Executive Report from the APCSS Conference on “Inter ...
Executive Report from the APCSS Conference on “Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects” March 1-3, 2005, Honolulu, HI,
Prepared by Alexandre Mansourov, Ph.D.
Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects
The APCSS conference on “Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects” examined the economic transition in the DPRK and its impact of North-South relations, evaluated the direction and prospects for political change in North Korea and the South’s approaches to influencing the direction of political evolution in the North, considered the impact of political changes in the ROK on inter-Korean relations, examined the cross-penetrating and mutually remolding influences of the North and South’s foreign policies and national security strategies on one another, contemplated the future scenarios in political reconciliation and Korean nation-building, discussed various Northeast Asian perspectives on inter-Korean reconciliation, as well as analyzed the long-term sustainability of the US-ROK alliance in the context of the North-South rapprochement, the ROK domestic trends, global US defense transformation strategy, and the US-ROK military force realignment on the peninsula.
Forty-nine policy practitioners and academics from six countries attended the conference, including representatives from the U.S. State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2), U.S. Congress, KEDO, Air University, Naval War College, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and a Washington-based NGO, 10 participants from ROK, 2 from Russia, 1 from Japan, 1 from the PRC, 1 from the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom, a Swedish representative from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 4 from PACOM, 3 from USFK, 1 from JICPAC, 1 from MARFORPAC, 1 from PACAF, 1 from PACFORUM, 7 from APCSS, Consul-Generals from Japan and ROK, and other on-island (BYU, UH, HPU, EWC) participants (see a list of conference attendees attached).
Below are some of the major observations made by the conference participants:
1. Economic Transition in the DPRK and Its Impact on North-South Relations
North Korea is extremely serious about economic reforms, but at the same time it is extremely nervous about the political and social impact of reforms. These reforms have caught on, they are real, not just a tactical adjustment. The mid-level cadres in the North are allowed to travel abroad more and learn more, and they want to accelerate domestic changes, but the political leadership is worried about the risks involved, knows its limitations, and will continue to regulate the process. The nuclear standoff has a relatively insignificant impact on the current direction of economic reforms, but may place limits on their pace, ultimate depth and breadth in the long run. Without the resolution of the nuclear issue, although Pyongyang may continue to benefit from its growing economic engagement with China and expanding inter-Korean economic relations, it will not be able to join the “club” of civilized nations and get access to the international financial institutions and global capital markets which could provide financing necessary for the fundamental recovery and restructuring of the North Korean economy. Economic reform amidst political stability appears to be Kim Jong Il’s goal; the question is whether he will be able to have the cake and eat it, too.
The South has so far reacted positively and encouraged the North’s economic reforms through a strategy of “asymmetric engagement,” while benefiting from them in several important ways. South Korea’s “cash-based give-aways” helped shift the basis of North Korea’s economy to hard currency, forcing the North Korean Won to lose almost all its value. This is a huge macroeconomic change in the North where money in general and foreign currency in particular became king. South Korea altered the way the North Koreans think about profit-making, private entrepreneurship, market economy, and capitalism even at the level of official pronouncements. The South succeeded in improving dramatically the North Korean public and private perceptions of and attitudes toward the ROK (while the North Korean attitudes towards the United States are changing for the worse). The South is sweeping the North into the global Korean chic wave (“hallyu”), thereby refining the latter’s image in the eyes of the world public.
More significantly, the ROK government was able to make its own public feel much more secure and less threatened by the North. The ROK was able to prevent the collapse of the DPRK and stopped the humanitarian tragedy in the DPRK through the delivery of annual fertilizer aid. The North’s growing economic dependency on the South allows Seoul to counter-balance expanding Chinese economic influence in the DPRK. Inter-Korean economic integration opens up new venues and opportunities for the industrial restructuring of the ROK’s small and medium-size enterprises facing intensifying competition from China. In other words, all three South Korean goals vis-à-vis the North (secure its own people, prevent collapse, and prevent domination of North Korea by a foreign power) are met with satisfaction.
