Bringing Social Problems Perspectives Into Emergency



Bringing Social Problems Perspectives Into Emergency

Management Collegiate Curricula

Thomas E. Drabek, Ph.D.

John Evans Professor, Emeritus

Department of Sociology and Criminology

University of Denver

Denver, Colorado 80208-2948

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*A paper presented at the Emergency Management Higher Education Conference, Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Emmitsburg, Maryland, June, 2008. Portions of this paper are based on Drabek 2008. I wish to thank Ruth Ann Drabek for her work on this paper. Partial support was provided by the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the University of Denver through the John Evans Professorship Program. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA or the University of Denver.

Bringing Social Problems Perspectives Into Emergency

Management Collegiate Curricula

Abstract

During the past decade dozens of emergency management related courses, programs, and degrees have been created. To enhance the quality of these, a more strategic vision of the profession must be fostered. Inclusion of social problems perspectives within collegiate curricula is an essential step. Five topics comprise the essay: 1) introduction, 2) historical context, 3) key themes, 4) implementation strategies, and 5) conclusions.

Bringing Social Problems Perspectives Into Emergency

Management Collegiate Curricula

Introduction

Social science research focused on human responses to disaster has a long tradition, e.g., see Barton 1969, Dynes, 1970, Drabek 1986, Rodríguez et al. 2006, Drabek 2007c. A rich legacy of empirically based studies has evolved since Samuel Henry Prince (1920) first developed a series of analytical generalizations based on his observations following the explosion resulting from the collision of two ships at Halifax harbor (December 6, 1917). Over the years, especially through the efforts of faculty associated with research units like the Disaster Research Center (DRC) (founded at The Ohio State University in 1963; relocated in 1985 to the University of Delaware) and the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center (NHRAIC) (University of Colorado), specialized courses were developed wherein aspects of this burgeoning scientific base of information could be disseminated. Generally, these reflected the disciplinary perspective of the faculty member with sociology and social geography being most common. For example, as a disaster researcher who studied with Quarantelli and Dynes in the first cohort of graduate students working at the DRC, I began offering a course entitled “Community Response to Natural Disaster” at the University of Denver in 1974. During the 70s and 80s the number and variety of such courses increased.

In 1995, however, a significant development occurred when the Higher Education Project was developed within the Emergency Management Institute, at the National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland (Blanchard 2006). Following a planning meeting which was attended by a dozen or so academics, two decisions were implemented: 1) annual conferences focused on collegial emergency management programs, and 2) commission of a series of “instructor guides” to facilitate the development of future courses and programs (for elaboration see Waugh 2007, pp. 14-17, and Drabek 2006b). These and related activities stimulated dozens of faculty so that by 2007, over one hundred college-level programs in emergency management were operative.

The 2006 Higher Education Conference was co-sponsored, i.e., “Emergency Management and Homeland Security/Defense Higher Education Conference.” I was invited to participate in a panel focused on the “integration of academic emergency management and homeland security programs.” In preparation, I reviewed numerous course syllabi and program statements (see Drabek 2006a). As I further reflected on this experience, I came to two conclusions: 1) integration of emergency management and homeland security programs required much more than simple name changes; important contextual and cultural differences would have to be confronted, and 2) the quality of most programs should be enhanced so that a more strategic vision of the profession and a capacity for critical analysis are fostered. “. . . students must be encouraged to critically examine current ‘doctrine’, no matter its source. It is not enough to just ‘know’ the book.” (Drabek 2007a, p. 41).

As I pushed these ideas in preparation for a lecture I was to give as the third recipient of the E.L. Quarantelli Theory Award by the International Research Committee on Disasters (IRCD), I realized that my initial conclusions reflected more complex and much deeper issues (Drabek 2007b). They also reflected my extreme disappointment in many recent policy decisions. It is my view that emergency management, like our nation generally, has been going in the wrong direction especially since the terrible attacks on September 11, 2001. In that lecture I summarized nine specific emergency management policy areas wherein redirection is needed, e.g., roles of the military, strategies for reducing future attacks by terrorists, climate change priorities, etc. (for elaboration, see Drabek 2008, pp. 58-89).

