William James, “The Will to Believe” - thinkingBeings



Notes on William James, “The Will to Believe”

THESIS STATEMENT:

“Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”

1) The influence of the passions is normal and unavoidable in respect to genuine options that we face.

2) The influence of the passions is already apparent in Clifford’s own principle, which prescribes a singular (or

universal) strategy for balancing the goals of seeking truth and avoiding error.

• James sets up his “defense” of religious belief as a rebuttal of W. K. Clifford’s famous evidentialist principle, the principle that “It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

"The lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith" (p.26)

• He’s talking about the laws that a reasonable person might be expected to obey, regardless of what country they live in - the laws governing what reasonable people believe.

Case in point: the religious hypothesis that God exists.

• James himself believed that there is a higher consciousness than that of human beings that pervades the universe, to which we are connected more or less as the consciousness of our pet animals is connected to our own consciousness.

• James's contention in this regard: it is perfectly "legal" for him or someone else to believe this even though there is currently no scientific evidence for the existence of such a thing as this cosmic consciousness.

What about science, the scientific method?

• For instance, to the extent that the existence of God is not a matter of scientific fact, isn't it our intellectual duty to suspend belief in God?

James's view of science:

• The various tests that we put theories through before we allow that they are well proven scientifically (the scientific method): these serve one sort of human interest - our fear of being mistaken, of being taken by surprise by the course of events.

• Modern science: is a kind of organized nervousness on our part.

We also have other, different, interests than that of avoiding errors.

• For instance, we hope to discover new and unexpected things.

• We are under no absolute intellectual obligation to suspend belief in God just because, to date, God's existence has not been certified by any of the sciences.

It is a matter of which set of interests we choose to take priority regarding the hypothesis that there is a God:

1. Our fear of being mistaken

2. Our hope of being right.

• The person who gives in to his/her hope that there is a God is just as reasonable as the person who gives in to their fear that there may not be a God after all.

• James held out some hope that the "hypothesis" that there is a greater cosmic consciousness might someday be a matter of scientific investigation and "proof."

Table I:  Genuine Options

James’s use of the term “hypothesis” is broadly-construed, indicating a proposal that presents either a course of action that one might take, or a proposition that one might accept as true. A genuine option for someone S is a choice between two hypotheses, such that the option is:

|a. Living |A living option is one in which |By contrast, it is possible that S has a predilection to take |

| |both hypotheses are lives ones, i.e.,|only one of the two hypotheses seriously, in which case the |

| |ones that make some appeal to S, and |other, and by extension the option itself, is “dead.” |

| |which S considers it a real | |

| |possibility to accept. | |

|b. Momentous |A momentous option presents a unique | By contrast, a “trivial” option presents no such unique |

| |opportunity, an irreversible |opportunity, irreversible decision, or significant stake. |

| |decision, or a decision with a highly| |

| |significant stake. | |

|And c. Forced |A forced option is one where the two |By contrast, many options are unforced in the sense that there |

| |alternatives form a ‘complete logical|exists a third option beyond the proposed hypotheses. Compare |

| |disjunction’ (they are |the forced “Will you buy an umbrella, or not buy one?” and the |

| |contradictories representable by A |unforced “Will you go out with your umbrella or without it?” In |

| |and not-A). In such a case, there is |the latter case, a hidden third option exists: I might decide |

| |‘no standing place outside the |not to go out at all. |

| |alternatives’ (by the law of |    Similarly for propositions, “Accept A or do not accept A” is|

| |excluded-middle), so that not to |forced, while “Accept A or accept non-A” (where non-A, is a |

| |accept A is to accept not-A, even if |contrary of A, such as B, etc.) is unforced. With contraries, a |

| |only by default. |person always has the third option ‘outside the alternatives’: |

| |   Example for action: “Choose |accept neither one. |

| |between buying an umbrella, or not | |

| |buying one.” The general form for | |

| |options between propositions | |

| |(truth-claims) is: “Either accept | |

| |this proposition, or go without it.” | |

An ‘Ought-Implies-Can’ Argument Against Clifford’s Principle

‘Ought-Implies-Can’ is the idea that if I am told that I ought to do something (that I am obligated in some sense), then it must be the case that I can do that thing; and if I cannot, then the claim that an obligation exists must be mistaken.

James’s thesis statement might be formulated in modus tollens form as follows:

1. If, as Clifford’s Principle assumes, epistemic rationality is a demand for the negation of passional influence in all cases of deliberation over options between propositions, then it must be possible for human agents to negate passional influence over their deliberations in all such cases.

2.  But the negation of passional influence in all cases of deliberation over options between propositions is not possible, as the necessary passional favoring of either the council of courage or the council of caution in the case of “genuine options” shows.

C:   Therefore, it is not the case that as Clifford’s Principle assumes, epistemic rationality is a demand for the negation of passional influence in all cases of deliberation over options between propositions

Table II:  James’s  “The Will to Believe”

                                 The Evidentialist The Jamesian Believer

|A. Goal |Avoid believing what is false! |Believe what is true! |

|B. Risk of Losing the Truth |Remaining in ignorance; never coming to |Falling into error; coming to believe |

| |believe something that is true. |something that is false. |

|C. Guiding Rule or |Evidential reasoning should always prevail |In specific instances, pragmatic reasoning |

|Prescription |in our deliberations: “The rightness or |should be treated as a normal element in |

| |wrongness of belief in a doctrine |making up our minds:  “The thesis I defend is,|

| |(proposition) depends only upon the nature |briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not|

| |of the evidence for it, and not upon what |only lawfully may, but must, decide an option |

| |the doctrine is” (Clifford, EOB 102). Stated|between propositions, whenever it is a genuine|

| |negatively, “It is wrong, always, |option that cannot by its nature be decided on|

| |everywhere, and for anyone, to believe |intellectual grounds” (James WB, Sec. IV). |

| |anything upon insufficient evidence” (EOB | |

| |77). | |

|D. Applied to Religious |Withhold assent until sufficient evidence is|“The lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith,”|

|Hypothesis |present. The agnostic perspective considered|since the option between the alternatives of |

|(RH) |uniquely rational. |accepting or doing without the RH meets the |

| | |above conditions. |

|E. Justifying |There is a public duty to withhold assent, |There is a private right defended by the |

|Moral Argument |based on harm done by irresponsible and |desirability of an “inner tolerance,” a |

| |dishonest habits of belief-acquisition. |tolerance for diversity among beliefs |

| | |(specifically, those James terms |

| | |“over-beliefs”). |

|F. Primary Intellectual Virtue|Intellectual Caution: Since “we must avoid |Intellectual Courage: Since  “we must know the|

| |error,” we should maintain the “skeptical |truth,” we may have to dare to be wrong.  |

| |balance,” and remain uncommitted until |Under the conditions of the genuine option, we|

| |sufficient evidence is presented either for |may commit to belief “in advance” of |

| |or against a belief. |sufficient evidence. |

|G. Motivating Passion |Fear: “Better risk loss of truth than chance|Hope: “If religion be true and the evidence |

| |of error,—that is your faith-vetoer’s exact |for it still be insufficient, I do not |

| |position” (WB Sec. X). |wish...to forfeit my sole chance in life of |

| | |getting upon the winning side” (WB Sec. X). |

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