Executive Report from the APCSS Conference on “Inter ...



Executive Report from the APCSS Conference on “Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects” March 1-3, 2005, Honolulu, HI,

Prepared by Alexandre Mansourov, Ph.D.

Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects

The APCSS conference on “Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects” examined the economic transition in the DPRK and its impact of North-South relations, evaluated the direction and prospects for political change in North Korea and the South’s approaches to influencing the direction of political evolution in the North, considered the impact of political changes in the ROK on inter-Korean relations, examined the cross-penetrating and mutually remolding influences of the North and South’s foreign policies and national security strategies on one another, contemplated the future scenarios in political reconciliation and Korean nation-building, discussed various Northeast Asian perspectives on inter-Korean reconciliation, as well as analyzed the long-term sustainability of the US-ROK alliance in the context of the North-South rapprochement, the ROK domestic trends, global US defense transformation strategy, and the US-ROK military force realignment on the peninsula.

Forty-nine policy practitioners and academics from six countries attended the conference, including representatives from the U.S. State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2), U.S. Congress, KEDO, Air University, Naval War College, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and a Washington-based NGO, 10 participants from ROK, 2 from Russia, 1 from Japan, 1 from the PRC, 1 from the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom, a Swedish representative from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 4 from PACOM, 3 from USFK, 1 from JICPAC, 1 from MARFORPAC, 1 from PACAF, 1 from PACFORUM, 7 from APCSS, Consul-Generals from Japan and ROK, and other on-island (BYU, UH, HPU, EWC) participants (see a list of conference attendees attached).

Below are some of the major observations made by the conference participants:

1. Economic Transition in the DPRK and Its Impact on North-South Relations

North Korea is extremely serious about economic reforms, but at the same time it is extremely nervous about the political and social impact of reforms. These reforms have caught on, they are real, not just a tactical adjustment. The mid-level cadres in the North are allowed to travel abroad more and learn more, and they want to accelerate domestic changes, but the political leadership is worried about the risks involved, knows its limitations, and will continue to regulate the process. The nuclear standoff has a relatively insignificant impact on the current direction of economic reforms, but may place limits on their pace, ultimate depth and breadth in the long run. Without the resolution of the nuclear issue, although Pyongyang may continue to benefit from its growing economic engagement with China and expanding inter-Korean economic relations, it will not be able to join the “club” of civilized nations and get access to the international financial institutions and global capital markets which could provide financing necessary for the fundamental recovery and restructuring of the North Korean economy. Economic reform amidst political stability appears to be Kim Jong Il’s goal; the question is whether he will be able to have the cake and eat it, too.

The South has so far reacted positively and encouraged the North’s economic reforms through a strategy of “asymmetric engagement,” while benefiting from them in several important ways. South Korea’s “cash-based give-aways” helped shift the basis of North Korea’s economy to hard currency, forcing the North Korean Won to lose almost all its value. This is a huge macroeconomic change in the North where money in general and foreign currency in particular became king. South Korea altered the way the North Koreans think about profit-making, private entrepreneurship, market economy, and capitalism even at the level of official pronouncements. The South succeeded in improving dramatically the North Korean public and private perceptions of and attitudes toward the ROK (while the North Korean attitudes towards the United States are changing for the worse). The South is sweeping the North into the global Korean chic wave (“hallyu”), thereby refining the latter’s image in the eyes of the world public.

More significantly, the ROK government was able to make its own public feel much more secure and less threatened by the North. The ROK was able to prevent the collapse of the DPRK and stopped the humanitarian tragedy in the DPRK through the delivery of annual fertilizer aid. The North’s growing economic dependency on the South allows Seoul to counter-balance expanding Chinese economic influence in the DPRK. Inter-Korean economic integration opens up new venues and opportunities for the industrial restructuring of the ROK’s small and medium-size enterprises facing intensifying competition from China. In other words, all three South Korean goals vis-à-vis the North (secure its own people, prevent collapse, and prevent domination of North Korea by a foreign power) are met with satisfaction.

