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Korea Neg - 7 Week
A2: Korean War – 1nc 5
A2: Korean War – Low Risk 6
A2: Korean War – No Escalation 7
A2: Korean War – No North Provocations 8
A2: Korean War – No North Invasion 9
A2: Korean War – No South Retaliation 11
A2: Korean War – Bioweapons Ans 12
A2: Korean War – South Will Solve 13
A2: Korean War – China Will Solve 14
A2: Korean War – China Won’t Solve 16
A2: Korean War – North Will Preserve Its Survival 18
***Succession / Regime Collapse Adv ANS 18
A2: Regime Collapse Adv – 1nc 19
U.S. Presence Needed Post Unification / Collapse 20
Security Assurances Won’t Solve 21
External Threats Sustain the Regime 22
***Regionalism Adv ANS 22
A2: Regionalism Adv – 1nc 23
A2: Regionalism Solves Impacts from Withdrawal 24
ROK Already Participating in Regionalism 25
Alliance => U.S. Regional Integration 26
Alliances Compliments Regionalism 27
No Multilateralism 30
Economic Decline Turns Multilateralism 31
***ROK Soft Power / Modernization Adv Ans 31
Military Presence Key to ROK Autonomy 32
A2: ROK Modernization Deters China 33
***U.S.-China Relations Adv Ans 35
Good Relations Now 36
No U.S.-China War 37
China Won’t Balance Against U.S. 38
China’s Rise Is Not a Threat 39
***China Soft Power Adv ANS 41
China’s Influence Will Grow 42
Chinese Soft Power Increasing 43
China Becoming More Responsible in Region 45
China’s Soft Power Exaggerated 46
Several Factors Undermine Chinese Soft Power 47
Chinese Soft Power Won’t Solve 48
***Solvency ARGUMENTS 48
Must End Defense Treaty 49
Korea Neg - 7 Week
***DETERRENCE DA 49
1nc/2nc Uniqueness 50
Deterrence Now 51
A2: N/U – Troop Reductions Now 52
A2: N/U – Restructuring 53
1nc Links 54
2nc Link Block 55
2nc Crushes U.S. Influence 57
2nc Plan Causes Withdrawal from Japan 58
2nc Ground Forces Key 59
Link Extensions 60
U.S. Presence Prevents Allied Prolif 61
Withdrawal => Withdrawal from Japan 62
A2: Turn – Withdrawal => Regionalism 63
A2: Navy / Air Force Solves 64
Terrorism Impact – 2nc 65
North Korean Invasion Impact – 1nc/2nc 66
A2: ROK Can Defend Itself 67
***U.S.-ROK Alliance DA 67
U.S.-ROK Alliance DA – 1nc 68
U.S.-ROK Relations Good 69
2nc Link Block 70
Troops Key to the Alliance 72
2nc Nuclearization Internal Links 73
Laundry List Impact – 2nc 74
Solves North Korea & Economy – 2nc 75
Deters China / E. Asian Balance of Power 76
Deters North Korea 77
***ROK Defense Spending DA 77
Withdrawal => Increase in ROK Defense Spending 78
***ROK Peacekeeping DA 78
Piracy Impact 79
Middle East / South Asia Impact 80
Korea Neg - 7 Week
***CONDITION on DPRK Nuclear Freeze CP 80
CP – Condition on Denuclearization – 1nc 81
2nc Solvency *** 82
Solvency Extensions 83
2nc Solves Succession / Democracy 84
2nc Solves Regionalism 85
Unconditional Guts Leverage / A2: perm *** 86
Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip – 2nc 87
Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip 89
Allies Relations NB Ext 90
A2: Plan Solves Net Benefit 91
A2: NK Will Reject the Offer 92
A2: NK Won’t Make Concessions on Nuclear Program 94
***Condition on Chinese Cooperation CP 95
CP – Condition on Chinese Coop – 1nc 96
2nc Chinese Influence Bad NB 97
2nc Solvency 99
Withdrawal => Leverage for Coop 100
Solvency Extensions 101
Solves Denuclearization 102
solves WMD Prolif 103
China Will Do Soft Sanctions 104
Chinese Coop Key to Solvency 105
China Can Influence North Korea 107
China Will Say Yes 110
A2: Strong China-DPRK Relations Block Solvency 114
Taiwan NB 115
U.S.-China War NB 116
CP => U.S.-China Cooperation 117
U.S.-China Relations Good – Laundry List 120
U.S.-China Cooperation solves prolif and terror 121
U.S.-China Cooperation solves NPT, Taiwan, Chinese Economy 122
U.S.-China Cooperation solves Iran nuclearization 123
***Consultation CPS 123
Consultation Solvency - General 124
Consult ROK – Solvency 125
Consult ROK – Key to Alliance 126
Consult ROK – A2: Perm *** 127
Consult Russia – Solvency 128
Consult Russia – Say Yes 130
Korea Neg - 7 Week
***Ban Military Exercises CP 130
1nc Solvency 131
2nc Solvency 132
2nc Threat to Restart Exercises => Empirical Bargaining Chip 133
2nc Solves Tension / Prolif 134
Military Exercises Undermine Nonprolif Efforts 135
Military Excercises Bad – 2nc Laundry List 136
Military Exercises Bad – DOD Budget 137
Military Exercises => Korea War 138
Military Exercises => China/Korea War 139
Military Exercises => SK Anti Americanism 140
Military Exercises Will Provoke China 141
A2: NK Won’t Lashout at Exercises 142
A2: Exercises key to Readiness 143
Exercises Happening Now 144
***Other CPS 144
CP – Restructuring 145
CP – Peacekeeping Restructuring 146
CP – Remove Permanent Troop Stationing 147
CP – Gradual Withdrawal – 1nc 148
CP – Condition on End to Ballistic Missile PROGRAM 149
***REDUCE / Withdrawal Specification 149
Withdrawal Spec – Multiple Ways to Reduce U.S. Presence 150
A2: Korean War – 1nc
The North’s military is too weak to embolden it to attack
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 (5/29/10, “North Korean war unlikely, say analysts”, )
“China refuses scheming against NK with the US," read the front page banner headline. Patrick Morgan, a leading strategic analyst at the University of California, writes that the North has succeeded in looking "like Mighty Mouse" because its nuclear deterrence has not been tested by highly motivated potential attackers. "Why not? Because a collapse of the North seems at least as dangerous, and much more likely, than its use of nuclear weapons," Morgan says. The good news, however, is that the North's estimated eight nuclear missiles, of questionable functionality, are not nearly enough to embolden the North to deliberately risk outright military confrontation. "Pyongyang has never displayed intense dedication to anything except survival; it will not initiate a war to die for its principles," Morgan says. Peter Hayes, at the Nautilus Institute, recalls being in North Korea in 1998, when the country was also on a war footing. "The whole country just went berserk. It was like throwing petrol on an ant hill," he said. "Presumably [the war ritual] is a positive for the regime, or they wouldn't do it."
No escalation – empirical
Strobel and Landay, 10 – Foreign affairs correspondent, reporter (Warren and Jonathan, 5/25/10, Yahoo News, “Will North Korea's saber rattling lead to war?”
)
"It's not inevitable that it will escalate," said Mitchell Reiss , who negotiated with North Korea during the Clinton administration. Reiss said no war erupted after earlier North Korean acts that were more provocative than the sinking of the Cheonan was. Those included a 1983 bombing linked to North Korea that killed South Korean cabinet members who were visiting Burma and a 1968 commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence, the Blue House. Lee also "didn't shoot all of his bullets, and he left some incentives on the table for the North Koreans to behave better in the future," Reiss said, pointing to Lee's decision not to pull out of a joint industrial park in the northern border town of Kaesong.
South Korea won’t retaliate – doesn’t want to freak out investors
Kim, 6/16 (6/16/10, Jack, Reuters, “Q+A - How serious is the Korean crisis and risk of war?”
, JMP)
SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea has repeated its threat to take military action if the U.N. Security Council punishes it for what it says is a fabricated accusation by South Korea that it attacked and sank a navy ship, killing 46 sailors.
The sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March was the deadliest incident between the rival Koreas in decades.
Following are some questions about how serious the crisis is, whether it could escalate to an armed confrontation and how the North could react to the outcome of debate at the U.N.
WILL THERE BE WAR?
Many analysts doubt there will be war, as long as South Korea holds its fire. North Korea's obsolete conventional armed forces and military equipment mean quick and certain defeat if it wages full-scale war and Pyongyang is well aware of its limits.
South Korea has made it clear it will not retaliate despite investigations that found a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank the corvette Cheonan in March.
It knows the investment community will take fright if it does attack. President Lee Myung-bak's government has taken the case to the Security Council, rather than take the law into its own hands.
IS EVERYTHING SAFE AND SOUND?
No. As the level of rhetoric rises, there is always a risk of skirmishes which could in turn develop into wider conflict.
Lee raised the stakes by saying in a national address the South would exercise its right to defend itself if the North provoked it again. North Korea has said much the same.
Both have carefully avoided sounding like the aggressor, promising to fight only if the other strikes first.
But South Korea said it would resume loudspeaker broadcasts against the North at their armed border. Pyongyang says it will shoot at the equipment.
South Korea's defence minister has repeatedly said it would defend itself if the North begins shooting by quickly returning fire with overwhelming intensity.
Another risk could be the build-up of U.S. military forces on the peninsula that will be seen by the North as a sign of imminent invasion, something that leaders in Pyongyang are said to be genuinely afraid of.
The United States, which has about 28,000 troops stationed on the peninsula, threw its full support behind South Korea but said it was working hard to stop the escalation getting out of hand.
WHAT WILL THE SECURITY COUNCIL DO?
South Korea, not a member of the Security Council, and the United States, its key ally who is a permanent member, want the strongest action taken against the North that hits where it will hurt the destitute state's leaders.
But China, another permanent member and the North's major backer, will likely veto a resolution, possibly on grounds that the ship incident, unlike Pyongyang's nuclear tests, is a localised issue that is better addressed by the two rivals and not by the international community.
The alternative is a strongly worded statement by the Security Council that condemns the North's actions and calls for its pledge not to repeat provocative actions. Such a statement will be non-binding and will not involve prescriptions for sanctions such as a trade embargo.
As the North's chief U.N. representative said on Tuesday, Pyongyang is also likely to protest against such a statement.
WHAT ARE THE RISKS TO INVESTORS?
Market players have tended to think that confrontation between the two Koreas will not escalate into armed conflict because they believe Seoul will not risk the damage to its own economy and its powerful neighbours in North Asia, who together account for about a sixth of the world's economic output.
In South Korea, even a nuclear test does little to rattle financial markets, as market players are more concerned with direct armed confrontation and have become largely inured to the North's rhetoric.
But the latest report of Kim Jong-il calling for war readiness has unnerved financial markets.
Some analysts say historic trends suggest any market losses will remain brief, as long as the two Koreas stop short of all-out war.
A2: Korean War – Low Risk
Low probability
Russia & CIS Military Weekly, 10 (5/21/10, “Pyongyang can't wage war on South Korea – Margelov”,
)
The threats of war coming from North Korea are not serious, Chairman of the Federation Council International Affairs Committee Mikhail Margelov told Interfax. South Korea declared that North Korea sunk its warship in March, and North Korea "threatened a war involving all types of armed forces," Margelov said. The world should offer a diplomatic reaction, because no one needs a new Korean war, he said. "Certainly, the probability of a war between North and South Korea is very small. If North Korean communists wage that war, that would be their last battle because the combat ability of the [North Korean] armed forces is doubtful and economic resources are zero," he said. Thus, Russia has taken "an absolutely reserved and careful position. It has opposed the escalation of tensions and called for a strategic approach to the future of the Korean Peninsula, where people and countries have existed for over 1,000 years," Margelov said.
A2: Korean War – No Escalation
Won’t escalate to full scale conflict
Paal, 10 – vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (6/3/10, Douglas H., “The Cheonan Attack,” , JMP)
One thing we have observed about Kim Jong-il and the North Koreans: they do not let defeats go unanswered. After the loss of the North Korean ship, the commander of its component, known as Unit 586, General Kim Myung-guk, was demoted to three-star rank. But on April 25 this year, a month after the torpedo sank the South’s Cheonan, Kim received his fourth star again, personally from the Dear Leader. This strongly suggests both a desire for vengeance and a need for the North’s leader to maintain his close connection to the armed forces.
We have to assume that the North’s commanders believed they could pull this operation off without being clearly implicated, even though they would be widely suspected to be responsible. After all, would not the torpedo destroy itself and the evidence would sink to the bottom of the sea? This was intended to reduce the chances that the North would be forced to pay a price directly. And it would give voice to dissidents in the South to criticize and oppose the new Lee Myung-bak government, a consistent goal of the North.
Now, North Korea and its friends have been surprised by the clear evidence that it was guilty of launching the attack. The quality and integrity of the evidence assembled by the South and its international advisors have thrown Pyongyang (and Beijing) on the defensive. Both North and South have begun the process of sanctioning and threatening each other, though with discernible limits which signal intent to avoid outright conflict.
No Korean war – both sides won’t risk escalation out of self interest
Kang & Cha, 03 – *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetown’s school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: The Korea Crisis,” , JMP)
“The DMZ Is the Scariest Place in the World”
Yes, if looks could kill. When former U.S. President Bill Clinton called the border between the two Koreas the world’s scariest place, he was referring to the massive forward deployment of North Korean forces around the DMZ and the shaky foundations of the 50-year-old armistice—not peace treaty—that still keeps the peace between the two former combatants. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, there have been more than 1,400 incidents across the DMZ, resulting in the deaths of 899 North Koreans, 394 South Koreans, and 90 U.S. soldiers. Tensions have been so high tha tin 1976 the United States mobilized bombers and an aircraft carrier battle group to trim one tree in the DMZ. The deployments and operational battle plans on both sides suggest that if a major outbreak of violence were to start, a rapid escalation of hostilities would likely ensue.
In practice, however, no such outbreak has occurred. North Korea has faced both a determined South Korean military, and more important, U.S. military deployments that at their height comprised 100,000 troops and nuclear-tipped Lance missiles and even today include 37,000 troops, nuclear-capable airbases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any Korean conflict.
The balance of power has held because any war would have disastrous consequences for both sides. Seoul and Pyongyang are less than 150 miles apart—closer than New York is to Washington, D.C. Seoul is 30 miles from the DMZ and easily within reach of North Korea’s artillery tubes. Former Commander of U.S. Forces Korea Gen. Gary Luck estimated that a war on the Korean peninsula would cost $1 trillion in economic damage and result in 1 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties. As one war gamer described, the death toll on the North Korean side would be akin to a “holocaust,” and Kim Jong Il and his 1,000 closest generals would surely face death or imprisonment. As a result, both sides have moved cautiously and avoided major military mobilizations that could spiral out of control.
Ironically enough, as for the DMZ itself, although bristling with barbed wire and sown with land mines, it has also become a remarkable nature preserve stretching across the peninsula that is home to wild birds and a trove of other rare species.
A2: Korean War – No North Provocations
No more provocations coming
GSN, 6/4 (6/4/10, Global Security Newswire, “War Possible at Any Time, North Korea Says,”
, JMP)
U.S. Pacific Command head Adm. Robert Willard said today that there are no indications that the North is readying to carry out a third nuclear test or is repositioning its armed forces closer to South Korea.
"Right now we're not seeing indications that North Korea is intending the next provocation," Willard said.
"But I think everyone in the region is watching North Korea very closely given their unpredictability," he said while in Singapore for the security conference (Adam Entous, Reuters I, June 4).
A2: Korean War – No North Invasion
Kim Jong-il won’t start a suicidal war – he will just take incremental steps
Reuters, 10 (3/17/10, Jon Herskovitz, “North Korea may turn more menacing but options limited,”
, JMP)
SEOUL (Reuters) - Policy blunders and an economic crunch have put North Korean leader Kim Jong-il into one of the riskiest periods of his iron rule, which could make him turn even more aggressive in his dealings with the outside world.
But even if he chooses to resort once again to scare tactics to try to boost his bargaining power, he lacks a game-changing ace to play that would seriously rattle the international community or spook markets long used to his grandstanding.
Unless he is prepared to sail dangerously close to provoking a suicidal war -- and most experts firmly believe he is not -- then the most he can do is demonstrate incremental advances in the destructive capability of his armory or boost weapons sales to other countries at odds with the United States.
He is quite capable of provoking annoyance and concern, analysts say, but much less able to generate the kind of alarm that would cause a serious reassessment of the risks facing governments and financial markets in a region that includes the powerful economies of China, Japan and South Korea.
In fact, a signal of reconciliation may be his first step by ending a more than year-long boycott of international nuclear disarmament-for-aid talks, possibly within the next month.
No invasion – U.S. can still mount a counter attack and North Korea knows it would destroy its regime
Henriksen 3 – Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Thomas H., “Time to Leave South Korea”, Hoover Policy Review, 2003, )
Obviously, there are risks. A sudden transformation could cause instability in Asia. North Korea could interpret American withdrawal as a lack of resolve. But this seems unlikely given that an attack across the DMZ, with or without our small Maginot-line force, would be seen as an act of war by Washington, triggering a counterattack and imperiling the Pyongyang regime itself. In one sense, the absence of a U.S. force on the DMZ would make a massive U.S. retaliation easier; otherwise American troops would no doubt be overrun by the world’s fifth-largest army and face the danger of errant friendly fire.
The North is deterred from attacking because it knows it would lose
Gilbert, 04 – Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, “Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?” , JMP)
North Korea does however, possess a conventional military that is fully capable of launching an attack against South Korea. Even if North Korea does not use or sell a nuclear device it can still threaten the stability of the region with these conventional forces. Based on an intelligence estimate, this conventional first strike capability would most likely result in initial success as Seoul would be temporarily overrun or by passed. However, the logistical constraints of war would preclude the North Korean Armies from continuing the attack. Meanwhile the Combined Forces Command/United Nations Command operating under United States lead would launch a successful counterattack that would liberate Seoul and continue to drive north. This scenario, or one very similar, is the most likely course of events. The North realizes it would not win and that is probably the primary reason it remains north of the DMZ and continues to arm itself against an attack. Because it can no longer count on China or Russia to provide the nuclear umbrella, North Korea must become self-reliant. China, which continues to reach out to the world as they experiment with capitalist economics, becoming South Korea’s largest importer in 2003, is keenly interested in resolving this crisis, but not on the side of North Korea. Russia also continues to distance itself from North Korea; supporting the United States on economic issues and military intervention.17
A2: Korean War – No North Invasion
Kim Jong-il is rational – he won’t start a war because he knows it would destroy the North
Gilbert, 04 – Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, “Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?” , JMP)
The North Korean dictator is well known for his brinksmanship skills and is often viewed as an irrational actor. Is Kim Jung-Il irrational? I would argue he is a rational actor who is not clearly understood when measured by Western standards. Kim Jung-Il’s behavior is frequently misinterpreted as irrational when in fact he is simply pushing a dangerous situation to the limit so that his opponent will concede. As two Korea analysts have observed, “Dictators generally want to survive, and Kim is no exception. He has not launched a war, because he has good reason to think he would face fatal opposition from the United States and South Korea.”12 His will to survive was most recently noted when the leader agree to engage in multi-lateral six nation talks held in August/September 2003. But in the end Kim Jung-Il used the talks to once again raise the stakes by announcing the intent to “conduct a nuclear test.”13 Kim’s maneuvering once again pushed the limit by challenging those observers who may have doubted North Korea’s ability to conduct such a test.
Kim Jong-il will be cautious to avoid further harms to the economy
Reuters, 10 (3/17/10, Jon Herskovitz, “North Korea may turn more menacing but options limited,”
, JMP)
***Note – B.R. Myers is an expert on the North's ideology at Dongseo University
CHINA TO THE RESCUE?
While the parlous state of his economy may give Kim the incentive to rally support with some military muscle-flexing, it also limits his options, if he wants to avoid even more punishing U.N. sanctions and a U.S. Treasury crackdown on his finances.
"The North Korean regime cannot risk any further destruction of the economy at this point," Myers said.
China, the North's only major benefactor, offers Kim one of his few ways out.
Beijing fears a collapse of his government would bring chaos to its border and has blocked any global economic push that would significantly destabilize Pyongyang. It has also supplied food, oil and money to keep his government afloat.
China appears to want to augment social stability along its three provinces that border North Korea by increasing investment with the state, according to John Park, an expert on the region with the United States Institute of Peace.
"China is helping facilitate localized development needs to boost its broader geopolitical needs," Park said.
That relationship may help to temper any provocations by Kim who does not want to put China in the position of having to fend off global criticism for propping up Pyongyang.
A2: Korean War – No South Retaliation
No South Korean retaliation – doesn’t want to scare investors
Kuwait Times, 10 (4/25/10, “North Korea threatens to use nuke if invaded” )
South Korea's president on Friday gave the clearest signal yet Seoul had no plan to launch a revenge attack, calming investors worried that armed conflict would damage the South's rapidly recovering economy. "The probably catastrophic costs of a war on the peninsula will greatly constrain the U.S. and South Korean options for a military response, which thus remains an unlikely trigger for major military conflict," the global strategy group Control Risks wrote in a research note this week. The front end of the ship was raised by a giant sea crane and drained before being placed on a barge. One body has been found so far in the just-raised wreckage and six sailors were still missing, Yonhap news agency reported. The bodies of most of the 46 missing were found in the stern section raised earlier this month. Another 58 were rescued alive. "The way a hatch (near where the ship split in two) had been thrown off its hinge indicates there had been a very strong external impact," Yonhap quoted an un identified military official as saying, adding weight to the torpedo theory.
South Korean retaliation unlikely – too much at stake
UPI, 10 (5/20/2010, “Military Retaliation Not Seen as an Option”, )
Despite the anger in South Korea over the sinking of its navy ship, any retaliation against North Korea, blamed for the tragedy, is unlikely now, analysts say.
The concern is that any such strike could escalate into a bigger conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which is already tense because of North Korea's nuclear program and recent naval clashes between the two Koreas.
The 1,200-ton ship Cheonan went under March 26 in the Yellow Sea after an explosion and 46 of the 104 sailors aboard either died or are reported missing.
An international team of experts probing the incident announced its finding Thursday, saying the ship was torpedoed by a North Korean submarine. The North denied it.
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak summoned an emergency meeting of his top security advisers to consider counter-measures.
"In the short-term, I do not expect any military retaliation, or escalation that would result in a large-scale military conflict or war," Daniel Pinkston, analyst at Seoul's International Crisis Group, told Yonhap news agency.
However, he warned of the danger of inadvertent escalation or miscalculation in the long term.
Lee was quoted as telling Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd by telephone his government will take countermeasures and make North Korea admit its wrongdoing.
CNN reported that under a mutual defense treaty, the United States would need to defend South Korea against any aggression.
However a U.S. military official said: "I don't think it will come to that. They know they need to have a response, but there is too much at stake for South Korea to have a confrontation on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has nothing to lose, but South Korea is a serious country with a huge economy."
John Delury, a Korea expert at the Asia Society, told CNN other military options for South Korea could include increasing its naval presence along the maritime divide with North Korea, but noted that might trigger a conflict.
Nicholas Szechenyi at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies told CNN, "You have to be careful about military retaliation because North Korea has thousands of artillery pieces pointed towards the south and could bombard Seoul very quickly."
Other measures could include seeking further action by the U.N. Security Council. But Szechenyi said, "The problem is that China is a permanent member of the council and tends to take a very soft position on North Korea, so it is an open question whether the resolution will pass or not."
He suggested South Korea might ask the United States to put North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terror. The North was removed from the list in 2008 as part of a process to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear program in exchange for massive economic aid.
A2: Korean War – Bioweapons Ans
No extinction
O’Neill 4 O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” ]
David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.
And, dispersion is impossible
Newhouse, CDI Senior Fellow, 2 – senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information. Former senior policy advisor on European Affairs to secretary of state. Former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (John, World Policy Journal 7/31 V.XIX; N.2 p. 21)
Temperature, sunlight, wind, and moisture can all prevent effective delivery of chemical weapons. Biological pathogens are living organisms and thus more fragile than chemical agents. Chlorine in the water supply can kill them. Munitions can as easily vaporize an agent as dispense one. If released from a bomb or warhead, explosive effects would destroy all but 1-2 percent of the agent. 31
And, even bio-engineered diseases can’t cause extinction
1 (10/30, Survival of the Elitist: Bioterrorism May Spur Space Colonies, , AG)
Many scientists argue that there is no need to worry about the mortality of civilization right now. Eric Croddy is an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Croddy said the threat of a virus wiping out the entire human species is simply not real. Even the most horrific virus outbreak in history, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic that killed between 20 million and 40 million people, including hundreds of thousands in the United States, eventually stopped. Experts say new strains of the influenza virus emerge every few decades and catch the human immune system unprepared, but prevention measures and ever-evolving medical treatments overcome the outbreaks. "I'd be much more concerned about an asteroid hitting the planet," Croddy said.
A2: Korean War – South Will Solve
No war – south will repress it
Right Vision News, 10 (6/7/10, “Pakistan: South Korea Lee says no possibility of war in Korea”, )
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak on Saturday dismissed the likelihood of a war breaking out on the Korean peninsula, while pledging to clamp down on any action by the North deemed threatening. "There is no possibility of a war. There has been occasionally and locally peace-threatening behaviour (from the North) but we will strongly suppress it," Lee's spokesman, contacted by telephone, quoted him as saying at a meeting with businessmen in Singapore.
A2: Korean War – China Will Solve
China would intervene to prevent escalation
Business Monitor Online, 10 (3/26/10, “South’s Ship Sunk: What’s Next?” )
'Were North and South Korea to engage in even a limited clash, there would be a risk that both sides would send reinforcements to strike each other even harder. Provided that hostilities are kept to within a limited geographic area - primarily at sea - then the situation could be contained, even if it leads to dozens of casualties. This was the case in 1999 and 2002. The real danger would come if either Pyongyang or Seoul started attacking each other's land, especially territory or facilities not immediately associated with the putative naval clash. This would be interpreted by either side as escalation, raising fears of a wider battle. At that point, the conflict would become far more unpredictable, and China - North Korea's only true ally on the international stage - would probably feel the need to intervene behind the scenes to force Pyongyang not to take the confrontation too far. This would be highly likely if the US moves to support the South militarily in any West Sea clash.'
China wants cooperation and stability
China Daily, 10 (6/25/10, BBC, “ROK, US MARK 60 YEARS SINCE START OF KOREAN WAR”. l/n)
BEIJING - As the United States and the Republic of Korea hold a series of events commemorating the Korean War that broke out 60 years ago, China stressed that concerned parties should learn from history and cherish the hard-won peace and stability.
"What's important now is to take history as a mirror to build a better future," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said on Thursday. He added China is ready to develop friendly cooperation with countries in the region and be committed to safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The ROK navy is expected to stage a drill today to commemorate its first naval battle against the DPRK on the second day of the Korean War. Beside major events in the ROK, commemorations are slated for the US, the American Forces Press Service said "The US and the ROK are seizing this occasion to enhance their alliance and deter the DPRK," said Huang Youfu, director of the Institute of Korean Studies at Beijing-based Central University for Nationalities.
China has switched its foreign policy focus to stabilizing the region – the plunging economy is forcing it to take an assertive role against North Korea.
Korea Times 09 (6/26/09, “China Crosses the Rubicon,” Lexis)
LONDON - For two decades, Chinese diplomacy has been guided by the concept of the country's "peaceful rise." Today, however, China needs a new strategic doctrine, because the most remarkable aspect of Sri Lanka's recent victory over the Tamil Tigers is not its overwhelming nature, but the fact that China provided President Mahinda Rajapaska with both the military supplies and diplomatic cover he needed to prosecute the war.
Without that Chinese backing, Rajapaska's government would have had neither the wherewithal nor the will to ignore world opinion in its offensive against the Tigers.
So, not only has China become central to every aspect of the global financial and economic system, it has now demonstrated its strategic effectiveness in a region traditionally outside its orbit. On Sri Lanka's beachfront battlefields, China's "peaceful rise" was completed.
What will this change mean in practice in the world's hot spots like North Korea, Pakistan, and Central Asia?
Before the global financial crisis hit, China benefited mightily from the long boom along its eastern and southern rim, with only Burma and North Korea causing instability. China's west and south, however, have become sources of increasing worry.
Given economic insecurity within China in the wake of the financial crisis and global recession, China's government finds insecurity in neighbouring territories more threatening than ever.
Stabilizing its neighbourhood is one reason why China embraces the six-party talks with North Korea, has become a big investor in Pakistan (while exploring ways to cooperate with President Barack Obama's special representative, Richard Holbrooke), signed on to a joint Asia/Europe summit declaration calling for the release from detention of Burmese opposition leader Daw Aung Suu Kyi, and intervened to help end Sri Lanka's 26-year civil war.
The calculus behind China's emerging national security strategy is simple. Without peace and prosperity around China's long borders, there can be no peace, prosperity, and unity at home.
China's intervention in Sri Lanka, and its visibly mounting displeasure with the North Korean and Burmese regimes, suggests that this calculus has quietly become central to the government's thinking.
A2: Korean War – China Will Solve
China has already started to take control and establish security in East Asia – the US isn’t needed to keep the peace.
Korea Times 09 (6/26/09, “China Crosses the Rubicon,” Lexis)
Today, China's government seeks to shape the diplomatic agenda in order to increase China's options while constricting those of potential adversaries.
Instead of remaining diplomatically aloof, China is forging more relationships with its neighbours than any of its rivals. This informal web is being engineered not only to keep its rivals from coalescing or gaining privileged influence, but also to restrain the actions of China's local partners so as to dampen tension anywhere it might flare up.
China's newfound assertiveness, rather than creating fear, should be seen as establishing the necessary conditions for comprehensive negotiations about the very basis of peaceful coexistence and stability in Asia: respect for all sides' vital interests.
In recent years, such an approach ran counter to America's foreign-policy predisposition of favouring universalist doctrines over a careful balancing of national interests. With the Obama administration embracing realism as its diplomatic lodestar, China may have found a willing interlocutor.
China is beginning to take stronger measures to influence North Korea while at the same time maintaining relations
Snyder & Byun, 09 - *Director of the Center for U.S.-Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (4/2009, “Year of China-DPRK Friendship; North’s Rocket Fizzles ” )
Top-level diplomacy between Beijing and Pyongyang intensified this quarter in honor of China-DPRK Friendship Year and the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Prior to the Lunar New Year holiday in mid-January, Kim Jong-il held his first public meeting since his reported illness with Chinese Communist Party International Liaison Department Head Wang Jiarui. In March, DPRK Prime Minister Kim Yong-il paid a return visit to Beijing. The Chinese have accompanied these commemorative meetings with active diplomatic interaction with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan focused on how to respond to North Korea’s launch of a multi-stage rocket. Thus, China finds itself under pressure to dissuade Pyongyang from destabilizing activity and ease regional tensions while retaining its 60-year friendship with the North. Meanwhile, South Korean concerns about China’s rise are no longer confined to issues of economic competitiveness; the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis has produced its first public assessment of the implications of China’s rising economic capabilities for South Korea’s long-term security policies. The response to North Korea’s rocket launch also highlights differences in the respective near-term positions of Seoul and Beijing. Following years of expanding bilateral trade and investment ties, the global financial crisis provides new challenges for Sino-ROK economic relations: how to manage the fallout from a potential decline in bilateral trade and the possibility that domestic burdens will spill over and create new strains in the relationship.
Beginning a year of China-DPRK friendship
The January meeting in Pyongyang between Kim Jong-il and Wang Jiarui, chief of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Department, was Kim’s first meeting with a foreign guest since his alleged stroke in August 2008. The DPRK state media hailed China’s decision to give “free aid” to the North in an apparent effort to demonstrate Pyongyang’s solid ties with Beijing at a time of stagnation in inter-Korean relations. President Hu has twice extended an invitation to Kim Jong-il to visit China according to the North Korean media, leading to speculation that Kim may visit Beijing later this year as part of friendship year activities.
Sino-DPRK Friendship Year activities were officially launched during a five-day visit to China by DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il and a 100-member delegation on March 17-21. The visit occurred amid heightened regional concerns over North Korea’s planned satellite launch, but it is not clear in what form the Chinese leadership raised the issue with North Korea’s visiting premier. Premier Kim held meetings with President Hu Jintao, top legislator Wu Bangguo, and his official counterpart Wen Jiabao. Both sides pledged to use the year of friendship as an
opportunity to advance bilateral ties. Kim also met local leaders in Shandong Province, where he agreed to expand North Korea’s political, economic, and cultural ties. Hu pointed to a 60-year relationship that has “withstood the test of international and domestic changes” while Premier Wen proposed further cooperation on Six-Party Talks and denuclearization. He also called for improving bilateral relations through high-level political dialogue, cultural exchanges, and the pursuit of “common development” through trade and investment, mining exploration, and infrastructure.
Based on these diplomatic exchanges, Chinese officials reported that Kim Jong-il was healthy and in control and that North Korea had reaffirmed its commitment to denuclearization. The visit also served to underscore China’s important role and continued interest in managing security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Wang Jiarui’s previous visits to North Korea have coincided with major events; he met Kim Jong-il in January 2004 prior to Kim’s visit to China, and in February 2005, shortly after North Korea’s declaration that it was a nuclear-weapon state. China has renewed efforts to sustain high-level contacts with Pyongyang following a relative cooling of diplomatic exchanges in the aftermath of North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test. Talk among Chinese analysts of an adjustment from a “special” to a “normal” relationship with North Korea has been replaced with sober assessments of what approaches China can take in the context of the Sino-DPRK relationship to secure its own strategic interests. There is also an increased willingness on the part of Chinese analysts to suggest withholding promised benefits and even limited sanctions in an effort to influence North Korean behavior rather than simply using inducements to get North Korea to offer China quid pro quos.
A2: Korean War – China Won’t Solve
China will remain neutral to increase its hegemony
MacLeod, 1o (Calum, Correspondent for USA Today, 6/1/10, “A Sunken Ship, and Talk of War”, )
China has much to gain by maintaining its neutral stance, Bermudez says. He says the current crisis gives China a chance to burnish its reputation as an emerging power -- particularly in developing nations, where through the years it quietly has expanded trade relations and secured oil and precious mineral rights. "By holding the cards and maneuvering the United States on this issue, (China) shows to its Third World friends, allies and partners that it can handle the United States," Bermudez says. "That adds a lot of political juice to (the Chinese) in the Third World. "They may want this (issue) to stick around a while to keep their dog on a leash and keep the United States looking weak. It serves them politically."
China won’t support action against North Korea –too much to lose from regime collapse
Cornwell, 10 (5/28/10, Rupert, Independent Extra, “The Great Unknown; The Friday Essay the World’s Last Stalinist Regime Is On the Brink of Conflict Once Again. What Is it that North Korea Hopes to Achieve by Such Posturing? We Just Can’t Know, Argues Rupert Cornwell,” )
Consider the options from Beijing's viewpoint, and its stance makes perfect sense. North Korea's regime might or might not face terminal collapse without Chinese aid. But if it did collapse, two things would probably happen. There would be a destabilizing influx of North Korean refugees into China, followed by the absorption of the North into the vastly richer and more populous South - just as West Germany swallowed an imploding East Germany two decades ago.
That would mean a single pro-American state on China's north-eastern border. If so, score a huge victory for Washington on the East Asian geopolitical chessboard, and an equal setback for Beijing. There is, of course, a third option, of moving in concert with the West against North Korea - but that would surely see Mr Kim turning his spite against Beijing as well. One way or another, China wants to preserve the status quo, and its economic leverage over the US gives it means to do so. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Beijing has conspicuously failed to endorse the findings of the international commission on the fate of the Cheonan.
China can’t influence North Korea – sanctions prove
Snyder & Byun, 09 - *Director of the Center for U.S.-Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (1/10, “China Embraces South and North, but Differently,” )
High-level China-DPRK exchanges marked the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties despite UN sanctions against North Korea for its missile and nuclear tests earlier this year. Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in early October was the high point in those commemorations. KCNA reported that Chairman Kim Jong-il personally greeted Wen at Sunan airport upon his arrival on Oct. 4 and that he accompanied Wen in several public appearances.
China has highlighted Wen’s success in securing Kim’s promise of a “conditional return” to Six-Party Talks pending progress in direct negotiations with Washington, although Kim’s remarks made clear the North’s interest in direct US-DPRK dialogue rather than Six-Party Talks. The fact that Wen did not gain any additional movement by Kim compared to what North Korea had already committed to during Dai Bingguo’s visit the previous month raises questions about Chinese influence in Pyongyang, especially in light of rumors that Wen’s visit to Pyongyang was in question over the issue.
A2: Korean War – China Won’t Solve
China won’t pressure North Korea – fears a collapse
Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyun-kyung, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,”
, JMP)
China sided with the rest of the world to impose sanctions on North Korea last year after the latter launched missiles and conducted an underground nuclear test, condemning Pyongyang for escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
However, it has remained silent over the North torpedoing the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan, claiming the lives of 46 sailors in March.
China's double standard on the reclusive state's belligerent behavior has prompted experts to speculate over its motives.
Professor Kenneth Quinones, dean of research evaluation of Japan's Akita International University, told The Korea Times that there has been a change in China's policy toward North Korea since it supported the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions last year.
"China's approval of U.N. sanctions last year caused an intense debate within the Chinese government over whether to use pressure or to try to induce North Korea's cooperation," the former U.S. diplomat said.
Quinones said the foreign ministry preferred using international pressure but the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army preferred using inducement.
"The party and the army won the debate so after the U.N. sanctions that were approved in June, China moderated its policy toward Pyongyang," he said.
Some experts observed China learned a lesson that sanctions beget another bellicose act and that the side effect might cause the patron to rethink punitive actions.
China won’t change its stance on North Korea
Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyun-kyung, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,”
, JMP)
His comments came hours before Chun Yung-woo, second vice foreign minister, returned to Seoul Wednesday empty handed after wrapping up a two-day visit to China.
During the trip, the South Korean envoy met with several high-ranking Chinese officials to try and persuade them to join the Seoul-led effort to lock the North into appropriate codes of conduct.
South Korea initiated the diplomatic effort in retaliation for the North Korean torpedo attack.
Diplomacy, however, appeared to reveal its limitations as the South Korean envoy allegedly failed to influence China to look beyond its so-called strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula.
Beijing reportedly remained unchanged in its position to shield Pyongyang from coordinated punitive measures over the Cheonan case.
According to media reports, China is unwilling to join any UNSC statements or resolution if they specify North Korea as a player responsible for the act.
China thinks the Koreas should resolve the Cheonan incident themselves
Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyun-kyung, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,”
, JMP)
***Note – Professor Kenneth Quinones is the dean of research evaluation of Japan's Akita International University
'Cheonan is a domestic issue'
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said in an interview last week that China perceived the Cheonan case as a domestic issue, not an international one, whereas South Korea is pushing for global action against the North.
His remarks hinted Beijing believes Seoul should sit down with Pyongyang to resolve the torpedo attack and that the incident is not something that necessarily needs to be addressed at an international level.
The minister confessed that the perception gap between the two made it difficult for the South to convince China to join the effort to force the North to take the consequences of its deeds at the UNSC.
Based on his observation, China's double standard on North Korea stemmed from the belief that the communist state's nuclear threats such as that of last year, posed a common security threat to the international community including China and Russia, but that its torpedo attack on the warship alarmed only South Korea.
Quinones noted that he thinks "it is unrealistic for the government in Seoul to expect Beijing to support a sanctions resolution against North Korea at the UNSC."
"Nevertheless, President Lee Myung-bak must convince the South Korean people that he is pressing for resolute punishment of North Korea. By pressing for it, he can blame China for blocking such a resolution," he advised.
A2: Korean War – North Will Preserve Its Survival
No war – regime wants to preserve its survival
Asia Monitor, 09 (7/1/09, “Rising Risk of Military Crash” )
Despite its provocative actions, we continue to believe that North Korea does not seek an actual full-scale war. The regime of Kim Jong Il seeks survival, and it knows that war would ultimately lead to its defeat and probable overthrow. Thus, aside from testing the US and the South, the North's current activities reflect Kim's desire to reassert his leadership after a long period of illness, and demonstrate to the outside world - and indeed domestic hardliners - that there will be no change in Pyongyang's hardline policy if he dies. Regarding the succession itself, South Korea's National Intelligence Service reportedly told a group of legislators that Kim had recently chosen his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, 26, as his eventual successor. Nonetheless, given Kim Jong Un's young age, we consider it more likely that the North's National Defence Commission (NDC) would take power, at least in the interim. The NDC is the country's highest body, headed by Kim Jong Il himself, and its membership was recently expanded to 13. The rising profile of its members suggests that it would form a collective leadership, post-Kim Jong Il.
***Succession / Regime Collapse Adv ANS
A2: REGIME COLLAPSE ADV – 1NC
No risk of collapse now
Armstrong, 10. Professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University.. (Charles, 5/26/10, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” )
Contrary to common belief, North Korea is not facing internal political disarray or economic decline. Kim Jong Il appears to be fully in charge, and harvests for the last two years have been relatively good. Chinese sources estimate a substantial increase in North Korean industrial production over the last year. Whatever may have motivated the attack on the Cheonan, it was not the act of a desperate or divided regime, and the strong sanctions called for by President Lee -- even if China would agree to support and enforce them -- are not likely to get North Korea to admit responsibility for the attack or to change its behavior.
Regime stability is strengthening now
Kim, 6/3 (6/3/10, Kim Tae-gyu, Korea Times, “Cheonan attack brings stability to NK: SERI,” , JMP)
Stability in the communist regime of North Korea has strengthened in the aftermath of the sinking of South Korea's Navy frigate Cheonan, according to a leading private think tank in Seoul.
The Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), an affiliate of the country's foremost conglomerate Samsung Group, disclosed its survey on Thursday, which showed that the North Korean regime has been beefed up after the Cheonan disaster.
A multinational investigation team concluded late last month that the Navy ship had sunk in the West Sea on March 26 due to an unprovoked torpedo attack by North Korea although Pyongyang denies it.
"It may sound strange as tensions run high on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of the incident. But experts from both home and abroad agree that the Northern regime has strengthened of late despite the mishap," SERI researcher Bahng Tae-seop said.
"Its foreign exchange rate has got back on track and the severe inflation was also tamed to reduce volatility there. The Cheonan case and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's visit to China are important factors."
SERI interviewed a total of 37 experts on Korean issues from five nations - the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea. All are members of the six-party nuclear talks.
The institute said the respondents evaluated the internal stability of North Korea at 44.14 points during the April-June period of this year, up from 42.14 points a quarter ago.
A stability index reading of 50 points or higher indicates optimistic views are stronger than pessimistic ones and vice versa.
"The stability index of North Korea is still less than the benchmark 50 points. But the rating improved despite the Cheonan tragedy," Bahng said. "This might lead to speculation that the North might have intended the torpedo attack expecting an upside."
U.S. Presence Needed Post Unification / Collapse
Large military presence key manage North Korean collapse and unification
Dujarric, 04 – Visiting Scholar at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (7/12/04, International Herald Tribune, “Japan's Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea,” , JMP)
It is, of course, possible that North Korea will collapse. If North Korea does disappear, it will create a major vacuum in Northeast Asia which South Korea alone will not be able to fill. Seoul will need massive foreign financial assistance to deal with unification. It will also require political support. In this context, a large U.S. military presence in the country will be the best symbol of this support and of the commitment of the United States and its allies to the stability of the peninsula.
Forces still useful after reunification to deter China and other regional threats
Hyug-baeg, 08 – professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyug-baeg, U.S.-Korea Institute Working Paper Series, “How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad,” , JMP)
***Note – USFK = U.S. Forces in Korea
Beyond the Korean peninsula, U.S. support can also prove helpful for South Korea to establish itself as a hub of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia in general, supporting efforts to maintain regional stability. Should the Koreas be reunified, the role of the USFK could shift to deterring threats from China and to dampen the tensions in the Korea-Japan relationship. As has been shown in the case of U.S. forces in Greece and Turkey, and Israel and Egypt, keeping U.S. forces in two quarrelsome countries of Korea and Japan would not only help secure U.S. interests in those countries but also contribute to maintaining peace between Korea and Japan. (O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, 2003: 150-152) Similarly, U.S. backing would lend credibility to Korea to serve as a mediator between China and Japan if and when disputes between the two nations should arise.
Troops will even be needed post-unification to deter instability
Eberstadt, 02 – political economist who holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the AEI and is Senior Adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research (10/1/02, Nicholas, The National Interest, “Our Other Korea Problem,” , JMP)
Absent a convincing rationale, the Mutual Defense Treaty--and the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Korea for which it provides--cannot count on the continued support from both the South Korean and American publics that is necessary to sustain it. Since it is manifestly in the interests of Seoul and Washington to keep the U.S.-ROK military alliance in good repair, it is incumbent upon American and South Korean policymakers to elucidate that rationale.
The original rationale-premised on the risk of hostile external maneuvers against South Korea-may not yet be so passe as some think. If the day arrives that the North-South struggle is no more, however, a compelling rationale for a continuing ROK-U.S. alliance can still be made, based upon deterring instability in an economically important, too well-armed, and not-yet-solidly-liberal international expanse. On both sides of the Pacific, national audiences wait to be persuaded of that rationale. Statesmen who understand the value of the relationship would be well advised to devote a little more effort to the task.