It is not clear yet to what degree South Korean influence squares with China’s role in the DPRK’s economic restructuring and reforms. The lack of mutual benefit, transparency, and public accountability raises the questions about the efficiency and moral hazard in South Korean strategy of “asymmetric engagement.” Also, it is still an open question whether or not growing inter-Korean economic exchanges will lead eventually to a fundamental change in the DPRK’s economic system, and whether that will result in a greater improvement or no change in the North-South relations or may leave South Korea in the cold, thereby reigniting the game of competitive legitimation on the peninsula.
2. Political Changes in the DPRK and Their Impact on North-South Relations
North Korea seeks to build a strong military state under the “military-first policy” (MFP) and “kangsong taeguk” (“building a powerful and prosperous nation”) vision. The MFP is distinct from the old WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea) policy of militarization of the entire society. Neither is it simply a transient measure instituted to deal with the famine. Implementation of the “military-first policy” may be an act of transition to a different kind of political system reflecting primarily the corporate interests of the national security establishment rather than the political order dominated by the socialist workers’ party. Through the MFP, Kim Jong Il aligned himself with the military, hoping to survive, because the KPA is the only political, economic, and social entity that works very well in the North Korean society today. However, one should not discount the fact that in a communist state such as the DPRK, the military and the party tend to be fused at multiple levels: the KPA top brass are party members; and everyone depends on Kim Jong Il and is completely loyal to him. In this light, the MFP may be just a reflection of the fact that at the present moment Kim Jong Il is more pleased with the performance of the military cadres than the civilian cadres, which may change anytime at his discretion.
Can North Korea maintain the “military-first policy” and succeed with economic reforms? From the perspective of the DPRK’s domestic politics, the answer is positive: the MFP may be a slogan, an ideology, and the glue for domestic cohesion and stability, helping Kim Jong Il “keep the mind of military leaders intact” at a time of deepening economic reforms. Can North Korea pursue the MFP and reach a nuclear settlement with the United States? From the same domestic political perspective, the answer is negative; because nuclear weapons may be Kim Jong Il’s give-away to the Korean People’s Army to keep the top brass happy and content so that he can continue his economic reforms, save money on the modernization of conventional weapons, and intensify his pro-active engagement with the South.
The South goes along with the MFP, because Seoul does not want to interfere openly into the North’s domestic political affairs, and because the ROK government is not sure if they push for fundamental political changes, let alone regime change, they will get a better regime than Kim Jong Il’s in the end. Seoul prefers to look for a silver lining, making promising comparisons between the MFP and Park Chung-hee’s military rule. Some South Koreans regard the MFP as a convenient cover for Kim Jong Il, allowing him to proceed safely with the succession process – it is high time for the Dear Leader to start grooming his own successor under the protection of the DPRK’s national security establishment. Obviously, Seoul has an indirect stake in succession politics in Pyongyang, but the ROK government has not determined yet what role to play in North Korean domestic politics or how to exert influence upon it. The South believes that the process of inter-Korean reconciliation may contribute to the restructuring and dismantlement of the North’s economic and political systems in the long run. However, at the present moment, the ongoing political changes in North Korea do not appear to be of systemic or fundamental nature and do not to have much impact on the South-North relations yet.
3. Political Changes in the ROK and Their Impact on South-North Relations
In the process of deepening democratization, South Korea is moving away from the ideology of anti-communism and the 1948 consensus. Old ideological assumptions and political tenets are questioned, challenged, and thrown away. The key question is why should South Korea exist as an independent state separate from North Korea? The role and interests of the United States in the formation and preservation of the distinct South Korean national statehood is increasingly scrutinized. As the generational gap between the so-called 386 and 5060 generations widens, the ROK society and politics get more polarized, especially on such core issues related to the essence of the ROK’s national identity as the repeal of the National Security Law, re-writing of colonial and post-war history, reduction and withdrawal of USFK, re-alignment with China, etc. As a consequence, some participants suggested that inter-Korean reconciliation must be preceded by political reconciliation within the ROK. The South Korean political class must overcome internal divisions because its seeming inability to accept the responsibility for the past may impede the South-North reconciliation in the future.