It is not clear yet to what degree South Korean influence squares with China’s role in the DPRK’s economic restructuring and reforms. The lack of mutual benefit, transparency, and public accountability raises the questions about the efficiency and moral hazard in South Korean strategy of “asymmetric engagement.” Also, it is still an open question whether or not growing inter-Korean economic exchanges will lead eventually to a fundamental change in the DPRK’s economic system, and whether that will result in a greater improvement or no change in the North-South relations or may leave South Korea in the cold, thereby reigniting the game of competitive legitimation on the peninsula.

2. Political Changes in the DPRK and Their Impact on North-South Relations

North Korea seeks to build a strong military state under the “military-first policy” (MFP) and “kangsong taeguk” (“building a powerful and prosperous nation”) vision. The MFP is distinct from the old WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea) policy of militarization of the entire society. Neither is it simply a transient measure instituted to deal with the famine. Implementation of the “military-first policy” may be an act of transition to a different kind of political system reflecting primarily the corporate interests of the national security establishment rather than the political order dominated by the socialist workers’ party. Through the MFP, Kim Jong Il aligned himself with the military, hoping to survive, because the KPA is the only political, economic, and social entity that works very well in the North Korean society today. However, one should not discount the fact that in a communist state such as the DPRK, the military and the party tend to be fused at multiple levels: the KPA top brass are party members; and everyone depends on Kim Jong Il and is completely loyal to him. In this light, the MFP may be just a reflection of the fact that at the present moment Kim Jong Il is more pleased with the performance of the military cadres than the civilian cadres, which may change anytime at his discretion.

Can North Korea maintain the “military-first policy” and succeed with economic reforms? From the perspective of the DPRK’s domestic politics, the answer is positive: the MFP may be a slogan, an ideology, and the glue for domestic cohesion and stability, helping Kim Jong Il “keep the mind of military leaders intact” at a time of deepening economic reforms. Can North Korea pursue the MFP and reach a nuclear settlement with the United States? From the same domestic political perspective, the answer is negative; because nuclear weapons may be Kim Jong Il’s give-away to the Korean People’s Army to keep the top brass happy and content so that he can continue his economic reforms, save money on the modernization of conventional weapons, and intensify his pro-active engagement with the South.

The South goes along with the MFP, because Seoul does not want to interfere openly into the North’s domestic political affairs, and because the ROK government is not sure if they push for fundamental political changes, let alone regime change, they will get a better regime than Kim Jong Il’s in the end. Seoul prefers to look for a silver lining, making promising comparisons between the MFP and Park Chung-hee’s military rule. Some South Koreans regard the MFP as a convenient cover for Kim Jong Il, allowing him to proceed safely with the succession process – it is high time for the Dear Leader to start grooming his own successor under the protection of the DPRK’s national security establishment. Obviously, Seoul has an indirect stake in succession politics in Pyongyang, but the ROK government has not determined yet what role to play in North Korean domestic politics or how to exert influence upon it. The South believes that the process of inter-Korean reconciliation may contribute to the restructuring and dismantlement of the North’s economic and political systems in the long run. However, at the present moment, the ongoing political changes in North Korea do not appear to be of systemic or fundamental nature and do not to have much impact on the South-North relations yet.

3. Political Changes in the ROK and Their Impact on South-North Relations

In the process of deepening democratization, South Korea is moving away from the ideology of anti-communism and the 1948 consensus. Old ideological assumptions and political tenets are questioned, challenged, and thrown away. The key question is why should South Korea exist as an independent state separate from North Korea? The role and interests of the United States in the formation and preservation of the distinct South Korean national statehood is increasingly scrutinized. As the generational gap between the so-called 386 and 5060 generations widens, the ROK society and politics get more polarized, especially on such core issues related to the essence of the ROK’s national identity as the repeal of the National Security Law, re-writing of colonial and post-war history, reduction and withdrawal of USFK, re-alignment with China, etc. As a consequence, some participants suggested that inter-Korean reconciliation must be preceded by political reconciliation within the ROK. The South Korean political class must overcome internal divisions because its seeming inability to accept the responsibility for the past may impede the South-North reconciliation in the future.