Security Assurances Won’t Solve
Security assurances won’t solve North Korean regime collapse – the U.S. must maintain strong defense
Green, 09 – associate professor of international relations at Georgetown and the Japan Chair at the CSIS (Sep/Oct 2009, Michael J., National Interest, “The Perilous Case of Kim Jong Il,” EBSCO, JMP)
While the dangers inherent in all three stages of North Korea's demise are considerable, the North Koreans have at least done a service by obliterating any illusions that security assurances or promises of massive World Bank loans will solve the problem for us. The important thing is to recognize all the dimensions of threat represented by the North and to use all instruments of statecraft, from deterrence and pressure to diplomacy, to deal with them.
The United States should continue aggressively implementing the sanctions passed in June under un Security Council Resolution 1874 well beyond the next few months. These sanctions are aimed at cutting off North Korean trade in weapons, illicit goods and WMD. They should not be used as pressure to bring North Korea back to the table, as some Russian and Chinese officials have suggested, but instead to deter further provocations and to throw a better net around Pyongyang's proliferation and illicit trade. They should be removed only as the threat is removed.
Washington should also be realistic about what negotiations with Pyongyang can and cannot accomplish. The Obama administration has said it is only interested in a verifiable and irreversible agreement. It is extremely unlikely to get one from Pyongyang and we should assume as much. Even without a breakthrough, however, it will be important to test the North's intentions and to retain channels for de-escalation and dialogue, particularly given the opaque and uncertain transition under way in Pyongyang. But diplomacy is unlikely to solve this problem and the administration should set expectations accordingly.
And the Obama administration should not lose sight of the plight of the North Korean people. The United States should be clear and consistent in building international pressure on the regime for its horrifying human-rights record. More should also be done to provide food and medical assistance to the North Korean people, as long as it can be monitored by something close to international standards. It is also important to continue modest international NGO and training efforts now in place for the North Korean people, as long as the regime itself does not receive cash, technology or propaganda benefits. The more we can expose the North Korean people to the possibilities before them, the better prepared they will be.
The United States needs to attend to our defenses. The missile-defense budget should not have been cut in the current defense-appropriations bill. We need a robust dialogue with Japan and Korea on how to reinforce confidence in our extended deterrent. We should not be rushing to dismantle our combined forces command with South Korea simply because of bureaucratic inertia--particularly after 10 million South Koreans asked us not to because of the North Korean threat.
A priority for the United States in its relationship with China must be beginning contingency discussions and pushing Beijing to do the same with Seoul. While the six-party talks may not resume soon, five-party talks without North Korea would facilitate broader confidence building and eventual multilateral planning for changes on the peninsula.
Finally, it is imperative to demonstrate to North Korea and other potential proliferators that the United States does not and will not accept a nuclear North Korea and will impose significant consequences on the North for its actions.
Prudent preparation for the three stages of danger is critical for the peaceful transformation of the Korean peninsula and of Northeast Asia as a whole. Too often U.S. policy with North Korea has become stuck in tactical debates about modes of engagement. It is now time to focus on the strategic.
External Threats Sustain the Regime
Kim uses threats to justify its internal rule
Camner, 10 (5/21/10 “Why Would North Korea Sink a South Korean Warship?”
)
On Thursday, the South Korean government announced that the warship it lost in March was sunk by a torpedo attack from North Korea. While South Korea, Japan, and the United States discuss punitive action, North Korea has threatened "all-out war" if new sanctions are imposed. This saber-rattling by the desperately poor North should not be a surprise, says Kongdan Oh, co-author of The Hidden People of North Korea; it is simply the most recent provocation by a regime that needs an external state of crisis in order to justify its repressive internal rule. With international pressure mounting on China, the North's closest friend and benefactor, the regime of Kim Jong Il has achieved just that. The Atlantic spoke with Oh, who is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, about the crisis and what the North is hoping to accomplish.
We know that South Korea has provided compelling evidence that North Korea was responsible for the torpedo. Can you describe specifically what it was that convinced the investigators?
First, it is credible due to the accuracy and objectivity of the combined investigation team, which involved almost 25 experts from Korea, the United States, Australia, UK, and Sweden. Those are heavy-weights; it wasn't just one or two investigators from Korea. It was global and its level of expertise level was very deep.
Their significant discovery was the propeller part that was used in the torpedo. It was obviously a design that North Korea has been using. They weren't caught on the spot, but with all evidence in hand, it shows this is quite close to an iron-clad case.
Why would the North have done this?
As I have been telling the world for the last 15 or 20 years, the internal political dynamic in North Korea is such that they constantly need a crisis. The regime was built on lies. And the two leaders, Kim and Kim, created one of the worst -- or best -- cults of personality, perpetuating that they are the most brilliant strategic leaders and the entire world is kow-towing to them. That is a foundation of their propaganda.
North Korea is basically a failed state -- their basic economy is bankrupt. The military industrial economy is only 30 percent functioning. Other than Kim Jong's palace economy and slush fund, the economy doesn't exist.
In this state, the leader needs a tool to propagate why he should be in charge of the country. Today, a lot of people know that South Korea is not a slave to the Americans and the Korean economy may even be catching up with the Japanese economy. Information seeps through. So the North Korean regime needs more crisis. The ordinary kind of crisis will not be satisfactory, given the grumbling of the technocratic level of mid-class elite who see the North's declining power and know that there is no way out. So the regime has to create a fear of an imminent dangerous and war-like situation so the country will be united in solidarity under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. That's the internal dynamic. For years, it has been one crisis after another.
***Regionalism Adv ANS
A2: REGIONALISM ADV – 1NC
Strong alliance with South Korea is key to multilateral security regime
Hyug-baeg, 08 – professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyug-baeg, U.S.-Korea Institute Working Paper Series, “How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad,” , JMP)
***Note – USFK = U.S. Forces in Korea
Moreover, a strong alliance between the U.S. and South Korea can facilitate the establishment of a multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia. Korea’s strategic positioning, along with the support of USFK lend Korea the military capacity to serve as a balancer or stabilizer within the region. Thus, after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the U.S.-ROK alliance should be transformed from a collective defense organization aimed solely at deterring North Korea to a regional cooperative security regime that would promote and maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The USFK can play a similar role that American troops stationed in European countries have done for securing a multilateral peace community, such as NATO. Bilateral alliances between the U.S. and Northeast Asian countries would not only complement multilateral security regime, but also bind loose ties of the regional security networks.7
The thesis of their advantage is wrong – bilateral alliance don’t inhibit multilateralism
Hyug-baeg, 08 – professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyug-baeg, U.S.-Korea Institute Working Paper Series, “How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad,” , JMP)
Many have said that the existing bilateral alliances might act as barriers to multilateral dialogues in Northeast Asia. But I believe the contrary, that the existing bilateral alliances could be complementary to multilateral security cooperation, and vice versa. Strong bilateral alliances and bilateral trust can serve as the foundation for greater multilateral cooperation among partner countries. Northeast Asian countries that have pressing needs for multilateral security cooperation, may encourage their bilateral partners to participate in a multilateral security framework, not to replace bilateral cooperation, but to increase the scope and reach of what can be accomplished toward mutual goals. (Han Yong Sup, 2005)
South Korea is already playing a greater role with regional countries – balancing against the U.S. on certain issues
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Korea’s Choices: Past and Present
Interestingly, Korea’s diplomatic history shows a somewhat consistent pattern of loyalty relations with superpowers. In the premodern era, China exchanged protection, economic benefits, and legitimization for Korea’s loyalty. As Asia opened to modernity, Japan colonized Korea, forcing Korean loyalty to the empire. With the end of the Korean War in 1953, Korea invested its full loyalty in the United States, which yielded military and economic gains.
But as the international context changed, the exclusive U.S.-Korea relationship became more flexible. When the bipolar system collapsed at the end of the Cold War, former enemies began transforming their own identities, which allowed Korea to consider new diplomatic relationships. This new pattern of engagement resulted in “issue-oriented balancing,” or issue-specific coalitions among different groups of countries.4 For example, South Korea joined North Korea and China in criticizing Japan on the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine, pitting Korea with two Cold War enemies against its Cold War friend. At
the Six Party Talks, the views of the Roh Moo-hyun administration were more similar to those of China and Russia than those of the United States and Japan. After the Cold War, Korea was able to spread risks through a more symmetrical loyalty portfolio.
Korea seems increasingly inclined to explore exit options in the U.S.-Korea alliance because its voice has been repeatedly ignored in the United States. When the Clinton administration discussed preemptive strikes against North Korea, it failed to consult with the Korean government in advance. During the 1997 financial crisis, the Clinton administration was reluctant in arranging quick rescue funds to Korea.5 In June 2002, the United States hurriedly released its soldiers who were involved in a vehicle accident that killed two middle-school girls in Korea. In 2008, the U.S. ambassador made a careless comment that “Koreans should learn the science” about mad cow disease. And the United States has been reluctant to pay for the environmental pollution and damage committed by the U.S. army in the Yongsan military base. Based on these experiences, many South Koreans believe there is an asymmetry between their loyalty and voice in the U.S.-Korea relationship, and they are turning their eyes toward possible exit options.
Taiwan war won’t happen – experts agree
Adams, 09 – reporter for global post and newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, “The dragon sharpens its claws,” )
Taiwan insists it's an independent state. Beijing sees it as Chinese territory that must one day end its democratic "holiday" and return to the fold.
The U.S. has a commitment, albeit an ambiguous one, to help defend Taiwan's democracy against Chinese aggression.
That means U.S. Marines, sailors and pilots could one day, perhaps suddenly, be sent to take on Asia's most lethal military, all for the sake of a small island which few Americans can distinguish from Thailand.
The good news: most experts agree that conflict will probably never happen.
U.S. diplomacy has helped keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait for 60 years. And tensions have eased in the past year with the election of a Taiwan president who is forging better relations with Beijing.
Chinese and Taiwanese media reported this week that the two sides' militaries will both attend a conference in Hawaii this summer.
A2: Regionalism Solves Impacts from Withdrawal
Multilateral security mechanisms are not a suitable replacement for alliances
Snyder, 2009 (Scott, Asia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, “ U.S. Domestic Politics and
Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” )
c) Current military alliances and security arrangements (i.e., the Six Party Talks) might become
insufficient to meet pressing security needs.
The United States may promote regionalism more actively if it finds that an intractable conflict—such
as the one with North Korea—cannot be resolved satisfactorily using only deterrence and bilateral
talks. This raises the question of how one would supplement alliances, not necessarily search for a
wholesale alternative.
Essentially, the emergence of the Six Party Talks is a manifestation of such a scenario. They were
based on the idea that any solution to the North Korean nuclear issue will require the collective
involvement of all the parties neighboring North Korea if such a deal is going to stick. However,
current developments suggest that the Six Party mechanism is a tool to be used in conjunction with
alliance cooperation, not supplanting it. For most U.S. analysts, the idea of multilateral dialogue as a
supplement to the alliances is quite reasonable, but the continued existence of conflicting strategic
aims among relevant parties in the region suggests that any idea of abandoning the alliances in favor
of a multilateral security mechanism is implausible.
ROK Already Participating in Regionalism
South Korea is already promoting and participating in regional multilateral security forums
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Korea’s Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia
The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6
From Korea’s perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements.
Second, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the European Union. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreak of great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world. Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidence-building measure.
South Korea is already diversifying its relationships – reducing dependence on U.S. and Japan
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea’s external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making exclusive ties with the United States may be a high-risk investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea.
South Korea already shifting to a more regional focus
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Domestic Politics of Loyalty Portfolio
When international politics create an opportunity for a democratic country to revise its loyalty portfolio, then national policy changes need to be justified through domestic political processes. During the Cold War, Korea was not as free as it is now, and Korean people were not supposed to think about changing Korea’s loyalty portfolio. Full investment in the United States paid off in terms of security and Korea had no exit options. Therefore, until Korea became a full-fledged democracy in the 1990s, domestic politics with regard to Korea’s foreign and regional policies were almost invisible.
As Koreans witness the decreasing will and capacity of the United States to serve as a benevolent hegemon, more and more of them doubt Korea’s current loyalty portfolio. In addition, the breakdown of the Cold War system in the early 1990s and the emergence of regional options have changed the previous payoff matrix for Korea. Since these changes in international affairs coincided perfectly with democratization in Korea, Korea has already reshuffled its loyalty investment at a rate that has been dazzling for people accustomed to the Cold War setup.
Alliance => U.S. Regional Integration
Strong alliance ensures that U.S. integration in the region
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
President Lee Myung-Bak is eager for a closer strategic and economic relationship with the United States. The shared challenge is to strengthen the economic foundations of U.S.-South Korean relations; cooperate more closely in regional diplomacy, including in the realm of promoting good governance and human rights; and shift the military alliance from its focus on defending against North Korean aggression—which remains a necessary but not sufficient ambition—to conducting regional and global operations. An enhanced U.S.-ROK alliance would advance U.S. interests across Asia by ensuring that the United States remains integrated in the pivotal region where four great Pacific powers—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—meet.
Looking ahead, Asia’s political transformation—with the expansion of democracy from Japan and India to South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and beyond—may prove as important as Asia’s economic transformation in determining the region’s strategic future. More people live under democratic rule in Asia today than in any other region. China remains the great exception, but with deft diplomacy and wise leadership, American leadership in Asia will help sustain a pluralistic regional order in which norms of good governance can flourish; over time, this trend is likely to shape China’s own internal debate on political reform. In this regard, South Korea—prosperous, democratic, at peace with its neighbors, and enjoying close ties to the United States and other major powers—may represent a model not only for North Korea but for China to follow as the Asia-Pacific era dawns.
Alliances Compliments Regionalism
Regional alliance compliments the transition to regionalism
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
Regional security architecture Both the United States and South Korea have a compelling interest in moving their security partnership beyond the bilateral realm. A natural next step is deepening trilateral defense cooperation with Japan—not simply on functional missile defense cooperation as argued above or vis-à-vis North Korea, as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group has sought to do 338 Chapter 10 since 1999, but with regard to the broader security environment in East Asia and the Pacific. One useful model is the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, an important vehicle for defense coordination and planning among the United States, Japan, and Australia which has had the additional benefit of fostering enhanced bilateral security cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra, who signed a separate defense pact in 2007. The ascent to power in Japan of a less nationalist Democratic Party leadership committed to greater Asian regional cooperation makes this a propitious moment to expand the scope and ambition of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle.
It also makes possible the creation of other multilateral groupings that would not replace the U.S. alliance system but, if appropriately structured along a trans-Pacific axis, would complement it. These include an institutionalized forum bringing together the five parties that have cooperated in negotiations with North Korea through the Six-Party Process. An institutionalized Asian concert bringing together the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia could be a useful forum both for near-term coordination on North Korean denuclearization, longer-term planning for contingencies surrounding reunification of the peninsula, and agreeing on rules of regional conduct beyond the peninsula along the lines of the 19th century Concert of Europe.
Regionally lead multilateralism is an effective supplement to the current bilateral alliance system
Snyder, 2009 (Scott, Asia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, “ U.S. Domestic Politics and
Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” )
Conclusion
The United States maintains an ambivalent and detached attitude toward efforts to build multilateralism in Northeast Asia. Public opinion in the United States on issues related to Asian regionalism is unformed, and elite opinion is essentially satisfied with the status quo. Thus, there is little motivation on the part of the United States to seek alternative security structures in Northeast Asia. The idea of East Asian community is acceptable to the United States, but there is little appetite in the United States to lead such a project. At the same time, a mutually acceptable alternative leadership capable of shepherding such a project has not yet emerged. Moreover, there is little incentive on the part of the United States to pursue an alternative that would compete with or diminish the current alliance structure. But it is becoming clear that alliances alone are insufficient (albeit necessary) to address critical Asian security issues effectively. Multilateral cooperation is proceeding in various forms that are neither challenging to U.S. interests nor a U.S. priority.
Obama will promote regionalism within the framework of bilateral alliances
Snyder, 2009 (Scott, Asia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, “ U.S. Domestic Politics and
Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” )
How will the Obama administration make its mark on the development of regional security architecture in Northeast Asia? Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg has already outlined three elements of an Obama administration strategy to manage a “post Cold war transition characterized by rising powers and emerging transnational threats.” The strategy emphasizes sustaining bilateral ties with traditional allies; building new, cooperative ties with emerging Asian powers; and building “new structures of cooperation, both in the region and across the world which link Asia to the global order.”16 The strategy prioritizes bilateral alliances but clearly anticipates reaching out to rising powers and utilizing regional cooperation structures to buttress the goals of effective alliance management and new forms of engagement.
Alliances Compliments Regionalism
Multilateralism can develop alongside alliances
Snyder, ’09 – Senior Adjunct Fellow for Korean Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Polciy, the Asia Foundation, “From Nuclear Talks to Regional Institutions:
Challenges and Prospects for Security Multilateralism in Northeast Asia,” )
A second issue that continues to draw considerable debate related to the establishment of a multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia is the question of whether such a structure should serve as a replacement for or as a complement to the existing U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea. It has become standard practice for Chinese to characterize the concept of alliance as a legacy of the Cold War and to underscore the need to abandon alliance thinking in favor of security multilateralism as a more suitable model for preserving cooperation among states in the future, while conventional wisdom among American analysts is that there is no contradiction between America’s Asian alliances and the establishment of a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia.11 In fact, some American analysts may argue that common values among democratic states may enable the expansion of tasks in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances, and that those tasks might be synchronized as part of a regional approach to cooperation that emphasizes common objectives of both alliances to maintain regional stability. This sort of approach also sees an important role for the U.S.-led alliance network to play a balancing role in the context of China’s rise, for instance, in the context of the idea of a League of Democracies proposed by presidential candidate John McCain in 2008.
Because the alliances have served American interests well for so long, there is a hesitancy among American analysts to feel a strong need for innovation in this area or to respond to Asian desires for enhanced regional cooperation, especially in the security sphere. If the impetus for East Asian community building were to take off, such a development would have an indirect impact on U.S.-led alliances to the extent that the establishment of cooperation lessens security dilemmas faced within the region and lays the foundation for cooperative security. But Japan’s incomplete reconciliation with the rest of Asia over history, an ongoing regional rivalry between China and Japan, and the perceived need to hedge against the negative possibilities that might result from China’s rise make it unlikely that the United States or its allies would be convinced to abandon the alliance framework in favor of cooperative security anytime soon.
The United States is already pursuing regionalism in its response to North Korea’s security challenge by attempting to mobilize a coordinated response through the six party process. This effort recognizes that the issue cannot be resolved satisfactorily using only deterrence and bilateral talks. The emergence of six party talks recognizes that the North Korean nuclear issue will require the collective involvement of all the parties neighboring North Korea if such a deal is going to “stick.” Again, the six party mechanism is a tool to be used in conjunction with alliance cooperation, not supplanting the alliances with another form of security structure in Northeast Asia. For most American analysts, the idea of multilateral dialogue as a supplement to the alliances as a foundation for assuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia is quite reasonable, but the continued existence of conflicting strategic aims among stakeholders in the region suggests that any idea of abandoning the alliances in favor of a multilateral security mechanism is implausible. It is worth thinking through circumstances under which the United States might be more positively disposed to taking a more active role in Asian regionalism. For instance, if China were to experience a change in its system and become a democracy, would this development remove the perceived need for U.S.-led bilateral alliances and pave the way for cooperative security in Asia? What are the possible regional security implications of a situation in which the United States no longer plays the role of anchor for the global financial system? Another factor that has strengthened the desirability of alliances has been America’s own inability to play the role of sole provider of public goods. To the extent that partnerships and regional coalitions can play a role in multilateralizing the provision of international public goods through joint response to monitoring of sea lanes, multilateral provision of disaster relief, and joint responsibility for managing environmental issues such as climate change, these responses may contribute to American interest in Asian regionalism and might pose significant challenges to the continuation of America’s Asian alliances in their current form.
Conclusion
This paper has examined how North Korea’s nuclear pursuits have served to catalyze ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia over the course of the past two decades. On the one hand, the magnitude of North Korea’s challenge to common regional security interests has brought regional actors together and has served as a focal point for the development of a collective regional response to this challenge. On the other hand, there is no other issue beyond North Korea’s nuclear challenge that appears to be sufficiently compelling to overcome underlying security dilemmas or to drive the institutionalization of regional security cooperation among Northeast Asian countries. Although the North Korean nuclear issue has promoted habits of cooperation that could be regularized if they were to take root sufficiently that such a dialogue were perceived as serving the collective interests of all participants in the region, there is not yet sufficient reason in the view of this author to expect that any other issue will emerge as the basis for regional collective action in Northeast Asia.
Some may argue that the U.S.-led alliance structure itself is a major factor inhibiting the development of such cooperation because any good alliance needs an enemy to be targeted against. It is this idea that has led many Chinese analysts to classify
[CONTINUED]
Alliances Compliments Regionalism
[CONTINUED]
the U.S.-led alliances as a historical relic of the cold war. However, such a view does not take into consideration the idea that the glue holding alliances together might also derive from cooperation that stands for something rather than being focused on a common threat. This emerging rationale for alliance cooperation is double-edged, however, since existing alliances can also be used to hedge against the possibility of an emerging threat. To the extent that such a hedging strategy is still perceived as useful to ensure the security needs of alliance partners, it is much more likely that U.S.-led alliances will continue to develop in tandem with multilateral security cooperation rather than in opposition to such cooperation. To the extent that security multilateralism proves itself to be an effective and constructive contributor to keeping the peace by promoting high levels of mutual trust in Northeast Asia, such a development might make the alliances obsolete. Until then, it is likely that security multilateralism in Northeast Asia will continue to develop on an ad hoc basis in response to specific challenges that require cooperation to successfully manage.
No Multilateralism
Multilateralism impossible-
a. Ethnic groups
b. Territory
c. Emerging powers
Lum ’09 (Thomas, American Report of The Asia Foundation Emerging Leaders
Conference, “Current Developments In Southeast Asia: Implications For U.S."
Southeast Asia Relations,” )
Southeast Asia has long been a fragmented region, pulled by centrifugal forces of ethnicity, religion, colonial history, and geography. The strength of ASEAN – the ability of the organization to act cohesively and purposefully – often has been undermined by the lack of common interests among its members. Furthermore, as some countries in the region, such as Indonesia, grow in global stature, they may be tempted to act unilaterally on regional issues. The organization’s traditional disunity and unwillingness to impose human rights standards upon its members, particularly Burma, have been sources of tension between ASEAN and the United States. Professor Wang Gungwu put forth three possible future scenarios for ASEAN: (1) an organization that provides a forum for dialogue but remains passive toward regional issues; (2) a grouping that becomes ineffectual or breaks apart; and (3) an organization that becomes more assertive as external powers such as the United States and China compete for influence in the region. Wang was cautiously optimistic that the shared interest among Southeast Asian states, the United States, China, and other powers in the region in a strong ASEAN boded well for the organization. ASEAN, along with other regional and Pacific organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), APEC, ASEAN plus 3 (China, Japan, and South Korea), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), have enmeshed Southeast Asian countries, Northeast Asia, Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), India, the United States, and other countries in webs of political, security, and economic dialogue and cooperation. Although some U.S. policy makers have expressed concerns about China’s role in the EAS (the United States is not a member), Australia and India are said to help protect U.S. interests and balance China in the grouping. U.S. accession to the TAC in July 2009 gave the United States the option to become a member of the EAS. However, whether the U.S. wishes to become a member of the EAS remains unclear.
As the country reports delivered at the conference made clear, the region includes some of the world’s richest countries (Singapore) and poorest (Cambodia), varying levels of political development, deep differences of religion, ethnicity, and culture, and divergent international agendas. These disparities in turn pose challenges to political and regional stability and to the cohesion of ASEAN, the organization’s ability to respond to regional issues, and its relations with the United States.
Southeast Asian participants generally agreed on the benefits of regional free trade. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which is to be implemented in 2010 by six ASEAN countries (and 2015 for the remaining signatories), was created as a means to lower the prices of regional products for export, attract foreign investment, and lay the groundwork for an FTA with the United States. The United States market is viewed as vital for the region and as a driver for development, especially for the less developed export economies of Vietnam and Cambodia. One of the main attractions of joining ASEAN for Laos, one of the most isolated countries in the region, was the potential benefits of trade. Southeast Asian exports to the United States have stagnated in recent years, although much of the region’s exports of raw materials and components to China end up in finished goods in U.S. stores. Chief economic concerns of the Southeast Asian interlocutors at the conference included preventing bilateral FTAs from undermining regional trade arrangements; countering the perceived reluctance of the United States to move ahead with free trade initiatives; and finding ways to compete economically with China.
Regional security issues include terrorist and separatist movements, territorial disputes, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Much progress has been made on combating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Southeast Asian, pan-Islamist terrorist group. Key leaders have been captured, killed, or executed. However, JI training camps remain operational in the Philippines (Mindanao) and suicide bombers attacked the Jakarta Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels in July 2009. Although JI’s operational links to Al Qaeda are weak, Al Qaedist ideology continues to inspire and motivate the network’s actions, according to a regional security expert at the conference. The expert recommended U.S.-Southeast Asian efforts to better understand the roots of violent religious extremism.
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are five disputants that exert overlapping claims over dozens of small islands in the South China Sea. In 2002, ASEAN countries and China signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” which commits the parties to the peaceful resolution to territorial conflicts. Despite the lowering of tensions, these competing claims are a latent source of conflict. The United States government supports dialogue to address the issue but does not intend to get directly involved, according to U.S. officials. Two recommendations were offered by conferees. One speaker favored mediation and conciliation – suggesting that this was a more Asian way of resolving disputes – rather than the more legalistic and adversarial method of arbitration. Another expert argued that collaborative activities, such as joint oil exploration between China and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, best reduced the likelihood of conflict.
Economic Decline Turns Multilateralism
Economic decline turns multilateralism
Lum ’09 (Thomas, American Report of The Asia Foundation Emerging Leaders
Conference, “Current Developments In Southeast Asia: Implications For U.S."
Southeast Asia Relations,” )
In their country reports at the conference, Southeast Asian participants offered interesting insights into the problems of economic, political, and social development. Many of these domestic issues are not the topics of regional summits, although they have regional implications. To varying degrees, Southeast Asian countries have been adversely affected by the global recession and direct competition from China; however, other economic challenges, perhaps more fundamental, include corruption, income disparities, and underdeveloped legal institutions and infrastructure. One participant raised the notion of a “corruption plateau” whereby countries grow rapidly during the first phase of economic development but slow during latter stages due to corruption and low government capacity.
Several countries in the region have experienced political instability or human rights violations in recent years which have impacted foreign relations. Timor-Leste and Thailand have experienced setbacks to democracy while civil society groups have accused security forces in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia of abuses. The 2006 military coup in Thailand and alleged human rights violations by security forces in the region have hindered military cooperation with the United States, to varying degrees. Some conferees argued that domestic political battles were responsible for the escalation of border clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops in 2008-09. The postponement of the ASEAN summit in April 2009 in Thailand due to domestic political unrest was seen as a blow to Thailand’s leadership in the organization and a setback to the association’s economic agenda, including taking measures to stimulate their economies and promote trade during the global recession.
***ROK Soft Power / Modernization Adv Ans
MILITARY PRESENCE KEY TO ROK AUTONOMY
U.S. military presence helps preserve ROK autonomy and independence
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
The forward presence of American forces in East Asia over the past 60 years, and the role of the U.S. alliance system in enabling access to American trade and investment, also provided a number of broader benefits for the Korean people. U.S. defense of the air and sea lanes of maritime Asia made possible the explosion of trade, both within the region and with the rich economies of the West, that characterized East Asia’s post-World War 2 development model. American security guarantees to Japan and South Korea and the garrisoning of American forces in these and other countries prevented the emergence of raw balance-of-power politics in East Asia, precluding the kind of self-help behavior that might otherwise have induced leaders in Tokyo and Seoul to consider developing nuclear weapons to bolster their country’s security. America’s dominant role as an Asian security provider helped guarantee the autonomy and independence of smaller states, including South Korea and many Southeast Asian nations, that might otherwise have fallen into larger rivals’ spheres of influence, or worse.
American preponderance in East Asia contributed to what political scientists call under-balancing: U.S. defense commitments to its allies enabled them to spend more of their national resources on social goods and less on defense. The most significant impact was on Japan, which had been Asia’s leading revisionist and aggressive great power since the late 19th century. Not only was Japanese military power neutered with its defeat in World War 2; the U.S.Japan alliance effectively contained Japan’s remilitarization, enabling Japanese leaders to channel their energies towards economic growth while spending less than one percent of GDP on what was truly a “defensive defense,” given the dominant role of America’s armed forces in safeguarding Japan from coercion and aggression. In turn, Japan’s postwar redefinition of its national interests meant that Korea was, for the first time in centuries, not a subject of predation by its eastern neighbor.
A2: ROK Modernization Deters China
ROK supports Chinese rise – the alliance is not needed to balance against China
Kang 09 – Professor of Government Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business Research Director of the Center for International Business Dartmouth (David C., 4 1, “Between balancing and bandwagoning: South Korea's response to China”, )
Why has South Korea accommodated China, instead of fearing its growth and balancing against it? This article makes two central arguments. First, concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are fundamentally difficult to test, and to the extent that the theory can be tested, it appears to be wrong in the case of South Korea. In fact, we observe many cases in which rising powers are neither balanced nor "bandwagoned" but are simply accommodated with no fundamental change either way in military stance or alignment posture. Second, the factors that explain South Korean foreign policy orientation toward China are as much about interests as they are about material power. South Korea sees substantially more economic opportunity than military threat associated with China's rise; but even more importantly, South Korea evaluates China's goals as not directly threatening.
Related Results
KEYWORDS: balance of power, accommodation, China, Korea, US alliance
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A central debate in the field of international relations concerns the extent of balancing behavior. Kenneth Waltz's (1993, 17) confident assertion that "hegemony leads to balance" and that it has done so "through all of the centuries we can contemplate" is perhaps the default proposition in international relations. Yet in recent years, the balancing proposition has come under increasing empirical and theoretical scrutiny. Empirically, the absence of obvious balancing against the United States in the post-Cold War era led to a scholarly debate about why that might be the case (Paul 2005; Pape 2005; Schweller 2004; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Wohlforth 1999; Ikenberry 2002; Lieber and Alexander 2005). Theoretically, advances by scholars working in both the rationalist and constructivist traditions have pointed out the myriad ways in which state strategies depend on more than just the distribution of power (Powell 1999; Fearon and Wendt 2002; Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007).
Scholars are also beginning to focus on another case that has the potential to yield significant insights into this debate: China. In the past three decades, China has rapidly emerged as a major regional and global power. Since the introduction of its market reforms in 1978, China has averaged over 9 percent economic growth. Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in the country, and Chinese exports have begun to flood world markets. China is modernizing its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and is increasingly visible in international politics. However, although it would appear that these conditions are ripe for balancing behavior, China has managed to emerge without provoking a regional backlash (Goh 2007/08; Kang 2007; Womack 2003/04).
South Korea--the Republic of Korea (ROK)--presents perhaps the clearest example of this trend. A balance-of-power perspective would expect South Korea to fear a rapidly growing, geographically and demographically massive authoritarian and Communist China that sits on its border. Not only does China already have the military capability to threaten the peninsula, but the power disparity is widening. China also maintains close relations with North Korea--South Korea's main external threat since 1945. Furthermore, the United States and South Korea have enjoyed a close alliance for over a half century, and it was only US military action that prevented the North (in concert with the Chinese) from conquering the South in 1950. Since that time, the United States has stationed military forces in South Korea to prevent a second North Korean invasion. For all these reasons, the conventional perspectives would expect that South Korea fears a rapidly rising China and clings to its alliance with the United States.
Yet South Korea has drawn closer to China over the past two decades, not farther away. Furthermore, South Korea has had increasing friction with Japan, a capitalist democracy that shares an alliance with the United States. Indeed, South Korea appears more worried about potential Japanese militarization than it is worried about actual Chinese militarization. Although the US-ROK alliance remains strong, the key point for this article is that the alliance is not a balancing alliance against China, and the recent adjustments in the alliance were neither aimed at nor the result of China. In sum, there is little evidence that South Korea will attempt to balance China, and even less evidence that South Korea fears China.
A2: ROK Modernization Deters China
South Korea won’t balance China – trying to expand relations
Kang 09 – Professor of Government Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business Research Director of the Center for International Business Dartmouth (David C., 4 1, “Between balancing and bandwagoning: South Korea's response to China”, )
South Korea represents perhaps the paradigmatic case of how China is reshaping foreign relations in the region. South Korea has shown little inclination to balance China and instead appears on the whole to be moving steadily--and, skeptics have argued, naively--to expand its relations with China. South Korea and China have similar stances on a range of foreign policy issues, from the best way to deal with North Korea to concerns about the future of Japanese foreign policy. What makes the South Korean case even more vivid is that South Korea has been one of the closest US allies in the region for over sixty years.
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South Korean military capabilities have remained roughly the same over the past decade, and the ambitious Defense Reform 2020 plan is aimed notably at replacing outdated 1960s-era weaponry while maintaining the ability to deal with contingencies regarding North Korea (Han 2006; Bennett 2006). The ROK air force will replace 1960s-era F-4s and 150 F-16s with 60 KF-15s and 60 KF-Xs and 170 KF-16s (Table 1) and add 4 AWACS and 4 tankers, and "the resulting force should be a significant improvement in aggregate capabilities" (Bennett 2006, 5). The navy will reduce its outdated surface combat ships and upgrade the submarine force and add Aegis capabilities while reducing the overall quantity of combat ships. The greatest reduction in personnel will come from the army, which will reduce its size by one-third and reduce the number of divisions from forty-seven to twenty-four. Bruce Bennett (2006, 7) notes that although the new ROK military will be "more powerful, it is important to note that this will be a much smaller force ... despite its qualitative improvements, these reductions pose the risk that the 2020 ROK military will be perceived by some as being weaker."
It is revealing that South Korea's newest military purchases are mainly maritime in nature, with the newly christened Great King Sejong Aegis destroyer the first of at least three and perhaps six destroyers. If South Korea considered China a threat, ostensibly its force structure would be different. Naval forces are less effective for deterring a land threat from either North Korea or China, but it does reveal that South Korea's main concerns are naval. The Taipei Times, on July 3, 2007, quoted South Korean president Roh commenting on the launch of the Sejong: "South and North Korea will not keep picking quarrels with each other forever.... We have to equip the nation with the capability to defend itself. The Aegis destroyer we are dedicating today could be the best symbol of that capability." Perhaps even more interestingly, the experimental assault amphibious landing ship has been christened a "Dokdo" class of ships, which did not please the Japanese (Japan Policy and Politics 2005).
A2: ROK Modernization Deters China
U.S.-ROK alliance is not designed to balance against China
Kang 09 – Professor of Government Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business Research Director of the Center for International Business Dartmouth (David C., 4 1, “Between balancing and bandwagoning: South Korea's response to China”, )
However, the US-ROK alliance is directed more fundamentally to the North and to other contingencies, and the alliance is not a balancing exercise against China. Furthermore, there appears little evidence that the alliance has changed to accommodate rising Chinese power, and agreements on out-of-area operations do not appear to relate to China. The military aspect of the alliance has undergone fairly major changes in the past few years; but this was driven by US out-of-area needs (particularly the "war on terror") and South Korean domestic considerations, not China. The two allies signed a base-restructuring agreement that includes the return of over sixty US camps to the South Koreans, as well as the relocation of the US Army headquarters from downtown Seoul to the countryside. By 2012, wartime operational control will return to South Korea, and the United States is reducing its South Korean deployments from 37,000 to 25,000 troops (US Department of Defense 2000). US power on the peninsula is thus actually decreasing, and as a result, it has been noted that "the U.S. will emphasize the ROK's primary leading role in defending itself. Physically, the U.S. seems not to have sufficient augmentation forces, especially ground troops" (Choi and Park 2007, 18).
As a potential hedge against unanticipated problems that may arise in the future, the United States may provide a form of reassurance to South Korea, depending on the circumstances. Indeed, few argue that the United States would come to the aid of East Asian states unless it was in the United States' own interests to do so. Whether the United States would aid South Korea depends, as always, on the actual nature of the issue and the circumstances at the time. In part, this is a rational South Korean expectation: it is unwise to expect another country to unquestioningly support an ally, even a long-standing one. The United States and ROK acknowledged this possibility in their Strategic Consultation for an Allied Partnership on January 20, 2006:
The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the necessity for the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the ROK. In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people. (Choi and Park 2007, 13, emphasis added)
Finally, the United States is not balancing China either, and thus it is no surprise that South Korea does not view the alliance as balancing China. In fact, US policy toward China for the past thirty years has not been to contain China and keep it weak, as a nascent balancing strategy would suggest. Rather, the United States has consciously pursued the opposite policy: to help China grow and develop and to become a major regional and even global power. Seven consecutive US presidents have encouraged China's integration into the global system, from Richard Nixon's belief that "dealing with Red China ... means pulling China back into the world community" (Nixon 1967/68, 123) to President George W. Bush's welcoming "the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports international institutions" (Bush, 2006). As Thomas Christensen (2006, 108) notes, "Especially if one uses the United States' containment policies toward the Soviet Union as a basis of comparison, the [argument] that the United States has been dedicated to a grand strategy of containment of China as a general policy to maintain U.S. hegemony is, for the most part, divorced from reality."
For example, the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that "the United States welcomes the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China." The US military has also increasingly called for engagement and interaction with the Chinese military. On May 18, 2006, during a four-city tour of Chinese military bases by Admiral William Fallon, commander of US forces in the Asia-Pacific, the Bloomberg News quoted the admiral as saying that "the more they are like us, the easier it will be.... This is one area where the secretary of defense [Donald Rumsfeld] in particular has been pro-engagement." The United States and China have also discussed establishing a military hotline and joint naval drills (NHK 2006).
Official Bush administration policy has been to encourage China to be a "responsible stakeholder"--that is, official US policy claims that the key factor in determining whether the United States fears or welcomes China as a great power is not whether China is strong and rich but rather what its desires and intentions are. Many recent US policy analyses of China recognize that whether China's rise is stabilizing or destabilizing depends on China's identity and how that develops over time. For example, the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States called for a policy to "encourage China to make the right strategic decisions for its people while we hedge against other possibilities." In December 2005, former US deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick (US Department of State 2005) called on China to become a "responsible stakeholder" in international affairs. The US focus on Chinese goals rather than power has been a long-standing aspect of US foreign policy. As Iain Johnston (2007, xvii) has noted, "The Clinton administration's strategy of constructive engagement was, for some, aimed at pulling China into the "international community" and exposing it to new norms of the market and domestic governance."
The United States remains by far the most powerful and important country in the world, and all East Asian states would like more, not less, US attention to the region. Yet this also means that East Asian states know they cannot rely on, or expect, unquestioned US support. Most East Asian states welcome or accept US leadership, but the actual US-ROK alliance is not designed to deal with China, nor is it being modified with that purpose in mind.
***U.S.-China Relations Adv Ans
GOOD RELATIONS NOW
U.S. and China are committed to military-to-military relations now
Kellerhals, 10 (6/7/10, “Merle David Jr., Staff Writer, “Shangri-La Conference Highlights Asia-Pacific Security Concerns”, )
Gates said that last year President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao made a commitment to "sustained and reliable military-to-military relations" between the two nations. But the relationship has been repeatedly interrupted by "the vagaries of political weather."
"Regrettably, we have not been able to make progress on this relationship in recent months," Gates said. The Pentagon wants improved military-to-military relations with Chinese military officials at all levels to reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding and miscalculation, he added.
Gates said that as regional partners develop new capabilities, they have a responsibility to take a greater role in providing regional and global security. The nations of Asia have been making significant contributions in the Gulf of Aden against high-seas piracy, and in securing peace for Iraq and for Afghanistan, he said.
But North Korea has provided another reality, one that continues to undermine the peace and stability of East Asia, Gates said. The March 26 unprovoked attack on the South Korean ship Cheonan, in which 46 sailors were killed, is not an isolated event, he added.
No U.S.-China War
No war – China is focused on its economy
CRS, 08 (A study prepared by the Congressional Research service for the U.S. Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, April, 08, “China’s foreign policy and ‘soft power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa” )
Within the ongoing international debate about what China’s ultimate intentions may be for its growing global achievements, it is possible to point to some fundamental objectives that appear to be at least partial motivations for Beijing’s current international outreach. Adding to the uncertainty about PRC policies, these presumed objectives at times are in contradiction, suggesting either a lack of coherence or that they reflect internal Chinese disagreements and compromise. China’s policy direction is that much harder to predict when some of these key policy objectives are seen to clash, and experience tells us that abrupt shifts in policy, shifts which remain unexplained in many cases, still occur with a fair degree of regularity in the PRC system.
Enhancing Sustainable Economic Growth
Strong economic development continues to be seen as the core primary objective for the PRC leadership for a host of reasons—not the least of which are to raise the living standards of its enormous population, to dampen social disaffection about economic and other inequities, and to sustain regime legitimacy after the demise of communist ideology as an acceptable organizing principle. China’s annual economic growth rates routinely are in the double digits; in 2007, they reached an annual rate of 11.4 percent—the highest since 1994.9 This rapid and sustained economic growth has created voracious domestic appetites for resources, capital, and technology, as well as for markets for Chinese goods, and these appetites have served as powerful drivers of China’s international trade and investment agreements.
China Won’t Balance Against U.S.
Their claims are suspect and made by realists with little background knowledge of China – no reason China would challenge US heg
Shambaugh, 04 – Director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University (Winter 04/05, David, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Project Muse )
To be sure, this is a subjective assessment, but I would argue that it is a fair portrayal of the views and interests of the U.S. and Chinese governments. On balance, as Table 2 indicates, the United States and China find themselves on the same side of many of the key issues affecting the future of the Asian region, which may well enhance their opportunities for tangible cooperation.
Some observers in the United States, however, see China’s Asian engagement as an inexorable zero-sum attempt to displace the United States as the primary power in the region.94 Some have even called for preemptively containing China before it can truly challenge U.S. preeminence first in Asia and then globally. This policy prescription, which is rooted in the theory of offensive realism, is most notably advocated by the University of Chicago scholar John Mearsheimer. Both the logic and application of offensive realism in this case are, in my view, unsustainable. It is a classic example of an international relations theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence. As a China specialist, I do not recognize the China that Mearsheimer describes, and I see no evidence of his “Chinese hegemony” thesis and thus reject his policy prescription of preemptive containment.95 Contemporary international relations involve more than relations among great powers, and even great power interactions are not intrinsically zero-sum Hobbesian struggles. Rather they are complex mixtures of interdependence, cooperation amid competition, and structural adjustments. Just as one nation (China) rises, it does not ipso facto follow that another (the United States) must fall—or even decline relatively. Nor does the rising power necessarily seek hegemonic dominance. It is also not inevitable that rising powers challenge the established power, thus producing structural conflict (as, for example, the power transition theory would predict).
Not only do the analogies of previous rising powers fail to fit contemporary China, but they also have no precedents in China’s past. As historian Wang Gungwu points out, this is not the ªrst time in history that China has risen: it is the fourth such instance.96 In the Qin-Han, Sui-Tang, and Ming-Qing dynasties, external pressures on China’s northern and eastern periphery combined with domestic economic, social, and demographic pressures to precipitate dy nastic decline. Moreover, China does not have a significant history of coercive statecraft.97 China’s “tribute system,” which constituted the regional system in Asia for more than 2,500 years, was characterized by a combination of patronclient ties; economic interdependence; security protection for those closest to China (especially Korea); cultural assimilation into Confucian customs (lai Hua); political ritual (koutou); and benevolent governance (wangdao). The tribute system may have been hegemonic, but it was not based on coercion or territorial expansionism.98 These are essential points to bear in mind when considering China’s new ascendance in Asian affairs.
China’s Rise Is Not a Threat
China’s rise is positive – their hard power capabilities fall far short of the US and their main concern is appearing nonthreatening
Matthews & Di, 09 – professor of Defense Economics at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) **AND Research assistant at RSIS (9/30/09, Ron and Wang, Malaysia Insider, “The dragon marks its peaceful rise,” Lexis)
TWO events will once again focus the world's attention on the Middle Kingdom.
The first is that China's growth rate for this year is slated to hit 8 per cent, suggesting the country will be among the first of the mega-powers to recover from the global financial crisis.
The second will be tomorrow's sight of China's biggest and most impressive military parade in a decade, in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic.
Both events will inevitably fuel concerns about China's power. However, China views its rise as a peaceful one. Beijing's challenge is to project a soft rather than hard image of its power.
China's economic power is the result of its unparalleled growth, averaging 9.5 per cent per annum over the past three decades. As a result of this growth, the country has been able to increase its defence expenditure by 17 per cent in each of the last four years.
Reflecting this substantial expansion in defence expenditure, China's military power has undergone an impressive transformation, carrying with it the potential to destabilise the world order. China now has the world's biggest standing army, with more than 2.25 million soldiers and a broad array of advanced military platforms, including nuclear- powered submarines. The country is also in the process of acquiring aircraft carriers.
Unsurprisingly, China's rising hard power is seen as a threat. The United States, in particular, is nervous of China's burgeoning military capability and strategic reach.
But is this fear justified? There is room for doubt.
For instance, China's 'official' 2009 defence budget, at US $70.3 billion (S $99.6 billion), is only 10 per cent of what the US spends. Moreover, China's offensive capability is far inferior to that of the US. China's navy probably cannot sustain naval operations beyond 160km from its shores, its combat aircraft are less than half the number of America's, and much of its artillery is antique by Western standards.
China is aware of the international anxieties engendered by its growing military strength, and needs to communicate the purpose and nature of its military 'modernisation' programme.
Progress has been made on this front. In June, defence consultative talks between Beijing and Washington were resumed, and last month the two countries held maritime safety talks to reduce incidents such as the recent naval confrontation in the South China Sea.