“Progressive” observers credit President Roh Moo-hyun for challenging the structural status-quo, opening the long-overdue domestic political debates about the past social injustices and political persecutions, their necessary, albeit painful, present cures, and future course of Korea. They also commend him for following the U.S. model in “civilianization” of the ROK military, as well as for showing courage and standing up to the U.S. President Bush after the latter had publicly humiliated his predecessor President Kim Dae-jung. In contrast, “conservative” observers regard him as a short-sighted revolutionary leading his “young Talibans” in the Blue House to destroy domestic (values, institutions) and external (alliances, commitments, reputation) foundations of South Korea’s successful existence as a strong independent and prosperous state for the past half a century. In particular, they denounce the “Red House’s” “policy of feeding and engorging the monster” (read Kim Jong Il’s regime). They criticize the efforts of the “386G-infested” National Security Council, which relegated the Ministry of National Defense to the role of just a bystander in defense policy-making and damaged the morale among the officers’ corps. Pro-American sentiment is said to be increasingly suppressed within the ROK’s military, which is being re-socialized in accordance with more nationalistic educational guidelines. The “conservative” participants further contend that “the Roh Moo-hyun administration probably purged more people (with “pro-American” views) from the MND, MOFAT, and other national security agencies than Kim Jong Il did among his own ranks,” which resulted in a loss of self-confidence and sense of mission within the ranks of the national security establishment. Moreover, whereas in the past, one would advance his or her career at the MND and MOFAT by working the U.S.-related issues at their respective North American divisions, in the current political climate, reportedly, it would be rather dangerous for career growth to work on the U.S. issues or with the U.S. officials.
Political changes in the ROK in the past several years blind-sided everyone and led to the institution of the “pro-North” “sunshine policy” by the Kim Dae-jung administration and “pro-engagement” “peace and prosperity policy” (PPP) by the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which both totally redefined the South-North relations and transformed the ROK into an economic benefactor, diplomatic cheerleader, and military sentinel for Pyongyang, as well as a draw bridge between the DPRK and the world. The PPP is based on three principles – “no war, no collapse, and no pressure,” which puts it in stark contradiction with the U.S. approach towards North Korea, emphasizing that “all options are on the table,” “regime change may be a good idea,” “blackmail ought not to pay, and pressure must be applied.”
Among the growing number of areas that the South and the North can agree on today and appear to lend moral support to each other, one can note the vacillating anti-American feelings, dormant anti-Chinese sentiments (awakened by the “Koguryo flare-up”), and escalating anti-Japanese animosity (aggravated by the recent Tokto dispute and the history textbook problem). North and South Koreans tend to fight together against what they mutually hate, not for what they stand in common. Of course, one cannot discount the fact that South and North Koreans live in a tough neighborhood, and, therefore, they define their national identity through a lot of “antis.”
4. North Korean Foreign Policy and Its Impact on the North-South Relations
In general, North Korea has always sought to penetrate and subvert the South Korean political process with varying degrees of success and to influence the South Korean decision-making, especially with regard to Seoul’s policy towards Pyongyang and Washington. At a maximum, the North Korean leadership has not given up its long-held ambition of unifying the Korean peninsula on its own terms as a strategically superior power, arguing that the Southern leadership lacks the moral nationalist credentials because it allowed for the Southern land to be disgracefully occupied by foreign military forces for six decades, and asserting Pyongyang’s “indigenous” nuclear credentials (which is quite inconsistent with the North’s promise to dismantle its nuclear programs if the U.S. abandons its “hostile policy”) unavailable to Seoul because of its non-nuclear pledge. At a minimum, on security and economic grounds, the DPRK government seeks to take advantage of the “peace and prosperity policy” and to ensure that the ROK government will continue its engagement strategy towards Pyongyang, while attempting to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington and calling for the formation of a “united front” between the North and the South against the United States through the strategy of “national cooperation” on the nuclear and other important issues. Some conference participants suggested that in KEDO and at the six-party talks, North Korea’s strategy may be much more complex than just “driving a wedge” between the two allies: Pyongyang may regard Seoul as an intermediary helping “bring along the United States” and “make it more accommodating and flexible” in its policy towards the DPRK, as well as a facilitator and promoter of a unique “Korean (or Asian) solution” to the North Korean nuclear issue, if the six-party talks fail.