“Progressive” observers credit President Roh Moo-hyun for challenging the structural status-quo, opening the long-overdue domestic political debates about the past social injustices and political persecutions, their necessary, albeit painful, present cures, and future course of Korea. They also commend him for following the U.S. model in “civilianization” of the ROK military, as well as for showing courage and standing up to the U.S. President Bush after the latter had publicly humiliated his predecessor President Kim Dae-jung. In contrast, “conservative” observers regard him as a short-sighted revolutionary leading his “young Talibans” in the Blue House to destroy domestic (values, institutions) and external (alliances, commitments, reputation) foundations of South Korea’s successful existence as a strong independent and prosperous state for the past half a century. In particular, they denounce the “Red House’s” “policy of feeding and engorging the monster” (read Kim Jong Il’s regime). They criticize the efforts of the “386G-infested” National Security Council, which relegated the Ministry of National Defense to the role of just a bystander in defense policy-making and damaged the morale among the officers’ corps. Pro-American sentiment is said to be increasingly suppressed within the ROK’s military, which is being re-socialized in accordance with more nationalistic educational guidelines. The “conservative” participants further contend that “the Roh Moo-hyun administration probably purged more people (with “pro-American” views) from the MND, MOFAT, and other national security agencies than Kim Jong Il did among his own ranks,” which resulted in a loss of self-confidence and sense of mission within the ranks of the national security establishment. Moreover, whereas in the past, one would advance his or her career at the MND and MOFAT by working the U.S.-related issues at their respective North American divisions, in the current political climate, reportedly, it would be rather dangerous for career growth to work on the U.S. issues or with the U.S. officials.

Political changes in the ROK in the past several years blind-sided everyone and led to the institution of the “pro-North” “sunshine policy” by the Kim Dae-jung administration and “pro-engagement” “peace and prosperity policy” (PPP) by the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which both totally redefined the South-North relations and transformed the ROK into an economic benefactor, diplomatic cheerleader, and military sentinel for Pyongyang, as well as a draw bridge between the DPRK and the world. The PPP is based on three principles – “no war, no collapse, and no pressure,” which puts it in stark contradiction with the U.S. approach towards North Korea, emphasizing that “all options are on the table,” “regime change may be a good idea,” “blackmail ought not to pay, and pressure must be applied.”

Among the growing number of areas that the South and the North can agree on today and appear to lend moral support to each other, one can note the vacillating anti-American feelings, dormant anti-Chinese sentiments (awakened by the “Koguryo flare-up”), and escalating anti-Japanese animosity (aggravated by the recent Tokto dispute and the history textbook problem). North and South Koreans tend to fight together against what they mutually hate, not for what they stand in common. Of course, one cannot discount the fact that South and North Koreans live in a tough neighborhood, and, therefore, they define their national identity through a lot of “antis.”

4. North Korean Foreign Policy and Its Impact on the North-South Relations

In general, North Korea has always sought to penetrate and subvert the South Korean political process with varying degrees of success and to influence the South Korean decision-making, especially with regard to Seoul’s policy towards Pyongyang and Washington. At a maximum, the North Korean leadership has not given up its long-held ambition of unifying the Korean peninsula on its own terms as a strategically superior power, arguing that the Southern leadership lacks the moral nationalist credentials because it allowed for the Southern land to be disgracefully occupied by foreign military forces for six decades, and asserting Pyongyang’s “indigenous” nuclear credentials (which is quite inconsistent with the North’s promise to dismantle its nuclear programs if the U.S. abandons its “hostile policy”) unavailable to Seoul because of its non-nuclear pledge. At a minimum, on security and economic grounds, the DPRK government seeks to take advantage of the “peace and prosperity policy” and to ensure that the ROK government will continue its engagement strategy towards Pyongyang, while attempting to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington and calling for the formation of a “united front” between the North and the South against the United States through the strategy of “national cooperation” on the nuclear and other important issues. Some conference participants suggested that in KEDO and at the six-party talks, North Korea’s strategy may be much more complex than just “driving a wedge” between the two allies: Pyongyang may regard Seoul as an intermediary helping “bring along the United States” and “make it more accommodating and flexible” in its policy towards the DPRK, as well as a facilitator and promoter of a unique “Korean (or Asian) solution” to the North Korean nuclear issue, if the six-party talks fail.