China's Defence Ministry has also launched a Chinese and English website to give an unprecedented amount of information on the country's military capability. The country is also seeking to counterbalance its hard power with a focus on soft power projection, the ultimate goal being to create the image of a benign China.
For instance, in the area of maritime territorial disputes, it proposed to shelve disputes and engage in joint developments in 1978, providing the basis for the path-breaking preliminary agreement with Japan last year to jointly explore gas fields in the East China Sea. China has also cooperated with neighbouring countries in non-traditional security areas such as drug trafficking, piracy, terrorism, money laundering and cyber crimes.
The country has also sought to become a good international citizen. It has taken part in peacekeeping operations in international hot spots. In December last year, it sent three ships to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy in the waters off Somalia. China acted in response to a United Nations Security Council request for assistance. Significantly, it was the Chinese navy's first mission beyond the Pacific.
China provides a large amount of overseas aid, both economic and technical. By the end of 2005, it had completed 769 projects in Africa, most of which were associated with sustainable development.
The country has begun two other major programmes to expand its soft power. One is the establishment of the Confucius Institutes. The other is the launch of what has been described as a 'media aircraft carrier' aimed at the hearts and minds of a global audience. The Chinese government has pumped 45 billion yuan (S $9.3 billion) into supporting four key state-run news organisations - China National Radio, China Central Television (CCTV), People's Daily and the Xinhua News Agency - to expand the country's influence. There are also plans to launch an international news channel with round-the-clock global news coverage, rather like a Chinese version of the Arab network Al-Jazeera.
China's desire to cultivate the image of a benign and responsible state is likely to curtail any use of its hard power. Therefore, the country's rise should be viewed positively.
China’s Rise Is Not a Threat
The global climate prevents China’s rise from being violent – it will thrive within the Western system
Ikenberry, 08 – professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Proquest)
The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises?
Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order.
That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join.
This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.
China’s Rise Is Not a Threat
The nuclear age prevents a great power war from Chinese accession
Ikenberry, 08 – professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Proquest)
The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.
The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than outside of, the Western order.
China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse great-power leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "great-power exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so. Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system -- a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions.
China not only needs continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and institutions provide. The WTO's multilateral trade principles and dispute-settlement mechanisms, for example, offer China tools to defend against the threats of discrimination and protectionism that rising economic powers often confront. The evolution of China's policy suggests that Chinese leaders recognize these advantages: as Beijing's growing commitment to economic liberalization has increased the foreign investment and trade China has enjoyed, so has Beijing increasingly embraced global trade rules. It is possible that as China comes to champion the WTO, the support of the more mature Western economies for the WTO will wane. But it is more likely that both the rising and the declining countries will find value in the quasi-legal mechanisms that allow conflicts to be settled or at least diffused.
***China Soft Power Adv ANS
CHINA’S INFLUENCE WILL GROW
China’s leadership will inevitably grow in Asia.
BBC, 09 (7/23/9, “US Wants to Return to Asia to Contain China’s Influence,” Lexis)
Some analysts said that following the rapid improvement of China's national power, the increase of China's influence in the Asian region is an objective fact. But experts said that China does not harbor an ambition to contend with the United States for leadership in this region. China's influence in Asia has an unstoppable development trend. In face of reality, the United States may possibly choose to strengthen cooperation with China to maintain US influence in Asia. Of course, the United States may also choose a balanced manner to impede the increase of China's influence in Asia. But choosing both engagement and containment in dealing with China is still a consideration for the United States to protect its largest interests.
China has the power to punish North Korea over the sinking of the Cheonan and will continue to exercise influence in the region.
Kartokin, 10 - Senior China Analyst with the Department of the Navy (5/27/10, Jesse, “All Eyes on China in Wake of Cheonan Sinking” [tt_news]=36431&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=7b6d6a4171)
Calling for “resolute countermeasures” against North Korea, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak expressed his desire to deal with Pyongyang “through strong international cooperation” (Christian Science Monitor, May 20). Park Hyung-jun, the senior political affairs secretary to President Lee, underscored China’s central role in any international response to the Cheonan incident. Park noted that “we will explain [the investigation results] to China in full, so that we can have China play its role in the issue.” As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the host of the Six-Party Talks, and North Korea’s principal benefactor, China will exercise immense influence over the type and severity of any punishment meted out against Pyongyang.
In response to the Cheonan report and Seoul’s accompanying call for sanctions, North’s Korea’s Central News Agency insisted this constitutes an “intolerable, grave provocation [and] a declaration of war” (KCNA, May 24). Characterizing the Cheonan incident as a “conspiratorial farce to harm and stifle the DPRK”, Pyongyang pledged to “mete out a thousand-fold punishment to the puppet war thirsty forces” (KCNA, May 26). North Korea later indicated it would fire upon South Korea’s loudspeakers that are slated to resume propaganda messaging along the demilitarized zone (Seoul Hankyoreh, May 26).
Beijing’s vague official commentary and high-level diplomatic contact with North Korea in the wake of the sinking triggered significant concern in South Korea (Yonhap [South Korea], May 24). Beijing’s guarded statements reflect an effort to appear impartial and focused on preventing escalation rather than assigning blame or delivering justice. A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson called on all parties to “remain cool and exercise restraint” (Xinhua News Agency, May 7). China's deputy foreign minister characterized the incident as “unfortunate” but refrained from blaming North Korea (Global Times [China], May 21). Meanwhile, the Beijing Review reiterated Beijing’s general opposition to economic sanctions against Pyongyang, suggesting they are politically ineffective and only cause the public to suffer (Beijing Review, May 17).
Of greater significance to South Korean observers, Hu welcomed Kim Jong-Il to Beijing on 20 April, just days after South Korean President Lee consulted with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Shanghai. South Korean commentators suggested that Beijing’s unexpected invitation to the North Korean leader was inappropriate and insulting given the cloud of suspicion hanging over the Kim regime (Yonhap, May 12 and 13; JoongAng Ilbo [South Korea], May 8).
South Korean media expressed concern that China’s strategic interest in North Korean stability will override any pressure to deal firmly with Pyongyang. The moderate Korea Times predicted that even the most damning evidence concerning North Korean involvement in the Cheonan sinking will not lead Beijing to change its stance on North Korea (The Korea Times, May 10). The more conservative JoongAng Ilbo called South Korea’s “strategic partnership” with Beijing “a delusion,” insisting that China will always embrace strategies that enable it to exercise influence over the Korean Peninsula (JoongAng Ilbo, May 8).
Chinese Soft Power Increasing
China’s soft power is growing and primarily used for peaceful development.
Zheng, 09 – program manager and research assistant in the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program (March 09, Denise E, “China’s use of soft power in the developing world” )
China’s approach to foreign policy underwent a tremendous transformation during the past half
century, shifting from the war-and-revolution period under the rule of Mao Zedong to an era of
peace and development under more recent leadership. Two decades ago, China was viewed as an
austere and monolithic communist country that threatened the development of democracy in Asia
and elsewhere in the world—an image that was exacerbated by the callous response of the Chinese
Communist Party, and thus the state, to the 1989 student protests, quashing a nascent democracy
movement in China.
Today China is increasingly capitalist, modern, and globalized. Economic reforms, initiated
in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, have transformed China into one of the world’s largest destinations for
foreign direct investment and a vital link in global supply chains. Beijing’s “go global” strategy—an
incentive-driven program promoting Chinese firms to pursue rigorous investments abroad—is
exemplary of China’s transformation: prosperity from years of double-digit economic growth has
not only made China attractive to foreign investors but has also endowed China with the capital to
be a major consumer in the global marketplace.
As the world watches China transform, there is increasing anxiety that, after 25 years of
remarkable economic growth, Beijing has significantly elevated its capacity to influence world
affairs and that it will use this newfound strength coercively. Some experts believe that China
poses a serious challenge to the United States for the role of the world’s leading superpower—the
first credible threat since the existence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Conscious of
the apprehension surrounding its rise and worried that such sentiments could impede continued
economic growth, Beijing has sought to attach itself to the slogan “peaceful development” in an
effort to reassure others that its newfound strength is benign. Indeed, compared with the years of
Mao, China today appears much more “charming”—a transformation that can at least be partially
credited to its growing soft power, arguably Beijing’s most valuable foreign policy tool.
Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction.
A defining feature of soft power is noncoercive. The currency of soft power is culture, political
values, and foreign policies, and when these factors are perceived as legitimate, they form group
norms that have the capacity to shape behavior and motivate actions. Since the idea of soft power
was coined in the 1990s by Joseph Nye, there has been an ongoing debate about whether it includes
a country’s military resources and economic strength. According to Nye, a well-run military
with vast resources can give rise to admiration from other countries. Similarly, the prosperity
of a nation’s economic system (economic power) can attract other countries and cause them to
adopt similar economic institutions and policies.1 Walter Russell Mead argues that the projection
of a nation’s economic success can attract other states to believe that its increasing influence is
desirable, inevitable, or perhaps permanent. He believes that economic strength is “sticky” because
countries that adopt similar economic institutions and policies will find it more difficult to leave
the system.2 China’s growing economy is a major source of its increasing appeal in the developing
world. Wealth and the potential to be wealthy are attractive, and money confers normative power
and provides the means to disseminate culture and ideas. As Joseph Nye aptly states, “seduction is
almost always more effective than coercion.”3
Aware of the benefits of a sophisticated soft-power portfolio, Chinese leaders are aiming to
deepen relationships with all regions of the world, particularly the developing nations of Africa,
the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Beijing uses a variety of tools to increase its
influence in the developing world that include economic incentives and military cooperation;
however, traditional soft power has also become a growing piece of how China acquires its influence.
Although the nature of China’s relationships with the regions explored in this volume is
largely economic, Beijing has also sought to strengthen these relationships by promoting regional
economic integration and security mechanisms, emphasizing the role of the United Nations,
participating in humanitarian missions, providing concessionary loans and debt relief, increasing
cultural and academic exchange programs, and engaging local communities through skilled
diplomats.
There is a distinct style in China’s approach to relationship building: it practices an omnidirectional
friendship policy that emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty and noninterference
with the objective of securing stable and sustainable access to resources and opening new export
markets to fuel its economy.4 Differences in regional geopolitical dynamics, however, require
Beijing to tailor its soft-power strategy in each of the four regions it is active.
What types of activities are the Chinese pursuing in these regions to strengthen their influence?
How do geopolitical factors affect China’s approach to each of these regions? Is China’s soft
power effective? This volume, a compilation of essays by senior CSIS scholars, is designed to take
a deeper look at what China is doing in these regions and what China’s soft-power activities mean
for the United States. It is part of a broader project that examines the future of U.S.-China relations
in 2009 and beyond.
Chinese Soft Power Increasing
China’s soft power will continue to grow as the U.S. declines
CRS, 08 (A study prepared by the Congressional Research service for the U.S. Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, April, 08, “China’s foreign policy and ‘soft power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa” )
Whether one is reading press accounts and scholarly treatises or traveling through the regions under discussion, the PRC seems to be everywhere. It is tempting to begin to think in alarmist terms, thereby magnifying presumed PRC strengths as well as perceived U.S. weaknesses. Many concerned observers focus on the competitive strengths that PRC soft power has in relation to the United States, pointing out that the PRC international approach is particularly strong in areas where the U.S. political system and U.S. values make it less competitive. Some suggest that these PRC strengths have a brighter future in today’s global economy, meaning that China will have increasing economic and political soft power clout internationally at the expense of the United States. Still, a closer look at some of the PRC’s presumed assets suggests that they may have downsides as well.
No Strings
The recipient governments of PRC trade and investment are particularly attracted to the fact that Chinese money generally comes with none of the pesky human rights conditions, good governance requirements, approved-project restrictions, and environmental quality regulations that characterize U.S. and other Western government investments. With an authoritarian government that has few if any democratic imperatives, China has capitalized on its willingness to make such ‘‘unrestricted’’ international investments as part of its ‘‘win-win’’ international strategy.
China Becoming More Responsible in Region
China is becoming a more responsible stakeholder in the region
Kartokin, 10 - Senior China Analyst with the Department of the Navy (5/27/10, Jesse, “All Eyes on China in Wake of Cheonan Sinking” [tt_news]=36431&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=7b6d6a4171)
Beijing’s growing international engagement is motivated in part by a desire to bolster its international image. Over the past decade in particular, Beijing has sought to assure the world of its “peaceful development,” insisting that China will not destabilize the existing order as it becomes more powerful. Beijing has also seemingly embraced the U.S. formulation of becoming a “responsible stakeholder,” implying that it will more actively contribute to the global order from which it benefits. Beijing has curtailed its weapons proliferation, contributed naval forces to the multinational anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and leveraged its unique relationship with Pyongyang as an asset in the Six-Party Talks. The Cheonan incident illustrates the threat that Pyongyang can pose to Beijing’s desired narrative.
China’s Soft Power Exaggerated
China’s soft power is exaggerated – the US will be ahead for a long time
Zheng, 09 – program manager and research assistant in the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program (March 09, Denise E, “China’s use of soft power in the developing world” )
Although Beijing has devoted significant effort to increasing its soft-power capability, the extent
to which China’s soft power has actually increased is often exaggerated. Two recent public opinion
studies conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Pew Global Attitudes Project
suggest that China’s real soft-power achievements are not as impressive as some analysts suggest.
In other words, the statement that the world finds China more charming is not entirely supported
by empirical evidence.
The soft power of the United States still exceeds that of China by a substantial margin, even in
China’s own neighborhood. In a study conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which
surveyed public opinion in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, the United States, and China,
the United States was regarded by every state (with the exception of China) as the most influential
in the key areas of soft power: economics, culture, human capital, diplomacy, and politics.19
A majority of respondents saw China as a future leader of Asia; however, it is uncertain whether
Asian states see this as an entirely positive thing. In fact, the United States is seen as a stabilizing
and countervailing force in the Asia region as China takes on a greater role.
Trends in international opinion toward China reflect similar results. According to a Pew
Global Attitudes Project released in July 2008, which surveyed 21 countries in all regions of the
world during the year preceding publication of the study, the United States has improved its image
in ten states while China’s image has improved in only two states.20 Three states view the United
States less favorably today than a year ago, and nine states view China less favorably. Although
China’s influence in world affairs is seen as strong, particularly in Asia and Africa, an overwhelming
number of countries perceive that China acts in a unilateral fashion.
Both of these public opinion studies indicate a worrisome disconnect between how China
perceives itself and the world and how the rest of the world perceives China. Domestically, the
Chinese believe that China’s expanding influence is viewed positively and is welcomed by the
rest of the world. Many countries have a considerable degree of apprehension about China’s rise,
however, and are unconvinced that China is irrevocably on the path of peaceful development. Yet,
one unmistakable finding is that developing countries have a significantly more positive view of
China’s rising influence than developed countries, suggesting that China’s soft power strategy in
Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia are yielding results.
Several Factors Undermine Chinese Soft Power
China’s attempts to gain soft power are failing – lack of human rights, free speech, and democracy
Ford, 10 (4/29/10, Peter, Christian Science Monitor, “On eve of Shanghai Expo 2010, China finds 'soft power' an elusive goal;
Chinese authorities have seized on the Shanghai Expo 2010 - the largest in history - as another chance to enhance 'soft power' that is generated by the spread of cultures, values, diplomacy, and trade. The expo opens this weekend” Lexis)
At the heart of the Shanghai World Expo stands the host nation's pavilion, a giant latticed crown painted crimson. Packed with exhibits portraying daily Chinese life, China's ethnic diversity, and the standard bearers of Chinese philosophy, the display shows China's friendliest face to the world. Hard on the heels of the Beijing Olympics, the authorities here have seized on the Expo - the largest in history - as another chance to improve the rising giant's international image. Learning how to win friends and influence people is a task to which the government has attached the highest priority in recent years.
It appears, however, to be failing. A BBC poll released in April found that only one-third of respondents in 14 countries believe China is a positive influence, down from one-half just five years ago. IN PICTURES: Shanghai World Expo 2010 "The government is putting a lot of resources and a lot of attention into boosting China's 'soft power,' but they've got a lot of problems with the message," says David Shambaugh, head of the China Policy Program at George Washington University in Washington. "The core aspects of their system" - such as one-party rule, media censorship, and suppression of critics - "are just not appealing to outsiders." Chinese policymakers and academics are increasingly fascinated by "soft power," whereby nations coopt foreign governments and citizens through the spread of their cultures, values, diplomacy, and trade, rather than coerce them by military might. Frustrated by Western domination of global media, from entertainment to news, and by what it sees as unfair coverage, China has launched a $6.6 billion campaign to tell its own story to the world by building its own media empires. Li Changchun, the ruling Communist Party's top ideology official, was blunt in a 2008 speech: "Whichever nation's communications capacity is the strongest, it is that nation whose culture and core values spread far and wide ... that has the most power to influence the world," he said. Is the message convincing? But this is not enough, says Li Xiguang, head of the International Center for Communications Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Even the best-paid messengers need a convincing message. "The United States has built its soft power by making its value and political system ... universal values," he says. "China will not beat the US in soft power until we have a better and newer form of democracy, freedom, and human rights." China has had some success in projecting soft power in developing countries, especially in Africa. "Wherever you go in Africa, roads are being built, and the people building them are Chinese," says Aly Khan Satchu, a financial analyst in Nairobi. "China expresses its soft power through building infrastructure." China's rapid economic development is an inspiration to many Africans, says Mr. Satchu. "The Chinese are selling themselves as having experienced catch-up and offering to help African governments do the same," he says. Chinese firms are also preparing to bid on high-speed railroads in California and elsewhere in the United States. Americans are familiar with some Chinese cultural icons. "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" (2000) was a blockbuster movie, and Houston Rockets basketball star Yao Ming is a household name. But China lacks a Hollywood or a US-style TV industry. Part of the problem, suggests Pang Zhongying, of Beijing's Renmin University, is that English, unlike Chinese, is an international language. Even with the creation of more than 200 Confucius Institutes around the world teaching Chinese, "I don't think China can overcome this difficulty in the short term." At the same time, says François Godement, director of the Asia Centre in Paris, however admired Chinese culture may be, "it is less easily translatable" to other cultures. Political control issuesAdding to the government's difficulties is its insistence on controlling all expressions of contemporary Chinese culture. Beijing squandered an opportunity at last year's Frankfurt book fair, which showcased Chinese literature, by pressing for a ban on exiled writers. Press coverage focused not on Chinese authors but on Beijing's heavy hand. This desire for complete political control, says Professor Godement, means that "they don't give creators the freedom to create works that would project soft power." "There is a huge gap between the official Chinese judgment and that of outsiders," adds Professor Pang. "There are many intellectuals in China, but a good intellectual is not necessarily an officially recognized one." The government has opted instead to pursue public diplomacy, or "overseas propaganda," as it is known here. Rarely does a month pass without a visit to Beijing by media managers and journalists from one developing country or another. But this is not the same as projecting soft power, Mr. Shambaugh notes. "China has a huge soft power deficit," says Pang. "The current Chinese model solves problems, of course, but it is also part of the problem. People outside China will pick China's virtues, but try to avoid its disadvantages. We should learn from such natural choices, from the impression that China can only build roads and schools. That is a problem we must address." IN PICTURES: Shanghai World Expo 2010 Related: China earthquake: day of mourning Official and grassroots relief groups rally in wake of China earthquake Web, religious freedom on agenda as US-China rights dialogue resumes All China coverage
Chinese Soft Power Won’t Solve
Chinese soft power won’t solve – human rights abuses and lack of freedom
The Economist, 10 (1/9/10, “From the charm to the offensive: Banyan,” Lexis)
China's smile diplomacy shows its teeth
IF A single impulse has defined Chinese diplomacy over the past decade, it is its smile: near and far, China has waged a charm offensive. With its land neighbours, India excepted, China has amicably settled nearly all border disputes; it has abjured force in dealing with South-East Asian neighbours over still unsettled maritime boundaries. On the economic front, the free-trade area launched on January 1st between China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations is the world's biggest, by population. China's smiling leaders promise it will spread prosperity.
Farther afield, China has scattered roads and football stadiums across Africa. By the hundreds, it has set up Confucius Institutes around the world to spread Chinese language and culture. More than anything, the Beijing Olympics were designed to showcase gentle President Hu Jintao's notions of a "harmonious world". In all this, the leaders appear not simply to want to make good a perceived deficit in China's soft power around the world. A more brutal calculus prevails: without peace, prosperity and prestige abroad, China will have no peace and prosperity at home. And without that, the Chinese Communist Party is dust.
Yet of late smiles have turned to snarls. The instances appear unrelated. Last month China bullied little Cambodia into returning 22 Uighurs seeking political asylum after bloody riots and a brutal crackdown in Xinjiang last summer. On December 25th, despite China's constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, a veteran human-rights activist, Liu Xiaobo, received a long prison sentence for launching a charter that called for political freedoms. Western governments had urged leniency.
Britain had also called for clemency for Akmal Shaikh, a Briton caught smuggling heroin into Xinjiang. Mr Shaikh seems to have been duped by drugs gangs. His family insist he suffered mental problems and delusions. Yet the courts refused a psychiatric evaluation. Britain's prime minister, Gordon Brown, said he was "appalled" by Mr Shaikh's execution. In turn, China lashed out at this supposed meddling and ordered Britain to "correct its mistakes". Sino-British relations, painstakingly improved in recent years, have come unravelled.
It is harder to complain of foreign meddling when Chinese actions have global consequences. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 the Chinese held the yuan steady as currencies all about them crumbled. Not only did that avert a round of tit-for-tat devaluations. The regional respect China earned, its diplomats argue, paved the way for the charm offensive that soon followed. New-found respect gave China a taste for more.
In contrast, during this downturn many complain that China's dogged pegging of its currency to the dollar harms others. As the world's fastest-growing big economy, with the biggest current-account surplus and foreign reserves, its currency ought by rights to be rising. By several yardsticks the yuan is undervalued and Americans and Europeans fear this leaves them with the pain of global rebalancing. ASEAN furniture-makers and nail foundries also beg for relief from the mercantilist advantage that a manipulated currency gives China.
Most striking of all were China's actions at the Copenhagen summit on climate change, where the world's biggest emitter appeared churlish. In a bid to avoid being pinned down to firm commitments, China insisted that all figures and numerical targets be stripped out of the final accord, even those that did not apply to China. Further, China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao, at first did not deign to sit down with President Barack Obama on the final day, sending relatively junior officials instead. China may have got a deal it liked, but at the cost of a public-relations disaster.
Some think this a prelude to a prickly, more unpleasant China in the decade ahead, but it is too soon to conclude that. More likely, China will now try to patch up relations with Britain, and keep putting a positive gloss on Copenhagen. Peace and prosperity is still the calculus. China is spending billions cranking up its state media to go global, taking Mr Hu's message of "harmony" to a worldwide audience.
But the message of harmony will ring hollow abroad if it is secured by muzzling voices at home. Besides, there is now less goodwill to go around. A smile is fresh at first, but loses its charm if held for too long. One problem with China's smile diplomacy, says the man who coined the phrase, Shi Yinhong of Renmin University in Beijing, is that China's global impact—its demand for resources, its capacity to pollute—is so much greater than a decade ago. " For all we may smile, you can still smell us," he says.
That even applies in places, such as Africa, where enthusiasm for China was once unbounded. China has more than a presentational problem. For instance, it sends Africa both destabilising arms and peacekeepers, the one generating demand for the other. China's manufactures destroy local industries. Many Africans resent Chinese firms' deals with their unpleasant leaders and blame them when leaders pocket the proceeds. China's clout makes a mockery of two guiding tenets of its charm offensive: relations on the basis of equality; and non-interference.
That calls for a new diplomacy. China's presentational problems with the old one speak of an abiding lack of sophistication, and an attachment to a ritualistic diplomacy ill-suited to fast-moving negotiations, such as in Copenhagen, where the outcome is not pre-cooked. Over the case of Mr Shaikh, the official press indulged in the predictable and puerile ritual of railing about the historical indignity of the Opium War. Yet even many Chinese recognise that the world—and even drug-pushing British gunboat-diplomacy—has changed, and that it may be time to move on. Banyan demands that China correct its mistakes.
***Solvency ARGUMENTS
MUST END DEFENSE TREATY
Terminating the defense treaty is key to solve – the plan is necessary but not sufficient
Bandow 98 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance (Doug Bandow, “America’s Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Orbis, 42(4), Fall, Ebsco)
Whatever the ROK’s position, however, Washington should terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty and return to its noninterventionist roots, Seoul, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, and others in East Asia will always be prepared to fight “to the last American.” But Washington should risk the lives and wealth of its citizens only when interests fundamental to its own political community are at stake, lest American soldiers be reduced to the status of gambit pawns in somebody else’s chess game.
***DETERRENCE DA
1NC/2NC UNIQUENESS
U.S. presence is sustainable – committed to maintaining credible deterrence
Kellerhals, 10 (6/7/10, “Merle David Jr., Staff Writer, “Shangri-La Conference Highlights Asia-Pacific Security Concerns”, )
Washington -- Pursuing common interests in the Asia-Pacific region has increased common security even as the region contends with new and evolving challenges, says U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore June 5, Gates said the region faces challenges from rising powers and failing states, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, extremist violence and cyberthreats against the trade and commerce on which Asia's economic stability depends.
"Confronting these threats is not the task of any one nation acting alone. My government's overriding obligation to allies, partners and the region is to reaffirm America's security commitments in this region," Gates said.
The region's unprecedented economic growth and political development since the end of World War II was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, Gates said, it was enabled by clear choices and commitments to peace and stability. The region, he said, made commitments to open commerce; to a just international order and the rule of law; to open access to the sea, air, space and cyberspace; and to resolve conflict without force.
The United States, after considerable assessment by the Obama administration of the costs and risks in its national security strategy, is increasing its deterrent capabilities in a number of ways in the Asia-Pacific region. The first is developing missile defenses that are flexible and deployable to counter a growing ballistic missile threat, Gates said. The severest threat has come from efforts by North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them.
Gates said the United States is renewing its commitment to "a strong and effective deterrence" for the U.S. homeland and the defense of allies and partners across the region. While President Obama has pledged to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as these weapons exist.
Gates said that, as the United States has demonstrated for more than 60 years, the strength of the U.S. commitment and deterrent power in the Asia-Pacific region is expressed by the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region.
The U.S. defense posture in Asia is shifting to one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable, Gates said. This comes, he acknowledged, with a major build-up on Guam and with the agreement recently reached on basing with Japan. In particular Gates was referring to an agreement to relocate a Marine air station near Futenma to a less-populous area on Okinawa.
"It is important to note that we should not measure U.S. presence, and the associated impact and influence, solely in terms of conventional military bases," Gates told delegates to the ninth annual Asian security conference. "Rather, we must think more about U.S. presence in the broader sense of what we achieve in the region -- the connections made, the results accomplished."
Gates elaborated on the concept of U.S. presence to include everything from visiting military medical teams and civil engineering personnel to partner militaries training together to enhance capabilities for contributing to international security efforts.
"These kinds of activities reflect a priority of the overall United States security strategy: to prevent and deter conflict by better deploying and integrating all elements of our national power and international cooperation," Gates said. Deterring conflict includes sustained diplomatic, economic and cultural ties to maintain stability and improve relationships, he said.
Deterrence Now
Military exercises boosting deterrence
TendersInfo, 10 (6/7/10, “United States: US Defense Secretary Announces Plans for Joint South Korean Military Exercises, )
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says the United States will participate in combined military exercises with South Korea to counter North Korea's recent provocative military action. He made the announcement Saturday at an Asia security summit for defense ministers and intelligence officials in Singapore.
During his speech Saturday at an Asia Summit in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates again condemned North Korea's provocative military action in sinking a South Korean warship in March and killing 46 sailors. He said the incident is part of larger pattern of reckless behavior and that North Korea continues to undermine the peace and security of Asia.
"North Korea has for some time faced the choice of continuing as a destitute, international pariah, or charting a new path. Since then, the North Korean regime has only further isolated itself from the international community," he said.
North Korea has denied any involvement in the attack, but a multinational investigation team concluded that North Korea was responsible.
Gates promised continued U.S. support for South Korea and said the two nations will conduct joint military exercises in response to the sinking.
A2: N/U – Troop Reductions Now
Status quo does not involve any reduction in U.S. troops despite transfer of wartime OPCON
Yonhap, 10 (2/4/10, “U.S. commander says ‘no change’ in troop number in S. Korea,” Nationwide International News, lexis)
The number of U.S. troops in South Korea will remain unchanged after Seoul takes back the wartime operational control of its troops from Washington, the top U.S. commander here said Wednesday, strongly denying speculation of weakened U.S. military support after the transition.
"The U.S. troop numbers will stay the same as we fight side-by-side. The transition does not mean the United States will reduce its commitment," Gen. Walter Sharp told a group of graduating cadets of the Korea Military Academy. "We will never reduce our responsibility to defend Korea. It will always be our No. 1 responsibility."
The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) currently retains wartime operational control, or OPCON, over South Korea's military, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War, when the U.S. and South Korea fought against the North. Seoul, which is technically still at war with Pyongyang as their conflict ended in a truce rather than a peace treaty, is slated to take back OPCON on April 17, 2012.
The scheduled OPCON transfer has spawned concerns over a weakening of South Korea's defensive capabilities amid Pyongyang's continuing nuclear ambitions that led to an atomic test in 2006 and another in 2009.
The U.S. commander's remarks are in line with a statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who told a group of journalists in Seoul Wednesday that his government is seriously considering concerns in Korea and is willing to closely discuss the issue.
"We are doing a number of things right now," Sharp said. "We are developing one bilateral plan both countries will agree to ... and developing a list of capabilities our secretary of defense and (Seoul's Defense) Minister Kim Tae-young will agree to. One thing is the nuclear umbrella."
Sharp said that the "time has come for Korea to take on more responsibilities for the defense on the peninsula."
"This is the first responsibility for any nation to defend its own people," he said.
Minister Kim called the slated date of the OPCON transfer "bad timing" during a local defense forum last month, indicating the South Korean government may ask Washington to reschedule the transition.
Gen. Sharp added that there are four things the USFK must do: deter North Korea; rapidly carry out war plans in the case of attack from the North; engage with other partners in northeast Asia; and work together on overcoming global security issues with South Korea when the country's military is strong enough.
"The Korean military is an outstanding military that we are very proud to be serving side-by-side," he said. "Korea is helping to build up peace not only along the demilitarized zone, but in hot spots in many other places around the world."
A2: N/U – Restructuring
Restructuring of U.S. troops presence in South Korea will not jeopardize Korean security
Roehrig, 08 – Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence Roehrig, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Presence in Korea: Implications for Korean Security and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Academic Paper Series, )
For the United States, the withdrawal and relocation of U.S. troops have been important parts of its effort to transform the military, and U.S. military leaders are convinced that restructuring along with the transfer of wartime OPCON will not jeopardize Korean security. According to the USFK commander, Gen. Burwell B. Bell, the three ROK armies that defend the peninsula “are powerful fighting forces. They’re very, very capable.”33 Concerning the command transfer, General Bell noted that the ability to deter and defeat North Korea, if necessary, is the most important consideration “and nothing will be done, in transferring any command relationships, that jeopardizes that fundamental.”34
1nc Links
Withdrawal in the midst of Korean threats will send the wrong message to both adversaries and allies – spurring proliferation and global aggression
Facts on , 07 (8/7/07, "U.S.-South Korea Relations." Issues & Controversies On File: n. pag. Issues & Controversies. Facts On File News Services, )
Proponents maintain that the combination of a U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea and North Korean threats of nuclear proliferation would prompt other countries in the region to build up their own military capabilities to counter those of North Korea. South Korea and Japan, they say, might pursue nuclear programs of their own if they feel threatened. China might increase its missile capabilities in response, which in turn could lead its adversaries, such as Taiwan, to expand their own military options, supporters argue.
The absence of U.S. forces countering North Korea could increase the threat of military confrontation in the area and lead to a general trend of nuclear development, supporters warn. The U.S. military presence in South Korea, they say, provides a security guarantee to the region and helps keep the balance between competing powers. Removing U.S. forces could damage cohesion in the area, they argue. "To pull our troops out of South Korea would risk creating a leadership vacuum in the region and cause further destabilization," says William Cohen, who was secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton (D, 1993-2001).
Supporters contend that removing U.S. troops from the South could be seen as backing down from a confrontation with the North. Such a move might be seen around the world as a sign of weakness, they caution, which could embolden U.S. adversaries and encourage similarly aggressive and belligerent positions in other situations. That precedent would be especially dangerous when applied to nuclear proliferation, they argue.
"Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," says Kurt Campbell, former deputy assistant secretary of defense. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior."
Will cause Japan to nuclearize and embolden China against Taiwan
Dao, 03 (1/5/03, James, NY Times, “Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?” , JMP)
Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia.
"In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond."
In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said.
Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms.
"Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term."
"Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."
2nc Link Block
Our link outweighs – the plan will be read as weakness and embolden adversaries
Facts on , 07 (8/7/07, "U.S.-South Korea Relations." Issues & Controversies On File: n. pag. Issues & Controversies. Facts On File News Services, )
An absence of U.S. military power in the region, supporters argue, would also encourage other regional powers to increase their military forces in defense against the threat posed by North Korea. That, in turn, could cause other countries to arm themselves against potential threats, sparking an escalating arms race that could spread throughout the region and beyond, supporters contend. It is possible that one or more countries involved would soon develop nuclear weapons, they say.
Removing troops from South Korea would also be bad policy for the U.S., supporters argue. It would be taken as a sign of weakness, they contend, and a victory on the part of North Korea. Proponents argue that such a move would send a signal to others that aggressive behavior can be used to force the U.S. to back down.
Withdrawal will devastate U.S. military credibility, spur global aggression by adversaries
Henricks, 05 – Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., “Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments,” , JMP)
USFK Force Realignments Will Have Adverse Effects on U.S.-ROK Relations
Moving USFK military forces out of South Korea will have adverse effects on the U.S.-ROK alliance in the following areas: The ROK will consider the United States as having broken defense commitments; the ROK will be left vulnerable to attack due to lack of adequate military advancements; and the ROK will question the United States’ commitment of defense should North Korea attack.
ROK will consider the United States as having broken defense commitments. A significant factor to remember is that the Korean War has not officially ended. Even though there has been an “armed truce” which has been in place for over 50 years, withdrawing U.S. troops would be tantamount to leaving an ally on the battlefield to be run over by the enemy. “By deploying USFK in a forward area as a ‘tripwire’12 in order to defend and retaliate against the North Korean attack, the United States has successfully deterred North Korea’s attack.”13 Although this is an extreme picture of the U.S.-ROK alliance situation, it still deserves some consideration. “Abrogation of the U.S. security treaty with South Korea and abandonment of that long-standing ally…could seriously degrade the importance of military power as a U.S. foreign policy implement, undercut U.S. interests in national credibility, and perhaps encourage aggression against other U.S. friends around the world. Civil war on the Korean Peninsula probably would erupt. The Republic of Korea and Japan might feel needs to develop their own nuclear weapons.”14 The deterrence of North Korea and the defense of South Korea is firmly grounded in the presence of USFK military forces, for “…it is impossible to talk about the [U.S.-ROK] alliance without focusing on USFK.”15
2nc Link Block
U.S. military presence is key to deter a number of Asian conflicts – perception of decline will gut U.S. credibility
Auslin, 10– resident scholar at AEI (Michael, 3/17/10, “U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, , JMP)
Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Moreover, after the cataclysm of World War II, we have worked together to maintain stability in the western Pacific, throughout the Cold War and after. Without the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forward-based posture is untenable, particularly in a period of growing Chinese military power in which the acquisition of advanced weapons systems indicates increased vulnerability of U.S. forces over time.
There are over 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, and another 11,000 afloat as part of the 7th Fleet, while three-quarters of our military facilities are in Okinawa. Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the Pacific. Both Washington and Tokyo have revised the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the U.S. military in Japan to respond to local concerns over judicial access to U.S. service members, and domestic pressures to reduce Japan's $4 billion annual Host Nation Support (HNS) are a continuing feature of bilateral discussions. The new Japanese government has indicated its desire to consider further revision of SOFA and HNS, which portends continued, sometimes difficult negotiations between both sides, though I would be surprised by any significant changes in either.
It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American commitment to the region. From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.
A significant reduction of US forces is interpreted as a declining commitment to regional stability-ensures regional instability, proliferation, and lowering of power projection
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
As world events influence changes in U.S. interests, the objectives of the forward military presence in Korea already relate to more than just fulfilling a promise to the Korean nation and opposing North Korean aggression. Serious reduction of U.S. forces, or diplomatic and political activities, may be interpreted throughout Asia as a declining commitment to regional stability. After all, the United States maintains forces in Germany today, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and its threat more than ten years ago. In this region, with reliance on bilateral relationships, the effect of U.S. reduced effort in any way would be more profoundly felt. The time is ripe for the United States to lay a foundation and prepare for a future of opportunities, instead of waiting for the inevitable challenges. If the United States desires to protect its national interests in regard to Northeast Asian regional stability, ensure nuclear weapon nonproliferation, access to key markets and resources, and enhance force projection capabilities, the US must maintain a forward-based military presence in a unified Korea.
2nc Crushes U.S. Influence
Withdrawal will wreck U.S. influence
Kang & Cha, 03 – *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetown’s school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: The Korea Crisis,” , JMP)
“The United States Should Pull Its Troops Out of an Ungrateful South Korea”
Not yet. Massive demonstrations, Molotov cocktails hurled into U.S. bases, and American soldiers stabbed on the streets of Seoul have stoked anger in Congress and on the op-ed pages of major newspapers about South Korea. As North Korea appears on the nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the groundswell of anti-Americanism. They cringe at a younger generation of Koreans who tell cbs television’s investigative program 60 Minutes that Bush is more threatening than Kim, and they worry about reports that South Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun, was avowedly anti-American in his younger days.
Most Koreans have complicated feelings about the United States. Some of them are anti-American, to be sure, but many are grateful. South Korea has historically been one of the strongest allies of the United States. Yet it would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South Koreans about U.S. policy and the continued presence of U.S. forces as merely emotional. Imagine, for example, how Washingtonians might feel about the concrete economic impact of thousands of foreign soldiers monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the nation’s capital, as U.S. forces do in Seoul.
But hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces is hardly the answer to such trans-Pacific anxiety, particularly as the U.S.–South Korean alliance enters uncharted territory. The North Koreans would claim victory, and the United States would lose influence in one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world—an outcome it neither wants nor can afford. In the long term, such a withdrawal would also pave the way for Chinese regional dominance. Some South Koreans might welcome a larger role for China—a romantic and uninformed notion at best. Betting on China, after all, did not make South Korea the 12th largest economy and one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world.
The alternatives to the alliance are not appealing to either South Koreans or Americans. Seoul would have to boost its relatively low level of defense spending (which, at roughly 3 percent of gross domestic product, is less than that of Israel and Saudi Arabia, for example). Washington would run the risk of jeopardizing its military presence across East Asia, as a U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula raised questions about the raison d’être for keeping its troops in Japan. A revision in the U.S. military presence in Korea is likely within the next five years, but withdrawal of that presence and abrogation of its alliance are not.
2nc Plan Causes Withdrawal from Japan
Withdrawing troops from South Korea will encourage Japanese nuclearization
Campbell & Sunohara, 04 – senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** visiting fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, “9. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP)
Even the recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense, under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to revise America’s global military posture have engendered anxiety in Japan and other countries. For example, when it became known that the Pentagon was considering withdrawing some U.S. military forces from South Korea, some South Korean officials indicated they were losing confidence in the U.S. security commitment to their country.78 Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned that such actions could trigger not only Seoul but also Tokyo to consider a nuclear weapons option: “Conceivably, if we withdraw from South Korea, then South Korea either will have to defend itself somehow, in which case it may need nuclear weapons, and that would certainly further intensify pressure on Japan to respond.”79
Withdrawal from South Korea will cause escalatory war and devastate U.S. influence across Asia and lead to pullout from Japan
Eberstadt, 02 – political economist who holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the AEI and is Senior Adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research (10/1/02, Nicholas, The National Interest, “Our Other Korea Problem,” , JMP)
An American troop withdrawal from Korea, or the downgrading of the U.S. presence into a peacekeeping force, would generate far-reaching reverberations-though some U.S. analysts favor such a course of events. One such reverberation would concern the future of U.S. forward bases in Japan. For Japan to be the only East Asian state hosting U.S. troops, this on top of the continuing controversy in Japanese domestic politics with regard to Okinawa, might be hard to sustain for long. Thus, an American military pullout from South Korea, far from leading to a bolstering of U.S. forces elsewhere in East Asia, might trigger a major diminution of American influence in the Pacific.
The worst of all outcomes would be a politically rancorous American withdrawal from Korea at a time when a highly armed North Korean state fronting an effective charm offensive saw opportunities to further its old ambition-the re-unification of the peninsula under its aegis. Those particulars could all too easily set the stage for a potentially devastating conflict in Korea, with spillover potential to other major powers.
But even presuming genuine rapprochement between North and South and some measure of stability in Korea, an American withdrawal from Korea would still create a security vacuum and invite a latter-day version of the Great Game of realpolitik the Pacific powers played so roughly in the region a century ago. A U.S. military withdrawal from Korea might be welcomed in Moscow or Beijing, but, in truth, both are ambivalent about the departure of the American military presence in Korea. In public they support U.S. withdrawal, but privately they recognize that Northeast Asia would be a less stable neighborhood-and a region less disposed to economic growth-without the U.S. military presence. Although any losses-in terms of diminished economic potential and reduced national security-would be distributed unevenly in the region, all the Pacific powers and South Korea would lose from an end to the U.S.-ROK military alliance and the U.S.-dominated security order in East Asia. Of all the political actors in East Asia, only the DPRK-the region's lone radical revisionist state-could reasonably expect any benefits.
Withdrawal from Korea will force pullout from Japan – risks nuclearization
Campbell & Sunohara, 04 – senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** visiting fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, “9. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP)
Domestic Factors
As the only people to have had a nuclear weapon used against them, the Japanese have long maintained a pacifist stance when it comes to nuclear and military issues. Even with the current debate regarding constitutional reform and Japan’s becoming a normal state (that is, remilitarizing), the Japanese public has not lessened its resistance to an independent nuclear capability. The depth of this antinuclear sentiment is such that only major changes in the international or domestic environment, and probably only a combination of such changes, could engender a domestic political environment more permissive toward Japan’s acquiring nuclear weapons.
Domestic factors do exist, however, that could lead to such a development. For example, although broadly supportive of the Japanese-American alliance, the Japanese people have expressed discontent with some of its manifestations. A substantial portion of the Japanese public, for instance, opposes the American military presence in Japan and would like to see it much reduced or even eliminated entirely. Such feelings are especially prevalent on the island of Okinawa, where the American military occupies approximately one-sixth of the island and American troops repeatedly behave improperly in the eyes of the local population.
This sentiment could very well increase if the United States continues with its plans to integrate its East Asian military bases more deeply into the global war on terror (thereby making the bases in particular and Japan in general more likely terrorist targets) and sustains unpopular American military operations in the Middle East.84 Likewise, should U.S. forces have to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula as a result of a decision by the government of either South Korea or a newly reunified Korea, the Japanese government would find it hard to justify Japan’s becoming the sole Asian country hosting American military bases. However, if Washington carried out a major reduction in the U.S. military presence without sufficient consultation with or approval of the Japanese government, it could be an inducement for Japanese leaders to reconsider a nuclear weapons option.
2nc Ground Forces Key
Withdrawing only ground troops weakens U.S. commitment to the Korean peninsula and harms U.S.-China relations
Kim 99 - Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (Sung-Han Kim, “Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research Agenda,” The University of California at San Diego, 5/26-27/99, .)
Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw its ground troops from Korea leaving behind only naval and air force units in a unified Korea. This may well be an approach by which Washington would retain its existing role of ensuring regional security while at the same time enjoying increased flexibility. Seen from the standpoint of the United States, this option is compatible with the policy of ensuring safe passage in the Pacific, while avoiding possible criticism of infringing upon the sovereignty of Korea that may be raised over a continued presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea, in addition to checking the emergence of hegemonic activity in the region.
Nevertheless, a drawback of this scenario is that in light of its lack of ground forces, the U.S. commitment to "automatic involvement" in any development on the Korean peninsula would be seen as considerably weakened. The presence of ground troops constitutes the clearest evidence of the political determination of the United States. Therefore, if Washington's political commitment appears diminished due to the withdrawal of all but its naval and air forces, the effectiveness of U.S. forces in Japan would also decline markedly. Moreover, if the United States were to maintain naval forces along Korea's west coast across from the Chinese coastal territory, Beijing would likely react sensitively, a factor which could harm U.S.-China relations.
Permanently stationing ground troops is key to deterrence – uniquely signals U.S. commitment and boosts credibility of the nuclear umbrella
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,” , JMP)
Forward Deployments
The forward presence of U.S. military forces has value for deterrence and assurance that is well recognized. Forces routinely deployed on or near the territory of an ally not only, or even primarily, augment the armed strength of that country, but also serve as a concrete and continuing reminder that the United States has a strong interest in its security and will fight in its defense. Permanently stationed ground forces, in particular, seem to have an assurance effect not duplicated by temporary deployments (port calls to show the flag, for example), probably because they are unlikely to be withdrawn overnight and often are positioned where they will be directly engaged by an enemy attack, thus ensuring U.S. involvement in a conflict. The likelihood, if not certainty, that U.S. forces would be engaged in a conflict can lend credibility to an associated nuclear guarantee. If forward deployments include U.S. nuclear weapons, those arms themselves offer a tangible assurance that the ally is covered by the nuclear umbrella.
