" in the region in and around Afghanistan, where the United States has been fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban for more than 7½ years after attacks in New York and at the Pentagon. Nevertheless, the American public has been wary about the war in Afghanistan, according to a CNN/Opinion Research Corp. poll conducted in February. Last month, Americans were almost evenly divided between those who support the war and those who oppose it, the poll showed, with 47 percent in favor and 51 percent opposed. Opposition to the war in Afghanistan is more muted than opposition to the war in Iraq, but it's not so muted among Democrats. Two-thirds of Americans overall oppose the war in Iraq, but 64 percent of Democrats oppose the war in Afghanistan.
Opposing the war in Afghanistan is a key platform for the democrats in the midterms
John Nichols, Beat writer for The Nation, 12/01/2009, “Democrats Campaign Against Obama's Afghan Plan,”
Even before President Obama formally announces his plan to surge more than 30,000 additional U.S. troops into Afghanistan, Democrats who want to win elections are campaigning against it. The next big election for Democrats is the Massachusetts primary organized to fill the U.S. Senate seat of the late U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy. The leading candidates in next Tuesday's primary are scrambling to appeal to the party's base voters in a state that gave overwhelming support to Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election. But the candidates are not presenting themselves as enthusiastic backers of the president's military adventuring abroad. In fact, they are doing the opposite. Congressman Mike Capuano, who has attracted the support of anti-war activists in groups such as Progressive Democrats of America, is up on television with a commercial that trumpets his anti-war stance. In it, the congressman recalls his vote against authorizing the war in Iraq and then says: "Now there's a call for more troops in Afghanistan, but the questions remain: What's our mission? How do we define success? And what's our exit strategy? Without the right answers to those questions, I will never vote to send more of our sons and daughters to war. Never!"
The public opposes continuing Bush’s wars
John Nichols, Beat writer for The Nation, 12/01/2009, “Democrats Campaign Against Obama's Afghan Plan,”
But it is also wise from a political standpoint. Polls suggest that base Democratic voters, the folks who cast the ballots in party primaries, still respect Barack Obama as an individual and support his positions on a variety of issues. But they are not inclined to back the president when he expands what Brunner correctly notes is "a war he -- and our nation -- inherited from former President George W. Bush."
Internal – Obama Popularity Key
The plan changes the perception of Obama’s failure, that’s necessary for democrats in the midterm
Mark Halperin, Political analyst for TIME Magazine, 2/22/2010, “Can Obama Fend Off the 'Failure' Attacks?,”
The only way for Obama to turn his presidency around is to change this perception. And the only way to change this perception is to rack up some wins. After November's losses in the New Jersey and Virginia gubernatorial races, Scott Brown's stunning capture of Ted Kennedy's Massachusetts Senate seat, a spate of Democratic congressional retirements, the stalling of health care, consistently nerve-wracking economic news and steadily falling national and state presidential poll numbers, finding some political or policy victories to sweep aside the clammy shroud of failure is not going to be easy.
Public perception of Obama is key
Matthew Rusling, Analyst in Osaka, 2/14/2010, “Public ire could hurt U.S. Democrats -- but how much?,” Xinhua,
Stephen Weber, chief operating officer at the Program on International Policy Attitudes, said much depends on how Obama is viewed by the public come election time. "What Obama's image is will probably be more important than the generic congressional ratings," he said. "I would suggest that Obama's ratings in November will be a better predictor of the Congressional outcomes than the Congressional generic ballot."
Presidential popularity matters more than unemployment numbers
Matthew Continetti, associate editor of the Weekly Standard, 3/3/2010, “It’s a Long Road to November,”
When you look at midterm results over the years, you find that presidential job approval matters more than the unemployment rate. Unemployment was low in both 1994 and 2006, but Congress changed hands because at those times Clinton and Bush were unpopular. At the moment, Obama's job approval is about 48%. That's not bad, and as long as Obama retains the assent of a supermajority of Democrats, his approval rating won't drop much lower.
Obama campaigned on the peace platform, proves it can successfully motivate the base
Thomas Eddlem, freelance writer and educator, 12/3/2008, “Obama’s Choice of Hillary Clinton Signals He’s Not Anti-War,” The New American,
But during the campaign, Obama remained the comparative peace candidate (by outward appearances, anyway), and Hillary Clinton stood as the candidate who called for another four years of the disastrous Bush administration foreign policy. Clinton didn't explain it in so many words, of course, but that's essentially what it was. The November election contest was likewise one between a candidate who advocated a Republican big-government domestic policy (borrow and spend) and a Bush-style war policy versus a Democratic big-government domestic policy (tax and spend) and a peace platform. Voters chose the person they perceived to be the peace candidate in both the primary and general elections. But Obama's cabinet picks on December 1 signaled that Americans are getting a war president. Obama stated that he had said during the campaign that he would remove "combat" troops from Iraq within 16 months but that it is "likely to be necessary — to maintain a residual force." He added that "it's also critical that we recognize that the situation in Afghanistan has been worsening" — a theater where he wants to send more troops.
Impact – Economy
Legislative gridlock is key to the economy
Keith Fitzgerald, Chief Investment Strategist, 7/24/2008, When Gridlock is Good: Why a Contentious Election and Legislative Bottlenecks Pack a Profit Punch for Investors,
And yet, as frustrating as legislative gridlock is for many voters (myself included), the data suggests that politicians’ inability to act might actually be good for the markets. The bottom line: Legislative gridlock translates into higher profits for investors. We realize that this runs contrary to the conventional wisdom on the subject but, as we point out so frequently, sacred cows frequently make the best burgers. Our proprietary research suggests that markets tend to run in long cycles averaging 17-21 years in length, while the White House political cycle runs in eight-year increments – at best. That means the political cycle is considerably shorter than dominant market cycles. Our takeaway: In the long run, there’s really no correlation between who holds the White House and successful long-term investing because the political and market cycles are rarely in sync over such disparate periods. Are the results any different in the short run? Nope. Here, too, the data suggests that it doesn’t really matter which political party is in control really doesn’t matter (a conclusion that’s supported by the accompanying chart, which includes data from Ned Davis Research and some analysis by Money Morning).
Gop Congress with Obama as president is key to the economy
Daniel Kadlec, Journalist for TIME and MONEY magazine, 2000, “Vote for Gridlock,” TIME,
Gridlock, in fact, is one candidate investors should vote for. The Dow has fared best when one party has controlled the White House and the other has controlled Congress, the optimum formula being a Democratic President and a Republican-controlled Congress. That combo has produced Dow gains, excluding dividends, of 10.7% a year. The hands-down loser: Republicans with a mandate. When the g.o.p. has run both branches, the Dow has limped at less than 1% a year.
GoP win key to the economy – empirical evidence proves
Donald Luskin, chief investment officer at Trend Macrolytics LLC, 9/12/2008, “Divide Government is Best for the Market,” Wall Street Journal, pg. np
But then who ever said that the president alone determines the economy or the stock market? It's Congress that makes the laws. The president just signs them. Based on congressional control, the study results look very different. Under Republican Congresses, stocks have averaged a 19% return, while under Democratic Congresses only 11.9%. Real GDP growth, lagged two years, has averaged 3.7% under Republican Congresses, and only 3.2% under Democratic ones. Then there are the various party mixes between the president and Congress. If John McCain wins and we have a Republican president and a Democratic Congress, history leads us to expect an average 10.3% total return from stocks and 3.3% real GDP growth. If Barack Obama wins, and we have a Democratic Congress too, then according to history stocks will average 13.8%, and real GDP growth 3.3%. But that's no argument for voting for Mr. Obama. Vote for Mr. McCain -- but vote for Republican senators and representatives too. When Republicans have controlled the whole government, it blows away anything Democrats can do. Stocks have averaged 17.5% and real GDP growth 3.3%.
A GoP win would immediately boost the stock market
Donald Luskin, chief investment officer at Trend Macrolytics LLC, 9/12/2008, “Divide Government is Best for the Market,” Wall Street Journal, pg. np
If the electorate were really smart, it would elect a Democratic president and a Republican Congress. Under that deal, stocks have averaged a 20.2% total return, and real GDP averaged 4%. That tells us that economic and stock market success isn't really about partisan politics at all. Sadly, nobody has a political incentive to conduct a study about that.
Impact – Wars
Gridlock prevents US intervention in wars which mitigates the impact of all of their impacts
William Niskanen, chairman of the Cato Institute and former acting chairman of President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers, 2003, “A Case for Divided Government,”
The prospect of a major war is usually higher with a united government, and the current war makes that clear. Each of the four major American wars in the 20th century, for example, was initiated by a Democratic president with the approval of a Congress controlled by Democrats. The war in Iraq, initiated by a Republican president with the support of a Republican Congress, is consistent with this pattern and has already proved to be the only use of U.S. military force lasting more than a few days that was initiated by a Republican president in over a century.
Divided government checks military expansionism and war
Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute and the author of The Cult of the Presidency, 2009, Washington Examiner,
Why shouldn't we, given the horrors of one-party government? Whenever one faction controls both elected branches, checks and balances disappear. My colleague Bill Niskanen, former chairman of President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors, points out that since the start of the Cold War, we've had only a dozen years of real fiscal restraint: Six under Eisenhower and a Democratic Congress, and six under Clinton and a GOP majority. Per Niskanen's calculations, since FDR, unified governments have spent roughly three times as fast as divided ones, and they've been much more likely to waste blood and treasure abroad. The Framers tried to craft a constitution that gave politicians proper incentives to check each other. "Ambition [would] counteract ambition," as James Madison saw it, with congressmen keeping presidents honest and vice-versa. Things haven't worked out as planned. Too often, party loyalty trumps constitutional fidelity, as evidenced by former House speaker Denny Hastert's self-image as a "lieutenant" of George Bush rather than a guardian of congressional prerogatives. But when different parties hold the legislature and the executive, the Madisonian system works better. Divided government leads to many more congressional investigations into presidential misconduct, and, as two University of Chicago scholars demonstrated recently, "the White House's propensity to exercise military force steadily declines as members of the opposition party pick up seats in Congress."
Legislative gridlock prevents US intervention in global conflicts
Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute and the author of The Cult of the Presidency, 2009, Washington Examiner,
Why shouldn't we, given the horrors of one-party government? Whenever one faction controls both elected branches, checks and balances disappear. My colleague Bill Niskanen, former chairman of President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors, points out that since the start of the Cold War, we've had only a dozen years of real fiscal restraint: Six under Eisenhower and a Democratic Congress, and six under Clinton and a GOP majority. Per Niskanen's calculations, since FDR, unified governments have spent roughly three times as fast as divided ones, and they've been much more likely to waste blood and treasure abroad.
Impact – Warming Regulations
GoP win limits EPA warming regulations
Environmental Leader 9
As Congress Drags Feet on CO2 Regulations, EPA Moves Forward,
The Environmental Protection Agency, as it promised it would do, is moving ahead to regulate carbon dioxide emissions in the absence of Congressional action, Reuters reports. When the EPA came out with its endangerment finding on CO2 and the Clean Air Act, the Obama Administration signaled to Congress that it should adopt emissions-limiting legislation, in order to keep the EPA from moving ahead with its proposal. Now, the EPA has sent has its final proposal to the White House, reports the Examiner. If the White House approves the proposal, the EPA will have the authority to regulate and cut CO2 emissions, in spite of slow action on Congress’ part. Adoption of some sort of CO2 cut target is seen as a critical step in the forthcoming Copenhagen global climate talks. This end-around by EPA would help show the world that the U.S. means business in cutting emissions. At least one columnist speculates that if Republicans regain control of Congress, they will be able to derail the EPA’s efforts by using legislative riders to prevent EPA from regulating CO2.
EPA regulations collapse the domestic steel industry
Thomas Gibson, President & CEO, American Iron and Steel Institute, 3/8/2010, “Manufacturing Industry at Risk,”
It is imperative that Congress delay EPA’s efforts to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources. Most American manufacturing facilities, including steel mills, will be impacted if Congress does not delay EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from stationary sources. This will impose additional economic burdens and regulatory delays that will impede new business investment and slow efforts to get the economy moving again. Legislative action to stop EPA regulation of stationary sources is essential to preserving jobs and promoting economic growth while Congress considers comprehensive legislation to address climate change. Furthermore, EPA regulation will only exacerbate the competitiveness problems facing energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries by increasing their costs while their overseas competitors continue to avoid regulation. Only a comprehensive legislative approach to climate change can address the important international competitiveness and carbon leakage issues that are critical to energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries like steel. We have already lost 11.7 million manufacturing jobs over the last decade, 2.1 million alone since the start of the recession. The steel industry has already voluntarily stepped up to the plate by reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 31% since 1990. Especially in light of the tepid economic recovery and the rampant expansion of steelmaking capacity that has occurred in non-regulated economies like China, the risks and uncertainties of unilateral regulation under the Clean Air Act are simply too great for the EPA to control.
Domestic Steel key to hegemony and power projection
J. Michael Waller, Ph.D., is the Walter and Leonore Annenberg Professor of International Communication at the Institute of World Politics, 9/17/2001, Insight on the News, pg. np
That's also the argument of many U.S. steel producers, who find it unprofitable to upgrade their own blast furnaces but profitable to roll out finished products using imported semifinished steel. Those closest to the mining sector agree, but hope to persuade decisionmakers in Washington that they perform a unique national-security function. Part of that function is assured production of steel during protracted conflict. Another part concerns U.S. power projection. "It is a tenet of U.S. policy that the national, economic and military security of the United States depends on its position as a maritime power and the strength of its national maritime infrastructure," says George J. Ryan, president of the Lake Carriers Association, which represents 12 U.S. companies operating ships on the Great Lakes.
Impact – Card Check
Significant GoP gains tank card check legislation
Andrew Leonard, political analyst, 10/16/2009, “Obama's secret plan for a successful presidency,”
Mickey Kaus says everything is falling into place for a successful Obama presidency. Except that, in the best Mickey Kaus tradition, his thesis is so drenched with contrarian posing that the definition of a "successful" Obama presidency means the abandonment of most of the policy goals Democrats have for his term. The Kaus thesis is predicated on Obama getting healthcare reform passed, after which the Democrats get clobbered by a still-crippled economy in the 2010 midterm elections. That, in turn, will mean that the rest of the "controversial big Dem bills that got backed up in 2010" -- climate change, card-check, immigration reform -- will die stillborn.
Card check collapses small business
Matthew Bandyk, analyst for US News and World Report, 5/19/2008, “Employee Free Choice Act: From Beltway to Main Street,” ,
The Employee Free Choice Act would allow employees to vote on whether or not to unionize with an open system of signing cards, as opposed to the secret-ballot process that is the status quo. It sounds arcane, but the basic debate when it comes to small business is this: Is a process that would effectively increase union members a good thing? The SBE Council gives some reasons to think not: Card-check, which eviscerates the current right employees have to cast a private vote regarding whether they want union representation or not, enables abusive organizing tactics. This mandated approach to union organizing—where everyone in the workplace would know how each individual feels about union representation—will only serve to establish an environment that is ripe for harassment and underhanded tactics. This unfair, turn-key approach to forced unionization will be especially burdensome and costly for small businesses.... The 'card-check' bill would boost the level of unionization, increase costs, and restrain productivity. That, of course, means that businesses become less competitive. Of course, in the long run, both business owners and employees would suffer.
Small businesses are key to the economy
National Federation of Independent Business, 2008, “Get Smart on Small Business: The Backbone of the U.S. Economy,”
Small Business and the U.S. Economy: • Small business produces roughly half of the private Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and creates, on average, about two-thirds of net new jobs annually.1 • Small businesses are the greatest source of new employment in inner cities, comprising more than 99 percent of establishments and 80 percent of total employment.2 • American small business is the world’s second largest economy, trailing only the United States as a whole.3 • Small businesses employ more than half of private sector employees. 4 Ninety percent of small businesses employ fewer than 20 people.5 • Small firms represent 99.7 percent of all employers. 6 • Nearly 16 million people operate a small business as their primary occupation in a year. 7 • Women-owned firms have grown at around two times the rate of all firms 8; minority-owned firms have grown at around four times the rate of all firms.9 • More than 70 percent of adults think small business owners work harder than government workers, big corporation employees and corporate CEOs. 1
AT: “Weak on Foreign Policy” Link Turn
Non-unique – the GoP is spinning Obama’s Iran and North Korea policy as weak
Politico, 5/9/2009, Mitt Romney: Obama 'weak' on Iran, North Korea,
Former Gov. Mitt Romney (R-Mass.) criticized President Barack Obama on Monday for looking “weak” over his administration’s handling of Iran and North Korea. “Recently, Iranian President [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad announced that his nation has successfully mastered every step necessary to enrich uranium, violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty it has signed,” Romney wrote in an e-mail to supporters. “And North Korea's Kim Jong Il launched a long-range missile on the very day President Obama addressed the world about the peril of nuclear proliferation.” “In both instances, the world's equation for peace and security was altered, and the Obama administration chose inaction.”
Obama perceived as weak on foreign policy and security now
Cal Thomsas, America’s most widely syndicated op-ed columnist, 7/15/2009, “Obama's Foreign Policy Weakness, Real Clear Politics,”
In the most important arenas -- foreign policy and domestic security -- nations and terrorists who mean America harm have a right to think Mr. Obama is weak and can be challenged with few consequences. While the response to the Somali pirates offered an initial sign that the president was prepared to use force against bad people with evil intent, subsequent statements and inaction to other threats are not encouraging. Islamic insurgents in Somalia purportedly tied to al Qaeda recently carried out a series of killings, bombings and other attacks against Westerners and African security forces without even a rhetorical response from the president. After his initial reluctance to say much about the fraudulent election in Iran and the huge demonstrations that led the government to bloody and kill unarmed civilians, the president denounced the violence but said nothing about what might happen if it continued. And so it continued. The G-8 said little and did nothing but will meet again in September to consider a stronger statement. Honduras? The president is on the wrong side of that one, too. As Hondurans have demanded adherence to their constitution, the Obama administration has sided with a protege of Hugo Chavez's and the Castro brothers' who tried to obliterate it. Terrorists-in-waiting mostly remained in the shadows during the George W. Bush administration but now think they can meet openly to plot the downfall of the United States. Hizb ut-Tahrir, an international movement that wants to re-establish a caliphate and indoctrinate Muslims into supporting jihad, will step up its recruitment efforts at a planned meeting Sunday in a Chicago suburb, reports the Investigative Project on Terrorism: "The group, whose alumni include 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and suicide bombers, will hold a conference entitled 'The Fall of Capitalism and the Rise of Islam.' " Why should they fear a president who still wants to negotiate with the Iranian nuclear bomb builder Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? There is nothing worse for the world than to have a U.S. president who is perceived as weak. Weakness can result in the deaths of innocent people, a wrecked economy (again) and new attacks on American allies and interests around the world. This perception of weakness may be contributing to the drop in Mr. Obama's approval ratings at home.
Obama perceived as weak on foreign policy now
ABC News, 2009, “2012 Republicans Paint Obama as 'Weak',”
Republicans with an eye on the White House in 2012 are stepping up efforts to portray President Obama as "weak" on foreign policy. First there was Nevada Sen. John Ensign, who has a political speech planned for June 1 in Sioux City, Iowa, telling CNN that Obama's recent meeting with Hugo Chavez at the Summit of the Americas was "irresponsible". “When you're talking about the prestige of the United States and the presidency of the United States, you have to be careful who you're seeing joking around with,” Ensign told CNN on Sunday.“And I think it was irresponsible for the president to be seen kind of laughing and joking with Hugo Chavez." Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who said recently that he will decide next year on whether to run for president in 2012, criticized Obama on Monday for what he called a "weakness" in his emerging foreign policy.
AT: Health Care Outweighs
Health care is too divisive to influence the midterm either way
Charlie Cook, Political Analyst Specializing in Election forecasting, 2/27/2010, “What Can Save The Dems?,” National Journal,
What could change the current trajectory, preventing the Republicans from gaining more than the 40 seats they need to take control of the House and from winning more than six or seven seats in the Senate? Some observers argue that if the Democrats pass some kind of health care reform bill, scaled down or not, they would appear less ineffectual and would change the current thinking that they have wasted the better part of the past year and come up empty-handed. That sounds plausible, but only if the public's perception of the Democrats' health care plan changes significantly. Democrats have not exactly been winning many perception battles lately. And in the end, would they really help themselves by enacting something that most voters say they don't like and don't want? So what if pollsters can pick apart the Democrats' health care reform legislation and find considerable public support for many of its pieces. If people don't like the total package, those exercises are purely academic. In short, it's hard to see how passing health care is the way for Democrats to get out of this mess.
Health Care won’t influence the election because the GoP won’t run on it
Ross Douthat, 2009, “Off the Chart,” New York Times, pg. np
If there’s any comfort for Democratic legislators in this landscape, it’s the possibility that the angst-ridden health care debate may matter less to their re-election prospects than anyone expects. Amid the town-hall tumult in August, Obamacare looked like 2010’s defining issue. But when you talk to Republicans on Capitol Hill today, it sounds as if health care will play a relatively modest role in the campaign they plan to run.
Democrats cannot spin health care as a win
Lisa Mascaro, Washington Correspondent, “House holds key to unlocking health care reform bill,” 3/3/2010,
Still, as November’s midterm elections approach, House Democrats are faced with two unsavory options: pass a bill they may not like or pass nothing at all. “People feel like you’ve got to get something done,” Titus said last week as she and other Democrats gathered to celebrate passage of one small piece of health care reform — a bill that revokes the insurance companies’ antitrust exemption. “I feel that way.” Republicans are capitalizing on this scenario, gearing up for campaign slogans to match either outcome — Democrats are do-nothings who, with control of the House, Senate and White House, failed to accomplish their goals, or they must answer for passing a health care bill the public has not yet embraced.
AT: Unemployment Outweighs
Unemployment rates aren’t key
Charlie Cook, Political Analyst Specializing in Election forecasting, 2/27/2010, “What Can Save The Dems?,” National Journal,
What about unemployment? The February Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey of 52 top economists estimates that unemployment for this year will average 10 percent, the same level that President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers forecast earlier this month. Some political scientists have said that there isn't a strong a correlation between high unemployment rates and midterm election losses by the president's party. In the post-World War II era, however, unemployment has never been over 8 percent during an election year except when the two parties shared control in Washington. The only midterm election held when unemployment topped 8 percent was in 1982, when Democrats controlled the House and Republicans had the Senate and the White House. Even in that year, unemployment crossed into double digits only two months before the election.
Unemployment statistics won’t affect the election
John Harwood, American journalist who is currently the Chief Washington Correspondent for CNBC and a writer for The New York Times, 11/30/2009, “Unemployment and Midterms,” New York Times, pg. np
So both parties expect the Democrats’ House majority, now 258 seats, to shrink. Less clear is whether the highest unemployment in a generation will expand the loss to well beyond the average, 22 seats in each midterm election since 1950. After matching data on joblessness and elections, Seth Masket, a political scientist at the University of Denver, asserted in a recent blog post, “There’s not much evidence unemployment has any effect at all.” Reagan-era Republicans lost 26 House seats amid the high joblessness of the 1982recession. Yet Democrats lost a comparable number under Mr. Truman in 1950, as did Republicans under Mr. Bush in 2006, when unemployment remained low.
There is no statistically significant correlation between unemployment and incumbent success
Seth Masket, Professor of Political Science @ Denver, 11/2009, “Yet More on Unemployment and Midterm Elections,”
The odd implication is that an increase in unemployment is associated with improved fortunes for the president's party. However, the R-squared of .02 suggests that there's probably not much going on here. I'm guessing that slope isn't close to statistically significant. And again, there's not much here to suggest that high unemployment will lead to a particularly bad year for Democrats in 2010. Meanwhile, over at Real Clear Politics, Sean Trende offers a bit of a critique on my trying to draw lessons from so few observations: We have only had 15 midterm elections since 1950. This is barely data; it’s more of a good collection of anecdotes. This statement struck me as a bit anti-quantitative at first, but the rest of the article makes it clear that Trende is serious about looking for appropriate hard data to address this question. He goes back a lot further in time than I do. The point that he was making above is that you can come up with a story to explain why the president's party did or did not lose a bunch of seats in any given year: Is your President pursuing an unpopular war and controversial policies at home (1966, 2006)? Then it probably doesn’t matter that the economy is blazing ahead. Is the President kicking some al Qaeda arse a year after they attacked us, and getting ready to take out a longtime nemesis (2002)? The public is going to be more forgiving of the sluggish growth in real disposable income and rising unemployment. The end result of this is that every election becomes something of an explainable, unique event – in other words, they’re almost all outliers. There's certainly some truth to this, although this is true of pretty much any dataset. When you're dealing with a small number of observations, everything looks like an outlier. Yet there's nothing particularly wrong with drawing inferences from only 15 observations, or even fewer. There is, for example, a broad acceptance that economic performance affects presidential elections, and those data are only drawn from post-WWII presidential elections. The relationship between economic performance and voting behavior is a bit stronger for presidential elections than it is for midterms, but it either case we shouldn't lose the forest for the trees.
AT: Other Issues In the Interim
Other issues can’t affect the midterm, Congress won’t do anything
Michael Lind, Salon analyst, 3/1/2010, “Why Republicans want gridlock, Salon,”
Why is the Republican Party insisting on gridlock in Washington? Why is the Republican minority in California blocking necessary change? The Beltway pundits who attribute everything to electoral cycle gamesmanship do not understand the deeper cause of this scorched-earth policy: demographic decline. Having lost much of the white professional class to the Democrats (perhaps temporarily), the Republican Party is increasingly the party of the declining white working class. Non-Hispanic whites are shrinking as a percentage of the U.S. population. Meanwhile, the traditional skilled working class and lower middle class are shrinking as a proportion of the workforce, while the service sector proletariat and college-educated professionals increase their share. To add insult to injury, the Democrats, instead of reaching out to white working-class voters, often have snobbishly dismissed them, as Obama did with his patronizing discussion of the "bitter" people. In these circumstances, the American white working class quite naturally is experiencing "demographic panic." Declining groups experiencing such anxieties generally focus on blocking adverse change, using the political institutions they still control. Apart from hanging on to their power as long as they can, they usually do not have programs for governing the country, something they do not expect to be able to do in the long run.
There can’t be any issues in the interim, Congress is won’t puruse legislation
Ed Hornick, CNN political analyst, 2/22/2010, “Is Congress gridlocked and broken?,”
Two months into the new year, Congress is at a standstill, stuck in party-line votes, heated debates and electoral politics. And there's no indication that will change before mid-term elections in November, political observers say: Democrats are afraid to take chances on anything that might alienate voters, and Republicans can stand pat and hope the anti-incumbent mood brewing in the country will help weaken Democrats' control of Congress. "The problem is the combination of highly ideologically polarizing political parties operating at sort of near parity," said Thomas Mann, a congressional scholar at the nonpartisan Brookings Institution.
There won’t be action close to the election
Stacie Paxton, Press Secretary for the Democratic National Committee, 3/16/2010, “Working with an unpredictable Congress,” The Hill,
The only thing people seem to agree on is that it will be extremely difficult to get much of anything accomplished during the time left. A senior House Democratic leadership aide told me that with so many Democrats feeling vulnerable right now, unless legislation is bipartisan or viewed as virtually risk-free, you won’t see it this year. And, given the midterm elections, Congress will likely grind to a halt by the summer, so the next few months may be the only window.
***Politics DA***
Climate Bill – 1NC Shell
Moderate climate bill gaining consensus in the Senate now.
German, Staff writer, 4-12-2010, “Crunch Time for Climate Change Bill,” The Hill,
Kerry, Graham and Lieberman – christened “KGL” in energy circles – hope to win over centrist Democrats and some Republicans, whose views on cap-and-trade (or any emissions limits) generally range from skepticism to strong opposition. The Senate trio is breaking with the House, which passed a sweeping cap-and-trade bill last year that is viewed as a non-starter in the upper chamber. Instead they plan to propose a more limited cap-and-trade system (which they’re no longer calling cap-and-trade) applied to power plants, with other industrial plants phased in after a multi-year delay. In a bid for oil company support – or at least neutrality – they’re planning to address transportation with a fee on motor fuels, rather than requiring refiners to obtain emissions allowances for tailpipe pollution. KGL are also including provisions to boost nuclear power construction, wider offshore oil-and-gas drilling, and low-emissions coal projects.
Obama will push it – political capital is key.
Darren Samuelsohn, Greenwire, 4-12-2010, “White House Rhetoric May Signal Climate-Bill Surge,” New York Times,
With the bruising health care debate over, President Obama's top economic adviser left little doubt last week that energy and climate has taken its place atop the administration's agenda. During a 30-minute speech (pdf) at a Washington energy conference, Larry Summers, the head of the White House's National Economic Council, used lofty rhetoric to warn of the long-term consequences if Congress fails to follow through this year on a sweeping overhaul of how the nation generates and uses energy. "Read the history of great nations," Summers said. "Read how they succeed and read how they fail. Their ability to mobilize to solve problems before they are absolutely imminent crises is what determines their longevity. That's why this task of economic renewal is so important broadly. And that's why I believe it is so important that we move for economic reasons to pass comprehensive energy legislation." Summers, a former Treasury secretary and president of Harvard University, went on to outline ways a climate and energy bill can help the U.S. economy grow, from creating short-term jobs to reducing uncertainty and increasing confidence for new private-sector investments. "Ultimately, economic policy choices, like investment decisions for a family, involve seeking opportunity and involve minimizing risk," Summers said. "If you think about the risks to our ecology, the risks to our security, we minimize those risks with comprehensive energy policy. And if you think about the opportunity to lead in what is really important, we maximize that opportunity with comprehensive energy legislation. That's why energy is so crucial a part of President Obama's economic strategy." Advocates for U.S. action on climate change welcomed Summers' remarks, saying they saw in them an important message from the Obama administration. With the health care bill signed into law, key White House players are turning their attention to an energy debate that will demand considerable heavy lifting if an energy and climate measure is going to have a chance to pass the Senate and reach the president's desk before the midterm election. "It was very important symbolically that the rest of the White House, beyond Carol Browner and CEQ, is getting engaged in this battle," said Dan Weiss, a senior fellow at the left-leaning Center for American Progress, referring to Obama's top climate and energy adviser and the Council on Environmental Quality. Obama will have some work to do on Capitol Hill.
Changing military deployment is controversial.
Tim Kane, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 5-24-2006, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005,”
Heavy deployments of American troops to the Middle East are an essential part of the global war on terrorism. However, the duration of troop deployments has been a source of controversy within the United States. There is controversy about whether there are too many or too few soldiers in Iraq, controversy about the nature of America's geopolitical ambitions, and controversy about the impact on the families of soldiers. Much of the debate is carried on in a fact-free vacuum, lacking the context of American troops' traditional footprint around the globe for the past half-century.
Climate Bill – 1NC Shell
Climate legislation key to prevent runaway climate change.
New York Times, “The Case for a Climate Bill,” 1-23-2010,
Start with timing. The long-term trend in greenhouse gas emissions is up (the decade ending in 2009 was the warmest on record), and the sooner emissions decline, the better. The bill passed by the House last year calls for emissions in 2020 to be 17 percent lower than they were in 2005. This is the bare minimum required to give the industrialized world a fighting chance of achieving an 80 percent reduction by midcentury, which most mainstream scientists think will be necessary to avert the worst consequences of global warming. Then there is the race for markets. China is moving aggressively to create jobs in the clean-energy industry. Beijing not only plans to generate 15 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020, but hopes to become the world’s leading exporter of clean energy technologies. Five years ago, it had no presence at all in the wind manufacturing industry; today it has 70 manufacturers. It is rapidly becoming a world leader in solar power, with one-third of the world’s manufacturing capacity. Finally there’s the question of credibility: Mr. Obama said in Copenhagen that the United States would meet at least the House’s 17 percent target. Success in the Senate is essential to delivering on that pledge. Failure would undo many of the good things he achieved in Copenhagen, and it would give reluctant powers like China an excuse to duck their pledges.
US legislation is uniquely key to global action – necessary to negotiate a new treaty.
EurActiv (European news network), 2-22-2010, “Europe worried about standstill on US climate bill,”
Europe is observing the developments amid growing concern that the global community will have to bury all hopes of securing a new international climate treaty if the US fails to pass its climate bill. "Obama's troubles with the climate legislation package naturally raises concerns on this side of the Atlantic," said Green MEP Satu Hassi (Finland). "If the US doesn't manage to pass legislation limiting greenhouse gas at federal level, this would of course impact on the climate negotiations and make it more difficult to achieve an international climate agreement. The US would then give among others India and China an easy argument to refuse binding actions," she added.
Runaway warming causes extinction.
Oliver Tickell, British journalist, author and campaigner on health and environment issues, and author of the Kyoto2 climate initiative, 8-11-2008, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction,” The Guardian,
We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way.
Uniqueness - Yes Climate Bill
Climate bill will pass – drilling and nuclear power winning swing votes.
German, Staff writer, 4-12-2010, “Crunch Time for Climate Change Bill,” The Hill,
Paul Bledsoe of the bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy said the White House embrace of drilling – and Obama’s support for building new nuclear plants – could help win bipartisan support for a broader climate and energy bill. Earlier this year the administration announced federal loan guarantees to help utility giant Southern Company build new reactors, and is also asking Congress to greatly expand the nuclear loan program. “It is providing some political opportunity. The question is whether moderates in both parties are comfortable enough with a more limited cap-and-trade approach combined with a more robust supply agenda,” said Bledsoe, the group’s director of communications and strategy. “That is really the crux of it.”
Momentum building for climate bill – Court fight won’t cause delay.
Evan Lehmann and Christa Marshall, ClimateWire, 4-12-2010, “Court Fight Adds Confusion to Senate Climate Effort,” New York Times,
Kerry, Graham and Lieberman have been working behind the scenes to gain support from industry, environmentalists and their Senate colleagues. Those efforts could accelerate the pace at which the bill gains support when it's introduced, expected next week. Supporters, meanwhile, say the Senate could continue to work on the massive climate measure well into summer, perhaps even passing it days before Congress breaks for the month of August. "I think it will have almost no impact," Daniel Weiss, director of climate strategy at the Center for American Progress, said of Stevens' departure. "There's going to be ample time in June, July and early August to bring this bill to the floor."
Climate bill at the top of the agenda – will avoid other political fights.
Evan Lehmann and Christa Marshall, ClimateWire, 4-12-2010, “Court Fight Adds Confusion to Senate Climate Effort,” New York Times,
There's a stretch of time between two congressional recesses, Memorial Day and the Fourth of July, that provides an optimal window for movement of a bill, said Chelsea Maxwell, a former climate adviser to retired Sen. John Warner (R-Va.). That gives lawmakers an opportunity to bring legislation to the Senate floor before the height of the election season and any political maneuvering over a Supreme Court nominee. "The climate bill will either come first or die," Maxwell said.
Obama leadership gaining GOP support now.
Darren Samuelsohn, ClimateWire, 3-25-2010, “Obama Aides Meet With Senate Dems to Map April Strategy for Climate Bill,” New York Times,
The hour-long meeting in Reid's office included White House legislative affairs director Phil Schiliro and Obama's energy and climate adviser, Carol Browner. According to a Senate Democratic leadership aide, the Obama officials pledged to work with the committee leaders once Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) release their bill next month. Reid (D-Nev.) encouraged the Senate committee leaders to give "constructive comments and suggestions within a few weeks of when they get text," the aide said. Several of the senators in the room expressed hope that additional GOP senators beyond Graham would soon start to publicly support and engage in the legislative process. "The leader feels before he brings up a bill he wants to know he's got a shot at getting it through," Environment and Public Works Chairwoman Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) said before the meeting in Reid's office. Commerce Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) said afterward that he appreciated the White House officials' presence in the room. "I like that," he said. "I like the fact they were in there. And I think people in essence were very frank because they were there."
Uniqueness – Yes Political Capital
Obama has political capital – health care momentum.
Evan Thomas and Katie Connolly, staff writers at Newsweek, 3-26-2010, “Learning from LBJ,” Newsweek,
In the afterglow of the health-care success, Goodwin thinks that Obama has amassed some good will and mo-mentum he can use to gain more victories. "The telling moment was in the signing ceremony when [Obama] said, 'You've taken your lumps.' And then a congressman yelled out, 'You're right, we did, and we still stood.' When you've been in the trenches together as they were in this fight, it does create relationships that he can now build on and they can build on too," she says. Goodwin also expects Obama to have a stronger appetite for change now that he's had one big success. "Once you've achieved something that everyone admits is a historic achievement, it does something, I think, inside a president's heart," she says. "LBJ said after he got the Civil Rights Act through in 1964, knowing that he had done something that would be remembered in time only emboldened him to want to do more, because the feeling was so extraordinary…cThe next year, when he proposed voting rights, people around him said, 'No way, you have to let the country heal'…cjust as people might be saying that about Obama. My guess is that what happens when you feel that sense of fulfillment inside is that it makes you remember what the presidency is about, to use power to change the lives of people in a positive way. It will only, it seems to me, make it more likely that he will continue now to go forward with the rest of his agenda."
Approval ratings are up post-health care.
Chris Dolmetsch, staff writer, 3-31-2010, “Obama’s Approval Rises After Health-Care Overhaul,” Business Week,
March 31 (Bloomberg) -- President Barack Obama’s approval rating moved higher after Congress passed the most sweeping overhaul of U.S. health-care policy in more than four decades, his key domestic legislative goal, a poll released today showed. The Marist Poll found that 46 percent of registered voters approve of the job Obama is doing, up from 44 percent in a survey conducted in early February. Forty-three percent disapprove of his performance compared with 47 percent last month.
Their evidence is outdated – Obama agenda has new momentum.
Liz Halloran, Washington Correspondent for Digital News (NPR), 4-6-2010, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made,” NPR,
Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style."
Links – Changing Military Policy
Changing military policy drains political capital – they wield huge political power.