Some U.S. participants emphasize continuity in the North Korean negotiating behavior vis-à-vis South Korea and regard it largely as uncompromising, unyielding, deceptive warrior-like “pseudo-negotiations,” and a tool of revolution and class struggle to be used to defeat the Southern enemy. In contrast, the ROK participants point out the incremental changes in “real negotiations” – less propaganda and grandstanding, more pragmatism and preference for “behind-the-curtain” dealings, more sincerity, greater flexibility and willingness to close the eyes to formality and procedures, more diversity of issues under consideration (including the military issues), proliferation of meeting locations, more diverse negotiating partners, less frequent resort to suspension and delay - that have emerged since the North-South summit in June 2000. These changes resulted in a new friendlier and more cooperative atmosphere in bilateral negotiations and the North-South contacts in various multilateral settings, including within the United Nations, KEDO, and on the sidelines of the six-party talks.

In terms of substance, however, recent political changes in the South led to dramatic changes in the South Korean negotiating behavior. South Korean political leaders promoting the “kumbaya-like” policy of peace and prosperity toward the North are reluctant to use the economic leverage to influence North Korea’s behavior and do not take “no” for an answer from their own inter-Korean negotiators, which ties the latters’ hands and puts them in an inferior bargaining position. As a consequence, as one U.S. participant argued, “the ROK negotiators are forced to absorb the insults from the North,” and the “North Korean negotiators manhandle, dominate, and bury them.” The Chinese participant echoed this sentiment by asserting that “for North Korea, inter-Korean reconciliation is a tool for squeezing economic resources and learning capitalist ways from the South, as well as for trying to break up the South Korean society by penetrating into the ROK through various exchanges and the Internet.” He argued that the DPRK dictates the speed, direction, and scope of the inter-Korean reconciliation; and although the ROK has accepted a lot of North Korea’s demands, the DPRK leadership still refuses to describe the Roh Moo-hyun’s administration as a “good Korean government,” because “it has only one good side – a pro-North policy, whereas the other side of it is bad, namely, its adherence to the strategic alliance with the United States.”

5. Future Scenarios in Korean Nation-building

Conference participants discussed three ways how the inter-Korean reconciliation may unfold – the North-led, the South-led, and mutually cooperative, and four different hypothetical scenarios of the emergence of a unified Korean state, namely, through gradual internal reformation of the North and deepening political reconciliation through proliferation of joint standing commissions, or a fratricidal war, or abrupt collapse and extinction of the DPRK, or the South-led appeasement and virtual reunification. Some participants felt strongly that reunification was unlikely to be either peaceful or democratic or equitable, despite all public declarations and good intentions of all the parties concerned, because power essentially cannot be shared.

One participant raised the possibility that the Northern collapse scenarios could differ: the North Korean state may break up along some invisible internal fault lines and the KPA military leaders may attempt to set up their own mini-garrison states (“warlordism”), or an economic collapse may lead to political chaos and a civil war among the KPA generals competing for central political power. Under both collapse scenarios, although the ROK may attempt to step in and take the lead in restoring the law and order and restructuring the economic, political, and military institutions in the northern half of the peninsula in accordance with its own blueprint, China may deem it necessary to move in, too, and play a greater role in defending the sovereignty and national interests of the crumbling North Korean state with or without Kim Jong Il’s clan.

Many U.S. participants wondered whether political reconciliation between two Koreas meant growing South Korea’s appeasement of the North. The ROK government appears to be willing to concede some strategic ground as a non-nuclear weapon state and grant Kim Jong Il his wish to gain a certain degree of international acceptance or acquiescence by the world for his nuclear weapons program and a freshly minted membership card in the nuclear club. Koreans, both in the North and South, are said to be “ready to tolerate almost anything from each other, except foreign domination.” Hence, they predicted the emergence of a more assertive, nationalistic, autonomous, and strategically non-committed Korean peninsula as a result of the inter-Korean reconciliation process in the future. Both Russian and Chinese participants expressed their support for greater Korean political reconciliation, hoping that when Korea is eventually unified, it will be “a friendly country without any foreign troops on its soil.” Many other participants expressed hope that American troops would stay on the peninsula even after Korean reunification.