The United States has deployed general purpose forces in South Korea for more than a half century. From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, the U.S. troop level in the ROK was 60,000-70,000. During the Vietnam War, in line with his “Guam Doctrine” to make U.S. allies in Asia shoulder more of the defense burden, President Nixon ordered the withdrawal of some 18,000 troops from South Korea, reducing the total there to 43,000. In the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter pledged to pull out all U.S. ground forces from South Korea, but as president removed only a token number (roughly 3,000 troops). The Carter cut subsequently was reversed by President Reagan to bolster the U.S. commitment to the ROK. As part of the post-Cold War retraction of American forces from overseas deployments, President George H.W. Bush ordered the troop level in South Korea reduced to 36,000 and then suspended further withdrawals in light of concern about the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The U.S. force on the peninsula increased slightly and stabilized at somewhat more than 37,000 during the Clinton administration. Between 2004 and 2006, as a result of the Global Posture Review conducted by the George W. Bush administration, the number of troops dropped to 28,500, where it remains today.54 At this level, South Korea is the country with the third largest peacetime deployment of American troops, behind only Germany (54,000) and Japan (33,000).55 One South Korean observer cites this ranking as an indication of the high priority the United States assigns to the defense of the ROK.56 According to an opinion survey conducted in early 2008, most South Koreans (70 percent) see the overall U.S. military presence in East Asia as contributing to regional stability.57
Link Extensions
Total withdrawal of U.S. forces reduces commitment to deterrence and risks war especially in a time of tensions
Davino 04 – Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Administration of the United States Pacific Command (Michael F. Davino, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” Strategy Research Project, 3/15/04, )
Although the region’s economy and the support we receive from our allies are important, the major reason for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region, particularly in South Korea, is as a deterrent to the DPRK. “North Korea poses many problems, of which its two nuclear programmes – the main worry of the moment – are just the start. Also alarming are its missile development and proliferation [and] its chemical and biological warfare capacity….” 21 Northeast Asia therefore, is a critical region in the struggle against proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Our national security strategy requires that “we must be able to stop rogue states before they are able to …use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.”22 Both the PRC and Russia are nuclear powers, it is likely that the DPRK has several nuclear weapons, and the ROK and Japan are clearly capable of developing them. However, the presence of U.S. forces in the region and the implied willingness of the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan, has been enough to keep them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region, at a time when tensions over the North Korean nuclear program are increasing, would risk sending the wrong message to both our allies and the North Koreans.
U.S. Presence Prevents Allied Prolif
U.S. presence key to non-proliferation and trade – prevents South Korea and Japan nuclearization
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
The U.S. will continue to maintain vital interests in the region and retain a credible military presence to protect them. U.S. vital interests in the Asia Pacific region include increased foreign trade, a key component to continued U.S. prosperity. Currently, U.S. trade with Asia far exceeds trade with Europe representing thirty percent of all U.S. exports and millions of domestic jobs.48 The U.S. will continue to honor treaty obligations with Korea and Japan and seek to maintain open navigation and security of the strategic sea lanes in the region. Maintaining alliances and remaining engaged in the region is important to a successful nonproliferation strategy. Failure to successfully mediate the current North Korean nuclear crisis and maintain a balance of power in the region may result in South Korea and Japan pursuing WMD.
Withdrawal => Withdrawal from Japan
US withdrawal from South Korea would lead to withdrawal form Japan
JIR, 01 (6/2/01, Jane’s Intelligence Review, “A US military presence in Asia: offshore balancer or local sheriff?”. cns.miis.edu/pubs/eanp/sheriff.pdf)
Korean reunification
The gradual improvement in North-South Korean relations and the possibility of reunif- ication have important implications for the US military presence on the Korean penin- sula and in Asia at large. If North and South Korea reunify will US troops stay and, if so, at what level?
Views in the region differ. The leaders of the ROK and the DPRK have called for US troops to stay. Their reluctance to see US troops depart is tied to concerns over the fact that they are sandwiched between sev- eral large powers including China, Russia, Japan and the USA. There are fears about the creation of a power vacuum.
However, if reunification occurred, the direction of South Korean public opinion is unclear and leaders in Seoul might not be able to resist the popular sentiment in favour of US withdrawal. The South Korean public has been increasingly displeased with US troop presence and reunification will lead to either/both an official or unofficial reassessment of US troop presence.
Many within Washington and Tokyo are becoming increasingly concerned that if the US leaves the Korean peninsula this will put pressure on Japan as the single largest military base of operation in Asia. Such a development could spark a similar public debate in Japan, leading to calls for a reduction or withdrawal from Japan, especially if Japan’s recession persists. There are already reports indicating that consideration of reduced or even withdrawn US ground forces in Japan and the ROK is under review in Washington.
Continued US military presence in Korea may be seen by Beijing as being directed at China. Beijing’s current tacit acceptance of
regional politics among China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas.
China and the USA hold opposite views about the benefits of alliances and about the structure of Asian security. Chinese officials persistently call for the USA to abandon its military alliances as the centrepiece of its military strategy in Asia. Beijing views these as a means to contain China and to dominate the Asia-Pacific theatre.
US TMD programmes in Asia raise similar concerns in Beijing. These contrasting vis- ions between the USA and China of alliance and regional security suggest the emer- gence of a competition for influence bet- ween Beijing and Washington in the Asian theatre. China will look for every oppor- tunity to limit US influence and weaken US alliances in Asia.
The challenges to the USA’s military presence in Asia will come from the changing regional politics among China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas.
the USA on the peninsula is both an accep- tance of the historical legacy of the Korean War and recognition of the usefulness of the USA in maintaining a balance in a situation in which Korea is still divided. However, reunification changes this calculation. Bei- jing will likely view troops in Korea as a way for the USA to position itself as a regional hegemon in an effort to limit China’s free- dom of movement in Asia. China has already officially suggested that US troops depart after reunification.
Such concerns on the part of Beijing could have a spill-over influence on other regional security issues. US-Japan and US-Taiwan defence ties will begin to have direct bearing on Sino-US relations as Beijing comes to view both of these as part of a broader regional strategy to contain and limit China’s role as a regional power.
A2: Turn – Withdrawal => Regionalism
Withdrawal will cause a power vacuum and force allies to go nuclear
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
In the second scenario, a U.S. retreat into isolationism (perhaps following withdrawal leading to a self-inflicted defeat in Afghanistan) or accelerated material decline (perhaps induced by failure to reverse America’s alarming levels of national debt)— perhaps toxically combined with reduced U.S. defense expenditures and/or political leaders unwilling to rally the American public for a continued leadership role in world affairs—would induce the weakening of Washington’s alliance commitments in East Asia and its willingness to remain the region’s security guarantor. Such a regional order that was “ripe for rivalry” would resemble that forecast by American strategists after the Cold War, when an American withdrawal from the region and raw balancing behavior in the midst of dynamic power shifts seemed likely to make “Asia’s future look like Europe’s [conflict-prone] past.”7
Such a balance-of-power order would feature self-help behavior by Asian states of the kind that has been mitigated to date by American defense commitments. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan might develop and deploy nuclear weapons as the only means of securing their autonomy and defense against the Chinese military giant in their midst (and additionally, in South Korea’s case, against a Japanese neighbor of whom Seoul historically has been equally wary). Chinese leaders might find themselves free to pursue their declared revisionist aims in the South China Sea, no longer constrained by America’s Seventh Fleet and robust alliance network, while lesser Asian states whose territorial claims conflict with China’s would find they had less ability to leverage a less-engaged America’s support in their favor.
A2: Navy / Air Force Solves
It would take days to relocate troops
Dao, 03 (1/5/03, James, NY Times, “Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?” , JMP)
In addition, the United States is creating a base for four submarines in Guam and has a maintenance and logistics base in Singapore. The United States Pacific Command is headquartered in Hawaii. From those bases, American warplanes could reach South Korea in hours. But it would take days for an armada of warships or troop carriers to arrive from Japan.
Adm. Dennis Blair, now retired, who commanded American forces in the Pacific until last year, argues that even if the threat from North Korea dissipates, the United States should keep forces on the peninsula in case of crises in other parts of Asia. "A soldier, marine or sailor in Korea or Japan was much more useful than one in Hawaii or San Diego, just because of the sailing time it takes to get then across the Pacific," he said.
Takes weeks to deploy naval forces – ground troops key to check escalation
Henricks, 05 – Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., “Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments,” , JMP)
Another consideration is deployment time to the Korean Peninsula should the DPRK decide to provoke USFK forces at the DMZ. When The People’s Republic of China (PRC) tested short-range ballistic missiles near Taiwan in 1995/6, the United States responded by dispatching a pair of aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. It took on the order of two weeks to get these warships into the area.22 With the current operations tempo of the U.S. armed forces, a two-week response time to the Korean Peninsula would most likely be a best-case scenario.
The wars in which the U.S. military fights today (such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom) testify to the need for large numbers of ground troops and ground troop support to accomplish the mission. Technological advances in military hardware in and of themselves cannot win wars and keep the peace. A war on the Korean Peninsula would not be different in this respect. The proximity of Seoul, South Korea to the DMZ (approximately 25 miles) provides another reason for a robust USFK troop presence to keep the DPRK from provoking hostilities at the DMZ. One author even noted, “Korea is a country where the decisive military arm is likely to be the infantry if it is adequately backed by mortar and artillery fire and close air support.”23
Terrorism Impact – 2nc
U.S. forces in Korea are key to deterrence and the war on terror
Colonel Stevens, 06 (3/15/06, Colonel Wayne Stevens, “Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” , JMP)
If war breaks out on the peninsula, the ROK will most likely require considerably more than 34,000 U.S. troops to assist.87 The need for U.S. forces within Northeast Asia capable of rapidly deploying from within the region instead of from the U.S. will enhance the ROK’s ability to stop DPRK’s aggression quickly. The joint and flexible capabilities of the U.S. forces such as air superiority, precision guided missiles, and BCTs that are more capable of independent action and more responsive to regional combatant commanders can give the ROK forces a distinctive edge during combat operations and ensure the U.S. strategic focus of maintaining stability within the region.88
Some have argued for removing or reducing the U.S. forces on the peninsula because DPRK’s nuclear capability negates the need for U.S. conventional forces in the South.89 Despite the lack of conclusive proof that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons; the DPRK may find it harder to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons. North Korea already admitted that they are conducting a nuclear weapons program and the North has extracted spent fuel and reprocessed the fuel into weapons-grade plutonium.90 Although the nuclear argument may have some validity, a major U.S. concern is the need to have forward deployed basing to allow U.S. forces to project its military power. The forces in the ROK provide the U.S. with the capability to continue its deterrence mission and also to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on foreign soil before it reaches the U.S.91
The impact is extinction
Sid-Ahmed, 4 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, )
A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody.
So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded.
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.
But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
And, retaliation causes nuclear war
Corsi, 5 – PhD in political science from Harvard. (Jerome, excerpt from Atomic Iran, )
The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy – Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another.
North Korean Invasion Impact – 1nc/2nc
Withdrawal will cause North Korea invasion of Seoul – even the libertarians agree
Huessy, 03 – Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, “Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers,” , JMP)
However, Carpenter has long advocated a unilateral withdrawal of our U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea, under the guise of arguing that such a reduction of U.S. forces would save tax-payer dollars, as well as U.S. lives, should there be an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
In fact, Carpenter, in conversations I have had with him, readily agrees that a U.S. withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula might very well precipitate an invasion by the communists in the North with the aim of quickly capturing Seoul and then suing for peace in an agreement that would eventually give control over a unified country to the communists.
Apart from the fact that U.S. forces withdrawn from the ROK would be redeployed elsewhere in the U.S. and thus save the U.S. taxpayers nothing and given that U.S. military forces deployed overseas and at home have declined by over 1 million soldiers since the end of the Cold War, a withdrawal from the ROK by the United States would do nothing except cause another Korean War, kill millions of Korean civilians and soldiers and place in danger the ability of Japan to maintain its economy in the face of a Korean Peninsula in communist hands. As every Commander of U.S. forces in Korea since 1979 has told Congress in public testimony, Japan is not defensible if Korea is taken by the communists. A blockade of trade routes to and from Japan would become a realistic weapon in the hands of the PRC, not dissimilar to a blockade of Taiwan by the PRC portrayed by Patrick Robinson in Kilo Class.
Will escalate to global nuclear war
Huessy, 03 – Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, “Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers,” , JMP)
It may be wishful thinking, but I believe China has the ability to help shape the future in the region in a positive way. For the U.S. to withdraw from the ROK, as proposed by Carpenter, might very well initiate not only another Korean War but also possibly another World War. When I lived in Seoul and attended Yonsei University in 1969-70, my Korean father and Yonsei professor, Hahm Pyong Choon, later to become Ambassador to the United States and national security adviser to the President of the Republic of Korea, told me there were always those who sought to purchase liberty and freedom on the cheap. At an embassy reception in Washington, he reminded me what he had told me in class: “Those on the left think you are imperialists; those on the right do not want to spend the money”.
In 1985, the communists planted bombs in Burma where the ROK cabinet was meeting. Professor Hahm was killed by the very same North Korean communists whom wish to see the withdrawal of American forces from the region. To save a few dollars, however unintentionally, we might end up the North Korean army in downtown Seoul. Certainly, armed with nuclear weapons, the North will be difficult at best to deter from such an attack. To the people of the Republic of Korea: America will not leave, we will not run, we will not forget the extraordinary sacrifices we both have made to secure the freedom of your country and ours. This is the basis for the Bush Administration’s strategy, and with that sufficient reason it should be supported.
A2: ROK Can Defend Itself
Fiscal constraints preventing South Korea defense upgrades
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,”
, JMP)
Seoul instead sees other means, both diplomatic and military, of dealing with the North Korean nuclear danger. On the diplomatic front, there are the talks, sanctions, and inducements intended to convince Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons capabilities. The military response likewise involves multiple measures. Two weeks after the first North Korean nuclear test, Gen. Lee Sang-hee, then-chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a directive to the chiefs setting forth a three-part approach to the new threat: deterrence of nuclear aggression; precision strikes against enemy nuclear facilities; and defense against nuclear attack.80 For deterrence, Seoul will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. That guarantee, according to South Korean sources, is backed by nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missiles on attack submarines, nuclear cruise missiles or free-fall bombs on B-52H or B-2 long-range bombers, or nuclear bombs on shorter-range F-15E or F-16 strike aircraft.81 If deterrence fails, the ROK military expects to detect indications that a North Korean nuclear attack is imminent and then conduct preemptive air and missile strikes against nuclear-related targets.82 For this purpose, the military plans to acquire improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (airborne and ground-based early warning radar and Global Hawk drones),83 upgraded strike aircraft (F-15Ks),84 precision-guided munitions (Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, and laser-guided penetrating bombs),85 and longer-range missiles (the 1,000km Hyunmu 3 cruise missile and a 500-km ballistic missile now in research and development).86 To counter North Korean nuclear missiles that escape destruction on the ground, additional active defenses (Aegis-equipped destroyers and advanced Patriot batteries) will be deployed.87 Implementation of the ambitious second and third parts of the approach (precision-strike capabilities and defenses) has been hampered by fiscal constraints on the ROK defense budget.88 The central importance of the first part, the U.S. nuclear guarantee, is evident in the previously discussed South Korean efforts to underscore and understand more fully that commitment.
South Korea can’t afford to replace U.S. ISR capabilities which are key to defense
Henricks, 05 – Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., “Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments,” , JMP)
South Korea’s Strong Economic Development Enhances its Ability to Defend Itself
The South Korean economy has undergone tremendous growth over the past several years. It is fast becoming an economic stronghold in the Pacific-Asian arena. Due in part to their strong economy, “ROK forces are undergoing modernization and improvements in many key areas through indigenous weapons production, co-production, and procurement through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and direct commercial channels.”25 However, this modernization will take several years, even decades, and cannot be realistically relied upon to cover current vulnerabilities caused by prospective USFK force realignments. Additionally, the issue of cost sharing with the U.S. for the U.S.-ROK alliance has been raised due to the strong South Korean economy. “Economic success makes it possible for the ROK to share a larger portion of security-related costs on the Korean Peninsula. However, it must be noted that these contributions come while the ROK is also modernizing its force structure, establishing a more modern command and control system, improving the quality of life for its armed forces, and experience increasing political pressures to expand spending on domestic programs.”26 However, a South Korean author cautions that, “The U.S. advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are an essential part of defending South Korea should deterrence fail. Its ISR assets are estimated to cost $15 billion, which [the] South Korean economy could not afford as of today in the short run.”27 Therefore, despite a strong and growing economy, the ROK is not currently in a position to absorb the costs associated with the current prospective USFK troop withdrawals. 25
Advanced weaponry and air defenses not in place and ROK must still train troops
Henricks, 05 – Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., “Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments,” , JMP)
The ROK will be left vulnerable to attack due to lack of adequate military advancements. A main consideration regarding moving USFK troops out of the ROK is that what USFK will lack in numbers of troops will be made up in advanced military technology. However, the question needs to be addressed as to when that military technology will arrive on the Korean Peninsula. As of yet, USFK has not put in place advanced weaponry and air defenses necessary to adequately defend against the massive DPRK forces, artillery, and short-range missiles. “The recent relocation of USFK [forces] from forward areas to rear areas is based upon the premise that this will not reduce U.S. deterrent power because the mobilization speed and superiority of U.S. precision-guided weaponry will compensate for the increased distance from North Korea’s front line. However, South Koreans are concerned about the possibility that the United States might reduce its deterrent power for South Korea to defend Seoul in the initial stage of war.”16 With a very robust economic growth in recent years, South Korea has gained the ability to take significant steps in growing and modernizing their own military capabilities, diminishing the need for a large U.S. military presence. However, there are critical technologies that are essential to the defense of their country that the ROK lacks at this time that will take several years to put in place. Additionally, the USFK must take into account not only placing advanced military technology in the ROK, but also the training time necessary to bring ROK forces up to minimum proficiency levels to operate such technology. “If the United States were to reposition the 2nd ID’s [USFK 2nd Infantry Division] assets, it would not be certain whether South Korea could successfully defend itself at an early stage of a second Korean war.”17
***U.S.-ROK Alliance DA
U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE DA – 1NC
U.S. ground forces key to maintain a credible nuclear guarantee for Seoul
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,” , JMP)
Forward deployment of forces, then, is one of the principal ways in which the United States assures the South Koreans of its commitment to their defense. Forward-deployed forces are the embodiment of that commitment and the mechanism by which the United States would become engaged in any new Korean war. In certain circumstances, the direct engagement of American conventional forces in such a conflict could increase the prospect of U.S. nuclear use. This connection reinforces the nuclear guarantee to Seoul. For these purposes, the presence of some not-insignificant U.S. ground force in South Korea is more important than the specific number of troops or their disposition. While U.S. nuclear weapons in the past were forward deployed in South Korea, a nuclear presence on the peninsula has not been essential to the nuclear guarantee.
Prevents South Korean prolif
Hughes, 2007
[Christopher W., PhD University of Sheffield, 1997, Reader/Associate Professor, University of Warwick. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” January, Asia Policy No 3, ]
South Korea’s history of considering its nuclear options closely corresponds with and demonstrates well the four principal drivers governing the potential for nuclear proliferation. The national security consideration has clearly been paramount for South Korea. Its geographical situation at the intersection of the security interests of the major powers in Northeast Asia presents South Korea with a number of long-term security and related alliance dilemmas. During the Cold War, the most pressing of these security dilemmas was obviously the confrontation with North Korea, and Seoul, lacking confidence in its own national resource constraints to deter Pyongyang, turned to U.S. alliance conventional and nuclear security guarantees. Consequently, the possibility of the alliance dilemma of U.S. abandonment was what formed the prime driver for South Korea’s first attempt at acquiring nuclear weapons. South Korea’s perception of declining U.S. implacability in the face of North Korea provocations in the late 1960s, U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s, and U.S. plans to scale back its troop deployments (under the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations) all galvanized President Park to begin to seek nuclear weapons. Park was only dissuaded from this option by U.S. threats to cease security and economic guarantees altogether. South Korea was then forced to return to the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the absence of its own deterrent, thus enabling the reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees.54
Escalates to global nuclear war
Cirincione, 2000 – Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Spring 2000, Joseph, Foreign Policy, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain”, JStor)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
U.S.-ROK Relations Good
US-Korea relations at a historical high-recent Obama troop proves
Cha 10 – Senior Adviser and Korea Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Victor Cha, “The New Old Reliable,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/13/10, )
The final quarter of 2009 included a number of significant developments in US-Korea ties. President Barack Obama made his first trip to Seoul in November, and Special Envoy for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth traveled to Pyongyang in December. The summit between Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak marked the continuation of an historical high in relations between the two countries. On issues affecting the alliance, Obama and Lee found common ground on North Korea, while they inched forward with the Korea-US free trade agreement. Meanwhile, Bosworth’s three days of talks with North Korean officials brought the most encouraging signs of a return to the six-party process since talks broke down at the end of 2008. The Obama administration is faring well on the Korean Peninsula, even as relations with other major powers of the region become more complicated. Those accompanying Obama on his trip to Asia informally acknowledged that Korea was the "best stop" on the trip and sensed a personal connection between the two leaders.
2nc Link Block
U.S. forces are key to maintain a health alliance even if they aren’t key to deterrence
Feffer ’05 – co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. (10/3/2005, John, “The Future of U.S.-South Korean Security Relations” )
Finally, the United States and South Korea must grapple with issues related to U.S. ground forces. In 2004, the Bush administration announced a one-third reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. Over and above its political dimensions, this decision directly stems from a much longer process of force restructuring. The Pentagon’s assessment is essentially correct that troops in fixed positions with slow-moving tanks fight yesterday’s wars. U.S. deterrent capacity largely resides in firepower based outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet in Japan. But this reality raises provocative questions. Do U.S. forces in Korea serve only a symbolic rather than a deterrent function? And why didn’t the Bush administration consider troop reductions as a bargaining chip in negotiations with North Korea? Several studies suggest that South Korea could repulse an attack by North Korea without U.S. support. This should come as no surprise, since the South has been outspending the North in the military sphere by a factor of two since 1990. The North Korean military has been adversely affected by food shortages, energy shortages, and spare part shortages, and North Korea’s military has not kept pace with the latest technological developments. Les Aspin, former U.S. secretary of defense, has estimated that South Korea’s military strength represented 60% of the coalition forces arrayed against Iraq in the first Gulf War while North Korea’s represented 60% of the total Iraqi offensive force at that time. And we all know the results of that unequal fight, even though Iraq, unlike North Korea, was a relatively prosperous oil-rich country. No one should underestimate North Korea’s ability to destroy Seoul with an artillery barrage or the North Korean military’s ability to fight against an invader. However, North Korea’s capacity for launching a conventional attack with troops and tanks is no longer the threat it was 50 or even 20 years ago, and it is this conventional type of attack that U.S. forces are prepared to counteract.But if U.S. forces stationed in Korea have largely lost their specific deterrent function, they still serve other roles. The South Korean government values the U.S. military presence as a concrete sign of alliance health and U.S. commitment to its defense, even if that defense would be largely undertaken by forces based outside the peninsula. And North Korean leaders, it has been reported, are not opposed to a U.S. military presence even after unification--perhaps in a peacekeeping capacity--as an insurance policy against revived Japanese militarism. Moreover, there is the question of the impact that future U.S. troop reductions could have on investor confidence in South Korea.
The stance of changing presence is irrelevant – any restructuring is perceived as the US acting unilaterally to weaken its commitment to the alliance – such perceptions determine the future of the relationship
Hwang ’04 – is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (12/21/2004, Balbina, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations”, )
Nevertheless, perceptions matter in foreign policy, and both Washington and Seoul should pay heed to the changing environments in both countries. Various components of the leadership in both countries have been making concerted efforts to adjust the formal details of the alliance to reinvigorate the relationship and improve its efficiency. For example, as part of the Department of Defense's Global Posture Review, the Pentagon and the ROK Defense Ministry have been discussing the future of the alliance with the object of implementing needed changes to the U.S. force structure on the Korean peninsula. As part of the plan to increase the efficiency and efficacy of the alliance and the U.S. defense commitment, they have agreed to a gradual drawdown and repositioning of U.S. forces on the peninsula. While both governments wholeheartedly agree on the positive benefits of restructuring, public misperception, particularly among South Koreans, has undermined these efforts. Restructuring has been falsely characterized as a unilateral move by Washington, indicating either a reduction of U.S. commitment or preparation for a sudden attack on North Korea. In reality, such changes to the alliance structure actually strengthen the American commitment to the ROK's defense, as evidenced by the U.S. pledge of $11 billion over the next 10 years for joint development of the ROK military. Regrettably, such misperceptions undermine the strength of the alliance, just when full cooperation and a combined show of strength are critical to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem peacefully. Although some critics argue that Washington should postpone-if not abandon-efforts to restructure the alliance during this particularly tense time with North Korea, the uncertainties caused by North Korea make improving the alliance even more urgent. Moreover, given the perennial nature of the North Korean threat, there may never be a good time-much less a better time- for restructuring. Both Washington and Seoul must focus on bridging the gap in public attitudes toward the future of the alliance. The alliance has served the interests of both countries for the past half century and will continue to do so in the future if current misgivings are overcome. President Roh and the South Korean leadership should reassess their priorities and-given how much South Korean and regional security depends on the alliance-make every effort to lead their country toward a positive and enthusiastic embrace of the relationship. President Bush and his Administration should work toward understanding the immense changes that have occurred in South Korea and exhibit greater sensitivity to South Korean concerns. Both sides need to commit to improving dialogue and communication across all levels of the government and society if the alliance is to thrive and prosper.
2nc Link Block
Withdrawal will crush U.S.-South Korean relations and the erode deterrence versus North Korea
Dujarric, 04 – Visiting Scholar at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (7/12/04, International Herald Tribune, “Japan's Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea,” , JMP)
Though it is possible that these moves will be reversed, as things change right now the United States is poised to permanently downgrade its presence on the Korean Peninsula.
If these changes do take place, they will have a dramatic impact on Japan.
The Seoul-Washington military relationship is a critical element of the ties that bind South Korea to the United States. A decline in the U.S. presence on the peninsula will weaken the alliance between Seoul and Washington. The militaries of the two countries will stop enjoying the close relationship that a large U.S. presence creates and South Koreans will doubt the credibility of the American commitment.
The U.S. ability to influence South Korea will decline while the South Korean capacity to make itself heard in Washington will also diminish. American deterrence will also decline.
A North Korean attack is unlikely but one must be ready for low-probability events. North Korea will interpret the U.S. move as a sign that the United States does not care about North Korea. Moreover, as events in Iraq have demonstrated, heavy ground forces are still very relevant to fighting a war. A USFK shorn of most of its army forces will be less potent.
Lack of consultation will wreck the credibility of U.S. security assurances and spur allied nuclearization
Campbell & Einhorn, 04 – senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, armscontrol, and other national security issues (Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, “12. Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations,” ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP)
However, bolstering the confidence of nuclear abstainers in the reliability of U.S. security assurances requires more than tangible support. It is essential, especially as the United States transforms its worldwide force structure, that Washington go out of its way to consult closely with friends and allies whose interests are affected to explain the rationale for the adjustments, to accommodate any requests that it reasonably can, and to demonstrate that the changes do not erode the U.S. security commitment. In the case of the repositioning of U.S. forces in Korea, more harm was done to U.S.-South Korean alliance relations by the peremptory manner in which decisions made in Washington were presented to the Korean allies than by the content or even the timing of the moves.
In dealing with the abstainers, the United States should not wait until the specter of nuclear reconsideration arises. It should instead anticipate possible problems and try to head them off with preventative diplomacy. In anticipation of the unwelcome prospect that North Korea will persist in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, the United States should begin consulting privately now with its South Korean and Japanese allies on how to cope with that contingency without them having to acquire independent nuclear deterrent capabilities. Similarly, discreet discussions should be held with Seoul about the possibility that a nuclear-armed North Korea would some day collapse and be absorbed into South Korea and that a reunified Korea would inherit the DPRK?s nuclear arsenal. Well before that contingency arises, the United States should seek a commitment from South Korean authorities that in exchange for a continued American security assurance, a reunified Korea would give up its nuclear inheritance and remain a non-nuclear weapons state. Preventative diplomacy could also be useful in the case of Turkey. In discussions involving NATO, the European Union, and Turkey about future defense structures and missions and about Turkey’s place in the evolving European architecture, the United States should be conscious of the importance of ensuring that Ankara remains confident enough about its security situation to maintain its non-nuclear course. And with an eye to keeping Egypt in the nonnuclear camp, we should encourage Israel not to do or say anything in the nuclear realm – such as publicly declaring or testing its nuclear capability – that could generate pressures in Egypt for pursuing a nuclear option.
Troops Key to the Alliance
U.S. Troop presence is the only way to improve and modernize the U.S.-ROK Alliance
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE FOR THE 21st ALLIANCE
In light of this wider frame—the imperative of strengthening the partnership between Washington and Seoul to shape Asia’s evolving order and Korea’s leadership at its core—what would an agenda for strengthening the U.S.-South Korean alliance over the coming decade look like? Both countries have conducted the Strategic Cooperation for Alliance Partnership talks in an effort to define and operationalize a broader role for the alliance in regional and global affairs. Such a program could be built around the four pillars of enhanced military cooperation, regional security architecture, regional economic liberalization, and global partnership. Enhanced military cooperation
The U.S. troop presence in South Korea remains the living embodiment of the alliance and the U.S. commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. The revolution in modern warfare that allows effective power projection from offshore air, sea, and space platforms should not overrule the common-sense judgment that there is no substitute for the permanent deployment of an integrated American military presence on the Korean peninsula. Contrary to some conventional wisdom, such a deployment may prove as valuable to the security of Korea and the interests of the United States in a post-unification environment as they do today in deterring North Korean aggression. Therefore, any roadmap for strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance should include bolstering political and public support for a continuing American troop presence on the peninsula, even as the U.S.-ROK command structure evolves. South Korea’s planned assumption of full command authority over Korean forces in 2012 modernizes the alliance as an equal partnership; the challenge for military leaders in both countries will be ensuring that changing command-andcontrol authorities do not dilute the potency of what has been one of the world’s most effective combined military force.
2nc Nuclearization Internal Links
Decline in the credibility of the umbrella will push the South to nuclearize
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,”
, JMP)
The adverse consequences of a U.S. nuclear guarantee that no longer assures Seoul should not be underestimated. Coverage by the nuclear umbrella has played an important role in discouraging South Korea from building a nuclear arsenal of its own, for example. If the guarantee were to lack credibility, one of the barriers to a revived South Korean nuclear weapons program would be lowered. And a nuclear ROK would be a wild card in a region already faced with the prospect of greater instability in the future.
Perceived decline in credibility of security guarantee with spur South Korean proliferation
Campbell & Einhorn, 04 – senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, armscontrol, and other national security issues (Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, “12. Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations,” ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP)
Alleviate Security Concerns
With the exception of Syria, all the countries covered in this study derive substantial security benefits from their association with the United States. Some (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey) are formally allied with the United States through bilateral or multilateral (that is, NATO) security treaties; one (Taiwan) has received commitments in the form of U.S. legislation and presidential policies; another (Saudi Arabia) has relied on informal understandings and close defense cooperation; and still another (Egypt) has been an intimate partner of the United States in regional peace arrangements and bilateral security ties. These various security relationships with the United States have been instrumental in each country’s nuclear calculus. Indeed, in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the historical record suggests that perceived erosion in the reliability of security guarantees from the United States can dramatically change the calculation of the costs and benefits of remaining non-nuclear.
In the period ahead, questions may arise about the continued value of the U.S. factor in the security equations of a number of the countries studied. In response to fundamental changes in the international security environment since the end of the cold war – especially the demise of the Soviet threat to Europe, the spread of WMD and other asymmetrical military capabilities, the emergence of failed states and militant Islamic movements, and the growth of well-financed, capable terrorist networks operating on a global basis – the United States is now proceeding with a massive overhaul of its force deployments overseas. As U.S. forces are reconfigured and repositioned to meet the evolving requirements of the war on terrorism, friends and allies (including some whose perceptions of the terrorist threat and prescriptions for dealing with it differ from those of Washington) may wonder whether these changes are fully consistent with their own security priorities. For example, many South Koreans, including strong supporters of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, are troubled by plans to relocate U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone and out of Seoul, especially while the impasse over North Korea’s nuclear program remains unresolved. Japanese are speculating about how U.S. force realignments in Korea and elsewhere will eventually affect them. In Southwest Asia, while U.S. forces are now heavily committed to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, major questions exist about the future of America’s military presence in the region.
Laundry List Impact – 2nc
US-South Korean cooperation solves terrorism, prolif, piracy, drug trafficking, climate change, poverty, human rights and disease
Snyder, Et. Al. ’10 – director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. “US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” ww.content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf)
Strong alliance coordination with South Korea has ensured peninsular stability for more than five decades, initially in response to North Korea’s conventional threat and now in promoting a coordinated response to North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. While successfully deterring North Korea, the alliance also provided the political stability necessary for South Korea’s economic and political transformation into a leading market economy with a vibrant democratic political system. South Korea’s democratic transformation has allowed a more robust and enduring partnership with the United States that also applies to a growing list of regional and global security, economic, and political issues beyond North Korea. Presidents Obama and Lee recognized the potential for such cooperation through the adoption of a Joint Vision Statement at their White House meeting in June 2oo9.43 Citing shared values between the two countries, the statement outlines an agenda for broadened global cooperation on peacekeeping, postconflict stabilization, and development assistance, as well as for addressing a wide range of common challenges to human security, including “terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and epidemic disease.”44 The Joint Vision Statement also underscores U.S. commitments to defend South Korea from North Korea’s nuclear challenge by providing extended deterrence to protect South Korea—that is, a pledge to use its nuclear arsenal in response to any nuclear attack on South Korea—and to transition the role of U.S. forces in South Korea from a leading to a supporting role. It also pledges to strengthen bilateral economic, trade, and investment ties through ratification of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The Task Force believes that the Joint Vision Statement constitutes a valuable foundation for U.S.-ROK cooperation and should be implemented fully. The Korean decision in late ŒŸŸ9 to provide a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan is a welcome contribution to the global security issue at the top of the Obama administration’s agenda, and South Korea’s role as host and chair of the Group of Twenty (Gro) summit in ŒŸŠŸ and the ŒŸŠŒ nuclear security summit is a basis on which the United States and South Korea can build cooperation to manage recovery from the global financial crisis. The role of the alliance as a platform for constructive South Korean regional diplomacy is likely to become more important in the context of rising Chinese influence. When paired with the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is based on a complementary set of values and interests, the U.S.-led alliance system in Northeast Asia is a cornerstone for regional stability and provides a framework for promoting East Asian security cooperation.
Solves North Korea & Economy – 2nc
U.S.-South Korea alliance is key to managing Obama’s global agenda including North Korea and the financial crisis
Pritchard, et. al, 09 – former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea and co-chair of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula (6/16/09, Jack Pritchard, John Tilelli – former commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces in Korea and co-chair of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, and Scott Snyder – director of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, The Baltimore Sun, “Viewpoint: A new chapter for U.S.-South Korea alliance,” , JMP)
While all eyes have been trained on North Korea's belligerent and aggressive actions in recent weeks, it is important to note that the U.S.-South Korea alliance has emerged as a linchpin in the Obama administration's efforts to successfully manage an overcrowded global agenda, and a pivotal tool for safeguarding U.S. long-term interests in Asia.
When South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak meets with President Barack Obama at the White House Tuesday, the two leaders must effectively address three main areas: policy coordination to address North Korea's nuclear threat, the development of a global security agenda that extends beyond the peninsula, and collaboration to address the global financial crisis as South Korea takes a lead on the G-20 process.
By conducting a second nuclear test in May, followed by a number of missile launches, North Korea has forced its way onto the Obama administration's agenda. First and foremost, effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination is critical to managing both the global effects of North Korea's nuclear threat on the nonproliferation regime and the regional security challenges posed by potential regime actions that lead to further crisis in the region.
North Korea's internal focus on its leadership succession, and the apparent naming of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's little-known and inexperienced youngest son as his successor, make the task of responding to North Korea's aggressive and destabilizing actions all the more challenging. Both deterrence and negotiation must be pursued on the basis of close consultations. Presidents Obama and Lee must also develop coordinated contingency plans in the event of internal instability in North Korea.
Through effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination, it should be possible to forge a combined strategy capable of managing the nuclear, proliferation, and regional security dimensions of North Korea's threat. A coordinated position would also strengthen the administration's hand in its efforts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea.
Both countries also face hostage crises involving citizens detained in North Korea. The recent conviction of two U.S. journalists heightens the stakes for the United States, although the administration has tried to decouple their plight from Pyongyang's missile tests.
Second, Presidents Obama and Lee should set the stage for a reinvigorated vision of a broader role for the U.S.-South Korea alliance as an important component of a broader U.S. strategy toward East Asia. A critical aspect of this vision is a mutual commitment to jointly address sources of global and functional instability beyond the peninsula. Lee Myung-bak has offered a vision of a global Korea that features an expanded commitment to peacekeeping and development assistance that is in greater proportion to South Korea's economic clout as the world's 13th largest economy.
As the third-largest contributor of troops to Iraq, South Korea has also demonstrated its capacity to make valuable contributions to post-conflict stabilization. The U.S.-South Korea alliance can serve as a platform by which South Korea can make such contributions in many other areas, including Afghanistan. South Korea has already made commitments to send engineers and medical personnel to Afghanistan. It is poised now to expand its contributions, in line with its broadening scope of interest in contributing to global stability and its economic prowess.
Third, South Korea is an essential partner in addressing the global financial crisis. Its emphasis on fighting protectionism and promotion of stimuli at the April G-20 leaders meeting in London illustrate how closely its priorities are aligned with those of the United States. A U.S. Federal Reserve Bank line of credit to South Korea last fall played a critical role in stabilizing the South Korean's currency and forestalled a possible repeat of South Korea's difficulties in the Asian financial crisis of a decade ago.
The Obama and Lee administrations have the opportunity to send a powerful signal opposing protectionism by winning legislative support in both countries for the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiated by their predecessors. With the necessary revisions to meet new political conditions, Mr. Lee and Mr. Obama should urge their respective legislatures to consider early ratification of the trade pact. This would both support more effective coordination on the global financial crisis
and underscore its value as a precedent that sets high standards for trade agreements in Asia, in contrast to the proliferation of Asian trade agreements that do little to promote a more open Asian trade and investment environment.
U.S.-South Korean coordination to manage North Korea's challenge to nonproliferation norms, the global financial crisis, and the transition in Afghanistan will underscore the practical value of alliance contributions to meet mutual interests in global security and prosperity. For this reason, Presidents Obama and Lee have a compelling interest in establishing a firm foundation for unlocking the potential of alliance cooperation in the service of our shared interests.
Deters China / E. Asian Balance of Power
Alliance deters Chinese hegemony and ensures transition to stable East Asian balance of power
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
By structuring an Asian security system that favors democratic forms of social organization and cooperation among liberal states to provide the public goods that undergird the regional order, the U.S. alliance system, and the U.S.-ROK alliance within it, the institutional partnership between Washington and Seoul helps Asian states move towards regional community-building based on consensual norms of economic liberalism, good governance, military and diplomatic transparency, and the common security they provide. At the same time, South Korea’s alliance with America hedges against the development of a non-consensual order by shaping a regional balance of power and influence that constrains the possibilities for Chinese hegemony and shores up the independence of lesser states within a pluralistic regional order.
Therefore, South Korea’s alliance with the United States should remain its preferred external alignment because it reinforces Seoul’s position within its preferred pathways to regional order and serves as a useful hedge against the development of alternative regional systems detrimental to South Korea’s autonomy and security. In this reading, the U.S.-ROK alliance is not a Cold War legacy whose utility ended with that conflict. Nor is it merely a hedge against North Korean aggression until the Pyongyang regime mellows in a way that diminishes the danger it poses to the South and/or puts the peninsula on a track towards peaceful reunification. Rather, the U.S.-South Korea alliance is a vital tool for both Seoul and Washington to shape Asia’s developing regional order and their respective roles within it.
Deters North Korea
Strong US-Korea alliance is key to deter North Korean provocations
Snyder, Et. Al. ’10 – director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. “US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” ww.content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf)
A strong U.S.-South Korea alliance remains the foundation for coordination of policy toward North Korea. Both U.S. president Barack Obama and South Korean president Lee Myung-bak have agreed that their top policy objective vis-à-vis North Korea is its complete denuclearization. Their common goal is to promote a regional strategy that constrains North Korea’s destabilizing activities and counters the risks resulting from its nuclear and missile activities. In the wake of the ship sinking, the two administrations have worked particularly closely to forge bilateral and multilateral responses designed to strengthen deterrence and ensure that North Korea cannot engage in such provocations with impunity.
***ROK Defense Spending DA
WITHDRAWAL => INCREASE IN ROK DEFENSE SPENDING
Withdrawal will force South Korea to boost military spending
Young, 09 – Legal assistant to the chairman of the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies in Seoul. (Lee Jae, 3/4/09, “Upgrading the South Korea-U.S. alliance,” )
Consequently, the South Korean government will impose on itself the new responsibility of securing a military surge in time of emergency. This responsibility is burdensome in that South Korea will have to persuade U.S. forces to intervene swiftly and actively if they are needed. As long as the South Korea-U.S. alliance exists, the United States can be expected to provide military support. But the partial withdrawal of U.S. military forces means that South Korea cannot maintain the same level of military presence and deterrence over the North it has had so far. It will have to increase military spending to make up for the U.S. withdrawal.
***ROK Peacekeeping DA
PIRACY IMPACT
ROK forces are key to anti-piracy forums
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
Another new multilateral mechanism could be functional groupings of principal Indian and Pacific Ocean powers, including the five above plus India, Australia, and Indonesia, (1) to develop a joint anti-piracy and disaster relief naval force, and (2) to build regional peacekeeping capacity for joint peacekeeping operations under UN-mandated operations in Africa and the Middle East. South Korea, with its capable armed forces, could play an important role in both the peacekeeping and the anti-piracy forums, inculcating habits of cooperation among Indo-Pacific powers that could spill over into other functional realms.
Middle East / South Asia Impact
ROK military deployments stabilize Middle East and South Asia
Twining, 10 – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” )
With regard to land power, South Korea’s military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq set an important precedent for future contributions by the Korean armed forces to stabilization and security operations in the arc of instability encompassing the Middle East and South Asia. U.S.-ROK combined training and exercises could increasingly focus on enlarging the South Korean army’s capacities for counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilization with an eye on future challenges beyond the peninsula. This program to add a global-operations dimension to the interoperability between the American and South Korean armies on the peninsula would build on existing joint training and planning for stabilization operations following a potential collapse of the North Korean regime.
***CONDITION on DPRK Nuclear Freeze CP
CP – CONDITION ON DENUCLEARIZATION – 1NC
Text:
The United States federal government should offer to __________ if the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea agrees to simultaneously freeze its nuclear program.
Only the counterplan can solve – unreciprocated concessions allows North Korea to undermine nuclear negotiations with indefinite demands
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
One goal clearly articulated by the North Korean regime over the last decade that may explain its recent behavior has been to obtain a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible security assurance,”3 a promise that the
United States will not launch a preemptive or preventive military attack on North Korea. Another possibility, however, is that the negative security assurance demand is just a bargaining chip. U.S. negotiators have held out the possibility of a negative security assurance or other limited military concessions if North Korea made substantive concessions in its nuclear program, which the North Koreans have refused to make so far. For example, in the June 2004 six-party talks, the U.S. proposal for resolving the nuclear issue included an offer of a negative security assurance in response to North Korean nuclear dismantlement.4 Yet, granting a negative security assurance to Pyongyang without receiving at least a verifiable freeze leading to the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program carries some risks. Pyongyang might simply pocket the negative security assurance and use the diplomatic momentum to shift negotiations to other issues, such as the deployment of U.S. troops on the peninsula, a peace treaty, or the formal treaty relationship between the United States and South Korea. The point is not the specific demand, but rather the idea that unreciprocated concessions may convince Pyongyang that it has the ability to forestall resolution of the nuclear issue with indefinite demands.
The plan alone crushes U.S. deterrence and causes war and allied prolif
Cronin, et. al, 94 – Report Coordinator and Specialist in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division at the CRS (6/1/1994, Richard P., CRS Report for Congress, CRS94-470F, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: U.S. Policy Options,” , JMP)
While a U.S. withdrawal based on a credible non-proliferation regime might be security-enhancing, a diminished U.S. troop presence or a withdrawal based on anything less than a verifiable, inter-Korean confidence building system and full-scope IAEA nonproliferation safeguards, could well be highly destabilizing. Apart from critically weakening or eliminating the longstanding, effective U.S. deterrence role, a U.S. withdrawal without a verifiable nonproliferation regime would also likely cause South Korea to reconsider producing nuclear weapons. Such a train of events on the Korean peninsula could lead to a Japanese reassessment of the reliability of the U.S. security role in the Western Pacific and Japanese decisions to rearm and/or shift Japan's nuclear program towards weapons production.