Antonia Chayes and Dipali Mukhopadhyay, visiting professor of international politics and law at Tufts University's Fletcher School and doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School, 1-28-2009, “Remembering Clausewitz: Restoring the Civil-Military Relationship,” US News and World Report,
It is tempting for Americans to skirt the multiple, overlapping, and often antagonistic relationships among these organizations and, instead, to adopt the agenda of the military. The high esteem, enormous budget, and unparalleled capabilities of the military make it easy for politicians to "listen to the generals," thereby inoculating themselves from future blame. The incoming president has shown an inclination to reject this approach. It will take hard work to address the mutual frustration and distrust of international partners, civilian and military, but the effort will restore a needed balance. The first American-led wars of the new century have not only involved great costs in blood and treasure but they have redefined the boundaries of the civil-military relationship in our government. Today, the generals, willingly or not, seem to be the guiding hand in decisions of broad strategic importance. But, ultimately, U.S. civilian leadership must bear responsibility for charting our strategic course in this rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. One can only hope that irreversible decisions will not be made in the weeks ahead. President Obama must work through a process that incorporates both military and civilian perspectives. Only then will the United States have a well-considered grand strategy to frame our efforts in the challenging terrains of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Changes to military policy are inherently controversial – competing interests.
William Hartung, Director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, Spring 2001, “Eisenhower's Warning: The Military-Industrial Complex Forty Years Later,” World Policy Journal,
The Bush-Rumsfeld agenda, which amounts to a unilateralist drive for U.S. preeminence based on an ambitious missile defense scheme and a re-legitimation of the role of nuclear weapons as an instrument not only of deterrence, but of warfare, ought to be opposed.11 The good news for those who would do so is that there is no single agenda within the defense establishment. There are competing agendas-on Capitol Hill, among the services, and in the White House. As these power centers fight it out to determine the outlines of U.S. military spending, there should be room for input from the forgotten actors in this drama, the "alert and knowledgeable citizenry" that Eisenhower saw as our best hope for making sure that the military establishment serves the public interest, not the economic interest of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, or the parochial interests of powerful members of Congress.
Even popular policies encounter military resistance – plan spurs controversy.
Anthony Zinni, Distinguished senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2001, “A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past,” Strategic Forum,
Change would be difficult in any military that has not suffered a disastrous defeat or faced an immediate threat to the existence of the nation. Fortunately, the U.S. military does not face those conditions, but their absence can serve to mask the need for change. In the past, legislation has been required to impose significant change without these conditions. The military bureaucracy and politicians with vested interests in preserving status quo infrastructure, systems, organizational structures, and programs will resist change or will support only change on the margin. This will further complicate needed reform. It is evident that there will be some change in defense structure. Certainly the projected global challenges to American interests seem to require a different kind of military to deal with them. Both sides in the last presidential election took positions advocating transformation and change, and the American public seems generally supportive. The question is whether there will be significant change or whether politics, bureaucracy, traditional thinking, and other demands on resources will limit our ability to realize the full benefits of a true transformation.
Links – Afghanistan Reductions Hurt Obama
Afghanistan withdrawal crushes Obama’s agenda – alienates all constituencies.
Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, July-August 2009, “Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan,” The American Interest Online,
However, reversing policy and disengaging would be no easier for Obama. It would be the wrong course on the merits. Politically, it would commit the Administration to a policy now supported by only 17 percent of the electorate. It would play into the traditional Republican narrative of Democratic weakness on defense, facilitate widespread if ill-founded Republican accusations of the Administration’s leftist radicalism, and risk alienating moderate Democrats in battleground districts whose support the President will need on other issues. However bad the news may look if the United States fights on, withdrawal would probably mean a Karzai collapse and a Taliban victory, an outcome that would flood American TV screens with nightmarish imagery.
Broad support for increasing deployments in Afghanistan – all Republicans oppose the plan.
Richard Lardner, Staff Writer for the Associated Press, 10-12-2009, “Key senator says Afghan mission in jeopardy,” Military Times,
Meanwhile, Republicans argued that Obama would be making a major mistake if he doesn’t quickly answer McChrystal’s call for more troops. Sen. John McCain, the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee, said it would be “an error of historic proportions” if Obama decides against a significantly larger U.S. presence. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said Afghan national police are “getting slaughtered” and thousands more forces are needed to bring security and stability to the country. “It’s hard to train people, send them off to fight when they get killed ... at their first duty station,” said Graham, who is also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., said that a request by Obama for more troops in Afghanistan would have broad support from Senate Republicans. McConnell also acknowledged Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai’s government is rife with corruption.
Afghanistan reductions hurt Obama – looks like he’s opposing his Generals.
Joe Garofoli, staff writer, 10-16-2009, “Code Pink's more nuanced Afghanistan policy,” San Francisco Chronicle,
While Benjamin's core "Bring the troops home" mantra hasn't changed, it has become more complicated. "What I was left feeling is that I don't know what would be a realistic timeline without first coming up with the exit plan," she said. Before she went there, "I felt that troops should start coming home now." "My position hasn't been changed. But I feel now I have a better understanding from the many people we spoke to that an exit strategy has to have several components to it. The sooner there is a commitment to come home, the faster that peace talks can happen." She feels Obama has been backed into a "disastrous" political corner now that McChrystal's proposal for a troop increase is public. "Now it pushes him into a corner of being labeled as not supporting the commanders on the ground," she said, "which is a very vulnerable position for him to be in."
Their link turns are based on hype – Democrats won’t oppose continued Afghani deployments.
Jay Newton-Small, Congressional correspondent for Time, 9-14-2009, “Congressional Dems Get Balky on Afghanistan,” Time,
In his anxiety — and admission of possible acquiescence — Levin may represent most of his Democratic peers. With many Republicans supporting him, including John McCain and Sarah Palin, Obama might still have the votes necessary to send more troops. "I cannot imagine a Congress of Obama's own party denying him resources for a war he has called his top priority," said Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "But so far he apparently hasn't decided if he wants those added resources, and he clearly hasn't yet made the case."
Links – Iraq Reductions Hurt Obama
Link only goes one direction – sticking to the current agreement can’t hurt Obama politically – new withdrawal plan causes a Congressional battle.
Kevin Drum, political blogger for Mother Jones, 8-21-2008, “Iraq Withdrawal Thoughts,” CBS News,
This is very good news for Democrats. It means that our eventual withdrawal from Iraq will not only be a bipartisan action, it will have been the creation of a Republican president. This is going to make it almost impossible for conservatives to ramp up any kind of serious stab-in-the-back narrative against anti-war liberals. Basic Obama spin: "I'm glad to see that President Bush has finally come around to my view etc. etc." This ought to be a big win for him: he visits Iraq, meets with Nouri al-Maliki, gets Maliki's endorsement for a near-term troop withdrawal, and then gets to applaud as President Bush signs on. Looking ahead, it's also a big win for Obama if he wins in November. Instead of a bruising congressional battle on withdrawal starting in January, he can just continue along the path Bush has set out. At most he'll tweak it a bit, which he can do on his own and without expending a lot of political capital.
Changing Iraq withdrawal timetable is a flip-flop for Obama.
Raed Jarrar and Erik Leaver, Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action & Peace Action Education Fund and Research Fellow with the peace and security program at the Institute for Policy Studies, 3-4-2010, “Sliding Backwards on Iraq?”
An Obama flip-flop on the timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops would have serious consequences in the United States and Iraq. The U.S. global image will be tarnished, Obama’s credibility will be called into question, and the administration will likely lose what little global political capital it gained in the last year.
Flip flops destroy political capital.
Michael Fitts, Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania Law School, January 1996, “The Paradox of Power in the Modern State,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p.857
Centralized and visible power, however, becomes a double-edged sword, once one explores the different ways in which unitariness and visibility can undermine an institution's informal influence, especially its ability to mediate conflict and appear competent. In this context, the visibility and centralization of the presidency can have mixed effects. As a single visible actor in an increasingly complex world, the unitary president can be prone to an overassessment of responsibility and error. He also may be exposed to a normative standard of personal assessment that may conflict with his institutional duties. At the same time, the modern president often does not have at his disposal those bureaucratic institutions that can help mediate or deflect many conflicts. Unlike members of Congress or the agencies, he often must be clear about the tradeoffs he makes. Furthermore, a president who will be held personally accountable for government policy cannot pursue or hold inconsistent positions and values over a long period of time without suffering political repercussions. In short, the centralization and individualization of the presidency can be a source of its power, as its chief proponents and critics accurately have suggested, as well as its political illegitimacy and ultimate weakness.
Widespread Republican support for US deployments in Iraq – times have not changed.
Daniel Larison, contributing editor, 4-12-2010, “Iraq, Republicans and Conservatives,” The American Conservative,
As Millman suggests, support for the Iraq war has become an important part of modern conservative, and I would add Republican partisan, political identity. The Iraq war produced “the most polarized distribution of partisan opinions on a president and a war ever measured,” as Gary Jacobson says. The strong identification of conservatives and Republicans with the Iraq war was at first a point of pride and then a source of increasingly defensive self-justification as the vast majority of the country turned against the war and against conservatives and the GOP. Even if most Republican members of Congress recognize that the war was a “terrible mistake,” they refuse to acknowledge publicly that their support for the war and public discontent with the war were responsible for costing them their majorities in Congress. That tells me that even as a matter of crude electoral calculations the Congressional GOP has learned nothing. As a practical matter, mass Congressional Republican recognition of the error of invading Iraq has not led to any significant political or policy changes. As far as most Republican voters and conservatives are still concerned, “people like us” do not oppose foreign wars, and they especially don’t oppose the Iraq war in any meaningful way, and one reason for this is that the public face of opposition simply does not include mainstream Republicans, much less Republicans in any position of leadership or influence.
Links – Japan Reductions Hurt Obama
Bipartisan support for maintaining current military presence in Japan.
John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies , 3-6-2010, “Okinawa and the new domino effect,” Asia Times,
And that's one reason the Obama administration has gone to the mat to pressure Tokyo to adhere to the 2006 agreement. It even dispatched Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Japanese capital last October in advance of president Obama's own Asian tour. Like an impatient father admonishing an obstreperous teenager, Gates lectured the Japanese "to move on" and abide by the agreement - to the irritation of both the new government and the public. (See Gates gets grumpy in Tokyo, October 28, 2009) The punditocracy has predictably closed ranks behind a bipartisan Washington consensus that the new Japanese government should become as accustomed to its junior status as its predecessor and stop making a fuss. The Obama administration is frustrated with "Hatoyama's amateurish handling of the issue," writes Washington Post editorial page editor Fred Hiatt. "What has resulted from Mr Hatoyama's failure to enunciate a clear strategy or action plan is the biggest political vacuum in over 50 years," adds Victor Cha, former director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council. Neither analyst acknowledges that Tokyo's only "failure" or "amateurish" move was to stand up to Washington. "The dispute could undermine security in East Asia on the 50th anniversary of an alliance that has served the region well," intoned The Economist more bluntly. "Tough as it is for Japan's new government, it needs to do most, though not all, of the caving in."
Reducing Japanese deployment spurs military opposition
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world and has written articles for dozens of military magazines, 2009, “Outdated Military Bases in Japan,”
However, American Generals and Admirals resist change because they enjoy the imperial flavor of "their" bases in Japan. They stall political efforts to close outdated bases by insisting on years to study proposed changes, and then years to implement them. A recent example occurred when U.S. Army Generals quietly defeated Donald Rumsfeld’s attempt to downsize Army bases in Germany. If President Obama expects results, he must dictate changes and insist on rapid action. Closing and downsizing foreign military bases requires no congressional approval. The first steps are to close the American airbases at Futenma and Atsugi, and transfer the aircraft carrier battle group based near Tokyo to the USA.
Broad public support for military deployments in Japan.
Michael J. Green, Senior Adviser & Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6-25-2009, “Japan’s Changing Role,” Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia,
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the state of our alliance with Japan. By almost any indicator, the state of the U.S.‐Japan alliance has never been stronger. In the most recent polling, 76% of Japanese say that the alliance with the United States is useful to Japan – the highest level since 1978. Meanwhile, 80% of the American public say that they consider Japan a reliable ally. That is a remarkable contrast to twenty years ago when Americans told pollsters they were more afraid of the Japanese economy than Soviet nuclear missiles, and when pundits published books with titles like “The Coming War with Japan.” We weathered those difficult years of “Japan‐bashing” because Americans came to understand how important our military bases in Japan are to peace and stability in Asia, and how much the international community depends on Japan’s active role as the second largest contributor to international institutions from the IMF to the United Nations and as a leading provider of overseas development assistance. The Japanese people also came to appreciate the centrality of the alliance and of shared values with the United States in the face of North Korean nuclear and missile provocations and uncertainty about China’s rising power.
Links – Kuwait Reductions Hurt Obama
None of their general link turns apply – the media ignores military deployments in Kuwait – and they’re the backdrop of US military strategy.
Nick Turse, Fellow at New York University's Center for the United States and the Cold War and the winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction, 11-22-2009, “Out of Iraq, Into the Gulf,” CBS News,
Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee early this year, General David Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), stated: "The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus because of its importance to our interests and the potential for insecurity." He continued: "T]he countries of the Arabian Peninsula are key partners... CENTCOM ground, air, maritime, and special operations forces participate in numerous operations and training events, bilateral and multilateral, with our partners from the Peninsula. We help develop indigenous capabilities for counter terrorism; border, maritime, and critical infrastructure security; and deterring Iranian aggression. As a part of all this, our FMS [Foreign Military Sales] and FMF [Foreign Military Financing] programs are helping to improve the capabilities and interoperability of our partners' forces. We are also working toward an integrated air and missile defense network for the Gulf. All of these cooperative efforts are facilitated by the critical base and port facilities that Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], and others provide for US forces." In fact, since 2001 the Pentagon has been pouring significant sums of money into the "critical base and port facilities" mentioned by the general -- both U.S. sites and those of its key regional partners. These are often ignored facts-on-the-ground, which signal just how enduring the U.S. military presence in the region is likely to be, no matter what happens in Iraq. Press coverage of this long-term infrastructural build-up has been remarkably minimal, given the implications for future conflicts in the oil heartlands of the planet. After all, Washington is sending tremendous amounts of military materiel into autocratic Middle Eastern nations and building-up bases in countries whose governments, due to domestic public opinion, often prefer that no publicity be given to the growing American military "footprint."
KBR would oppose the plan – they staff bases in Kuwait.
Pratap Chatterjee, managing editor of CorpWatch, “Inhering Halliburton’s Army,” 2-19-2009,” Mother Jones,
He outlined a series of steps to slash headquarter staffs by 15% in the two years to come and promised even more dramatic changes to follow. While the invasion of Afghanistan the following month was conducted by military personnel, Rumsfeld's ideas started to be implemented in the spring of 2002. Indeed, the building of bases in Kuwait in the fall of 2002 for the coming invasion of Iraq was handled almost entirely by KBR. Today, there is one KBR worker for every three U.S. soldiers in Iraq—and the main function of these workers, under LOGCAP, is to build base infrastructure and maintain them by doing all those duties that once were considered part of military life—making sure that soldiers are fed, their clothes washed, and their showers and toilets kept clean. While many stories have been written about the $80,000 annual salaries earned by KBR truck drivers, most of the company's workers make far less, mainly because they are hired from countries like India and the Philippines where starting salaries of $300 a month are considered a fortune.
They have massive political power.
Kelley Vlahos, contributing editor at The American Conservative, 3-3-2010, “KBR and the Pentagon — Billions More and No Turning Back,” The American Conservative,
I am sure that many will view the latest military contract award to Kellogg, Brown and Root (former subsidiary of Halliburton) — worth upwards of $2.8 billion for work in Iraq – through a political lens. We all know the company’s hold on Washington to be as tenacious as a barnacle on a pirate ship. However, KBR’s relationship has gone far beyond political favoritism. When the paymasters at the Pentagon say KBR is the only outfit to do the job, believe it. The “job” has turned into a massive shift of military operations to the private sector. There is no going back now. KBR is the largest and most capable defense contractor out there, and without it doing everything from building airfields and barracks to serving food, handling waste removal, delivering water and fuel — well, the Pentagon would not be able to wage the war alone.
Links – South Korea Reductions Hurt Obama
Bipartisan support for the US-Korea alliance.
Victor D. Cha, D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair at Georgetown University as well as a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Council, February 2009, “Going Global: The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance,”
The record of U.S.-ROK relations that President Barack Obama inherits, however, is not nearly as bad as some might have predicted. In fact, there is a sturdy foundation upon which the new administration can build. Despite gloomy predictions in 2002 that this alliance was in trouble, the alliance has far outperformed expectations, achieving more positive changes over the past several years than in any comparable period in the alliance’s history. This progress was enabled by strong bipartisan support for the alliance in Washington and in Seoul, a key sign of its strategic importance.
Broad Congressional support for the military status quo in South Korea.
Jason W. Forrester, visiting fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, May 2007, “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the US-South Korea Relationship,”
Nevertheless, the negative undercurrent of congressional views on Korea has yet to affect the 53-year-old U.S.-ROK military alliance. In 2005, some members expressed concern regarding President Roh’s statement that South Korea might play the role of “balancer” in the region, a concept that seemed at odds with that of a U.S. ally. For the most part, Congress seems satisfied with the Bush administration’s plan to adjust the U.S. force posture on the peninsula and the results of the ongoing U.S.-ROK talks designed to implement that plan. That satisfaction hints at a widespread recognition on Capitol Hill that the global requirements of the U.S. military force posture are shifting with the war in Iraq and the longer-term war on terrorism. A number of other positive factors in Congress reinforce the close alliance between the United States and the ROK. Some members of Congress are aware of and appreciate South Korea’s contribution of 3,000 troops to the multinational forces in Iraq. Others argue that bilateral trade and the overall economic relationship have been generally cooperative and well managed. There is also a reservoir of admiration for what the ROK has achieved over the past several decades, particularly in building a democracy. South Korea boasts the largest contingent of foreign students studying in the United States (about 100,000, 13 percent of all active international students in the United States). Finally, in spite of periodic differences, most members of Congress and their staff consider U.S.– South Korea cooperation in the Six-Party Talks to be positive.
They can’t win a link turn – no strong opposition to military in South Korea.
Jason W. Forrester, visiting fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, May 2007, “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the US-South Korea Relationship,”
While few members of Congress and their staff focus much attention on U.S.– South Korea relations, most members and staff have a positive view of the relationship. In particular, no staff or members contacted during the course of this study took the stark position that the U.S.-ROK relationship has outlived its usefulness, as some policy analysts in Washington, D.C., argued a few years ago. In general, when asked for their initial thoughts about South Korea, most interlocutors did not mention anti-Americanism. Nonetheless, as discussed below, for a small minority in Congress, concern about the perceived rise of anti- Americanism in South Korea was—and remains—a key area of concern.
Links – Turkey Reductions Hurt Obama
Military will oppose the plan – they lobby Congress to maintain military relationship with Turkey.
Journal of Turkish Weekly, 3-19-2010, “US Military Praises Turkish Role in Afghanistan, Iraq,”
Two senior United States generals praised Wednesday Turkey’s military assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan while hinting at fears the cooperation could be scaled back with a potential U.S. House vote on Armenian genocide claims. Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. Central Command and responsible for Afghanistan and Iraq, and Gen. Duncan McNabb, commander of the U.S. Air Force's Transportation Command, spoke at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on their forces' defense authorization budget requests for next year. Vic Snyder, a Democratic representative from Arkansas, asked the two generals to comment on the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia. During a time when the two countries’ reconciliation process has been showing signs of faltering, a House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution on March 4 calling on Washington to define the World War I-era killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as "genocide." Turkey has warned that Ankara's cooperation with the U.S. will be adversely affected if the full House endorses the bill. Petraeus said he did not want to comment directly on Snyder's question, but chose to focus on the importance of Turkey's military collaboration with the U.S. on Afghanistan and Iraq. "[Turkey has] forces deployed in Afghanistan. In fact, they're operating with considerable skill – [and] very impressively in the Kabul district, which is their area of responsibility there," Petraeus said. "And then, of course, there is Turkish involvement in a relationship with Iraq which, again, all of us sought to work together, as we did to promote the relationship of Iraq with its other neighbors as well," he said. McNabb also emphasized the significant role Turkey's southern İncirlik Air Base has played in helping U.S. logistical military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. "İncirlik is a really pivotal base for us, both for the re-supply of Iraq and for the re-supply of Afghanistan."
Congress supports military deployments in Turkey – overwhelming priority in relations.
Michelle Singerman, journalist, January-March 2008, “U.S. Vote on Armenian Genocide Swayed by Geo-Politics,” Peace Magazine,
Originally, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said if the vote came out of committee it would go to the floor before the end of next session, which would mean sometime in November. Yet, the effort to move the vote to Congress has now collapsed. "We knew well in advance this [Resolution 106] bill would have passed because it had several hundred co-sponsors, which I think is unusual," Shirinian says. He notes after the vote, support for the bill suddenly diminished. He and Payaslian attribute the weakened support to lobbying by Republicans and threats by the Turkish government. Payaslian said it is also possible that some other factor changed Pelosi's mind, such as a "Clinton effect" -- "A phone call to Pelosi saying `Why would you bring this up when we have American soldiers in Iraq? The Turkish military may be coming in and you are worried about something that happened 90 years ago?'" A sobering statement by Dana Perino, President Bush's chief spokeswoman, one day after the vote, offers Payaslian's theory some plausibility. "One of the reasons we opposed the resolution in the House yesterday is that the President has expressed on behalf of the American people our horror at the tragedy of 1915," Perino said. "But at the same time, we have national security concerns, and many of our troops and supplies go through Turkey. They are a very important ally in the war on terror, and we are going to continue to try to work with them. And we hope that the House does not put forward a full vote."
Powerful defense contractors will oppose the plan.
Kevin Bogardus, staff writer, 3-3-2010, “Top defense contractors warn that genocide measure will hurt business,” The Hill,
Executives for the nation’s top defense contractors say billions of dollars in business with Turkey could disappear if a genocide resolution advances on Capitol Hill. Formally recognizing the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Turks during World War I as genocide could have “unintended consequences,” chief executives for Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and United Technologies Corp. warned in a Feb. 26 letter to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-Calif.). “There is reason to believe committee passage of the resolution risks a rupture in U.S.-Turkey relations. Alienating a significant NATO ally and trading partner would likely have negative repercussions for U.S. geopolitical interests and efforts to boost both exports and employment,” the letter says. The executives told Berman that U.S. defense and aerospace exports to Turkey in 2009 were more than $7 billion and that tens of thousands of American jobs depend on “strong relations” between the two countries. It follows a Feb. 24 letter from the Aerospace Industries Association to Berman that expressed similar concerns about the resolution.
Internal Link – Obama Gets the Blame
Obama will get the blame – public can’t attribute blame to individual Congress members.
Michael Fitts, Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania Law School, January 1996, “The Paradox of Power in the Modern State,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p.888
Finally, the public may hold the president more responsible simply because individual members of Congress are less likely to be held responsible. As many political scientists have observed, public perceptions of members of Congress seem to present a classic collective action problem, in which no one individual member appears to have a significant effect on collective government action. In this context, it can be quite easy to avoid individual responsibility for collective decisions because each representative faces a prisoner's dilemma in effecting change. n210 No one is a "but for" cause of an event. Even if the result is not literally collective, moreover, the information problems faced by the public in assessing the individual contribution of a representative in a body such as Congress can be overwhelming. n211 Where constituents do not surmount this prisoner's dilemma, individual members of Congress who avoid responsibility enjoy a structural advantage. n212 This is one explanation for the well-known "incumbency effect" that members of Congress enjoy, in which they avoid responsibility for nationally contentious issues and claim it for locally favorable results. n213
Only the president takes the blame for military policy – Congress will point fingers.
Joel Richard Paul, Professor at the University of California Hastings College of the Law, Fall 2000, “Is Global Governance Safe for Democracy?” Chicago Journal of International Law, p.270
To restore balance to the Constitution, the courts should exercise jurisdiction over any claim arising from the president's failure to invoke the WPR. By forcing the president to provide the required notice to Congress, the courts would compel Congress to decide within sixty days whether to authorize the use of force. Whether Congress approves or disapproves of the president's action, Congress should be obliged to say so. The present situation allows Congress to take the course of least resistance by doing nothing. At present, if the military exercise succeeds, Congress can congratulate the president; it if fails, Congress can avoid the blame. But democracy suffers when Congress does not make a decision, because the voters cannot hold their representatives accountable for the use of military force. Moreover, when Congress avoids taking responsibility for foreign commitments, US foreign policy suffers. While Congress waits to see which way popular opinion is swinging, the United States appears weak and irresolute. US allies cannot depend upon its foreign commitments if the executive is acting without the public support of Congress. Thus, courts would strengthen our democracy and our foreign policy by imposing upon Congress the duty to decide on the record whether to support the president's use of military forces. Enforcing the WPR is one illustration of how US courts could correct the executive's encroachment on congressional foreign relations power.
Afghanistan proves – Obama has political ownership of ongoing military operations.
Mark Memmott, blogger for NPR and former writer for USA Today, 12-2-2009, “Afghanistan: It's Now 'Obama's War',” NPR,
As NPR's Kevin Whitelaw puts it, the president "assumed full political ownership of the conflict in Afghanistan" and all that comes with it. Now, NPR's Ken Rudin adds, comes the tough task of selling the strategy to a skeptical Congress: "There is clear restlessness on Capitol Hill about what to do with the war in Afghanistan, now in its ninth year and showing little sign of a successful conclusion. And much of the restlessness and concerns are coming from Obama's own party."
Internal Link - Political Capital Key to Climate
Political capital key to climate – only presidential leadership can solve.
Darren Samuelsohn, Greenwire, 4-12-2010, “White House Rhetoric May Signal Climate-Bill Surge,” New York Times,
Many say Summers' remarks underscore that Obama has already decided to push on climate change and energy. And with a new piece of legislation expected next week from Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), advocates for such a measure say the president's task is clear. "He needs to be active personally on everything, from the details to selling this to the American public," said Eileen Claussen, president of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. "You can say 'clean energy jobs,' and there will be some, but there will also be some job losses. You've also got to be positive and straight, and I don't know if anyone can do it other than the president."
Obama key to swing moderate senators on climate.
Darren Samuelsohn, Greenwire, 4-12-2010, “White House Rhetoric May Signal Climate-Bill Surge,” New York Times,
Once the details emerge on the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman bill, observers expect Obama and Vice President Joe Biden to get into the action themselves by leaning on reluctant swing votes. "There's something about the president or vice president of the United States talking to you about these things that helps get to 'yes,'" Weiss said, who said the White House could have significant sway on retiring senators like Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) and George Voinovich (R-Ohio). Obama last month invited 14 senators to the White House for a closed-door talk about energy and climate. Grumet said he can envision another strategy session not too far off. "If I were the president, I'd be watching, and trying to nurture all these different efforts forward so at some time in early May it'd be possible to say, 'Hey, why don't you all come over to the East Room and see what we have in common,'" Grumet said.
Political capital key to climate legislation.
Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and head of , 2-2-2009, “What Obama Must Do on the Road to Copenhagen,” Yale Environment 360,
Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, says that emissions must be stabilized by 2015 and in decline by 2020. Science, in its rightful place, can tolerate no further delay. For Obama, the political winds at his back are now as favorable as they will ever be. He is in a position to seize 2009 and do three things to meet the climate challenge: properly educate the American public about climate change and the need for immediate action; exercise the full might of his executive powers and regulatory discretion under the Clean Air Act to jump-start action; and spend freely from his enormous store of political capital to lead the government to enact comprehensive federal climate legislation. If he does, the United States will reclaim the mantle of global leadership when it takes its seat in Copenhagen.
Internal Link - Political Capital Finite
Political capital is finite – drains Obama’s ability to pass other legislation.
Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor at Florida State University College of Law, October 1994, “A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making,” Iowa Law Review, pp.38-39.
The cumbersome process of enacting legislation interferes with the President's ability to get his legislative agenda through Congress much as it hinders direct congressional control of agency policy-setting. A President has a limited amount of political capital he can use to press for a legislative agenda, and precious little time to get his agenda enacted. These constraints prevent the President from marshalling through Congress all but a handful of statutory provisions reflecting his policy vision. Although such provisions, if carefully crafted, can significantly alter the perspectives with which agencies and courts view regulation, such judicial and administrative reaction is not likely to occur quickly. Even after such reaction occurs, a substantial legacy of existing regulatory policy will still be intact. In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.
Political capital is finite for Obama.
Karl Rove, former senior adviser and deputy chief of staff to President George W. Bush, 11-20-2008, “Now Obama Has to Govern,” Wall Street Journal,
Even giving the list to outside groups raises problems. Such strong-arming irritates allies, infuriates fence sitters, and enrages opponents in Congress. Lawmakers dislike grass-roots lobbying by those representing people in their states or districts. They'll be livid if the White House facilitates it. Gregory Craig, slated to be White House counsel, will likely put the brakes on use of the campaign's email addresses. One challenge the president-elect faces is setting a starting agenda that's too ambitious. Even a popular new president has finite political capital and time. The congressional pipeline moves more slowly than any White House wishes, especially a new administration.
Political capital finite on foreign policy – trades off with domestic priorities.
Bruce Stokes, international economics columnist at the National Journal and former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 11-5-2008, “The World Looks to Obama – Part I,” YaleGlobal,
By three to one, Americans want the next president to focus on domestic issues, not foreign policy, according to a September survey by the US Council on Foreign Relations. Fewer Americans than at any point in this decade assign high priority to preventing genocide (one in three favor such action), strengthening the United Nations (one in three), promoting and defending human rights (one in four) and reducing global spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases (one in two). Obama must sell international engagement to Americans. His likely secretary of state, who many believe will be Senator John Kerry, the Democrat’s 2004 presidential candidate, lacks sufficient stature to make this sale on his own. With the bully pulpit of the White House, presidential leadership can turn public opinion. But even with the deference accorded any new president, Obama will only have so much political capital to spend on foreign-policy concerns given domestic economic challenges.
AT: Link Turn - Winners Don’t Win
Controversial issues drain political capital.
Michael Kranish, Staff Writer for the Boston Globe, 11-6-2008, “For Obama, high expectations and high hurdles,” Boston Globe,
To avoid mistakes of past presidents, Panetta said, Obama should put at the top of his agenda some early issues he is confident he can win, and delay other more controversial measures that are bound to fracture Congress. The new president must be also be willing to upset some supporters by delaying action on their priorities, including healthcare reform, until he has some successes in his effort to improve the economy, Panetta said. Indeed, amid the euphoria expressed by Obama supporters after his victory came a note of caution from the US Chamber of Commerce. Bruce Josten, the chamber's executive vice president, said yesterday that Obama's decisive defeat of John McCain is "hardly a strong mandate." He urged Obama not to squander precious political capital on hot-button issues that would alienate the business community, such as a proposal to make it easier for workers to form unions.
Winners win only applies to pet issues like health care – not the plan.
Chris Matthews and Chuck Todd, Host of Hardball and Correspondent for NBC, 6-22-2009, “Hardball with Chris Matthews,” MSNBC,
MATTHEWS: Gentlemen, let‘s start and I want to start with Chuck, our guy on the beat. One thing we‘ve learned, it seems, from presidents is you better win that first year. Reagan won the first year. Bush won the first year. If you win the first year, you really get it going. If you don‘t win on your big issue, your pet project, if you will—and it‘s more important than that—you really set a standard for defeat and you go down to further losses down the road. Your thoughts on this. CHUCK TODD, NBC CORRESPONDENT/POLITICAL DIRECTOR: Well, no, you‘re—A, you‘re absolutely right. And B, it‘s, like, people that are familiar with the way Rahm Emanuel thinks on trying to strategize when it comes to a legislative agenda and getting these big things done, you know, this is the lessons he feels like he learned the hard way in that first two years of the Clinton administration, ‘93, ‘94, when a lot of their big things went down. Sure, they got their big stimulus package, but they never did get health care. And that is what defines those first two years when you look back on it. Fair or unfair, that‘s what it‘s seen as.
Obama can’t regenerate capital – it’s finite.
Selwyn Ryan, Director of the St. Augustine Branch of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the West Indies, 1-18-2009, “Obama and Political Capital,” Trinidad & Tobago Express,
Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be difficult for him to deliver half of what he has promised, let alone all of it. Reality will force him to make many ’u’ turns and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a vast accumulation of political capital, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and fast diminishing asset in today’s world of instant communication, which once misspent, is rarely ever renewable. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who did not know how to husband the political capital with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama’s face inscribed with the plaintive words, ’I Trust You.’
AT: Link Turn – Popularity Not Key to the Agenda
Popularity undermines Obama’s agenda – Bush empirically proves.
Grover Norquist, President of the Americans for Tax Reform, 9-1-2002, “Bush’s White Elephant,” The American Enterprise,
President Bush's approval rating has remained above 70 percent forten months. Far from being an asset, these approval ratings are a liability that has hurt his agenda. Immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Democrats feared and Republicans hoped that Mr. Bush's approval ratings--which jumped from 57 percent to 90 percent--would create political capital that would help Bush advance his legislative agenda and elect more Republicans. Both Republican hopes and Democratic fears went unfulfilled. On November 6, only 55 days after September 11, the GOP lost control of the governors' mansions in Virginia and New Jersey. President Bush made no progress on legislative priorities such as reforming Mexican immigration and giving Americans the option of investing part of their Social Security taxes. A dozen Congressional leadership staff members have told me that the President's high approval ratings have not helped him pass any important bills.
Obama’s popularity doesn’t translate into his agenda – public doesn’t support specific policies.
Rick Klein, ABC News' Senior Political Reporter, 6-23-2009, “The Note: Drag & Pull -- Agenda Lags Behind Obama’s Popularity,” ABC News,
With a news conference Tuesday at 12:30 pm ET (out of primetime), and a health care forum Wednesday evening on ABC (back in primetime), the president gets to make his case with what remains the most solid brand in American politics today: himself. That brand retains impressive approval ratings -- 65 percent in the new ABC News/Washington Post poll. But it remains what he wants to do with those numbers that promises difficulties. From the start, the public hasn’t been behind his policies so much as it’s been behind him. And the president gets further out in front with every new detail that emerges in a health care plan that isn’t really a fully formed plan. (And look what was back Monday: “Yes, we can,” the president said Monday morning, per ABC’s Jake Tapper.) (“The slogan really didn’t have the same oomph this week, in the stodgy old Diplomatic Reception Room,” Tapper reported on “Good Morning America” Tuesday.) The underpinnings of Obama’s presidency -- and his argument for getting Congress to move his way -- has been found in the numbers all along: Since Obama’s election, a key piece of his political currency has been that confidence has been on an upward swing; right track finally beat wrong track in April. Now, wrong track is back on top -- and with a slow erosion of support on key issues, the climb in optimism about the nation’s course is no longer.
Consensus of studies prove that popularity isn’t key to Congressional opinion.
Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University and Associate Professor of Political Science at Fordham University, 1990, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp.28-29
In addition, there are theoretical problems. Some of the confusion results from lack of clarity about what the theory linking popularity and presidential support actually predicts. Edwards’s (1980) argument and analysis suggest that presidential popularity exerts strong, direct effects on congressional decision making. Despite Rivers and Rose’s (1985) criticisms of his interpretation, Edwards reports some very strong relationships between partisan public approval and partisan support in Congress which seem to support his conclusions about the importance of presidential popularity. But virtually every study of congressional behavior suggest that such external forces as public opinion will have marginal effects at best. Moreover, in his discussion of “presidential prestige” as a source of presidential power, Neustadt (1960, 87) emphasizes that it “is a factor operating mostly in the background as a conditioner, not the determinant, of what Washingtonians will do about a President’s request.”
Impact – US Competitiveness
Failure to act on climate destroys US competitiveness – we’re falling behind in key industries.
Kate Gordon et al, Vice President for Energy Policy at American Progress,3-4-2010, “Out of the Running?”
The United States has a clear moral imperative to join the worldwide effort to reverse climate change. But it also has an urgent economic imperative to become a clean-energy leader. The clean-energy achievements of China, Germany, and Spain represent a significant step in the fight against global warming pollution, but their driving motivation has been their own economic self-interest, through creating vibrant new industries, sustainable jobs, and international markets for clean-energy technologies. We can do the same and we can do better, but not if we use the excuse—as opponents of passing comprehensive energy and climate legislation frequently do—of temporarily weak economic conditions to delay the transformation to a clean energy economy. It is through a failure to act that the United States will suffer economically.
Renewable energy development is critical to overall global competitiveness.
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Editor, March 2005, “Off Track,” Washington Monthly,
But there is perhaps no economic sector that is undergoing a more profound evolution, or in which government investments could make a bigger difference, than energy. As India and China continue their rapid industrialization, and with it their need for oil, analysts predict that the price of oil, already sky-high, will grow even more prohibitive--which means that whichever companies develop the most effective alternative fuels and energy-efficiency technology will revolutionize the industry, and whichever countries can produce those breakthroughs may become rich on it, the Bahrains of the 21st century.
Competitiveness is critical to US leadership.
Bruce Jentleson, Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, 8-6-2007, The Globalist,
The Business Roundtable tellingly uses the term “atrophy” to express its concern about what has been happening to U.S. scientific and technological superiority. And the National Intelligence Council points to science and technology as the key uncertainty for whether the United States will remain the world’s “single most important actor.” The declining competitiveness of the U.S. automotive industry — which for a century was a driving economic engine and the country’s defining cultural symbol — is telling. 2007 has been the year Toyota ended General Motors’ reign as first in worldwide sales.
US leadership is key to prevent global nuclear war.
Zalmay Khalilzad, Program director for strategy, doctrine, and force structure of RAND's Project AIR FORCE, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?” Washington Quarterly, p.84
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Impact – Anti-Americanism
Failure to pass climate legislation spurs global anti-Ameicanism.
Bruce Stokes, international economics columnist for the National Journal, 12-10-2009, “US Opinion Turns Against the Globalism of its President ,” Yale Global,
Despite president Obama’s promise to reverse Bush administration foot dragging on climate change, curbing carbon emissions lacks public support in the US. Less than half the American public sees climate change as a major threat, raising doubts about whether Congress will ever approve pending legislation to curb carbon emissions. American obstructionism on climate change in the early part of this decade fueled a world-wide rise in anti-Americanism even before the Iraq war. If the US is again seen as the roadblock to an international agreement, Obama’s good intentions may not be enough to stem a revival of anti-American sentiment.
Anti-Americanism prevents the global spread of democracy.