6. US-ROK Alliance and Inter-Korean Reconciliation

Conference participants held a very lively exchange about the current state of relations within the U.S.-ROK alliance. The optimists say that South Korea has been one of the most reliable U.S. allies for decades, despite occasional policy disagreements and flare-ups of anti-American sentiment in the South. The U.S.-ROK alliance is “rock-solid” (no pun intended). Security cooperation is “good” and the alliance is “in an excellent condition,” despite some public misperceptions. The ROK military views the North Korean threat in the same way as the U.S. military does. The inter-parliamentary dialogue is at a high level. Bilateral trade and investment are growing. Optimists argue that public expectations about the alliance performance are extremely high, and, therefore, any minor issue or problem tends to provoke extreme disappointment in both capitals. In contrast, there are rather low expectations in the management of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and, as a result, there is little disappointment whenever anything goes wrong. Optimists believe that although North Korea is looking for ways to break apart the alliance, the inter-Korean reconciliation has had no negative impact on the U.S.-ROK military alliance yet.

The pessimists argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance exist on nostalgia for the “good old days,” questioning whether “the good old days” were really “so good.” They contend that the alliance is “on life support,” and alliance restructuring is “badly needed,” because “the alliance no longer serves the best interests of either the United States or the Republic of Korea.” The U.S. and ROK appear to define the North Korean threat differently, which tends to undermine alliance cooperation. Seoul seems to believe that the North Korean threat emanates from its weakness (danger of economic collapse, internal instabilities), not its strength; whereas Washington tends to regard North Korea as a “blackmailing bully,” and not as “legitimate state, worth saving,” with which the U.S. can enter into binding agreements (as one participant put it, “what should you do if Hitler walked into the room?”). Pessimists believe that the North-South reconciliation is damaging the U.S.-ROK alliance. They suggest that “if there is a zero chance of the North attacking the South, as many South Koreans are told by their government, then why does not Seoul ask Washington to withdraw the USFK completely?” They go even further by raising the possibility that the U.S. should “bring our boys home” and totally disengage from the Korean peninsula, both from the South and the North, but stay committed to Japan and Australia, and tell Koreans “call us back when you get serious about your defense.”

But, the “middle-of-the-road” moderate views prevailed among conference participants. They argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance is “in a pretty good shape.” The two allied democracies and market economies share many national interests and common bonds, norms, and values, as well as command plenty of mutual trust and understanding across a wide range of issue-areas and problems. They assert that the U.S. disengagement from the Korean peninsula is a “lousy idea,” a “nutty idea,” “a bad idea” that serves as an example of the so-called “avoidance behavior” on the part of the United States, because it would damage incalculably the national interests of both the United States and the Republic of Korea in many obvious and invisible ways. Instead of abandoning the Korean peninsula, some moderates argued that the U.S should stop calling the North “evil” or “rogue” and look at it as a “legitimate negotiation partner,” albeit “very angry and weak,” with which the international community “can do business” and resolve the outstanding concerns, including the nuclear issue through genuine negotiations. Whereas other moderates may concede that North Korea is evil, but they insist that it is time to “shake hands with the devil,” and start listening to the “silent majority” of the ROK people who believe in the inter-Korean reconciliation, that “there is no alternative to engagement, whatever its form,” and that a policy of “forced regime change will cause a suffering to all Korean people.” All moderates assert that the North-South reconciliation is “not an illusion,” that “it is feasible, especially if China and Russia say it is feasible,” and that the “United States should be prepared to give Koreans some space and allow for the South-North reconciliation to proceed beyond just an agreement not to fight.” These moderates believe that the U.S-ROK alliance must be the main leverage for the South Korean government in its dealings with the North aimed at enhancing the South’s security and accelerating the inter-Korean rapprochement.

In conclusion, conference participants engaged in a lively debate about the future direction of the reconciliation efforts on the Korean peninsula. While some focused on the dramatic changes that have occurred in both the North and the South, others emphasized the importance of maintaining the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the face of an uncertain neighbor to the north. Regardless of the perspective, however, all attendees agreed that the political and economic shifts on the peninsula are driving a demand for changes in the security relations in the region. Therefore, going forward it will become increasingly important to take into account the growing sense of Korean nationalism in South Korea and the gradual movement toward a more open economy and society in North Korea. Recognizing these shifts will be crucial to any reshaping that occurs within the U.S.-ROK alliance.