Escalates to global nuclear war
Cirincione, 2000 – Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Spring 2000, Joseph, Foreign Policy, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain”, JStor)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
2nc Solvency ***
North Korea will accept the offer but if given the opportunity it will pocket the concession and ramp up its demands
Cronin, et. al, 94 – Report Coordinator and Specialist in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division at the CRS (6/1/1994, Richard P., CRS Report for Congress, CRS94-470F, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: U.S. Policy Options,” , JMP)
OPTION 6: NEGOTIATED REDUCTION OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA
This option at present has only limited U.S. domestic support and no significant support within the Clinton Administration or Congress. It would likely only be considered in the face of an impossible diplomatic situation based on a combination of factors, including:
* weakening resolve on the part of South Korea and/or Japan to make difficult diplomatic and military steps, or commit the necessary resources for effective confrontation;
* continued progress by Pyongyang in building an effective nuclear weapons capability;
* outright Chinese or Russian opposition to U.S. policies, leading to paralysis in the UN Security Council;
* the emergence of sentiment for withdrawal in the U.S. public based on a perceived lack of sufficient U.S. interests at stake or a perception of inadequate support from South Korea and/or Japan, and growing opposition to having U.S. forces serve as a "trip wire" against a possibly nuclear armed North Korea.
The option would be based on a U.S. view that there were no other practical options to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program besides substantially meeting North Korea's bottom-line demand as the price of giving up its nuclear weapons program. Under this option, the United States would make a new effort to gain North Korean compliance with full IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities in return for concessions regarding the American military presence .
Given North Korea's longstanding goal of securing a withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, its leaders might in theory, at least, be willing to allow inspections of their nuclear facilities in return for a reduction or elimination of the U.S. military presence. In view of North Korea's negotiating style and record to date, however, it would be just as likely to seek to use its nuclear card as a way of gaining its goals without making concessions, and even increasing its demands.
U.S. military presence is the key threat to North Korea – a phased withdrawal can be used to negotiate an end to the North’s nuclear program
Lee, 99 – former Foreign Service Officer for the ROK Government (11/9/99, Hwal-Woong Lee, “The Perry Report: A Scenario for a Collision Course?” , JMP)
The new report on U.S. policy toward North Korea prepared by Dr. William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, was published by the State Department on October 12, 1999. Separately, Dr. Perry himself summarized his report in his column "Korea: Why We Can't Stand Still" carried by the Washington Post on October 18, 1999.
The Perry Report, in a nutshell, recommends the following. (1) North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are destabilizing factors and the U.S. should negotiate with Pyongyang for the North's total renunciation of these programs. (2) In a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion, the U.S. should, in alliance with South Korea and Japan, reduce pressures that North Korea perceives as threatening, normalize relations with it, relax sanctions against it and take other positive steps that would provide opportunities for the Pyongyang regime. (3) If North Korea would not come along and the negotiations fail to produce desired results, the U.S. and the allies should take specific steps to contain the North Korean threat. (4) The U.S. must not withdraw any of its forces from Korea.
Noting some recent exchanges of positive gestures between Washington and Pyongyang, Perry predicted in his column that a senior North Korean official's visit to Washington will be forthcoming. He further expressed his hope that the implementation of these measures, if met by North Korea's positive response, will result in a secure, stable and prosperous Korean Peninsula after decades of insecurity. Would it? I doubt that it would.
First of all, the Perry Report is based on the belief that U.S. forces and alliances in the region are strong, and that North Korea understands this. It, therefore, envisions a solution to the problem by intimidation, not by reason. It recommends that the U.S. should first try to persuade North Korea to accept U.S. demands by offering some reciprocal benefits and then resort to certain forcible steps if the North would not come along. This is the same old "carrot and stick" strategy, which has already been proved ineffective.
Secondly, Perry's theory is self-contradictory. He presupposes that there has been "security" in Korea thanks to the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and, therefore, insists that the U.S. must not withdraw them. Yet, he predicts that the measures he recommends could lead to a secure, stable and prosperous Korean peninsula "after decades of insecurity," admitting that there has been no "security" in Korea.
Thirdly, Perry has failed to realize the real nature of long confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea. For three years from 1950, the U.S. fought a war with North Korea with an intention to obliterate it. The armistice agreement of 1953 was simply a military arrangement to pause the hostilities in the battlefields. Forty-six years later, the situation in the Korean peninsula today still remains a military stalemate that has yet to be superseded by a political solution, such as the conclusion of a peace treaty. By narrowly focusing on military questions alone, namely the North's nuclear and missile programs, the Perry Report failed to provide any basis for a political solution to end the military stalemate on the Korean peninsula.
Fourthly, Perry has ignored, perhaps purposefully, the unquestionable link between the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and the existence of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Although the U.S. contends that American forces in South Korea are necessary for the security of the peninsula, their presence has been the main threat to the security of North Korea, thus driving the North Koreans to pursue WMD programs in their desperate efforts to defend themselves from possible U.S. attack. To put it straight, the North's WMD programs are the inevitable effects of the U.S. military presence in the South.
My observation is that, given its population, economy and military strength, North Korea has no motivation to provoke a military confrontation with the U.S., the only super-power of the world. They may, therefore, want to keep a dialogue with the U.S. going and try to take whatever is obtainable from the U.S. so long as they are not inexorably pressed for total renunciation of WMD programs. Once pressed for that, however, Pyongyang will not be able to go along any further, especially under the circumstances where U.S. forces are there in South Korea pointing guns at them. This will oblige the U.S. to take what Perry calls the second path steps to contain what it considers a threat from the North, an implying the use of force.
If Washington is serious about making peace with Pyongyang, it should recognize that the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is a sheer threat to the North's security and, therefore, it should eliminate, not just reduce, this threat. Otherwise, North Korea simply cannot give up its WMD programs. The only practical way of inducing the North's agreement to total renunciation of its WMD programs will, therefore, be to barter it for American consent to a phased withdrawal of its forces from the South. Actual implementation of such deal should of course be preceded by a political arrangement for general arms reductions and non-aggression pledges by the parties concerned.
In the absence of these crucial elements, the Perry Report, I am afraid, is nothing more than a scenario for collision course.
Solvency Extensions
North Korea has been willing to make some concessions on its nuclear program in the past – the conterplan is critical to prevent destabilizing increases in the North’s program
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (5/1/09, Doug, Korea Times, “With Realism and Restraint,” , JMP)
North Korea demonstrates the limits of President Barack Obama's more accommodating diplomacy.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea engages in perpetual brinkmanship. Last winter the tortuous negotiations over the North Korea's nuclear program crashed if not burned over verification procedures for Pyongyang's official nuclear declaration.
The Obama administration hopes to rejuvenate the six-party talks, but the way forward is uncertain after the North's recent missile launch.
In fact, the effort was much ado about nothing. The botched effort suggests that the DPRK poses less than a formidable military threat. Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, snickered: "On the idea of proliferation, would you buy from somebody that had failed three times in a row and never been successful?"
However, as a step designed to win international attention the test was far more successful, creating the usual public frenzy in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. The U.S. denounced the launch as illegal and went to the United Nations for redress.
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon complained that the action was "not conducive to efforts to promote dialogue, regional peace and stability," as if those were North Korea's objectives.
China and Russia exhibited their usual reluctance to crack down on the North. With Beijing's call for "calm" and "restraint," the Security Council approved a resolution insisting on little more than enforcement of previously approved sanctions.
What should Washington do?
The Obama administration needs to realistically assess the conundrum that is North Korea. We should downplay any expectations of changing North Korea.
America should step back and let others take the lead in dealing with Pyongyang. A desperately poor, isolated state with an antiquated military, the DPRK poses far greater problems for its neighbors than for America.
Only South Korea is within reach of the North's army — a good reason for the U.S. to withdraw its troops, since they are not needed to safeguard the Republic of Korea. (Seoul enjoys a vast economic, technological, population, and diplomatic edge over the North.)
Japan along with the ROK is vulnerable to North Korean missiles. China and the South both fear a violent DPRK collapse and refugee flood. Beijing also suffers from the nightmare of spreading nuclear proliferation, which could result in Japan developing nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, Washington and North Korea's neighbors have only bad options. It would be wonderful to create a democratic, humane DPRK. It is more important to avoid a new Korean war and cap any North Korean nuclear arsenal.
Thus, the Obama administration should focus its efforts on halting any further North Korean nuclear developments.
Unfortunately, convincing Pyongyang to yield its small atomic arsenal will require a geopolitical miracle. However, Pyongyang can do little with a small cache of nuclear weapons: attacking the U.S. would be suicidal, and Kim prefers his virgins in the here and now.
In contrast, the North could do enormous damage with a large and growing stockpile of nuclear materiel, including underwriting widespread proliferation.
To the extent the DPRK has been willing to comply with its promises — both in accepting the Clinton-era Agreed Framework and the later accord negotiated with the Bush administration — it has been to freeze its existing program. Future negotiations should focus on the same end.
For the same reason the U.S. must not get sidetracked by the North's missile program. As one American official anonymously declared: "We are not going to … let them distract us from the goal, which is denuclearization."
While the prospect of North Korea possessing advanced missile technology is unsettling, nuclear proliferation is the more important game.
Finally, Washington needs to concentrate on changing the negotiating dynamic with North Korea before negotiating with Pyongyang. For years the DPRK has used brinkmanship to win concessions. The U.S., ROK, and other friendly states need to reverse this reward structure.
First, they should respond to the North's provocations with bored contempt rather than excited fear. Calling an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council sent precisely the wrong message to Pyongyang.
Second, rather than publicly whining about North Korea's actions, friendly nations should quietly inform Pyongyang that they will offer no benefits while it is ratcheting up tensions.
If the DPRK responds positively, however, Washington should offer diplomatic recognition and the end of trade sanctions, small concessions in areas where punitive policies have manifestly failed; South Korea should move back toward the "Sunshine Policy."
The prospect of a peace treaty with America, full normalization of political and economic relations with the U.S., expanded trade with and aid from South Korea and Japan, and full participation in international institutions might beckon Pyongyang forward.
North Korea will long be with us. The Obama administration must recognize that any success will come only slowly, painfully, and incrementally, and as a result of a limited agenda realistically implemented.
2nc Solves Succession / Democracy
The counterplan ensures a stable succession process and a transition to a more democratic North Korea
Sang-Seek, 10 – professor at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University. (Park, 3/29/10, The Korea Herald, “N. Korea in a state of emergency again?” )
Recently, the mass media has reported that a crisis situation in North Korea is looming again. The reports are based on unconfirmed information that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il may not live beyond 2013 and the United States, South Korea and China will soon meet to discuss the emergency situation likely to follow his death.
These reports are reminiscent of the aftermath of Kim Il-sung's sudden death in 1994 and the subsequent development of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations and the conclusion of the Geneva Framework Agreement. Some speculated at that time that the U.S. made significant concessions to North Korea, believing that the North Korean regime would soon collapse, then the North Korean nuclear weapons facilities would be dismantled and the light-water reactors provided for the North could be taken over by South Korea.
Some North Korea specialists warn that even if such reports are correct and the South Korean and U.S. government authorities have been preparing for such an emergency, the mass media and both government authorities should not talk about the issue openly. In order to understand the nature of the crisis situation, the term crisis situation needs to be clearly defined. Otherwise, we won't be able to tell whether the North is faced with a crisis or formulate the right strategy.
The "crisis situation" can be defined broadly or narrowly. One scenario is that following the North Korean leader's death or incapacitation, a single person (his son, Kim Jong-eun, or somebody else) or a collective leadership (composed of both the party and military elites) takes over power. These two leaderships will preserve the Kim Jong-il system, a totalitarian autocracy.
The second scenario is that after Kim's death, one person or a collective leadership (same as above) will take over power, and both leaderships will abandon the Kim jong-il regime to seek a more democratic one and conciliatory policy toward the West and South Korea.
The final scenario is that after Kim Jong-il's death, the North Korean regime collapses and the entire nation falls into chaos. The broad definition encompasses these three scenarios, while the narrow definition includes only the third. The mass media and U.S. government authorities seem to identify the crisis situation in North Korea with the third outcome. The most desirable scenario for South Korea and the U.S. is the second, while the worst is the third. In terms of feasibility, the first scenario is most likely. If the third scenario becomes a reality, the North Korean nuclear issue could become extremely problematic.
It is said that South Korea and the U.S. have a plan to deal with North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. However, some serious questions need to be addressed. Do they need the authorization of the U.N. for their intervention in the North Korean crisis? Can casus belli be invoked in this situation? Who should take care of North Korea's WMDs? - The U.S. alone? The U.S. and South Korea jointly? The U.S., South Korea and China together or the U.N. Command alone?
If the first scenario plays out, the status quo in the Korean peninsula is likely to continue, and the North Korean nuclear issue will remain unresolved. The reason why the first scenario is most feasible is that the Kim Jong-il system, which is the continuation of the Kim Il-sung system, is firmly established in North Korea and no organized opposition, military or civilian, is possible in such a totalitarian autocracy. In other words, the North Korean regime is similar to the Cuban regime, not the Ceausescu regime of Rumania.
Another point to be made in this connection is that state collapse, regime collapse, regime change and government change need to be distinguished. States rarely collapse; they die hard. The first scenario belongs to the category of government change (soft landing); the second, that of regime change; and the third, that of regime collapse (hard landing).
The North Korean nuclear issue can provide an opportunity to make the second scenario a reality. If North Korea and the U.S. swap the denuclearization of North Korea with the security guarantee of North Korea simultaneously, North Korea is likely to abandon its nuclear programs. As the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter said, there is no reason why the U.S. cannot give security guarantees to North Korea as the latter requests.
The word "simultaneously" does not mean "at the same time" in this usage. The dismantlement process and the verification process can hardly be implemented at the same time, just as the U.S. recognition of North Korea, lifting of all the U.S. and U.N. economic sanctions and the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty cannot be implemented at the same time. A carefully planned sequential implementation schedule should be drawn up and the wordings and expressions of the agreement should be clear and unmistakable. Both sides have often argued over the wordings and accused each other of using the ambiguity for the purpose of derailing the negotiation process or of gaining more concessions from the other side.
The North Korean regime has been able to preserve the Kim Jong-il system since the death of Kim Il-sung by carefully balancing the "rogue state" status and the "failed state" status because the North Korean leadership knows that if it tries to get out of one of them, it will risk its political system. Ironically, the U.S. efforts to transform North Korea into a normal state for the last 15 years have helped the North Korean regime survive.
2nc Solves Regionalism
Successful North Korean denuclearization creates regionalism
Synder 9 – Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Senior Associate, International Relations (Scott, “China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security”, pg. 169-170) MGM
In the context of diplomacy surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue, a third pattern is evident in which China is the "pivot" player and the United States and South Korea act as "wing" players. In this circumstance, China is viewed as the external actor likely to have the greatest influence and leverage with the North Korean leadership, and the one who holds the key to resolving the nuclear crisis. In light of the pre-nuclear test divergences in South Korean and US preferences for bringing the North Korean nuclear crisis to a resolution, there has been an element of competition between the United States and South Korea to influence China's positions in managing the crisis in the early rounds of the six-party talks. As convener and host of the six-party talks, China has taken a position of responsibility in facilitating diplomacy to bring the crisis to resolution, but clearly prefers the crisis to be resolved via negotiation rather than pressure. Chinese views also attribute responsibility for the crisis as much to the United States for failure to overcome mistrust in its relations with North Korea, as to North Korea for pursuing asymmetric methods to ensure its own security. South Korean interests also lie in pursuing a negotiated settlement to the issue that will avoid heightened tensions, instability, or military conflict. Despite the existence of US–South Korean coordination in pursuit of the shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea, South Korean prioritization of maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula regardless of North Korea's nuclear status overlaps with China's preferred priorities. There is a clearly discernible triangular pattern by which China takes the "pivot" position as the convener of the six-party talks and as the party with the greatest apparent leverage over North Korea, while the United States and South Korea compete as "wing" players for China's favor in a "romantic triangle" relationship. Under current circumstances, another factor for consideration is the existence of a common security problem—North Korea—that can serve as a driver for joint cooperation among all three members of the triangle, and the possibility that the experience of practical cooperation might serve as a foundation for lessening, at least temporarily, the strategic rivalries that otherwise might naturally occur among the three parties. Although the three parties are unequal in terms of power, this type of joint coordination on North Korean issues, to the extent that it might be possible to organize, would conform most closely to the "ménage a trois" relationship, in which China, the United States, and South Korea would work together to achieve the same overriding objective of denuclearizing North Korea. Given the rhetorical support that all the parties have provided for the idea of an eventual cooperative security framework as an endpoint for managing long-term regional security concerns beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis, there is the possibility that such cooperation might serve to abate or ameliorate security competition among states. But such cooperation would only be possible in the context of proper management of the strategic rivalries inherent in the China–South Korea–United States triangular relationship, which could also emerge as primary obstacles to the effective management of the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the interaction of the three parties in the context of recent diplomatic developments in the six-party talks.
Unconditional Guts Leverage / A2: perm ***
Unconditional withdrawal will just fuel North Korean belligerence – U.S. military power is a key source of leverage
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
U.S. military leverage theoretically functions both in a negative fashion, as U.S. deployments and commitments deter North Korean military adventurism, and in a positive fashion, because incentives to ratchet down military tension might elicit cooperative behavior from Pyongyang. This is not to say that Washington should make direct military concessions to Pyongyang in response to threats; doing so would serve to reinforce the North Korean belief that their foreign policy goals can be best achieved through brinkmanship. Yet, U.S. military power remains a potential source of leverage and will inevitably be employed as a piece of a negotiated agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program or if a new nuclear bargain is not achieved.
Empirically true
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
Some empirical evidence supports this fear. In 1991, North Korea claimed that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea were the critical factor motivating its nuclear program. When the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea as part of a reconfiguration of U.S. forces following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea shifted its demands, asking for an unprecedented level of access to South Korean and U.S. military facilities to “confirm” that the nuclear weapons had been withdrawn. This method of partial compliance, at best, while simultaneously shifting the goalposts or ratcheting up demands is well documented in North Korean negotiating tactics.5 Essentially, giving North Korea a security assurance without verifiable nuclear dismantlement is unlikely to create diplomatic momentum and risks delaying an ultimate solution by prematurely taking the stick out of U.S. hands.
North Korea will claim victory and use it to expand its power base – guts allied leverage
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Another risk is diplomatic. Diplomatic risk will affect the United States on the international front. The North Koreans will view any troop withdrawal (or even troop reduction) as a sign of victory over the U.S. By declaring victory, the U.S. and South Korea could lose the leverage to bring peace and stability in the region. Additionally, the North Korea government can use this tactic to further legitimize their power base, therefore making it difficult to negotiate any peace agreement without strong North Korean demands. Finally, any troop withdrawal or reduction may cause the South Koreans to feel abandoned, which violates the current 1953 Mutual Defense agreement to defend South Korea against North Korea.
Plan fuels North Korea’s brinksmanship strategy and undercuts U.S. negotiating strategy
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
The limited U.S. presidential debate on North Korea focused on the importance of multilateral or bilateral talks, but this approach is a false dichotomy and ultimately holds little relevance. What is important is whether Pyongyang will feel pressure if it refuses to be willing to reach a negotiated settlement and whether renewed North Korean brinksmanship will fail to elicit economic benefits for the regime. Without the credible ability to make the status quo worse for Pyongyang and to checkmate its traditional, flailing brinksmanship strategy to get more concessions, the United States and its allies will remain relatively powerless to influence Pyongyang’s strategic choices.
Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip – 2nc
Troops can be used as a bargaining chip with North Korea – will pave the way for successful negotiations
Feffer, 04 – contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (6/23/04, John, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” , JMP)
The vortex of Korean politics can make even Donald Rumsfeld sound like the most radical Korean peace activist. "After the cold war," he declared on June 3, "U.S. forces have been stationed in South Korea for too long." The occasion was the announcement of the largest U.S. troop reductions from the Korean peninsula since the Korean War armistice, which took place 51 years ago this month. The Pentagon is withdrawing one-third of its forces from South Korea and sending a portion of them to Iraq.
Since this announcement comes at a time not of relative tranquility but rather of heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea, some critics have charged the Bush administration with sacrificing security in East Asia on the altar of its Iraq policy. "Scavenging troops from South Korea," writes Jon Wolfstahl in the International Herald Tribune, "sends exactly the wrong signal at the wrong time to U.S. allies and adversaries alike." These critics are missing the point. American troops are no longer needed on the Korean peninsula. The Bush administration's only mistake is in not going far enough. An even more dramatic withdrawal of U.S. troops would not compromise security and could even help unknot the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.
The Pentagon announcement comes just before a third round of Six-Party Talks that bring together the United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The previous two rounds went nowhere and expectations for this third round are low. The United States is insisting on CVID or the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programs – before any substantive compromise can be hammered out. Having declared North Korea beyond the pale, the Bush administration is stuck in a theological hole: any form of negotiations looks suspiciously like "supping with the Devil." North Korea, meanwhile, has broached various scenarios whereby they freeze and then dismantle their programs in exchange for energy, economic incentives, security guarantees, or a mixture of the three.
It might seem strange that the United States is reducing its military footprint on the Korean peninsula at this juncture. The Pentagon points out that the current plan has been on the drawing board since the end of the Cold War. Troops in fixed positions with slow-moving tanks, according to the Pentagon, fight yesterday's wars. Today's conflicts require rapid response units that can move quickly and over long distances. U.S. military presence in Korea – as well as in Japan – is being refashioned for the instantaneous demands of the virtual age and to intervene in areas further south as part of the "war on terrorism."
This restructuring was first delayed in the early 1990s during the first nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea. Why, during a second and potentially more serious crisis, is the restructuring moving forward? Certainly the immediate need for troops in the Iraq occupation is one reason.
The deeper issue, however, is the declining utility of American troops on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's conventional forces have deteriorated in strength over the last twenty years, even as Pyongyang has directed large portions of its stagnant government budget toward the military. South Korea's armed forces, which include 690,000 troops, have meanwhile steadily improved its capability. Because of the high cost of fuel and the lack of critical spare parts, North Korean military pilots train 13 hours a year, which is what an American pilot easily clocks in a month. Or to give another example of the growing disparity of forces, South Korea has the luxury to spend between ten and one hundred times more per soldier for their equipment and other needs.
Given the dramatic reversal of comparative strength between North and South, the tiny U.S. contingent – around 5 percent of South Korean troop strength – does not bring much to the table. The U.S. decision in 2003 to redeploy U.S. forces away from the DMZ has eliminated their function as a tripwire, the first line of defense against a North Korean invasion.
Military boosters emphasize the symbolic value of U.S. troops in demonstrating the unwavering commitment of the United States to its alliance with South Korea and to deter any North Korean attack on the South. But even this symbolism has become drained of meaning. South Korea under Roh Moo-Hyun wants more equality in its relations with the United States, which translates into greater control over military affairs. Younger South Koreans now see the United States – or, to be more precise, the trigger-happy unilateralism of the Bush administration – as more dangerous than North Korea.
U.S. deterrent capacity, meanwhile, now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan. As it did fifty years ago, U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus.
Although they have only a minor military function and declining symbolic value, the remaining U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula can play a vital new role: bargaining chip.
North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation. So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal.
The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea would certainly have its drawbacks. South Korea is spending more now on its defense than ever before and the Defense Ministry has called for an additional 13 percent increase in the military budget to compensate for the disappearing U.S. troops. The peace movement in Japan and Okinawa also want to bid farewell to U.S. troops, so the shifting of U.S. forces eastward, while a boon for the Korean peace movement, would not necessarily be a plus for the region as a whole. Still, U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula would be such an enormous step toward resolving inter-Korean tensions that the benefits outweigh the costs.
Beset on all sides for its Iraq policy, the Bush administration needs a foreign policy victory. It needs to demonstrate that it isn't ignoring the Korean peninsula. And it needs to show the world that the United States, if only after 51 years, does eventually bring home its troops.
Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip – 2nc
Troop withdrawal should be made after North Korea agrees freeze its nuclear program
Scowcroft and Kanter 3 – *president of the Forum for International Policy and national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush AND **a senior fellow at the forum and under secretary of state from 1991 to 1993 (5/1/2003, Brent and Arnold, “A surprising success on North Korea”, Lexis) MGM
United States objectives likewise remain the same. We will not pay blackmail, and we will not buy the same horse twice. But we do want to stop North Korea from being a threat to peace and security in northeastern Asia and a supplier of weapons of mass destruction elsewhere. To realize these goals, we must dismantle the North Korean nuclear and missile programs in a way that is realistically irreversible and verifiable.
In return, we should be willing to join with others in providing credible assurances to North Korea that it need have no concern about its own security, so long as it does not threaten others. We should also make clear that we would be prepared to take a leading role in ending North Korea's political and economic isolation. Such a proposal would be a deal about a whole new horse, going far beyond the 1994 Agreed Framework.
As for North Korea's intentions and objectives, the Beijing talks offered confusing and contradictory hints. Only when there are serious negotiations to make clear both what we and the other concerned parties require of North Korea, and what we are prepared to do in return, will we get to the bottom line.
The United States accordingly should make clear that it is prepared to continue its policy of engagement with the North (to be expanded as soon as possible to include South Korea and Japan) with a view to negotiating a peaceful resolution. This willingness, however, will be predicated on a freeze in North Korea's nuclear and missile activities. We can press the case that if the North Koreans are serious about putting those programs on hold, we would reciprocate with respect to our military forces in and around the Korean peninsula. But if North Korea continues to expand its nuclear activities and, in particular, if it pursues the reprocessing of its spent fuel rods, the United States will have no choice but to fundamentally reassess its commitment to a diplomatic resolution.
Troop reductions should be linked to corresponding threat reductions by North Korea
Seongwhun 7 - PhD in management sciences, a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, author of numerous books and reports (4/4, Cheon, “North Korea and the ROK-U.S. Security Alliance”, ) MGM
Link U.S. Force Reduction with North Korean Threat Reduction
Regarding the U.S. Forces in South Korea, rather than a unilateral and hasty readjustment, U.S. Force change should be part of the overall arms control and peacebuilding process on the Korean peninsula. For instance, two high-ranking officials during the senior Bush administration proposed linking North Korea’s nuclear capability and the U.S. military posture on the peninsula.87 In this regard, it is auspicious that an outcome of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks is to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula at an appropriate forum and to explore ways and means to promote security cooperation in Northeast Asia. It is also noted that the Bush administration is considering a broad new approach to deal with North Korea that would include starting negotiations over a formal peace treaty.88 Under the circumstances, it is strongly recommended that any further reduction of the U.S. Forces in South Korea become a part of this broader and regional initiative and be linked with a corresponding threat reduction by North Korea.
Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip
Military threats are a key source of leverage over North Korea
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
MILITARY
Unlike cultural influence, military influence is more tangible. Military influence can function in a negative fashion through threats and coercive actions designed to deter or compel certain behaviors. Positive military incentives can involve the provision of financial assistance, equipment, or even assurances not to attack under certain circumstances. Given that North Korea’s security strategy, especially its public justification, largely revolves around perceived threats from the United States and, to a lesser extent, South Korea, developing military leverage over the North Korean regime seems quite possible.
Allies Relations NB Ext
We have an external net benefit – unconditional action will drive a wedge between the U.S. and Japan and South Korea
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
By consistently raising issues such as the negative security assurance, Pyongyang could also be trying to set a trap for the United States, seeking to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan as well as South Korea no matter how Washington responds. If Washington grants a negative security assurance to Pyongyang, absent receiving verifiable concessions, it could create the perception in South Korea and especially Japan that the United States is insufficiently committed to resolving the nuclear dispute. Because of concern about military overextension due to deployments in the war on terrorism, U.S. actions could be perceived as a resource-based compromise, creating concern that the United States is willing to look the other way and accept de facto North Korean nuclear weapons. Conversely, a U.S. refusal to grant a negative security assurance to North Korea in the face of more cooperative behavior from North Korea could damage U.S. relations with Japan and especially South Korea by making the United States appear belligerent. These complications confront policymakers attempting to utilize U.S. military might to leverage North Korea.
North Korea will try to pocket the concession and drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK
Cronin, et. al, 94 – Report Coordinator and Specialist in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division at the CRS (6/1/1994, Richard P., CRS Report for Congress, CRS94-470F, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: U.S. Policy Options,” , JMP)
POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING GOALS AND STRATEGY
Most analysts see the regime's foremost concern as less the long-standing goal of unification under the North than the more immediate goal of insuring its survival. Many in this group judge that the nuclear card is being played primarily to gain concessions from the United States and South Korea that would bolster its survival prospects. Under this interpretation, North Korea calculates that fear of provoking a new Korean conflict on the part of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other countries, will cause them to avoid confrontation and seek accommodation. Pyongyang will seek to maximize the achievement of near-term benefits such as the cancellation of joint U.S./South Korean military exercises, U.S. diplomatic recognition, lifting the post-1950 U.S. embargo on the North, and western and international economic aid, with minimum concessions of its own. Ultimately, some advocates of this interpretation see Pyongyang substantially bargaining away its nuclear capability for the right combination of benefits.
An alternative interpretation has a more confident North Korea believing that it has already obtained the leverage -- perhaps surpassing its own expectations -- to negate superior U.S. military power and extract diplomatic and economic concessions while preserving its nuclear option. This interpretation rests on Kim's perception that fear and war avoidance are influencing Seoul and Washington and correlates with the regime's staunch public stance justifying its resistance to IAEA inspections while blaming the United States as the source of nuclear threat to the Korean peninsula. This interpretation assumes that the intensely nationalistic and distorted world view of North Korea's leaders will make it difficult, if not impossible for them to yield to external pressures.
Under either interpretation, North Korea likely will try to have it both ways -- getting concessions while seeking to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul, protecting its nuclear option, and undercutting the U.S. rationale for keeping its troops in South Korea. Pyongyang appears to place especially high value on twin objectives of dictating terms to South Korea on unification and other issues while bargaining directly with the United States on nuclear and other security matters of concern to South Korea and its neighbors.
A2: Plan Solves Net Benefit
The plan puts the cart before the horse – reductions should only be made after North Korea has dismantled its nuclear program
Gilbert, 04 – Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, “Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?” , JMP)
RECOMMENDATION:
The first option is the most viable option for resolving the nuclear crisis. Diplomacy must continue to be given a chance. Diplomacy in the form of multilateral talks needs to continue in addition to unilateral talks between the United States and North Korea. In fact, all five of the nations involved in these multilateral talks are seeking to reconvene talks by the end of the year.29 But what is best for Korea is a combination of both options one and three. In fact, there may be facets of the Agreed Framework that can be salvaged in the interest of time. But the key to disarming the current crisis will be sustained negotiations.
Sustained negotiations can lead to North Korea abandoning its nuclear program. Such negotiations must be seen as credible and serious. In order for this to occur, the hard-line rhetoric that often finds resonance within the Bush administration must cease, as it is both provocative and counterproductive. The application of the Bush Doctrine is not an option; North Korea does not pose a direct threat against the United States now or in the immediate future.
Concerning the terrorist threat from North Korea, the only connection between North Korea and other members of the “Axis of Evil” is financial at best. North Korea is a closed society and there is no evidence that it has knowingly supported terrorist organizations during the past two decades. There is no linkage between Kim’s regime and al Qaeda. Unless the United States can unequivocally demonstrate that North Korea is transferring nuclear material or weapons of mass destruction to other rogue states or terrorist organizations, no legitimate argument can be made for pre-emptive military action. The administration needs to tone down the rhetoric and come to the table prepared for either unilateral or multilateral discussions or both with North Korea.
Diplomatic negotiations should start with the Agreed Framework. Negotiations and compromises need to be made about which parts of this historical agreement are still valid and therefore merit pursuing. The return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors at some point in the future should be agreed upon early. This agency serves as independent eyes for the global community showing that steps are being taken to safeguard the weapons grade uranium and that the plutonium production program is returned to a frozen state as agreed upon in 1994. The IAEA would insure the nuclear weapon program is dismantled. Concomitantly, steps should be taken to finish the first light-water reactor agreed upon in 1994. Getting North Korea to agree to one reactor instead of two could be a political victory for the Bush Administration, which felt that two reactors were too much in the first place.30
Economic negotiations should also address food and energy needs. North Korea needs the fuel oil shipments suspended by the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO), and these shipments will mostly likely be required prior to shutting down the nuclear reactors. World relief organizations and international food aid should address the needs of the people. South Korea should continue to reach across the DMZ and stimulate economic development. Neither China nor South Korea can underwrite the implosion of the North Korea economy. Another key to these multilateral talks is to stabilize the economy of North Korea by providing aid in the form of fuel oil, food, and the promise of further financial support upon the verifiable full dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program.
Once an agreement can be reached on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and the dismantling is underway, the United States can then begin to look towards restructuring its footprint on the Korean Peninsula. Our current force structure levels in the area of operations serve as deterrence to a North Korean attack, but the same deterrence can be achieved with fewer troops. Upon the completion of the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program, troop reductions should take place, as both countries will have signed a treaty of non-aggression with each other. These reductions should be monitored by the United Nations and remain completely transparent to the global community.
Conflict on the Korean Peninsula does not seem likely and has not seemed likely for the past decade. Without allies, principally China and Russia, North Korea could not possibly survive an armed conflict with the United States. They might succeed in launching a successful attack against Seoul, but as our military forces have so competently demonstrated in both Afghanistan and Iraq (1991 and 2003), a North Korean attack would be political suicide. The United States has too much at stake in the economic prosperity of Northeast Asia and the alliances to undertake a pre-emptive strike. A war on the peninsula would destabilize the world financial markets.
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has suggested that deterrence and burdensharing should guide our alliance with South Korea.31 Today the Pentagon is rethinking the numbers of boots on the ground in Korea. We definitely need to maintain a regional presence in order to retain a credible deterrent option, but with today’s operational reach we do not need to be in Seoul. Both Wolfowitz and Pace seem convinced that given the proper structuring we can in fact do more with less in Korea. I would agree that “less is better for Korea”: less U.S. Forces and less Korean Forces.
However, reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula by restructuring the U.S. military footprint can only occur when North Korea agrees to dismantle its nuclear program. So let’s not get the proverbial cart before the horse; diplomatic negotiations must successfully conclude before the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia can agree to troop reductions.
A2: NK Will Reject the Offer
Even if North Korea “says no” we still solve – builds international support for more coercive solutions
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
It is currently unclear whether Pyongyang would agree to verifiable nuclear dismantlement in exchange for serious economic and political incentives from the United States. If such an agreement can be reached, it will pave the way for a nuclear-free peninsula. If it fails, the United States will have overwhelming international support to move toward a more coercive solution. Currently, Pyongyang simply responds to U.S. diplomatic overtures with threats and brinksmanship, a cycle that intensifies crises and the possibility of armed conflict on the peninsula. In return, the United States and other regional actors seem to have little ability to threaten or otherwise influence Pyongyang. Responding to the current situation by granting unreciprocated concessions to the North Koreans would likely exacerbate the problem; allowing North Korea to reap the economic benefits of broken promises will not lead to a sustainable solution.
If North Korea says no it puts the U.S. in a better position internationally to solve the problem
Scowcroft and Kanter 3 – *president of the Forum for International Policy and national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush AND **a senior fellow at the forum and under secretary of state from 1991 to 1993 (5/1/2003, Brent and Arnold, “A surprising success on North Korea”, Lexis) MGM
There is no assurance that Pyongyang will respond positively to such an approach, much less that negotiations will be successful. On the contrary, history gives rise more to pessimism than hope. But even if that pessimism proves warranted -- and North Korea shows itself to be more interested in nuclear proliferation than in guaranteed security -- continuation of Washington's good-faith effort will put it in an immensely stronger position internationally to deal with the threat.
A2: NK Will Reject the Offer
North Korea wants withdrawal of U.S. forces
Sohn, 10 (6/3/10, Sohn Kwang Joo, Chief Editor, Daily NK, “Cheonan the Introduction to Kim's Second Act,”
, JMP)
However, South Korea and the U.S. have no intention of accepting the North’s demand for a peace treaty as long as they know very well that North Korea’s ultimate aim is the complete withdrawal of U.S. Forces from South Korea and the destruction of the military alliance between the South and the U.S.
Will say yes – North Korea sees its nuclear program as a means to leverage a security guarantee from the U.S. – especially a withdrawal of U.S. troops
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
The North Korean Position on the Nuclear Crisis
Today North Korea seems to be determined to maintain nuclear weapons, which provide both a last resort for its security and a powerful means of political leverage vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States. North Korea may reluctantly give up its nuclear weapons only after it has obtained a security guarantee and secured political leverage through other means. Probably the most reasonable goal for the near future is a peace treaty with the United States and consequent withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. North Korea believes that this can be achieved only through bilateral talks with the United States.
Ever since the second nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002, North Korea has made it clear that it wants nothing but a security guarantee or peace treaty. This position is starkly different from its position in the first nuclear crisis in 1994, when it demanded substitute energy from light water reactors, economic aid, normalization of relations with the United States, and removal of the nuclear umbrella over South Korea in return for abandonment of its nuclear program.
It has become more urgent for Pyongyang to promote internal security and strengthen the solidarity of the North Korean people. For this purpose, Pyongyang may want to close the door to the United States, if it cannot expect any concessions from it. In the 2005 New Year’s joint editorial, North Korea hinted at its intention to isolate itself by emphasizing its method to promote internal stability: the improvement of agricultural production and people’s daily life. North Korea has said, “The United States regards the nuclear issue and the ‘human rights issue’ as two levers in executing its policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK,” and it has threatened to boycott the Six-Party Talks.
In this sense, the biggest misunderstanding of the United States may be its belief that North Korea’s economic difficulties will force it to come to the negotiation table and eventually abandon its nuclear program, as Libya did.
As the standoff in the nuclear crisis continues, North Korea may want to strengthen its position in order to attract the United States to bilateral negotiations. It is extracting more plutonium and increasing its stockpile of nuclear weapons.22 The long-range Taepodong II missile test on July 5, 2006 was intended to demonstrate North Korea’s ability to deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States. North Korea will also try to develop inter-Korean relations in the name of ‘national collaboration’ to gain economic assistance from the South and to discourage the U.S. hard-line policy towards the North. It will also strengthen its ties with Russia and China.
A2: NK Won’t Make Concessions on Nuclear Program
Recent multilateral negotiations prove North Korea is willing to make concessions
Kim 9 – Associated Press Writer (9/18/2009, Kwang-Tae, The Associated Press, “NKorea's Kim hints at returning to nuclear talks”, Lexis) MGM
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly said Friday his country is ready to engage in multilateral talks, the latest move in a diplomatic chess game with the U.S. and regional powers seeking to rid Pyongyang of nuclear weapons. "North Korea would like to solve relevant issues through bilateral and multilateral talks," China's official Xinhua News Agency quoted Kim as telling a special envoy sent by Chinese President Hu Jintao. Kim's remarks heightened the possibility of Pyongyang's return to stalled six-party disarmament negotiations it defiantly quit earlier this year. Though Kim did not appear to specify the forum which involves the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan North Korea watchers believe that is the signal he is sending. Kim's mention of multilateral talks "is seen as North Korea's intention to return to the six-nation negotiations," said analyst Lee Sang-hyun of the Sejong Institute, a security think tank outside Seoul. North Korea has been insisting on one-on-one negotiations with the United States over its nuclear programs. Washington, which had strictly demanded the North first return to the multilateral negotiating table, is now, however, mulling direct talks in what appears to be a subtle policy shift to help break the nuclear impasse and eventually resume the six-party discussions. China, North Korea's principal ally, has hosted the forum since 2003. The last session was held in December last year. "North Korea appears to have determined that it has no choice but to accept the opportunity," the Sejong Institute's Lee said, noting Washington and Pyongyang are seeking common ground for dialogue amid a burgeoning mood of conciliation. North Korea released two detained U.S. journalists last month in an apparent goodwill overture to Washington during a visit by former President Bill Clinton. It also subsequently released a detained South Korean worker and four captured South Korean fishermen and called for the resumption of stalled tourism projects with Seoul. North Korea's Kim also told the Chinese envoy, Dai Bingguo, that North Korea "is committed to safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula," Xinhua reported from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. North Korea has said it cannot give up its nuclear arsenal as long as the U.S. continues with what Pyongyang says is a "hostile policy" and plans for a nuclear attack. Washington denies it has any such intentions. In a letter Dai handed to Kim, Hu reiterated Beijing's stance that the Korean peninsula should be denuclearized and said China is ready to spare no efforts to work with North Korea to realize that goal, Xinhua said. South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Moon Tae-young declined to comment on Kim's reported remarks. Dai and top Chinese nuclear envoy Wu Dawei returned to Beijing later Friday, North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency said. The Kim-Dai meeting comes amid recent speculation of a possible visit to Pyongyang by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao early next month, although there has been no confirmation from Beijing. Also, the North has invited Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. special envoy on North Korea, to visit the country, an invitation Washington says it is considering. In response to a question in the National Assembly in Seoul on Thursday, South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said he understood that Wen would visit, but that the timing had not been finalized. Friday's meeting in Pyongyang came as the United States studies the North's call for direct talks on its nuclear weapons. The U.S. says such dialogue could be worthwhile to get North Korea back into the six-nation disarmament negotiations. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly told reporters Friday that he had seen press reports about the Dai meeting with Kim but would not comment further, referring questions to Chinese officials. "We, of course, remain committed to engaging North Korea bilaterally but only in the six-party context, only if it helps to lead to a resumption of that six-party contact," Kelly said. South Korea says it does not oppose direct U.S.-North Korea talks if they are aimed at resuming the six-party process. But South Korean officials, including President Lee Myung-bak, have cautioned against any hasty optimism, saying North Korea has shown no willingness to disarm. They say North Korea's recent conciliatory gestures came because it feels the pain of U.N. sanctions on its weapons exports and financial dealings that were imposed after it conducted a nuclear test in May.
A2: NK Won’t Make Concessions on Nuclear Program
North Korea will negotiate about their weapons policy
Harden 9 – Washington Post Foreign Service (9/19/2009, Blaine, Washington Post, “N. Korea Open to Talks, Kim Tells China;
Statement Signals Reversal on Nuclear Issue, Fits Familiar Bargaining Pattern”, Lexis) MGM
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il told a Chinese diplomat Friday that his government is willing to discuss its nuclear program in "bilateral or multilateral" meetings, China's official news agency said. North Korea walked away from stalled six-nation nuclear talks in the spring, during a time of stepped-up belligerence in which it launched missiles, conducted an underground nuclear test and threatened war with South Korea. Since August, however, the unpredictable communist state has reversed course, releasing several detained foreign nationals, including two U.S. journalists, and opening doors to trade with South Korea. Kim's statement is potentially the most significant move in the North's recent charm offensive. It could revive Beijing-based nuclear negotiations between the two Koreas, China, the United States, Russia and Japan. But Kim's words also fit a pattern of behavior in which North Korea precipitates an international security crisis and then, months or years later, moves to resolve it, usually in return for aid and other benefits. The Obama administration has repeatedly said it would hold bilateral discussions with the North Koreans only if they returned to the six-party talks, which began in 2003 and had resulted in North Korean promises to disable and ultimately get rid of its nuclear weapons program in return for economic and diplomatic concessions. U.S. officials say they are well aware of North Korea's practice of behaving badly, changing course and then seeking rewards from the international community. In May, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned North Korea, "As the expression goes in the United States, 'I am tired of buying the same horse twice.' " On Friday, the official New China News Agency quoted Kim as telling a special envoy sent by Chinese President Hu Jintao, "North Korea would like to solve relevant issues through bilateral and multilateral talks." The news agency also quoted Kim as saying that North Korea would "maintain its goal of denuclearization and make efforts for the protection of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula." The statement was an about-face from what North Korea had said in April, after the U.N. Security Council unanimously condemned Pyongyang's launch of a long-range missile. Then, North Korea ordered U.N. nuclear inspectors out of the country, vowed it would restart its plutonium factory and pledged to never again participate in the six-country nuclear negotiations. In April, Pyongyang also said the multilateral talks had "turned into a platform" for forcing the North to disarm and for bringing down its system of government. The Chinese envoy, Dai Bingguo, traveled to Pyongyang this week as part of an effort to persuade North Korea to return to the six-party talks. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is expected to travel to North Korea next month to discuss the nuclear issue. China, North Korea's closest ally and primary economic benefactor, has been unusually outspoken this year about its displeasure with Kim's government for detonating a nuclear device in May and for walking out of the denuclearization talks. In a letter that China's envoy handed to Kim, the news agency said, Hu reiterated Beijing's stance that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized and said China will spare no effort to work with North Korea to realize that goal.
Kim’s signaled he’s willing to denuclearize
Reuters 10 – (5/7/2010, “Kim Jong-il says North Korea committed to denuclearization”, ) MGM
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il reiterated his commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, China's state-run Xinhua news agency reported on Friday. The Chinese authorities previously declined to comment on media reports that Kim visited China just over a month after a South Korean warship sunk under unexplained circumstances in the Yellow Sea near the disputed maritime border with North Korea. However, Xinhua confirmed on Friday that Kim's unofficial visit took place from May 3 to 7. "Hu and Kim exchanged views on international situation, situation in Northeast Asia and the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue," the agency reported. The two leaders said that "peace, stability, prosperity on the Korean Peninsula is in line with common interests of China, the DPRK and the Northeast Asian countries" and expressed their readiness to "make joint efforts for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula," Xinhua said. The North Korean leader also said he would cooperate with his Chinese counterpart to restart the six-party talks, which came to a halt a year ago. "Kim said that the DPRK will work with China to create favorable conditions for restarting the six-party talks," the Chinese news agency said. The talks, involving Russia, Japan, China, the United States, North and South Korea, stalled last April when Pyongyang pulled out of the negotiations in protest against the United Nations' condemnation of its missile tests. The Chinese and North Korean leaders said "the relevant parties in the six-party talks should demonstrate sincerity and make positive efforts for pushing forward the six-party talks." Kim visited China in 2000, 2004 and 2006. The Chinese and North Korean authorities traditionally inform the public of such visits after they have been carried out.