Some U.S. participants emphasize continuity in the North Korean negotiating behavior vis-à-vis South Korea and regard it largely as uncompromising, unyielding, deceptive warrior-like “pseudo-negotiations,” and a tool of revolution and class struggle to be used to defeat the Southern enemy. In contrast, the ROK participants point out the incremental changes in “real negotiations” – less propaganda and grandstanding, more pragmatism and preference for “behind-the-curtain” dealings, more sincerity, greater flexibility and willingness to close the eyes to formality and procedures, more diversity of issues under consideration (including the military issues), proliferation of meeting locations, more diverse negotiating partners, less frequent resort to suspension and delay - that have emerged since the North-South summit in June 2000. These changes resulted in a new friendlier and more cooperative atmosphere in bilateral negotiations and the North-South contacts in various multilateral settings, including within the United Nations, KEDO, and on the sidelines of the six-party talks.
In terms of substance, however, recent political changes in the South led to dramatic changes in the South Korean negotiating behavior. South Korean political leaders promoting the “kumbaya-like” policy of peace and prosperity toward the North are reluctant to use the economic leverage to influence North Korea’s behavior and do not take “no” for an answer from their own inter-Korean negotiators, which ties the latters’ hands and puts them in an inferior bargaining position. As a consequence, as one U.S. participant argued, “the ROK negotiators are forced to absorb the insults from the North,” and the “North Korean negotiators manhandle, dominate, and bury them.” The Chinese participant echoed this sentiment by asserting that “for North Korea, inter-Korean reconciliation is a tool for squeezing economic resources and learning capitalist ways from the South, as well as for trying to break up the South Korean society by penetrating into the ROK through various exchanges and the Internet.” He argued that the DPRK dictates the speed, direction, and scope of the inter-Korean reconciliation; and although the ROK has accepted a lot of North Korea’s demands, the DPRK leadership still refuses to describe the Roh Moo-hyun’s administration as a “good Korean government,” because “it has only one good side – a pro-North policy, whereas the other side of it is bad, namely, its adherence to the strategic alliance with the United States.”
5. Future Scenarios in Korean Nation-building
Conference participants discussed three ways how the inter-Korean reconciliation may unfold – the North-led, the South-led, and mutually cooperative, and four different hypothetical scenarios of the emergence of a unified Korean state, namely, through gradual internal reformation of the North and deepening political reconciliation through proliferation of joint standing commissions, or a fratricidal war, or abrupt collapse and extinction of the DPRK, or the South-led appeasement and virtual reunification. Some participants felt strongly that reunification was unlikely to be either peaceful or democratic or equitable, despite all public declarations and good intentions of all the parties concerned, because power essentially cannot be shared.
One participant raised the possibility that the Northern collapse scenarios could differ: the North Korean state may break up along some invisible internal fault lines and the KPA military leaders may attempt to set up their own mini-garrison states (“warlordism”), or an economic collapse may lead to political chaos and a civil war among the KPA generals competing for central political power. Under both collapse scenarios, although the ROK may attempt to step in and take the lead in restoring the law and order and restructuring the economic, political, and military institutions in the northern half of the peninsula in accordance with its own blueprint, China may deem it necessary to move in, too, and play a greater role in defending the sovereignty and national interests of the crumbling North Korean state with or without Kim Jong Il’s clan.