My focus here, however, will be to summarize a theoretical perspective that provided the rationale for my conclusions. Further reflection on my August lecture has reinforced these, i.e., the more strategic vision required of the profession can be enhanced through the inclusion of key ideas from social problems theory (see Drabek 2008, pp. 10-27).

Historical Context

The practice of emergency management, like that of any other profession, requires skillful application of generalized knowledge to new and unique situations. Naive application or generalization of any research study finding is a sure path to failure. Hence, all professionals must have some understanding of basic epistemological assumptions and controversies within the disciplines from which the knowledge originated that they are seeking to apply.

For example, years ago Quarantelli (1987) challenged disaster researchers to answer an obvious question, i.e., “What is a disaster?” This has produced numerous essays wherein alternative answers and theoretical schema have been advanced by a wide range of scholars, e.g., Quarantelli 1998, Perry and Quarantelli 2005, Perry 2006.

Why is this question important to emergency managers? There are many reasons, but two are critical: 1) generalizability, and 2) perspective. When research findings are reported, both researchers, and any who would try to apply the conclusions, like emergency managers, must ask about the limits of generalizability. When asked if reactions to military attack involving nuclear bombs would parallel those following natural disasters, Quarantelli (2004) voiced this opinion.

“. . . if people are asked to evacuate from a certain area, whether the impetus for the evacuation is radiation fallout or a hurricane doesn’t matter. However, people are only going to accept certain warnings as legitimate. But fundamentally, we thought that a nuclear attack was qualitatively different from any other situation. Therefore, we could not say to what degree the response to a nuclear attack or a hurricane would be similar.” (Quarantelli 2004, p. 325).

In contrast, Clarke (2006) challenged a fundamental conclusion from disaster research regarding post-event emergence of altruistic communities. These have been documented in dozens of studies focused on a wide range of events, including tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, and the like. But as we witnessed after Katrina, as the magnitude of impact escalates, the response may differ significantly. Magnitude of impact is but one of several key attributes of disaster events. If London was really hit by a “worst case” surprise, Clarke asked, what might be the relevance of the altruistic community conclusion from the macro level view of the world system?

“What, after all could Zimbabwe really do to help England recover? . . . the response wouldn’t be uniform even within the United States. The religious right would probably say Londoners brought it on themselves; it was divine retribution for sinful behavior. Russia could do little.” (Clarke 2006, p. 176).

“I don’t mean to sound coldhearted, but if we’re really going to think smartly and imagine well about worst cases we have to be honest about political realities. The happy conclusion of disaster researchers—that altruistic communities form after calamity—has limits.” (Clarke 2006, p. 177).

Second, there is the matter of perspective or theoretical paradigm. Quarantelli, coming from a symbolic interactionist view, has argued forcefully that disaster researchers will best be served by social change perspectives. These, he proposed, “. . . would force us to consider the more positive aspects of disasters (all but impossible to consider in a social problem context that focuses on the negative).” (Quarantelli 2005, p. 353). As we try to think about classification systems that differentiate among “types” of disasters, Quarantelli had cautioned that we should not get side tracked into broader issues of social problems and the value issues raised in such analyses. More recently, he and two colleagues (Quarantelli et al. 2006, pp. 25-27), have extended his assessments by examining “new happenings” such as responses to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the “SoBig computer F virus spread”. These led to the development of a new category, i.e., “trans-system social ruptures” (TSSRs). TSSR events are quite different from the tornadoes, floods, or hurricanes, etc., which comprise much of the disaster research information base. TSSR events “. . . jump across different societal boundaries, disrupting the fabric of different social systems.” (Quarantelli et al. 2006, p. 27). Hence, generalization of results flowing from earlier studies of more “typical” disasters may not be appropriate.