***Condition on Chinese Cooperation CP
CP – Condition on Chinese Coop – 1nc
The United States federal government should offer to __________ only if the Peoples Republic of China agrees to remove Kim Jong-il from power.
Conditioning the plan on Chinese support to remove Kim Jong Il from power is key to ensure stable power transition without war. China will say yes.
Carpenter, 06 – vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato (10/11/06, Ted Galen, “China Must Pluck Kim from Nuke Perch,” , JMP)
North Korea has now barged into the nuclear-weapons club by conducting a nuclear test. In the weeks to come, there will be much discussion about how the United States should respond. The best option is encouraging China to oust Kim Jong Il. That is not to suggest that China should invade and occupy North Korea. Rather, it should pursue more subtle subversion, and it is ideally positioned to do so, since China provides a major portion of North Korea's food and energy supplies.
The prospect of a nuclear North Korea is almost as unappealing to China as it is to the United States. The move stands to push an already aggressive Japan into remilitarizing, reasserting itself in East Asia and perhaps also building nuclear weapons.
Until now, Beijing has been reluctant to put any serious economic pressure on Pyongyang. China worries that, if it undermines Kim Jong Il's regime, the North Korean state will unravel.
Such a development could have a number of unpleasant consequences for China, including a united Korea allied to the United States, and the presence of U.S. troops on the Chinese border.
The United States can allay those fears. Washington should assure Beijing that, if China subverts Kim's government, the United States will withdraw its forces and end its alliance with South Korea. That alliance is a wasting asset. Increasingly, Seoul aligns its foreign policy with that of Beijing rather than Washington, so it is long past time for an amicable divorce.
None of the alternatives is so enticing, and some, including the military option, are positively rash. Some hawks, including Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), have previously suggested air strikes against North Korea's nuclear installations and missile sites. Pyongyang might well retaliate against South Korea and Japan, triggering a general war.
Proposals to impose a blockade are almost as reckless. Under international law, a blockade is an act of war, and North Korea's leaders may consider it a prelude to the real thing.
If all else fails, America should rely on deterrence and containment. As unpleasant as a nuclear North Korea might be, the United States has deterred other unsavory and volatile regimes in the past, notably Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.
Indeed, China acquired its nuclear capability on the eve of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. That spasm of fanaticism made China as weird a place as North Korea is today. With an arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them with accuracy, the U.S. should be able to deter North Korea.
But the possibility of pushing Kim out without firing a shot is better. The offer of an American withdrawal from the Korean peninsula would be tempting - perhaps irresistible - to Chinese leaders, because it would make China the most influential power on the peninsula.
Chinese officials must already be pondering whether it is worth preserving the North Korean regime.
Kim ignored their warnings not to conduct new missile tests, and he has now ignored even stronger warnings that he not test a nuclear bomb.
So the Chinese may well be ready to eliminate their troublesome client - if the United States makes it worth their while. It would be a relatively painless way to end the North Korean threat for good, so we should at least explore the option.
2nc Chinese Influence Bad NB
Counterplan collapses Chinese neutrality which is key to its influence in the third world
Macleod 10 – reporter for USA Today (6/3/2010, Calum, USA Today, “Tension in Korea: A sunken ship, and talk of war”, ) MGM
"We're in this clear cycle now without any clear exit ramps. The danger about conventional provocations is that the DMZ and the balance of forces are on hair-trigger alert on both sides," says Cha, who adds that he worries North Korea may attempt another strike against South Korea. "There's an action-reaction cycle that in some ways is more dangerous than the possibility of a conventional war." Such a war could devastate both sides quickly. North Korea and South Korea boast two of the largest and most well-equipped militaries in the world, says Joseph Bermudez Jr., a senior defense analyst for the Jane's Information Group. About 70% of North Korea's 1.2 million servicemembers are stationed near the DMZ, and the South Korean capital, Seoul, and its sprawling suburbs are vulnerable to North Korean artillery, Bermudez says. South Korea has 680,000 servicemembers backed by 28,500 U.S. troops, but it is outnumbered by the North's troops and vast advantage in rocket launchers, tanks and artillery. Bermudez says North Korea could not stand up to the firepower of a U.S.-backed South Korea but could do great damage. Then there is China, a wild card in the dispute that has been the North's main benefactor and protector for the past two decades. It was hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops flooding onto the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War that maintained the division of the country between a western-backed South and a communist North. China has much to gain by maintaining its neutral stance, Bermudez says. He says the current crisis gives China a chance to burnish its reputation as an emerging power — particularly in developing nations, where through the years it quietly has expanded trade relations and secured oil and precious mineral rights. "By holding the cards and maneuvering the United States on this issue, (China) shows to its Third World friends, allies and partners that it can handle the United States," Bermudez says. "That adds a lot of political juice to (the Chinese) in the Third World. "They may want this (issue) to stick around a while to keep their dog on a leash and keep the United States looking weak. It serves them politically."
Chinese influence in Africa fosters oppressive regimes, triggering multiple state failures
Brookes and Shin 6 - *Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs and the Chung-Ju Yung Fellow for Policy Studies AND **Research Assistant in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation (2/22/2006, Peter and Ji Hye, The Heritage Foundation, “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States”, ) MGM
Amid growing concerns about the People’s Republic of China’s burgeoning influence around the globe, Beijing has now set its sights on Africa. China’s interest in Africa is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing’s interest centered on building ideological solidarity with other underdeveloped nations to advance Chinese-style communism and on repelling Western “imperialism.” Following the Cold War, Chinese interests evolved into more pragmatic pursuits such as trade, investment, and energy. In recent years, Beijing has identified the African continent as an area of significant economic and strategic interest. America and its allies and friends are finding that their vision of a prosperous Africa governed by democracies that respect human rights and the rule of law and that embrace free markets is being challenged by the escalating Chinese influence in Africa. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) aids and abets oppressive and destitute African dictatorships by legitimizing their misguided policies and praising their development models as suited to individual national conditions. Beijing holds out China’s unique development model—significant economic growth overseen by a disciplined, one-party totalitarian state with full authority, if not control, over all aspects of economic activity—as an example for others to emulate. Moreover, China rewards its African friends with diplomatic attention and financial and military assistance, exacerbating existing forced dislocations of populations and abetting massive human rights abuses in troubled countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. As a consequence, Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa counters the liberalizing influences of Africa’s traditional European and American partners. China’s vigorous campaign to develop close ties with individual African nations also reflects Beijing’s global quest to isolate Taiwan diplomatically (seven of the 26 countries that have full diplomatic relations with Taiwan are African).1 The most pernicious effect of the renewed Chinese interest in Africa is that China is legitimizing and encouraging Africa’s most repressive regimes, thereby increasing the likelihood of weak and failed states. The United States must also be alert to the potential long-term disruption of American access to important raw materials and energy sources as these resources are “locked up” by Chinese firms for the PRC’s domestic market to maintain China’s economic growth.
2nc Chinese Influence Bad NB
State failure destabilizes the globe – results in disease spread, nuclear terrorism, and rogue nation prolif – this guarantees nuclear war
The African Studies Centre et al 3 (December 2003, The Transnational Institute, The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center – CIP-FUHEM, “Failed and Collapsed States in the International System,” )
In the malign scenario of global developments the number of collapsed states would grow significantly. This would mean that several more countries in the world could not be held to account for respecting international agreements in various fields, be it commercial transactions, debt repayment, the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the use of the national territory for criminal or terrorist activities. The increase in failed states would immediately lead to an increase in international migration, which could have a knock-on effect, first in neighbouring countries which, having similar politicoeconomic structures, could suffer increased destabilization and collapse as well. Developments in West Africa during the last decade may serve as an example. Increased international migration would, secondly, have serious implications for the Western world. In Europe it would put social relations between the population and immigrant communities under further pressure, polarizing politics. An increase in collapsed states would also endanger the security of Western states and societies. Health conditions could deteriorate as contagious diseases like Ebola or Sars would spread because of a lack of measures taken in collapsed areas. Weapons of mass destruction could come into the hands of various sorts of political entities, be they terrorist groups, political factions in control of part of a collapsed state or an aggressive political elite still in control of a national territory and intent on expansion. Not only North Korea springs to mind; one could very well imagine such states in (North) Africa. Since the multilateral system of control of such weapons would have ended in part because of the decision of the United States to try and check their spread through unilateral action - a system that would inherently be more unstable than a multilateral, negotiated regime - one could be faced with an arms race that would sooner or later result in the actual use of these weapons. In the malign scenario, relations between the US and Europe would also further deteriorate, in questions of a military nature as well as trade relations, thus undercutting any possible consensus on stemming the growth of collapsed states and the introduction of stable multilateral regimes towards matters like terrorism, nuclear weapons and international migration. Disagreement is already rife on a host of issues in these fields. At worst, even the Western members of the Westphalian system - especially those bordering on countries in the former Third World, i.e. the European states - could be faced with direct attacks on their national security.
2nc Solvency
The counterplan solves the case better – gives China an incentive to productively boost its influence to prevent Korean proliferation and instability
Bandow, 10 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/25/10, Doug, The Daily Caller, “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia,” , JMP)
While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace.
For instance, the Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With 27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any conflict.
Less obvious but potentially more serious is the future status of Taiwan. The People's Republic of China insists that the island, separated from the mainland by Japanese occupation and civil war, return to Beijing's authority. The Taiwanese people are never likely to support control by the PRC.
Although China-Taiwan relations have improved with a new government in Taipei, Beijing may grow impatient as its power increases and be tempted to substitute coercion for negotiation. However, Washington has implicitly guaranteed Taipei's security, which could lead to a serious military confrontation between the U.S. and China.
How to maintain the peace in East Asia? Washington must engage the PRC on both issues.
America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not.
China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly.
As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S.
In return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC's border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark — predictably — a hostile response from China.
Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC's role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan.
For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea's Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment.
His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed — and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments.
To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal. The North's nuclear program would yield concern even in the best of cases. But the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is no best case.
The regime started a war in 1950 and engaged in terrorism into the 1980s. Pyongyang has cheerfully sold weapons to all comers. Worse, today it appears to be in the midst of an uncertain leadership transition. If North Korean forces sank the South Korean vessel, then either Kim Jong-il is ready to risk war or has lost control of the military, which is ready to risk war.
The Obama administration should indicate to the PRC that Washington will face sustained pressure to take military action against the North — which obviously would not be in Beijing's interest. Should the DPRK amass a nuclear arsenal, the U.S. would have no more desire than China to be in the middle of a messy geopolitical confrontation, especially one that could go nuclear.
Thus, Washington would not be inclined to block decisions by the ROK and Japan to create countervailing nuclear arsenals. Just as the prospect of a North Korean bomb worries the U.S., the possibility of a Japanese nuclear capacity would unsettle the PRC.
Should China take the tough, even risky (from its standpoint) steps necessary to moderate or transform Pyongyang, Washington should promise to reciprocate. The DPRK poses the greatest threat to regional peace and security. Eliminate it, and eliminate the principal justification for a U.S. military presence in East Asia. Most obvious would be a promise not to maintain American bases or troops in the Korean peninsula, whether united or divided. Pulling back units from Japan would also be warranted.
The issue of Taiwan requires Chinese forbearance rather than action. A Chinese commitment to peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status would eliminate the geopolitical dispute most likely to set America and Beijing at military odds.
The PRC already has triumphed on the international stage since most nations, and all major countries, recognize China over Taiwan. Winning formal control over Taipei would offer Beijing symbolic rather than practical benefits.
Moreover, China's economy has surpassed that of Taiwan and today benefits enormously from Taiwanese investment. The growing economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait also diminishes the importance of Taipei's de facto political independence.
The two peoples if not the two states are growing increasingly interrelated. The lack of political control over 23 million people may pose a nationalistic affront to the PRC, but it is one Beijing should bear to promote its larger objective of attaining global leadership.
In contrast, using military force — whether intimidation, blockade, or invasion — against the island would generate costs far out of proportion to any possible gains in terms of prestige. A hostile regional and Western response would be inevitable.
China's neighbors certainly would see the PRC's rise as anything but peaceful. Any coercive act would be a powerful impetus for Japan to create a larger military and adopt a more aggressive foreign policy.
The greatest risk would be a confrontation with the U.S. Economic retaliation would be certain and military intervention possible. Given the length and strength of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, no American administration could easily stand by if the PRC used force against Taipei.
Chinese aggression also would validate the warnings of American hawks, who are pressing for ever higher military outlays despite America's dearth of serious adversaries. Even Europe would see Beijing as a threatening actor, rather as major European powers came to view Wilhelmine Germany, and likely would retaliate economically.
Washington should press the PRC to take two simple steps: renounce the use of force to resolve Taiwan's status and remove missiles now targeting the island. In return, Taiwan should indicate that it will not ally with any party or allow other powers to use bases against the PRC. The U.S. should explain that it has no intention of intervening militarily against China, maintaining a military alliance with Taiwan, or using military facilities on the island. Washington also should pull back other military units stationed nearby, such as the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa.
Demonstrating its pacific intent would enable the PRC to defuse proposals to revamp America's alliances with South Korea and Japan to deal with other contingencies — meaning China. Although Beijing's rise has been steady, its continued rise will be smoother if achieved in cooperation with its neighbors and without hostility from them or America. The PRC's own actions will be the most important factor in determining other nations' reactions.
It is often said that Americans live in a dangerous world. We do. But shoe and underwear bombers do not match the threat posed by nation states armed with nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, carrier groups, and armored divisions.
While the future is uncertain, it is difficult to imagine the U.S. at war with Russia, India, or any significant power other than China. Thankfully, conflict with the latter also remains unlikely.
But the mere possibility of a future military confrontation reinforces the importance of the world's two most important nations working to defuse potential conflicts. Which means cooperating on North Korea and Taiwan. Doing so successfully would go a long way to make the 21st century one of peace and stability.
Withdrawal => Leverage for Coop
The plan can be used to leverage Chinese cooperation on North Korea
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Certainly, a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in the region would certainly bring regional fallout, causing other nations in the region to rethink their national security strategy. Along with the parties directly involved in the peninsula, China and Japan will also need to rethink their own grand strategies in the region to maintain a balance of power and to maintain stability in the Korean Peninsula.
China
According to their national strategy, “China will mainly rely on its own strength for development, and therefore poses no obstacle or threat to any one. China needs a peaceful international environment for its own development, which in turn will enhance peace and development in the world. Holding high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, China adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy of the defensive nature. China will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony.” 35 Additionally, “the foundation for the Six-Party Talks is not solid enough as uncertain factors linger in the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The threat posed by terrorism, separatism and extremism is still grave.” 36 Finally, China’s national security policy is to “pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and adhere to the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination with a view to securing a longterm and favorable international and surrounding environment. 37
China will most likely pursue stronger strategic relationships with Russia as well as Japan in the event the U.S. completely withdraws from South Korea. Since there is no clear hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region, a multi-polar balance of power would probably be beneficial for the region. Due to their sheer size and presence in the region, each nation could work together to help maintain stability not only to the Korean Peninsula, but to the overall Asia-Pacific region.
In order to maintain balance of power in the region, China will most likely pressure North Korea to unify the Koreas. However, if the Koreas unite under South Korea’s influence, they (the Chinese) would view this as a strategic advantage of the U.S. due to the close proximity to Korea and China; therefore the most favorable condition would be to have North Korea unify the Koreas under North Korean conditions.
One of the challenges the current Administration faces according to Park, is the “lack of strong policy coordination with China, in jointly leading the multinational diplomatic effort”38 The U.S. might use their withdrawal from South Korea as leverage for China to pursue a more strategic role in the Asia Pacific theater. According to the 2006 QDR, the U.S. is in a favor of China playing a more strategic role in the Asia-Pacific Theater. For China, “The United States remains focused on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as partner in addressing common security challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and piracy.” 39
Solvency Extensions
The U.S. should work out an agreement with China that allows the U.S. to withdrawal and ensures stability
Brinkley 10 - professor of journalism at Stanford University, is a former foreign correspondent for the New York Times (Joel Brinkley, “China is North Korea’s Prime Enabler,” SF Gate, 6/6/10, )
China's motives are clear enough. Its leaders know that if they back away from North Korea, reduce or eliminate aid, the regime will quickly collapse. Almost everyone in the world would welcome that except China. The Chinese worry about millions of refugees pouring over the border, about a new government in Pyongyang dominated by South Korea and its ally, the United States.
But that does not have to be. Renegade governments like North Korea's threaten most everyone. It's in the entire world's interest to assure China that it does not have to fear a collapse of the Kim Jong il regime. Shouldn't South Korea and the United States, the two most important players here, work out an agreement with Beijing?
Make China aware of the immediate benefits. If North Korea were a friendly, peaceful nation, the United States could reduce its military presence in the region to something China ardently wants. Under an agreement, China could administer the country for an interim period. The U.N. Security Council, where China holds a veto, would work out a long-term solution.
No, the end result might not be a unified, democratic Korea. But the state would finally be stable and calm, its people at last given enough to eat. That would be a relief for most everyone on Earth.
Solves Denuclearization
China and North Korea is hitting a divide, US-Sino cooperation over military presence now key to denuclearize the peninsula
Snyder, Et. Al. ’10 – director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. “US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” ww.content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf)
The Task Force finds that China’s policy toward the Korean peninsula—and the role of cooperation and competition on Korean issues as a component of the U.S.-China relationship—is a critical variable that influences the range of available tools for addressing North Korea’s nuclear program. The current DPRK regime’s survival depends on China’s willingness to supply the necessary food and fuel to ensure North Korean sustainability. If North Korea’s economy is on life support, the Chinese are providing the necessities to keep it alive. Although China and North Korea have a shared history and ideological foundation, bilateral ties have frayed over the past two decades as China has taken a path of economic reform and North Korea has continued to pursue autarchy and isolation. Hence, China and North Korea have less and less in common. In fact, China’s policy toward North Korea is contradictory to overall trends in People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreign policy. Whereas China works to promote regional stability, a nuclear North Korea provides a fundamental challenge to security in the region. These contradictions are at the core of China’s policy dilemma as it manages its relations with North Korea.23 That China continues to view the Korean peninsula through the lens of its relationship with the United States exacerbates these contradictions. China has continuously insisted that the core motivation for North Korea’s nuclear pursuits lies in its mistrust of the United States and that security assurances in the context of improvements in the U.S.-DPRK political relationship would belie North Korea’s need for a nuclear program. Even though North Korea’s nuclear pursuits have directly challenged Chinese interests, mistrust of U.S. intentions on the Korean peninsula—which dates to the Korean War—has inhibited Sino-U.S. cooperation on Korean issues. China has emerged as a mediator between Washington and Pyongyang by hosting the Six Party Talks, a role in which Chinese diplomats have taken great pride, but Chinese mediation efforts are more focused on China’s desire to keep both sides calm rather than on achieving a solution. North Korea’s continued insistence on defying Chinese efforts to mediate—even as its economy depends utterly on Chinese imports—demonstrates China’s patience. While China is concerned about North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapons capacity, its greater concern is the possibility of North Korean instability. For this reason, China emphasizes negotiations and has been reluctant to consider coercive measures as part of its strategy toward North Korea. China remains wary of U.S. preferred tools for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, eschewing pressure and sanctions in favor of economic incentives and attempts to entice North Korea to join in dialogue and cooperation. A U.S. approach that emphasizes regional cohesion in dealing with North Korea requires Chinese cooperation, but there are limits to the range of options China is willing to consider. China wants to maintain its own independent approach to the Korean peninsula, even as it cooperates with the United States. Following North Korea’s first nuclear test in 20o6, some Chinese analysts criticized their government for working too closely with the United States, which, they charged, resulted in a cooling of Sino-North Korean ties and a perceived loss of Chinese influence in North Korea. After North Korea’s ŒŸŸ‹ test, Beijing chose to reinforce ties with Pyongyang even while going along with a strong UNSC resolution condemning the test. This bifurcated course of action may have preserved Chinese influence in North Korea, but China has thus far been unable to use that influence to convince North Korea to recommit itself to denuclearization. The task of persuading China to assume greater responsibility for North Korea’s denuclearization is a challenging one. China’s leaders must come to the conclusion that a nuclear North Korea under its current unpredictable leadership risks the stability that China has invested so heavily in trying to preserve. Past experience suggests that China takes action only when it perceives increased tensions or the possibility of military conflict between North Korea and the United States. In early 2003, China determined that it would play a more active mediating role when it appeared that the prospect of military confrontation between the United States and North Korea was rising. China has also been concerned about the negative effect of North Korean provocation of its neighbors. For example, Chinese leaders were alarmed when North Korea’s Œ006 tests prompted discussions in Japan about preemption and the question of whether to consider its own nuclear option.24 China has also responded when its leaders perceive that North Korea is a high priority for the United States or feel that the United States might negotiate directly with North Korea. President Bush’s personal efforts to discuss North Korea with Chinese president Hu Jintao mobilized enhanced Sino-U.S. cooperation, though former assistant secretary of state Christopher R. Hill’s visit to North Korea in June Œ00¥ without consulting with or debriefing Beijing evoked concern.25 For China and the United States to succeed in coordinating their policies toward North Korea, the subject of how to achieve a nonnuclear Korean peninsula will have to be treated as a top priority on the bilateral agenda, ideally at the presidential level. It will not be easy for the United States to catalyze further cooperation from China. But Chinese leaders should seriously consider the possibility that North Korean proliferation resulting in nuclear terrorism would likely draw a much sharper U.S. military response. China worries about the emergence of an unfriendly regime in a future unified Korea. If the Obama administration’s efforts to build regional cohesion and closer Sino-U.S. cooperation are to bear fruit, the United States will need to clarify its objectives toward the Korean peninsula and provide reassurance about its intentions. The Task Force calls for a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula and “principles” of a united Korea. Such a dialogue could include discussion about the process of potential unification and what a unified Korea might look like, including the number, location, and even presence of U.S. troops in Korea and a pledge to keep the peninsula nuclear-free. Any discussion with China regarding desired outcomes or future developments on the Korean peninsula would have to be based on full, prior U.S. coordination with allies in Seoul and Tokyo.
solves WMD Prolif
US-Chinese co-operation key solve WMD prolif in the Korean Peninsula
Snyder, Et. Al. ’10 – director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. “US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” ww.content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf)
Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability. Sino-U.S. cooperation to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is in the mutual interests of both countries and will be a critical proving ground for the relationship. Failure to make progress toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would be a significant setback for efforts to promote a cooperative approach to regional security in Northeast Asia. The level of China’s cooperation and involvement is the main factor that will determine whether it is possible to achieve a strategy that goes beyond containment and management of North Korea’s nuclear and missile aspirations to rollback.
China Will Do Soft Sanctions
China is willing to impose limited sanctions
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership? pg. 177, ) MGM
Third, China and the United States continue to have substantial disagreements on the efficacy of economic sanctions but may find common ground in some instances. Beijing will selectively apply pressure on states both through unilateral means and support for targeted sanctions agreed on by members of the UN Security Council to induce compliance with international agreements. China believes that limited pressure sends a useful political signal that may compel the target country to reconsider its policies, especially if combined with inducements and opportunities for progress through dialogue. China continues to oppose harsh sanctions that are aimed at forcing changes in policy by inflicting injury to a country’s economic development and the livelihood of the people.
Chinese Coop Key to Solvency
China is the only State with the power to stop North Korea’s attack
The Age, 10 (5/28/10, “China holds the key to Korean standoff,” Lexis)
Theories abound as to why North Korea should have embarked on a course that is so patently against the interest of its ruling clique, most of which suggest that Kim Jong-il is trying to placate restive generals who have been increasingly critical of the North's dismal economic performance under his leadership. Whatever the reason for the North's new bellicosity, however, the crucial influence in halting any further slide towards war must be wielded by Pyongyang's only ally, China.
Beijing has a strong material interest in staving off conflict and propping up its erratic neighbour: if the regime collapses, China would have to deal with an influx of refugees on its southern border. In previous standoffs between the two Koreas, or between North Korea and the US, China has lent at least rhetorical support to its ally, though of an increasingly grudging kind. There are signs that even this may be beginning to end, with Chinese officials expressing exasperation and bewilderment at the North's aggressive actions. Less inclined to criticise, however, have been China's generals, who have their own ties to their counterparts in North Korea, outside the two countries' political leaderships.
Whether the US can persuade Beijing to use its influence in North Korea to defuse tension on the peninsula will be a crucial test for the Obama administration's project of building a new relationship with China. Even more, it will be a test of China's readiness to assume the global diplomatic responsibilities to which it aspires. As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in Seoul this week, it is in everyone's interest, including China's, that North Korea should change direction.
China is the only country who can influence North Korea successfully – their first concern is stability
Marshall, 10 – President of the Progressive Policy Institute (6/16/10, Will, “China is the Key to Handling Nuclear North Korea” Lexis)
Instead, it's time for quiet but pointed talks with China about prospects for political change within North Korea. China, which supplies the North with food, fuel, and trade, as well as political support, is the one country with any real leverage over its behavior. The critical question now is whether, in the wake of the Cheonan episode, Beijing will continue to act as the Kim dynasty's enabler. Chinese officials have condemned the attack but have so far refused to assign the blame to North Korea. Beijing is in a difficult position, however, since it doesn't want to sour relations with the South, a far more significant trading partner. And the Chinese know that Pyongyang's nuclear bluster and spasmodic attacks on the South reinforce America's security alliances in the Far East.
Where the Koreas are concerned, China craves stability above all else. This gives the Obama administration an opening to "heighten the contradictions" in Beijing's policy; namely, that its support for the Kim dynasty ensures chronic instability on the Korea peninsula. Sooner or later, this Cold War anachronism will implode, and Washington and Beijing ought to start preparing jointly for that eventuality. For now, containment offers a better guide to U.S. policymakers than engagement.
Chinese Coop Key to Solvency
China is thwarting U.S. policies toward the North now – its cooperation is key
Colonel Stevens, 06 (3/15/06, Colonel Wayne Stevens, “Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” , JMP)
A second concern involves how China fits into the international politics and influence within the Northeast Asian region. China has undergone a major economic transformation by ascending from a financially bankrupt country to a major trading center of goods in the Asia- Pacific region; replacing the U.S. “Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore already export more to China and send more investment capital to China than they do to the United States.”56 China’s economic growth coupled with its growth in military ground forces is making China a major player in the Northeast Asia region and a growing influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, more Asian countries are depending on China instead of the United States for economic growth.57 Also, because of China’s growing military power more Asian countries have started to adjust their realignments with China.58 Some political science observers argue that “the ROK is closer to China than the U.S. in the six-party talks”59 or that “the ROK no longer supports U.S. policy toward North Korea, but rather cooperates with China to undermine U.S. efforts to isolate and coerce North Korea.”60
The purpose of the Six-Party talks is to establish a forum for the United States, China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and Russia to discuss and talk through the issues concerning the DPRK nuclear weapons program. China’s influence in international politics can possibly be best seen during the September 2005 fourth round of the Six-Party Talks when they urged the DPRK and the U.S. to accept the September 19 th Agreement that included ambiguous language on the light water reactor and allows North Korea to retain a civilian nuclear program.61 North Korea reluctantly accepted the ambiguous statement about the light water reactor and “China made clear it was prepared to blame the U.S. for failure of the talks if it did not also accept the statement.”62 Although both South Korea and China stated that North Korea must stop their nuclear weapons program, their positions during the Six-Party Talks presents a challenge for the U.S. For example, “South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong Young has proclaimed that the North is entitled to a nuclear program”63 and the Chinese delegation for the November 2005 fifth round of the Six-Party Talks stated that the DPRK has a right to retain nuclear capability for their civilian nuclear energy program.64 The U.S. representatives, however, were adamant about ceasing all nuclear operations to include nuclear operations for civilian nuclear energy programs until North Korea has fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program.65 China’s improved position in Northeast Asia, both militarily and economically, can be viewed by other countries in the region as a viable alternative to a U.S. alliance for maintaining regional stability. Countries in the region may seek to improve their foreign relations with China after taking into consideration that Russia and China conducted a joint military exercise called “Peace Mission 2005” in August 2005. The exercise gave China an opportunity to observe some of Russia’s weaponry that China will probably purchase. The exercise started in Russia and concluded in China under a scenario of the two countries responding in order to stabilize a fictional country within the region.66 China’s economic and military growth, improved China-Russia relations, along with China’s support for North and South Korea cooperation, warrant considering China as a potential threat to the U.S.
Mathematical analysis proves US-Sino cooperation over North Korea is the best policy
Sin 9 – works at Troy University (11/27/2009, Steve, “North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Implications for Sino-American Bilateral Relations”, pg. 19-21, ) MGM
It should be pointed out that the utility calculation also does suggest that the option of not cooperate should not be used alone without the possibility of changing the strategy to cooperative at some point of the relationship because the consequence of the United States and North Korea both not cooperating could be catastrophic to the Northeast Asian security arrangement – as shown in the lower right-hand square of Figure 3-1. If the United States is not going to use both cooperative and not cooperative strategies, whether simultaneously as it is doing now or sequentially, the results show the only viable choice for the United States at that point is to cooperate. As for the United States strategy for Sino-American engagement in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, cooperation is the strategy that both maximizes the utility and is risk-averse whether or not China chooses to cooperate with the United States or not (shown in Figure 3-3). For China, cooperation, again, is the best strategy with the highest payoff against North Korea. Relative to the United States, however, China has more maneuvering space as to its decision to whether to cooperate or not to cooperate with North Korea because for China the only scenario that will cause China to realize negative utility is if North Korea decides not to cooperate and retain its nuclear capability at the same time (shown in Figure 3-2). Implications and Recommendations Implications for Sino-American Relation The three strategy and payoff matrixes illustrated quantitatively the divergent priorities and desired outcomes of the United States and China in regards to the North Korean nuclear issue. It was determined the United States can only realize a positive utility if and only if the United States cooperated with China and China cooperated with the United States in return. In contrast, while China maximized its utility if it cooperated with the United States, it would not realize a negative utility as long as the United States cooperated with it. In relation to North Korea, the United States was able to realize positive utility if the United States cooperated with North Korea and North Korea cooperated and denuclearized in return, or if the United States chose not to cooperate but the North decided to cooperate and denuclearize anyway. Dissimilarly, while China was shown to maximize its utility if it cooperated with North Korea and North Korea cooperated and denuclearized in return, it was able to realize a small amount of utility, or at least break even, as long as North Korea cooperated with China regardless of if North Korea denuclearized or not. Based on these results, it can be concluded the United States must cooperate with both China and North Korea and persuade North Korea to denuclearize (whether directly or indirectly through China) to protect its interests and achieve its policy goals. It can also be concluded China has more options in dealing with both the United States and North Korea. While it is best for China to cooperate with both the United States and North Korea and entice North Korea to denuclearize, unlike the United States, China can protect its interests and achieve its policy goals even if North Korea does not denuclearize. Both the United States and China realize highest utility if the two countries cooperated fully and North Korea denuclearized; therefore, it is most likely the two countries will continue to cooperate in the future to bring North Korea to the negotiating table with the ultimate goal of denuclearizing it. However, the analysis also clearly showed that disparity of circumstances and priorities could generate conflict between Washington and Beijing in their independent pursuit of national interests.
China Can Influence North Korea
China has massive influence over North Korea
Shinn 10 – former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (June, James, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, pg. 60, ) MGM
I wish to highlight a major and a minor point in this otherwise excellent report. First and foremost, if the Task Force is correct that “it is a top priority in U.S.-China relations to make progress in bringing North Korea back to the path of denuclearization”—and I believe it is—then Beijing’s sustained life support for the Kim regime is clearly the key to the rollback and the regime change options. I doubt that “a dialogue designed to provide strategic reassurance” will convince China’s leaders to cut the lifeline to their client state to the east. Instead, diplomatic, economic, and military pressure of the highest order, and on a multilateral basis, will be required.
China can influence North Korea because of its crude oil supply, food aid, and trade volume
BBC 09 (10/7/09, “South Korean paper on China’s Growing Influence over North” Lexis)
(CHOSUN ILBO) -The construction of a major bridge over the Apnok or Yalu River is part of an economic partnership agreement China and North Korea signed on Sunday. At present, the only bridge connecting the two countries across the Yalu River is the Sino-(North) Korea Friendship Bridge built in 1943. The 66-year-old dilapidated, single-lane bridge, which has handled more than half of North Korea's trade with the outside world, symbolizes North Korea's closed and withered state.
China accounts for almost 70 per cent of North Korea's trade volume. But for Beijing, the volume of trade with North Korea is negligible. From an economic standpoint, it is North Korea that needs a new bridge, yet it is China that proposed it and is footing the W150 billion ($1US=W1,170) bill. China made the offer two years ago, but North Korea has put off responding.
The primary reason was that the North feared its tightly sealed borders would be blown open by the winds of change and reform from China. But it seems to have been overwhelmed by China's strength as it can no longer survive without it.
Although still ruled by Kim Jong Il [ Kim Cho'ng-il], North Korea is being sucked deeper into China's political, economic and military influence. It is no secret that the North Korean regime would be unable to last long if China were to close off its crude oil supply. People who have visited North Korea say advocates of close ties with China hold key positions within the Kim Jong Il [ Kim Cho'ng-il] regime.
China has already secured mining rights for North Korea's key mines, including Musan iron ore mine in North Hamgyong Province, Hyesan copper mine in Yanggang Province and Yongdeung coal mine in North Pyongan Province. China is in charge of prospecting for offshore oil deposits on the West Sea and has won exclusive use of certain docks in Rajin port by either building or expanding them. China has also won the rights to fish in parts of North Korea's territorial waters and to develop the Yalu River. During the latest visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, the two countries also signed agreements in the areas of food, energy, education and information and technology.
Yet China, which wields so much influence in North Korea, is not using it to the fullest in getting Pyongyang to scrap its nuclear weapons programme. It does not want to endanger the North Korean regime, and there are many signs that Beijing believes the status quo is to its advantage.
China has bolstered its military presence on the Yalu River. It is obvious why. The future of the Korean people depends on whether North Korea chooses to abandon its nuclear ambitions and whether South Korea has the wisdom to accept the North as a partner in prosperity and use that relationship to achieve reunification. Failure to do that will deliver both Koreas straight into Beijing's strategic framework, where it will get stuck as a side show to China's golden age
China Can Influence North Korea
China is willing to spend economic and diplomatic capital to influence North Korea.
Reuters, 10 (5/11/10, “China Wagers on Long-Term Stake in North Korea” )
BEIJING, May 11 (Reuters) - China won no clear dividends from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's latest secretive visit but showed it will wager major economic and diplomatic stakes on shaping its neighbour's shaky future.
After Beijing ended its official silence about Kim's five-day visit that ended on Friday, Chinese media reported that North Korea was willing "to discuss creati
That was far from a firm personal commitment from Kim to rejoin the moribund six-party disarmament talks that also includes the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan.
Chinese President Hu Jintao, however, appeared focused on securing a bigger economic role for China in North Korea, and gaining more clarity over Kim's intentions, said analysts.
China's leaders want to "position themselves effectively in the event that there is change in North Korea, to protect their interests and advance their influence", said Bonnie Glaser, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., who studies Chinese foreign policy.
Kim's frailty from age and illness was visible in news footage of his visit. Worries about what could follow his death or infirmity appear to have magnified China's determination to extend its stake in the North.
"China appears to have been preparing what is more or less a bail-out package with strings attached", said John Park, a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington D.C. who studies Chinese-North Korean relations.
"Kim's frail health has raised alarm bells (in China)".
But China's courting of North Korea carries economic costs, and has irked the two countries' neighbours, who fear that Beijing's backing could dilute pressure on Kim to return to nuclear disarmament talks.
Officials in Seoul have chided China for courting Kim soon after a South Korean naval ship, the Cheonan, sank from what they have hinted was probably a North Korean torpedo.
China has vastly more trade with South Korea than with the North. But Beijing will put up with diplomatic squalls with Seoul as a down-payment for firmer ties with Pyongyang.
Turmoil in the North could release a surge of refugees into northeast China and even threaten the North's survival as Beijing's strategic buffer against South Korea and its ally, the United States.
Chinese reports said Hu told Kim that their two countries should "strengthen strategic communication" on major domestic and foreign issues -- words that could cover discussion of Kim's succession plans.
"Hu's proposal suggested that China does not want any more surprises such as missile tests, or nuclear tests, or incidents such as the Cheonan", said Wei Zhijiang, an expert on Korea at Zhongshan University in southern China.
China’s influence over North Korea means it will denuclearize
Snyder 9 – Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (6/17/2009, Scott, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests and Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here?”, House Testimony, pg. 7, ) MGM
If such a dialogue were possible, it might change the context in which North Korea is operating and compel North Korean cooperation at the risk of its own regime survival. China in effect holds considerable leverage over North Korea and the effect of international sanctions has been to increase North Korea’s economic dependency on China. The practical objective and result of U.S.-China strategic cooperation would be to change North Korea’s strategic context in ways that would compel one of two possible scenarios: either the regime moves back to substantive implementation of denuclearization through negotiations or the conditions will be created under which a successor political leadership cooperates to pursue denuclearization. Prospects for strategic coordination with China to shape the strategic context for dealing with North Korea would in principle be enhanced as a result of strengthened U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliance coordination toward North Korea. Advance coordination with allies would set the parameters for a U.S.-China dialogue so as to ensure that South Korean and Japanese interests, respectively, are taken into account. To the extent that China views Japanese and South Korean defense strengthening—or the prospect of a strengthened U.S.-led alliance system—as contrary to Chinese interests, the North Korean tests should catalyze Chinese cooperation through the six-party process.
China Can Influence North Korea
North Korea will say yes to China because of their massive dependency on China
Pritchard et al. 10 – President of the Korea Economic Institute (June, Charles, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, pg. 20-23, ) MGM
The Task Force finds that China’s policy toward the Korean peninsula— and the role of cooperation and competition on Korean issues as a component of the U.S.-China relationship—is a critical variable that influences the range of available tools for addressing North Korea’s nuclear program. The current DPRK regime’s survival depends on China’s willingness to supply the necessary food and fuel to ensure North Korean sustainability. If North Korea’s economy is on life support, the Chinese are providing the necessities to keep it alive. Although China and North Korea have a shared history and ideological foundation, bilateral ties have frayed over the past two decades as China has taken a path of economic reform and North Korea has continued to pursue autarchy and isolation. Hence, China and North Korea have less and less in common. In fact, China’s policy toward North Korea is contradictory to overall trends in People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreign policy. Whereas China works to promote regional stability, a nuclear North Korea provides a fundamental challenge to security in the region. These contradictions are at the core of China’s policy dilemma as it manages its relations with North Korea.23 That China continues to view the Korean peninsula through the lens of its relationship with the United States exacerbates these contradictions. China has continuously insisted that the core motivation for North Korea’s nuclear pursuits lies in its mistrust of the United States and that security assurances in the context of improvements in the U.S.-DPRK political relationship would belie North Korea’s need for a nuclear program. Even though North Korea’s nuclear pursuits have directly challenged Chinese interests, mistrust of U.S. intentions on the Korean peninsula—which dates to the Korean War—has inhibited Sino-U.S. cooperation on Korean issues. China has emerged as a mediator between Washington and Pyongyang by hosting the Six Party Talks, a role in which Chinese diplomats have taken great pride, but Chinese mediation efforts are more focused on China’s desire to keep both sides calm rather than on achieving a solution. North Korea’s continued insistence on defying Chinese efforts to mediate—even as its economy depends utterly on Chinese imports—demonstrates China’s patience. While China is concerned about North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapons capacity, its greater concern is the possibility of North Korean instability. For this reason, China emphasizes negotiations and has been reluctant to consider coercive measures as part of its strategy toward North Korea. China remains wary of U.S. preferred tools for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, eschewing pressure and sanctions in favor of economic incentives and attempts to entice North Korea to join in dialogue and cooperation. A U.S. approach that emphasizes regional cohesion in dealing with North Korea requires Chinese cooperation, but there are limits to the range of options China is willing to consider. China wants to maintain its own independent approach to the Korean peninsula, even as it cooperates with the United States. Following North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, some Chinese analysts criticized their government for working too closely with the United States, which, they charged, resulted in a cooling of Sino-North Korean ties and a perceived loss of Chinese influence in North Korea. After North Korea’s 2009 test, Beijing chose to reinforce ties with Pyongyang even while going along with a strong UNSC resolution condemning the test. This bifurcated course of action may have preserved Chinese influence in North Korea, but China has thus far been unable to use that influence to convince North Korea to recommit itself to denuclearization. The task of persuading China to assume greater responsibility for North Korea’s denuclearization is a challenging one. China’s leaders must come to the conclusion that a nuclear North Korea under its current unpredictable leadership risks the stability that China has invested so heavily in trying to preserve. Past experience suggests that China takes action only when it perceives increased tensions or the possibility of military conflict between North Korea and the United States. In early 2003, China determined that it would play a more active mediating role when it appeared that the prospect of military confrontation between the United States and North Korea was rising. China has also been concerned about the negative effect of North Korean provocation of its neighbors. For example, Chinese leaders were alarmed when North Korea’s 2006 tests prompted discussions in Japan about preemption and the question of whether to consider its own nuclear option.24 China has also responded when its leaders perceive that North Korea is a high priority for the United States or feel that the United States might negotiate directly with North Korea. President Bush’s personal efforts to discuss North Korea with Chinese president Hu Jintao mobilized enhanced Sino-U.S. cooperation, though former assistant secretary of state Christopher R. Hill’s visit to North Korea in June 2007 without consulting with or debriefing Beijing evoked concern.25 For China and the United States to succeed in coordinating their policies toward North Korea, the subject of how to achieve a nonnuclear Korean peninsula will have to be treated as a top priority on the bilateral agenda, ideally at the presidential level. It will not be easy for the United States to catalyze further cooperation from China. But Chinese leaders should seriously consider the possibility that North Korean proliferation resulting in nuclear terrorism would likely draw a much sharper U.S. military response. China worries about the emergence of an unfriendly regime in a future unified Korea. If the Obama administration’s efforts to build regional cohesion and closer Sino-U.S. cooperation are to bear fruit, the United States will need to clarify its objectives toward the Korean peninsula and provide reassurance about its intentions. The Task Force calls for a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula and “principles” of a united Korea. Such a dialogue could include discussion about the process of potential unification and what a unified Korea might look like, including the number, location, and even presence of U.S. troops in Korea and a pledge to keep the peninsula nuclearfree. Any discussion with China regarding desired outcomes or future developments on the Korean peninsula would have to be based on full, prior U.S. coordination with allies in Seoul and Tokyo.
China Will Say Yes
China will say yes to preserve the NPT, prevent US-China war over Taiwan, and sustain their economy and political stability
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?”, pg. 174, ) MGM
China shares the U.S. objective of achieving a nuclear weapons–free Korean peninsula not because it worries that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against China but because of the possible responses of other powers to Pyongyang’s nuclear gambit. In addition to the possibility of a U.S. conventional strike on North Korea that would likely create chaos that could spill over into China, a chain reaction could ensue with Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan pursuing their own nuclear weapons. Whereas China could plausibly adapt to a nuclear Japan, the development of nuclear weapons by Taiwan has long been a formal casus belli for the Chinese leadership and thus would pose very high costs to China, including a likely military confrontation with the United States. The Chinese also worry that a nuclear North Korea could be the death knell for the NPT, resulting in the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons in volatile regions such as the Middle East. Any of the above scenarios would undermine China’s peaceful security environment that is necessary for its continued economic growth, which is in turn imperative for the sustained legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
Changing opinions after the last missile test proves China is willing to take a tougher line with North Korea.
Zhu 09 – Deputy Director at the Center for International & Strategic Studies and Professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University (6/1/09, Feng, “North Korea Nuclear Test and Cornered China,” )
It’s too early to say what Beijing would prefer to do in response to North Korea’s provocations. Yet, the breaking of China’s illusion that the DPRK’s nuclear capability could be dismantled through negotiations will very likely bring about a quick and fundamental change in China’s policy. The reason is simple: the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons was not scary as long as it was believed to be temporary and could be eventually eliminated. North Korea’s secretive conspiracy to become a de jure nuclear power, however, has recklessly crossed Beijing’s “bottom line” and will inevitably and catastrophically lead to the collapse of multinational talks. Beijing was willing to tolerate the diplomatic deficit caused by inefficient Six-Party Talks, but is not prepared to accept a truly nuclear North Korea. Exceptionally, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie joined the international community on May 27 to decry North Korea’s nuclear test. This is a significant sign that China’s policy toward the North might shift.
Presumably, Beijing will fully engage other parties and seek a new UN Security Council resolution to address common concerns. But this time, Beijing will not offer any protection for the DPRK if the Security Council decides that a tougher policy is what Pyongyang deserves. Kim Jong-il’s folly has deprived the North of its last important friend in the international arena and has dramatically brought new unity to Asia.