Many U.S. participants wondered whether political reconciliation between two Koreas meant growing South Korea’s appeasement of the North. The ROK government appears to be willing to concede some strategic ground as a non-nuclear weapon state and grant Kim Jong Il his wish to gain a certain degree of international acceptance or acquiescence by the world for his nuclear weapons program and a freshly minted membership card in the nuclear club. Koreans, both in the North and South, are said to be “ready to tolerate almost anything from each other, except foreign domination.” Hence, they predicted the emergence of a more assertive, nationalistic, autonomous, and strategically non-committed Korean peninsula as a result of the inter-Korean reconciliation process in the future. Both Russian and Chinese participants expressed their support for greater Korean political reconciliation, hoping that when Korea is eventually unified, it will be “a friendly country without any foreign troops on its soil.” Many other participants expressed hope that American troops would stay on the peninsula even after Korean reunification.
6. US-ROK Alliance and Inter-Korean Reconciliation
Conference participants held a very lively exchange about the current state of relations within the U.S.-ROK alliance. The optimists say that South Korea has been one of the most reliable U.S. allies for decades, despite occasional policy disagreements and flare-ups of anti-American sentiment in the South. The U.S.-ROK alliance is “rock-solid” (no pun intended). Security cooperation is “good” and the alliance is “in an excellent condition,” despite some public misperceptions. The ROK military views the North Korean threat in the same way as the U.S. military does. The inter-parliamentary dialogue is at a high level. Bilateral trade and investment are growing. Optimists argue that public expectations about the alliance performance are extremely high, and, therefore, any minor issue or problem tends to provoke extreme disappointment in both capitals. In contrast, there are rather low expectations in the management of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and, as a result, there is little disappointment whenever anything goes wrong. Optimists believe that although North Korea is looking for ways to break apart the alliance, the inter-Korean reconciliation has had no negative impact on the U.S.-ROK military alliance yet.
The pessimists argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance exist on nostalgia for the “good old days,” questioning whether “the good old days” were really “so good.” They contend that the alliance is “on life support,” and alliance restructuring is “badly needed,” because “the alliance no longer serves the best interests of either the United States or the Republic of Korea.” The U.S. and ROK appear to define the North Korean threat differently, which tends to undermine alliance cooperation. Seoul seems to believe that the North Korean threat emanates from its weakness (danger of economic collapse, internal instabilities), not its strength; whereas Washington tends to regard North Korea as a “blackmailing bully,” and not as “legitimate state, worth saving,” with which the U.S. can enter into binding agreements (as one participant put it, “what should you do if Hitler walked into the room?”). Pessimists believe that the North-South reconciliation is damaging the U.S.-ROK alliance. They suggest that “if there is a zero chance of the North attacking the South, as many South Koreans are told by their government, then why does not Seoul ask Washington to withdraw the USFK completely?” They go even further by raising the possibility that the U.S. should “bring our boys home” and totally disengage from the Korean peninsula, both from the South and the North, but stay committed to Japan and Australia, and tell Koreans “call us back when you get serious about your defense.”
But, the “middle-of-the-road” moderate views prevailed among conference participants. They argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance is “in a pretty good shape.” The two allied democracies and market economies share many national interests and common bonds, norms, and values, as well as command plenty of mutual trust and understanding across a wide range of issue-areas and problems. They assert that the U.S. disengagement from the Korean peninsula is a “lousy idea,” a “nutty idea,” “a bad idea” that serves as an example of the so-called “avoidance behavior” on the part of the United States, because it would damage incalculably the national interests of both the United States and the Republic of Korea in many obvious and invisible ways. Instead of abandoning the Korean peninsula, some moderates argued that the U.S should stop calling the North “evil” or “rogue” and look at it as a “legitimate negotiation partner,” albeit “very angry and weak,” with which the international community “can do business” and resolve the outstanding concerns, including the nuclear issue through genuine negotiations. Whereas other moderates may concede that North Korea is evil, but they insist that it is time to “shake hands with the devil,” and start listening to the “silent majority” of the ROK people who believe in the inter-Korean reconciliation, that “there is no alternative to engagement, whatever its form,” and that a policy of “forced regime change will cause a suffering to all Korean people.” All moderates assert that the North-South reconciliation is “not an illusion,” that “it is feasible, especially if China and Russia say it is feasible,” and that the “United States should be prepared to give Koreans some space and allow for the South-North reconciliation to proceed beyond just an agreement not to fight.” These moderates believe that the U.S-ROK alliance must be the main leverage for the South Korean government in its dealings with the North aimed at enhancing the South’s security and accelerating the inter-Korean rapprochement.