Amar C. Bakshi, Next America Fellow who spent the past year reporting for the online editions of The Washington Post and Newsweek, 2009, “Why World Views of America Matter,”
And in the larger struggle for open markets and transparent democracies, we need their faith. But when we support regional dictators like Islom Karimov in Uzbekistan -- who used the cloak of the “war on terror” to boil dissidents alive -- our silence only strengthens the forces of political Islam, and risks locking us in a perpetual struggle against new foes who link their near oppressors with us, the far one. Anti-American sentiments then make life harder for genuine pro-democracy forces around the world. In Iran, for example, a pro-U.S. population runs the risk of falling under an increasingly nationalistic spell as the U.S. waves sticks and few carrots. In Venezuela, young student activists who lead the public demonstrations against Hugo Chavez scrupulously avoid citing the U.S. as a model democracy and turn to Scandinavian nations instead. These pro-democracy forces attempt to espouse the ideals America does, while keeping their distance from the U.S. itself. It’s a taxing tightrope act that may not prove sustainable. New options for political alliances, business partnerships, entertainment outlets and global narratives are emerging in China, Russia, India, South Korea, South Africa, and Brazil. The young generation who grew up in a post-9/11 world may prove more likely to look beyond America when imagining their future. As these new competitors rise, America must enhance its advantages; chief among these are the ideals it promises – openness and opportunity. But if anti-American sentiments harden, young citizens around the world might opt for something new, another narrative that places them at the front of the emerging global order. This could impact where they go to study, work, and innovate, and, among the extreme, whether they decide to engage in violence against an old foe.
Democracy solves extinction.
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, )
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
Impact – Warming Real/Fast
Scientific consensus proves anthropogenic warming – research anomalies don’t disprove.
William White, former molecular biologist at the University of Utah, 4-9-2010, “Weather forecasts unsettled, but not climate science,” Salt Lake Tribune,
First, the overwhelming global consensus of scientists is that man-made GHGs are driving global warming. The science surrounding local or regional climate change is unsettled but, it should come as no surprise, weather forecasts are, too, and both use computer modeling to make their predictions. In virtually every field of science one will find dissenting viewpoints, deliberate manipulation of data and conclusions based on the incorrect use of statistics. An example of this is within the medical sciences wherein reviews of the peer-reviewed literature reveal that 40-50 percent of the papers have not used the correct statistical approach or tests in the analysis of their experiments. Yet virtually no one questions their surgeons, pediatricians, doctors or pharmacists when they turn to them for their health care. When experiments are repeated thousands of times and the results are the same, we have reached a consensus. Such is the state of the science of human-driven global warming being the direct result of increasing GHGs.
Recent email scandal does not disprove climate science.
The Guardian, 4-15-2010, “Climate Science: The Dark Side of the Light,”
The damage has been incalculable, but the original sin appears milder by the day. While John Humphrys pronounced that the public were increasingly dubious about climate science on the BBC yesterday, an independent report into those now-infamous emails between its practitioners at East Anglia found that their output was not tainted at all. For all the conspiracy theories that have buzzed round the web, the Royal Society-nominated probe was asked to look beyond the scientists' casual remarks in personal notes and focus on their considered conclusions in published papers. The verdict was emphatic: "The basic science seems to have been done fairly and properly."
Scientific indicators prove rapid climate change is happening.
Bill McKibben, Scholar in Residence at Middlebury College and the author of a dozen books, 2-25-2010, “The Attack on Climate Change Science,” Common Dreams,
Now, you could fill the Superdome with climate-change research data. (You might not want to, though, since Hurricane Katrina demonstrated just how easy it was to rip holes in its roof.) Every major scientific body in the world has produced reports confirming the peril. All 15 of the warmest years on record have come in the two decades that have passed since 1989. In the meantime, the Earth’s major natural systems have all shown undeniable signs of rapid flux: melting Arctic and glacial ice, rapidly acidifying seawater, and so on.
Their evidence is based on political spin – no scientific evidence.
Bill McKibben, Scholar in Residence at Middlebury College and the author of a dozen books, 2-25-2010, “The Attack on Climate Change Science,” Common Dreams,
Access to money and the media is not the only, or even the main reason, for the success of the climate deniers, though. They’re not actually spending all that much cash and they’ve got legions of eager volunteers doing much of the internet lobbying entirely for free. Their success can be credited significantly to the way they tap into the main currents of our politics of the moment with far more savvy and power than most environmentalists can muster. They’ve understood the popular rage at elites. They’ve grasped the widespread feelings of powerlessness in the U.S., and the widespread suspicion that we’re being ripped off by mysterious forces beyond our control.
AT: Impact Turn - Climate Bill Helps the Economy
EPA rules make energy regulation inevitable – legislation is a net improvement for businesses.
Steve Hargreaves, staff writer, 2-2-2010, “Obama's climate change police,” CNN Money,
As a whole, utilities would like to see Congress pass a global warming bill similar to the one that passed the House this summer, although perhaps one a bit less ambitious in its targets. They also believe using the EPA is a bad idea. Most utilities believe regulation in some form is coming, and they want to be at the table crafting the laws as they are passed. Global warming legislation keeps getting bumped further down the agenda in the Senate and is now behind financial reform and health care. But Jim Owen, a spokesman for the utility trade organization the Edison Electric Institute, is still hopeful Congress will pass something, and in the process tell EPA it does not need to act.
The bill won’t kick in until after the end of the recession – it won’t hurt the economy.
New York Times, “The Case for a Climate Bill,” 1-23-2010,
Washington has been forecasting the likely death of a climate bill with renewed certainty since Massachusetts elected a Republican senator who promised to block pretty much anything Mr. Obama wants. But even before then we were hearing two reasons why a bill could not pass: The Senate won’t have any strength left when it finishes with health care, and the nation cannot afford a bill that implies an increase in energy prices. The first reason is defeatist, the second greatly exaggerated. The climate change bills pending in the Senate would not begin to bite for several years, when the recession should be over. The cost to households, according to the Congressional Budget Office, would be small. A good program would create more jobs than it cost.
Climate legislation boosts the economy – saves the auto industry, creates jobs, and solves oil dependence.
Gregor Peter Schmitz, correspondent in the Washington office of Der Spiegel, 1-27-2009, “Obama Calls for Green Battle against Economic Crisis,” Spiegel Online,
But, during his brief address, Obama already had his sights on another audience: those politicians and citizens who prefer to view climate-protection measures as harmful during the economic crisis. To these people, Obama wants to present his measures as a premium to be paid in order to usher in economic recovery. Obama is promoting his program by saying it will lead to a reduction in oil consumption and reduce dependence on foreign dictators and terorrists. It will also mean more money for renewable energy and more jobs. Obama envisions the creation of up to 460,000 new jobs through the program. And people believe the president when he says that even the ailing American auto industry might profit over the long term from stricter new emissions specifications. "Our goal is not to further burden an already struggling industry," Obama says. "It is to help America's automakers prepare for the future."
***Courts CP***
Courts CP 1NC
Text: The United States Supreme Court should hold that Congress must affirmatively authorize the United States (military and/or police presence) in _______________________.
The counterplan solves and competes– having the Court declare the necessity of Congressional approval is critical to change policy and bolster public approval for the withdrawal.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.114-115
The fact that most people qualified their support for most policies, sometimes to the point of endorsing incompatible objectives, meant that Vietnam was exactly the sort of problem that needed to be resolved by Congress. Indeed, only the national legislature was in a position to define precisely the problem the country was confronting. Was it simply how to get the United States out of Vietnam (the doves, characterization), or was it rather how to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that Americans would no longer have to fight in Southeast Asia (the hawks' version)? Not until there was some agreement about national purpose could the proper means be found to solve the Vietnam problem. By holding that Congress must affirmatively authorize whatever additional military action was taken in Vietnam, the Supreme Court could have made unavoidable some painful prioritizing that the country's leaders had been dodging. It could also have given to a body structurally suited to the task the difficult job of working out the uncomfortable compromises between means and ends necessitated by the conflicting demands of a public unprepared to accept either the indefinite military involvement in Vietnam that "winning" required or the Communist takeover that would result from immediate withdrawal. Only Congress could ensure that the course of action the nation pursued, while one about which most people had serious reservations, would enjoy the support, however grudging, of a majority of Americans. The Supreme Court was in a position to restructure the political environment in such a way that Congress would have to act. All the Court had to do was hold the war unconstitutional because there had been no declaration of war, thus making it necessary for Congress to authorize whatever was done in Vietnam from then on. As Ely asserts, "Courts have no business deciding when we get involved in combat, but they have every business insisting that the officials the Constitution entrusts with that decision be the ones who make it." That is all the Warren Court had to do.
The counterplan results in withdrawal.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.115-116
Had it required congressional authorization of military operations in Vietnam, it might well have ended the war. To be sure, as long as Johnson remained in the White House, Democratic Senators and Representatives were reluctant to challenge administration policy. But once Nixon became President in 1969, party loyalty no longer restrained the Democratic majority on Capitol Hill. Even among Republican legislators, opposition to the war mounted. If forced to take affirmative action authorizing further military operations in Vietnam, Congress probably would have done so, but in a way that required them to be terminated relatively soon. Furthermore, if the President failed to comply with those congressional limitations, he would have been doing something the Supreme Court had declared not just illegal but unconstitutional. That would have been a political burden no Chief Executive, especially one elected with a minority of the popular vote, as Nixon was in 1968, would want to carry into a campaign for re-election.
Courts CP 1NC Cont’d
Lack of court ruling on troop deployments functions as a grant of legitimacy – only the counterplan can challenge deference.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.112
Avoiding this question by treating it as "political" theoretically says nothing about whether anything is constitutional, but in actuality it weakens the legal constraints on the challenged conduct. When the Supreme Court does that, it fails to perform what Chief Justice John Marshall long ago declared to be "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department "to say what the law is." Such abdication is inconsistent with judicial responsibility. "Withdrawal is not a choice free from constraints," Keeton points out, due to "the potential harm that [it] may cause to interests that... the judge was charged to serve while acting in [his or her] defined professional role." The idea that the Supreme Court could avoid affecting U.S. Vietnam policy by disposing of challenges to the legality of the war with opaque denials of certiorari is naive. As Keeton observes, "the form of judicial reasoning that explores considerations of principle and policy underlying constitutional... declarations of law results in a choice that is neither more nor less value-laden than reasoning that contains no reference to principle or policy." By saying nothing, the Supreme Court said something, and it was the wrong thing. Its use of denials of certiorari to dispose of challenges to the legality of the war betrayed the sort of "lack of imagination" that, according to Barton, can result in a problem being "imprisoned within a decisional procedure that offers little prospect of solving" it.
Courts CP 1NC
Deference to executive war powers causes unilateralism and failed military missions.
David Gray Adler, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, December 2000, "Virtues of the War Clause." Presidential Studies Quarterly, p.779
The constitutional constraints imposed on the president in foreign affairs and war making two hundred years ago remain vibrant, vital, and compelling, contrary to Mervin's charge of obsolescence. The question then, as now, pits the values of unilateralism against those of collective decision making. If anything, presidential practice across two centuries confirms the wisdom of the original design, for the theory of executive unilateralism, as well as its traditional, underlying arguments, was exploded in the tragedy of the Vietnam War. Mervin's call for deference to the president is an argument that would reduce Congress to the role of spectator and exalt rule by presidential decree. It recalls the pervasive sentiment of the Cold War, and a literature of advice, that urged blind trust of the executive on the ground that he alone possessed the information, facts, and expertise necessary to safeguard U.S. interests. Rarely has a sentiment been so troubling, dangerous, and antidemocratic. It led to the Vietnam War, the imperial presidency, and Iran-Contra, as well as to the entrenchment of presidential supremacy in foreign relations, with its attendant military and policy failures, from Cuba and Cambodia to Lebanon and Somalia. There is nothing, moreover, in the broader historical record to suggest that the conduct of foreign relations by executive elites has produced wholesome results. Indeed, the wreckage of empires on the shoals of executive foreign policies provides ample evidence that, as Lord Bryce noted, the wisdom of "classes" is less than the "masses."
Broad US executive power gets modeled.
Robert D. Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, April 2008, “The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction,” Boston University Law Review, p.348
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is vital to appreciate that the scope of the executive power, particularly in the twenty-first century, is not only a constitutional or historical issue. As an international lawyer rather than a constitutionalist, I want to stress briefly that these debates and their concrete manifestations in U.S. law and policy potentially exert a profound effect on the shape of international law. Justice Sutherland's sweeping dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., that the President enjoys a "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress," has been (correctly, in my view) criticized on a host of grounds. But in practice, in part for institutional and structural reasons, it accurately reflects the general preeminence of the President in the realm of U.S. foreign affairs. Because of the nature of the international legal and political system, what U.S. Presidents do and say often establish precedents that strongly influence what other states do and say - with potentially dramatic consequences for the shape of customary international law. The paradigmatic example is the establishment of customary international law on the continental shelf following the Truman Proclamation of September 28, 1945, which produced an echo of similar claims and counterclaims, culminating in a whole new corpus of the international law of the sea for what had previously been understood only as a geological term of art.
Courts CP 1NC Cont’d
That causes global preemption and WMD wars.
Robert D. Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, April 2008, “The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction,” Boston University Law Review, pp.349-351
Many states took note, for example, when in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS"), President Bush asserted that the United States had the right under international law to engage in preventive wars of self-defense. While, contrary to popular belief, the United States never in fact formally relied on that doctrine in practice, many would argue that President Bush de facto exercised this purported right when he initiated an armed conflict with Iraq based on claims, which have since proved unfounded, about its incipient programs to develop catastrophic weapons. The 2006 NSS notably retreats from the 2002 NSS's robust claims of a right to engage in preventive wars of self-defense. Yet even within this brief, four-year period, an astonishing number of other states have asserted a comparable right to engage in preventive self-defense. These include not only states that the United States has described as "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran, but Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, and (though technically not a state) Taiwan. I doubt we will welcome the consequences of this pattern for the evolving jus ad bellum of the twenty-first century. Equally, after President Bush's decision to declare a global war on terror or terrorism - rather than, for example, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their immediate allies - virtually every insurgency or disaffected minority around the world, including peoples suffering under repressive regimes and seeking to assert legitimate rights to liberty and self-determination, has been recharacterized by opportunistic state elites as part of the enemy in this global war. The techniques employed and justified by the United States, including the resurrection of rationalized torture as an "enhanced interrogation technique," likewise have emerged - and will continue to emerge - in the practice of other states. Because of customary international law's acute sensitivity to authoritative assertions of power, the widespread repetition of claims and practices initiated by the U.S. executive may well shape international law in ways the United States ultimately finds disagreeable in the future. So as we debate the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century, the stakes, as several panelists point out, could not be higher. They include more than national issues such as the potential for executive branch officials to be prosecuted or impeached for exceeding the legal scope of their authority or violating valid statutes. They also include international issues like the potential use of catastrophic weapons by a rogue regime asserting a right to engage in preventive war; the deterioration of international human rights norms against practices like torture, norms which took years to establish; and the atrophy of genuine U.S. power in the international arena, which, as diplomats, statesmen, and international relations theorists of all political persuasions appreciate, demands far more than the largest and most technologically advanced military arsenal.
2NC Impact – SOP - Hegemony
Challenging troop deployments is the key lynchpin of executive power.
Ann Scales, Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law, 2005, “Soft on Defense: The Failure To Confront Militarism,” Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice, p.374
War tends to enhance the power of the executive branch, whether presidential, parliamentary, or monarchical. Legal interpretations that make it easier for the Executive to go to war make it easier for the Executive to accumulate power. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the dueling constitutionalists described above, those from the pro-Executive interpretive camp are more likely to turn up in powerful non-elected policy making positions. For example, Berkeley Law Professor John Yoo, author of a spate of recent articles urging the legitimacy of broad Executive power over military matters, was also the Justice Department official who infamously wrote that the United States was not bound by the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of prisoners taken during the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions. In my lifetime, the accumulation of Executive power in military matters seems like a juggernaut. Congress has not actually declared war since World War II, and has not vigorously acted to limit Executive power in the absence of a declaration of war. Instead, Congress tends to provide "authorizations" to use force in various situations, as Congress did before the invasion of Iraq. We can usefully visualize these authorizations as delegations (constitutional or not) to the Executive of the Legislative power to declare war. It seems to be a perfect political avoidance strategy. Everybody gets cover, the President's power is enhanced, and the defense contractors back in (some) Congressional districts get fat, new contracts.
Separation of powers is crucial to US hegemony.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, pp.143-144
These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon" with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government. Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. The courts, too, are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts.
US hegemony is key to prevent global nuclear war.
Zalmay Khalilzad, Program director for strategy, doctrine, and force structure of RAND's Project AIR FORCE, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?” Washington Quarterly, p.84
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
2NC Impact – Executive Power - Democracy
Ending deference to broad executive power key to democracy.
Victor Hansen and Lawrence Friedman, professors of law at the New England School of Law, 2009 The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.127
There is something reassuring in the thought that the threats could be met more effectively by consolidating defensive authority in the executive branch. When seeking new approaches, however, we must be mindful that the legal paradigm we adopt does not reintroduce the very threats to our democratic system of government against which the framers sought to protect us. It bears remembering that the framers were not unfamiliar with both internal and external threats which had the very real possibility of quashing our fledgling democracy almost before it could take root. The framers were, after all, informed by the experience of fighting an eight-year war for the very existence of their country against the most powerful military in the world. What that experience taught them, among other lessons, was that as great as such threats could be, a greater danger lay in providing the means for tyranny to spread at home through such actions as consolidating all defensive authority in one branch of government. In our desire to feel safe in a dangerous world, we cannot forget this lesson. And there are alternatives. In this book, we have maintained that the better argument is that the constitutional allocations of authority and traditional checks and balances, which have served us in the past, provide a sufficient means with which to both combat the threat of terrorism and retain the important sense of accountability that is a hallmark of the rule of law in our constitutional democracy.
Restoring US democracy key to spread of global democracy.
Richard Soudriette, president of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), 2001, “Promoting Democracy at Home,” Journal of Democracy, p.134
These events demonstrated that even long-established democracies must constantly strive to improve their election systems in order to guarantee credibility and transparency. Since the days of the Reagan administration, democracy promotion has been a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. Yet in the wake of the 2000 election, the United States has received a great deal of criticism from abroad. Russian parliamentarian Alexei Mitrofanov, for example, commented, “America has been lecturing us for eight years on democracy. Now it’s our turn to lecture you.” If the United States has a flawed election system at home, how can it maintain its credibility in promoting democracy abroad? It must lead by example by making the necessary improvements to bring the country’s election system into the twenty-first century. The United States played a key role in helping to expand the number of electoral democracies in the world from 39 in 1974 to 120 in 2000. The U.S. Agency for International Development has provided election assistance (often through IFES) in more than 100 countries. The time has come for the United States to apply at home what it has long been teaching abroad.
Democracy solves extinction.
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, )
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
AT: Permutation – Do Both
Permutation cannot solve the net benefit – simultaneous action prevents the Congress from responding to the Court’s call for action – this investment of responsibility is key to solve.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.116-118
Thus, the Warren Court had an opportunity to engage in some "systems intervention" problem solving along the lines of that advocated by proponents of Critical System Heuristics." In analyzing any social system, practitioners of that brand of systems analysis seek to identify the system's designer, its decision maker, its beneficiaries, and those who, although not directly involved in the system, are affected by it. They then ask a series of questions, designed to determine both what the roles of those groups are with respect to the system and what they ought to be. Applying this approach to the American governmental system, one identifies the Supreme Court as its designer. That means the Court is in a position to determine who ought to be the "decision taker" with respect to matters, such as whether the country will undertake military operations. What it decides about that should depend on who the beneficiary of the system ought to be and what its purpose should be. The beneficiary of the American governmental system is, presumably, the American people, and its purpose should be to implement their policy preferences. With respect to Vietnam, therefore, Congress was the most suitable "decision taker." The Supreme Court was in a position to place in its hands the decision about how long the United States should continue to fight in Vietnam. Two things suggest it ought to have assumed responsibility for making that allocation of decision-making authority. The first is that whether the President or Congress should decide if the United States will go to war is a matter that is supposed to be controlled not by either of them but by an external factor, the Constitution. The second is that, because of its expertise in interpreting the Constitution, the Court was the expert best suited to design a governmental system for determining whether and how long America would continue to fight in Vietnam.
Permutation relies on the notion that the executive has the authority to act – which doesn’t speak to the key question of constitutional law.
David Swanson, master's degree in philosophy from the University of Virginia, chair of the accountability and prosecution working group of United for Peace and Justice, 1-25-2009, “Dangerous Executive Orders”, Op-ed News,
The Center for Constitutional Rights has expressed concern that President Obama's executive order banning torture may contain a loophole. But no president has any right to declare torture legal or illegal, with or without loopholes. And if we accept that presidents have such powers, even if our new president does good with them, then loopholes will be the least of our worries. Torture is, and has long been, illegal in every case, without exception. It is banned by our Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2340A. Nothing any president can do can change this or unchange it, weaken it or strengthen it in any way. Preventing torture does not require new legislation from Congress or new orders from a new president. It requires enforcing existing laws. In fact, adherence to the Convention Against Torture, which under Article VI of our Constitution is the supreme law of the land, requires the criminal prosecution of torturers and anyone complicit in torture. Most of the seemingly noble steps taken by Congress in recent years and by President Obama in his first week have served to disguise the fact that torture always was, still is, and shall continue to be illegal.
AT: Permutation – Do Both Cont’d
Acting on the assumption of constitutionality can’t solve our deference arguments – sets the precedent for future presidents to assume the authority to act.
David Swanson, master's degree in philosophy from the University of Virginia, chair of the accountability and prosecution working group of United for Peace and Justice, 1-25-2009, “Dangerous Executive Orders”, Op-ed News,
The same order that President Obama uses to ban torture also orders the closure of all CIA detention facilities. Congress never authorized the creation of such things in the first place. Ordering their closure is the right thing to do. But if a president can give the order to close them, what is to prevent another president giving the order to reopen them? The answer should be all of the laws and treaties violated. Obama's executive order largely orders the government to cease violating various laws. But in so doing, rather than strengthening the laws, the new president weakens them almost to the point of nonexistence. For, what power does a law have to control behavior if it is never enforced? What deterrent value can be found in a law the violation of which results merely in a formal order to begin obeying it? And what status are we supposed to give all the other violated laws for which no such formal orders have been given?
AT: Permutation – Do the Counterplan
The permutation severs – the plan requires that the US withdraw its military forces – the counterplan does not. Severance is a voting issue because it undermines the negative’s ability to generate ground, which destroys fairness.
Executive action is normal means – the president has complete control over troop deployment.
Julian Ku and John Yoo, Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, and Visiting Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Summer 2006, “Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch,” Constitutional Commentary, p.206
This conclusion stems from a misunderstanding of the manner in which the President and Congress make national security policy. Of course, there remains serious dispute among scholars about whether the President can exercise independent foreign affairs and national security powers, with the majority view among foreign affairs scholars that the President must act pursuant to congressional authorization and that Congress has the upper hand in setting policy. But putting to one side the normative element of this debate, it should be undisputed that as a descriptive matter the President exercises broad power in these areas, far broader than those he has in domestic affairs. Presidents not only control diplomatic communications with other nations, but they generally determine what the foreign policy of the United States shall be during their terms in office. They have used force abroad without congressional permission, including significant wars such as Korea and Kosovo, and exercise complete control over the deployment of the armed forces, and their strategy and tactics. They sit at the head of an enormous foreign affairs and national security bureaucracy, with stations throughout the world, staffed by millions of officials and soldiers with a budget of more than $ 400 billion a year.
The counterplan is abnormal means – Courts don’t act on military deployment questions.
James P. Terry, Chairman of the Board of Veterans Appeals in the Department of Veterans Affairs, Spring 2009, “The President as Commander in Chief,” Ave Maria Law Review, pp.48-49
The federal courts have largely upheld the expansive nature of the President's authority as Commander in Chief. In fact, it has been the courts which have carefully shaped the President's authority with respect to the nature and scope of that power under Article II, both in terms of the President's inherent authority as well as the President's shared authority (with Congress) to wage and fund armed conflicts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution vests the President with all the power and authority accorded by customary international law to a supreme commander in the field. Moreover, "he may invade [a] hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States." He may establish and prescribe the jurisdiction of military commissions, unless limited by Congress, in territory occupied by American forces. He may insert covert agents behind enemy lines and obtain valuable information on enemy troop dispositions, strength, planning, and resources. Within the theater of operations, he may requisition property and compel services from American citizens and friendly foreigners, although if he does so, the federal government is required to provide just compensation. He may also bring an armed conflict to a conclusion through an armistice, and stipulate conditions of the armistice. The President may not, however, acquire territory for the United States through occupation, although he may govern recently acquired territory until Congress provides a more permanent governing regime.
Normal means for the plan is executive action – president makes the decision regarding troop deployment.
James P. Terry, Chairman of the Board of Veterans Appeals in the Department of Veterans Affairs, Spring 2009, “The President as Commander in Chief,” Ave Maria Law Review, pp.46-47
In practice, then, the President's discretion to authorize the use of military force is exceedingly broad. Unique opportunities have presented themselves throughout this nation's history for expansion and refinement of this presidential authority. These were notably evident not only in our declared wars, but also in presidential determinations to use force to defend U.S. interests in the absence of a declaration of war. Thus it was that President Truman never sought congressional authorization before dispatching troops to the Korean Peninsula (believing that compliance with the U.N. Security Council's recommendation was enough); n81 President Eisenhower likewise acted on his own in putting troops in Lebanon, as did President Johnson when he sent troops to the Dominican Republic; and most significantly, President Kennedy eschewed asking for any approval in sending thousands of "advisers" into Vietnam, although President Johnson did secure passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 before introducing significant ground forces.
AT: Courts Not Perceived
Counterplan solves all their international perception arguments – executive not key to foreign policy advantages.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, pp.153-154
Professors Posner and Sunstein have argued for exceptional deference on the ground that, unless the executive is the voice of the nation in foreign affairs, other nations will not know whom to hold accountable for foreign policy decisions. But the Guantanamo litigation demonstrated that American hegemony has altered this classic assumption as well. The transparent and accessible nature of the U.S. government made it possible for other nations to be informed about the detainee policy and, conceivably, to have a role in changing it. The Kuwaiti government hired American attorneys to represent their citizens held at Guantanamo. In the enemy combatant litigation, the government was forced to better articulate its detainee policies, justify the detention of each detainee, and permit attorney visits with the detainees. Other nations learned about the treatment of their citizens through the information obtained by attorneys. Although the political climate in the U.S. did not enable other nations to have an effect on detainee policy directly - and Congress, in fact, acted twice to limit detainees' access to the courts - this was an exceptional situation. Foreign governments routinely lobby Congress for favorable foreign affairs legislation, and are more successful with less politically-charged issues. Even "rogue states" such as Myanmar have their lobbyists in Washington. In addition, foreign governments facing unfavorable court decisions can and do appeal or seek reversal through political channels. The accessibility and openness of the U.S. government is not a scandal or weakness; instead, it strengthens American hegemony by giving other nations a voice in policy, drawing them into deeper relationships that serve America's strategic interests. In the Guantanamo litigation, the courts served as an important accountability mechanism when the political branches were relatively unaccountable to the interests of other nations.
Court decisions critical to US foreign policy.
Noah Feldman, law professor at Harvard University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 9-25-2008, “When Judges Make Foreign Policy,” New York Times,
This may seem like an odd way of thinking about international affairs. In the coming presidential election, every voter understands that there is a choice to be made between the foreign-policy visions of John McCain and Barack Obama. What is less obvious, but no less important, is that Supreme Court appointments have become a de facto part of American foreign policy. The court, like the State Department and the Pentagon, now makes decisions in cases that directly change and shape our relationship with the world. And as the justices decide these cases, they are doing as much as anyone to shape America’s fortunes in an age of global terror and economic turmoil.
Court is perceived internationally – modeling proves.
Jessica Neuwirth, Equality Now, Spring 2001, “Brief of Equality Now and Others as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners: in the Supreme Court of the United States ,” Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies, p.390
The United States Supreme Court is a model for countries around the world and should play a leading role in the interpretation and application of international law. High courts in other countries have historically looked to the jurisprudence of the Court for guidance, and the United States Government has frequently declared the importance of international law and the promotion of human rights. Particularly in the context of immigration law, the Court has looked to and cited international law.
AT: The President Will Ignore the Ruling
President will comply with the ruling – too much political incentive, precedent proves.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, p.123
The legal culture of the late twentieth century was such that compliance was the only option, even for the Commander in Chief in time of war. During the Korean conflict President Harry Truman seized the nation's steel mills, whose output was vital to the national defense, in order to keep them from being idled by a strike. When the Supreme Court ruled in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer that the Constitution did not give him the authority to take such action, Truman promptly dispatched a letter to the Secretary of Commerce, ordering him to return the confiscated mills to their owners. "The President complied less than thirty minutes after the Justices finished reading their opinions in the Steel Seizure cases." There is little reason to doubt that Nixon or Johnson would have done the same thing had the Warren Court declared the Vietnam War unconstitutional. Rather than provoking a political backlash and possible impeachment by doing something the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional, they would have turned their attention to lobbying Congress for authorization to take the military actions in Southeast Asia that they believed the national interest required. And as Harold Hongju Koh points out, "even in foreign affairs, executive decisions based on legislative consent will more likely express the consent of the governed than those generated by the executive bureaucracy alone."
President will comply – civil war precedents are outdated
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, p.122
Although the effect of holding the war unconstitutional, even in Mora or Luftig, would have been merely to require Congress to take a vote, the Justices might have refrained from acting out of fear that the President and the military would defy them, thereby damaging the image and influence of the Supreme Court. Civil War history offered a disturbing example of such defiance; under orders from President Abraham Lincoln, a Union Army general had refused to comply with the writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in Ex parte Merryman. Warren seems to have realized, however, that in the last half of the twentieth century such defiance was unlikely. Once, after his Court ordered the Army to release a prisoner, one of his law clerks asked him how they were going to make the military comply. When Warren told the clerk not to worry, the young man reminded him that President Andrew Jackson had supposedly once responded to a ruling handed down by an earlier Chief Justice by declaring that John Marshall had made his decision, now let him enforce it. Warren replied, "If they don't do this, they've destroyed the whole republic, and they aren't going to do that."
Executive will abide by the courts ruling – experience and precedent prove.
Thomas W. Merrill, Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, October 1993, “Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,” Cardozo Law Review, pp.46-47
On the other hand, there is widespread agreement that the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by courts, regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for the judgment. As the papers of my two co-panelists demonstrate, this understanding is not universal. However, I would venture to guess that the sample of views reflected by this panel is extremely unrepresentative on this point. The decision discussed by Professor Paulsen, Ex parte Merryman, is the only reported instance of which I am aware where a President asserted the power to disregard a judicial judgment on the ground that he disagreed with its legal basis. President Lincoln's action was contrary to his own previously expressed views about judicial supremacy, and is today regarded as an aberration. Much more representative of contemporary attitudes is the universal approbation that followed President Nixon's prompt decision to comply with the judgment entered in the tapes case.
AT: Troop Deployment Not in Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction
Supreme Court can choose which subjects to tackle – they can rule on military deployments.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law , Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.103-105
For Supreme Court justices, that means chiefly following the Constitution. The Constitution is, however, a comparatively brief and often rather vague document, which frequently fails to provide clear answers to questions raised by litigants. Although obligated to provide reasoned explanations for its decisions, the Supreme Court enjoys wide latitude with respect to the substance of those rulings. This discretion enables it to resolve cases by articulating rules of constitutional law that will solve, or at least contribute to the solution of social problems. Furthermore, because the Supreme Court enjoys essentially unlimited freedom to choose which disputes it will decide, it can select those that afford the best opportunities for creative problem solving. As David M. O'Brien points out, "Unlike other federal judges,... the justices have virtually complete discretion to screen out of the many cases they receive the few they will decide." "The power to decide what to decide... enables the Court to set its own agenda." This, in turn, allows it to function "like a roving commission, or legislative body, responding to social forces." The Supreme Court no longer sits primarily to resolve disputes between the litigants who bring cases to it. "Long ago, United States courts of appeals became... in practical effect the last resort for most cases in the federal courts." The essential role of the Supreme Court, its members agree, is to resolve issues of national importance. Its function, according to the late Chief Justice William Howard Taft, is "to [expound] and stabilize principles of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon constitutional questions and other important questions of law for the public benefit." Serving as a kind of "super legislature," the Supreme Court is in a position to "manage legal change." As Hugh Baxter explains, "Because the Court fills its docket almost entirely at its own discretion, a self-conscious majority of Justices can pursue a project of transforming an existing body of federal law by selecting the case or cases strategically most advantageous to that project." The Warren Court could have used this control over its docket to select from the many cases it was asked to review during the late 1960s, those that afforded the best opportunities for rendering decisions that could help to "solve" the Vietnam "problem." Clearly, a solid majority of the justices viewed the war as a national problem. The only zealous "hawk" on the Court was Abe Fortas. A longtime crony of Lyndon Johnson, he continued to serve as an advisor to the President after LBJ appointed him to the high tribunal in 1965. Among the subjects on which Johnson frequently consulted Fortas was Vietnam. As Larry Berman reports, "In his unofficial capacity as friend, counselor and strategist, Fortas supported an unrestrained policy of stepping up the war." His colleague, Byron White, may also have been a "hawk."
AT: Troop Deployment Not in Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction Cont’d
No reason the Court can’t decide issues of force deployment – they have simply made a choice not to.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.110
Schoen is correct. The principal support for the ostensible astuteness of the Court's silence on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War is the supposed nonjusticiability of the issue. "Nonjusticiable," is, however, less a descriptive adjective than the statement of a conclusion. It is a term of art which denotes little more than that courts will not decide issues courts do not decide. It is a rationalization for caution masquerading as a rule of law. Justiciability is really, as Thomas Barton explains, just the relationship between adjudicative procedures and the problems such procedures are asked to resolve. The quandary confronting the Warren Court was whether adjudicative procedures could resolve a problem lying within the realm of war and foreign affairs. Issues of this type have "traditionally been recognized as prime examples of "political questions,'" which courts should abstain from deciding for sePtion-of-powers reasons. Such issues "have been cited as prime examples and a principle justification of" the Political Question Doctrine, which elevates to the level of a constitutional principle judicial abstention from deciding matters purportedly best left to Congress and the Executive.
Plenty of test cases exist – Vietnam example proves.
Michal R. Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law , Fall 1999, “Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?” California Western Law Review, pp.107-107
Despite the fact that most of his colleagues shared those doubts, Warren's normally activist Court studiously avoided ruling on the legality of what was going on in Vietnam. The reason was not lack of opportunity. According to Douglas, at least nineteen cases challenging the legality of this "presidential" war were filed with the Supreme Court over the years. Some litigants contended that the Vietnam conflict violated international law. More argued that the United States was not legally at war in Vietnam, generally because Congress had never authorized the hostilities there with a declaration of war, as required by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. n60 Ten times between March of 1967 and Warren's retirement in June of 1969, the Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari in one of these cases, thereby declining even to consider the legality of the war.
Troop Deployment/War Powers Key to Separation of Powers.
Troop deployments are the key issue for separation of powers – presidents are over-reaching now.
Timothy D. A. O'Hara, JD Candidate, Winter 1998, “Without Justification: Misplaced Reliance on United Nations Security Council Resolutions for Presidential War Making,” John Marshall Law Review, pp.632-633
Certainly, the current state of presidential war making remains unclear. However, it is not without limitations, and it must be realized that in relationship to unilateral presidential deployments on U.N. missions or otherwise, the President is potentially acting unconstitutionally or at least in his "lowest ebb' of constitutional authority. Nevertheless, such a realization would not have surprised the Founding Fathers; in fact they anticipated it. As previously discussed, this is why our government is one of separated powers. Though, what the Founding Fathers did not seem to have anticipated is the apparent apathy of the Courts and especially Congress to check such arbitrary uses of presidential military force. This Part briefly examines the role of the other two branches of government in allowing the development of presidential war making and discusses the policy implications of the Michael New case that all branches of the government should consider before allowing or ordering military deployments.
War powers are a slippery slope – expansion of executive authority destroys separation of powers.
Jules Lobel, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, 2008, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War,” Ohio State Law Journal, pp.394-395
The Administration's claim of unchecked power to conduct battlefield operations, a position that is ironically accepted by both the Administration and many of its critics, raises difficult questions as to where to draw the line between congressional and Executive power over the conduct of warfare. The Administration's argument starts with the proposition that Congress could not statutorily require the President to shift the 101st Airborne division from Baghdad to Anbar province. Similarly, Congress could not have directed FDR to launch D-Day at Brittany rather than Normandy, or to initiate an invasion of France in 1943 instead of attacking Italy. The Administration and its critics appear to agree on this point. The Administration then argues that actions that are important to military success on the battlefield also fall within the sphere of exclusive presidential power. So, for example, what if commanders believe that a prisoner captured on the battlefield possesses information critical to the success of the battle? Proponents of broad Presidential power would argue that the issue of how, when, and where you interrogate him or her is just as much a tactical military decision as the decision about where troops should be placed and how campaigns should be conducted. So too, the Administration would argue that the power to make decisions about how and where to place spies to obtain information about enemy plans is a part of the President's power to conduct military campaigns. Taking this premise a step further, the Administration argues that Congress could not interfere with the President's wartime decisions to engage in electronic surveillance against the enemy by requiring him to obtain a warrant. Similarly, if Congress could not limit the D-Day invasion force to a certain number of soldiers, then Congress could not disapprove the President's surge strategy in Iraq. Once one accepts the Administration's starting proposition that the President has broad exclusive power to make tactical battlefield decisions, a proposition most commentators appear to accept, the possibilities for extension seem almost limitless. Yet, as this Article will demonstrate, that starting proposition is erroneous.
War powers are meant to be narrow – no support for broad executive authority.
Reid Skibell , JD Columbia Law School , Fall 2004, “Separation-of-powers and the Commander in Chief: Congress's Authority to Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations ,” George Mason Law Review , p.201
While the Framers intended that the Commander-in-Chief Clause would convey a power to the President independent of Congress, most of the evidence suggests they felt this power would be sharply limited. Indeed, given the system of checks and balances found throughout the Constitution, it would seem incongruous that in one of the most important areas of governance they would instill the President with authority as broad as that argued for by the Bush administration. The available historical evidence supports this contention. It demonstrates that the Framers intended the Commander-in-Chief Clause to convey nothing more than that the President would have independent authority in battlefield decisions. This is not to say that the detention of enemy combatants cannot be justified under the President's commander-in-chief power, on which this paper does not take a position. Rather, the point is that separation-of-power formalism is based on an originalist position regarding the division of constitutional authority that is simply not compatible with the current administration's view of the breadth of the commander-in-chief power.