China will say yes to maintain relations
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?”, pg. 169, ) MGM
Desire to avoid a setback in U.S.-Chinese relations also factored into Beijing’s reassessment. Preserving stable ties with Washington was a top priority. Improvement in relations with the Bush administration had been hard won and to some extent remained tenuous because exchanges between the U.S. and Chinese militaries were still frozen and U.S. intentions toward Taiwan remained unclear. Beijing had carefully averted a confrontation with Washington in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war and hoped to avoid a setback in relations over divergent approaches to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
China Will Say Yes
China will support the counterplan – doesn’t want North Korea to motivate Japan to go nuclear too
Shirk 6 – professor in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (10/26/2006, Susan, YaleGlobal Online, “China Gets Tough With North Korea”, )
Although Americans may not yet recognize it, the newest and most important factor driving China’s response is its relationship with Japan. China’s highest foreign-policy priority in Asia is repairing its troubled relations with Japan, and the Chinese realize that the North Korean nuclear crisis can help them do that. A common enemy can unite even countries that don’t like each other much. Public opinion in China and Japan had grown mutually hostile as Chinese leaders pumped up nationalism as a way to bolster support for the Communist Party. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese martyrs from World War II, including 14 convicted war criminals, outraged Chinese citizens. Student protests against Japan erupted in 25 cities in spring 2005. Chinese politicians didn’t dare invite Koizumi to China or meet with him outside the country. Hu and Koizumi never picked up the telephone to call each other after North Korea tested missiles this summer, although each man consulted with leaders of every other country in the region. Their territorial dispute over the possibly oil-rich waters in the East China Sea intensified. Most worrisome from the standpoint of the Chinese politicians was the possibility of patriotic students taking to the streets against their own weak-kneed government the next time a Japanese prime minister visited Yasukuni. Many of the Chinese political elite blame the dangerous deterioration of relations with Japan on former President Jiang Zemin, whose Patriotic Education Campaign had stirred historical memories of Japan’s occupation of China during the 1930s and ‘40s. Jiang’s harping on history to senior officials, even the emperor, when he visited Japan in 1998 further estranged the Japanese public and its politicians. Hu is eager to contrast his diplomatic skills with those of his predecessor. His administration worked out a pragmatic understanding with incoming Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to get relations back on track. China announced an “agreement to eliminate the political obstacle” while Abe remained publicly noncommittal about whether he intended to visit Yasukuni. Abe made Beijing rather than Washington the destination of his first foreign trip. The diplomatic breakthrough was a triumph for Hu – until North Korea spoiled it. Showing backbone against North Korea also discourages Tokyo from following Pyongyang down the nuclear path. From the Chinese perspective, a nuclear Japan is a nightmare more horrifying than a nuclear North Korea. The Japanese, directly threatened by North Korean missiles, are more likely to open the question if they see the Chinese passively accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear test, by driving China to become part of the solution and averting conflict between China and Japan, shifted strategic ground in Northeast Asia. Paradoxically, it may have made Northeast Asia less dangerous, not more so.
China says yes to maintain their reputations
Pollack 9 - Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (10/23/2009, Jonathan, YaleGlobal Online, “China’s North Korea Conundrum: How to Balance a Three Legged Stool”, ) MGM
But Hu Jintao and other senior Chinese leaders are intent on pursuing renewed nuclear diplomacy. Hu’s reputation and international stature are directly linked to the multilateral efforts to inhibit and ultimately reverse nuclear weapons development in the North, with China serving as host, convener, and facilitator of the Six Party Talks. An explicit admission of the failure of multilateral talks would be a severe blow to Hu’s prestige, and also a major challenge to China’s regional strategies.
China Will Say Yes
China says yes – they’re beginning to show increased influence in North Korea, including forcing Kim to reenter into disarmament talks.
Goodspeed, 09 (10/7/09, Peter, National Post, “North Korea Bows to Chinese Diplomacy; Nuclear Talks; About-face Coincides with Premier’s Visit,” Lexis)
For centuries China has made peripheral states observe a tribute system in which they endured a ritualistic submission to the emperor's "mandate of heaven."
Apparently old habits die hard.
On Sunday, an obviously ill North Korean leader Kim Jong-il made an unusual trip to Pyongyang's international airport to personally welcome Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Premier, at the start of a three-day visit.
The visit and the red-carpet airport reception were ostensibly intended to demonstrate the friendly ties that join North Korea and China, and to mark 60 years of diplomatic relations between the two communist states.
But the public shows of affection came after a belligerent North Korea has created some serious disturbances on China's northeastern border -- walking away from nuclear disarmament talks in April; exploding a powerful nuclear bomb in May; conducting missile tests; tossing out international monitors and foreign aid workers; restarting a mothballed nuclear reactor; and threatening to invade South Korea and resume the Korean War.
Mr. Wen, China's chief troubleshooter and the man responsible for day-to-day operations of its government, appears to have convinced North Korea to mend its ways.
Just 72 hours after his arrival, Mr. Kim was quoted as saying North Korea is prepared to return to international nuclear disarmament talks if
it can first make progress in bilateral negotiations with the United States.
Four months earlier, it flatly declared the Chinesesponsored disarmament talks "dead." It spurned all future contacts with the United States, accusing Washington of leading an international conspiracy to attack North Korea.
China could not have been pleased. It spent the past six years trying to reach a negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis by sponsoring the six-party disarmament talks that included the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and North Korea.
It was a major diplomatic initiative for China, which aspires to superpower status and regional influence. By angrily walking away from the talks, North Korea humiliated Beijing's leaders and threatened China's own stability.
A nuclear-armed North Korea also threatens to push Japan toward rearmament and abandoning its pacifist constitution. It could encourage South Korea and even Taiwan to seek their own nuclear arsenals.
Even more frightening is the uncertainty and instability. A pugnacious North Korea might inflict on China's economy by constantly threatening South Korea and the United States.
China, which lost up to a million dead protecting North Korea during the Korean War, no longer seems to feel obligated to be Pyongyang's patron. It just wants to be left in peace to make money, and grow rich and strong.
So, after decades of insisting China's relationship with North Korea is "closer than lips to teeth," Mr. Wen may finally have decided to show the North Koreans his fangs.
It would not be hard to do. Beijing's influence in Pyongyang is enormous. China controls 70% of North Korea's fuel supply and a third of its food imports, and spends 30% of its foreign aid budget on North Korea.
Its influence is all the more important now that North Korea is suffering food and energy shortages, and its ravaged economy is being squeezed by UN sanctions imposed after its nuclear tests.
Beijing, in the tradition of China's ancient emperors, may also be expected to have a say in endorsing or rejecting the ailing Mr. Kim's selection of a successor.
China has an interest in maintaining North Korea's stability and it has the power to influence any faction that tries to stage-manage the installation of a successor to Dear Leader.
Not surprisingly, Yang Jiechi, China's Foreign Minister, greeted news of Pyongyang's abrupt about-face by praising the effectiveness of Mr. Wen's diplomacy.
His boss's visit was "rich in content, weighty in outcome and significant in meaning," he told the official Xinhua news agency.
"Premier Wen had sincere and in-depth talks with the DPRK [North Korean] leaders on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and made much headway on the promotion of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula."
North Korea's official Central News Agency also noted China offered an unspecified amount of aid during Mr. Wen's visit.
China Will Say Yes
China voted to sanction North Korea proving its willing to take a stronger line against North Korea
Snyder & Byun, 09 - *Director of the Center for U.S.-Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (9/09, “Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience”
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North Korea’s missile launch on April 5 and nuclear test on May 25 posed a test to the international community following two UN Security Council resolutions in 2006 condemning North Korea’s actions. For China, the tests again highlighted the tensions between its emerging role as a global actor with increasing international responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to North Korea as an ally with whom China shares longstanding historical and ideological ties. On June 12, China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 condemning North Korea’s nuclear test, banning sales of nuclear and missile-related technology and heavy weapons to North Korea, authorizing financial sanctions against companies involved with North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, and authorizing the implementation of an inspections regime for suspect shipments into and out of North Korea. China now must decide whether it will actively implement the resolution. As a result of North Korea’s declining trade with South Korea and the international community, China’s economic leverage with North Korea has grown. But it is unclear whether China will utilize such leverage given strategic concerns about regional stability and the impact on the political succession process now underway in Pyongyang.
China is being harsher than North Korea than expected and Chinese opinion is shifting toward stronger sanctions.
Snyder & Byun, 09 - *Director of the Center for U.S.-Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (9/09, “Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience”
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North Korea’s May 25 nuclear test prompted a stronger reaction from China, which announced its “resolute” opposition to the test. China’s support for UNSC Resolution 1874 demonstrated its commitment to play a “constructive” role and resulted in a considerably harsher resolution (i.e., “with teeth”) than many had expected China would support, although Beijing made sure that implementation of the key provisions of the resolution would be optional rather than obligatory. Although China joined international condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear test, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry also noted that Resolution 1874 “is not all about sanctions” and that diplomatic means is “the only way” to resolve Korean Peninsula issues, arguing that the DPRK should be recognized as a “sovereign country and UN member.” At an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board meeting on June 17, Tang Guoqiang, head of the Chinese delegation, affirmed that the DPRK as a sovereign state “should have the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy after it returns to the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” and that diplomatic means is the “only right way” to address the North Korean
nuclear issue.
Following the test, a number of high-level consultations occurred between South Korea and China. A previously planned defense ministerial exchange went forward shortly following the nuclear test as Lee Sang Hee made his first trip to China as ROK defense minister to meet his counterpart Liang Guanglie and Vice President Xi Jinping, who pointed to “increasing political trust” between the two countries. Following meetings with Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Beijing on June 10, South Korean Nuclear Envoy Wi Sung-lac
confirmed China’s support for the new UNSC resolution that was passed two days later.
North Korea’s nuclear test has sparked open debate on whether China should support harsher UN sanctions. China’s Global Times survey conducted shortly after the test in late May showed a 50-50 percent divide in views among Chinese foreign policy experts on tough sanctions against North Korea. This suggests a gradual shift toward support for sanctions, given that most Chinese experts have doubted the effectiveness of sanctions and warned against their impact on stability and refugee flows into China.
A2: Strong China-DPRK Relations Block Solvency
China-North Korea relations have deteriorated
Cheng 5/28/10 – China expert at the Heritage Foundation (Dean Cheng, “China Must Choose on North Korea,” DoD Buzz, 5/28/10, )
But this presumes that North Korea-PRC relations really are as close “as lips and teeth,” as was often claimed in the 1960s. In reality, however, there is real reason to question whether North Korea is especially close to China. North Korean founder Kim Il-Sung was nobody’s puppet; instead, he was very good at playing the USSR and the PRC off against each other, while remaining outside the firm orbit of either. Indeed, North Korea has gone to great lengths to rewrite history, minimizing China’s substantial contributions to the Korean War, despite Chinese casualties that number in the hundreds of thousands.
Moreover, both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have rejected following the Chinese path of “Reform and Opening,” in which China has pursued a more capitalist approach to its economy while maintaining political control in the hands of the Communist Party. This has only further increased the gap between Beijing and Pyongyang, since the dependence of the moribund North Korean economy on Chinese largesse has not resulted in North Korean compliance with Chinese interests.
It is also useful to recall that North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 after China had reassured the world that North Korea would not do so. This was sufficiently embarrassing to Beijing to merit a straight-forward rebuke that the test was a “flagrant and brazen” violation. It also resulted in the Chinese joining in the passage of a UN Resolution (1718) condemning the North Korean action.
Taiwan NB
Multilateral cooperation with China over large issues creates precedent that reduces their ability to engage Taiwan
Christensen 99 – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton (Spring 1999, Thomas, International Security Vol. 23 No. 4, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, pg. 71-73, JSTOR) MGM
One possible way to ameliorate the security dilemma is through multilateral regimes and forums designed to increase transparency and build confidence. For various reasons, Beijing has viewed multilateral confidence building with some suspicion. Many Chinese analysts emphasize that the increased transparency called for by such institutions can make China's enemies more confident and thereby reduce China's deterrent capabilities, particularly its ability to deter Taiwan independence or foreign intervention in cross-strait relations.67 Especially in the early 1990s they worried that multilateral forums and organizations might be fronts for great powers, and that confidence-building measures might be aspects of a containment strategy designed to keep China from achieving great power status in the military sector.68 That said, China has not shunned multilateral forums. China has participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its first meeting in 1994, and in 1997 Beijing hosted an ARF intersessional conference on confidence-building measures. Although Beijing has prevented any dramatic accomplishments at ARF meetings on important questions such as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the precedent of such Chinese participation seems potentially important.69 As Iain Johnston and Paul Evans argue, although still in their nascent phases, these developments should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric or showmanship. China is capable of participating in meaningful multilateral accords, as is demonstrated by its recent agreements on border demarcation and confidence-building measures struck with Russia and the former Soviet republics in Turkish Central Asia. Moreover, there is a small but growing community of true believers in Beijing in the benefits of arms control, confidence-building measures, and multilateralism more generally.7 The reduced fear of U.S. domination of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and of ASEAN collusion against China, combined with the increased fear of developments in U.S. bilateral diplomacy in the Asia Pacific since 1996, have convinced many formerly skeptical analysts that some form of multilateralism may be the best alternative for China given the risks posed by U.S. bilateral business as usual.71 Given that China both fears and has little influence over various aspects of current U.S. bilateral diplomacy (such as strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance or the U.S.-Australia alliance), accepting a bigger role for multilateral dialogue, if not the creation of formal multilateral security institutions, may be the least unpleasant method of reducing the threat that U.S. bilateralism poses.72 So, in this one sense, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance may have had some unintended positive results by encouraging China to consider more seriously the benefits of multilateral forums that might reduce mutual mistrust in the region.73 This phenomenon runs counter to psychological and social constructivist theories on the security dilemma that emphasize how accommodation, not pressure, is the best way to make states adopt more cooperative postures.74
U.S.-China War NB
Chinese cooperation on Korea prevents superpower conflict between the two countries
Emmott 5/31 – former editor for The Economist (5/31/2010, Bill, The Times, “China's stance on North Korea could lead to war;
The world may be anxious about the Kim regime but greater dangers lie in its superpower neighbour failing to act”, Lexis) MGM
Try this quiz. You are the leader of a rising economic superpower, with ambitions for global political power. You have pledged to pursue a "peaceful rise" and to work through the United Nations wherever possible to maintain international stability. Out of the blue, your unruly neighbour, an ally and quasi-dependant for the past 60 years, torpedoes a warship of its own neighbour, killing 46 sailors, and then, when accused of this crime, threatens all-out war. What do you do? Virtually nothing, is China's answer so far, for that is the superpower and the neighbour is North Korea. Officially, Chinese leaders are still "reviewing the evidence" presented by an international team that was asked by South Korea to investigate the sinking in March of the Cheonan, evidence that has convinced virtually everyone else that a North Korean torpedo was to blame. A faraway country of which we know little, is what many are tempted to say of Kim Jong Il's northeast Asian enclave, paraphrasing Neville Chamberlain's notorious line about Czechoslovakia in 1938. The North Koreans have a long history of outrageous behaviour, from killing most of the South Korean Cabinet on a visit to Rangoon in 1983, to living off counterfeiting and cigarette-smuggling, to firing missiles over Japan, to testing nuclear weapons twice in the past four years. Recently, in negotiations they have mostly proved to have been after something, and have scuttled back into their "Hermit Kingdom" when they got it. That is why much of the attention given to the Cheonan sinking and the threats of war since March has been devoted to working out what the North Koreans might be up to. Are they after something again, is a succession battle under way, or was the sinking just a mistake? Beyond a few flutters in the stock markets, especially in Asia, much of the world has carried on worrying more about the euro and BP's oil spill than a new Korean war, despite 2010 being the 60th anniversary of the start of the old one. It is time to worry rather more, by focusing instead on China and its policy towards North Korea. For what China's reaction should tell us is that China's interests in the Korean Peninsula are different from those of the West, of South Korea or of Japan. And in that divergence of interest lies danger: it makes North Korea the likeliest flashpoint for a potential conflict between China and America. On other issues, the Chinese leadership is widely lauded for its fast and effective decision making - on bulldozing old city centres, for example, or building motorways and power stations, or giving aid to African governments in return for mining rights. Far better than those fusty old democracies, mutter the admirers. So why, we should all be asking, are they so slow to make up their minds about North Korea and its acts and threats of war? The official line is that China is concerned about stability in North Korea and fears a huge influx of refugees across its long border with that country if Mr Kim's regime should collapse. A further line, peddled more quietly by Chinese officials, is that China doesn't really have much influence over those strange, unpredictable Koreans. So all it can do is take part in the six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, an on-off exercise that gathers together America, China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas, urge everyone to show restraint, and hope for the best. This line, always pretty thin, is looking ever thinner. The idea that Chinese security forces would not be capable of crowd control in the border region beggars belief. Dealing with refugees might be awkward, and even costly, but as a reason for tolerating military adventurism it is simply not credible. Nor is the notion of Chinese impotence: most of North Korea's trade is with China, most of its oil supply comes from there, and virtually the only foreign companies in North Korea are Chinese. It would be pretty easy for China to "keep its boot on Kim's neck", as Americans like to say these days. So why doesn't it? The answer, surely, must be that China prefers to keep North Korea the way it is. Strategically, it provides a buffer against Japan and averts the prospect of a troublesome and eventually powerful unified Korea in the future. This has been the case ever since Mao Zedong sent in Chinese troops to rescue the North during the Korean War of 1950-53. This preference would not matter much as long as the North Korean regime looked basically stable and was a danger principally to its own people. But this is no longer the case. Imagine what could happen when Kim Jong Il dies - which, being 68 and unhealthy, he might suddenly do. Suppose there is a struggle over the succession, one that could turn bloody, given that North Korea is said to be the world's most militarised society. America, well aware that North Korea has about half a dozen nuclear warheads, will feel an urgent need to send troops in to seize nuclear materials. South Korea will, like Helmut Kohl in 1989, feel an urgent, historic need to ignore the huge costs and push for unification: the North is family, after all. And China? My guess is that it would send its troops to the border, and probably across it, "in the interests of stability", but actually to keep North Korea independent and under Chinese tutelage. The stage would thus be set for the first 21st-century confrontation between two superpowers. This is one of the biggest risks facing the world. To reduce it, China needs to be engaged in open dialogue about North Korea, its behaviour and, above all, its future. It may not be seemly to discuss what to do when a regime collapses, especially one of an ally, but that is increasingly necessary in the case of the Kim dynasty. Communication between the Chinese and American militaries remains patchy, with efforts to set up hotlines and the like slow to come to fruition. The chances of a misunderstanding in a moment of tension are high. Communication between the political leaderships is better, if still very stilted. The Cheonan sinking could be the last chance to force China to face up to the fact that its North Korean dependant is not just embarrassing but dangerous, to force it to discuss the future of the Korean Peninsula, to force it to join the 21st century rather than staying stuck in the 1950s. Unless that happens, next time it could really be war.
CP => U.S.-China Cooperation
China will say yes and the counterplan will boost overall strategic relations
Sin 9 – works at Troy University (11/27/2009, Steve, “North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Implications for Sino-American Bilateral Relations”, pg. 24, ) MGM
In the near-term, China and the United States are most likely to continue their cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue; however, the road to narrowing the strategic differences of the two countries will be long and difficult. Unfortunately, this probably means the North Korean nuclear issue will not see much progress either. For the United States, adoption of a set of bold policies, such as providing a negative security guarantee to China, proposing to reduce the number of American troops stationed in Korea upon unification of the Korean Peninsula, or creating an environment where a unified Korean Peninsula would ensure China a much higher economic benefit than a divided one, could pay dividends in both ensuring the Chinese cooperation and transforming the Sino-American relations – not only surrounding the North Korean issue but also for the overall strategic relationship.
U.S.-Sino cooperation over North Korea is key to other areas of cooperation – there is spillover
Pritchard et al. 10 – President of the Korea Economic Institute (June, Charles, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, pg. 4, ) MGM
Productive Sino-U.S. consultations on North Korea have been lauded in recent years as evidence that the United States and China can work together to address common security challenges. Conversely, the failure to collaborate to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization will represent a setback and an obstacle to other areas of U.S.-China security cooperation. For this reason, it is essential for the United States and China to develop a clear understanding regarding how to deal with North Korea, thereby establishing a framework for lasting stability on a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
U.S.-Sino cooperation over North Korea is critical for future multilateral efforts
Pritchard et al. 10 – President of the Korea Economic Institute (June, Charles, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, pg. 52, ) MGM
Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability. Sino-U.S. cooperation to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is in the mutual interests of both countries and will be a critical proving ground for the relationship. Failure to make progress toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would be a significant setback for efforts to promote a cooperative approach to regional security in Northeast Asia. The level of China’s cooperation and involvement is the main factor that will determine whether it is possible to achieve a strategy that goes beyond containment and management of North Korea’s nuclear and missile aspirations to rollback.
CP => U.S.-China Cooperation
China accepts the condition in order to cement future US-China cooperation in Eastern Asia
Pollack 9 - Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (10/23/2009, Jonathan, YaleGlobal Online, “China’s North Korea Conundrum: How to Balance a Three Legged Stool”, ) MGM
NEWPORT: The 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and North Korea earlier this month provided the occasion for a high-level Chinese visit. But Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit also underscored China’s daunting tasks in balancing its regional and global interests dealing with its embattled, nuclear armed neighbor. Though nominally marking the anniversary, Wen and other senior Chinese officials sought principally to reshape the future contours of bilateral relations. Beijing has concluded that it must provide a continued lifeline to Pyongyang, in the hopes of stabilizing the regime and slowly incubating internal change in the North, without triggering fears of potential Chinese domination. At the same time, China is seeking to disentangle itself from its long-standing, if largely dormant, security obligations to North Korea, with future ties defined as “friendly cooperative relations,” not an alliance. Finally, Beijing is attempting to induce Pyongyang’s return to nuclear diplomacy, without conferring legitimacy or permanence to the North’s claimed status as a nuclear weapons state outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beijing also fully recognizes that its ability to cooperate with the United States in inhibiting Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions will be pivotal in shaping future US-China relations and East Asian security as a whole.
Resolving the North Korea will shape future US-Sino cooperation
Jisi 5 - Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and Director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China (September/October 2005, Wang, “China's Search for Stability With America”, Foreign Affairs, ) MGM
In the field of international security, the primary focal point in Chinese-U.S. relations is the North Korean nuclear issue. On this question, the Bush administration has little choice but to act cautiously, relying on the six-party talks to exert pressure on Pyongyang and using various mechanisms (such as the U.S.-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative) to stop North Korea from exporting nuclear materials or technology. China, in its own way, has tried to dissuade North Korea from developing nuclear weapons but so far has declined to support multilateral blockades or sanctions on Pyongyang. If North Korea ever publicly, explicitly, and unmistakably demonstrates that it does possess nuclear weapons, the policies of the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia -- all of which favor a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula -- will have failed. The United States might then call for much tougher actions against North Korea, which would increase tension and narrow China's options. The result could be new friction between China and the United States and a serious test of their relationship. If, on the other hand, the six-party talks are resumed, tensions between the United States and North Korea may ease, and China's role will then be more favorably recognized. Should that occur, the countries involved in the process might even consider expanding the six-party mechanism into a permanent Northeast Asian security arrangement, a development that would serve the interests of all the countries concerned and one that China should favor. Under the current circumstances, however, such a possibility is slim. The more likely outcome is that tensions between Washington and Pyongyang will persist, although without an actual war breaking out.
CP => U.S.-China Cooperation
US-China cooperation over North Korea uniquely boosts bilateral relations
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?”, pg. 165-166, ) MGM
“This whole six-party process has done more to bring the U.S. and China together than any other process I’m aware of,” stated Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and the top U.S. negotiator at the six-party talks, after agreement was reached on the February 13, 2007, action plan on North Korean nuclear disarmament.1 This remark, one of numerous accolades by U.S. officials praising Beijing for its cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, was undoubtedly partly intended to encourage China to use its influence over North Korea to further the process of denuclearization. Yet, there is little question that successful cooperation on the North Korean nuclear crisis has provided a boost to the U.S.-Chinese relationship. The threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear programs presented a rare strategic opportunity for close U.S.-Chinese cooperation that would prove to be the first successful comprehensive collaboration on an international security issue of critical importance to both countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union.2 Determined that the North Korean nuclear issue should be addressed multilaterally rather than bilaterally, the Bush administration sought to involve China from the inception of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in the fall of 2002. Initially, China preferred to remain uninvolved. Beijing did not view the situation as an opportunity to strengthen ties with the United States or enhance its role in Northeast Asia. Worried by the unraveling of the Agreed Framework, a bilateral accord signed by Washington and Pyongyang in October 1994 to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, the Chinese urged the United States to resolve the tense situation through bilateral dialogue with North Korea. Eventually, however, China judged the risks of inaction to exceed the costs of initiating a multilateral dialogue process. Over time, China’s role in the process evolved from a passive onlooker to a reticent host and finally to “chief mediator” and “honest broker.”3 Today, although the crisis is far from resolved and the realization of denuclearization is uncertain, an examination of the process from the onset of the crisis in 2002 to the February 2007 agreement offers a useful lens through which to examine U.S.-Chinese cooperation on a critical security issue and its impact on the broader bilateral relationship. It also provides a test of Beijing’s willingness to take up former deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick’s challenge “to become a responsible stakeholder” in the international system.4
Experts agree cooperation over North Korea boosts relations
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?”, pg. 167, ) MGM
The Bush administration resolved to adopt a different approach toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) than the Clinton administration had pursued. Judging that the United States lacked sufficient leverage bilaterally to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs, Washington opted for a multilateral strategy that would enable regional actors with a stake in realizing a denuclearized Korean peninsula to pool their leverage. A multilateral approach especially appealed to then– national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, who had a personal interest in promoting the establishment of multilateral security institutions in Asia.9 The U.S. decision to deal with the North Korean nuclear challenge multilaterally provided an exceptional opportunity for China further to bolster ties with the United States. One analyst later contended that the North Korean nuclear crisis was “a gift from [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-il” to advance U.S.-Chinese cooperation.
U.S.-China Relations Good – Laundry List
U.S.-Sino relations solve several scenarios for extinction
China Daily, 8 (Rikki N. Massand and Gazelle Emami, “U.S.-China relations at the world's fingertips,” 4-20-2008, , JMP)
To frame the importance of this discussion and the topics that must be met, Siegal used the analogy of “the U.S. and China having their hands around each other’s necks and we’re both going over the waterfall.” After that comment a man in the audience then suggested that in that case both countries would have to look to the other for help and teamwork would be the only way to survive. That theme resonated from coast to coast. At the University of California-Berkeley, speaker Sidney Rittenberg took a more intimate approach to U.S.-China relations. A man who lived in China for 35 years, Rittenberg has worked for the past two decades as an advisor to major corporations doing business in China such as AIG, Intel, Hughes Aircraft, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, and Ford. At the Bay Area gathering he emphasized respect and dignity through his own stories, and instead of categorizing the issues into right and wrong Rittenberg advocates looking at the bigger picture. For him the imperative for Americans is to learn to get along with the Chinese. “We must -- we don't have a choice. The crises that threaten the human race, like weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups, global warming, none of the issues will get resolved unless we work with China, Brazil, India and of course Europe and other countries. Really the central axis that holds the whole thing together is the U.S. and China," Rittenberg said.
US-China relations key to solve terror, WMD prolif, regional conflicts, and boost the economy
Friedberg 5 – Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School (Fall 2005, Aaron, International Security Vol. 30, No. 2, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?”, pg. 8, Pmuse) MGM
The answers to these questions are of enormous importance. If tensions between the two Pacific powers worsen, the whole of Eastern Eurasia could become divided in a new cold war, and the prospects for confrontation and conflict would seem certain to rise. On the other hand, a deepening U.S.-China entente could bring with it increased possibilities for sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional disputes, and the successful management of pressing global problems, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whether for good or ill, the most significant bilateral international relationship over the course of the next several decades is likely to be that between the United States and the PRC.
U.S.-China Cooperation solves prolif and terror
Future US-China cooperation is critical for solving nuclear prolif and terror
NPR 10 – (Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, pg. 12, ) MGM
By promoting strategic stability with Russia and China and improving transparency and mutual confidence, we can help create the conditions for moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and build a stronger basis for addressing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
U.S.-China Cooperation solves NPT, Taiwan, Chinese Economy
China will say yes to preserve the NPT, prevent US-China war over Taiwan, and sustain their economy and political stability
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?”, pg. 174, ) MGM
China shares the U.S. objective of achieving a nuclear weapons–free Korean peninsula not because it worries that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against China but because of the possible responses of other powers to Pyongyang’s nuclear gambit. In addition to the possibility of a U.S. conventional strike on North Korea that would likely create chaos that could spill over into China, a chain reaction could ensue with Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan pursuing their own nuclear weapons. Whereas China could plausibly adapt to a nuclear Japan, the development of nuclear weapons by Taiwan has long been a formal casus belli for the Chinese leadership and thus would pose very high costs to China, including a likely military confrontation with the United States. The Chinese also worry that a nuclear North Korea could be the death knell for the NPT, resulting in the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons in volatile regions such as the Middle East. Any of the above scenarios would undermine China’s peaceful security environment that is necessary for its continued economic growth, which is in turn imperative for the sustained legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
U.S.-China Cooperation solves Iran nuclearization
US-Sino cooperation key to prevent Iranian nuclearization
Glaser and Liang 8 - *Senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND **writer for Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008, Bonnie and Wang, Washington Quarterly, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?”, pg. 178, ) MGM
China will be a bigger player in regional and global issues in the future, and Chinese-U.S. cooperation will be increasingly necessary to address current and emerging security problems. In addition to North Korea, Beijing has already contributed in important ways, both positive and negative, to efforts to settle the conflict in Sudan, resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge, and promote reconciliation and democracy in Burma. Engaging China in sustained dialogue about the intersection of U.S. and Chinese interests in the international system will be essential. The Senior Dialogue between the U.S. deputy secretary of state and China’s executive vice foreign minister, initiated under the Bush administration, is an important mechanism designed to advance such discussions. In addition, future U.S. presidents will need to attach high priority to establishing effective and candid presidential communication that facilitates mutual trust.
***Consultation CPS
CONSULTATION SOLVENCY - GENERAL
Any policy change requires close consultation and a new Korea-U.S. security joint statement like the one the U.S. has with Japan
Kim 99 - Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (Sung-Han Kim, “Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research Agenda,” The University of California at San Diego, 5/26-27/99, .)
Conclusion
The raison d'etre of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which represents an important element of Washington's Asia-Pacific strategy in the post-Cold War era, has been sustained as inter-Korean relations have yet to depart from the Cold-War confrontation. It is also true that there are limits to the alliance, while various problems have emerged in South Korea-U.S. relations due to differences in policy priorities of the two countries.
Therefore, South Korea and the United States should promote an engagement policy toward North Korea with due patience, while simultaneously strengthening their alliance system and striving to develop a regional alliance capable of contributing to regional stability in Northeast Asia. Security officials of both countries should engage in close consultation and announce sometime in the future a "new Korea-U.S. security joint statement" comparable to the "U.S.-Japan security joint statement," while preparing to transform their bilateral relations into a new alliance based on a shared new role for promoting stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.
The U.S. forces in Korea, who have contributed immensely to ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula, should continue to cooperate with the South Korean forces under the South Korea-U.S. joint defense system so long as a threat from North Korea persists. Once this threat from the North dissipates, the scale of U.S. forces in Korea will inevitably be reduced. But the continued presence in Korea of a symbolic number of U.S. ground troops, along with naval and air force elements, even after Korean unification, together with U.S. forces in Japan,[1] will contribute to maintaining stability in Northeast Asia.
Since the present South Korea-U.S. joint defense system will have to be changed once the threat from North Korea disappears, consultations should be held with the United States to discuss the issues of restoring wartime operational control and improving the South Korean military's ability to prepare for its own defense, manage command control operations, and effectively gather and analyze intelligence.
The key to overcoming differences between South Korea and the United States in policy priorities, as evidenced in the waging of a "triangular game" among North and South Korea and the United States despite South Korea-U.S. concurrence in security interests, lies in further cementing the South Korea-U.S. bilateral security alliance and preparing to convert this alliance into a regional alliance system.
One thing that should be kept in mind in this process is that a multilateral approach to a security system for Northeast Asia should be pursued in parallel with a consolidation of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. South Korea's relations not only with the Untied States but also with China, Japan and Russia should be handled with attention to detail under a framework of South Korea's security policy structure. It is now time for South Korea to lay the groundwork for long-term security programs by retaining cooperative relations with the United States in regard to North Korea policy amid a changing security environment in the post-Cold war period while preparing for new developments on the Korean peninsula.
Consult ROK – Solvency
The US needs to consult with South Korea to balance the US-ROK alliance
Morgan 7 (Patrick M., Ph.D., Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies – University of California, Irvine, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, International Journal of Korean Studies, XI(2), Fall, p. 76)
As for American allies, they are equally frustrated about the United States. It wants to lead but, in their view, in a rather authoritarian way, quite unsuited to a clutch of democracies. It is also too unilaterally inclined. It doesn’t “consult” enough, a word which they usually use as if it meant “take our advice.” It doesn’t limit its actions to those legitimized in some larger collective decision process. These irritating behavior patterns are made more disturbing by the fact that the United States regularly takes security issues too seriously. It sees threats as greater and more urgent than they are and therefore overreacts, becoming too ready to take extreme steps including the use of coercion.
This frustration has been clearly evident in recent years in NATO and other US alliances. However, in the US-ROK alliance, it has posed particularly troublesome difficulties. The broad ROK position is that the US has failed to adjust to today’s stronger Korean national feelings and to the enormous progress of South Korea that has helped inspire those feelings. The alliance has not been adjusted to the ways South Korea is now a much more significant country. It needs to become more “balanced,” with the ROK playing a larger, more independent, role in shaping its own security policy and posture. It should be in charge of joint military operations in fighting a new war. It should be more self-reliant on national defense. It should be in charge of designing and implementing the political strategy for dealing with North Korea – settlement of the division of the peninsula should basically be in Korean hands. Hence the ROK role in the alliance would be larger, its priorities given much more attention. Instead, the US just dismissed the ROK engagement strategy and has pursued policies contrary to it that risked igniting a war on the peninsula and great harm to the ROK.8
Consult ROK – Key to Alliance
Divergence in interests is weakening the alliance – consultations are key to bridge the gap and strengthen the alliance – Denuclearization policies prove
Snyder, Et. Al. ’10 – director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. “US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” ww.content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf)
Inter-Korean relations deteriorated rapidly with the February 2oo8 inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as president of South Korea, whose more skeptical approach to North Korea overturned a decade of progressive efforts to engage the North and promote peaceful coexistence. North Korea responded with numerous aggressive statements and threats of attack, although its conventional military capabilities lag far behind the South.
The divergence of priorities between the United States and South Korea on policy toward North Korea has been a continuing challenge for the U.S.-South Korea alliance since the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in the early 199os. The Republic of Korea’s (ROK) priorities have understandably been focused on the peninsula, favoring stability and engagement, while the United States has larger global concerns about proliferation and ramifications beyond the peninsula. Ongoing consultations are needed to bridge this gap in perspectives, which results from the U.S. view about the dangers of North Korean proliferation potential compared with South Korea’s prioritization of the need for peninsular stability. With the exception of a short period during the Clinton and Kim Dae-jung administrations in 1999–when both the United States and South Korea were pursuing active engagement with North Korea, the management of differences between Washington and Seoul in their approaches to North Korea has required frequent attention. Alliance coordination on North Korea became a major source of difficulty during the Bush and Roh administrations and even limited military planning for North Korean contingencies. These differences in priorities, however, have been minimized as a result of Lee Myung-bak’s strong commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization and the breakdown of the Six Party Talks in late 2008. This commitment was reflected during South Korea’s 2007 presidential election campaign, when Lee announced his “Denuclearization, Openness, 3,000” policy. As Lee reiterated in his inaugural address, he committed to make South Korean investments in North Korea with the objective of raising North Korea’s per capita GDP to $3,000. These investments would be conditioned on North Korea pursuing policies of denuclearization and openness to the outside world.28 The Lee administration came into office in February 2008 determined to restore U.S.-ROK alliance coordination toward North Korea, effectively aligning its priority of denuclearization with that of the United States. Although this emphasis has caused tensions in inter-Korea relations, the Lee administration’s approach improved relations between the United States and South Korea at the end of the Bush administration and under the Obama administration. It also deprives North Korea of the leverage with which it had previously exploited differences between Washington and Seoul. The Lee Myung-bak administration’s emphasis on denuclearization brings U.S. and South Korean policies closer in line with each other. At the same time, it is possible that South Korea’s aversion to coercive or military options that might lead to instability on the peninsula could come into conflict with American measures to pursue counterproliferation or prevent transfers that might enable nuclear terrorism.
Consult ROK – A2: Perm ***
U.S. must make a good faith effort to take South Korean opinions into consideration – North Korea will exploit perceived splits
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
In another approach to understanding anti-American sentiment, consider it as an emotional phenomenon—a visceral reaction to the very idea of American. Real or perceived American arrogance results in more heated responses from the ordinary people on the street, who demonstrate and make demands on the Korean government. Complaints of water pollution from US military bases, crimes committed by US military gone unpunished, and South Koreans profiled as North Korean agents at US airports are only a few examples.41 General (retired, ROK Army) Kim Jae Chang, former deputy commander of the Combined Forces Command, now a key advisor to Korean leaders, offered an interesting comparison between American and Korean perspectives. He stated that Americans favor the opinion of “give me liberty, or give me death”, while Koreans favor the opinion of “give me honor, or give me death.”42 In this respect, perhaps the United States loses credibility in South Korea because it addresses problems with policy instead of emotion. President Bush made a promise to Americans and the world that the United States would have a “humble” foreign policy, which is exactly what Koreans were looking for: a US president who would engage on a human level. Unfortunately, they perceive the opposite: a US president who uses Korea as a pawn on the global chessboard.43 The bottom line is that high-handed American actions are an issue of pride. Until US leaders address the emotional side of its policy decisions, South Koreans will hold on to the notion that America does not understand or care about them. This dangerous trend is exactly the opportunity that North Korea would like to leverage.
Only prior and genuine consultation can boost US influence and produce
Morgan 7 - Ph.D., Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies – University of California (Patrick M., “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, International Journal of Korean Studies, XI(2), Fall 2007, p. 76)
For its part the US needs to expand on an important but overlooked (in the US) feature of the Six-party talks. While the US sought to use the talks to isolate and contain North Korea, which to a degree the participants succeeded in doing, the talks also served to contain the United States. Just as in the North Atlantic regional system, success for the hegemon requires that it uses its leadership position to gain an earned influence rather than operate on an assumed or structural influence. American influence should continue to be gained in the well developed ways employed during the Cold War in the transatlantic region – putting an emphasis on constant consultation, showing a determination to build consensus whenever possible, often displaying a willingness to defer to other members’ concerns and a readiness to take advice. Leadership in those days involved offering important ideas and normally setting the agenda, then coming up with the working proposals for discussion, but consistently ensuring that all parties had their say and being open to adapting proposals to gain a consensus. The United States needs to bring this sort of leadership to bear in Northeast and East Asia, abandoning the more clearly unilateral posture which the Bush administration unsuccessfully pursued. There are certainly many frustrations in using this form of leadership, and the US is not a patient nation. But it learned to operate this way during the Cold War to its everlasting credit, and it needs to return to it now.
Consult Russia – Solvency
Korea is a key issue in U.S.-Russian relations – Russia wants to be seen as an important player in the region
Parker 03- Colonel, United States Military, (4/7/03, Richard, US MILITARY PRESENCE IN A UNIFIED KOREA, 2003, April 7, )
The first approach by the Russian Empire toward Korea was in 1654, along the northern border on the Amur River. Conflict was constant between China, Japan, Russia, and Korea for several centuries, leading to Soviet occupation of Manchuria and Northern Korea at the end of World War 2.24 From the Korean War onward, Soviet influence in North Korea was increasingly replaced by China. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian influence on the peninsula all but vanished. A major concern for all the regional powers, if not the world, continues to be the situation in Russia. As it manages conflict between central and individual republics, economic turmoil, and a declining position in world events—Russia still maintains a large nuclear weapons arsenal, great national resources, and a seat on the United Nations Security Council. It will want to be seen as an important player, to be included in the resolution of key regional issues.25 In particular, Russia’s major levers on events in Asia are arms sales and resource exports. While most countries produce about 80-90 percent of their arms for domestic use, Russia exported three times as much as they kept for their own military, with China as one of the 6 primary buyers.26 How the United States engages Russia and the other regional powers concerning unification and the future of Korea will play an important part in maintaining Northeast Asia regional stability.
Consulting and cooperating with Russia is key to solvency
Bauer, 09 - strategist for Special Operations Command Korea (Summer 2009, John, “Unlocking Russian Interests on the Korean Peninsula”, )
Russia’s interventions in Kosovo and Georgia clearly demonstrate that Russia will not hesitate to use military force if a regional crisis threatens its national interests. In light of these two examples, one might be quick to conclude that the Russians will similarly intervene in the event of a Korean crisis. Recent Russian policy, however, seems to suggest the possibility of an entirely different outcome if a Korean crisis were to occur. This is because a remarkable convergence in long-term interests between Seoul and Moscow has begun to occur, one that has led Russia to militarily isolate North Korea and to pressure Pyongyang to open its doors economically. The origin of this shift in Russian policy has been Russia’s desire to create a lasting, mutually beneficial economic partnership with South Korea. Russia’s economic partnership with South Korea is causing the strategic calculus on the Korean Peninsula to change dramatically. The long-standing stalemate, once exacerbated by the Soviet Union’s support to Pyongyang, is beginning to show signs of fissure as Russia now appears more like a potential ally to the South Koreans than a belligerent. Rather than presenting a direct challenge to South Korean-led reunification, Russia may now actually be in the position of supporting it. Nevertheless, Moscow’s delicate diplomatic stance remains tenuous as it tries to balance the risk of alienating the North against the benefits of favoritism toward the South. Adding to the equation is the United States, whose inherent skepticism toward Russia potentially jeopardizes the tremendous opportunity Russia is presenting to America’s close military ally, the Republic of Korea. For nearly 60 years, the United States has invested vast resources to help keep the North Korean military machine at bay. If American policy is firmly committed to a reunification of the peninsula under the purview of its alliance partner and if a future North Korean crisis is in fact a real possibility, then the United States should consider this new prospect, namely Russian cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, as an asset that could help undermine the North Korean regime. The strategic value of such a partnership might even be efficacious enough to directly lead to a final termination of the decades-long standoff in Korea. Yet this opportunity may be missed if not carefully nurtured now, before war or crisis occurs within North Korea.
Consult Russia – Solvency
Cooperation in Korea is key to US-Russia relations
Toloraya 08 – diplomat with the rank of Minister and Director of Korean Programs at IMEMO, the top Russian Foreign Ministry official in charge of the Korean peninsula, Doctor of Economy and a Full Professor degree in Oriental Studies (Georgy, Asian Perspective, “THE SIX PARTY TALKS: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE”, ProQuest)
U.S. officials in the first George W. Bush administration considered Russian policy toward the Korean issue "unhappy," stemming from Russia's "great power aspirations." The Americans constantly wanted to change it. For example, in October 2003 Bush urged Putin to act sternly with North Korea, "as with a capricious child that throws food on the floor."20 Predictably, Moscow was against such policies in principle. So this demand was seen as an attempt to further isolate Pyongyang by spoiling its relations with Russia. The United States also suspected that Moscow was keeping it in the dark concerning its dealings with Pyongyang.21 Russia is still often seen in the United States as merely supporting China on the main issues in Korean affairs, and not playing an independent role.22 At crucial moments in the UN (e.g., adopting the resolution on North Korea's missile launches in July 2006, and on its nuclear test in October 2006), while Russia's stance was seen as opposing the United States,23 the U.S. side complained that the "Russian problem" was merely as a reflection of the "Chinese one." More recently, Russia was reproached for "inactivity" in responding to the initiatives of Lee Myung-bak's administration and was said to be doing little to help North Korea overcome its isolation.24 Washington was not happy with Russian statements that North Korea and the United States shared the fault for the stalling of the Six Party Talks in 2008.25 In a fantastic scenario drawn up by some commentator, Russia is even considered capable of a Machiavellian design to arm North Korea with the purpose of selling more arms to South Korea and helping eventual production of nuclear weapons in South Korea after a U.S. withdrawal. 26 Some conservative U.S. experts consider that "Russia increasingly plays a self-serving spoiler role more related to a resurgent Russian resistance to the US globally than to anything relevant to Korea."27 The spread of such opinions is regrettable since Russia's stance on nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula is in fact close to that of the United States. Russia supports U.S. efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the problem of Korean security. Russia does not maintain a unilaterally pro-Pyongyang position, as Western commentators sometimes argue.28 Russian politicians and high-ranking diplomats are on record repeatedly saying that North Korean nuclear programs "threaten our interests," as when they strongly protested against the 2006 DPRK nuclear test.29 On many occasions Russia has confirmed support for the Six Party Talks and vowed to continue cooperation for denuclearization. 30 A South Korean report has provided an appropriate assessment of Russian policy: Russia has pursued fairly non-controversial policy objectives toward the Korean Peninsula: nuclear non-proliferation and the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula; support for inter-Korean dialogues and interactions contributing to a peaceful re-unification; expansion of mutually beneficial economic cooperation; and trying to obtain greater Korean involvement in developing Siberia and the Russian Far East. . . . Moscow has attempted to enhance its role as a serious "broker" with North Korea.31 Officially, Washington admits that U.S.-Russian cooperation on the North Korea nuclear problem is one of the important examples of foreign-policy coordination between the two countries. 32 U.S. officials point out that the solution to the Korean problem is probably "the place we could work with Russia, as we have trouble working in other areas"33 (especially after the Russian- Georgian conflict). Russian officials also see Russian-U.S. cooperation on Korean affairs as a possible model of foreign-policy coordination. Basing their opinion on 2007-2008 policy consultations, they are generally satisfied with the U.S. government's approach. This approach, they argue, is based on recognition of the Russian ability to positively influence the denuclearization process and does not lead to infringement of Russian interests.34
Consult Russia – Say Yes
Russia opposes military pressure on North Korea
Choe 03 (Sang-Hun, Associated Press, “U.S. Bombers Reach Guam in Korea Crisis”, )
A group of long-range bombers, deployed as a show of U.S. military might, have landed in Guam and more bombers were scheduled to arrive Thursday as tensions increased in the standoff over North Korea's nuclear programs. North Korean state radio on Thursday condemned the reinforcement as a preparation for invading the communist state, said South Korea's national Yonhap news agency. Meanwhile, Russia and China both urged Washington to hold direct talks with Pyongyang to defuse the standoff peacefully, saying that they opposed military or other pressure on the isolated country. The Pentagon ordered the deployment of 12 B-1 and 12 B-52 bombers last Friday to deter conflicts that could arise in the West Pacific, said Lieutenant David Faggard at the U.S. Pacific Air Force headquarters in Hawaii. Lieutenant Tom Wenz, a public-affairs officer at Guam's Andersen Air Force Base, confirmed the landing of the first group of bombers. Tensions over North Korea's nuclear program heightened over the weekend, after North Korean fighter jets briefly intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan. Guam is about 3,200 kilometers from North Korea. The deployment of heavy bombers "was designed to show countries throughout the region that we don't have all our eggs in one basket," Faggard said, referring to the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf region. "These moves are not aggressive in nature. It's a prudent measure to bolster our defense posture," said Andersen spokesperson, Lieutenant Kim Melchor. After the interception, U.S. President George W. Bush said that diplomatic efforts to defuse the tension were in progress but that the military option was on the table as a last resort. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement Thursday that Moscow "noted with concern" that Washington doesn't exclude military means for solving the problem. China said that it also opposed any sanctions. "We believe it would only lead to further problems or complications of the situation," said Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan.
