Public-Private Partnerships: Security and Emergency ...



Public-Private Partnerships:  Security and Emergency Response Collaboration

in a New Threat Environment

by Deena S. Disraelly

Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY

and

MASTER OF ENGINEERING IN LOGISTICS

at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

September 11th, 2001 marks the worst terrorist action to occur on United States soil and opens a new period in history in which indiscriminate terrorist acts are possible, if not probable. Many of these possible acts, as well as the actions to prevent and recover, will have an impact on the supply chain and services in ways that we cannot yet understand. Previous research has focused on theft prevention and the disruptions such thefts might cause, and very little research on the supply chain impacts of September 11th exist. What is clear, however, is that as government agencies propose new policies and regulations and the threat of international terrorism continues, corporate America needs to find a method for securing their operations. These methods may include the creation of public-private partnerships as well as the introduction of new technology, increasing inventory, and building system resilience, among others.

Limited examples of public-private partnerships for security exist, however, there are several examples of partnerships for emergency response. Since both emergency response partnerships and security collaboratives share the same objective – to protect and secure the personnel, facilities, and supply chain – this thesis investigates emergency response, early detection, and post-September 11th security examples to determine the key factors in establishing successful public-private partnerships. The aim of the analysis was to determine if there exist common themes in the partnerships which suggest a possible set of guidelines by which partnerships could be formed and succeed and through which supply chain security and corporate emergency response could be made more effective and efficient.

The initial step of the research was to determine what the goal of the government’s actions were post-9/11 with regard to improving supply chain security. Speeches, periodicals, press releases, and the text of bills and passed laws were used to formulate the timeline of government actions taken with regard to terrorism and homeland security in the 911 days between September 11th, 2001 and March 11th, 2004, the day the Madrid train station bombings occurred. Preliminary research showed that most of the government’s actions in the first year were aimed at recovering and responding; several billion dollars were distributed to aid the nation in dealing with its grief and fear regarding the attacks. Within six months of the attacks, however, the focus began to shift from reacting to preventing. New laws and agency regulations were put into place which relied on private sector support in order to ensure success.

Since the government focus was on the combination of private sector-dependent regulations and the formation of partnerships, the next area for study was existing partnerships for security. The resultant research, however, showed that there were few such partnerships and limited research had been done. Thus, with the eventual goal of building partnerships for security, the topic was broadened to incorporate a look at public-private partnerships in all sectors, so that key characteristics of successful partnerships could be identified. For the purposes of this research a security and emergency response partnership was defined as:

Public-private partnership – a relationship involving at least one each, but potentially more, of private (for-profit organization, company, industry association representing several similar companies, or an organization of companies with a common goal) and public (a local, state, or federal level rule-making body, official or agency) parties who are interdependent and share a common objective to minimize risk and ensure restoration of safety and security, even if their ultimate goals are different.

Review of the literature indicate two key items: 1) based on the different purposes and players participating in partnerships, a suggested parameter for creating and maintaining partnerships could be generated; and 2) interdependencies – government needs fulfilled by business and vice versa – are vital to partnerships in which all members are active and all members receive both benefits and assistance. Examples of the identified interdependencies are shown in the tables below.

|Government Needs: |Business Provides: |

|Economic Engines/Services |Unimpeded commerce  |

| Project Financing |Money to pay for both service and infrastructure maintenance |

| |directly |

|Knowledgeable Experts |People who work in and understand industry, interrelationships, |

| |and the impacts of potential regulations; critical feedback and |

| |insight for immediate response |

| Policies that are useful, efficient and complied with |Feedback, support/dissension and lobbying in favor of/opposed to |

| |proposed policies |

|Security Assessments |Assessment of security up & down the supply chain |

|Local implementation of security measures |Compliance with existing regulations |

|Information Sharing |Information in the areas in which it operates |

|Cooperation at all levels – extra eyes, ears and hands |Training, operations and risk management planning, etc. |

|Business Needs: |Government Provides: |

|A Level Playing Field – everyone investing to ensure the security|Regulations, standards, and enforcement |