AT: Obama Already Solved Executive Power
Obama won’t solve executive power – recent actions and history of Democratic presidents prove.
Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute, 10-14-2008, “New President Won't Tame Executive Power,” Orange County Register,
But there are good reasons to doubt that an Obama administration would meaningfully de-imperialize the presidency. From Truman and Johnson's undeclared wars to the warrantless wiretapping carried out by FDR, JFK, LBJ and Nixon, the Imperial Presidency has long been a bipartisan phenomenon. In fact, our most recent Democratic president, Bill Clinton went even further than his predecessors in his exercise of extraconstitutional war powers. Prior presidents had unilaterally launched wars in the face of congressional silence. But Clinton's war over Kosovo in 1999 made him the first president to launch a war in the face of several congressional votes denying him the authority to wage it. Recently, Barack Obama has found his own convenient rationales for endorsing broad presidential powers in the area of surveillance. When he signed on to the surveillance bill Congress passed this summer, Sen. Obama broke an explicit campaign promise to filibuster any legislation that would grant immunity to FISA-flouting telecom companies. By voting for the bill, Obama helped legalize large swaths of a dragnet surveillance program he'd long claimed to oppose. Perhaps some were comforted by Obama's "firm pledge that as president, I will carefully monitor the program." But our constitutional structure envisions stronger checks than the supposed benevolence of our leaders.
Obama won’t solve – political incentives for maintaining broad executive power.
Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute, 10-14-2008, “New President Won't Tame Executive Power,” Orange County Register,
What motivated Obama's flip-flop? Was it a desire to look "tough" on national security-or was it that, as he seems ever closer to winning the office, broad presidential powers seem increasingly appealing? Either way, it's clear that the post-9/11 political environment will provide enormous incentives for the next president to embrace Bush-like theories of executive power. Can we really expect a Democratic president, publicly suspected of being "soft on terror," to spend much political capital making himself less powerful? Not likely, say analysts on both sides of the political spectrum. Law professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, both left-leaning civil libertarians, predict that "the next Democratic president will likely retain significant aspects of what the Bush administration has done"; in fact, "future presidents may find that they enjoy the discretion and lack of accountability created by Bush's unilateral gambits." Jack Goldsmith, head of the Bush administration's OLC from 2003-04, argues that "if anything, the next Democratic president - having digested a few threat matrices ... will be even more anxious than the current president to thwart the threat."
Obama is continuing to boost executive power.
Gary, Wills, Professor of History Emeritus at Northwestern, 10-8-2009, “Entangled Giant,” New York Review of Books,
George W. Bush left the White House unpopular and disgraced. His successor promised change, and it was clear where change was needed. Illegal acts should cease—torture and indefinite detention, denial of habeas corpus and legal representation, unilateral canceling of treaties, defiance of Congress and the Constitution, nullification of laws by signing statements. Powers attributed to the president by the theory of the unitary executive should not be exercised. Judges who are willing to give the president any power he asks for should not be confirmed. But the momentum of accumulating powers in the executive is not easily reversed, checked, or even slowed. It was not created by the Bush administration. The whole history of America since World War II caused an inertial transfer of power toward the executive branch. The monopoly on use of nuclear weaponry, the cult of the commander in chief, the worldwide network of military bases to maintain nuclear alert and supremacy, the secret intelligence agencies, the entire national security state, the classification and clearance systems, the expansion of state secrets, the withholding of evidence and information, the permanent emergency that has melded World War II with the cold war and the cold war with the “war on terror”—all these make a vast and intricate structure that may not yield to effort at dismantling it. Sixty-eight straight years of war emergency powers (1941–2009) have made the abnormal normal, and constitutional diminishment the settled order. The truth of this was borne out in the early days of Barack Obama’s presidency. At his confirmation hearing to be head of the CIA, Leon Panetta said that “extraordinary rendition”—the practice of sending prisoners to foreign countries—was a tool he meant to retain. Obama’s nominee for solicitor general, Elena Kagan, told Congress that she agreed with John Yoo’s claim that a terrorist captured anywhere should be subject to “battlefield law.” On the first opportunity to abort trial proceedings by invoking “state secrets”—the policy based on the faulty Reynolds case—Obama’s attorney gen- eral, Eric Holder, did so. Obama refused to release photographs of “enhanced interrogation.” The CIA had earlier (illegally) destroyed ninety-two videotapes of such interrogations—and Obama refused to release documents describing the tapes.
Deference Bad – Conflict
Ending judicial deference key to prevent nuclear conflict.
Barry Kellman, Professor at DePaul University College of Law , December 1989, “Judicial Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But who is to Guard the Guards Themselves?” Duke Law Journal, p.1599-1600
Standing at the vanguard of "national security" law, these three decisions elevate the task of preparing for war to a level beyond legal accountability. They suggest that determinations of both the ends and the means of national security are inherently above the law and hence unreviewable regardless of the legal rights transgressed by these determinations. This conclusion signals a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility. The very underpinnings of constitutional governance are threatened by those who contend that the rule of law weakens the execution of military policy. Their argument -- that because our adversaries are not restricted by our Constitution, we should become more like our adversaries to secure ourselves -- cannot be sustained if our tradition of adherence to the rule of law is to be maintained. To the contrary, the judiciary must be willing to demand adherence to legal principles by assessing responsibility for weapons decisions. This Article posits that judicial abdication in this field is not compelled and certainly is not desirable. The legal system can provide a useful check against dangerous military action, more so than these three opinions would suggest. The judiciary must rigorously scrutinize military decisions if our 18th century dream of a nation founded in musket smoke is to remain recognizable in a millennium ushered in under the mushroom cloud of thermonuclear holocaust.
Our impact arguments contextualize to the aff – allowing the executive sole control over basing decisions risks nuclear conflict.
Jonathan A. Bush, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University Law School , October 1994, “The Binding of Gulliver: Congress and Courts in an Era of Presidential Warmaking,” Virginia Law Review, p.1742
In reality, the problem of exigent wars, nuclear or conventional, goes well beyond the Cuban Missile Crisis. As we came to learn only in the 1970s, the United States and presumably the Soviet Union made agreements throughout the Cold War with foreign friends, backed by the promise to use force if necessary. Some of these arrangements were concluded by Executive Agreement, open or secret; others were simply off the record. Some agreements allowed for American bases on the ally's territory, some even for positioning nuclear weapons there. In light of this, Ely may still be right in saying that the United States is party to no agreement that binds it, automatically and without constitutional deliberation, to go to war for an ally. But the multiplication of agreements and troops and pre-positioned nuclear weapons, almost all without initial congressional oversight, meant that the Executive alone, based on an exigency theory, had effectively committed the nation to probable war in the event these troops or bases or allies were attacked. A few critics warned of this problem, but most observers seemed focused on the tactical advantages of our having lined up new allies. Surprisingly, Ely's expansion of the "repelling sudden attacks" formula might well permit most of these wars, authorized in the first instance on the president's say-so alone.
History is on our side – unilateral executive authority not key to fight necessary wars – which means we control the question of unnecessary military escalation.
Jonathan A. Bush, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University Law School , October 1994, “The Binding of Gulliver: Congress and Courts in an Era of Presidential Warmaking,” Virginia Law Review, p.1738
In fact, with the exception of Pearl Harbor, few of our wars arise out of unexpected or exigent circumstances. Almost always, the wars represent the ratcheting up of slow, long-simmering tensions, during which the Executive had ample time to consult the Legislature. The same can be said of the various crises currently on the horizon: we have had months, even years, in which Congress could have considered the options in Bosnia and Haiti. Moreover, unlike in the early years of the Republic, Congress is almost always in session or readily available to the President. Doubtless someone in the federal bureaucracy has even made contingency plans for convening Congress after a nuclear attack on Washington. In any event, Congress is capable of swift action in the event of true exigency, as the speedy response to Pearl Harbor illustrates. The failure to consult Congress typically stems not from time pressure, but from an unwillingness to explain the planned intervention properly to the American people or from an inability to consider thoroughly the political dimensions of the intervention in the first place. Neither failure should serve as the basis for war not authorized by Congress. If neither the Congress nor the people yet support a necessary war, presidential leadership, not evasion, is required; if the intended war is foolish, congressional scrutiny is all the more important.
Deference Bad – Environment
Judicial deference allows military destruction of the environment.
John S. Applegate, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington, 1999, “Book Review: National Security and Environmental Protection: The Half-Full Glass,” Ecology Law Quarterly, pp.368-369
The defense establishment is not exempted from any of the major environmental laws (in fact, when Congress directly addresses the question, it uniformly includes defense activities), but federal courts have allowed it to behave as though it were exempt. This is the aspect of the intersection of the environment and national security that Dycus finds most troubling. The excessive deference given by the federal judiciary to claims of defense necessity is a recurrent theme in National Defense and the Environment, and it drives Dycus' central proposal for reform. He argues that the courts should require consistently defense agencies to follow existing environmental rules and procedures to the same extent as private entities. Procedural approaches to environmental regulation, like NEPA, will fail unless the actions in question receive careful judicial scrutiny and unless there is a credible threat that the activity will be halted if the procedures are not followed. Moreover, uncritical deference undermines the thorough and public examination of the competing claims that form the substantive content of a procedural approach like NEPA.
The military is the vital internal link to environmental destruction.
John S. Applegate, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington, 1999, “Book Review: National Security and Environmental Protection: The Half-Full Glass,” Ecology Law Quarterly, pp.354-355
National Defense and the Environment addresses a problem of critical importance to the nation. Environmental impacts of defense activities are as widespread as the defense establishment itself, which is to say that they reach every corner of the United States. DOD and DOE operate on a grandiose scale, employing about 1.5 million men and women in uniform, 1.7 million more in the reserves, and many more civilians. DOE alone employs over 100,000 civilians. The resulting air emissions, water discharges, and production of solid industrial and household waste are typical of analogous civilian activities, but the military produces them in massive quantities. In addition, defense activities create highly unconventional environmental hazards. Unexploded and surplus ordnance, millions of gallons of liquid waste that is both extremely corrosive and highly radioactive, chemical weapons excess nuclear warheads and weapons-grade plutonium and defoliant production residues are just some of the more exotic materials that the defense agencies have produced and must manage.
That causes extinction.
James Gustave Speth, dean of the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 10-21-2008, “Environmental failure: a case for a new green politics,” The, Guardian,
The United States, of course, is deeply complicit in these global trends, including our responsibility for about 30 percent of the carbon dioxide added thus far to the atmosphere. But even within the United States itself, four decades of environmental effort have not stemmed the tide of environmental decline. The country is losing 6,000 acres of open space every day, and 100,000 acres of wetlands every year. About a third of U.S. plant and animal species are threatened with extinction. Half of U.S. lakes and a third of its rivers still fail to meet the standards that by law should have been met by 1983. And we have done little to curb our wasteful energy habits or our huge population growth. Here is one measure of the problem: All we have to do to destroy the planet's climate and biota and leave a ruined world to our children and grandchildren is to keep doing exactly what we are doing today, with no growth in human population or the world economy. Just continue to generate greenhouse gases at current rates, just continue to impoverish ecosystems and release toxic chemicals at current rates, and the world in the latter part of this century won't be fit to live in. But human activities are not holding at current levels – they are accelerating, dramatically. The size of the world economy has more than quadrupled since 1960 and is projected to quadruple again by mid-century. It took all of human history to grow the $7 trillion world economy of 1950. We now grow by that amount in a decade. The escalating processes of climate disruption, biotic impoverishment, and toxification, which continue despite decades of warnings and earnest effort, constitute a severe indictment of the system of political economy in which we live and work. The pillars of today's capitalism, as they are now constituted, work together to produce an economic and political reality that is highly destructive environmentally. Powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow by generating profit (including profit from avoiding the environmental costs their companies create, amassing deep subsidies and benefits from government, and continued deployment of technologies originally designed with little or no regard for the environment); markets that systematically fail to recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government; government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth imperative; rampant consumerism spurred by sophisticated advertising and marketing; economic activity now so large in scale that its impacts alter the fundamental biophysical operations of the planet — all combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is undermining the ability of the earth to sustain life.
AT: Deference Key to Hegemony
Boosting the role of the court is key to hegemony – prefer our specific, predictive evidence.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, pp.90-91
Moreover, the post-Cold War world has provoked a crisis in realism. The United States is a global hegemon. It is unrivaled in its ability to deploy force throughout the globe, and it provides "public goods" for the world - such as the protection of sea lanes - in exchange for broad acceptance of U.S. leadership. Although realism predicts counter-balancing, no great power or coalition has yet emerged to challenge America's predominance. And despite a new round of predictions about American decline, the U.S. is still projected to have by far the largest economy and the largest military for decades. Political scientists have struggled to define this American-led system, but courts and scholars of constitutional law have largely ignored it. n12 Instead, most debates about special deference have simply accepted outmoded classic realist assumptions that became conventional wisdom in the 1930s and 40s. This Article offers a new model for assessing appropriate judicial deference in foreign affairs that takes account of American-led order. By maintaining consistent interpretation of U.S. and international law over time and providing virtual representation for other nations and non-citizens, U.S. courts bestow legitimacy on the acts of the political branches, provide public goods for the world, and increase America's soft power - all of which assist in maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the American-led hegemonic order.
We control uniqueness for hegemony – failure to get all branches to approve of military deployments destroys military morale.
Timothy D. A. O'Hara, JD Candidate, Winter 1998, “Without Justification: Misplaced Reliance on United Nations Security Council Resolutions for Presidential War Making,” John Marshall Law Review, p.637
However, the potential that such concerns are more common place than publicized should not be viewed as strictly theoretical. This is supported by statements of the district judge in the New case suggesting that allowing New a stay would "create a good deal of confusion about the lawfulness of such deployments." If this potential for confusion is indicative of soldiers' attitudes concerning such military deployments, then the President, Congress, and the Courts should consider this when dealing with issues of military deployments. Vietnam has tragically shown what can happen when soldiers and a nation lose faith in the purposes and authority for a military action. While today's army is all volunteer, there is no reason to think that a similar lack of morale could not again develop if military deployments continually fail to enjoy support from all branches of the government. It is for this reason, perhaps even more than the constitutional arguments, that a process must be developed that works with the modern need for military force while also protecting and preserving the imperative checks and balances inherent in the Constitution.
Reducing deference key to hegemony – legitimacy is the vital internal link.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, p.148
The hegemonic model generally values courts' institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model. The courts' strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy. This means that courts' treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different functional considerations - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - against one another is made less intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.
AT: Deference Key to Foreign Policy – Expertise/ Timing
Expertise arguments are wrong – courts capable of handling issues related to foreign affairs.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, pp.129-130
The argument regarding courts' limited access to information and lack of expertise seem persuasive at first, but it loses its force upon deeper inspection. For instance, expertise is also a rationale for Chevron deference in the domestic context. Generalist judges handle cases involving highly complex and obscure non-foreign affairs issues while giving appropriate deference to interpretations of agencies charged with administering statutory schemes. What makes foreign affairs issues so different that they justify even greater deference? Perhaps foreign affairs issues are just an order of magnitude more complex than even the most complex domestic issues. However, this line of thinking very quickly leads to boundary problems. Economic globalization, rapid global information flow, and increased transborder movement have "radically increased the number of cases that directly implicate foreign relations" and have made foreign parties and conduct, as well as international law questions, increasingly common in U.S. litigation. If courts were to cabin off all matters touching on foreign relations as beyond their expertise, it would result in an ever-increasing abdication of their role.
There’s no link to their speed arguments – the counterplan sets a precedent of evaluating current policies – which won’t hamper crisis management.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, p.150
But there are limits. Although speed matters a great deal during crises, its importance diminishes over time and other institutional competences assume greater importance. When decisions made in response to emergencies are cemented into policy over the course of years, the courts' institutional capabilities - information-forcing and stabilizing characteristics - serve an important role in evaluating those policies. Once a sufficient amount of time has passed, the amount of deference given to executive branch determinations should be reduced so that it matches domestic deference standards.
There’s no impact to their information arguments – better information doesn’t necessarily lead to better policy.
David Gray Adler, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, December 2000, "Virtues of the War Clause." Presidential Studies Quarterly, p.781
Mervin's flat declaration that, when it comes to foreign policy, the president is "infinitely better informed" than Congress, inspires no controversy or debate. But his conclusion that when the president draws on his superior resources and pronounces a threat to the United States' vital interests somewhere on the other side of the world, that he is entitled to deference from Congress so that he may meet his responsibilities as foreign policy leader and guardian of the nation's security, tugs on a string of non sequiturs. First, presidential possession of information does not imply an entitlement to act on it. The textual allocation of foreign affairs powers and the expectation that Congress is the principal decision maker implies a need for, and thus a right to, all relevant information and, as a consequence, a correlative presidential duty to share information with Congress, a duty embodied in the original understanding of the State of the Union Address and in early statutes. As stated by Justice Joseph Story (1905, 2:1561), "There is great wisdom, therefore ... in requiring the President to lay before Congress all facts and information which may assist their deliberations." Second, whether a nation's actions threaten our vital interests is less a matter of brute fact and more a matter of values, perception, and judgment; in short, such a presidential pronouncement is question begging. It is clear that executive branch invocations of "vital interests," like its invocations of "national security," which are claimed to be perceived and understood only by executives, are often meant to silence opposition and to persuade dissidents to close ranks, but Congress need not acquiesce in such pronouncements, for it assumes the very ground that must be proven. Third, if a president declares the existence of a threat to U.S. security interests on the other side of the globe, as posited by Mervin, there is hardly a need for immediate military action, which affords the president an opportunity to make his case to Congress. Finally, as we have seen, the executive enjoys no constitutional designation as foreign policy leader or national security guardian and, even if it did, any reaction to a given event--for example, seizure of a U.S. embassy--would not be automatically dictated by the facts but, rather, would require interpretation, consideration, and analysis of the information at hand in light of a host of values, including an assessment of the desirability, risk, and cost of a military response. These are determinations that are grounded in information but are leavened with value considerations and, as such, better reached through collective decision making.
AT: Deference Key to Foreign Policy – Pres Leadership Not Key
Courts solve all their leadership arguments – rulings serve as a key form of soft power.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, p.157
The enemy combatant litigation also underscores the extent to which the classic realist assumptions about courts' legitimacy in foreign affairs have been turned on their head. In an anarchic world, legitimacy derives largely from brute force. The courts have no armies at their disposal and look weak when they issue decisions that cannot be enforced. But in a hegemonic system, where governance depends on voluntary acquiescence, the courts have a greater role to play. Rather than hobbling the exercise of foreign policy, the courts are a key form of "soft power." As Justice Kennedy's majority opinion observed in Boumediene, courts can bestow external legitimacy on the acts of the political branches. Acts having a basis in law are almost universally regarded as more legitimate than merely political acts. Most foreign policy experts believe that the Bush Administration's detention scheme "hurt America's image and standing in the world." The restoration of habeas corpus in Boumediene may help begin to counteract this loss of prestige.
One-voice arguments are wrong – inter-branch conflict is not unique.
Robert Knowles, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” Arizona State Law Journal, p.131
But as has been frequently observed, the United States has never strictly spoken "with one voice" in foreign affairs. The Constitution's text allocates foreign affairs powers to both the Congress and the President. In practice, Congress has from time to time disagreed with the President, even regarding highly sensitive national security matters. And the courts have, from the very beginning, rejected executive branch interpretations of treaties. Although the separation of powers has been criticized as interfering with the ability of the United States to form a unified foreign policy, this is the government that the Constitution created. The one-voice argument simply does not hold up to scrutiny, at least in its strong form. But there are other rationales for a weaker form - embarrassment and accountability.
They have it backwards – placing all leadership responsibilities on the president causes foreign policy mistakes – history of the twentieth century proves.
David Gray Adler, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, December 2000, "Virtues of the War Clause." Presidential Studies Quarterly, p.780
The literature of executive supremacy often ignores the dimensions of executive flaws, foibles, and frailties. The electoral process is not infallible; an elected president may lack the wisdom, temperament, and judgment, not to mention perception, expertise, and emotional intelligence, to produce success in foreign affairs. Those qualities, which to be sure are attributes of the occupant and not the office, cannot be conferred by election. Moreover, power and responsibility entail consequences. The duties and demands of the office are sure to produce stress, tension, and fatigue, which may lead to exhaustion, misperception, and impaired judgment. Theodore Sorenson (1963) observed, "I saw first-hand, during the long days and nights of the Cuban Missile Crisis, how brutally physical and mental fatigue can numb the good sense as well as the senses of normally articulate [sic] men" (p. 78). Stress and strain may lead to an erosion of mental and physical health, which may distort perception and judgment. The tragic, final chapter of Woodrow Wilson's career is illustrative: isolation, obstinacy, mental deterioration, and distorted judgment impaired the pursuit of some of his objectives, including foreign policy goals. President Dwight Eisenhower suffered a stroke and a heart attack while in office. He worried about his ability to meet the duties of the office and arranged to be replaced by the vice president in the case of complete disability. Ronald Reagan's gradual mental deterioration may have preceded the Iran-Contra affair. Whether or not Richard Nixon's judgment and mental state were affected by prescription drugs allegedly taken in response to depression, the fact that concerns about his mental state led Secretary of Defense James IL Schlesinger to take the extraordinary step of reminding all military units to ignore orders from "the White House" unless they were cleared by him or the Secretary of State illustrates the grave potential of unilateral presidential power in foreign affairs.
Courts Don’t Link to Politics
Courts don’t link to politics – they’re sheltered from political fall-out.
Artemus Ward, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, January 2009, “A Review of “Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History,” Congress and the Presidency, p.120
After the old order has collapsed, the once-united, new-regime coalition begins to fracture as original commitments are extended to new issues. In chapter 3 Whittington combines Skowronek’s articulation and disjunctive categories into the overarching “affiliated” presidencies as both seek to elaborate the regime begun under reconstructive leaders. By this point in the ascendant regime, Courts are staffed by justices from the dominant ruling coalition via the appointment process—and Whittington spends time on appointment politics here and more fully in chapter 4. Perhaps counter-intuitively, affiliated political actors—including presidents—encourage Courts to exercise vetoes and operate in issue areas of relatively low political salience. Of course, this “activism” is never used against the affiliated president per se. Instead, affiliated Courts correct for the overreaching of those who operate outside the preferred constitutional vision, which are often state and local governments who need to be brought into line with nationally dominant constitutional commitments. Whittington explains why it is easier for affiliated judges, rather than affiliated presidents, to rein in outliers and conduct constitutional maintenance. The latter are saddled with controlling opposition political figures, satisfying short-term political demands, and navigating intraregime gridlock and political thickets. Furthermore, because of their electoral accountability, politicians engage in position-taking, credit-claiming, and blame-avoidance behavior. By contrast, their judicial counterparts are relatively sheltered from political pressures and have more straightforward decisional processes. Activist Courts can take the blame for advancing and legitimizing constitutional commitments that might have electoral costs. In short, a division of labor exists between politicians and judges affiliated with the dominant regime.
Politicians won’t take the blame for Court decisions – absolves them of the need to make political decisions.
Howard Gillman, Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Southern California, 2003, “Judicial Independence Through the Lens of Bush v. Gore: Four Lessons from Political Science,” Ohio State Law Journal,
As a general rule, the insulation or independence of courts is not best explained in terms of these political advantages. After all, most of what courts do (especially lower courts) is of little or no interest to policy-makers (beyond a general interest in relatively efficient case processing), which means that deference to courts is normally a byproduct of the overall political banality of the judiciary’s work, rather than its sensitivity or salience. However, Mark Graber’s path-breaking discussion of legislative deference to the Supreme Court has made it clear that under certain circumstances—such as the emergence of political disputes that threaten to disrupt established partisan coalitions—the Supreme Court’s political insulation is self-consciously exploited by national party leaders. To illustrate, Graber develops the following case studies: (1) the interest of beleaguered party leaders in the late 1850s to have the justices take the lead in addressing slavery politics; (2) the assumption among Congressional leaders in 1890 that the Supreme Court would make the final determination on key aspects of antitrust policy; and (3) the perceived advantages to national elites in the early 1970s for the justices to declare unconstitutional certain kinds of abortion statutes. Some national political leaders in the 1950s may have believed that federal courts were in a better position to address certain civil rights controversies than other institutions of the national government. Additionally, conservatives who might have felt some political pressure to vote for laws such as the Gun-Free School Zone Act or the Violence Against Women Act may be silently grateful that the Rehnquist Court is attempting to reduce Congress’s authority to pass laws for which they have little enthusiasm. Whether this can be demonstrated in these cases, the overarching point is that it would not be unusual for elected officials to support courts when they insulate elected officials from having to make controversial decisions.
Courts Don’t Link to Politics Cont’d
President won’t take the blame for court rulings.
Girardeau A. Spann, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, Winter-Spring 2000, “Writing Off Race,” Law and Contemporary Problems, p.469
What President Clinton has failed to do is to assert the full scope of his constitutional authority to formulate race relations policy for the nation that elected him to be its political leader. In doing so, he has aligned himself with past Presidents who were passive rather than active in the formulation of constitutional policy. It is often convenient for a President to deflect political controversy to the Supreme Court. A President can appease political allies with rhetoric that endorses more than the Court will allow, and can appease political opponents by acquiescing in Court-ordered results that fall short of presidential rhetoric. That is rational behavior for a politician—particularly in the contemporary environment of designer politics, where rhetorical labels seem to matter at least as much as substantive outcomes. It is rational, but it may also be unconstitutional.
***Recruitment CP***
Child Care CP 1NC
The Department of Defense should substantially increase family based child care assistance for members of the United States Military in need.
Military child-care is insufficient now
Fleet Reserve Association, 6-2009, Statement of The Fleet Reserve Association On Support for Military Family Programs Policies and Initiatives Presented to: Personnel Subcommittee United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, pg. np
The Department of Defense (DoD) goal is to achieve 80 percent of the potential child care need which is sufficient capacity to place children from waiting lists within one to three months after care is requested. That goal has not been met. The Marines Corps has only achieved 64 percent and the Navy has achieved 72 percent with a corresponding three to six months placement. However, placement wait times in fleet concentration areas are usually longer. A recent FRA online military child care survey indicates that 39 percent of respondents found access to a military child care center to be very difficult and 27 percent found access to be “somewhat difficult.” Additionally the survey found that 26 percent of respondents were either “very or somewhat dissatisfied with care.” The survey was based on responses from 107 military families with children. The availability of child care remains a top issue among dual-income families and single parents. FRA welcomes the $276 million in the FY 2009 war supplemental to provide 25 more child care centers for more than 5,000 kids. In total Congress has provided funding to construct or expand over 90 child development centers since 2008, but more needs to be done.
Military child care is key to both recruitment and retention – solves the internal link
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
An important reason for this choice may be found in the widespread understanding that child care availability and quality can affect key DoD goals of readiness, retention, and possibly recruitment. Some military members with young children need or want child care for their children. For some of these families, access to child care may affect the ability of the military member to show up for duty. This need may be particularly true for dual-military and single-parent families, which lack a parent who can be counted on to provide backup care. Moreover, military families may need care at times when civilian care is difficult to find or simply not available. Military members are often required to report for duty on nights and weekends. They may be called to duty on short notice; they may have irregular shifts or shifts that do not correspond with the typical workday. Concerns about the quality of child care may affect a parent’s ability to concentrate on their job. If quality is assured, the parent can more comfortably focus on the work at hand. Deployments pose an additional set of issues for military families with young children. Spouses who work outside the home may need additional child care support to manage life as a working parent while the military member is deployed. Spouses who do not work outside the home may need access to child care at various times of the day in order to get household chores done or simply to have some respite. The needs of families affected by deployment may be quite different from the needs of other military families. Ultimately, child care can become an important retention issue—particularly at a time of active deployment. If families become frustrated with military life because of a lack of child care options that meet their needs, they may decide to leave the military entirely. Child care support may also factor into the decision of recruits—particularly older recruits who already have families or may be thinking about having families. The above discussion suggests reasons why DoD, as an employer, might need or want to provide additional support to members with young dependents in the interests of recruitment, readiness, and retention. Furthermore, it suggests reasons why DoD might want to provide reliable high-quality child care that is flexible enough to meet the demands of military life rather than simply giving families additional cash to spend as they wish. Indeed, DoD does already provide higher pay to military members with dependents, as discussed above. By offer- ing an additional benefit that directs families with young children to spend a certain amount of money on a limited set of child care providers who meet military quality standards, DoD may be able to ensure that the child care that families use is reliable and flexible (hence contrib- uting to readiness), that the care is of high quality (hence contributing to readiness, retention, and possibly recruitment), and that spouses of deployed military members actually do get the additional support they need during times of deployment (hence contributing to retention).
Child Care Insufficient Now
Military child care is lacking now
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
Early Childhood Education for All: A Wise Investment brings together research and state experience on the critical importance of early care and education to children—and also to taxpayers and those concerned with economic development. It sets the stage for new ways we can meet the need for high quality early childhood education for all children. New thinking is needed more than ever. When we passed welfare reform in 1996, Congress also promised to provide increased funding for services such as child care and transportation to assist families’ ability to work and achieve self-sufficiency. However, although some improvement followed, public investments in early child education and child care have stalled again. Stagnant federal funding and state cutbacks have left working families with less access as well as reduced levels of assistance. Without an adequate revenue stream, states have lowered eligibility limits for child care assistance; required parents to pay more toward the cost of education and care; and reduced emphasis on quality initiatives. Put simply, our country does not have a long-term strategy for providing early childhood education and quality and affordable child care to working parents. We have failed to make it a priority. But child care and early childhood education must be a priority. As the Perry study proved, exploring the lives of at-risk African-American children over a 40-year period, child care can be the single greatest difference between success or failure in American society. And as we learned during a Congressional briefing with Legal Momentum on their report this past spring, quality, affordable child care and early education can bring taxpayers undeniable savings.
Recruitment is decreasing now
Peter Singer, Senior fellow at the Brookings institute and the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative, 2007, “Bent but Not Broken: The Military Challenge for the Next Commander-in-Chief,” brookings.edu/papers/2007/~/media/Files/Projects/Opportunity08/PB_MilitaryReadiness_PSinger.pdf
Overstretched personnel and threats to force quality will not go away by themselves. The number of ground forces proposed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review support only 18 brigades for deployment. Under current transformation plans, these units also would have about 3,500 fewer personnel per unit. But, at the height of U.S. deployments, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alone involved 20 brigades, now universally agreed as far too few. After congressional pressures grew, the Bush Administration permitted the Army to maintain 30,000 extra troops, a measure that did not ease shortfalls.
Military force structure is on the brink
Peter Singer, Senior fellow at the Brookings institute and the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative, 2007, “Bent but Not Broken: The Military Challenge for the Next Commander-in-Chief,” brookings.edu/papers/2007/~/media/Files/Projects/Opportunity08/PB_MilitaryReadiness_PSinger.pdf
A spent and broken force after Vietnam, the U.S. military has been rebuilt into the most professional, best-trained, and best-equipped military in history. For all the challenges presented in Afghanistan and Iraq, its combat capabilities are unmatched. Indeed, the greatest threats we face no longer come from peer competitors, but from foes that seek out weakness on other planes of battle. This excellence is under siege. Our military has been at war for the last six years, but—other than at our airports—our nation has not. There has been no call to service and no mobilization on a national scale. Instead, our leaders have deferred the tough challenges, which are beginning to create serious crunches on both military personnel and equipment that no serious candidate for President can ignore. The U.S. military’s ability to field sufficient, high-quality, well-equipped forces is at a “tipping point.” It is certainly far from broken, but warning symptoms are clearly mounting.
Private Care Fails
Private care is insufficient to solve military needs
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
The lack of visibility of the CDC subsidy poses a serious barrier to DoD’s benefiting from it in terms of recruitment and retention. The services are not unaware of this problem: the U.S. Army, for example, has produced a brochure that clearly states that “the Army covers much of the cost (of CDC care).” Given the size of the subsidy provided, lack of visibility is an issue worthy of serious consideration and possible adjustment. In focus groups conducted as part of our study on child care demand (see Moini, Zellman, and Gates, 2006), many participants expressed the belief that DoD was “making a profit” from CDC care. In other words, parents believe that they pay more for child care than it costs DoD to provide it. On a related point, several CDC users expressed the opinion that if they left the military, it would be easy for them to obtain similar quality child care for the same (or even a lower) price. In fact, it is quite dif- ficult to obtain high-quality child care in civilian centers, and when such care is available, it is much more expensive than the fees paid by military parents for CDC care.
Plan leads to recruitment – private employer child care doesn’t solve
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
Private employers provide child care benefits with an eye to the bottom line: They offer these benefits to improve recruitment, reduce absenteeism, and decrease turnover. Some employ- ers operate child care centers or subsidize care in the community; many provide resource and referral services. In recent years, employers have begun to offer benefits of a different kind— moving away from specified services and goods that the employer pays for, such as child care centers, to changes in the work environment that employees value highly, such as flextime and the ability to work from home. However, these flexible benefits do not necessarily obviate the need for child care; further, they fail to address two chronic problems in locating and using care: lack of availability and mediocre quality.
Only DoD child care is effective – private sector can’t fill-in
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
There are several reasons why DoD might decide to provide child care directly, rather than provide an allowance or a voucher that could be used to purchase child care services. One reason would be that DoD can provide child care more efficiently than other provid- ers. Another argument is that because of shift work and irregular schedules, military families have unique child care needs that cannot be easily met by private-sector providers. A related argument is that there are not enough high-quality providers in the private sector to serve all military families. In assessing arguments about a lack of private-sector care with particular characteristics, it is necessary to consider not only what the market for child care currently looks like, but also what it could look like if DoD were to provide child care support through other means.
Family Care Centers Are Key
DoD family care centers are high quality, yet aren’t fully supported
Charles Shumer, Senator, and Carolyn Maloney, Vice Chair, 2007, “Helping Military Moms balance Family and Longer Deployments,” The Joint Economic Committee,
Child care access and costs are an additional concern during deployment. Since the U.S. military’s presence in Iraq, hundreds of thousands of children have seen one or both parents leave for deployment. According to the Department of Defense, in September 2006, approximately 230,000 children had a parent in Iraq, Afghanistan or the Horn of Africa. Although the military has created an impressive infrastructure for high quality child care, deployment and frequent moves raise child care concerns. In 1992, the military standardized child care provision during deployment requiring single parents and dual-military couples with children to develop short and long term plans concerning the care of their dependents in the event of deployment. For single parent families, securing long- term care can be a challenge though on-base referral services help families come up with a plan. In recent years, the military has taken significant steps to improve military families’ access to quality child care services. The military has dramatically increased the number of available child care centers and spots available for children. Furthermore all center-based military child care centers have received some form of accreditation, a sharp contrast to the civilian sector where approximately 0.8% of family child care homes and 9.5% of day care centers are accredited. Similarly, few states have mandatory accreditation for child care centers and training for child care workers comparable to military standards. The military has also established sliding-scale fees to help families afford this essential service.
Family care centers can meet a significant need that improves readiness and retention
Charles Shumer, Senator, and Carolyn Maloney, Vice Chair, 2007, “Helping Military Moms balance Family and Longer Deployments,” The Joint Economic Committee,
Despite the substantial progress in expanding child care access and lowering cost, a substantial unmet need still exists. The Department of Defense has reported that even with new centers being constructed, due to the special issue of deployment, the military is approximately 35,000 spots short of expected need, and some military family advocates think this is a substantial underestimation. At the same time, the number of new born babies and younger children in the military is expected to increase. Unmet child care needs impacts military readiness. In a 2006 survey by the RAND Corporation, 9 percent of military families reported having unmet child care needs, while these families were more likely to have children between the ages of zero and five. These same families reported they were “much more likely” to leave the military. In the same survey, researchers found that child care issues affect women at a higher rate than men. Thirty-seven percent of military mothers reported missing work due to a child care issue, compared to 7 percent of men.
Family child care centers are high-quality and a necessary alternative to standard care
United States Air Force, 2009, “Family Child Care,”
Family Child Care (FCC) programs consist of in-home care provided by licensed providers. Trained FCC providers are available for daily, night, weekend, and unusual hours of care for children 2 weeks to 12 years of age. Providers are required to complete an extensive training program and are constantly monitored for quality to maintain their license. Family Child Care is a realistic alternative to a center-based care program. FCCs provide home-like, individualized care. Family Child Care programs benefit military families by providing care for children whose parents have a variety of work schedules, including evenings and weekends. Family Child Care provides a quality alternative to center-based programs and expands the availability of childcare at Yokota. FCC homes are an integral part of the Family Member Programs. Each home is monitored on a monthly basis by the Family Child Care Coordinator; these visits are unannounced.
CP is a Pre-Requisite to Retention
Child care is inaccessible now
Gail Zellman et al., PhD, is an analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, 2009, “Meeting Needs through Military Child Care,” Armed Forces and Society, pg. np
The Department of Defense (DoD) supports the largest employer-sponsored sys- tem of high-quality child care in the country. Through accredited child develop- ment centers (CDCs), family child care (FCC) homes, youth centers, and other after-school programs, the DoD provides approximately 176,000 spaces for military children aged zero to twelve, according to the Office of Family Policy.1 Yet despite the system’s vast size, access to military child care is far from universal. Many families remain on waiting lists or seek alternatives off-base. The DoD recognizes that high-quality child care is both a readiness and retention issue. Lack of child care creates conflicts between parental and mission responsibilities. If parents encounter such problems regularly, they may decide to separate from the military.