In direct contrast, I see great benefit, at least for some purposes, in using the rich insights that have emerged within social problems perspectives. Indeed, my answer to Quarantelli’s basic epistemological question is this: Disasters are non-routine social problems. (Drabek 1989). Kreps and I (1996) elaborated on the implications and payoffs of this position. Generally speaking, disasters remain a low priority for local officials and the public because the probability of impact is low. As Stallings (1995) has documented, even in California, the earthquake hazard has evolved in public perception so as to be only a “partially constructed” social problem (see also, Stallings 2005, 2006 and Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Unlike poverty, disaster events, as opposed to hazards, can be demarcated in social time and space (Kreps 2001). Thus, when certain triggering events occur, the perception of risk distribution may be redefined by key interest groups. Certainly, since the attacks on 9/11 we have witnessed a massive manipulation of risk perceptions related to terrorism (Lustick 2007, Altheide 2006, Jenkins 2003). As Furedi (2006) put it, there has been exponential growth in a “market in fear”. Prior to 9/11, many social problems texts included chapters or sections focused on the roots of terrorist attacks. As a strategy, terror has a long history (Waugh 2006). Through such information and these types of understandings, emergency managers can develop a much more strategic vision of their profession (e.g., see Oyola-Yemaiel and Wilson 2003).

Key Themes

The first continuing field teams to collect systematic data following a large number of disasters were based within the University of Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center (NORC). As their analyses were published, e.g., Fritz and Marks 1954, the field director, Charles Fritz (1961) integrated their conclusions with the work of others. When Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (1961) first published their widely used social problems text, they included a chapter by Fritz entitled “Disasters”. Five years later, they published a new edition (1966). It did not include the Fritz chapter. Neither did any subsequent versions, e.g., 1976 (4th edition). Their explanation is informative.

“Three new chapters have been introduced—on alcohol, poverty, and war and disarmament—to deal with vital problems of contemporary society not included in the first edition. These additions have been at a price: to avoid lengthening an already long book, it was necessary to drop the chapters on problems of military life, of disaster and catastrophe, and of transportation in the metropolis, which proved to be more appropriate for graduate students than for undergraduates. Advanced students will want to consult those chapters in the first edition to learn how the sociological orientation helps to clarify problems once assumed to be the exclusive province of other specialists.” (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p. ix).

I’ve selected seven themes from this rich social problems legacy that I use in my own courses. These enhance student capacity for critical analysis and foster a more strategic vision of emergency management.

1. There is a relationship between the private troubles experienced by individuals and the public issues of their day.

This insight is one of the cornerstones of “the sociological imagination” (Mills 1959). Merton and Nisbet (1966) used different language and referenced such theorists as Weber (1946) and Mannheim (1936), rather than Mills. But they described how societies differed in the extent to which an “ethic of fatalism” is replaced with an “ethic of responsibility”.

“To the extent that the ethic of responsibility spreads in a society, social problems tend to become manifest rather than remaining latent. But even within such a society, largely oriented toward directed social change, countervailing processes make for the continued latency for a time of certain social problems.” (Merton and Nisbet, 1966, p. 797).

What “countervailing processes” were operative in the Gulf states, especially Louisiana, that prevented officials and citizens from better anticipating and preparing for a storm like Katrina (2005). Some would wash their hands knowing that they had been successful with the exercise known as Hurricane Pam (e.g., see Brinkley 2006, pp. 18-19). Others would point to their work that documented the continued loss of wetlands that heretofore had reduced vulnerability (Bourne 2004). But the outcome remains—over 1,300 people died. Why did the changing distributions of risk, a process that had been going on for years, remain off the public agenda? Why didn’t the preparedness plans that had been designed get implemented in a manner that could have saved more lives and reduced the trauma of rescue for many survivors?

To understand the failed Katrina response, like that of any other disaster event, we always must place emergency management within the community, state and federal context of the time. Through their analysis Hartman and Squires (2006) highlighted the institutional patterns of racism, sexism, and ageism that molded this flawed response. There was much more than, for example, a priority shift toward terrorism among emergency officials. The private troubles of Katrina victims exposed a whole range of public issues that defined the institutional vulnerabilities that analysts like Perrow (1984, 2006, 2007) highlight as aspects of “normalcy”.

2. All societies are in a constant degree of change reflecting patterns of consensus and dissensus among and within institutional areas.

Before Dynes prepared his excellent summary of disaster field studies (1970), he worked with two other Ohio State faculty members on a social problems text (1964). In it they emphasized that the social fabric is both fragile, because it always is subject to change, and powerful, because it is taken for granted. Conflicts always are present. At times they can boil over whenever patterns of strain become redistributed and highly polarized. Hence, emergency managers, like all other officials within the intergovernmental system, must negotiate areas of “emergency consensus” so that the “mass assault”, to use Barton’s (1969) term, can be coordinated. To the degree that the emergence of such areas of consensus is delayed, responders are trapped within webs of broken systems that fail.