In conclusion, conference participants engaged in a lively debate about the future direction of the reconciliation efforts on the Korean peninsula. While some focused on the dramatic changes that have occurred in both the North and the South, others emphasized the importance of maintaining the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the face of an uncertain neighbor to the north. Regardless of the perspective, however, all attendees agreed that the political and economic shifts on the peninsula are driving a demand for changes in the security relations in the region. Therefore, going forward it will become increasingly important to take into account the growing sense of Korean nationalism in South Korea and the gradual movement toward a more open economy and society in North Korea. Recognizing these shifts will be crucial to any reshaping that occurs within the U.S.-ROK alliance.
INTER-KOREAN RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION: DRIVERS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS
CONFERENCE ATTENDEE LIST
1-3 MARCH 2005
Dr. J. Michael Allen
Associate Dean and Professor of History
College of Arts and Sciences
Brigham Young University - Hawaii Campus
55-220 Kulanui Street #1938
Laie, HI 96762-1294
Phone: 1-808-293-3794
Fax: 1-808-293-3328
E-mail: allenm@byuh.edu
Mr. Bradley Babson
Consultant
149 Pennellville Rd
Brunswick, ME 04011
Phone: 1-207-373-0707
Fax: 1-207-373-0555
E-mail: bradbabson@
Dr. Seungjoo Baek
Chief, North Korea Research Team
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Cheong Ryang P.O. Box 250
Seoul 130-650, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-961-1383
Fax: 82-2-961-1172
Phone: 82-2-961-1778
Fax: 82-2-961-1160
E-mail: bsj@kida.re.kr
Lieutenant Colonel Carl Baker
Military Professor
Policy Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8957
Fax: 1-808-971-8949
E-mail: bakerc@
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
Professor of National Security Studies
Air Command and Staff College
Air University
225 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112
Phone: 1-334-953-5073
Fax: 1-334-953-1999
E-mail: bruce.bechtol@maxwell.af.mil
Mr. Stephen Bradner
Special Advisor to Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK
United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea
PSC 303 Box 40
APO AP 96204
Phone: 82-2-7913-3490
Fax: 82-2-7913-7813
E-mail: bradners@korea.army.mil
Dr. Seongwhun Cheon
Senior Research Fellow
The Korean Institute for National Unification
Kangbuk-ku
Suyu 6-dong
Seoul 535-353, Republic of Korea
Phone: 822-901-2571
Fax: 822-901-2547
E-mail: swc339@kinu.or.kr
Mr. Ralph A. Cossa
President
Pacific Forum CSIS
Pauahi Tower Suite 1150
1001 Bishop Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 1-808-521-6745
Fax: 1-808-599-8690
E-mail: PacForum@hawaii.
Mr. Scott R. Feeney
North Korea Country Director
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Asia and Pacific Affairs
International Security Affairs
2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400
Phone: 1-703-614-6473
Fax: 1-703-695-8222
E-mail: scott.feeney@osd.mil
Major Stephen M. Folena
Chief, Combined Political and Economic Analysis
United States Forces Korea (C/J-2)
PSC 303 Box 26
APO, AP 96204-0026
Phone: 315-723-3099
E-mail: Stephen.m.Folena@korea.army.mil
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Gransback
Country Director-Korea
U.S. Pacific Command
Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate
Northeast Asia Division
Box 64015
Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96861-4015
Phone: 1-808-477-3500
Fax: 1-808-477-0513
E-mail: stephen.gransback@pacom.mil
Mr. Richard Halloran
Visiting Professor
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-395-0511
Fax: 1-808-396-4095
E-mail: oranhall@hawaii.