Retention is impossible without placating military spouses – child care is key
Gail Zellman et al., PhD, is an analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, 2009, “Meeting Needs through Military Child Care,” Armed Forces and Society, pg. np
Child care may have downstream effects on both readiness and retention. One of RAND’s early studies of military child care suggested that parents and providers, as well as military commanders, see child care “as a means of enhancing readiness by decreasing the conflict between parental responsibilities and mission requirements.”11 Aspects of readiness such as service members’ organizational commitment have also been linked to perceived policy support for families in Army surveys.12 Child care may also influence readiness and retention through their effects on spouses. The DoD has long recognized that it recruits individuals but retains families. Army survey data suggest that an individual’s intent to stay in the service is related to a “perceived family-friendly work environment”;13 a study of Navy mothers found much the same sentiment.14 Moreover, if a military member’s spouse is not happy with the military lifestyle, then that member may be more likely to leave the mili- tary.15 Recent RAND research suggests that military families with employed civilian spouses tend to be more satisfied with military life. A 2004 RAND study found that about three-quarters of military spouses who are out of the workforce report child care issues as the primary reason for not working.
The counterplan is the only way to effectively retain a sizable portion of the military
Gail Zellman et al., PhD, is an analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, 2009, “Meeting Needs through Military Child Care,” Armed Forces and Society, pg. np
While some of these spouses were out of the labor force by choice, a “sizable number” reported barriers to workforce participation that included child care issues, an aspect of the military lifestyle that made it more difficult to balance work and family as a military spouse.16 Other research suggests that these findings are part of a more general association between spouses’ ability to meet their goals (e.g., stay at home with children or pursue a career) and their level of support for remaining in the Army.17 In interviews, a substantial number of spouses of military members cited child care problems as a reason for not seeking work outside the home. While DoD has managed to create a widely admired system of high-quality care, it is less clear that the system is effectively meeting the needs of military families and DoD and deploying resources in the most effective manner. Our study addresses these issues.
22 percent of the military is at risk
Gail Zellman et al., PhD, is an analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, 2009, “Meeting Needs through Military Child Care,” Armed Forces and Society, pg. np
Families who cannot access their preferred child care arrangement might ulti- mately choose to separate if they believe that their preferred option would be acces- sible outside the military. While relatively few families report unmet child care need, we found that many more parents report unmet preference. Overall, 22 percent of survey respondents indicated that they would prefer another child care arrangement over their current one. Parents of preschool-aged children are more likely than par- ents of school-aged children to report unmet preference.
Child Care Key to Hegemony – Readiness/Retention
High quality child-care is key to readiness
Pre-K Now, Military activist organization, 2009, “Pre-K for Military Families,”
Long and recurring deployments for parents and frequent relocations for entire families are facts of military life. The potential consequences of these disruptions can be reduced, however, in part by giving military families access to high-quality, voluntary pre-kindergarten programs. How Pre-K Can Help Military Families The young children of our nation's men and women in uniform face many unavoidable anxieties. Military families move three times more frequently than their civilian counterparts. With each move comes changes in access to the network of family members, friends, and early care and education providers that children rely upon. Children's stress further increases when duty calls one or both parents away from home during a deployment. A parent's absence is more than an emotional hardship on a child; it means a substantial loss of time with a child's first and most important teacher. High-quality pre-k can help military families address these challenges, providing children with a sense of stability and continuity as well as the social, emotional, and academic skills needed to cope with stress and succeed in school. Military parents also benefit from access to high-quality pre-k. Service members often cite the welfare of their children as their chief concern during deployments. Studies have shown that military parents are more focused on their critical and sometimes dangerous work when they know that their children are receiving quality care and education back home. General David Grange (Ret) puts it this way: "If the soldier knows their family is taken care of, they can do their mission."
Effective child care promotes retention and readiness
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
Our evidence indicates that child care is a readiness and retention issue for many service
personnel. Military members report that child care issues prevent them from reporting to duty
and cause them to be late for or absent from work. Some military members also indicate that
child care issues may lead them to leave the military.
This is true for all personnel with children
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
Our evidence indicates that child care is a readiness and retention issue for many service
personnel. Military members report that child care issues prevent them from reporting to duty
and cause them to be late for or absent from work. Some military members also indicate that
child care issues may lead them to leave the military.
Child Care Key to Hegemony – Productivity
Military compensation is key – creates loyalty to the military that deters early retirement and increases readiness
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
The Military Compensation System With the transition from the draft to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s, compensation became an important tool through which DoD manages recruitment, readiness, and retention (Rostker, 2006; CBO, 2007). In an all-volunteer force, individuals must be convinced to join and remain in the military and to separate when it is in the best interests of the organization; the compensation system is a key lever to influence those decisions (Hogan, 2004). The impact of compensation on the decisions of military personnel is moderated by a number of factors outside the military, particularly the strength of the U.S. economy, employment opportunities in the private sector, and the changing demographics of new recruits. In recognition of these factors, in the early 1980s, DoD began to adjust the levels of military compensation to reduce the pay gap between military and civilian compensation (CBO, 2007). For example, in the late 1990s, when a booming economy and post–Cold War downsizing policies contributed to large drops in military recruitment and missed recruitment targets, the military increased cash compensation levels and expanded retirement benefits (Williams, 2004; CBO, 2007).
Empirically, compensation is necessary to boost recruitment and retention
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
These changes have been credited for at least part of the increased recruiting levels between 1998 and 2003 (Williams, 2004). Studies have also found that compensation plays a role in military members’ decisions to stay in the military, rather than retire or separate early (GAO, 2000). From the inception of the all-volunteer force, the military compensation system has been subject to assessment and evaluation, most notably through the Quadrennial Reviews of Mili- tary Compensation. The purpose of these reviews is to ensure that DoD is making the most effective use of its compensation tools (basic pay, benefits, bonuses, and recruiting incentives) in the most cost-effective way to meet its recruiting, retention, and readiness goals.
Child care compensation promotes worker productivity which sustains hegemony
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
Readiness and Productivity The 2004 RAND child care survey by Moini, Zellman, and Gates (2006) asked military fami- lies whether child care issues had prevented a parent from reporting for military duty either fol- lowing the birth of a child or after the most recent relocation. Such problems were an issue for over one-third (36 percent) of dual-military families and over 10 percent of single parents, but only for fewer than 1 percent of families with a civilian spouse. The survey also asked whether child care issues forced a parent to miss work or be late to work in the past month. Over half (51 percent) of military mothers and 22 percent of military fathers reported being late to work in the last month because of child care issues. Similarly, over two-thirds (37 percent) of mili- tary mothers and 7 percent of military fathers reported having to miss work because of child care issues. Clearly, female military parents are carrying a greater child care burden and cover- ing for child care inadequacies more often than their male counterparts. This situation is mir- rored in the experiences of private-sector employees as well. These survey results suggest that child care issues have implications for the productivity of military members and that this is true even for families that are using DoD-sponsored child care options.
Child Care Key to the Economy
Military child-care is modeled
Samantha Quigley, Staff, 2009, “Official Calls Military Child Care ‘Model for Nation’,”
The Military Child Care Act of 1989 has made the military child care system the one to emulate. “We have come a long way,” said Tommy T. Thomas, deputy undersecretary of defense for military community and family policy, during the opening remarks of the department’s annual child development conference. “The Department of Defense Child Development System is … a model for this nation.”
More evidence – US military child-care policies are modeled
National Women’s Law Center, 2005, “Military Child Care Continues to Serve as Model for the Country,”
“The military’s systemic approach to child care continues to serve as a model for our nation’s civilian child care needs,” said Nancy Duff Campbell, NWLC Co-President. “The military’s child care improvements over the past 15 years offer significant lessons for the civilian child care sector.” NWLC’s original Be All That we Can Be report described the dramatic overhaul in the military child care system between 1989 and 2000, prompted by congressional hearings and the enactment of the Military Child Care Act of 1989, and the lessons the military experience provides for civilian child care. That report concluded that the military’s comprehensive, systemic approach to child care – covering children from birth to age 13 in a range of high-quality child care settings – was a key element of its success. It found that the military child care system had been transformed from one fraught with poor quality and high parent costs into a model for the nation, serving upwards of 200,000 children each day. Today, that system is even more comprehensive.
High quality child care key to the economy – massive rate of return
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
In a time of scarce public resources, the care and education of young children will continue to fall to the bottom ofthe priority list until there is a shift in public understanding about the economics of raising the next generation. High-quality early childhood education is too vital to be brushed aside as a social services expenditure for only a few families or as too expensive to consider in tight budgetary times. Early education is important for all children. And study after study shows that it is not too expensive. Quite the contrary. Investments in quality child care and early childhood education do more than pay significant returns to children—our future citizens. They also benefit taxpayers and enhance economic vitality. Economic research—by Nobel Prize-winners and Federal Reserve economists,in economic studies in dozens of states and counties, and in longitudinal studies spanning 40 years—demon- strate that the return on public investment in high quality childhood education is substantial.
Defense spending improves the economy
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2-2-2009, “No Time to Cut Defense,”
It doesn't make fiscal sense to cut the defense budget when everyone is scrambling for measures to stimulate the economy. Already, under the current Pentagon budget, defense contractors will begin shutting down production lines in the next couple of years -- putting people out of work. Rather than cutting, the Obama administration ought to be increasing defense spending. As Harvard economist Martin Feldstein recently noted on this page, defense spending is exactly the kind of expenditure that can have an immediate impact on the economy.
The CP Reinvigorates the Economy
High Quality child-care is key to math and reasoning education
Child Defense Fund, 2003, Good Child Care Assistance Policies Help Low-Income Working Families Afford Quality Care and Help Children Succeed,
Quality child care helps shape children’s futures and is critical to school readiness. The research is clear that the quality of child care has a lasting impact on children’s well-being and ability to learn. Children in poor quality child care have been found to be delayed in language and reading skills, and display more aggression toward other children and adults. A major study found that children in high quality child care demonstrated greater mathematical ability, greater thinking and attention skills,and fewer behavioral problems.These differences held true for children from a range of family backgrounds, with particularly significant effects for children at risk.
Child care is comparatively more important to the economy than other services
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
Every dollar invested in universally available quality early care and education saves taxpayers as much as $13 in public education, criminal justice and welfare costs over the next few decades as well as increased tax collections in the long term. • The early care and education industry is economically important and often larger than other industries currently supported by economic development funding. Developing the skill base of workers in this field must become a part of each state’s economic development strategy. • It is shortsighted not to invest sufficient resources in early care and education since the return on investment to taxpayers is greater than many current economic devel- opment programs.
Child care itself is big business – that’s key to the economy
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
In fact, I think many people will be surprised to learn from this report how critical the child care industry in this country is to our economy. In my own state of Connecticut, child care providers generate a billion dollars annually.And although our state is known for its pharmaceutical industry, we actually have more citizens working in the field of child care. This report helps Americans understand that when it comes to our economy, child care is big business.
High quality child care is key to educational attainment
PhysOrg, 9-15-2009, “High-quality child care leads to academic success for low-income kids,”
Children who spent more time in high-quality child care in the first five years of their lives had better reading and math scores in middle school, according to researchers from Boston College, the Harvard Graduate School of Education and Samford University, who studied 1,300 middle school students. Looking deeper, researchers found that low income children who received high-quality child care achieved at similar academic levels as their more affluent peers, even after taking into account factors such as levels of parental education and employment. “The real takeaway here is that even minimal exposure to higher quality child care protects children from the harm done by living in poverty," co-author Eric Dearing, an associate professor of applied developmental psychology in the Lynch School of Education at Boston College, said. "When it comes to early child care, quality matters more for children in poverty than for affluent children in promoting the long term academic achievement of the former up to similar levels as the latter."
Retention Key To Hegemony
Retention is key to a ready force – sustains hegemony best
Phillip Carter, former Army officer and Iraq veteran, and Owen West, a trader at Goldman, Sachs, recently returned from his second tour with the Marines in Iraq, 2005, “Dismissed!,”
The services must shift the manpower priority from recruiting to retention. The fact that the Navy and Air Force have consistently met their recruiting quotas in the face of a global war demonstrates that there is no shortage of young Americans willing to join the military. Shouldering a rifle in the mountains of Tora Bora or on Fallujah's streets is a different story, however. Though the Army and Marines have to recruit less than a quarter of 1 percent of the eligible population each year, they are finding that America's warrior class is small. "There's a difference between those who want some life experience and those who want to fight," says a Marine recruiter. "And most of [the latter] sign up anyway." The focus should be on retaining those who gravitate to the tip of the spear instead of coercing those more comfortable with service than soldiering.
The Army only met retention efforts because they scaled back goals
Army Times, 2009, “’09 retention goals cut by more than 15%,”
The Army has scaled back by 10,500 its retention goal for the year, officials said March 24. The goal is now 55,000 instead of 65,500. This is the first time, at least since 2001, that the Army has decreased its retention goals midway through the year, said Master Sgt. Patrick Johnson, the retention operations noncommissioned officer in the Army G-1.
Top economists agree
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
Nobel prize-winning economist James Heckman supports the investment ofpublic dollars in early childhood education out of urgent concern about the low skills of the U.S. workforce. He fears a continuing decline in skill level in the coming decades, with a disastrous loss of U.S. productivity and economic competitiveness. He concludes that it makes “sound business sense to invest in young children from disadvantaged environments,”since quality pre-Kindergarten programs “gener- atesubstantial savings to society and...promote higher economic growth by improving the skills of the workforce.”
Force Key To Hegemony
Maintaining a strong quantity and quality of soldiers is key to warfighting
Allan Batschelet, Master of Military Art and Science Candidate at US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994, “NATIONAL SERVICE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ARMY'S ABILITY TO RECRUIT QUALITY SOLDIERS,” pg. np
The United States is arguably the only superpower in the world today. The vision of the world the United States aspires to is one of freedom, respect for human rights, free markets, and the rule of law.3 To achieve its national interests the United States must retain a credible, quality army as the decisive instrument of national power. As the Army becomes smaller it is imperative to realize that near-term reductions in manpower quality have long-term effects. According to Trevor N. Dupuy, (General, USA, RET.) a respected defense analyst: Facts indicate that while a country may expect to coast for some time on the intangibles of troop quality, leadership, discipline, training, and tactics, a high level of combat effectiveness, once lost, may be hard to restore.4 Without the ability to successfully conduct and win a sustained land conflict, the United States will forfeit its role as world leader and jeopardize its national interests. This problem has implications for the future security of the United States. The United States Army has rebuilt itself from the demoralized hollow service of the Vietnam and post-Vietnam eras into a credible deterrent of armed aggression and a first-class fighting force. This metamorphosis is evidenced by the Army's success in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Just Cause, and Provide Comfort. Today the Army is capable of providing the land component of a joint task force that can deploy to any location in the world and achieve decisive victory. The United States must ensure the continuation of this capability. It can do so only by ensuring that the Army continues to acquire the quantity and quality of soldiers necessary to operate its sophisticated weapon systems.
Army recruitment is key to overall force structure – implicates deterrence, readiness and hegemony
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2006, “Personnel and Readiness,”
Perhaps no other factor is as important to the effectiveness of the US military as the quality of its personnel. Likewise, the "readiness" of the US military to fight effectively on relatively short notice depends critically on keeping US forces well trained, and armed with well maintained equipment. As a result, trends in military recruitment and retention, training rates, and equipment maintenance and repair, are monitored closely by the administration and Congress, and have frequently sparked intense and often highly politicized debates.
Technology isn’t enough, strong personnel is key to hegemony
Mackubin Owens, Associate Dean and Professor of national security affairs @ Naval War College, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2006, “A Balanced Force Structure to Achieve a Liberal World Order,” orbis/5002/owens.balancedforcestructure.pdf
Transformation: Technology, Training, and Doctrine - There is no question that the United States relies heavily on material factors to implement the “American way of war.” Technology is usually considered to be the most important of these material factors and the source of military transformation. The problem with what might be called technocentric thinking — the belief that an edge in technology itself is enough — is that it can lead to a dangerous de-emphasis of other factors critical to success in war, especially force structure, doctrine, and training. The radical restructuring of US force structure from a balanced force of air, land, naval, and space capabilities to one that relies primarily on long-range air- or ship- delivered precision strike would be very risky. Such an unbalanced force structure might work fine against an opponent that has not mastered the modern system of force employment but against one that has, it would be at a severe disadvantage. Accordingly, the United States also must guard against over-reliance on technology at the expense of those factors that enhance soldierly excellence, such as high recruiting standards, quality training, and operational readiness, can ultimately reduce future US military capability relative to our adversaries, both actual and potential.
Forces Are The Only Way to Power Project
Nothing else is sufficient, only military forces can prevent global conflict
Mackubin Owens, Associate Dean and Professor of national security affairs @ Naval War College, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2006, “A Balanced Force Structure to Achieve a Liberal World Order,” orbis/5002/owens.balancedforcestructure.pdf
A strategy of primacy is militarily demanding. The United States must be able to lead coalitions to defeat terrorists, restore order to unstable regions, support international law, and enforce peace in regions of vital interest to the United States, and deter aggression and win if deterrence fails. Primacy requires flexibility and a force structure able to respond to contingencies across the entire spectrum of conflict. This strategy will require a higher level of defense spending than in the recent past. This remains a bargain. After all, US military forces essentially provide an international “public good” by underwriting the security upon which global stability, interdependence, and ultimately prosperity depend. If the US forces that provide this public good are stretched thin because they are under-funded, the result may be a decline in stability and prosperity. World War I illustrates how rapidly an interdependent world order can collapse if the rise of aggressive powers are not checked.
Retaining forces deters global conflict
William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and Michelle Flournoy, former Undersecretary for Defense, 2006, “The U.S. Military: Under Strain And at Risk,”
The flip side of the recruiting coin is retention. The good news is that the Army and Marine Corps are meeting their overall retention goals, for the moment, thanks in large part to the willingness of young patriots to endure additional danger, hardship and time away from home when their country calls. But this may not be enough to avoid a major retention crisis for the Army. Although the Army is reporting that many soldiers are taking advantage of reenlistment bonuses, it is difficult to get an accurate picture of retention, because of the administration’s use of “stop loss” orders to keep members in service beyond their original commitment. This practice has skewed the data somewhat and effectively hidden growing personnel deficits, particularly in the junior grades of the Army. Some 9,800 soldiers are currently under “stop loss” orders, and the Army will likely continue stop loss for up to 9,000 soldiers through the end of fiscal 2006. While the Army Reserve and Army National Guard exceeded their retention goals for people in more senior grades, they fell substantially short of their goals for those deciding whether to renew their commitment for the first time, creating the potential for long-term imbalances in the force.
The military has been pushed to the brink, sustaining retention is key to overall power projection
William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and Michelle Flournoy, former Undersecretary for Defense, 2006, “The U.S. Military: Under Strain And at Risk,”
Most of our active duty military has chosen to stay in the force after one or even two tours, but it is reasonable to fear that after a third year-long deployment in a compressed period, many will choose to leave the force. Many senior military officers who lived through the Vietnam era and its aftermath believe that if significant numbers of senior non-commissioned officers and field grade commanders begin to leave the force, this could set off a mass exodus and lead to a “hollowing out” of the Army. Meanwhile, the United States has only limited ground forces ready to respond to contingencies outside the Afghan and Iraqi theaters. As a global power with global interests, the United States must be able to deal with challenges in multiple regions of the world simultaneously. If the Army were ordered to send significant forces to another crisis today, its only option would be to deploy units at readiness levels far below what operational plans would require. As stated rather blandly in one Defense Department presentation, the Army “continues to accept risk” in its ability to respond to crises on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. The absence of a credible, sizable strategic reserve increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to challenge the United States. Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialized assets to deter or respond to aggression, the visible overextension of our ground forces could weaken our ability to deter aggression.
Forces are More Important Than Tech Investment
Technology cannot replace troops
Donna Miles, Staff, 2009, American Forces Press Service, “Technology to enable, not replace warfighters,”
Robots are helping to save warfighters' lives as they bring incredible new capabilities to the battlefield, but probably won't ever replace humans in combat, the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command said Monday. Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis, who also serves as NATO's supreme allied commander for transformation, told a Brookings Institution audience in Washington that he doesn't see any time in the foreseeable future when human beings won't be central to warfighting, despite technological advances. "War is fundamentally a social problem that demands human solutions, despite the American penchant for a purely technological solution," he said during a session about the impact of new robotic technologies on warfare. Telling the audience he's "no Luddite" -- a reference to an 18th-century English movement that opposed technological change -- Mattis said he's a big advocate of technology that gives warfighters a leg up on the battlefield He shared a story about a visit to Iraq, when he encountered an explosive ordnance disposal team standing in formation beside a hole in the ground. Inside the hole were pieces of a robot that had survived six earlier blasts, but was destroyed by the seventh. "They were actually burying the robot," he said. "That robot had saved their lives." Mattis pointed to other valuable uses of robots, including unmanned aerial vehicles that provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as well as attack capabilities. The time is coming, he said, when an unmanned medical evacuation craft will be able to land in a "hot" landing zone to extract wounded troops. But Mattis emphasized that technology alone can't fight and win wars. "I want the best possible technology in the hands of our troops," he said. "But the idea that this is going to solve the problem of war is a little silly if you study history." That's because although technology has altered the character of war, "the fundamental nature of war has not changed," he said.
Troops are the biggest internal link to hegemony
Jim Talent, Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness and welfare reform issues. 2-20-2007 “More: The crying need for a bigger U.S. Military,”
Add to this the fact that the active-duty Army is clearly too small. Even in an age of transformation and non-linear battlefields, America will always need the capacity to put boots on the ground. Particularly in the post-9/11 era, the U.S. needs the ability to carry on sustained, large-scale peacekeeping or low-intensity combat missions, without having to send the same units on three or four tours over the life of a mission. A nation of America's size and strength should not have to tie up essentially its whole active-duty Army, much of its Marine Corps, and many of its reserves in order to sustain 130,000 troops in the kind of low-intensity combat we are experiencing in Iraq.
The military needs more troops not tech
Lolita Baldor, Military Contributor, 7-16-2009 “US military eyes plan to increase Army by 30,000,”
Military leaders have been warning Congress that the problem has been getting worse, as the number of soldiers unable to return to the battlefield has increased by as much as 3,000 in the last several years, according to Gen. Pete Chiarelli, the Army's vice chief of staff. "It is a stretched and sometimes tired force that is meeting all the requirements, but at the same time it is difficult to get our units up to the operating strength they need to before deployment," Chiarelli said. According to the Army, 13 percent of the personnel in a typical unit heading to war are not available, compared to 11 percent previously. Roughly 9,400 soldiers are in so-called "warrior transition units," with either physical or stress-related injuries. Another 10,000 are unavailable because of less serious injuries, medical screening problems or pregnancy. In addition, about 10,000 have been tapped for other duties, or have just returned from the battlefront, guaranteed one year at home before they redeploy.
AT: Spending DA To CP
Non-Unique – some child care spending now
Gail Zellman et al., PhD in Social and Clinical Psychology, 2008, “Options for Improving the Military Child Care System,”
Singer and Davis (2007) estimate that DoD spends about $480 million annually on military child care. Given the wide variety of child care options used by military families and the fac- tors that are related to child care use, it is worthwhile to consider the cost drivers of the military child care system. To do this we draw on information from Zellman and Gates (2002). That study relied on the results of a survey of 69 military installations to construct estimates of the cost of different child care options. The survey was conducted in the fall of 1999 and asked installations to provide information from fiscal year 1998. The survey data were analyzed to assess the total cost of different child care options and to assess the pattern of subsidies from DoD to military parents.
And, the stimulus funded some military child-care
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, 2009, Progress for Military Families,
CHILD CARE FACILITIES: Invested in expanding child care spaces on military bases by roughly 15,000 from 2007 to date, including providing $239 million in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. (2007-2009)
Tons of spending now – child care is being left behind
Marcy Whitebook, PhD, 2004, “By a Thread,” W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
Public investment at all levels of government has also mush- roomed, with federal and state spending now at about $20 billion per year (Helburn and Bergmann 2002). The lion’s share of these public dollars comes from the federal government, either in the form of tax credits for those families who pay income tax (dependent care or flexi- ble spending accounts), or as subsidy vouchers to cover the cost of child care for low-income families. Still, child care is the only educational service relying so heavily on parents to foot the bill, with parent fees accounting for 60 percent of the national expenditure on child care, government funds accounting for 39 percent, and employer sup- port for only 1 percent. By contrast, parents contribute only about one- fourth of higher education costs, with government and philanthropy assuming the remaining balance (Mitchell, Stoney, and Dichter 2001). Child care costs can consume anywhere from 6 to 23 percent of a fam- ily budget (Giannarelli and Barsimantov 2000). In urban communities, child care costs exceed those of tuition at most public universities (Schulman 2000).
AT: DOD Tradeoff DA to CP
Any shortfall will be met with supplemental funding
Jordan Tama, Staff Writer, 1-15-2009, “Progressive Policy Institute, Reforming Defense Acquisition, “
The all-too-common result: The government authorizes the development of more weapons systems than we can really afford; production falls years behind schedule; and systems fail to live up to expectations. These problems have been exacerbated by a growing reliance on supplemental budget requests to fund procurement. Supplemental bills are supposed to fund emergency expenses -- like operating expenses for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- but the Bush administration and Congress have used them to add tens of billions of dollars in funding for weapons acquisition under the rubric of the "war on terror."
There is no tradeoff between funds in the military
Jordan Tama, Staff Writer, 1-15-2009, “Progressive Policy Institute, Reforming Defense Acquisition, “
In reality, most of these buys are unrelated to any current emergency or near-term contingency. This backdoor funding ploy distorts the entire national- security budgeting process because supplementals receive less scrutiny from budget overseers. Perhaps even more importantly, such maneuvers diminish any incentive to make difficult decisions about trade-offs between desired programs.
Obama will respond to the plan with increased funding
Market Watch, 8-27-2008, “Guns or butter ... why not both? Democrats ask,”
Democrats have an ambitious agenda in this year's election: To stimulate the economy, cut taxes for middle-class families and seniors, increase spending on vital domestic issues, and not blow up the federal deficit. But their plans to promote the general welfare could be hobbled by an equally urgent need: To protect America from its enemies, foreign and domestic. 'There are just so many things that need to be fixed. If we don't start funding the Veterans Administration, if we don't start taking care of the veterans, the cost to America will be so significantly great in the future. Shame on us.' It's an age-old dilemma: Should the government provide guns or butter? Ideally, of course, it could do both. And perhaps if Sen. Barack Obama does end the Iraq war, the nation could enjoy a small peace dividend that could pay for some of the things his party wants to do. The choice between guns or butter is a false one; it's really a matter of priorities, said Larry Mishel, president of the labor-funded Economic Policy Institute. Perhaps this is especially so in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Mishel paraphrased Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., as saying: "On Sept. 10, there was no money for anything. On Sept. 12, there was money for everything."
AT: DOD Tradeoff DA to CP
Funding isn’t key to military supremacy – corruption and misuse prevents the impact
The Nation, 3-3-2008, “More Guns, No Butter”,
In other words, the shocking waste displayed by military contractors in Iraq merely replicates what has long been standard practice in Washington. This is not a secret. The Government Accountability Office and sharp-eyed critics in Congress like Henry Waxman have been exposing the reckless, even criminal, practices of military contractors for years. A courageous presidential candidate would start by making two patriotic accusations: the armed forces have undermined themselves by this scandalous misuse of scarce public money, and the swollen military budget is all about feeding the hogs in the military-industrial complex.
Hegemony will be secure even without adequate funding
Harvey Sapolsky et al., professor of public policy and organization at MIT, 1997, “Come Home America,” International Security, pg. np
Given its geographical advantages and nuclear arsenal, the United States would be very secure even if Japan, China, and Russia matched its defense expenditures. The fact is that, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, no one else comes close. It is not at all clear what, if anything, Americans are getting for their extra defense dollars. The United States can spend much less than it does today and still be much more secure than it was during the Cold War. U.S. defense spending has dropped from its Cold War peak, but the budget is still within its Cold War range (see Figure 2). In fact, defense outlays in 1995 were very close to those of an average peaceful year of the Cold War. America has not cashed in a "peace dividend," but has traded it for a "security dividend," even as the external threat has disappeared." The United States can cut defense greatly and still enjoy the security that geography and the end of the Cold War provide.
No risk of nuclear terrorism
Matthew Bunn, senior Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, 4-2-2008, “The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,”
Fortunately, there is good news in this story as well. First, there is no convincing evidence that any terrorist group has yet gotten a nuclear weapon or the materials needed to make one – or that al Qaeda has yet put together the expertise that would be needed to . Indeed, there is some evidence of confusion and lack of nuclear knowledge by some senior al Qaeda operatives.16 Second, making and delivering even a crude nuclear bomb would be the most technically challenging and complex operation any terrorist group has ever carried out. There would be many chances for the effort to fail, and the obstacles may seem daunting even to determined terrorists, leading them to focus more of their efforts on conventional tools of terror – as al Qaeda appears to have done. Both al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo appear to have encountered a variety of difficulties, demonstrating that getting a nuclear bomb is a difficult challenge, even for large and well-financed terrorist groups with ample technical resources.
The US is resilient to nuclear terrorism
Ben Friedman, PhD Candidate @ MIT, 2009, “Terrorism Hysteria Watch,”
One aim of the conference we held last week at Cato (watch it here) was to encourage the country to adopt a more grown-up approach to combating terrorism — less fear-mongering, more confidence, or as James Fallows put it, “reclaiming Gary Cooper, not Chicken Little, as our national icon.” Chicken-littleism has political causes that we can’t change. But pointing out threat inflation should at least make its authors think twice. To that end, here are three recent examples of officials or the media hyping terrorist capability. 1. Senator Kit Bond, at Dennis Blair’s confirmation hearing as Director of National Intelligence, said the following: Our entire way of life is just a few moments away from annihilation if terrorists succeed in obtaining a weapon of mass destruction. Nonsense. Our way of life survived various wars, the virtual destruction of a large swath of New Orleans, and other disasters. It would survive even nuclear terrorism.
AT: Casualty Aversion Prevents Solvency
No casualty aversion – it’s a myth and the public is willing to accept casualties
Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement, professor of strategy and policy on the faculty of the Naval War College, Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2004, “The Casualty-Aversion Myth,” Naval War College Review, pg. np
It's easy to see. . . . People go off to war and the bands play and the flags fly. And it's not quite so easy when the flag is draped over a coffin coming back through Dover, Delaware. -SENATOR JOHN GLENN, 1997 That is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How does casualty sensitivity affect the pursuit of American national security objectives?1 The first question is easy to answer: There is no intrinsic, uncritical casualty aversion among the American public that limits the use of U.S. armed forces. There is a wide range of policy objectives on behalf of which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success. Squeamishness about even a few casualties for all but the most important national causes is a myth. Nonetheless, it is a myth that persists as widely accepted conventional wisdom.
The public is not irrationally reactive – they won’t backlash at excessive casualties
Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement, professor of strategy and policy on the faculty of the Naval War College, Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2004, “The Casualty-Aversion Myth,” Naval War College Review, pg. np
Nonetheless, there are many interests and national objectives for which Americans have readily found the risk of casualties an acceptable cost. There is in fact no evidence that the public is intrinsically casualty averse. Several studies based on polling data demonstrate that the American public is willing to accept casualties when the need and the likely consequences are explained to them by national leaders. This readiness is not restricted to issues of vital national interests or self-defense. The public takes its lead from how national leaders characterize and justify the mission. Leadership plays a crucial role in influencing how the public responds to casualties. One of the best studies on this topic is Eric V. Larson's Casualties and Consensus.14 In this detailed study, Larson explores the relationship between public support for military operations and the level of casualties for World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Panama, the 1991-92 Gulf war, and Somalia. The findings are very instructive. Majorities of the public have historically considered the potential and actual casualties in U.S. wars and military operations to be an important factor in their support, and there is nothing new in this. But the current attention to the public's unwillingness to tolerate casualties misses the larger context in which the issue has become salient: The simplest explanation consistent with the data is that support for U.S. military operations and the willingness to tolerate casualties are based upon a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders.15 Further, casualties do not trigger an immediate public desire for withdrawal from an operation. Both in Vietnam and in Somalia, for example, the public was willing to accept casualties even as the political leaders signaled that the United States would extract itself. The public supported orderly, not precipitous, withdrawal. In both cases, Larson's analysis suggests that an important consideration was the public's support for continued engagement until prisoner or hostage issues were resolved.16
There is no casualty aversion – the public is understanding and don’t want to avoid war
Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement, professor of strategy and policy on the faculty of the Naval War College, Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2004, “The Casualty-Aversion Myth,” Naval War College Review, pg. np
The public's understanding of casualties is neither capricious nor fickle. The emotional commitment of liberal societies to the dignity and worth of individuals is part of the foundation of those societies. Human costs weigh heavily-but not too heavily. The public understands and accepts that risks to individuals are sometimes required by the larger interests of society. The public wants to minimize casualties-not just among members of the American military but also innocent civilians and sometimes even enemy combatants. However, as numerous studies have shown, the public understands in essence Clausewitz's dictum that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means."
AT: Iraq Withdrawal is Key to Retention/Readiness
Iraq doesn’t widely affect retention and recruitment, only the counterplan solves key motivations
David Axe, Journalist who traveled with forces in Iraq, 1-11-2007, “A Peek Inside ROTC,”
A: I haven't seen studies indicating whether or not Iraq is hurting ROTC recruitment. I would guess that it is, but only slightly. ROTC can always increase scholarships to make up losses. So I can't really speak to long-term, Army-wide trends regarding ROTC recruitment. But I did speak to cadets who dropped out of ROTC specifically because of Iraq. They are few and far between, however. Strangely, the Iraq war seems to have motivated many people to join the military. It's something of a rallying call, I guess. That phenomenon hasn't totally made up for shortfalls caused by people's opposition to the war, but it has alleviated the losses. The military has managed to sustain recruiting despite the war. Huge bonuses have certainly helped.
Retention hasn’t changed since the war began
Carl Bialik, co-founder of Gelf Magazine, 6-8-2008, Tallying the Effects of the New GI Bill,” Wall Street Journal, pg. np
But the CBO suggests that this change in force structure isn’t an inevitable result of the bill. The 16% decrease in retention could be counteracted by spending $6.7 billion between 2009 and 2013 to boost re-enlistment bonuses. Meanwhile, the 16% increase in recruitment could be negated by saving $5.6 billion on advertising, enlistment bonuses and other measures. These numbers, too, are extrapolated from earlier studies, but they suggest that maintaining the current force structure could be achieved with an increase in spending of $1.1 billion over five years — compared with the direct cost of the benefits, about $52 billion. “DOD works very proactively to smooth out recruiting and retention,” Prof. Warner said. For instance, based on his preliminary analyses of the effect of the war in Iraq, “Retention has not fallen much from the pre-war period. Bonuses and stop-loss have seemed to work.”
Numerous other issues outweigh
William Perry et. al, former Secretary of Defense and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1-2006, “The U.S. Military: Under Strain and At Risk,”
Throughout the post-Cold War period, and increasingly since 9/11, the U.S. military has experienced a mismatch between the capabilities it inherited from the Cold War and the capabilities it needs to deal with emerging threats. Forces optimized to fight major conventional wars are now being asked to combat terrorism, conduct stability and reconstruction operations, and fight counterinsurgency campaigns. The mix of capabilities resident in the force needs to be fundamentally rebalanced. This requires four parallel efforts: • First, the U.S. military must convert units that are in low demand in the new security environment into unit types that are in high demand in order to reduce the most acute strains on the force. That is already underway, but should be accelerated. • Second, we need to rebalance the mix of capabilities in the active and reserve components and create more stable and predictable schedules for deployment. • Third, we need to take maximum advantage of technology and services offered by the private sector to make the best use of our military personnel. In today’s military, incorporating the latest information technology and “working smarter” can substantially reduce manpower requirements. • More broadly, the U.S. government needs to build deployable operational capacity in key civilian agencies like the State Department to conduct critical tasks for which the U.S. military does not have a comparative advantage. The U.S. also needs to encourage the development of greater international capacity to conduct complex missions like stabilization and reconstruction.
The CP Helps Obama’s Agenda
Child care helps the agenda – leads to consensus building
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
Although tax cuts and budget deficits have rendered government spending more difficult, there is potential for a consensus-building politics around the future success of children. In the 17th Congressional District ofTexas (which includes President George W. Bush’s ranch in Crawford),an independent 527 committee called Vote Kids provided detailed information about the “embarrass- ing record”of state Representative Anne Wohlgemuth on supporting funding cuts to children’s health and education programs. President Bush won the district with 66 percent of the vote; Democratic Representative Chet Edwards won 52 percent and beat Wohlgemuth. Three days later the legislature restored all the funding that had been slashed.
Plan will be spun as a win – shown as being kid-friendly
Leslie Calmen, Senior Vice President, Legal Momentum and Director, Family Initiative, and Linda Tarr-Whalen Managing Partner, Tarr-Whelan and Associates, 2005, “Early childhood education for all: A wise investment, Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative & MIT Workplace Center,”
The intersection between family,work and economic development can provide major political wins The achievement ofhigh-quality early care and education for all children should be approached as a mainstream reform that is good for everyone, suggests Karen Kornbluh of the New America Foundation. At the conference she offered several good examples: George W. Bush advocating for comp time during his re-election campaign to show that “government is on your side”; Bill Clinton signing the Family and Medical Leave Act as his first legislative initiative; and Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigning for statewide afterschool to set the stage for his successful run for governor ofCalifornia. This winning political mentality contrasts with the current defensive posture that advocates are forced into as they fight annually to protect or expand funding for early child- hood care and education and face the question of“why should my tax dollars go for someone else’s children?”
The counterplan increases support for the military – it means the powerful military lobby would latch on and help the agenda elsewhere
Charles J. Dunlap, Colonel in the Military, 1994, Wake Forest Law Review, pg. np
In addition, the military undermines the fiscal check because it is a particularly effective lobbyist. Like other agencies of government, the armed forces are technically proscribed from lobbying, although they may "communicate" with Congress. Nevertheless, the military services employ a number of imaginative techniques to influence legislation. According to Hedrick Smith, they "unabashedly lobby senators and House members" by flattering them "with courtesies and perquisites" such as domestic and foreign trips. More disturbing, the military often will ensure support by spreading the procurement of expensive weapons systems over scores of congressional districts. Smith also insisted that the "military can turn off the faucet" when displeased with a legislator. Even the most vociferous military critic is subject to pressure when the economic livelihood of constituents is at stake. Armed Forces Journal alleged that Congressman Ron Dellums "was probably right" when the military critic charged that the closing of four military bases in his district was politically motivated. The magazine blamed the Pentagon, claiming its "temptation to deal poetic justice was likely more than it could resist."