3. Because social problems are socially constructed, so too must be their solutions.

Remember the acute and chronic poverty that defined New Orleans before Katrina. Reduction of poverty requires a focus on structure. While the rates vary a bit from study to study, we currently have nearly 20 percent of our population—55 million people—living in a state of poverty (Block et al. 2006). Why? Because of fundamental structural issues.

“Looking abroad also shows that government policies can dramatically reduce poverty levels. The probability of living in poverty is more than twice as high for a child born in the United States than for children in Belgium, Germany, or the Netherlands. Children in single-mother households are four times more likely to be poor in the United States than in Norway. The fact that single-parent households are more common in the United States than in many of these countries where the poor receive greater assistance undermines the claim that more generous policies will encourage more single women to have children out of wedlock. These other countries all take a more comprehensive government approach to combating poverty, and they assume that it is caused by economic and structural factors rather than bad behavior.” (Block et al. 2006, p. 17).

4. As with wealth and other forms of privilege, the socially powerful also have greater influence in defining what is and is not a social problem.

When Domhoff (2006) looked back at C. Wright Mill’s (1956) classic statement on the concentration of power within the United States, he acknowledged its depth and breadth. But Mills was wrong, he argued, to grant military leaders equal standing with the corporate rich.

“This point is demonstrated most directly by the fact that military leaders are immediately dismissed if they disagree with their civilian bosses, as seen numerous times since the early 1960s, and most recently in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, when a top general was pushed into retirement for daring to say there was a need for more troops than former corporate CEO and current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his think-tank advisors thought necessary.” (Domhoff 2006, p. 548).

Clearly “the military” represent a complex and far reaching power base (Domhoff 2005). But since Mills’ assessment, additional power bases have emerged although some are more transitory and less potent. For example, “ . . . power also can be generated from a religious organizational base, as seen in the civil rights movement, the rise of the Christian Right, and the Iranian Revolution.” (Domhoff 2006, p. 550).

5. There is an interdependence among social problems, including their origins, analysis and solutions.

Those advocating a “social vulnerability approach” to disasters (e.g., see Enarson et al. 2003, 2006 and Enarson 2007), illustrate this theme well. By pushing emergency managers to examine sectors of socially vulnerable populations within their communities, be they gender, race or class based, more effective social policies and procedures can be designed. While similar to this approach, social problems perspectives greatly broaden the vision. Many of the post-Katrina analyses compiled by Hartman and Squires (2006) illustrate this.

“ . . . some noted the sickeningly high poverty rate among the city’s black residents, but said nothing about how radicalized poverty contributed to the crisis. Neither the concentration of subsidized housing, nor the lack of car ownership among poor blacks—which made it impossible for many African Americans to flee New Orleans because the city’s middle-class-oriented evacuation plan was predicated on people leaving in their own vehicles—were mentioned. Racialized disinvestment in schools, public health, and other critical institutions in the core city, which impacts the suburbs as well, has existed for decades, but unlike the wind and the water, it garnered little attention. We do not believe that anyone intended to strand poor blacks in New Orleans. But it was predictable . . .” (powell et al. 2006, pp. 64-65).

6. Sociological analyses of social problems preclude blaming the victims.

While all of us make choices, the consequences with which we must live, the range of options perceived varies directly with our experience base. Growing up poor usually does not provide much vision of hope. Those at the very bottom of the economic pile perceive constraints so narrow that the very word “choice” becomes offensive. Reflecting a naïve belief in “the American Dream” and values rooted in images of “rugged individualism” we invest in solutions designed to transform “flawed” individuals, rather than structure. As Rubington and Weinberg (2003) put it: “It is in the interest of a capitalist society to endorse solutions to social problems that treat individual persons, thereby creating a market for treatment industries while discouraging solutions that call for a radical change in the social structure.” (p. 251).