|of the whole | |

|Established and Enforced Security Standards |Establishment of |

| |the national threat warning system |

| |minimum standards for protection of supply chain |

| |new security minimums and response plans for energy providers |

| |transportation/traveling standards of safety for passengers |

|Standard setting to enable IT integration and visibility |Regulations for integration & standards |

| |Security initiatives to provide protection and protective |

| |standards for IT infrastructure |

|Regulatory Coordination |A single source for rules and regulations, in addition to |

| |coordination between agencies |

|Technology Investment Support |University and Corporate funding for research |

|Project Funding to help comply with expensive regulations |Grants, tax assistance, and federally funded loans |

|Secure Physical Infrastructure -- tunnels, bridges, |Protection |

|transportation systems, highways, etc. |of food, drug, and water supplies |

| |for key IT infrastructure |

|Faster flow through Customs |Increased personnel for monitoring |

| |Frequent traveler/known shipper id cards |

| |Fast lanes for rapid transport |

| |Offshore & pre-inspections |

| |Container tracking capabilities |

|Information Sharing |Current threat level data and some actions necessary in |

| |coordination with the threat level in place |

Using known examples of collaborations and partnerships, primarily in emergency response and security, a list of practitioners was identified – examples of partnerships that appeared successful, had demonstrated results either through practice or application and demonstrated tangible interdependencies (or a lack thereof). Survey candidates were identified based on information available in literature reviews and through recommendations made by government officials and industry leaders. The final interview candidates were selected to provide a variety of industry fields and types of partnerships and collaborations which could potentially play a role in post-September 11th supply chain protection. The partnerships include two emergency response cooperatives – one with a technology firm and one with several utility industry partners, a Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) partnership, an overview of partnerships in the syndromic surveillance and early detection field, and the precursor to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

A series of semi-structure interviews were conducted with two or more partners in each of the above partnerships. Whenever possible, multiple private sector stakeholders were asked to participate to provide more information about the interrelationships and the partnership itself. It is important to note that, due to the limited number of interviews conducted, the data has no statistical significance, however, it does provide the basis for some very preliminary conclusions and areas for further study.

Motivation, cooperative goals, communication and trust were determined to be the main components of successful partnerships. The selection of the proper type of partnership is likewise vital – partnership selection appeared to be based on the levels of interdependency between the public and private sectors and the perceived level and type of threat. Collaborative partnerships – partnerships based on cooperative motivations and goals made up of partners whose primary aim is to build on commonalities and interdependencies in order to achieve a common benefit (most often improved security or early warning) – and Preparative and Emergency Response Partnerships – partnerships formed to create operational response plans prior to an emergency and train using established procedures and plans so that all parties are prepared to mitigate damage resultant from a man-made or natural disaster – were those most commonly selected by survey participants to describe their own organizations.

The proposed Partnership Selection Grid, shown below, is designed to help companies select the correct public-private partnership based on the type of threats most likely faced by the company – man-made or natural – and the level of interdependency recognized between the public and private sectors.

[pic]

Those companies with little or no reliance on the government and concern about natural, unpreventable attacks only might elect not to participate in partnerships. These companies are expected to be very limited, since in most cases, government provides basic emergency response services as the very least. On the opposite end of the spectrum, companies with interdependencies on the government including services exchange, information sharing, and others, who are at risk from both natural and man-made disasters, should select a joint collaborative and emergency response cooperative to improve security, response and recovery. Again, the basis for the partnership – whether it is compliance with government regulations or coordination of security and emergency response procedures – should be the primary motivation for participation in the partnership. Although the goal might be business continuity for the corporate sector and limited risk to people and property for the public sector, both groups will have a reason to work together given a strong motivating factor.

In corporate America, neither emergency response nor security can be achieved by just the government or just the private sector. Public-private partnerships provide a potentially viable solution with collateral benefits which may outweigh the significant implementation costs. This will, however, require an effort on the part of the private sector to establish partnerships, make recommendations and force themselves to be heard and a willingness on the part of the public sector to accept the private sector’s expertise and listen.

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