Ms. Balbina Y. Hwang
Policy Analyst
Northeast Asia
Asian Studies Center
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 1-202-608-6134
Fax: 1-202-675-1779
E-mail: balbina.hwang@
Mr. Im Jong In
Member of National Assembly
National Assembly
834 National Assembly Bldg 1
Yoido-Dong
Young Deung Po-Gu
Seoul 150-702, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2 784-6301
Fax: 82-2 788-3834
E-mail: jonginim@
Mr. Frank Jannuzi
East Asia Specialist
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
2523 Guilford Ave
Baltimore, MD 21218
Phone: 1-410-243-3706
Fax: 1-202-228-3612
E-mail: frank_jannuzi@foreign.
Lieutenant Colonel Clay C. Janssen
Special Operations Planner
Special Operations command Korea (SOCKOR)
PSC 450 Box 419
APO, AP 96206
Phone: 315-723-7623
Fax: 315-723-5751
E-mail: Clay.Janssen@korea.army.mil
Dr. Christopher R. Jasparro
Associate Professor
Transnational Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8968
Fax: 1-808-971-8949
E-mail: jasparroc@
Ambassador Charles Kartman
Executive Director
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
600 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10016
Phone: 1-212-455-0211
Fax: 1-212-681-2649
E-mail: ck@
Dr. Kim Byung Kook
Professor
Korea University
Department of Political Science
5-1 Anam-Dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-3290-2189
Fax: 82-2-2277-1684
E-mail: bkk@korea.ac.kr
Mr. Kim Gun Su
Chief of Staff, Assemblyman Im, Jong In
National Assembly
834 National Assembly Bldg
1 Yoido-dong
Youngdeung po-gu
Seoul 150-702, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-784-6301
Fax: 82-2-788-3834
E-mail: pdgkgs@
Dr. Steven Kim
Assistant Research Professor
Research and Publications Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-4057
E-mail: kims@
Dr. Ko Seung-Kyun
Professor, International Studies
Hawaii Pacific University
MP-301
1188 Fort Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 1-808-247-5339
Fax: 1-808-544-0834
E-mail: sko@campus.hpu.edu
Dr. Koh Byung Chul
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Illinois at Chicago
380 Woodlawn Ave
Glencoe, IL 60022-2176
Phone: 1-847-242-0824
Fax: 1-847-835-4618
E-mail: bckoh99@
Dr. Jimmie R. Lackey
Executive Director
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8915
Fax: 1-808-971-8999
E-mail: lackeyj@
Professor Lee Seok-soo
Director, Office for North Korea Studies
Korea National Defense University
The Mershon Center of Ohio State University
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
Phone: 82-2-300-2156
Fax: 82-2-309-9878
E-mail: sslee@kndu.ac.kr
Dr. Lim Wonhyuk
Fellow
Korea Development Institute
Cheongryang PO Box 113
Seoul, Republic of Korea 130-012
Phone: +82-2-958-4206
Fax: +82-2-964-5479
E-mail: lilmster@kdi.re.kr
Professor Stephen W. Linton
Chairman
Eugene Bell Foundation
PO Box 170
Clarksville, MD 21029
Phone: 1-410-531-8424
Fax: 1-410-531-8425
E-mail: linton@
Dr. Liu Ming
Director of International Relations Program
School of World Economy & Politics
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
7/622 Huai-hai Road (M)
Shanghai, China 200020
Phone: 5306-0606 ext 2463
Fax: 5306-3814
E-mail: lium_14@
Colonel Kevin W. Madden
Secretary
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission
PSC 303, Box 54
APO, AP 96024-0054
Phone: 011-82-2-8913-3200
Fax: 011-82-2-7913-4315
E-mail: maddenkw@korea.army.mil
Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov
Professor
Regional Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-5025
Fax: 1-808-971-8989
E-mail: mansourova@
Dr. John Merrill
Chief, Northeast Asia Division
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
U.S. Department of State
2244 North Illinois Street
Arlington, VA 22205
Phone: 1-202-647-4767
Fax: 1-202-647-5286
E-mail: jmerrill05@
ACjmerri@us-state.