Years ago, Ryan (1971) taught us why blaming victims was ineffectual. So when I witnessed televised scenes of Katrina evacuees and the courageous rescues by Coast Guard personnel and others, my mind raced back to another place of death. In 1976, 139 people died in the Big Thompson Canyon flood in Colorado. A local sheriff and others blamed the victims. “We warned them, but they wouldn’t leave.” My social problems perspective led me to ask, “But sheriff, isn’t it your job to devise an evacuation plan that works?” I elaborated on this theme in my Katrina essay, i.e., “Don’t Blame the Victims” (Drabek 2005). Blaming victims precludes the examination of “root causes” (see also Erikson 1997 and Picou et al.1997).

7. Like war in earlier analyses, today, terrorism is commonly defined as a social problem.

The strategy of terrorism has been used for centuries. McVeigh and Wolfer (2004) illustrate this fact, e.g., Ku Klux Klan actions (p. 133) and proceed to expose “root causes”. The “normalcy” of such violence is seen when historical context is understood. When perceptions of injustice prevail, some will resort to violence as illustrated by the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), the Flour Riot (1837), and other such events. Hence, terrorism results when activists goad others, often the poor, into a perceptual trap. “Enough is enough, we’re not putting up with this anymore.”

While the creation of war related products provide economic security for some, McVeigh and Wolfer (2004) argue that the U.S. “. . . still ignores the basic value conflicts, ideas and ideals between Western and Eastern cultures.” (p. 349). Hence, the $842 billion in arms sales to other nations by the United States in 1997, did little to reduce the threat of either terrorism or war (McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 386). After reviewing more current data on arms sales, growing public fear of terrorist attacks and rising military expenditures, Lauer and Lauer (2006) ask: “What if the United States invested the billions spent on military preparations in electronics, education, health, and other sectors that benefit human beings.” (p. 419).

Clearly record levels of arms production and sales, expanded military training facilities, and the like, are linked directly to the economic security of many, not just those at the top. Such economic interdependencies fuel policy decisions within both the public and private sector. Within such structural arrangements the root causes of the most violent disasters are found (Neubeck et al. 2007). So clearly, efforts at mitigation will have far reaching consequences and strong resistance. We would do well to ponder the wisdom hidden within the words of one of our earliest patriots—Thomas Paine.

“Every war terminates with an addition of taxes, and consequently with an addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they are now commenced and concluded, the power and interest of Governments are increased. War, therefore, from its productiveness, as it easily furnishes the pretence of necessity for taxes and appointments to places and offices, becomes a principal part of the system of old Governments; and to establish any mode to abolish war, however advantageous it might be to Nations, would be to take from such Government the most lucrative of its branches.” (Paine 2003, p. 254).

Most social problems analysts have concluded that a global or international perspective is required. Until recently, most concluded that the single most important social problem is war and all of its ramifications. Global warning, climate change, or whatever label you want to put on it, however, increasingly is viewed as the greatest threat to the well being of future generations (e.g., see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007 and Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences 2006, p. 69). But within the U.S.A. especially, extensive erosion of civil liberties and the success of fear generation also constitute real threats. As Al Gore (2007) put it: “. . . when fear and anxiety play a larger role in our society, logic and reason play a diminished role in our collective decision making.” (p. 48). In short, the key processes that define our form of government are put at risk.

It is through an enhanced understanding of these broader theoretical contexts that emergency managers can discover a more strategic vision of their profession.

Implementation Strategies

The above themes articulate important insights from social problems perspectives. How can they best be integrated into emergency management curricula? The question is complex, but here are a few ideas to ponder.

1. Inclusion and expansion of relevant courses.

The two most obvious with which I am familiar are “The Social Dimensions of Disaster” (Drabek 2004) and “A Social Vulnerability Approach To Disasters”. (Enarson et al. 2003). In either or both of these courses, instructors could include assignments that provide students with opportunities to explore the themes I developed above. For example, a position paper could be assigned wherein students would explore Kreps’s (2001) article in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Possible topics could include: “How do disasters differ from other social problems?” Issues of class, gender, and race could be linked from a vulnerability perspective to matters of civil liberties and differential impacts of both war and global warming.