INTER-KOREAN RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION: DRIVERS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS

CONFERENCE ATTENDEE LIST

1-3 MARCH 2005

Dr. J. Michael Allen

Associate Dean and Professor of History

College of Arts and Sciences

Brigham Young University - Hawaii Campus

55-220 Kulanui Street #1938

Laie, HI 96762-1294

Phone: 1-808-293-3794

Fax: 1-808-293-3328

E-mail: allenm@byuh.edu

Mr. Bradley Babson

Consultant

149 Pennellville Rd

Brunswick, ME 04011

Phone: 1-207-373-0707

Fax: 1-207-373-0555

E-mail: bradbabson@

Dr. Seungjoo Baek

Chief, North Korea Research Team

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Cheong Ryang P.O. Box 250

Seoul 130-650, Republic of Korea

Phone: 82-2-961-1383

Fax: 82-2-961-1172

Phone: 82-2-961-1778

Fax: 82-2-961-1160

E-mail: bsj@kida.re.kr

Lieutenant Colonel Carl Baker

Military Professor

Policy Studies Department

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-971-8957

Fax: 1-808-971-8949

E-mail: bakerc@

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.

Professor of National Security Studies

Air Command and Staff College

Air University

225 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112

Phone: 1-334-953-5073

Fax: 1-334-953-1999

E-mail: bruce.bechtol@maxwell.af.mil

Mr. Stephen Bradner

Special Advisor to Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK

United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea

PSC 303 Box 40

APO AP 96204

Phone: 82-2-7913-3490

Fax: 82-2-7913-7813

E-mail: bradners@korea.army.mil

Dr. Seongwhun Cheon

Senior Research Fellow

The Korean Institute for National Unification

Kangbuk-ku

Suyu 6-dong

Seoul 535-353, Republic of Korea

Phone: 822-901-2571

Fax: 822-901-2547

E-mail: swc339@kinu.or.kr

Mr. Ralph A. Cossa

President

Pacific Forum CSIS

Pauahi Tower Suite 1150

1001 Bishop Street

Honolulu, HI 96813

Phone: 1-808-521-6745

Fax: 1-808-599-8690

E-mail: PacForum@hawaii.

Mr. Scott R. Feeney

North Korea Country Director

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Asia and Pacific Affairs

International Security Affairs

2400 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-2400

Phone: 1-703-614-6473

Fax: 1-703-695-8222

E-mail: scott.feeney@osd.mil

Major Stephen M. Folena

Chief, Combined Political and Economic Analysis

United States Forces Korea (C/J-2)

PSC 303 Box 26

APO, AP 96204-0026

Phone: 315-723-3099

E-mail: Stephen.m.Folena@korea.army.mil

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Gransback

Country Director-Korea

U.S. Pacific Command

Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate

Northeast Asia Division

Box 64015

Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96861-4015

Phone: 1-808-477-3500

Fax: 1-808-477-0513

E-mail: stephen.gransback@pacom.mil

Mr. Richard Halloran

Visiting Professor

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-395-0511

Fax: 1-808-396-4095

E-mail: oranhall@hawaii.

Ms. Balbina Y. Hwang

Policy Analyst

Northeast Asia

Asian Studies Center

Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts NE

Washington, D.C. 20002

Phone: 1-202-608-6134

Fax: 1-202-675-1779

E-mail: balbina.hwang@

Mr. Im Jong In

Member of National Assembly

National Assembly

834 National Assembly Bldg 1

Yoido-Dong

Young Deung Po-Gu

Seoul 150-702, Republic of Korea

Phone: 82-2 784-6301

Fax: 82-2 788-3834

E-mail: jonginim@

Mr. Frank Jannuzi

East Asia Specialist

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

2523 Guilford Ave

Baltimore, MD 21218

Phone: 1-410-243-3706

Fax: 1-202-228-3612

E-mail: frank_jannuzi@foreign.