The CP Avoids the Political Capital DA
Not funding child care costs political capital – only risk of a turn
Margy Waller, Visiting Fellow @ Brookings, 2005, “The Federal Welfare Debate: Is Congress Deserting Working Families?,”
Just child care alone needs a massive new investment in order to begin to meet the existing need. Adding meaningful transportation, education, training, housing, and income supports would create additional pressure on the federal budget. It's my bet that there are some conservatives who have noted the increase in spending for work supports and want to put a stop to it before the pressure to more adequately fund these popular services becomes a political problem. That's why they're promoting an expensive addition to the cost of running a program of temporary cash assistance.
The targeted nature of the counterplan ensures it wouldn’t be opposed by conservatives
Steven Barnett et al., Professor @ Rutgers, Chair of Educational Leadership @ Bank Street College of Education, 2004, “The Universal vs. Targeted Debate: Should the United States Have Preschool for All?”, April 2004, Issue 6, resources/policybriefs/6.pdf
Proponents of targeting cite three key advantages. Compared to universal preschool programs, targeted programs are said to be:(1) more efficient and cost the public less,(2) higher in quality, and (3) receive greater public support .Each of these arguments is set out more fully below. Efficiency and Low Cost Targeted programs are said to have larger benefits and lower costs to the public. While high-quality early learning programs can benefit virtually all children, more substan-tial effects have been shown for those preschoolers most at risk of poor outcomes. Given this finding, why not invest resources where they are likely to do the most good? Moreover, targeted programs do not spend public dollars on children whose parents can afford such programs. Quality Because they serve a relatively small number of children with the greatest needs, targeted programs can focus on quality. They do not dilute quality by spreading resources too thin. These resources include not only money, but also facilities and qualified staff. Thus, targeted preschool programs are more likely to provide the intensity and dura-tion of service required by children with the greatest needs.
Even though new spending may be unpopular, since it’s targeted it won’t engender backlash
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 2005, “Reducing the Cost of Child Care Through Income Tax Credits,”
Low- and middle-income working parents frequently spend a significant portion of their income on child care. As an increasing number of single parents take jobs, and as the number of two-earner families continues to rise, child care expenses are an unavoid- able and increasingly unaffordable expense for these families. This policy brief looks at one way of making child care more affordable: the dependent care tax credit offered by the fed- eral government and many states. How the Federal Dependent Care Credit Works he federal government allows an income tax credit to help offset child care expenses. In 2004, single working parents (and two-earner married couples) with children under 14 could claim a credit to partially offset up to $6,000 of child care expenses. Low-income taxpayers can receive a credit of up to 35 percent of these expenses. In 2004, this meant a maximum credit of $2,100. The credit percentage gradually falls from 35 to 20 percent of expenses for higher-income taxpayers. Taxpayers with incomes over $43,000 can claim the minimum credit of 20 percent of child care expenses. This “sliding scale” approach helps to target tax relief somewhat more effectively to low-income taxpayers, although the credit is available to even the wealthiest taxpayers.
***Security K***
Security K Explanation
By W. James Taylor
Emporia State University
“Security” comes in many different forms. Traditional international relations theories (IR) tend to view “security” within the logic of threats, enemies, and peace as the absence of direct warfare. It is assumed that the world is a violent, chaotic place that requires ordering and calculation. Dubbed “securitization” by IR scholars and debaters alike, this kritik addresses the underlying assumptions behind the dominant paradigm that informs foreign policy decisions.
The argument presented here relies on discourse analysis (Foucault), speech act theory (Austin), and the Coppenhagen School of philosophy in general. As such, close attention is paid to the role of representations and power relations in constructing a discourse on security. Representations are important in shaping how we think about the object of study. If we discuss war in terms of defeating enemies, the policies we choose will likely reflect a more interventionist posture.
This drive for security stems from an inherent will of (in)security. That is, the more we seek to “secure” the nation, the more faith we put in sovereignty and violence. Dillon argues that this forms a circular politics where we are constantly seeking and finding new threats to secure. In this framework, peoples of a given population become disposable—justified collateral damage for not conforming to the dominant international political order. Not only does this embody the very notion of biopolitics (Foucault/Agamben), but is the warrant for why there is no value to life in a framework where a sovereign can determine life or death.
The 1NC shell presented here covers the general logic of security thinking in terms of threat construction (also referred to as “enemy imagery”), a fixation with survival, and war representations. Particular attention should be given to the Dillon & Reid in 2000 evidence. It makes several arguments, including serial policy failure (Aff. Does not solve), epistemology & ontology, and world ordering. The Gorelick evidence makes the internal link to biopolitics via disposable populations. The terminal impact is no value to life. However, the extension evidence includes extinction and inevitable violence impacts.
Also included are several sets of specific scenario links. While the Affirmative will have generic representations and security answers, most will be unable to answer your very specific links. Moreover, you can object to the very utterance of the word “security”. This allows you to claim the alternative truly solves 100% of the case (via a floating PIC). The alternative is rooted in representations theory just as much as the links. To “vote Negative to adopt a critical perspective on security studies that rejects the securitizing discourse of the 1AC” means taking a radically different approach to international relations scholarship that expressly rejects both the logic of security imbedded in the plan and the rhetoric of the 1AC.
In many respects, this version of the “Security K” borrows from not only debates about representations, but also from threat construction, statism, Other-ization, borders, realism, and biopolitics. These are most represented in works by K. Fierke, J. Huysman, M. Dillon, D. Campbell, A. Burke, R. Lipshutz, S. Dalby, J. Der Derian, and M. Shapiro. On the opposing side: J. Mearsheimer, A. Murray, Y. Noorani, S. Guzzini, M. Shaw, A. Agathangelou, and M. Macdonald.
Answering the Security kritik can take several forms, dependent on the assumptions and clear links of the 1NC. For example, you defense of the State will not be as applicable if there is not a clear 1NC link. In general, the 2AC has the following options: 1). Framework, 2). Defend Realism good & inevitable, 3). Read offense to a discourse focus, 4). Defend your representations, and/or 5). Win a permutation. Ideally, there would be an appropriate combination of some or all of these. Another option assumed by some in the more Realist camp lies in describing violence and war as inevitable features of human existence. Some go so far as to claim that violence is a biological imperative.
Because of its flexible links and impacts, the Security kritik will likely appear in many rounds this year. Reading the background material on the debate surrounding realism, representations, and critical security studies would be a valuable knowledge base for anyone looking for success on an international relations/foreign policy topic. Good Luck!
Security K 1NC
Security discourse is rooted in representations of enemy creation. This constructs a rhetorical structure that predisposes policy decisions to reflect securitizing ideologies
Jef Huysmans, Ph.D., Lecturer at the Open University (UK), 2006, “Agency and the politics of protection: implications for security studies,” The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, p. 8.
Such an approach accounts for security effects in one of two ways. It can ground foreign and/or domestic policy in a deep cultural structure that predisposes a people to relate to other people on the basis of stark distinctions between friends and enemies, good and evil. David Campbell has accounted for a predisposition towards enemy creation in US society in this way (Campbell 1998; Milliken 1999). Alternatively this approach reads security discourse as a speech act that structures situations into security situations by calling them ‘security problem'. Security problems are talked into existence because security language applies a particular rhetorical structure that asserts existential threats that need to be dealt with urgently to the situation (Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). These cultural and linguistic approaches emphasise the structuring power of language and power resources. But they also move away front intentional concepts of power. They lodge security agencies in structures of representation that they do not control. Power is not simply about X being able to define a symbolic representation in art to move away from neorealist structuralism that emphasises the distribution of material security issue for Y, even if Y is against it. Power of representation works on the basis of political culture and language that predispose agents towards securitising phenomena; it pre-structures their intentions, identities and policy options.
The affirmative isolates these security threats as specific problems to escape. This denies epistemological and ontological questioning, causing serial policy failure
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University and Julian Reid, lecturer in international relations at Kings College in London, spring 2000, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 25, issue 1, p. np
As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.” More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.
Security K 1NC
War Is Socially Constructed Through Representations
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 56-57
The idea that international relations is a social construction can be thought about in quite simple terms. To construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist. For instance, a material substance, such as wood, exists in nature, but it can be formed into any number of objects, for instance, the beam in a house, a rifle, a musical instrument or a totem pole. Although these represent material objects in and of themselves, they do not exist in nature but have come about through acts of human creation. Once constructed, each of these objects has a particular meaning and use within a context. They are social constructs in so far as their shape and form are imbued with social and cultural values, norms and assumptions rather than being the product of purely individual thought or meaning. Similarly, explicitly social phenomena, such as states or alliances or international institutions, that is, the collective subjects of international relations, may build on the basic material of human nature, but they take specific historical, cultural managed but not eliminated. In the absence of an authority to adjudicate in cases of dispute, a competitive human nature will give rise to conflict. The idea that war is a social construction relaxes these assumptions. War is a recurring phenomenon. However, not all history is a history of war. Throughout history, actors have taken steps to limit, shape or transform the nature of war. War, in this respect, is a social artefact, constructed by humans for specifically human ends, but potentially in conflict with other human ends (Fierke 2005a: 2). War is distinguished from violence more generally by its dependence on socially recognized rules. Indeed, as Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (2000: 3) note, 'the idea that the conduct of armed hostilities is governed by rules appears to be found in almost all societies without geographical limitation.'
The Affirmative’s Fixation On Survival And Risk Is A Securitizing Ontology That Denies Emancipation
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University, 2008, “Underwriting Security,” Security Dialogue, 39; 309-332
Risk ontology is therefore contingently eventual rather than purely anthropocentric. Its world is governed less by sovereign wills and more by contingent occurrences, albeit contingent occurrences are governed even more explicitly now by the polysemous play of the sign in the form especially, for example, of price and price fixing. The subject of risk-based securities is also preoccupied with survival. But the very reality of ‘survival’ is understood differently here as well. Surviving becomes a different game, one dependent upon the capacity to pass out of phase with oneself and become something that one was once not – a successfully traded risk-based commodity, for example, in which subjectivity is emergent and adaptive, articulating itself through a differential calculus of exposure to contingency as the mode of its own self-governance. This is a perspectival world of relative valuation more rigorous and more remorseless than progressive postmodernist philosophers once proclaimed the emancipatory promise of the ontology of the event to be. Risk is nothing if not relative, perspectival and transformational.
Securitization Transforms People Into Mere Objects To Be Manipulated For State Power And Widespread Cruelty
Nathan Gorelick, Professor at University at Buffalo, State University of NY, 2008, “Imagining Extraordinary Renditions: Terror, Torture and the Possibility of an Excessive Ethics in Literature,” Theory & Event, 11(2), p. np
Aimé Césaire noted this phenomenon in his articulation of the full brutality of colonialism, and in his equation, "colonization = thingification"; as extraordinary rendition demonstrates, the total securitization of everyday life, like colonization, conceptually transforms people into objects through (and against) which to define state authority. This radical objectification manifests as "force, brutality, cruelty, sadism... forced labor, intimidation, pressure... contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses." Yet, as Césaire demonstrates, this "thingification" of life is not an accidental byproduct of European liberal humanism. Instead, the worst forms of violence are, in a very real sense, necessitated by the Enlightenment and the western metaphysical tradition of which it is a product. In Césaire's words, "through the mouths of the Sarrauts and the Bardes, the Mullers and the Renans, through the mouths of all those who considered -- and consider -- it lawful to apply to non-European peoples 'a kind of expropriation for public purposes' for the benefit of nations that were stronger and better equipped, it was already Hitler speaking!" Moreover, as Césaire and many other colonial and post-colonial thinkers suggest, the cultivation of the fundamental unit of political and moral account -- the sovereign subject -necessitates an other against which to define legitimate subjectivity. The other is constituted in opposition to everything that the sovereign, rational, autonomous self supposedly is not. The irrational other, thus devalued, can be abused, erased or exterminated with impunity.
Security K 1NC
There Is No Value To Life In Their Framework Of Calculation
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University, April 1999, “Another Justice” Political Theory, (27)2, p. 165
Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.
The Alternative Is To Vote Negative To Adopt A Critical Perspective On Security Studies That Rejects The Securitizing Discourse Of The 1ac
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 205
Critical approaches to security necessarily stand with the weak against the strong. But the question is how these lines are drawn. Hurricane Katrina revealed that it is not sufficient to divide up world power in geographical terms, between North and South or West (or even the United States) and rest. The United States, the global superpower, also contains weakness and suffering, and this suffering bears a family resemblance to other conflict areas of the world which have been impacted by American power. Perhaps the attempt to designate weak and strong needs to be questioned in so far as it is as problematic as drawing territorial boundaries around ethnic groups. One theme of this book has been the fluidity of identity boundaries of all kinds. International politics is not merely about a security dilemma between states. Critical approaches to security raise a question about how the politics of power and the inscription of boundaries contribute to the reproduction of strong and weak and, with it, human suffering, militarism and war. The 'clash of civilizations', in so far as it exists or is in the process of being constructed, is not first and foremost between states but between state and non-state actors. Some have questioned the assumption that strong, mostly Western, great powers have the right to bear arms, while resistance movements, representing the weak, do not (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 350). Others call for a rewriting of the rules to be more explicit in discussing the activity of non-state actors. Others still call for a global dialogue about the rules themselves. In critical terms, this means an analysis of the historical origins of the rules, who benefits from them, who is empowered to decide and the consequences. Robert Cox (1981), in making a contrast between problem-solving and critical theory a quarter of a century ago, anticipated these questions. Emancipation starts with these questions and a rethinking of what it means to be secure in the world we have made and are forever in the process of making.
Taking A Critical Turn In Security Studies Is Key To Avoid The Replication Of Hierarchies
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 204
Conventional security studies focuses on the sovereign state, which is isolated and competitive, and a protector of its population. Critical security studies placed this construction in a historical relationship between North and South, or West and the rest, emphasizing their mutual constitution and revealing how this representation of sovereignty benefits some at the expense of others. In spatial terms, an inherently relational world is presented in terms of isolated and discrete states, which is reinforced by methodological tools drawn from the natural sciences. With these tools, the world is approached as a set of discrete objects with words operating as labels for these objects. Critical security studies transforms this static picture into a more dynamic process by which a set of historical relationships, far from based on protection, have reproduced hierarchy and war, and have benefited some at the expense of others.
The Word “Security” Is Security Logic
The Very Utterance Of The Word “Security” Is A Speech Act Rooted In Soveriegn Survivalism
Øyvind Jaeger, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, November, 2000, “Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” (7)2, Peace and Conflict Studies,
Security, to be sure, is about the sovereignty and survival of the state as such – the state as an independent political unit. That does not, however, necessarily imply a privileging of the military sector of the state as is the case with classical security. Following Ole Wæver (1997a; 195; 1994), what pertains to security should be looked at as the speech-act of politics the discursive practice of doing by saying which is at work when states, not least the Baltic ones, are seeking to secure state formations. What is an issue of security, and what not, is delineated through speech-acts in a performative discursive practice coined by Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994) as securitisation, making security issues of what is spoken of as security: One speaks security, and therefore it is a matter of security. As with sovereignty (cf. Walker 1993), security has no ontological basis outside of discourse. An army is not a threat in and of itself – it is merely an army – but becomes one when denoted in terms of danger. Conceiving of security as a speech-act, Wæver argues that security is not something "out there" with an objective existence and a priori ontology, something that one should strive to acquire as much of as one possibly can. On the contrary, security is an act that comes into play by the very utterance of the word security.
“Security” Is Code Word For Legitimiing Infinite Violence In A Continually Reproducing Security Logic
Øyvind Jaeger, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, November, 2000, “Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” (7)2, Peace and Conflict Studies,
Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist.
“Security” Is Not An Object But A Discursive Speech Act
Øyvind Jaeger, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, November, 2000, “Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” (7)2, Peace and Conflict Studies,
This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes. The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat-defence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place.
China Threat Claims Are Rooted In Security
Their Construction Of A Rising Chinese Threat Is Rooted In A Securitizing Ontology
Christian Weber, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Frankfut, September 2008, “Securitizing China and Russia? Western relations with “rising powers” in the East,” , ACC. 11-9-09]
One clear example for the reproduction of the West through practices of securitization is the conceptualization of China’s rise as a long term security threat. Since the mid-1990s, Western scholars and politicians try to evaluate the power potential and the aims of the Chinese leadership in order to assess in a more informed fashion whether Western states should be either concerned or dispassionate about China’s impressive economic growth rates and its increases in military spending. One striking feature of this literature is its normative Western outlook. Scholars, particularly in the U.S., presume that the current “liberal international order” and the Western supremacy within this order must be preserved. A revision of the existing rules on China’s terms is hardly ever considered as an acceptable option and is associated with warlike escalations of previous power transitions. Thus, the literature on “China’s rise” starts from the presupposition that Western predominance should be upheld and depicts a more powerful China as a challenger that should be either fully socialized into the “liberal system” through a policy of engagement or restrained from subverting it through a containment strategy.
China Threat Arguments Construct A Narrative Of (In)Security
Christian Weber, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Frankfut, September 2008, “Securitizing China and Russia? Western relations with “rising powers” in the East,” Securitizing%20China%20and%20Russia_September_2008.pdf
In the public debate about China’s rise the liberal and the realist arguments are combined to a distinctive narrative that can be summarized as follows. China poses a long term threat to the security of the U.S. and the liberal Western order as a whole. As soon as the leading great power in the world is seriously challenged by the “rise” of great powers that are equipped with the sufficient demographic and economic potential, the fight over world hegemony cannot be prevented forever. Democracies and “totalitarian regimes” cannot coexist peacefully indefinitely. This is a lesson that can be drawn from 19th and 20th century history. Sooner or later they will fight each other until one or the other side prevails. Therefore, it would be detrimental to U.S. long term interests to engage China in a policy of “appeasement” e.g. through trade partnership as the Clinton administration had practiced it. Instead it must assume a firm posture and contain China through a “politics of strength” e.g. with a military build-up in East Asia and the forging of alliances of democracies. It is up to the U.S. as the leader of the Western world to take the initiative and demonstrate military strength. This narrative had a considerable impact in China itself where it was received under the label of “Chinese threat theory”. Chinese scholars and officials reviewed U.S. and European articles that named China as a security threat and took it as an illustration of the onesidedness with which China was treated by foreigners. In this way, complaining about the Western “Chinese threat theory” at the same time fostered Chinese foreign policy identity: the country would not turn to imperial expansion as Western great powers had done in the past but would instead go its own way of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”. This short reconstruction of the China threat narrative shall serve only as a starting point illustrate how a securitization of China could look like. Of course it is only one specific part of an overall discourse about how to understand and react to China’s growing importance in world politics that is taking place in the academy as well as in policy circles and in the wider public. But at least one preliminary observation still seems worth noting. China is not only seen as a threat in the United States as one might expect. For example, the Gaullist former French prime minister Edouard Balladur recently called for a “union of the West” that could stop the alleged relative decline of the Atlantic community vis-à-vis China’s economic growth. Opinion polls indicate that large parts of the population not only in the United States but also Europe see the “growing power of China” as an economic and even as a “military threat”. Of course this does not mean that they would support a policy of containment.
China Threat Arguments Are Rooted In Security Logic
Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, June 1, 2004, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 305-31.
More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.
China Threat Claims Are Rooted In Security
Representations of china as a threat presume china as a knowable object to be managed. Their positivist lens that locks scholars and policymakers into a self-fulfilling cycle of otherization and conflict that should be rejected
Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, June 1, 2004, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 305-31.
While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature.
Even calls for strong sino-u.s. Relations rely on securitization
Christian Weber, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Frankfut, September 2008, “Securitizing China and Russia? Western relations with “rising powers” in the East,” Securitizing%20China%20and%20Russia_September_2008.pdf
People who are worried about China’s growth may favor diplomatic negotiations as the more adequate measure. But nevertheless the description of the problem has an impact on the range of options that are taken into consideration. When the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in its recent Asia Strategy conceptualizes “Asia as a strategic challenge and opportunity for Germany and Europe”, it pushes the range of alternatives in a certain direction. If even those who prefer a politization of Sino-Western relations through multilateral negotiations and economic cooperation build their arguments upon a description of China’s rise as a “strategic challenge” the plausibility to treat it like a security issue increases.
Fear-Based Representations Of China Are Rooted In Racist Politics That Should Be Rejected
Henry C.K. Liu, Pres. Investment Group, August 20, 2005, “Trade wars can lead to shooting wars,” Asia Times,
The prospect that China can be a major economic power is feeding widespread paranoia in the United States. The fear is that developing nations, led by China and India, may out-compete the advanced nations for high-tech jobs while keeping the low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing jobs they already own. China already is the world's biggest producer and exporter of consumer electronics and it is a matter of time before it becomes a major player in auto exports. Shipbuilding is now dominated by China and aircraft manufacturing will follow. The US Navy is now dependent on Asia, and eventually China, to build its new ships, and eventually the economics of trade will force the US Air Force to procure planes made in Asia and assembled in China. The fear of China by the US dates back to almost two centuries of racial prejudice, ever since Western imperialism invaded Asia beginning in the early 19th century. Notwithstanding that it is natural, ceteris paribus, that the country with the world's largest population, an ancient culture and long history would again be a big player in the world economy as it modernizes, the fear that China might soon gain advantages of labor, capital and even technology that would allow it to dominate the world economy and gain the strategic advantages that go along with such domination is enough to push the world's only superpower openly to contemplate preemptive strikes against it. Furthermore, Chinese culture commands close affinity with the peoples of Asia, the main concentration of the world's population and a revived focal point of global geopolitics. Suddenly, socio-economic Darwinism of survival of the fittest, celebrated in the United States since its founding, is no longer welcome by US policymakers when the US is no longer the fittest and the survival of US hegemony is at stake. To many in the US, particularly the militant neo-conservatives, international trends of socio-economic Darwinism now need to be stopped by war.
Russian Threat Discourse Securitizes
Security Predictions Of “Russian” Behavior Conflates Multiple Political Identites In An Attempt To Erase Difference
Oleksandr Sushko, director of the Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 2004, “The Dark Side of Integration: Ambitions of Domination in Russia’s Backyard,” The Washington Quarterly 27.2, p. 119
Despite the fact that the former Soviet republics have been independent for 12 years, the 12 countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are generally considered by the Western public as one integrated unit, that is, the West still often perceives of the vast expanse of territory to the east and southeast of Poland as “Russia.” Several significant factors contribute to this perception, including the apparent similarity of sociopolitical and economic models across the CIS and an inability of the former Soviet states (except, probably, for the Baltic states) to convey their individuality and identity to Western observers. Any realistic assessment of the contemporary politico-economic criteria that could be used to measure the extent of integration of this post-Soviet region, however, reveals that this area is far from unified. The CIS lacks a single functioning organization that serves to integrate its members. Although CIS member nations signed an agreement on free trade as early as 1994, the commonwealth has no functioning free-trade area (FTA) because the Russian Federation’s State Duma (the lower chamber of parliament) blocked its ratification. No trade, economic, or legislative regulations encompass all CIS member states; and the use of discriminatory economic tools, such as quotas and antidumping among members, has become widespread.
Constructions Of A Russian Threat Are Rooted In A Discursive Framing Of Cold War Thinking And Sovereign (In)Security
Øyvind Jaeger, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, November, 2000, “Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” (7)2, Peace and Conflict Studies,
Reading Baltic literatures on security, one is not left in much doubt that Russia is the organized political power, (i.e. the representation of an anthropomorphic collective will). The Russian state is the danger to the Baltic. The danger of Russia is primarily seen as one of encroachment – be it by ways of political or economic subversion, or by downright military aggression – on their state sovereignty. Conflating state and nation, everything Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian is thereby also threatened. The sheer size and might of Russia, and the asymmetric power relations between Russia and the Baltic states itself is inscribed with danger. The prevalent economic and political instability in Russia is denoted as a threat in terms of uncertainty and unpredictability, that is, installed as one link in a discursive chain of equivalence casting Russia as anarchy, the binary opposition to state sovereignty. Baltic state sovereignty is thus underpinned by a discourse of danger securitising culture, crime, diseases, alleged smear campaigns and possible invasions alike. In this discourse of danger, the current thaw and policy of liberal reform in Russia is interpreted as a mere parenthesis in a brutal history of Russian imperialism, her true nature, as it were. It is widely held among the Balts that the imperial traditions in Russian foreign policy might resuscitate at any time and imminently pose a threat to the Baltic states. The bottom line of Baltic threat perception and assessment is one of Russian coercive aggression.
Their Russia/China Scenario Is Rooted In The Fear Of (In)Security
Christian Weber, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Frankfut, September 2008, “Securitizing China and Russia? Western relations with “rising powers” in the East,” Securitizing%20China%20and%20Russia_September_2008.pdf
Political measures that Western countries have taken in the relations towards China and Russia can be conceptualized as institutional consequences that qualify as changes in the Western order. Starting from these changes, the first and most general question is how they became possible in political struggles of signification and legitimation. Approaching this broad question involves first of all looking for controversies over Western policies towards China and Russia and observing how actors in specific contexts argued for their respective position. In order to tell us something about transformations in the Western order these controversies should at least potentially involve European as well as North American voices. We should analyze the policy debates that led to these changes by singling out opposing positions in the West - always keeping in mind the indeterminacy of the situation and the contingency of the process by conceding the actors the capacity to act otherwise. In the surroundings of controversial debates about Western policies towards China and Russia there should be abundant examples for diverging conceptions of the West.
North Korea Arguments Are Rooted In Security
Descriptions of n. Korean “backwardness” and a tyrannical threat are driven by the impulse of nuclear orientalism
Hugh Gusterson, Professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason Univ., taught in MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, March 1, 2008, “Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 29-30
One is struck, reading American media coverage of North Korea, by certain recurrent themes, stereotypes, metaphors, and storylines. These suggest an overarching narrative framework shared by many journalists and commentators who write about North Korea. Whichever newspaper one reads, ‘‘the story’’ is roughly the same: North Korea is a backward, isolated country run by a tyrant with comically eccentric, excessive tastes. His regime consistently lies and cheats and is driven by a childish narcissism, while the United States, which must manage the international system, behaves with the steady consistency of a father figure. Nuclear weapons do not belong in the hands of the backward, unpredictable North Korean regime, and the question is whether, despite its duplicity and unreliability, it can be persuaded to give up its weapons, or whether the regime must be isolated until it expires. This narrative construction of North Korea is fashioned out of shards of reality, but they are often assembled into a caricature that simplifies the messy complexity of the real world in a way that makes for entertaining reading but also, if policy makers believe what they read in the newspaper, unsophisticated policy. In the following sections, I will sketch out the basic elements of ‘‘the story,’’ then explain how this representation of the North Korean problem harms our policy debates and how the media might better cover the story.
Their representations of n. Korea are steeped in ideology and inaccuracies that depoliticize politics and guarantee error replication
Hugh Gusterson, Professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason Univ., taught in MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, March 1, 2008, “Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 22-23
Given that the Korean dilemma is one of the biggest headaches for U.S. and other foreign policy makers, good, accurate, detailed, and nuanced media coverage of events on the Korean Peninsula is vital in producing an informed public and a policy-making process that is judicious, supple, and intelligent. While the American print media have certainly published a remarkable number of column inches on developments in North Korea, much of the coverage has been repetitive, unimaginative, narrowly sourced, ideological, and, at its worst, baldly inaccurate. Such compromised media coverage can only hobble public debate and the policy-making process, to the detriment of U.S., and international, security. In the pages that follow, I will anatomize the inadequacies of American print media coverage of Korea, focusing especially on the high end of the print media market that, presumably, has more impact on policy discussions. I leave it largely to the reader’s imagination how much worse things are at the bottom end. This article is structured around what one might think of as both vertical and horizontal slices into the material. I start with a vertical or chronological slice, following media narration of unfolding events, in particular the collapse of the Agreed Framework. The horizontal slice in the second half of the paper brings into view a number of ideological tics—stereotypes, assumptions, and narrative frames—that repeat over a decade in American media coverage of North Korea. These recurrent representational tics depict Korea in a metaphorical funhouse mirror, making it harder to see clearly the North Korean problem and to find a way through to a solution.
The media is fixated on securitizing representations of n. Korea
Hugh Gusterson, Professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason Univ., taught in MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, March 1, 2008, “Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 35-36
I have argued here that mainstream American media coverage presents North Korea as a country that lies and cheats under the eccentric leadership of Kim Jong Il, while downplaying ambiguities around allegations of North Korean cheating as well as North Korea’s own grievances about U.S. compliance with the Agreed Framework. When it comes to discussing U.S. policy options for the future, it is generally accepted in the mainstream media that a military attack on North Korea is off the table. The dilemma, then, is usually portrayed as whether to isolate North Korea and hope its regime either collapses or comes to heel (as the hardliners around Vice President Dick Cheney suggest), or whether to engage North Korea in talks aimed at achieving its denuclearization (as many former Clinton administration officials and moderates in the Bush White House advocate).
India-Pakistan Scenarios Are Securitizing
Media Reports Of The Indo-Pak Conflict Only Escalate Tensions
Tejas Patel, Masters in Philosophy from the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, March 2005, “News Coverage and Conflict Resolution: Aid or Impediment,”
This thesis tests Galtung’s claims regarding news coverage of conflict. The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir was chosen as a case study. The findings of the study confirm that news coverage of conflict invariably focuses on violence and details of violent events. Such coverage potentially aggravates already volatile conflict by failing to highlight peaceful alternatives and anticipating further violence. My study also identifies – in the case of Indian English language newspaper coverage of the India-Pakistan conflict and Kashmir – factors which explain why conflict is reported in the manner Galtung suggests. I conclude by recommending certain measures drawn out from my personal interaction with journalists reporting on India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.
Post-Mumbai Tensions Prove The Media’s Fetish With Violence Can Escalate Conflicts
Najam Sethi, Staff Writer, December 1, 2008, “Media a 'problem' in India-Pakistan relations,” New Kerala,
Speaking at the inaugural session of World Newspaper Congress after receiving the World Association of Newspapers' (WAN) "Golden Pen of Freedom" award here, Sethi said the media in both the countries was too intensely nationalistic and had pushed them to the brink of war after last year's terrorist attacks in Mumbai. "After Mumbai last year, both the media put on the war paint and pushed their governments to the brink of war," said Sethi, the editor-in-chief of the Friday Times and the Daily Times. Contending that media is part of a problem rather than solution in India-Pakistan relations, he gave instances of media stalling the peace dialogue at critical points.
Conflict Between India & Pakistan Epitomize Media Violence Fetish, Risking Further Escalation
Tejas Patel, Masters in Philosophy from the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, March 2005, “News Coverage and Conflict Resolution: Aid or Impediment,”
Galtung’s major thesis is that present day journalism leaves out the most important part of the story – how a conflict might be transcended. According to Galtung, the way media operate while reporting on war and violence, they not only serve as catalysts to unleash violence, but are violent in and by themselves. Researchers (McNair 1988; Young 1991; Wolfsfeld 1997; Galtung 1998; Kellow and Steeves 1998; Futehally and Shaheen 2001; Fischer and Galtung 2002; Kellner 2002; Tehranian 2004) agree to the fact that media has the potential to escalate conflict by highlighting violence. Botes states that there is a consensus among media scholars that conflict is news and news is normally presented within some kind of conflict framework. According to him, Conflict being such a major part of news; it has become a commodity for which all forms of media compete. Since conflict news is source of such rivalry, it is not only often dramatized or exaggerated, but frequently abused for commercial purposes (Botes 1998: 4-6).
Afghanistan Is A Securitizing Mission
Market liberalization and expansion are at the heart of the u.s. Mission in afghanistan
Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary, South and Central Asian Affairs Department of State, February 14, 2008, Statement before the Committee on Senate Armed Services, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis
When we speak of our commitment, we are speaking of an investment in the future. Afghanistan is
not just a battle theater to fight enemies, but a place of strategic opportunity. Afghanistan represents an opportunity to have a close, democratic ally in the heart of a continent with unmatched political and economic capital and potential. Afghanistan has the potential of becoming the linchpin for regional integration in South and Central Asia. The past six years have showed us that it has the potential for transformation from a broken, failing state that harbored terrorists into a democratic, prosperous land bridge between the South and Central Asian regions - regions that were virtually disconnected until 2001.A free and secure Afghanistan provides new opportunities for growth in trade and security, for the benefit of the region and the world
The u.s. Began afghanistan through securitizing ideology to entrench globalization and imperialism
Pepe Escobar, Staff writer, November 6, 2001, “The New Imperialism,” Asia Times,
Apart from all the by-products of their demented version of Islam, the Taliban in the end dealt a major blow to Washington. They did not control all of Afghanistan as expected. They did not bring peace: on the contrary, they installed a police state and engaged in ethnic cleansing (against the Hazaras). Average Afghans stress that the Taliban version of "peace" soon degenerated into an internal jihad against the civilian population. They did not end poppy cultivation: on the contrary, they made a lot of money out of it. They treated women in the most repulsive way. And - the ultimate reason for their current predicament - they extended a precious red Afghan carpet to Osama bin Laden and his Arab-Afghans. From courting this irascible lover, America is now bombing it to oblivion. But as millions in the Muslim world keeps on repeating, not a single piece of evidence has been produced in public to suggest that the Taliban are totally, partially, or even marginally responsible for September 11. Not a single piece of a so-called unimpeachable evidence was "independently verified" - as BBC and CNN are so fond of saying (even when they are verifying something during a Taliban-sponsored tour of Kandahar). Any talk of a future broad-based Afghan government is a smoke screen. As far as American interests are concerned, it has to be a government that no matter what facilitates the American perspective of the Last Great Oil Rush. If push comes to shove, America may even contemplate an occupation of Afghanistan, more or less disguised via the UN. Before that happens, policy makers had better listen to Afghan professor Jamalluddin Naqvi, who says, "History is witness to the fact that Afghanistan is a human and territorial Bermuda Triangle from where no one ever comes out - at any rate in one piece." Henry Kissinger would grumble that this is just realpolitik. It would certainly be an instance of the New Imperialism in action. The international community should thank the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times for informing us all in advance. Another imperialist with impeccable credentials, globalization's puppy dog Thomas Friedman, wrote in the New York Times that "the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps". Globalization does not work without the New Imperialism. But another reading of history is always possible. In their seminal book Empire, Tony Negri and Michael Hardt argue that the process of globalization has generated a universal and oppressive New Imperialism - but stress that a real humanist alternative to imperialism and war is more than possible.
U.s.-led reforms are a ruse for opening up afghan markets and stifling democratic change
Ann Marlowe, staff writer, February 11, 2008, “Two Myths About Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, p. A13.
Karzai manages by panic, with massive corruption and an absence of vision. It's a tribute to the Afghan people's energy and U.S.-implemented economic regulations and reforms that Afghanistan's gross domestic product has more than doubled since the invasion. But Karzai has sought to derail grass-roots efforts at building democracy and to stifle Afghanistan's nascent civil society, repeatedly siding with fundamentalists against progressives.
Realism Is A Flawed Understanding Of IR
Realism Legitimizes Action At The Expense Of Ethics
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 181
The realist school of international relations has often discounted the moral or idealist political discourse of states, arguing that it is mere window dressing for other interests. While this may be the case, one can ask why states bother to justify their policies if only power and interest matter. If a state such as the United States has the military power to impose its will, which it does, why would it bother with the rhetoric of democracy, human rights and human dignity? It does so because this language constitutes the legitimacy to act; it is necessary in consolidating the consent of a population, or the international community, and the consent of the soldiers who risk their lives in war. There is a need in this case to hold up a critical mirror to the principles advocated in the name of fighting terrorism and the practice.
Realism is a circular fear of insecurity that ultimately collapses into nihilism in its attempt at mastering being. The drive to securitize makes violence inevitable
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University, 1996, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, pp. 21-22
The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics—the ‘end of philosophy’ thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally—is that the philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered. The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d’être, in other words, masquerading as the preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable—whatever other value might once have been placed upon it—if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world.
Realism Cannot Account For Major World Changes
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 55
Critical security studies goes beyond the debate over narrowing or broadening the concept of security to highlight a problem posed by the end of the Cold War, that is, how to analyse processes of change at the international level. The realist framework of timeless competition between states proved to be less than useful for explaining the way the Cold War ended and many developments since. For instance, realist or rationalist theories assume that it is always more rational to arm than disarm. However, in the mid-1980s Gorbachev and Reagan initiated a process of disarmament for the first time during the Cold War. A second realist assumption is that any change at the international level is likely to involve war. Yet, in 1989, Europe was transformed by largely non-violent 'velvet' revolutions. A further assumption is that states don't willingly give up their empires without a fight, and they certainly don't abandon their sovereignty. Yet, as democratic revolutions shook the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, Gorbachev stood by and let them do it 'their way'. The USSR and the German Democratic Republic later disbanded at their own initiative, and the Federal Republic of Germany absorbed the latter. In the wake of these changes, the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance of the Eastern bloc, crumbled. Many political pundits argued that NATO was obsolete and would wither away in the absence of the Soviet threat (Pellerin 1997). However, NATO has not only survived but has expanded to incorporate a number of states which were formerly part of the Soviet bloc. According to Edward Kolodziej (1992: 431), 'the realist framework exempts the theorist from responsibility for explaining - or even expecting - systemic change ... What was really a passing snapshot of the Cold War was portrayed as an explanation for the global security system.' In so far as change has been a topic, the focus has been on the possibility of moving from a world of sovereign states to world government (Walker 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989:43).
Securitization Fosters Violence And Extinction
Security Discourse Allows The State To Justify Any Use Of Force, Jeopardizing Survival
Barry Buzan, Professor, University of Westminister, Et al 1998, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 21
The answer to what makes something an international security issue can be found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government. territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying "security," a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (Waever 1988, 1995b).
Securitization Guarantees Extinction
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University, 1996, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, pp. 14-15
The way of sharpening and focusing this thought into a precise question is first provided, however, by referring back to Foucault; for whom Heidegger was the philosopher. Of all recent thinkers, Foucault was amongst the most committed to the task of writing the history of the present in the light of the history of philosophy as metaphysics. That is why, when first thinking about the prominence of security in modern politics, I first found Foucault’s mode of questioning so stimulating. There was, it seemed to me, a parallel to be drawn between what he saw the technology of disciplinary power/knowledge doing to the body and what the principle of security does to politics. What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance—for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter. A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.