Dr. Park Syung Je
Director
Military Analyst Association
Sinwon 308-1701
Ku Mi-Dong
Bun Dang Ku
Sung Nam, Korea 463-510
Phone: 82-16-360-5901
Fax: 82-31-715-6151
E-mail: syungjepark@
Dr. Jonathan Pollack
Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies
United States Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
New Port, RI 02841
Phone: 1-401-841-4532
Fax: 1-401-841-4161
E-mail: pollackj@nwc.navy.mil
Ambassador Jack Pritchard
Visiting Fellow.
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusets Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-2103
Phone: 1-202-797-4369
Fax: 1-202-797-2485
E-mail: jpritchard@brookings.edu
Dr. Ryoo Kihl-jae
Associate Professor
University of North Korean Studies
28-7 Samchung-Dong
Chongro-ku
Seoul 110-230, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-3700-0734
Fax: 82-2-3700-0748
E-mail: kjstar@kyungnam.ac.kr
Colonel David M. Shanahan
Deputy Dean
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Rd.
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8945
Fax: 1-808-971-8949
E-mail: shanahand@
Professor Yoichi Shimada
Professor of International Politics
Fukui Prefectural University
4-1-1 Kenjojima
Matsuoka-cho
Fukui-ken, Japan 910-1195
Phone: +81-776-61-6000 ext.2304
Fax: +81-776-61-6014
E-mail: xyshimada@yahoo.co.jp
Dr. Edward J. Shultz
Professor
Department of Asian Studies
University of Hawaii at Manoa
1881 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96822
Phone: 1-808-956-6316
Fax: 1-808-956-2682
E-mail: shultz@hawaii.edu
Ms. Jane Skanderup
Director for Programs
Pacific Forum Center for Strategic
and International Studies
1001 Bishop Street
Pauahi Tower Suite 1150
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 1-808-521-6745
Fax: 1-808-599-8690
E-mail: jskanderup@hawaii.
Mr. Valery Sukhinin
Minister-Counsellor & DCM
Embassy of the Russian Federation
to the Republic of Korea
34-16, Chong-dong, Chung-gu
Seoul 100-120, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-318-2116
Fax: 82-2-754-0417
E-mail: rusemb@
Mr. Stephen M. Tharp
International Relations Specialist
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command
C5, Strategy Division
APO, AP 96204
E-mail: tharps@korea.army.mil
Dr. Alexander V. Vorontsov
Head of Section for Korean Studies
Institute of Oriental Studies
Russia Academy of Sciences
103753 Rozhdestvenka Street 12
Moscow 119602, Russia
Phone: 7-095 928-3566
Fax: 7-095-975-2396
Professor Woo Seong-ji
Assistant Professor
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
1376-2 Seocho 2 Dong
Seocho Gu
Seoul 137-072, Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 2-3497-7648
Fax: +82 2 575-5245
E-mail: seongjiwoo@
Lieutenant Colonel Clyde T. Burton
Korea Desk Officer
Policy & International Affairs, G-5
Marine Forces Pacific
355 Aoloa St., #L101
Kailua, HI 96734
Phone: 1-808-477-8581
Fax: 1-808-477-8580
E-mail: Clyde.burton@usmc.mil
Mr. John Du Toit
Korea Desk Officer
HQ, U.S. Pacific Command
(Contact information withheld per request)
Major General Lars B. Frisk
Swedish Member of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
UNCMAC
PSC 303 Box 54
APO, AP 96205-0032
Phone: +82-505-734-8991
Fax: +82-505-734-8825
E-mail: frisklb@korea.army.mil
Consul Takashi Hatori
Consulate-General of Japan
1742 Nuuanu Avenue
Honolulu, HI 96817-3294
Phone: 1-808-543-3111
Fax: 1-808-524-7434
E-mail: takashi.hatori@mofa.go.jp
Dr. Young W. Kihl
Professor
Department of Political Science
Iowa State University
503 Ross Hall
Ames, Iowa 50011
Phone: 1-515-294-7256
E-mail: ykihl@iastate.edu
Dr. Choon Nam Kim
Project Coordinator
Research Program
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601
Phone: 1-808-944-7372
Fax: 1-808-944-7446
E-mail: kimcn@
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