Lieutenant Colonel Clay C. Janssen

Special Operations Planner

Special Operations command Korea (SOCKOR)

PSC 450 Box 419

APO, AP 96206

Phone: 315-723-7623

Fax: 315-723-5751

E-mail: Clay.Janssen@korea.army.mil

Dr. Christopher R. Jasparro

Associate Professor

Transnational Studies Department

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-971-8968

Fax: 1-808-971-8949

E-mail: jasparroc@

Ambassador Charles Kartman

Executive Director

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

600 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10016

Phone: 1-212-455-0211

Fax: 1-212-681-2649

E-mail: ck@

Dr. Kim Byung Kook

Professor

Korea University

Department of Political Science

5-1 Anam-Dong, Sungbuk-Ku

Seoul, Republic of Korea

Phone: 82-2-3290-2189

Fax: 82-2-2277-1684

E-mail: bkk@korea.ac.kr

Mr. Kim Gun Su

Chief of Staff, Assemblyman Im, Jong In

National Assembly

834 National Assembly Bldg

1 Yoido-dong

Youngdeung po-gu

Seoul 150-702, Republic of Korea

Phone: 82-2-784-6301

Fax: 82-2-788-3834

E-mail: pdgkgs@

Dr. Steven Kim

Assistant Research Professor

Research and Publications Department

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-971-4057

E-mail: kims@

Dr. Ko Seung-Kyun

Professor, International Studies

Hawaii Pacific University

MP-301

1188 Fort Street

Honolulu, HI 96813

Phone: 1-808-247-5339

Fax: 1-808-544-0834

E-mail: sko@campus.hpu.edu

Dr. Koh Byung Chul

Professor Emeritus of Political Science

University of Illinois at Chicago

380 Woodlawn Ave

Glencoe, IL 60022-2176

Phone: 1-847-242-0824

Fax: 1-847-835-4618

E-mail: bckoh99@

Dr. Jimmie R. Lackey

Executive Director

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-971-8915

Fax: 1-808-971-8999

E-mail: lackeyj@

Professor Lee Seok-soo

Director, Office for North Korea Studies

Korea National Defense University

The Mershon Center of Ohio State University

1501 Neil Avenue

Columbus, OH 43201

Phone: 82-2-300-2156

Fax: 82-2-309-9878

E-mail: sslee@kndu.ac.kr

Dr. Lim Wonhyuk

Fellow

Korea Development Institute

Cheongryang PO Box 113

Seoul, Republic of Korea 130-012

Phone: +82-2-958-4206

Fax: +82-2-964-5479

E-mail: lilmster@kdi.re.kr

Professor Stephen W. Linton

Chairman

Eugene Bell Foundation

PO Box 170

Clarksville, MD 21029

Phone: 1-410-531-8424

Fax: 1-410-531-8425

E-mail: linton@

Dr. Liu Ming

Director of International Relations Program

School of World Economy & Politics

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

7/622 Huai-hai Road (M)

Shanghai, China 200020

Phone: 5306-0606 ext 2463

Fax: 5306-3814

E-mail: lium_14@

Colonel Kevin W. Madden

Secretary

United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission

PSC 303, Box 54

APO, AP 96024-0054

Phone: 011-82-2-8913-3200

Fax: 011-82-2-7913-4315

E-mail: maddenkw@korea.army.mil

Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov

Professor

Regional Studies Department

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-971-5025

Fax: 1-808-971-8989

E-mail: mansourova@

Dr. John Merrill

Chief, Northeast Asia Division

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

U.S. Department of State

2244 North Illinois Street

Arlington, VA 22205

Phone: 1-202-647-4767

Fax: 1-202-647-5286

E-mail: jmerrill05@

ACjmerri@us-state.

Dr. Park Syung Je

Director

Military Analyst Association

Sinwon 308-1701

Ku Mi-Dong

Bun Dang Ku

Sung Nam, Korea 463-510

Phone: 82-16-360-5901

Fax: 82-31-715-6151

E-mail: syungjepark@

Dr. Jonathan Pollack

Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies

United States Naval War College

686 Cushing Road

New Port, RI 02841

Phone: 1-401-841-4532

Fax: 1-401-841-4161

E-mail: pollackj@nwc.navy.mil

Ambassador Jack Pritchard

Visiting Fellow.

The Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusets Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20036-2103

Phone: 1-202-797-4369

Fax: 1-202-797-2485

E-mail: jpritchard@brookings.edu

Dr. Ryoo Kihl-jae

Associate Professor

University of North Korean Studies

28-7 Samchung-Dong

Chongro-ku

Seoul 110-230, Republic of Korea

Phone: 82-2-3700-0734

Fax: 82-2-3700-0748

E-mail: kjstar@kyungnam.ac.kr

Colonel David M. Shanahan

Deputy Dean

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Rd.

Honolulu, HI 96815-1949

Phone: 1-808-971-8945

Fax: 1-808-971-8949

E-mail: shanahand@

Professor Yoichi Shimada

Professor of International Politics

Fukui Prefectural University

4-1-1 Kenjojima

Matsuoka-cho

Fukui-ken, Japan 910-1195

Phone: +81-776-61-6000 ext.2304

Fax: +81-776-61-6014

E-mail: xyshimada@yahoo.co.jp

Dr. Edward J. Shultz

Professor

Department of Asian Studies

University of Hawaii at Manoa

1881 East-West Road

Honolulu, HI 96822

Phone: 1-808-956-6316

Fax: 1-808-956-2682

E-mail: shultz@hawaii.edu

Ms. Jane Skanderup

Director for Programs

Pacific Forum Center for Strategic

and International Studies

1001 Bishop Street

Pauahi Tower Suite 1150

Honolulu, HI 96813

Phone: 1-808-521-6745

Fax: 1-808-599-8690

E-mail: jskanderup@hawaii.

Mr. Valery Sukhinin

Minister-Counsellor & DCM

Embassy of the Russian Federation

to the Republic of Korea

34-16, Chong-dong, Chung-gu

Seoul 100-120, Republic of Korea

Phone: 82-2-318-2116

Fax: 82-2-754-0417

E-mail: rusemb@

Mr. Stephen M. Tharp

International Relations Specialist

ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command

C5, Strategy Division

APO, AP 96204

E-mail: tharps@korea.army.mil

Dr. Alexander V. Vorontsov

Head of Section for Korean Studies

Institute of Oriental Studies

Russia Academy of Sciences

103753 Rozhdestvenka Street 12

Moscow 119602, Russia

Phone: 7-095 928-3566

Fax: 7-095-975-2396

Professor Woo Seong-ji

Assistant Professor

Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

1376-2 Seocho 2 Dong

Seocho Gu

Seoul 137-072, Republic of Korea

Phone: +82 2-3497-7648

Fax: +82 2 575-5245

E-mail: seongjiwoo@

Lieutenant Colonel Clyde T. Burton

Korea Desk Officer

Policy & International Affairs, G-5

Marine Forces Pacific

355 Aoloa St., #L101

Kailua, HI 96734

Phone: 1-808-477-8581

Fax: 1-808-477-8580

E-mail: Clyde.burton@usmc.mil

Mr. John Du Toit

Korea Desk Officer

HQ, U.S. Pacific Command

(Contact information withheld per request)

Major General Lars B. Frisk

Swedish Member of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

UNCMAC

PSC 303 Box 54

APO, AP 96205-0032

Phone: +82-505-734-8991

Fax: +82-505-734-8825

E-mail: frisklb@korea.army.mil

Consul Takashi Hatori

Consulate-General of Japan

1742 Nuuanu Avenue

Honolulu, HI 96817-3294

Phone: 1-808-543-3111

Fax: 1-808-524-7434

E-mail: takashi.hatori@mofa.go.jp

Dr. Young W. Kihl

Professor

Department of Political Science

Iowa State University

503 Ross Hall

Ames, Iowa 50011

Phone: 1-515-294-7256

E-mail: ykihl@iastate.edu

Dr. Choon Nam Kim

Project Coordinator

Research Program

East-West Center

1601 East-West Road

Honolulu, HI 96848-1601

Phone: 1-808-944-7372

Fax: 1-808-944-7446

E-mail: kimcn@

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