Security Discourse Occludes All Value Considerations And Makes War And Peace Indistinguishable
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Ph.D., Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2008, “Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an introduction,” Review of International Studies, 34, pp. 265–292
Every traditional geopolitical discourse of security invokes security as the limit condition. War in particular operates as the privileged locus of the real for traditional security analysis; the reality said to trump all other realities in the hierarchy of values and needs that underpin its traditional geostrategic discourses. War here is, of course, construed as one of the instrumental means available to the state as actor. In an earlier lecture series pursuing these themes, however, Foucault controversially reverses Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the extension of politics by other means. He argues instead that war is not an instrument available to a political subject, but a grid of intelligibility from which modern accounts of liberal political subjectivity, in particular, arise. One might therefore gloss Foucault, here, and say that security discourse is the logos of war expressed as a logos of peace. In that sense, political modernity is the extension of war by other means; global liberal governance, especially, once it becomes the only remaining standard bearer of political modernity as a governmental project.
Securitization Denies A Value To Life
Securitization Justifies Bare Life Through The Biopolitical Management Of Sovereignty And Citizenship
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, pp. 115-116
What this example points to is the possibility of a field within which the boundary between citizen and migrant is easily blurred, such that, far from a clear distinction between secure citizens and insecure migrants, or insecure citizens and threatening migrants, a generalized environment of fear emerges. One argument prevalent in the critical literature on the securitization of migration is that these practices reconfigure the relationship between citizen and migrant and create a field of insecurity and 'unease', which becomes the basis of order. Thus, it is not only inside and outside that blur, as in Bigo's (2002) argument; rather both citizen and migrant are securitized, and thus transformed. The traditional debate over republican versus cosmopolitan notions of citizenship, where citizenship is a function of political agency, it is argued, has been replaced by the constitution of the citizen as an active participant in the reproduction of sovereign power. Citizens are adopted into 'the cause' of this power, acting as potential informants, intelligence gatherers, suspects or combatants, rather than critics of government policy (Eisen 2004). Muller (2005: 75) explains the failure of US citizens to resist the passing of the Patriot Act, and their role in facilitating and adhering to Homeland legislation, in terms of the binary framing of the War on Terror, where one could only be 'for or against' the Bush policy. This framing has the effect of demonizing citizens who resist. In this respect, a continuous `state of exception' is perpetuated by anxiety and fear and becomes part of the reproduction of sovereign power, or the 'performance of nationhood' (Shapiro 2004). Rather than identifying the threat, and subsequent fear, with a sovereign power, securitization is the constitution of 'bare life' and the `governmentality of unease'. Michel Foucault (1976) has argued that in modernity the legal authority of the state, accompanied by a view of individuals as citizens, represents a form of biopolitics. Biopolitics is the transformation of state power from the power of death to the management of populations and power over life. This reduces the citizen to what Giorgio Agamben (1998) refers to as 'bare life'. The citizen of 'normal politics', derived, for instance, from Aristotle's conception, engages in political debate and decision-making. By contrast, in Foucault's argument, sovereign power revolves around the governance of populations and biological life rather than political life. The subject of politics is no longer the potential agency of the citizen, but the management of life itself. In this respect, the founding political image of the West has shifted from 'Athens to Auschwitz' (Agamben 2004: 169).
Securitization Turns Democracy Into A Vehicle For Denying Agency And Imperial Power
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 180
Democratic practice requires a degree of stability and order, and sometimes the use of force is necessary to achieve this. There has been a tendency, at least in the West, to be more trusting of the United States in this role than might be the case with other hegemons. There is, however, an inevitable tension between building institutions for local people and the potential, in the process, of robbing them of their decision-making capacity or autonomy (Ignatieff 2003: 114). While much of America's international prestige in the twentieth century was derived from its efforts to promote self-determination and to take the side of freedom against empire, it has too easily in practice slid into the role of an imperial power promoting its own interests. Vietnam showed that overwhelming military power is no match when faced with a people who have nothing to lose. A similar claim could be made in regard to terrorism.
Security Is A Biopolitical Drive To Control Life And Freedom
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Ph.D., Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2008, “Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an introduction,” Review of International Studies, 34, pp. 265–292
Foucault therefore identified a different correlation of security and freedom than that which characterises the West’s traditional politics of security, founded as it is on an allied politics of the subject. There could be no more central question for politics, therefore, than that of the relation of freedom and security. While the very mythos of the modern state is founded in its claim to be a security provider, and the modern’s commitment to life is founded in the promotion of life, their respective security mechanisms seem nonetheless fated to threaten the very ideal of political order and the very valuation of life which they are supposed to advance. What is well understood now in relation to the geopolitics of state security is evident also in the biopolitics of security. Consistently hailed as part of the solution to the problematics of politics, freedom and justice, modern practices of security have consistently proved themselves to be part of the problem instead. This applies as much to biopolitics as to geopolitics.
Rejecting Security Representations Solves
Interrogating Securitization Opens Up New Alternatives That Transform Threat Perceptions
Øyvind Jaeger, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, November, 2000, “Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” (7)2, Peace and Conflict Studies,
Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty).
The logic of security infuses a biopolitical subjectivity into the nexus of knowledge/power. We can exploit the cracks in the system to transform the real
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Ph.D., Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2008, “Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an introduction,” Review of International Studies, 34, pp. 265–292
Biopolitics arises at the beginning of the modern age but it does not spring fully formed at its beginning. It would run entirely counter to Foucault’s approach to the analytic of power relations to pretend otherwise. While acknowledging a certain kind of precursor in the pastoral power of the Church, with which it appears superficially similar but from which it diverges in its specificities, what Foucault begins to draw out is the logic of formation which takes hold when power takes species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power/knowledge. This biopolitical logic of formation also expresses a new and emergent experience of the real. A logic of formation is therefore historical, local and particular. It also installs an ontopolitics as it experiments with novel ensembles or technologies of social practice. However generalised it may become, biopolitics is not itself a universal phenomenon. It is the actualisation instead of a specific historical and, we would argue, evolving economy of power relations. Such ensembles of practices do not actualise themselves in perfect realisation of their logic. First, because their logic is always a contested epistemic object for them. Second, because things always change in unintended ways. Biopolitical security practices do not articulate a design in nature. They are contingent achievements reflecting the partial realisation of designs which seek to enact ‘natures’. In the process, there are slippages and breakages, shifts and revisions, for which the original drivers and concerns of biopolitics no longer account. There is nothing unusual in this. It would be unusual if it did not happen. Mutation of the biopolitical order of power relations has continued to follow transformations in the changing order of [living] things. Such mutation has not merely entailed a change at the level of practice. Any change in practice is simultaneously also accompanied by a change in the experience of the real. In general terms the shift in the nature of the real associated with biopolitics, now, is captured by the term ‘emergence’.
Deconstructing Security Representations Allows Us To Avoid Threat Based Decisions And Address Underlying Causes
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 101
The basic problem is one of meaning. As Alexander Wendt states, `people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them' (Wendt 1992: 396-7). Weldes et al. (1999: 13) take this point further, to argue that meanings are fundamentally cultural and made possible by the discourses or codes of intelligibility that provide the categories through which the world is understood. Critics of constructivism, they argue, often confuse the issue by assuming that social construction is equivalent to fabrication, that is, if threats are constructed they don't really exist. Yet, to call a threat a social construction is not, for instance, to deny that nuclear weapons exist and that they can maim and kill millions. The question is rather one of 'how one gets from here to such widely shared propositions as these: that the U.S. is threatened by Russian, but not British, nuclear weapons; that Third World states are more likely to use their nuclear weapons than Western countries; that Iraq's nuclear potential is more threatening than the U.S. nuclear arsenal; and the U.S. is safer with nuclear weapons than without them' (ibid.: 12). The focus is the process by which objects embedded in one set of relationships are given meaning as threatening while in another they are understood to be benign.
Rejecting Security Representations Solves
Only A Clear Rejection Of Security Discourse Can Transform The Dominant Policy Framework
Anthony Burke, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, 2002, “Aporias of security,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), mi_hb3225/is_1_27/ai_n28906090/?tag=content;col1
It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available—and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web.
Security Is A Crucial Site Of Political Contestation To Transform Notions Of Difference As Threat
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 35
Further, Simon Dalby (in Krause and Williams 1997: 9) has argued that the conventional focus of security on the protection of political community equates difference with a threat from outside and thus reifies the need for protection from violent others. In this respect, security practices serve to reproduce insecurity. He asks whether the concept can be rethought in terms that don't necessarily equate difference with threat. Given the close association between protection and military means, is it possible to extend the definition of security to other realms without militarizing areas that otherwise would receive a political response? (ibid.: 5) These critical questions suggest the importance of making security a site of political contestation.
Only Challenging Security Discourse Can Subvert The Dominant Truth Regime And Foster New Alternatives To Infinite Violence
Anthony Burke, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, 2002, “Aporias of security,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), mi_hb3225/is_1_27/ai_n28906090/?tag=content;col1
The answer is not to seek to close out these aporias; they call to us and their existence presents an important political opening. Rather than seek to resecure security, to make it conform to a new humanist ideal--however laudable--we need to challenge security as a claim to truth, to set its "meaning" aside. Instead, we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social, and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces of being to the vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation. It is to see security as an interlocking system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways-to see security not as an essential value but as a political technology. This is to move from essence to genealogy: a genealogy that aims, in William Connolly's words, to "open us up to the play of possibility in the present ... [to] incite critical responses to unnecessary violences and injuries surreptitiously imposed upon life by the insistence that prevailing forms are natural, rational, universal or necessary."
Permutations Do Not Break Down “Security”
Security Representations Construct An Exclusionary Discourse Of Statist Privilege
Ian Loader, Prof. of Criminology & Director of the Centre for Criminology at Oxford, and Neil Walker, Professor of Law at the European University Institute (EUI), 2007, Civilizing Security, pp. 110-111
The key position of the police and their general-order function within a web of security-signifying beliefs and practices – one that tends to 'saturate the language of modern politics' (Dillon 1996: 12) and set the limits of our political imagination – operates in this regard to do four things. First, the massive assumption of security as a holistic and exclusionary discourse tends to privilege and cement the state itself as the guardian of security, and by extension the police as the guardian of the guardian, in ways that naturalize their 'tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly presence' (Benjamin 1921/1985: 141-2) in the life of modern societies and, with it, the institutional violence-in-the-last-resort that underpins 'democratic' politics (see also Taussig 1997; Neocleous 2000).
Representations Of Security Construct A Stable Discursive Structure Devoid Of Speaker Intentions
Jef Huysmans, Ph.D., Lecturer at the Open University (UK), 2006, “Agency and the politics of protection: implications for security studies,” The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, pp. 7-8.
More discourse analytical approaches in security studies developed linguistic and cultural answers to this question of how to conceptualise more specifically the capacity for change. They focused less on mobilisation and the relational structure defined by the relative power positions of the agents involved and more on how discursive structures render subjects and their relations (Huysmans 1998, 2002). This view relocates the question of agency by implying that the transformative capacity is not with the agents and the relations between them but is internal to the discourse itself (Lynn Doty 1997, 1999; Wight 1999, 2000). Speaking and writing security evokes a discursive structure that renders subjects and their relations to a considerable extent independent from the intentions of the ‘speaker'. The discourse is not simply speech or writing but a rather non-elastic structure of meanings that one has inherited historically and that frames social relations in a particular way. The question is not so much one of discursive agency as one of discourse as agency, that is the transformative capacity of discourse as structure.
Pointing out a specific threat constructs spatial boundaries that deny political agency, even if threats are “real”
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, pp. 101-102
The definition of specific threats brings with it a further spatial ordering, which inscribes the boundaries between the threatener and the subject to be protected. Traditional understandings of security focus on the duty of the state to protect its citizens and national territory from unwanted interference. This preoccupation has been the source of the sovereign state's legitimate monopoly on the use of violence. However, the emergence of refugees and stateless persons, at least since the nineteenth century, has raised an issue that cannot be accounted for in this conceptualization of security, that is, who provides protection for those who are not protected by states (Arendt 1966: 267-302; Marrus 1985; Soguk 1999)? The more recent emergence of private security firms, as well as the increasing role of humanitarian interventions, has also transformed the field in which the protector-protected relationship is defined. As Huysmans et al. (2006: 2) note, protection rests on three questions: 1) who can legitimately claim a need for protection, 2) against which danger, and 3) who is to do the protecting? These questions inform and structure political battles over questions of danger, legitimacy and protection, which are particularly salient in regard to protecting refugees. The central critical question is to account for the political agency of those who make and enact alternative security claims.
It is not that weapons or threats of one kind or another have been made up but rather that the meaning attached to them, and the subsequent practice, has been moulded in discourse. In this way, the actors and insecurities taken for granted by conventional security studies are called into question, thereby denaturalizing the state and its insecurities, demonstrating how both are culturally produced (Weldes et al. 1999: 10). Rather than being external to the object that is presented as a threat, insecurity is implicated in, and an effect of, the process of establishing and re-establishing the object's identity. Culture is the field of potentially contested codes and representations in which battles over meaning are fought (ibid.: 2).
Permutations Do Not Break Down “Security”
The Permutation Confuses The Is/Ought Distinction, Which Is Key To Transform Power Politics And Militaristic Notions Of Security Rooted In A Discourse Of Legitimacy And Power
K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 3-4
The critical approaches explored here engage with contemporary problems and issues, and in this respect are not divorced from the empirical world, as their critics often claim. They further reveal the extent to which all inquiries into security are normative. This reflects an emphasis less on the 'ought' as opposed to the 'is' than an argument that the world is always built on 'oughts', and is always in the process of being made. What is made is a product, not merely of material power, but of the assumptions we bring to day-to-day interactions. States, democracies, international institutions, power politics, humanitarian interventions, or economic sanctions only exist by virtue of the social, ideological, cultural or political structures by which they are given meaning and imbued with legitimacy and power. In this respect, the frequent distinction between material and ideational power rests on a fallacy. It fails to recognize that all power is constituted on the basis of legitimacy and meaning. To approach the study of security from a critical angle is implicitly a methodological pursuit that problematizes the process of 'knowing' and its consequences for 'being', although there exist different schools of thought regarding the relationship between these two. The book is itself an immanent critique of contemporary security practice. The concept of immanent critique, explored in more detail in chapter 8, refers to the critical practice of analysing the contradictions in one's historical context, in order to identify its emancipatory potential. One important contradiction highlighted in the book is the tension between the narrow military definition of security, based on a history of use during the Cold War, and the inherently political manifestation of the concept. Processes by which security is defined, by which threats become security threats, and by which individuals, states or others become subjects of security are fundamentally political.
The discourse of security is inseparable from soveriegn biopolitics. Their drive to secure knowledge makes the permutation epistemologically bankrupt
Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Ph.D., Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2008, “Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an introduction,” Review of International Studies, 34, pp. 265–292
It is part of our political discourse to talk in terms of a people, a public, a nation or a state as agents having intentions and expressing a view. The life of species being which Foucault first interrogated in his analytic of biopower was not this life. Empirically speaking, the life which Foucault first interrogated when inaugurating this analytic of the bio-economy of power relations was that of ‘population’. A population is not a subject, a people or a public. A population is a cohort of biological individuals. Specifically, from an insurer’s point of view, for example, a population is simply a risk pool. Populations are therefore said to display behavioural characteristics and correlations. The epistemologies of political subjectivity – especially in relation to traditional security discourses – are preoccupied with establishing secure knowledge about more or less rational choice, interests, intentions and capabilities, and so on. Even when they cannot realise it, which is always, their regulative epistemological ideal is the establishment of causal law. Conversely, the epistemologies associated with the biopoliticised securing of populations are those concerned with surveillance and the accumulation and analysis of data concerning behaviour, the patterns which behaviour displays and the profiling of individuals within the population. Instead of causal law, such power/knowledge is very much more concerned to establish profiles, patterns and probabilities. Here is an illustration.
Clinging To The Boundaries Of Security Denies Agency
Anthony Burke, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, 2002, “Aporias of security,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), mi_hb3225/is_1_27/ai_n28906090/?tag=content;col1
This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible."
***Capitalism K***
Capitalism K Explanation
Capitalism Explanation
The capitalism criticism is a structuralist critique that indicts the economic system that undergirds the affirmative harms. Capitalism can be defined in many ways, but is most easily understood as an economic system which promotes free markets and private ownership of both capital and the means of production. The role of government in this system is to enforce private property rights and ensure the free and fair operation of markets. While much of the world operates according to capitalist economic principles, the United States is considered the locus of the global capitalist order. This economic system has also come to influence and be a part of American political life as well.
While capitalism is the dominant global economic order, there are many who continue to object to it on principle because of its negative effects on the poor. Since the profit motive is the prime determinant of success in a capitalist system, it can exclude and disenfranchise those who fail to make a profit. Many anti-capitalists argue that capitalism inherently involves hierarchy, creating distinct classes of winners and losers (the bourgeois and the proletariat). The gap between the two is progressing at an ever larger rate, with the rich becoming ever more wealthy while a large segment of humanity struggles to even meet basic subsistence needs. This is exacerbated by the existence of finite resources for production, where one persons loss inevitably comes at the expense of someone else. This decline in available wealth pushes millions of people in the United States alone below the poverty line every year.
Against this backdrop of global economic expansion and the need to acquire finite resources to maintain the profit motive is the affirmative’s attempt to change US military deployments. This critique argues that the root cause of US overseas military power is capitalism, because the wealthy use the military as a tool to enforce their globalization agenda. Some affirmatives will argue that they withdraw troops in order to preserve American military dominance (solving overstretch, for example), directly playing into the hands of capitalist exploitation and ensuring the ever-greater expansion of coercive and violence military power. Other affirmative’s will position themselves in opposition to American militarism, withdrawing troops based on a more leftist ideology. This critique would argue that even this is used to justify the underlying system which made those military deployments possible in the first place, and call for a refocusing of political energy towards dealing with the problem at the root.
Whatever the link argument, this critique will argue that supporting capitalism in any form endorses an inherently violent system which sacrifices individuality on the altar of endless growth. This drive towards profit and conquest results in wars over resources, the destruction of the environment, and the elimination of large groups of people as unnecessary “surplus” labor. This critique argues that the only way to break the stranglehold of capitalism is to refuse to participate in the system, changing our politics to embrace a radical Marxism that emphasizes equality and dramatically decreases the importance placed on wealth and property.
Executing on the Capitalism Critique
This critique is particularly strategic for two reasons. First, it links to most affirmative’s on the topic, as the affirmative will rarely address the “root cause” of the capitalist system, but will instead tinker with the specifics of US deployment practices. Secondly, it is conceptually fairly simple and supported by very good evidence. Unlike other critiques with very difficult to understand literature designed to confuse your opponents and judge, this criticism is somewhat more intuitive. Winning on this critique requires attention to winning a few key arguments. First, you should win that capitalism will collapse in the long-run as we run out of resources and the profit motive runs up against intrinsic resource constraints. You should also win that this collapse will be violent and risk extinction. Then, you can argue that we should transition immediately, rather than wait for the collapse. Secondly, you should argue that whatever the affirmative does, it is an ineffective band-aid on a fundamentally flawed system. Since many affirmatives will on-face look like a “good” idea, you need to win that only a focus on addressing the cause of exploitation can solve, and anything short of this is a distraction for anti-capitalist movements. To make this link stronger, the negative should also argue that the affirmative “masks” the problem by making it look like we’ve solved the harms while ignoring the system that produced them in the first place.
Lastly, you should make sure to win that capitalism is, in fact, harmful. Many affirmative teams will choose to argue that capitalism is good and important for economic growth, environmental protection, or individual liberty. They will also argue that alternatives to capitalism exacerbate many of the problems with it. So, the negative should make sure to argue that capitalism makes war and extinction inevitable in the long run – so that the alternative is the only chance to remedy the harms and create a more equitable society.
Capitalism K 1NC
Calls for troop withdrawal miss the more fundamental truth that capitalism structures the very conditions for global violence – they treat a symptom, not a cause.
Greg Burris, instructor at Istanbul Bilgi U., 4-14-2010, “Coping with Capitalism,” Bear Market News,
This is, of course, not to say that therapy does not work. To the contrary, therapeutic practices like meditation, religious experience, and spirituality can, in fact, serve as effective coping methods. But this is precisely what makes them so dangerous. By soothing our symptomatic aches, these treatments act as a kind of anesthetic, dulling the pain and diverting our attention away from the systemic causes of our unpleasant maladies. As Dana Cloud put it in her study Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics, “the therapeutic […] dislocates political conflicts onto individuals or families, privatizes both the experience of oppression and possible modes of resistance to it, and translates political questions into psychological issues to be resolved through personal, psychological change.”6 Thus, while therapy may indeed deliver instant gratification, such remedies remain incredibly short-sighted as long as they address problems only at the level of the individual and do not point towards the larger, structural causes behind the bothersome symptoms. What happens, then, if we take these observations yet a step further and apply them to the realm of politics? Does the same lesson not also pertain to typical attitudes towards the global “war on terror”? If our wars abroad are, by themselves, the cause of our various societal ills, then we just simply need to get out. While the general call for withdrawal is one that all who are concerned for human life should wholeheartedly endorse, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture. Blaming the war entirely for today’s various problems is far too easy, and such a diagnosis acts to obscure the raw truth that merely withdrawing from Afghanistan or Iraq without also addressing those wars’ structural causes will do nothing to prevent the next conflict. Indeed, to treat the wars simply as a misguided policy decision or as a monstrous aberration serves only to hide the sinister reality that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were, in fact, created by the political and economic structures of our very own society. Ignoring this while simultaneously indulging in the happy consumerist fantasy would be tantamount to treating constipation with Žižek’s chocolate laxative. The path to war begins at home, and we must recognize that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are also symptoms — symptoms of the capitalist empire.
Resist the affirmative’s call to “do something” – this is just a way to justify the prevailing order
Adria Johnston, research fellow at Emory, December 2004, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, v. 9, i. 3, p. 259
The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.
Capitalism K 1NC Cont’d
Capitalism creates a world of pure death where all violence is possible
Internationalist Perspective, Spring 2000, “Capitalism and Genocide”, #36, Accessed 4/29/09,
Mass death, and genocide, the deliberate and systematic extermination of whole groups of human beings, have become an integral part of the social landscape of capitalism in its phase of decadence. Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima are not merely the names of discrete sites where human beings have been subjected to forms of industrialized mass death, but synecdoches for the death-world that is a component of the capitalist mode of production in this epoch. In that sense, I want to argue that the Holocaust, for example, was not a Jewish catastrophe, nor an atavistic reversion to the barbarism of a past epoch, but rather an event produced by the unfolding of the logic of capitalism itself. Moreover, Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima are not "past", but rather futural events, objective-real possibilities on the Front of history, to use concepts first articulated by the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. The ethnic cleansing which has been unleashed in Bosnia and Kosovo, the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, the mass death to which Chechnya has been subjected, the prospect for a nuclear war on the Indian sub-continent, are so many examples of the future which awaits the human species as the capitalist mode of production enters a new millenium. Indeed, it is just such a death-world that constitutes the meaning of one pole of the historic alternative which Rosa Luxemburg first posed in the midst of the slaughter inflicted on masses of conscripts during World War I: socialism or barbarism!
Capitalism K 1NC
Resisting capitalism is your primary ethical responsibility
Slajov Zizek, philosopher and Glyn Daly, 2004, Conversations with Zizek, p. 14-16
For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost istic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite . That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.
Alternative: Reject the affirmative and embrace the logic of anti-capitalist critique.
Only critique can throw off the shackles of capitalism
Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College. 2000. Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” Pg. 141.
Any discussion of the public intellectual, especially in connection with the various crises framing such discussions (of the humanities, of the Left or leftist intellectuals, of the university, of the public sphere) needs to be grounded in the assumption that only as a result of sustained theoretical struggle—the contention of foundational claims made exoteric—will any genuine critique emerge from the site of theory. Also, it will only be possi¬ble to do anything more than conceal the roots of the aforementioned cri¬sis if such critiques make visible the polemics constitutive of the public sphere and if they do so by siding with the polemic of theory against com¬mon sense. This, of course, requires implicating common sense in the op¬erations of global capitalism through ideology critique. Only in this way, by defending the public “rights” of theory and the theoretical grounds of politics, will it be possible to explain anything, that is, to offer critiques of ideology and expose the structures of violence appearing (anti)politically.
Capitalism K 1NC Cont’d
Doing nothing solves better – continuing to act will just replicate the affirmative harms
Slavoj Zizek, famous philosopher, 2004, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, p. 71
The stance of simply condemning the postmodern Left for its accommodation, however, is also false, since one should ask the obvious difficult question: what, in fact, was the alternative? If today’s ‘post-politics’ is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant leftist reaction to it can be aptly characterized as ‘principle opportunism’: one simply sticks to old formulae (defence of the welfare state, and so on) and calls them ‘principles’, dispensing with the detailed analysis of how the situation has changed – and thus retaining one’s position of Beautiful Soul. The inherent stupidity of the ‘principled’ Left is clearly discernable in it standard criticism of any analysis which proposes a more complex picture of the situation, renouncing any simple prescriptions on how to act: ‘there is no clear political stance involved in your theory’ – and this from people with no stance but their ‘principled opportunism’. Against such a stance, one should have the courage to affirm that, in a situation like today’s, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. Today’s predicament is that, if we succumb to the urge of directly ‘doing something’ (engaging in the anti-globalist struggle, helping the poor…) we will certainly and undoubtedly contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to ‘do nothing’ – thus opening up the space for a different kind of activity.
Uniqueness – Capitalism Is Collapsing
Capitalism is collapsing – financial shifts ensure
Michale Parenti, 4-26-2010, “Capitalism’s Apocalypse,” No Lies Radio,
Parenti predicted the financial crisis and said that giant corporate capitalism - by it’s very nature - is an apocalyptic system. When unregulated the built in elements of ever increased growth may well bring the whole system down. And he described the growing national debt not as a tragic mistake but as a means to shift ever more money from the tax payers to the financial institutions in the form of interest payments. This speech is an analysis of the many structural flaws of a capitalist system that puts it on a permanent collision course with democracy.
Capitalism is dead – the bourgeoisie has used up all of their lifelines.
Eduardo Smith, 1-27-2009, “The Economic Crisis: State Capitalism Is Running Out of Room for Manoeuvre,” Internationalism no 149,
Yet given the fact that so far the bourgeoisie has failed to contain the crisis, the odds for Obama's success are definitely not good. Nothing in the toolkit used by the doctors of moribund capitalism seems to have worked so far. After uncountable monetary and fiscal gimmicks -the Fed's key interest rate is close to being negative, trillions of dollars have been injected into the financial system, the federal budget deficit has ballooned to over one trillion dollars - the economy just keeps getting worse. The financial system is still in shambles, while the so-called real economy is getting worse by the day. Economic production and commodity sales are rapidly falling, bringing with them a wave of company bankruptcies and a massive upsurge in the numbers of workers being laid off throughout all the sectors of the economy. Although there are still no comprehensive figures about the economic performance during the past holiday season, all estimates predict historically low sales, while the last official figures on unemployment have the unemployed rate running at a 7.2 percent, the highest in the last 16 years
Collapse inevitable – this recession is the end of a 40 year process of decent
Eduardo Smith, 1-27-2009, “The Economic Crisis: State Capitalism Is Running Out of Room for Manoeuvre,” Internationalism no 149,
As we have often pointed out the present economic slump is just one moment in the open crisis of capitalism that started at the end of the 1960's, and that has only gotten worse ever since, despite the "recoveries" which follow the progressively worse "recessions" over the last four decades. Throughout these years -up to now - state capitalist policies have been able to avoid a dramatic collapse similar to that of the great depression, but only at the price of aggravating on the long term capitalism chronic crisis. Thus the ongoing recession -in America and throughout the world - with its dramatic shakeup in the financial system and its apparent unresponsiveness to the government economic manipulation, expresses the reckoning with reality of a system in crisis kept artificially alive by state capitalist policies. Let us be clear, the policies being prepared by Obama's bright boys are not new, they are variants of the same capitalist policies implemented by the state at one moment or another during the last four decades and that were widely used before during FDR's Depression era. However the failure of this state capitalist economic toolkit to work its magic and keep this moribund system alive is what gives the present world economic slump its true historical significance. And this does not bode well for the Obama's administration. If anything, the margin of maneuver that the state has today to manipulate the economy is far more reduced than what the bourgeoisie had in the 30's.
Link – Anti-War
The affirmative’s anti-war call is just grease for the capitalist machine – ignores the underlying structural violence at the root of their harms
Greg Burris, instructor at Istanbul Bilgi U., 4-14-2010, “Coping with Capitalism,” Bear Market News,
Thus, in the same way that Fanon’s torturer wanted to carry on with his business of torturing, just without the bothersome nightmares, does not the liberal anti-war movement today seek to carry on with the business of capitalism, just without its malignant symptoms? Indeed, the economic disparities and grievances that lie behind many of the globe’s acts of violence — both by states and by terrorists — are never really addressed. To do so would, in fact, require a fundamental rethinking of the capitalist fabric of the US state, something nobody within the system is willing to do. To truly address these issues would require that we treat the cause of the symptoms rather than just the symptoms. Or, to put it another way, if we want to end the wars that are caused by capitalism, we must work to overturn the capitalist system itself. Just like those people who think they can lose weight merely by gorging on “healthy” junk food and just like Fanon’s torturer who wanted to cure his nightmares through therapy, those who today believe they can continue to enjoy their capitalist cake and eat it too — just without the unpleasantries of terrorism, torture, and war — are only kidding themselves.
Anti-war movements are too weak to be anti-imperialism
Sam Ashman, Spring 2003, “The anti-capitalist movement and the war,” Int’l Socialism Journal, Iss. 98,
Anti-war activity is now taking place all over the US. Church groups, veterans, families of soldiers, Arabs, blacks, all are present on the protests. There are fewer Muslims involved, largely because of the fear instilled by a viciously racist campaign against them since 11 September which has seen thousands of immigrants rounded up, fingerprinted and/or deported. Reports of the demonstrations all talk of handmade placards saying 'Inspect Bush' and 'Regime Change Begins at Home'. In San Diego--the most militarised city in the country--there have been regular anti-war rallies of over 2,000 people, most of them as big as the largest anti Vietnam War demonstrations. There are weekly demonstrations and vigils and rallies in neighbourhoods and on campuses. An anti-war march in Pittsburgh of 5,000 people was described by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette as 'the largest peace rally in Pittsburgh since the Vietnam War era... Disparate groups--children, teens, senior citizens, long-time lefties, newcomers, anarchists, nuns and veterans--took part in the event.' Among activists there is a sense that they can now go on the offensive, that what they do really counts. The common sense of this movement is 'no war for oil' but the general weakness of the left within it means that a broader analysis of imperialism is not at the heart of the movement.
Anti-War movements fail even when they succeed – don’t know how to cope with marginal victories
David Graeber, 1-31-2008, “The Shock of Victory,” The End OF Capitalism,
The biggest problem facing direct action movements is that we don’t know how to handle victory. This might seem an odd thing to say because of a lot of us haven’t been feeling particularly victorious of late. Most anarchists today feel the global justice movement was kind of a blip: inspiring, certainly, while it lasted, but not a movement that succeeded either in putting down lasting organizational roots or transforming the contours of power in the world. The anti-war movement was even more frustrating, since anarchists and anarchist tactics were largely marginalized. The war will end, of course, but that’s just because wars always do. No one is feeling they contributed much to it. I want to suggest an alternative interpretation. Let me lay out three initial propositions here: 1) Odd though it may seem, the ruling classes live in fear of us. They appear to still be haunted by the possibility that, if average Americans really get wind of what they’re up to, they might all end up hanging from trees. It know it seems implausible but it’s hard to come up with any other explanation for the way they go into panic mode the moment there is any sign of mass mobilization, and especially mass direct action, and usually try to distract attention by starting some kind of war. 2) In a way this panic is justified. Mass direct action—especially when organized on democratic lines—is incredibly effective. Over the last thirty years in America, there have been only two instances of mass action of this sort: the anti-nuclear movement in the late ‘70s, and the so called “anti-globalization” movement from roughly 1999-2001. In each case, the movement’s main political goals were reached far more quickly than almost anyone involved imagined possible. 3) The real problem such movements face is that they always get taken by surprise by the speed of their initial success. We are never prepared for victory. It throws us into confusion. We start fighting each other. The ratcheting of repression and appeals to nationalism that inevitably accompanies some new round of war mobilization then plays into the hands of authoritarians on every side of the political spectrum. As a result, by the time the full impact of our initial victory becomes clear, we’re usually too busy feeling like failures to even notice it.
Link – Iraq
Opposing the war in Iraq allows the capitalist machine to reproduce itself
Slavoj Zizek, famous philosopher, November 2007, “Resistance Is Surrender,” London Review of Books,
These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’
Even if protest movements CAN be successful, anti-Iraq movements just reinforce capitalism
Slavoj Zizek, famous philosopher, November 2007, “Resistance Is Surrender,” London Review of Books,
My opinion is that the left is not able to offer a true alternative to global capitalism. Yes, it is true that ‘capitalism will not be around for ever’ (it is the advocates of the new politics of resistance who think that capitalism and the democratic state are here to stay); it will not be able to cope with the antagonisms it produces. But there is a gap between this negative insight and a basic positive vision. I do not think that today’s candidates – the anti-globalisation movement etc – do the job. So what are we to do? Everything possible (and impossible), just with a proper dose of modesty, avoiding moralising self-satisfaction. I am aware that when the left builds a protest movement, one should not measure its success by the degree to which its specific demands are met: more important than achieving the immediate target is the raising of critical awareness and finding new ways to organise. However, I don’t think this holds for protests against the war in Iraq, which fitted all too smoothly the space allotted to ‘democratic protests’ by the hegemonic state and ideological order. Which is why they did not, even minimally, scare those in power. Afterwards, both government and protesters felt smug, as if each side had succeeded in making its point.
War in Iraq was fought to further capitalism – the physical violence of militarism was just the beginning
SDAC, 2-4-2009, “Anarchists Call For Protest,” Philadelphia Independent Media Center, Self Described Anarchist Collective,
War and occupation and capitalism and imperialism are inextricably linked in the global race for the accumulation of wealth and power. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and their sister institutions have played a vital role in ensuring the preservation of that relationship. Shortly after the war in Iraq began, the IMF inserted itself into the war-torn land by imposing a series of Stand By Agreements to restructure the Iraqi economy. In predictable IMF neoliberal style, these agreements removed public subsidies on fuel and oil, causing the price of food and basic necessities to skyrocket. They also cut pensions for retirees, capped public sector worker wages while simultaneously firing hundreds of thousands of government employees, and privatized most state-owned enterprises. It wasn't enough for the US to physically destroy and occupy Iraq; they had to bring in the banks and financiers to ensure that even after the physical violence has ended, economic violence and occupation will reign supreme.
Link – Afghanistan
War in Afghanistan is just an attempt to extend free market neoliberalism to the Middle East
Patrick Weiniger, 1-13-2008, “Afghanistan,” Socialist Alternative,
The war in Afghanistan could not be more disastrous, both for the long-suffering people of that country, but also for the chief aggressor: the United States. And 2007 was the bloodiest year of the war - so far. As with every war in the history of capitalism, its proponents cloak their real aims with high-minded and noble-sounding phrases. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - just like the slaughter of World War I, the Vietnam War and countless other conflicts - were sold as battles for freedom, liberty, democracy, good vs. evil and so on. The Bush administration is hardly original in its rhetoric. The professed concern for the lives of the occupied peoples is patently false. It is estimated that these occupations have caused over one million casualties, as well as establishing a permanent legacy of death and deformity by the use of weaponry enhanced with depleted uranium. The American elite care little about human suffering. They are committed to the free market, neo-liberal economy policies that have seen a massive global increase in extreme poverty. They were quick to apply this economic dogma to their newly conquered Middle Eastern possessions. Companies like Halliburton made mega-profits for failing to provide services and infrastructure. Today, the war in Iraq is totally discredited. The US overstretched itself trying to link Saddam and bin Laden, and even more so, in inventing stories about WMDs. The lies were necessary because the genuine reasons for the war were so perverse and cynical. Chiefly, the war was about the US ruling class trying to extend its power in the world. In this case they were seeking to rewrite the geo-political map in the oil-rich, and strategically important, Middle East.
Afghanistan is just the outgrowth of imperialism – we fight wars to prop up capitalism
Patrick Weiniger, 1-13-2008, “Afghanistan,” Socialist Alternative,
Afghanistan and Iraq are essentially different theatres of the same American war. The US occupies both countries for the same reasons. Indeed the entire "war on terror" flows from the logic of imperialism. Imperialist military conflict is the inevitable extension of the economic competition upon which capitalism is based. Major companies rely on the states in which they are based to use their muscle to secure access to raw materials like oil, and to arrange favourable terms of trade with other nations. Imperialism is primarily about competition between the most powerful states in the world. And military strength is the ultimate arbiter of power between these states. This becomes clear when one considers how the victors of World War II were able to divide up the globe as they pleased at the conclusion of the war. The US and its ally Britain on the one hand, and the USSR on the other hand, simply carved up key sections of the world into "spheres of influence". Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has been the world's sole superpower. But as its economic position vis-à-vis other major capitalist nations has declined, the US has become increasingly reliant on its unsurpassed military might to shore up its dominance.