2. Integration into existing courses.

A few examples will make the point. Within a course on “disaster response,” issues of evacuation procedures and policies could be juxtaposed with the “don’t blame the victim” theme. In “disaster recovery” courses, differential impacts and required adjustments could be linked to class, gender, and race. Essay topics could challenge students to confront structural causes of poverty, for example, that may undermine recovery efforts. What policies might be required to mitigate against spousal-abuse (see Fothergill 2004) during long-term disaster recovery operations? In “disaster mitigation” courses, students could be challenged to examine differential power distributions within varied communities and relate these to potential conflicts that alternative mitigation proposals might evoke (e.g., see Wisner et al. 2003). The list could go on, but hopefully these examples will stimulate course alterations.

Recently I was pleased to review Dave McEntire’s (2009) newest product, i.e., Introduction to Homeland Security: Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective. This text is a good step toward the direction I am proposing especially in his treatment of such matters “root causes” of terrorism, inherent conflicts between policies designed to increase security and basic constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties, media censorship, and the like.

3. Specialized techniques.

To what extent are emergency management courses including opportunity for student debates? When pressed to prepare arguments for and against specific policy proposals and then present them formally, the capacity for critical analysis may be enhanced. Debate topics could reflect local, state or federal emergency management policy, either existent or proposed. Topics could reflect the range of subject matter addressed within the specific course.

Alternatively, students could be assigned roles in various forms of simulated community problem solving activities, e.g., council meetings, task force groups, etc. Simulated policy issues or proposals could be the focus with students assigned “roles” reflecting alternative value positions, e.g., local business, community activist group members, etc.

A more traditional option would be the assignment of policy papers. After preparation, these could be presented in class for critical assessment. But the topics selected should reflect the social problems perspective as well as the substantive focus of the course. For example, in either mitigation or response courses, students could be challenged to juxtapose the rationale for proposed expenditures. Mitigation measures might be far wiser than enhanced response capabilities. More importantly, however, are the larger issues of other social problems. Why should public monies be allocated for disaster exercises, for example, when so many community members lack jobs, health insurance, or adequate housing? What roles do emergency managers play in addressing other community social problems? In short, what vision of their profession do they practice?

Conclusions

Now that the number of collegiate emergency management programs has grown, it is time to press for increased quality. Two gaps are most significant: 1) strategic vision, and 2) capacity for critical analysis.

1. Emergency management programs should foster a more strategic vision of the profession.

A more strategic vision can be attained by defining disasters as non-routine social problems. Key insights from the rich social problems legacy should be integrated into existing emergency management programs through a variety of strategies. Faculty must explore these insights and the strategies that are most appropriate for their programs. Through such exploration their own vision of the profession of emergency management will grow as will their capacity to foster such vision within their students.

2. Emergency management programs should enhance student capacity for critical analysis.

It is not enough to know emergency management doctrine. While essential, even knowing the historical evolution of different policy areas (e.g., Rubin 2007), is not enough. Students must be encouraged to criticize current “doctrine” and debate reasonable alternatives. Their analyses will be enhanced if such assessments reflect the wisdom contained within social problems perspectives. Failure to understand the “root causes” of disasters, like other social problems, will constrain their capacity to envision fuller ranges of policy alternatives. Furthermore, failure to understand potential dissimilarities among disaster phenomena may lead to inappropriate generalization. And because looting did not occur following 200 tornadoes that impacted small or medium sized communities in the U.S.A., they may assume such actions will not follow events that differ in significant ways be they in New Orleans or Iraq. When pressed by faculty to be more critical in their analyses, their understanding of such key epistemological issues will be enhanced.

Reduced capacity for critical analysis may encourage them to stand-by when other community members, hurting from the loss and trauma of disaster, begin a search for “the guilty”. When I and Quarantelli (1967) observed this process following the 1963 explosion at the Coliseum in Indianapolis, we realized that the blame attribution process was deflecting attention away from root causes and structural change required. Hence, we concluded “. . . that putting other persons into the same position could have made little difference.” (Drabek and Quarantelli 1967, p. 16). And even more insidious: “Not only does individual blame draw attention from more fundamental causes, but it might actually give the illusion that corrective action of some sort is being taken.” (p. 16).

With impaired strategic vision and minimal capacity for critical analysis, future emergency managers will fail. Their failures will put our nation at even greater risk. Hence, I urge you to ponder, explore, and implement social problems perspectives into your programs.

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