Link – Afghanistan Cont’d
War on Afghanistan props up the US ruling class – just an attempt to maintain global hegemony
Patrick Weiniger, 1-13-2008, “Afghanistan,” Socialist Alternative,
The Afghan and Iraq wars were conceived by the US ruling class primarily as a reaction to the prospect of US global hegemony being challenged, either by an integrated Europe, a resurgent Russia, or most pressingly, by ascendant China. When Bush declared after 9/11 that "you are either with us or with the terrorists", he was effectively telling the rulers of all other nations that they must accept the right of the US to govern the world. Very few of these rulers felt able to challenge this statement at the time. But instead of ushering in a renaissance of US hegemony, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had actually seen a diminishing of US power. The reason is that the people of these countries have resisted in a most determined fashion. It has been possible to say with complete certainty for at least the last three years that the chance of the US salvaging some sort of victory in Iraq is zero. As for Afghanistan, the occupation is now in its eighth year, with the insurgency continuing to gain strength. The US-puppet government has no legitimacy in the country, and no control over most of it. As the left-wing commentator Tariq Ali put it recently: "To sum up the situation in Afghanistan, it's a total mess. The US can never win that war, and the main reason they can never win is that Afghans don't like being occupied. Afghans kicked out the British in the 19th century, the Russians in the 20th century, and now they're fighting again against the US and its NATO allies". Indeed, it is the right of the Afghan people, and the people of Iraq, to resist the subjugation of their country. Rather than admit defeat, the Bush administration has continued to obliterate thousands of US lives, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan lives. And the Democrats who control US Congress have done literally nothing to obstruct this process. In fact, many key Democrats like Barack Obama have participated in preparing the ground politically for a possible future attack on Iran. Frighteningly, there are precedents from the last 40 years of the US lashing out when faced with inevitable defeat in a war. Even though the US had clearly lost in Vietnam by 1968, they not only persisted until 1975, but actually extended the conflict into Cambodia. We can therefore say with complete justification that the US military machine is the greatest threat to the peoples of the Middle East and central Asia. And the words of Martin Luther King during the Vietnam era, that the US government is "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world", have never been more true than today. For this reason, socialists oppose the entire phoney "war on terror". And we oppose any Australian support for America's war. Australia's involvement in the disaster in Afghanistan is no mere token undertaking. The roughly 1000 troops deployed there play an active operational role. That is, they carry out killings, and themselves come under fire. Three troops have been killed in combat in recent months. Furthermore, the Australian Defence Force has had to abandon its previous attempts at a cover-up, and publicly release a report into the suicide last February of a soldier who had served in Afghanistan. The Melbourne Age noted on January 10 that the young man "was struggling to overcome post-traumatic stress disorder incurred after shooting a man dead in Afghanistan and telling others of how he had seen a child raped". The troops stationed in Afghanistan have not and will not be able to achieve anything, other than to do some of the dirty work of the US ruling class. They are assisting in one part of a global war that has involved routine torture at the Abu Ghraib prison, the gulag of Guantánamo Bay, 25,000 US troop suicides, a million dead Iraqis, and the diversion of trillions of dollars into military spending that ought to have been spent on alleviating poverty and fixing the climate crisis.
Link – Hegemony
US hegemony just props up the capitalist system – will inevitably collapse
Nick Beams, member of International Editorial Board and National Secretary of Australian Socialist Equality Party, 2003 “The Political Economy of American Militarism, part 2” July 2, articles/2003/jul2003/nb2-j11_prn.shtml
The immediate impetus for the drive to global domination by the US is rooted in the crisis of capitalist accumulation, expressed in the persistent downward pressure on the rate of profit and the failure of the most strenuous efforts over the past 25 years to overcome it. But it is more than this. At the most fundamental level, the eruption of US imperialism represents a desperate attempt to overcome, albeit in a reactionary manner, the central contradiction that has bedeviled the capitalist system for the best part of the last century.The US came to economic and political ascendancy as World War I exploded. The war, as Trotsky analysed, was rooted in the contradiction between the development of the productive forces on a global scale and the division of the world among competing great powers. Each of these powers sought to resolve the contradiction by establishing its own ascendancy, thereby coming into collision with its rivals. The Russian Revolution, conceived of and carried forward as the first step in the international socialist revolution, was the first attempt of a detachment of the working class to resolve the contradiction between world economy and the outmoded nation-state framework on a progressive basis. Ultimately, the forces of capitalism proved too strong and the working class, as a result of a tragic combination of missed opportunities and outright betrayals, was unable to carry this program forward. But the historical problem that had erupted with such volcanic force—the necessity to reorganise the globally developed productive forces of mankind on a new and higher foundation, to free them from the destructive fetters of private property and the nation-state system—did not disappear. It was able to be suppressed for a period. But the very development of capitalist production itself ensured that it would come to the surface once again, even more explosively than in the past. The US conquest of Iraq must be placed within this historical and political context. The drive for global domination represents the attempt by American imperialism to resolve the central contradiction of world capitalism by creating a kind of global American empire, operating according to the rules of the “free market” interpreted in accordance with the economic needs and interests of US capital, and policed by its military and the military forces of its allies. This deranged vision of global order was set out by Bush in his address to West Point graduates on June 1, 2002. The US, he said, now had the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to “build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.” Competition between great nations was inevitable, but war was not. That was because “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge thereby making the destabilising arms races of other eras pointless and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.” This proposal to reorganise the world is even more reactionary than when it was first advanced in 1914. The US push for global domination, driven on as it is by the crisis in the very heart of the profit system, cannot bring peace, much less prosperity, but only deepening attacks on the world’s people, enforced by military and dictatorial forms of rule.
US hegemony only exists to further global capitalism through military interventions
John Bellamy Foster, editor of the Monthly Review, December 2001, “Imperialism and ‘Empire’,” The Monthly Review, Vol 53, No 7,
At the present stage of the global development of capital, Mészáros insists, “it is no longer possible to avoid facing up to a fundamental contradiction and structural limitation of the system. That limitation is its grave failure to constitute the state of the capital system as such, as complementary to its transnational aspirations and articulation.” Thus it is here that “the United States dangerously bent on assuming the role of the state of the capital system as such, subsuming under itself by all means at its disposal all rival powers,” enters in, as the closest thing to a “state of the capital system.” (pp. 28-29). But the United States, while it was able to bring a halt to the decline in its economic position relative to the other leading capitalist states, is unable to achieve sufficient economic dominance by itself to govern the world system—which is, in any case, ungovernable. It therefore seeks to utilize its immense military power to establish its global preeminence.* “What is at stake today,” Mészáros writes, is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal. This is what the ultimate rationality of globally developed capital requires, in its vain attempt to bring under control its irreconcilable antagonisms. The trouble is, though, that such rationality—which can be written without inverted commas, since it genuinely corresponds to the logic of capital at the present historical stage of global development-—is at the same time the most extreme irrationality in history, including the Nazi conception of world domination, as far as the conditions required for the survival of humanity are concerned (pp. 37-38).
Link – Hegemony Cont’d
Global wars are just an outgrowth of US hegemonic attempts to further the capitalist order
John Bellamy Foster, editor of the Monthly Review, December 2001, “Imperialism and ‘Empire’,” The Monthly Review, Vol 53, No 7,
Among the disquieting developments that Socialism or Barbarism points to are: the enormous toll in Iraqi civilian causalities during the war on Iraq and the death of more than a half million children as a result of sanctions since the war; the military onslaught on and occupation of the Balkans; the expansion of NATO to the East; the new U.S. policy of employing NATO as an offensive military force that can substitute for the United Nations; U.S. attempts to further circumvent and undermine the United Nations; the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; the development of the Japan-U.S. Security treaty aimed at China; and the growth of an aggressive U.S. military stance with regard to China—increasingly seen as the emerging rival superpower. Over the longer run even the present apparent harmony between the United States and the European Union cannot be taken for granted, as the United States continues to pursue its quest for global domination. Nor is there an answer to this problem within the system at this stage in the development of capital. Globalization, Mészáros argues, has made a global state imperative for capital, but the inherent character of capital’s social metabolic process, which demands a plurality of capitals, makes this impossible. “The potentially deadliest phase of imperialism” thus has to do with the expanding circle of barbarism and destruction that such conditions are bound to produce.
Link – Law
Reliance on the law guarantees the rapid spread of capitalism.
Internationalist Perspective, Spring 2000, “Capitalism and Genocide”, #36, Accessed 4/29/09,
The real domination of capital is characterized by the penetration of the law of value into every segment of social existence. As Georg Lukács put it in his History and Class Consciousness, this means that the commodity ceases to be "one form among many regulating the metabolism of human society," to become its "universal structuring principle." From its original locus at the point of production, in the capitalist factory, which is the hallmark of the formal domination of capital, the law of value has systematically spread its tentacles to incorporate not just the production of commodities, but their circulation and consumption. Moreover, the law of value also penetrates and then comes to preside over the spheres of the political and ideological, including science and technology themselves. This latter occurs not just through the transformation of the fruits of technology and science into commodities, not just through the transformation of technological and scientific research itself (and the institutions in which it takes place) into commodities, but also, and especially, through what Lukács designates as the infiltration of thought itself by the purely technical, the very quantification of rationality, the instrumentalization of reason; and, I would argue, the reduction of all beings (including human beings) to mere objects of manipulation and control. As Lukács could clearly see even in the age of Taylorism, "this rational mechanisation extends right into the worker's `soul'." In short, it affects not only his outward behavior, but her very internal, psychological, makeup.
Relying on the rule of law makes capitalism stronger than ever.
Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher University of Ljubljana, October 1997, New Left Review, Accessed 4/29/09,
Nonetheless, the post-Nation-State logic of capital remains the Real which lurks in the background, while all three main leftist reactions to the process of globalization—liberal multiculturalism; the attempt to embrace populism by way of discerning, beneath its fundamentalist appearance, the resistance against ‘instrumental reason’; the attempt to keep open the space of the political—seem inappropriate. Although the last approach is based on the correct insight about the complicity between multiculturalism and fundamentalism, it avoids the crucial question: how are we to reinvent political space in today’s conditions of globalization? The politicization of the series of particular struggles which leaves intact the global process of capital is clearly not sufficient. What this means is that one should reject the opposition which, within the frame of late capitalist liberal democracy, imposes itself as the main axis of ideological struggle: the tension between ‘open’ post-ideological universalist liberal tolerance and the particularist ‘new fundamentalisms’. Against the liberal centre which presents itself as neutral and post-ideological, relying on the rule of the Law, one should reassert the old leftist motif of the necessity to suspend the neutral space of Law.
Failure to focus on the economy props up capitalism
Slavoj Zizek, famous philosopher, 1999, The Ticklish Subject, p. 356
Of course, one should fully acknowledge the tremendous liberating impact of the postmodern politicization of domains which were hitherto considered apolitical (feminism, gay and politics, ecology, ethnic and other so-called minority issues): the fact that these issues not only became perceived as inherently political but also gave birth to new forms of political subjectivization thoroughly reshaped our entire political and cultural landscape. So the point is not to play down this tremendous advance in favour of the return to some new version of so-called economic essentialism; the point is, rather, that the depoliticization of the economy generates the populist Right with its Moral Majority ideology, which today is the main obstacle to the realization of the very (feminist, ecological. . .) demands on which postmodern forms of political subjectiv¬ization focus. In short, I am pleading for a 'return to the primacy of the economy' not to the detriment of the issues raised by postmodern forms of politicization, but precisely in order to create the conditions for the more effective realization of feminist, ecological, and so on, demands.
Capitalism Bad – War
Capitalism leads to war and extinction
Istvan Mezaros, Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex, April 2000, Socialism or Barbarism, p. 37-38
The military dimension of all this must be taken very seriously. It is no exaggeration to say-in view of the formerly quite unimaginable destructive power of armaments accumulated in the second half of the twentieth century-that we have entered the most dangerous phase of imperialism in all history. For what is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet-no matter how large-putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means-even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones -at its disposal. This is what the ultimate rationality of globally developed capital requires, in its vain attempt to bring under control its irreconcilable antagonisms. The trouble is, though, that such rationality-which can be written without inverted commas, since it genuinely corresponds to the logic of capital at the present historical stage of global development-is at the same time the most extreme form of irrationality in history, including the Nazi conception of world domination, as far as the conditions required for the survival of humanity are concerned. When Jonas Salk refused to patent his discovery, the polio vaccine, insisting that it would be like wanting "to patent the sun," he could not imagine that the time would come when capital would attempt to do just that, trying to patent not only the sun but also the air, even if that had to be coupled with dismissing any concern about the mortal dangers which such aspirations and actions carried with them for human survival. For the ultimate logic of capital in its processes of decision making can only be of a categorically authoritarian "top-down" variety, from the microcosms of small economic enterprises to the highest levels of political and military decisionmaking. But how can one enforce the patents taken out on the sun and the air? There are two prohibitive obstacles in this regard, even if capital-in its drive to demolish its own untranscendable limits- must refuse to acknowledge them. The first is that the plurality of capitals cannot be eliminated, no matter how inexorable and brutal the monopolistic trend of development manifest in the system. And the second, that the corresponding plurality of social labor cannot be eliminated, so as to turn the total labor force of humankind, with all its national and sectional varieties and divisions, into the mindless "obedient servant" of the hegemonically dominant section of capital. For labor in its insurmountable plurality can never abdicate its right of access to the air and the sun; and even less can it survive for capital's continued benefit-an absolute must for this mode of controlling social metabolic reproduction-without the sun and the air.
Capitalism can only result in unending war
Samir Amin, director of the Third World Forum in Senegal, 2004, The Liberal Virus, pg. 23-4
In fact, the global expansion of capitalism, because it is polar¬izing, always implies the political intervention of the dominant powers, that is, the states of the system’s center, in the societies of the dominated periphery. This expansion cannot occur by the’ force of economic laws alone; it is necessary to complement that with political support (and military, if necessary) from states in the service of dominant capital. In this sense, the expansion is always entirely imperialist even in the meaning that Negri gives to the term (“the projection of national power beyond its fron¬tiers,” on condition of specifying that this power belongs to cap¬ital). In this sense, the contemporary intervention of the United States is no less imperialist than were the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century Washington’s objective in Iraq, for exam¬ple, (and tomorrow elsewhere) is to put in place a dictatorship in the service of American capital (and not a “democracy”), enabling the pillage of the country’s natural resources, and noth¬ing more. The globalized “liberal” economic order requires per¬manent war—military interventions endlessly succeeding one another—as the only means to submit the peoples of the periph¬ery to its demands.
Capitalism makes genocidal violence inevitable.
Internationalist Perspective, Spring 2000, “Capitalism and Genocide”, #36, Accessed 4/29/09,
The immanent tendencies of the capitalist mode of production which propel it towards a catastrophic economic crisis, also drive it towards mass murder and genocide. In that sense, the death-world, and the prospect of an Endzeit cannot be separated from the continued existence of humanity's subordination to the law of value. Reification, the overmanned world, bio-politics, state racism, the constitution of a pure community directed against alterity, each of them features of the economic and ideological topography of the real domination of capital, create the possibility and the need for genocide. We should have no doubt that the survival of capitalism into this new millenium will entail more and more frequent recourse to mass murder.
Capitalism Bad – Genocidal Violence
Capitalism is responsible for genocide and violence.
Internationalist Perspective, Spring 2000, “Capitalism and Genocide”, #36, Accessed 4/29/09,
Marxism is in need of a theory of mass death and genocide as immanent tendencies of capital, a way of comprehending the link (still obsure) between the death-world symbolized by the smokestacks of Auschwitz or the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima and the unfolding of the logic of a mode of production based on the capitalist law of value. I want to argue that we can best grasp the link between capitalism and genocide by focusing on two dialectically inter-related strands in the social fabric of late capitalism: first, are a series of phenomena linked to the actual unfolding of the law of value, and more specifically to the completion of the transition from the formal to the real domination of capital; second, are a series of phenomena linked to the political and ideological (this latter understood in a non-reductionist sense, as having a material existence) moments of the rule of capital, specifically to the forms of capitalist hegemony. It is through an analysis of the coalescence of vital elements of these two strands in the development of capital, that I hope to expose the bases for the death-world and genocide as integral features of capitalism in the present epoch.
Capitalism creates a system that rewards genocidal violence.
Joel Kovel, Professor at Bard, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, P. 141
Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally. When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom¬panied by a racist drumbeat; for global capital, the losses are regrettable necessities.
Capitalism creates a world of genocidal biopolitics were unending violence is unstoppable.
Internationalist Perspective, Spring 2000, “Capitalism and Genocide”, #36, Accessed 4/29/09,
The other side of bio-politics, of this power over life, for Foucault, is what he terms "thanatopolitics," entailing an awesome power to inflict mass death, both on the population of one's enemy, and on one's own population: "the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. .... If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers ... it is because power is situated at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." Nuclear, chemical, and biological, weapons make it possible to wield this power to condemn whole populations to death. Bio-politics, for Foucault, also necessarily entails racism, by which he means making a cut in the biological continuum of human life, designating the very existence of a determinate group as a danger to the population, to its health and well-being, and even to its very life. Such a group, I would argue, then, becomes a biological (in the case of Nazism) or class enemy (in the case of Stalinism, though the latter also claimed that biological and hereditary characteristics were linked to one's class origins). And the danger represented by such an enemy race can necessitate its elimination through physical removal (ethnic cleansing) or extermination (genocide).
Capitalism Bad – Environment
Capitalism will cause eco-doom by 2013 through global warming
Minqi Li, teaches economics at the University of Utah, August 2008, “Climate Change, Limits to Growth, and the Imperative for Socialism,” The Monthly Review,
The 2007 assessment report by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirms that it is virtually certain that human activities (mainly through the use of fossil fuels and land development) have been responsible for the global warming that has taken place since the industrial revolution. Under current economic and social trends, the world is on a path to unprecedented ecological catastrophes.1 As the IPCC report was being released, new evidence emerged suggesting that climate change is taking place at a much faster pace and the potential consequences are likely to be far more dreadful than is suggested by the IPCC report. The current evidence suggests that the Arctic Ocean could become ice free in summertime possibly as soon as 2013, about one century ahead of what is predicted by the IPCC models. With the complete melting of the Arctic summer sea ice, the disintegration of the Greenland ice sheets may become unavoidable, threatening to raise the sea level by five meters or more within this century. About half of the world’s fifty largest cities are at risk and hundreds of millions of people will become environmental refugees.2
Should let capitalism collapse now instead of later – key to save the environment
Glen, Barry, PhD, the President and Founder of Ecological Internet, January 4, 2008 “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology,”
We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon. A successful revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus upon bringing down the Earth's industrial economy now. As society continues to fail miserably to implement necessary changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to achieve global ecological sustainability is economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more fragile than it looks.
Capitalisim isn’t sustainable – collapse is inevitable
Barbara Harriss-White, Development Studies Prof @ Oxford, 2006, “Undermining Sustainable Capitalism,” Socialist Register, files/ecolbhweh19Oct06.doc
Capitalism is not fixing the environment. It is not able to, either in theory or in historical practice. Market-driven politics has ensured that renewable energy remains far from the point where it might start to form any kind of technological base, either for an alternative model of capitalist development (in the UK or in an engagement with large developing countries which are about to enter a highly polluting phase of industrialisation ), or for the remoralised and equitable allocations argued for by Altvater. In energy, there is no sign of the politics able to generate a new kind of social, non-market regulation of money and nature. Sustainable capitalism is a fiction and the politics of renewable energy are merely a reflection of the fiction.
AT: Capitalism Good
Capitalism isn’t key to space – just a tactic to divert attention from exploitation
Julien Tort, UNESCO, July 28 2005, Working paper for the Ethical Working Group on Astrobiology and Planetary Protection of ESA (EWG) “Exploration and Exploitation: Lessons Learnt from the Renaissance for Space Conquest”
The scenario in which extraterrestrial room is used as a response to the degradation of the terrestrial environment also leads us to the second question that may be asked when considering the parallel between the conquest of the West and the exploration of space. While the possibility of colonizing celestial bodies may seem distant, it diverts attention from terrestrial issues in a very real way. The paradigm of the accumulation of Capital is profoundly bound to the pollution and the overexploitation of natural resources. Likening space exploration to the discovery of America may then be misleading and dangerous. There is –most probably— no new earth to be discovered through space conquest and it is, so far, unlikely that any relief can come from outer space for environmental pain. Furthermore, even if the possibility of human settlements on other celestial bodies was likely, would it still be right to neglect the terrestrial environment, with the idea that we can go and live elsewhere when we are done with this specific planet (again a scenario that science fiction likes: see for example the end of Isaac Asimov’s Foundation)? In a way, the presentation of space as a new area for conquest and expansion tends to deny that the model of the limitless exploitation of natural resources is facing a crisis.
Capitalism can’t solve inequality – structural contradictions are inherent
John Bellamy Foster, editor of the Monthly Review, December 2001, “Imperialism and ‘Empire’,” The Monthly Review, Vol 53, No 7,
According to this analysis, the period of capitalism’s historic ascendance has now ended. Capitalism has expanded throughout the globe, but in most of the world it has produced only enclaves of capital. There is no longer any promise of the underdeveloped world as a whole “catching-up” economically with the advanced capitalist countries—or even of sustained economic and social advance in most of the periphery. Living conditions of the vast majority of workers are declining globally. The long structural crisis of the system, since the 1970s, prevents capital from effectively coping with its contradictions, even temporarily. The extraneous help offered by the state is no longer sufficient to boost the system. Hence, capital’s “destructive uncontrollability”— its destruction of previous social relations and its inability to put anything sustainable in their place—is coming more and more to the fore (pp. 19, 61).
AT: Capitalism Good Cont’d
Capitalism isn’t key to growth – drains the GDP with profit
W. J. Kowalski, doctoral candidate in Architectural Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University, March 2000, Anti Capitalism Modern Theory and Historical Origins,
Most companies use resources and human labor to generate profits for absentee owners, whether corporations, sole proprietors, or stockholders. The figure below illustrates the flow of wealth. The company will maintain the highest prices for consumer goods that the market will bear, while simultaneously paying the lowest wages that the workers will tolerate. The company employees receive a fraction of what their true labor is worth while the quality of the overpriced goods is kept at a minimum. The owners, non-working profiteers, will sacrifice even human health and the environment in their greed for excessive profits. In general, owners who do not actively participate in the operations perform no function other than parasitism and the existence of such a practice highlights a fundamental flaw of capitalism -- corporate non-entities are guaranteed the right to profit while human beings do not even have a guaranteed right to subsistence. The pie charts below show the effect of eliminating profits from the average Housing sole proprietorship (see these business statistics for the data on this and other industries). Maximum production requires foregoing profits and, therefore, the elimination of payments to any parties who are not working. Only salaries and expenses can be paid out. In a such a profitless company there is no drain on resources, as illustrated in the figure below, and all resources can be efficiently devoted to increasing production and improving quality. The profitless company is a self-owned entity in which the employees are the stewards. The company becomes an engine for generating essential goods and services and increasing employment. In a profitless system all prices drop to their natural levels and all workers are paid the true value of their labor. The synergy of profitless capitalism is illustrated in the figure below. When a complete range of companies goes profitless and single-source to each other, all of their costs begin dropping. The result is a synergy that could double or quadruple the GDP. The continuous construction of homes and other goods at cost would accelerate the standard of living and provide continuous employment. The reduced consumer costs would make everyone wealthy in the sense that they could live comfortably. Business taxes would also transfer to income taxes from increased employment, and so would not be negatively affected. By putting production before profit on a national scale we would effectively be prioritizing poverty, which is the only cause worth pursuing in the modern world, and implicitly includes the control of all diseases, social and otherwise. In profitless capitalism only those who work are paid although everyone would be guaranteed subsistence. The entire nation would ratchet itself up to a high standard of living without the drain on the economy produced by profiteering. The rich could keep what they have, but they would no longer be paid for doing nothing. Without interest paid on loans or capitalized funds being held in suspension, all available credit dollars would end up financing growth and production and thereby keep employment universal. The beauty of profitless capitalism is that it puts all the people to work directly for their own benefit. Instead of the fruits of their labors being drained off as profits and diverted to useless enterprise, their efforts are immediately and directly used for improving the quality of life. The people would be actively solving all of their most pressing problems instead of sitting in stagnation. All of this from a simple shift of paradigm.
Alternative Solves – General
Only the alternative can solve
Eduardo Smith, April 30, 2009, “The Economic Crisis: The Only Response is the Class Struggle,” Internationalism no150, p1
For revolutionaries there is only one solution to the crisis and that is sending capitalism once and of all to dustbin of history. This is the historical task of the world working class. But this will not happen automatically. A social revolution that will leave behind the ‘prehistory' of humanity by overcoming the exploitation of man by man, the divisions of society into classes, the existence of nations.... can only be the product of a conscious and collectively organized effort of the world proletariat. Of course this revolution will not fall out of the sky; it can't only be the result of a prolonged class struggle of which today we are only seeing the beginnings around the world. Faced with relentless attacks workers need to respond by refusing to submit to the logic of capitalism and developing the class struggle to its ultimate conclusion: the overthrow of capitalism. The task is immense, but there is no other way out.
We have an obligation to spread the news that capitalism is unsustainable in order to transition to socialism
Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 222-23
If one believes that capital is not only basically unjust but radically unsustainable as well, the prime obligation is to spread the news, just as one should feel obliged to tell the inhabitants of a structurally unsound house doomed to collapse of what awaits them unless they take drastic measures. To continue the analogy, for the critique to matter it needs to be combined with an attack on the false idea that we are, so to speak, trapped in this house, with no hope of fixing it or getting out. The belief that there can be no alternative to capital is ubiquitous and no wonder, given how wonderfully convenient the idea is to the ruling ideology.2 That, however, does not keep it from being nonsense, and a failure of vision and political will. Whether or not the vision of ecosocialism offered here has merit, the notion that there is no other way of organizing an advanced society other than capital does not follow. Nothing lasts for ever, and what is humanly made can theoretically be unmade.
We have to restructure our criticism of the prevailing order to end the ruling class – they’re stuck in a framework of government advocacy which legitimates the established order
Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, Dept English @ Syracuse, 1994, “The Stupidity that Consumption is Just as Productive as Production,” The Alternative Orange, V 4, Fall/Winter,
My concern is with the practices by which the post-al left, through dialogue, naturalizes (and eroticizes) the violence that keeps capitalist democracy in power. What is violent? Subjecting people to the daily terrorism of layoffs in order to maintain high rates of profit for the owners of the means of production or redirecting this violence (which gives annual bonuses, in addition to multi-million dollar salaries, benefits and stock options, to the CEOs of the very corporations that are laying off thousands of workers) against the ruling class in order to end class societies? What is violent? Keeping millions of people in poverty, hunger, starvation, homelessness, and deprived of basic health care, at a time when the forces of production have reached a level that can, in fact, provide for the needs of all people, or trying to over throw this system? What is violent? Placing in office, under the alibi of "free elections," post-fascists (Italy) and allies of the ruling class (Major, Clinton, Kohl, Yeltsin) or struggling to end this farce? What is violent? Reinforcing these practices by "talking" about them in a "reasonable" fashion (i.e. within the rules of the game established by the ruling class for limited reform from "within") or marking the violence of conversation and its complicity with the status quo, thereby breaking the frame that represents "dialogue" as participation-when in fact it is merely a formal strategy for legitimating the established order? Any society in which the labor of many is the source of wealth for the few—all class societies are societies of violence, and no amount of "talking" is going to challenge that objective fact. "Dialogue" and "conversation" are aimed at arriving at a consensus by which this violence is made more tolerable, justifiable and naturalized.
Alternative Solves – Withdrawing
Only by withdrawing support for the government as currently constituted, can we solve.
Tony Wilsdon, Activist and Freelance Author, September 18, 2005, The Socialist Alternative, Accessed 4/27/09,
To achieve this means breaking from giving any support to the two big-business political parties - the Republicans and Democrats. They are both fully implicated in creating the present mess we are in. We need to build a new political party to represent our interests as workers, the poor, and young people, and which points a finger at the real villains, the super-rich and the capitalist system. Freed from control by corporate sponsors, this workers' party could put forward a program that addresses our needs. It would be able to end this system of capitalism, which has been responsible for enriching a tiny group of billionaires at a time of massive need and poverty. We could then create a new democratic socialist society, where the working-class majority would have the power rather than the 1% who are rewarded under this system.
The act of rejection is an important political stance that is in line with Marxist revolution.
Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College, 2000, Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” P. 131-132.
Thus, despite Ross’s references to economic and historical determina¬tions, his investigation into New Age philosophy ultimately considers it to be a cultural matter, determined by inexplicable needs and desires. This means that although the critic can mark its differences from his or her own practices and commitments, he or she cannot critique it in the sense of inquiring into its conditions of possibility and political effects. The no¬tion that desire is a mechanism of hegemony and articulated within the dominant ideology and that it is therefore what most needs to be ex¬plained is completely excluded in the dominant discourses of postmodern cultural studies. All that is called for in these discourses is an updating of cultural forms, to allow for greater freedom—for some—within the exist¬ing social arrangements. The role of the critic, then, is to sympathize with this desire and establish its legitimacy regardless of the various and at times questionable forms it might take.
Only a radical rejection of capitalist practices can solve.
Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College, 2000, Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” P. 127-128.
Virno does recognize the danger that a politics predicated upon Exodus, by downgrading the “absolute enmity” implicit in the traditional Marxist assumption that class struggle in its revolutionary form issues in civil war, leads to the assumption that one is “swimming with the current” or is being driven “irresistibly forward” (1996, 203). A politics aimed at the establishment of liberated zones within capitalism under the assumption that the state will wither away without actually being “smashed” leads to the problematic one sees over and over again in postmodern cultural studies: “doing what comes naturally” as radical praxis. To counter this, Virno redefines the “unlimitedly reactive” “enmity” of the “Multitude” in terms of the “right to resistance” (206): What deserve to be defended at all costs are the works of “friendship.” Violence is not geared to visions of some hypothetical tomorrow, but functions to ensure respect and a continued existence for things that were mapped out yesterday. It does not innovate, but acts to prolong things that are already there: the autonomous expressions of “acting-in-concert” that arise out of general intellect, organisms of non-representative democracy, forms of mutual protection and assistance (welfare, in short) that have emerged outside of and against the realm of State Administration. In other words, what we have here is a violence that is conservational (206). The decisiveness of the question of absolute enmity becomes clear if we ask a rather obvious question: What distinguishes autonomous expressions from any privatized space (say, Internet chat rooms) that withdraws from the common in the name of friendships, mutual aid, or, for that matter, networks, gated communities, or whatever? In short, nothing can lead more directly to the death of revolutionary politics than the assumption that the days of absolute enmity are over. Autonomous expressions necessarily lead to the esoteric and the singular as the paths of least resistance. Therefore (as in all Left-Nietzscheanisms), they take as their main enemy the programmatic and the decidable, transforming liberation into a private, simulacral affair, regardless of their denunciations of capitalism. I will return to this issue in the next two chapters, but I want to conclude this discussion by stressing that only theory and action that establish spaces that bring the common out into the open—before an outside (theory and judgment) so as to make visible the concentrated political-economic force of the ruling class—can count as a genuinely “new” politics.
AT: Permutation
Only total rejection of the capitalist system and reform efforts like the aff, can solve.
Working Class Freedom, May 21, 2008, Accessed 4/29/09,
The socialist analysis of society shows that capitalism itself is the underlying cause of most of the problems which the social activists want to solve. The social activists attack the symptoms but ignore the cause. Social activists work to reform capitalism, socialists work to eliminate capitalism: the cause of the problems. If people eliminate the cause of the problems, the problems will not keep cropping up. Instead of trying to fix the symptoms, year in and year out, over and over again, forever, people can eliminate the cause, once. Then we can all get on with living our lives in a world where solutions actually solve problems, instead of just covering up symptoms. This approach can be emotionally difficult. It may even mean that someone dies today, who might have been saved by social activism. A simple analogy to explain the socialist perspective: If a pipe bursts and the water is rising on the floor, one can start bailing the water out while it continues to flow in, or one can turn the water off, and then start bailing. It may take a while to find the tap, and some valuables might be destroyed while searching, but unless the water is turned off, the water will continue to rise and bailing is rather pointless.
Complete rejection of the affirmative is necessary for anti-capitalism to be successful.
Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2004, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, p. 83-84
There is a will to accomplish the ‘leap of faith’ and step outside the global circuit at work here, a will which was expressed in an extreme and terrifying manner in a well-known incident from the Vietnam War: after the US Army occupied a local village, their doctors vaccinated the children on the left arm in order to demonstrate their humanitarian care; when, the day after, the village was retaken by the Vietcong, they cut off the left arms of all the vaccinated children. .. . Although it is difficult to sustain as a literal model to follow, this complete rejection of the enemy precisely in its caring ‘humanitarian’ aspect, no matter what the cost, has to be endorsed in its basic intention. In a similar way, when Sendero Luminoso took over a village, they did not focus on killing the soldiers or policemen stationed there, but more on the UN or US agricultural consultants or health workers trying to help the local peasants after lecturing them for hours, and then forcing them to confess their complicity with imperialism pub¬licly, they shot them. Brutal as this procedure was, it was rooted in an acute insight: they, not the police or the army, were the true danger, the enemy at its most perfidious, since they were ‘lying in the guise of truth’ — the more they were ‘innocent’ (they ‘really’ tried to help the peasants), the more they served as a tool of the USA. It is only such a blow against the enemy at [their]his best, at the point where the enemy ‘indeed helps us’, that displays true revolutionary autonomy and ‘sovereignty (to use this term in its Bataillean sense). If one adopts the attitude of ‘let us take from the enemy what is good, and reject or even fight against what is bad’, one is already caught in the liberal trap of ‘humanitarian aid’.
The plan is overwhelmed with the logic of capitalism, any inclusion of their advocacy dooms solvency.
Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College, 2000, Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” P.199.
The core of these antinomies is the unity of necessity and violence in the wage relation. This is the relation that requires daily ratification and thereby undermines the distinction between coercion and consent, that produces the conditions of its own reproduction and hence makes knowledge and apologia inseparable, and that requires a constant intellectual and material attack on the conditions of collective power required for submitting all hierarchical relations to public inspection. A certain polemical line—interested in pursuing questions of coercion and consent, knowledge and justification, and power and authority to their “logical conclusions”—is thus cut off at the roots. The human rights worldview produces and conceals the antinomy of complicity and powerlessness while rendering necessary, as historically concrete “radical alterity,” the pursuit of that polemical line as it is cut off categorically (in actually existing relations between power, knowledge, and principles). That is, radical alterity is ideology critique as the foundational mode of political action.
AT: Permutation
Tinkering with the system is rooted in capitalist ideology – only complete rejection can solve
Istavan Meszaros, Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex, 1995 Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, London: Merlin Press, pg 105-6
The reason why capital is structurally incapable of addressing causes as causes—in contrast to treating all newly arising challenges and complications as more or less successfully manipulatable effects—is because it happens to be its own causal foundation: a varitable, unholy ‘causa sui’. Anything that might aspire at socioeconomic legitimacy and viability must be accompanied within its predetermined structural framework. For as a mode of social metabolic control capital cannot tolerate the intrusion of any principle of socioeconomic regulation that might constrain its expansion-oriented dynamics. Indeed, expansion as such is not simply a relative—to a greater or lesser extent commendable, and in that light under certain circumstances freely adopted whereas under other consciously rejected—economic function but an absolutely necessary way of displacing the capital system's emerging problems and contradictions, in accord with the imperative of avoiding like plague their underlying causes. The self propelling causal foundations of the system cannot be questioned under any circumstance. If troubles appear in it, they must be treated as temporary ‘disfunctions’, to be remedied by reasserting with ever greater rigour the imperative of expanded reproduction. It is for this reason that there can be no alternative to the pursuit of expansion—at all cost—in all varieties of the capital system. So long ad the scope for unobstructed expansion is objectively present, the process of displacing the system’s contradictions can go on unhindered. When things do not go well, i.e., when there is a failure in economic growth and corresponding advancement, the difficulties are diagnosed in terms of the circular proposition which runs away from the underlying causes and highlights only their consequences by saying that ‘there is not enough growth.’ Dealing with problems in this perverse circular way, constantly repeating even at times of major recessions that ‘everything is in place’ for healthy expansion, creates the illusion that capital’s mode of social metabolic control is in no need of fundamental change. Legitimate change must be always envisaged as limited alteration and improvement of what is already given. Change must be brought about by innovation undertaken strictly at the instrumental level, which is supposed to make it self evidently beneficial. Since, however, the necessary historical qualifying conditions and implications of continued expansion are systematically disregarded or brushed aside as irrelevant, the assumption of the permanence and unquestionable viability of capital's causa sui is utterly fallacious.
Only a completely negative move can solve – the alternative is a prerequisite to ethical politics
Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 1999, The Ticklish Subject, p.153-154
It would therefore be tempting to risk a 'Badiouian-Pauline reading of the end of psychoanalysis, determining it as a New Beginning, a symbolic 'rebirth' - the radical restructuring of the analysand's subjectivity in such a way that the vicious cycle of the superego is suspended, left behind. Does not Lacan himself provide a number of hints that the end of analysis opens up the domain of Love beyond Law, using the very Pauline terms to which Badiou refers? Nevertheless, Lacan's way is not that of St Paul or Badiou: psychoanalysis is not 'psychosynthesis'; it does not already posit a 'new harmony', a new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan negativity, a negative gesture of withdrawal precedes any positive gesture of enthusi¬astic identification with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic identification - that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it but is simultaneously obfuscated by it and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what 'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier.
AT: Permutation Cont’d
Permutation doesn’t solve – fails to disturb the system
Slavoj Zizek, famous philosopher, 2008, In Defense of Lost Causes, p. 33
The "worldless" character of capitalism is linked to this hegemonic role of scientific discourse in modernity, a feature clearly identified already by Hegel who wrote that, for us moderns, art and religion no longer obey absolute respect: we can admire them, but we no longer kneel down in front of them, our heart is not really with them —today, only science (conceptual knowledge) deserves this respect. "Postmodernity" as the "end of grand narratives" is one of the names for this predicament in which the multitude of local fictions thrives against the background of scientific discourse as the only remaining universality deprived of sense. Which is why the politics advocated by many a leftist today, that of countering the devastating world-dissolving effect of capitalist moder nization by inventing new fictions, imagining "new worlds" (like the Porto Alegre slogan "Another world is possible!"), is inadequate or, at least, profoundly ambiguous: it all depends on how these fictions relate to the underlying Real of capitalism — do they just supplement it with the imaginary multitude, as the postmodern "local narratives" do, or do they disturb its functioning? In other words, the task is to produce a symbolic fiction (a truth) that intervenes into the Real, that causes a change within it.29
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related download
Related searches
- west coast surgical associates
- west coast college west covina
- west coast university irvine jobs
- costa rica west coast map
- florida west coast colleges and universities
- map of west coast of florida
- west coast satellite loop
- west coast radar
- west coast usa weather radar
- west coast doppler radar
- west coast weather map forecast
- west coast satellite