***Ban Military Exercises CP
1NC SOLVENCY
Text:
The United States federal government should announce its intent to conduct military exercise Team Spirit in the Republic of South Korea. The United States federal government should offer to cancel Team Spirit, as well as other military exercises, in exchange for North Korean acts of demilitarization.
The counterplan is sufficient to begin de-escalation and can be reversed if North Korea doesn’t reciprocate
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
The best way to avoid the nightmare of war remains the same as it has been for 53 years: to maintain a formidable CFC military supported by a strong U.S.-ROK alliance. Anti-American sentiments will continue to be felt and North Korea will always see the U.S. military as an impediment to Korean reunification. Short of complete withdrawal of USFK forces, anti-American sentiments will continue to hinder the U.S.-ROK alliance; short of unilateral security assurances from the U.S., the DPRK will continue to threaten peace on the Peninsula. However, recurring signals from subtle signs to obvious statements73 by North Korea suggest that a peaceful resolution is possible through military means.
Although any changes to the current military structure is a risk to security, acknowledgement of the signals from DPRK and moreover actions responding in kind to them may be sufficient to begin de-escalation and reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula. Such a gesture would not escape the attention of the DPRK. They have actively tried to disrupt exercises in the past, and its cancellation or dramatic reduction in scale would have to be considered a major conciliatory step. The value of such a step is that it would be easily reversible should the DPRK not reciprocate suitably within a reasonable period. No troops would have to be withdrawn, no weapons displaced, and the overall security posture on the Peninsula would remain unchanged. The U.S. military would have made a major gesture while remaining operationally unaffected.
Trying to outwait North Korea is not the answer. DPRK’s resolve is clear and unmistakable. Rather than focusing exclusively on North Korea’s denuclearization, the U.S. can improve its position in Northeast Asia, solidify its alliance with South Korea, and reduce military escalation with North Korea.74 But in order to achieve Korean reunification and peace on the peninsula, the U.S. should consider removing key obstacles first, to include perceptions by both Koreas, which hinder the process.75 The only option to remove key obstacles, short of complete withdrawal and further realignment or reduction of U.S. forces, is to make changes to the military exercises. What may appear as minor changes to the United States could mean renewed trust and the possibility for cooperation and dialogue to North Korea. The military has the capacity and the capability to make a difference. Is the U.S. military ready to take that risk?
Reduces tensions while still maintaining deterrence
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Military Exercises: Operational Options and Counterarguments
Although North Korea has gained the attention of diplomatic leaders around the world with the resumption of its nuclear weapons program, the United States must recognize 11 that the tension of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the anti-American sentiments in the ROK, and the provocative actions of North Korea are all related to the presence of USFK forces and the associated military exercises of the CFC. Of the four U.S. instruments of national power available to solve these issues, the military has the flexibility to exercise new initiatives and make quick operational changes while maintaining an effective deterrent to North Korean threats. Perhaps military acts of conciliation by the operational commander will gain the trust of the North Koreans and show that America “has no intentions to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.”57
If nothing else, changes in military exercises can serve to send subtle signals to the leaders of DPRK that the United States is willing to reduce military tension. Such acts may yield positive rewards beyond the operational level, such as minimizing the perception of threat to North Korea, supporting strategic diplomacy and policy in negotiations, and improving relations with our South Korean ally.
2nc Solvency
Military exercises undermine relations with North Korea, increase tensions in South Korea - CP allows US to not make concession
Chu, ’06 (2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
The 53-year alliance between the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has successfully deterred war against the Stalinist North Korean state along the most heavily militarized zone remaining of the Cold War era.1 For over 31 years, both U.S. and ROK military forces, under the mantle of the United Nations and the Combined Forces Command (CFC), have conducted a warfighting exercise called Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) to evaluate and improve joint and combined procedures, plans, and systems used in the event of conflict with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).2 Although this is only one of several major joint exercises staged annually in order to deter or defend against an attack, North Korea insists that all exercises on the Korean Peninsula are gross violations of the halfcentury armistice. Moreover, she claims that the exercises are not defensive, but rather a preparation for a preemptive attack.3
Military exercises have, in fact, adversely strained diplomatic relations with North Korea. On numerous occasions, the leadership of DPRK has blamed war exercises for reasons to halt peaceful negotiations or progress toward reunification. Furthermore, both North and South Korean citizens alike have expressed concern that the military exercises supported anti-nationalism and countered reunification efforts.4 In addition, the increase in anti-American sentiments in South Korea has also been blamed on military exercises. More importantly, military exercises have influenced the escalation of military tension in the Korean Peninsula.
As a part of the new global U.S. policy and South Korea’s drive for self-reliance, the U.S. position towards Korea has changed. The role of U.S. forces in Korea has changed from a supported to a supporting one.5 Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of major joint and combined military exercises as a means to deter North Korean aggression and to examine their value in light of current U.S. interests and the Northeast Asia security environment. Furthermore, the author will evaluate potential ways that the Commanders of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and United States Forces Korea (USFK) can influence strategic-level diplomacy by recommending ways to improve or maintain the readiness of the CFC without compromising its own security. By revising and/or updating the role of military exercises on the Korean Peninsula, the operational commanders will be able to minimize the perception of threat to North Korea, support strategic diplomacy and policy in negotiations, and improve Korean relations without any major concessions on its part.
2nc Threat to Restart Exercises => Empirical Bargaining Chip
Threats of exercises and their periodic cancellation has been used as an empirical bargaining chip
Farrell ’09 – Dr. John F, MA, University of the Philippines; EdD, University of Southern California, Professor of Warfighting at Air University’s Squadron Officer College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, (“Team Spirit A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” )
Team Spirit’s Legacy
Although Team Spirit has not been conducted since 1993, the United States has never permanently cancelled it, at least not officially. Each year the government makes a decision as to the disposition of the exercise, contingent upon North Korea’s compliance with the NPT. The United States occasionally brings up Team Spirit to threaten the North should it choose not to honor treaty commitments. After the first cancellation in 1992, General RisCassi warned that stalling from the North “could well reverse the progress made to date,” a prediction that came true with the one-time resumption of the exercise the following year.81 Gen John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that he agreed with the cancellation of the 1994 Team Spirit exercise but indicated that he wanted the maneuvers to return the next year.82 Gen Thomas Schwartz, commander of US forces in Korea in 2000, stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, although Team Spirit had been suspended, “the option remains open to conduct the large-scale dramatic demonstration of South Korean and United States resolve to defend against North Korean aggression.”83 The ghost of Team Spirit still seems to haunt the Korean Peninsula.
Few doubt this exercise’s military value in that it effectively trained US and ROK personnel in the field. Its political value in intimidating the North and eventually persuading the North Koreans to adhere to treaty obligations, however, appears to have been worth the sacrifice of cancelling an exercise that had become quite expensive and did not exercise the actual war plan, especially when several smaller and less costly exercises could adequately fill that bill.
One could well argue that, since the North eventually violated the 1994 Agreed Framework by developing and testing a nuclear device on 6 October 2006, the entire venture of including Team Spirit in nuclear negotiations came to naught. If one takes the longer view and looks at denuclearizing the Korean peninsula as a process rather than as a single result, however, then utilizing the exercise to achieve political purposes has proven beneficial. At this writing, the North Koreans have allowed inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency into their nuclear facilities and appear willing to exchange their ambitions of nuclear weaponry for economic relief and assistance. The role that Team Spirit played, and still plays, in that process was, and remains, significant.
2nc Solves Tension / Prolif
Tensions over military exercise are the key factor in Korean diplomacy – comparative ev
Chu, ’06 (2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Unlike UFL, the inactive Team Spirit (TS) exercise involved large-scale field maneuver and deployment of forces. The suspension of TS eased military tension on the Peninsula in 1994 and gave rise to the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercise in 1995. To compensate for the lack of actual field maneuver training during RSOI and demonstrate continued military resolve despite the suspension of TS, the Foal Eagle (FE) exercise was expanded and eventually took the form of TS. 21 Today, FE is a comprehensive FTX that involves most of the ROK Armed Forces to include the reserve forces and local governmental officers, USFK military, and special forces as well as a significant portion of the U.S. augmentation force.22 Although each of the exercises are different in scope, mission, and goal, all the major exercises are “designed to evaluate and improve combined and joint coordination, procedures, plans, and systems for conducting contingency operations between the U.S. and ROK forces."23
The U.S. military has and will continue to be instrumental in deterring another war by maintaining strong combined defense readiness.24 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reiterated to South Korea during the 37th annual Security Consultative meeting in October 2005 the need to maintain U.S. military presence in the Peninsula. Moreover, he recognized the importance of the UNC and the USFK to the commitment of regional security.25 While Washington continues to resolve regional tensions through diplomacy and peace-time engagement, Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed the strategic flexibility of U.S. military forces to deter conflict.26 However, while joint military exercises are one of the ways to prepare for such a conflict, they have become a hindrance to the achievement of the political objective.27 The adverse effects from military exercises have become just as threatening as the escalation of nuclear weapons itself.
Military exercises create tension with North Korea and prevent nuclear disarmament
Chu, ’06 (2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Finally, and most importantly, the joint exercises conducted by the U.S.-ROK forces have had nothing but negative reaction among the North Korean leaders. Although the primary reason for having such exercises is to strengthen U.S.-ROK readiness against the threat to freedom on the peninsula, they have had exactly the opposite effect. Instead of reminding the North Koreans of the firm Allied resolve to deter war, the annual exercises have given the Communists all the reasons to prepare for a preemptive attack with nothing else to convince them otherwise. Every year, instead of reducing tension and confrontation, the exercises have been blamed as the chief reason for its adverse effects on the peace in the Korean Peninsula.45
Inter-Korean relations, in particular, have been degraded as a result of the exercises, starting back even during the inception of inter-Korean dialogue in 1982. The dialogue stalled and was eventually suspended with little progress as a result of the TS exercise.46 North Korea, after establishing historical agreements during eight inter-Korean meeting talks in 1992, threatened again to cease talks if the TS military exercise continued. This, too, caused the inter-Korean relations to stalemate.47 In 2000, South Korea canceled all maneuver training and joint military exercises with the United States and focused on domestic preparedness in order to reflect the mood of reconciliation of the inter-Korean summit.48 Most recently, in 2005, the UFL exercise has threatened the progress of the SixParty Talks. North Korea criticized the exercise as a means to escalate tension and provoke conflict during peaceful negotiations.49 North Korean leaders believed that the exercise was staged to coincide with the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and accused the United States and the ROK of blackmailing them with external pressures. "It is unimaginable for us to sit at the negotiating table with the United Sates while the air is filled with dust from a war game opposing us," said a DPRK foreign ministry spokesman.50
“The stable conventional deterrence that has long marked the armistice period is now at risk by the North’s assertion…that in the absence of security assurances from the United States, [DPRK] has both the need and the right to acquire nuclear weapons.” 51 North Korea is using the military exercises and U.S. antagonism as a means of justifying the nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, DPRK maintains that it will give up its nuclear program if the U.S. gives up its hostile policy.52 In response, President Bush has repeatedly guaranteed that he will not attack North Korea under full compliance of international directives.53 While North Korea’s true intentions will never be known, Kim Jong-Il's participation in the interKorean summit of 2000 and agreement to reduce tension and bring permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula is the proof of North Korea’s recent strategic policy change.54 Moreover, Pyongyang’s willingness to participate in the recent Six-Party Talks also symbolizes North Korea’s eagerness to accept outside economic assistance and security assurances in spite of the nuclear program being a legitimate reaction to what she perceives to be a threat to her security.55 However, despite the reference to a peaceful resolution, DPRK continues to perceive U.S. military exercises as a possible reference for an attack on North Korea.56
Military Exercises Undermine Nonprolif Efforts
Military exercises kill disarmament efforts
CNN ‘10 (3-7, “North Korea to abandon disarmament over U.S. exercises,” )
(CNN) -- North Korea said Sunday it would no longer move forward with nuclear disarmament in response to a planned U.S.-South Korean joint military exercise.
The announcement was made by the official Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA.
"The maneuvers clearly indicate once again that the U.S. and the South Korean authorities are the harassers of peace and warmongers keen to bring a war to this land," the statement said.
North Korea also announced it would no longer abide by the armistice that brought a truce to the Korean War, saying that South Korea violated the agreement by participating in the military cooperation with the United States.
Disarmament talks were already at an impasse between North Korea, the United States and other nations. The military exercises would bring negotiations to a standstill and push North Korea to boost its nuclear arsenal, the statement said.
"The process for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will naturally come to a standstill and (North Korea) will bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defense," the statement said.
All talks between North Korea, the United States and South Korea will be suspended if the joint exercises go through as planned, North Korea said.
Military exercise cause Korean missile buildup – guts deterrence and readiness
Kim ’10 (3-8, Hyung-Jim, Hamilton News, “North Korea: We're Ready To 'Blow Up' South Korea, U.S. ” )
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea has recently created an army division in charge of newly developed intermediate-range missiles capable of striking U.S. forces in Japan and Guam, a South Korean news agency said Tuesday.
The report came as North Korea is stepping up its war rhetoric against the U.S. and South Korea after the allies started their annual drills Monday aimed at improving their defense capabilities.
The North's People's Army recently launched a division supervising operational deployment of missiles with a range of more than 1,860 miles (3,000 kilometers) that it had developed in recent years, Yonhap news agency reported citing an unidentified South Korean government source.
The missiles could pose a threat to U.S. forces in Japan, Guam and other Pacific areas that are to be redeployed in time of emergency on the Korean peninsula, Yonhap said.
Military Excercises Bad – 2nc Laundry List
Military exercises increase tensions, increase anti-American sentiment and prevent peaceful reunification
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Adverse Effects Due to Military Exercises
Military exercises have increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. First, they have promoted a conflicting view of U.S. military presence in South Korea and created a gap in perception of the North Korean threat. Second, exercises have increased anti-American sentiment. Finally, military exercises have provoked North Korea to take additional security measures and ultimately undermined the progress toward peaceful reunification.
Military Exercises Bad – DOD Budget
Military exercises crush the DOD’s budget
Farrell ’09- Dr. John F, MA, University of the Philippines; EdD, University of Southern California, Professor of Warfighting at Air University’s Squadron Officer College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, (“Team Spirit A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” )
Team Spirit’s Value
Continuing Team Spirit, however, was becoming increasingly costly. Transportation expenses for deploying and redeploying forces to the peninsula and sustaining them in the field for at least a month had become enormous. In 1984 the cost to the Air Force alone amounted to $30 million.57 By 1991 total outlay for the exercise had reached $150 million.58 By 1993 the combined cost of all exercises since Team Spirit’s inception in 1976 approached $900 million.59 For budgetary reasons, some people in the Defense Department wanted to change Team Spirit from an annual to a biannual exercise.60 In 1991 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney considered eliminating the exercise altogether as a cost-saving measure.61 Maintaining the most expensive exercise held by the Pentagon was becoming financially onerous when post–Cold War defense budgets were being trimmed.
Military Exercises => Korea War
Korean tensions on the brink – this exercise will cause escalation
Martinez ’10 (6-2, Luis, ABC News, “U.S. to Join South Korean Military Exercise Off North Korea Coast,” )
The U.S. aircraft carrier USS George Washington will participate in a joint naval exercise with South Korea next week in the Yellow Sea, the same waters west of the Korean peninsula where North Korea is accused of sinking a South Korean warship last March, ABC News has learned.
A U.S. official said the carrier, which operates from its home port in Japan, "will be sent to the waters off South Korea within coming days to participate in joint exercises" with the South Korean navy.
Slated to begin June 8, the official said this exercise will be "separate and distinct" from an upcoming anti-submarine warfare exercise that Pentagon officials had said recently would be occurring "in the near future." The upcoming exercise was first reported by South Korea's Yonhap News Agency.
Another U.S. official says additional U.S warships will be participating in the exercise, including a Japan-based Aegis destroyer and a Hawaii-based nuclear submarine. South Korea will also deploy a destroyer, a submarine and F-15 fighter jets to participate in the exercise.
Last week, South Korea conducted a one-day anti-submarine exercise close to where the incident with North Korea had occurred.
This won't the first time American aircraft carriers have participated in a major military exercises with South Korea. Last October, the USS George Washington participated in a practice operation in the Yellow Sea with the South Korean navy, and every year in March, the U.S. typically joins its southeast Asian ally for exercises at sea.
But the latest involvement of the U.S. military in South Korean exercises comes at a time of heightened tensions between North and South Korea after 46 South Korean sailors died in March when its warship Cheonan sunk under mysterious circumstances near a disputed maritime border.
Following a months-long international investigation that included salvaging the ship from the ocean floor, South Korea accused North Korea last week of using a mini-submarine to launch a torpedo that sunk the warship.
In a statement issued by the White House after South Korea announced its findings, the United States said South Korea could count on its full support. It also said "U.S. support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal."
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said last week that as part of that commitment, the South Korean findings had prompted the U.S. and South Korea to hold two military exercises with South Korea in the "near future." He said the U.S. had committed to holding an anti-submarine exercise and was in discussions about conducting a maritime interdiction training exercise.
Military Exercises => China/Korea War
Naval military exercises cause Chinese and North Korean backlash
Pomfret and DeYoung, ’10, 6-19, (John and Karen, Washington Post, “U.S. debates joining S. Korean military exercises,” )
The Obama administration is wrestling over whether to send an aircraft carrier to take part in military exercises with South Korea in what would amount to a significant show of force after the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship in March.
The back-and-forth over the USS George Washington reflects the precarious security situation in Northeast Asia after North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan on March 26. It underscores a huge issue facing U.S. and South Korean officials: how to stop North Korea, which is believed to possess nuclear weapons, from conducting conventional attacks such as the torpedoing of the Cheonan.
Some within the administration are arguing that dispatching the 97,000-ton carrier to the Yellow Sea off the Korean Peninsula, where the Cheonan was sunk, could anger China or cause North Korea to react violently, according to officials involved in the discussions. Others say the United States needs to send a clear message to its allies and to North Korea and China that the United States is standing firmly behind the South.
"It's a very tough call," said Susan Shirk, a former State Department official and an expert on Asian security at the University of California at San Diego. "You don't want to be too proactive. But you need to send a clear message."
Reports that the United States would send the aircraft carrier battle group surfaced in early June after Washington and Seoul decided to conduct more intensive joint military exercises in response to the attack, which killed 46 South Korean sailors.
On Friday, the Korea Times repeated earlier reports that the George Washington was being sent, citing an unidentified official at the Ministry of Defense. A Pentagon spokesman said no decision had been made.
"I think it's a question of the U.S. and South Korea working out what we want to do together and when we want to do it," said a senior administration official. And as for China, he said, "we'll make sure that they're not surprised."
An international team of experts assembled by South Korea amassed overwhelming evidence that a North Korean mini-submarine sank the Cheonan with a torpedo.
South Korea has since pushed the U.N. Security Council to take up the issue, has cut most ties to North Korea and has sought support from its neighbors to punish Pyongyang.
Still, Evan A. Feigenbaum, a former State Department official now at the Council on Foreign Relations, said North Korea has faced few consequences for its actions.
South Korea has received strong backing from Japan, but China has been cool to its entreaties. China waited almost a month to offer condolences after the deaths aboard the Cheonan and has yet to accept the contents of the report. North Korea has denied involvement in the incident.
China's state-run press has also reacted badly to reports that the United States was considering dispatching the aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea.
"Having a U.S. aircraft carrier participating in joint military drills off of China's coast would certainly be a provocative action toward China," warned the Global Times, an English-language newspaper run by the Communist Party's mouthpiece, the People's Daily.
Shirk and others said they back sending the aircraft battle group.
"Our commitment to the region is always in question because we're the outside power," Shirk said. Add to that the appearance that China's economy has recovered quickly while unemployment is still high in the United States. "It just reinforces doubts about our ability to deliver," she said.
"But it's dangerous," she acknowledged. "I would send it but not say anything about it. I wouldn't make some big muscular statement. I would just say, 'This is normal.' "
Military Exercises => SK Anti Americanism
Military exercises fuel South Korean anti-Americanism- perception key
Chu, ’06 (2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Unlike the last 50 years, ROK now views U.S. military presence and military exercises as a threat to her security. South Koreans do not register the same level of concern as many Americans over a potential North Korean invasion, nuclear weapons development, ballistic missile testing and missile sales abroad.30 In fact, most South Koreans think the Cold War is over. No longer are South Koreans faced with the invincible Kim Il Sung of the past, whose threatening actions and rhetoric often resoundingly justified South Korea’s security-first mentality. South Koreans today see Kim Jong Il as a leader who smiles, makes agreements and promises, and seems to be pursuing reforms in North Korea.31 Moreover, South Korean citizens seem to be satisfied with Kim’s promises, even though he has consistently either broken them or failed to fulfill them. They now feel a connection to what they see as poor, starving, and weak brethren in North Korea.32 South Koreans view Americans as more of a threat than the North Koreans as the United States continues to precipitate tensions on the Peninsula.33
The United States has become a threat to the ROK because South Koreans do not see North Korea’s nuclear brinksmanship as a regional and global threat to the war on terrorism in the same way as Americans view the DPRK. 34 The U.S. strategy has always been one of deterring the spread of communism by containing North Korea within its boundaries with a strong U.S. military presence.35 The only difference now is that North Korea threatens not with Stalinist ideas but rather with nuclear weapons. As a result, the U.S. military, under the auspices of the CFC, continues to “flex her muscles” with exercises to demonstrate exceptional combined readiness and an absolutely determined resolve to prevent or win a potential war with DPRK. For example, during the “enhanced deterrence” period just before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, 8th Army subordinate units of the USFK launched RSO&I and FE to engage in theater-specific training and readiness exercises.36 While this served to display U.S.-ROK’s steadfastness to deter North Korea from reengaging the South in a conventional and nuclear war, it also reminded the South Koreans that U.S. military exercises may only serve to increase the possibility of war on the Peninsula.
Anti-Americanism
Another source of tension is the decline in support for the United States in South Korea as the generation that was alive during the Korean War 50 years ago slowly dies out.37 Although anti-American feelings have always existed since the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, civil-military incidents due to military exercises have had detrimental effects on the support for the U.S. military. For example, in late 2002, the single biggest issue in South Korea was not North Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program but a traffic accident in which two South Korean school girls, while walking home from school, were tragically killed by a U.S. military vehicle during a training exercise.38 A dramatic upsurge in anti-American violence on the Peninsula began after the two U.S. soldiers were acquitted by the military court. The number of Koreans who sympathize with anti-Americanism continues to grow rapidly. Following this incident, a record 53% of the public indicated a negative or unfavorable perception of the U.S. due to events involving military presence and exercises.39
Disrespect for the Korean culture, tradition, and society by the military personnel has also fueled anti-American sentiments. The U.S. military has 36,000 troops stationed in Korea in any given period. However, many more soldiers visit Korea from the United States as augmentation or participants of the military exercises. This influx of soldiers has caused an increase in anti-American sentiments, especially in the cities where most U.S. troops go to relax and enjoy the Korean culture. Unfortunately, the taboo topic of prostitution has caused much debate in towns and cities adjacent to or near military installations. For example, not far from Itaewon, American clients have brought business to a large red-light district. Unfortunately, they have also brought pregnancy and violence into the mix.40 One of the greatest causes of resentment has been that the American servicemen involved in crimes have been able to seek refuge on their military bases under the protection of the Status of Forces Agreement where the Korean authorities have no jurisdiction.41
It is not only urban areas that have been affected by U.S. military presence and joint exercises. In Maehyang-Ri, a small fishing village on the western coast of the country, residents have lived with the largest bombing range in Asia on their doorstep for five decades. They claim that several villagers have been killed or injured by ammunition, that the constant roar of fighter planes overhead has damaged their property, and that villagers suffer psychological stress because of the noise and concerns about their safety.42 Since the range opened in 1952, 10 deaths and 8 injuries have officially been recorded.43 The most recent incident occurred in the summer of 2000 when an American jet jettisoned six 230-kg bombs that exploded without any harm to life. 44 Unfortunately, this event has attracted media attention and further advanced anti-America sentiments against the U.S. military.
Military Exercises Will Provoke China
The exercise will provoke China
Coughlin ’10 (6-19, Christopher, The Examiner, “Playing with fire on the Korean peninsula,” )
Recognizing the precarious military balance on the peninsula - a North Korean attack would create casualties and destruction in its first hours that would rival the final Soviet assault on Berlin in 1945 - South Korea has pragmatically opted for diplomatic actions, through multilateral economic sanctions and military exercises, to show that the South Korean government cannot be intimidated.
North Korea, which denies any involvement in the sinking, has publicly warned on Friday that it will strike "merciless blows" against the South if the UN moves to sanction the regime. Even for a regime that has made hyperbole into an art form, the rhetoric is uncomfortable.
Into this mix of action and charges comes details on the military maneuvers.
In early June, reports surfaced that the US would not only participate in the military exercises, but that the 97,000 ton, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS George Washington, would be the centerpiece of the US flotilla, symbolically operating in the Yellow Sea near the area where the Cheonan was attacked and sunk.
This was ostensibly designed to show solidarity with the South and American resolve to the North.
But that public announcement was both premature and problematic.
The Yellow Sea is the body of water that separates Korea from China. The distance from the Chinese city of Weihai to the South Korean port of Inchon is less than 200 miles, a little more than the distance from New Orleans to Pensacola.
Aside from the crisis created by North Korea's actions, the Chinese have a legitimate security interest in the Yellow Sea and what happens there, given the proximity of the Sea to a large part of the Chinese coast line, which is densly populated and near the manufacturing heart of China.
It is useful, in this context, to remember that when the Chinese were busy raising tensions in 1996 by shooting off missiles into the Taiwan Straits, and President Clinton ordered a US carrier group into the area to show US resolve, those forces were kept well away from the Taiwan Straits that separate China from Taiwan; an action which might have been viewed as needlessly provocative.
But now in a crisis that does not involve China, the US has at leasat notionally planned to send the most potent symbol of American military power into the restricted waters of an emerging world power? Let's keep in mind that China is the only tenuous leverage that the globe has on the North Korean regime, thus provoking Beijing does not further US-South Korean interests.
But with the word already out on the exercises and the carrier's involvement, the Washington Post today published a story indicating that top US officials are having second thoughts, compounding a bad decision and making it worse.
Instead of a policy grounded in cooperation, nuance and sophistication, our policy has been exposed as amateurish and unconstructive. And predictably, the Chinese are unhappy. State-run media stated that, "Having a US aircraft carrier participating in joint military drills off of China's coast would certainly be a provocative action toward China."
A2: NK Won’t Lashout at Exercises
North Korean threats trigger backlash – causes escalation
NBC ’09 (3-6, “N. Korea threats force change in flight paths,” )
SEOUL, South Korea - Air Canada and Singapore Airlines joined South Korean airlines in rerouting flights to steer clear of North Korean airspace Friday after the communist regime threatened Seoul's passenger planes amid heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea warned late Thursday that it cannot guarantee the safety of South Korea's passenger jets flying near its airspace if annual joint U.S.-South Korean military maneuvers go ahead as planned Monday.
South Korea's two main airlines, Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, immediately began redirecting flights away from the North's airspace.
On Friday, at least two foreign airlines, Air Canada and Singapore Airlines, also changed flight paths to and from Seoul, an official at the Civil Aviation Safety Authority said. He agreed to discuss the matter only if not quoted by name because he was not authorized to talk with journalists.
The two American carriers that fly to South Korea, Delta Air Lines Inc. and UAL Corp., said their routes did not take their planes near North Korea and they had not canceled or rerouted flights.
Worsening relations
Pyongyang's warning was the latest threat from North Korea at a time of mounting tensions over stalled reconciliation efforts and the North's plan for a missile test. The two Koreas technically remain at war because their bitter 1950-53 war ended in a cease-fire rather than a peace treaty.
Relations have worsened since conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office a year ago and refused to provide the impoverished North with aid unless the regime abided by its commitment to dismantle its nuclear program.
North Korea cut off ties, canceled joint inter-Korean projects and declared peacekeeping agreements with the South void.
Last year, the North stopped disabling its nuclear program, and last week it announced it was preparing to send a communications satellite into space — a launch that nations in the region suspect is a cover for testing a long-range missile capable of reaching Alaska.
In issuing its threat to South Korean airliners, the North did not say what kind of danger jetliners might face. It was not clear whether the North was threatening to shoot down planes.
Korean Air, South Korea's largest airline, has twice had planes downed: one shot down in 1983 by a Soviet fighter jet with the loss of all 269 people aboard and another destroyed by a bomb allegedly planted by North Korean agents in 1987 that killed all 115 people on board.
South Korea urged the North to retract the threat.
"The military threat against civil airplanes' normal flights is a violation of international norms and an inhumane act that cannot be justified under any circumstances," Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Ho-nyeon told reporters Friday.
Kim hinted the threat could be a way to clear airspace before a possible missile launch.
‘Entirely inappropriate’
U.S. generals representing the U.N. Command, the American-led body overseeing the cease-fire between the two Koreas, told their North Korean counterparts Friday that the threat was "inappropriate." They urged the North to retract the warning, the U.N. Command said.
North Korean generals rejected the demand, calling the warning a "self-defense measure," according to Pyongyang's Korean Central News Agency. The North's chief delegate at the meeting warned of "strong countermeasures" unless the U.S. called off the military exercises with South Korea, and he reasserted Pyongyang's right to launch a satellite into space, KCNA said.
A2: Exercises key to Readiness
Cancelling missions doesn’t affect readiness
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Finally, the last option is to suspend all major theater-level exercises. Exercises have been suspended in the past without reducing readiness. The cancellation and subsequent suspension of TS has had little to no impact on the readiness posture of the U.S.-ROK alliance today. More importantly, it demonstrated the U.S and ROK willingness to appeal to the needs of the enemy. With the future of the Six-Party Talks still yet to be determined, the cancellation of the exercises may “prevent the danger of a war and achieve solid peace on the Korean Peninsula.”70
The U.S. and ROK could also take steps beyond permanently cancelling these exercises. They could announce the cancellation of them in any given year, or change them into biannual alternating events, with only one or the other being conducted each year.
Computer simulations solve readiness
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Lastly, U.S. augmentation forces could be present virtually by internet and communication connectivity from outside the Peninsula. Since most of the exercises are computer-simulated, the exercises would be executed with little impact to the value of the training. It would be as though the U.S. forces were present in Korea sitting next to their Korean counterparts. The advances of modern technologies to include weapons, communication, and intelligence programs provide the United States the capability to have less military forces on the Peninsula during military exercises.62
Exercises Happening Now
Despite opposition – exercise still happening now
Ilbo, ’10 (6-19, Chuchung, “Joint Military Drill Could Come Up This Month,” Lexis)
The overdue South Korea-US joint Naval drill planned as a determined show of protest to the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan [Ch'o'nan] may finally be back on schedule.
But while one government source said yesterday that the drill -a show of military preparedness planned in addition to the two annual joint drills -will be held at the end of this month, other experts said it may face yet another delay.
"After consultations, South Korea and the United States decided to conduct a joint military drill in the final week of June," the source said. The joint military drill was initially planned early this month, but it has been delayed at the request of the United States.
The official said the Naval drill will be held on the West Sea [Yellow Sea], where the South Korean warship sank on March 26 along with 46 of its soldiers in what the South believes was a torpedo attack by North Korea. The official said the drill will be followed by joint anti-submarine exercises in early July.
"The joint drill will be centred on preventing the infiltration of North Korean special forces, detecting North Korean submarines and mastering capabilities of joint combat operations," another government official told Yonhap News Agency. "That will be held in a setting similar to real combat."
The official told Yonhap the drill will involve the USS. George Washington, a 97,000 ton-air craft carrier belonging to the US Seventh Fleet, as well as an Aegis-class cruiser. South Korea will mobilize a 4,500-ton KDX-II destroyer, an 1,800-ton Son Won-il submarine and F-15K jet fighters for the drill, the official said.
But Jung Jang-hyun, a professor at Kookmin University, said the drill could be delayed further, citing the slow process at the UN Security Council to procure international condemnation of the Cheonan attack.
Ryoo Kihl-jae, a professor of North Korea studies at Kyungnam University, agreed, saying "Given the sensitivity of the issue, holding a special drill won't be easy. North Korea said it will consider any 'provocation against it' a declaration of war, and China's against the drill because it's on the West Sea."
***Other CPS
CP – RESTRUCTURING
The U.S. should eliminate one of the ASCC headquarters along with one of the support command headquarters, the remaining ASCC headquarters should be stationed in Hawaii with a small forward element in Korea, the two theater support headquarters should be downsized and combined into one command stationed in Japan with a small forward element in Korea.
Reduces footprint in ROK
Davino 04 - Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Administration of the United States Pacific Command (Michael F. Davino, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” Strategy Research Project, 3/15/04, )
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE STATIONING OF U.S. FORCES IN KOREA
The U.S. must act on the findings of its ongoing evaluation of its force structure in Korea in the context of the entire Pacific region as well as its worldwide commitments. With the heavy requirements for ground combat forces to prosecute the global war on terror and to maintain an open-ended commitment for stability and support operations in Iraq, we can ill afford to have ground forces tied to one area. This situation is exacerbated because at any given time one or two maneuver brigades are being transformed to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams or to digitized heavy brigades and are therefore unavailable for employment.
ELIMINATE REDUNDANT HEADQUARTERS
The senior U.S. commander in Korea commands the ROK – U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), the United Nations Command (UNC) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), a sub- unified command of USPACOM. The U.S. Army currently devotes two army service component command (ASCC) headquarters, a corps headquarters and two theater support command headquarters to the USPACOM AOR.74 These Army and joint headquarters command, control and support just two Army infantry divisions (one in Korea and one in Hawaii), each of which is short a ground maneuver brigade, and a separate light infantry brigade in Alaska. This proliferation of headquarters, the heavy focus on Korea, and significant amount of effort preparing forces for a war on the peninsula, is not an efficient use of high-demand personnel billets and other increasingly scarce resources.
A more efficient Army force structure for command and control of its forces in Korea and in the Pacific would be to eliminate one of the ASCC headquarters in Korea along with one of the theater support command headquarters. The remaining ASCC headquarters could continue to be stationed in Hawaii with a small forward element remaining in Korea. The two theater support command headquarters, the 19th Theater Support Command in Taegu, ROK and the 9th Theater Support Command at Camp Zama, Japan, could be downsized and combined into one command stationed in Japan with a small forward element in Korea. These steps would help reduce our footprint in the ROK.
CP – Peacekeeping Restructuring
The US should transform the Combined Forces Command into a regional peacekeeping operation to maintain Northeast Asia stability
Parker 03-U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
NEW ROK-US SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS
The future security environment in Northeast Asia will necessitate a change in the organizations and relationships of the U.S.-Korean (United Nations Command, and Combined Forces Command) headquarters. Resolution of the armistice will probably cause an end to the United Nations Command. There is an opportunity, however, to consider transforming this command into a regional peacekeeping operations (PKO) command, with headquarters in Korea. There is much interest in PKO by Korean leadership and a headquarters in Seoul may offer advantages in future relationships with other Asian nations. Three possible options (not mutually exclusive) for Combined Forces Command (CFC) are: keep it the same, but alternate U.S. and Korean commanders; reduce the size and scope to a much smaller force (similar to the French-German model); and completely separate the two forces (as in Japan), using combined exercises to enhance interoperability. It would be difficult to keep CFC the same, without causing China to believe that it is the target of that alliance. The other two are more likely, especially if well advertised as a regional security and defense alliance. Whichever path is agreed upon, the groundwork for future changes in these organizations should begin now and be publicly articulated as part of the overall strategy for change in a unified Korea.
A unified Korea will also impact on the U.S. military (United States Pacific Command, USFK, and subordinate service and component) commands. The role of PACOM is already shifting to broader engagement, with a push toward multilateral approaches to issues (such as in combating transnational threats). The joint headquarters supplying forces to CFC, USFK, will be unnecessary regardless of CFC’s transformation. Instead, USFK should transition to a 17 smaller, expeditionary standing joint force headquarters, with interagency process capabilities. Probably, USFJ could be eliminated, with a regional focus for one joint force headquarters based in Korea. It should be located in the southern part of Korea (to allay Chinese concerns), near a large city with good transportation, such as Busan. The evolving U.S. force presence in Korea will find itself in a complex multinational and regional security focused environment. This small, highly mobile, and highly capable force will contribute greatly to the stability in Northeast Asia, supporting continued growth in Korea and Japan, while posing less of a threat to China.
CP – Remove Permanent Troop Stationing
The US should remove permanent position of ground combat brigades and opt for a regular rotation of brigades from the U.S. – solves Korean demand for land from bases
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
BASING IN KOREA
Rapid growth and urbanization in Korea will continue to create a demand for land and impact on bases occupied by U.S. forces. The population of South Korea is expected to grow from thirty-two million in 1985 to over fifty million in 2015, second only to Bangladesh in population density.50 Unification will more than double available land area, with only a fifty percent increase in population, allowing an opportunity to shift some U.S. bases north. Great care must be taken now to expand the LPP for a future that addresses all Korean land issues and military basing. We must reopen negotiations over unresolved individual land use issues, some of which date back to 1982. Of special interest to many Koreans is the return of the Yongsan base camp, which should be a high priority in the LPP. Additionally, the U.S. should be prepared to give up one of its two air bases in Korea. Similar concerns must be addressed in Japan, as well as looking to alternative locations.
Since Guam Island is the nearest base to Northeast Asia, after Korea and Japan, the U.S. military may need to seek additional options to parallel the LPP. One option is to expand the Army Prepositioned Stocks – Afloat (APS-A), allowing a more flexible, mobile approach to basing at sea. Another option is to remove the permanent positioning of ground combat brigades in Korea, opting instead for a regular rotation of brigades from the United States. This option will decrease base requirements, the number of family members in Korea, and allow flexible (different locations each rotation) basing that spreads the impact more equitably. A key factor in the final decision about basing is the identification of the required forces and capabilities.
CP – Gradual Withdrawal – 1nc
Withdrawal must be gradual and the U.S. must have the capability to reverse it depending on the circumstances
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
The rate and extent of withdrawing U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula is itself a delicate undertaking and has the potential to create instability and undermine U.S. national security objectives. Care must be taken to coordinate the withdrawal by heavily exercising diplomatic channels of communication to ensure U.S. actions and intentions are not misunderstood by either allies or potential regional aggressors. Ideally, the U.S. would pursue a gradual approach to withdrawal. This would allow the U.S. to gage the response of regional actors, thoroughly assess and reassess dynamics in the security environment, while retaining maximum flexibility to reverse the withdraw should the need arise. Certainly redeploying personnel, their property, and equipment, and closing facilities will take some time. Depending on the terms negotiated with the Korean government, complete withdraw could take considerable time to “restore” U.S. installations to an acceptable environmental standard. This was the case during retrograde operation during the draw-down in Europe and base closures in the U.S. However, environmental clean up need not involve U.S. combat troops, and in most cases, could be contracted. It is conceivable that the 8th U.S. Army consisting of a mechanized division headquarters, two mechanized infantry brigades, an aviation brigade, an artillery brigade, an engineer brigade, a military police brigade, a Patriot battalion, and a theater support command, could begin withdrawing six months after the reunification assuming the environment is deemed stable. Based on experiences of the U.S. retrograde in Europe, withdrawal of these units would take one and a half to two years. It is reasonable to assume that the ground forces would be the first to withdraw based on reasons previously cited. Also, most of the U.S. Army installations, with the exception of Yongsan Garrison, are used exclusively by U.S. forces whereas the air bases are co-operated bases and would likely service the ROK Air Force even after the U.S. departed.
CP – Condition on End to Ballistic Missile PROGRAM
U.S. should try to negotiate an end to North Korea’s ballistic missile program – it is the number one threat
Snyder, Et. Al. ’10 – director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. “US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” ww.content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf)
As North Korea’s nuclear tests have drawn attention from the United States and the international community, its missile development has proceeded in parallel. North Korea’s missile development has drawn censure, but the George W. Bush administration chose not to address missiles as part of the six-party agenda. The Task Force emphasizes that stopping North Korea’s missile development should be a high-priority issue for the Obama administration and the international community. The threat of North Korea’s missile program cannot be overstated. The development of an adequate delivery capacity would enable North Korea to expand the scope of its arsenal and threaten or actually deliver a nuclear strike to its neighbors. North Korea’s intercontinental missile capability emerged as a significant concern in August 1998, when North Korea launched its first Taepodong missile in an effort it claimed was the launch of a satellite. In 2oo6, the North Koreans tested a multistage missile, but the test failed less than a minute after the launch. North Korea has also conducted periodic tests of short- and medium-range missiles since 2oo6, especially in 2oo9. There has been occasional discussion of the need to add missiles to the six-party agenda, but the issue has not been formally taken up, in part because the nuclear issue has been deemed more urgent. North Korea’s earlier announcement of a multistage rocket launch carrying an artificial satellite payload in April ŒŸŸ9 was designed to evade international censure. The reasons for this test appear to have been driven by internal political considerations related to North Korea’s efforts to put into place a leadership succession process from Kim Jong-il to his third son, Kim Jong-eun. North Korea launched a similar missile test in the week before Kim Jong-il’s formal assumption of power in September 1998, presumably as a show of strength. The April ŒŸŸ9 test, only hours before Obama’s speech in Prague announcing his commitment to promoting global nuclear weapons reductions, drew immediate condemnation from the Obama administration and the international community. Given the need to constrain North Korean missile development and the fact that efforts to address the missile issue have not previously been a part of the six-party agenda, the Task Force recommends that the United States pursue bilateral negotiations with North Korea confined to the missile issue and separate from denuclearization talks, which should occur in the six-party framework. The first task of this negotiating effort would be to convince the DPRK to recommit to a moratorium on missile tests as negotiations over its nuclear and missile programs continue. North Korea’s expanded missile delivery capacity must be factored in to South Korean defense efforts, including strengthening missile defense and developing additional response capabilities necessary to offset that capability. At the same time, the United States should continue to strengthen missile defense coordination with Japan and South Korea to install proper defenses against any expansion in North Korean capabilities. With the consent of Japan and South Korea, the United States might consider declaring a willingness to pursue preemptive actions against future North Korean missile launches to reinforce existing UN Security Council resolutions against North Korean long-range missile tests.31 Of concern to the United States is the potential for North Korea to proliferate its existing weapons materials and technologies to other state or nonstate actors, particularly Iran. North Korea and Iran are known to have shared technology and information with each other as part of their respective missile development programs.32 And there are strong suspicions that cooperation between them extends to the nuclear field, including possibly both uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear development efforts.33 Cooperation in the missile field is long-standing and well known, with North Korean and Iranian scientists reportedly even present to observe their respective missile tests. In addition, there are indications that North Korea’s technical assistance to Syria to build a small-scale nuclear plant for plutonium production may have been leaked to Iran. Some estimates of the value of North Korea-Iran annual trade in these illicit areas run as high as $z billion in recent years.34 The possibility of further cooperation is of great concern to the United States and the international community. It directly challenges international norms embodied by the NPT, defies UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and challenges the capacity of member states to implement UNSC Resolution 1540, which requires cooperation to prevent the international transfer of fissile materials.35 UNSC Resolution 1874 seeks to prevent additional DPRK imports of sensitive technologies or components that might be used to improve North Korea’s missile development capabilities.36 The Task Force calls on all parties to implement these measures strictly in order to constrain further progress in North Korea’s development of a missile delivery capability or risk facing the consequences that would result from an even more dangerous North Korea with the capability to deliver a nuclear device to any part of South Korea or Japan.
***REDUCE / Withdrawal Specification
WITHDRAWAL SPEC – MULTIPLE WAYS TO REDUCE U.S. PRESENCE
There are multiple ways to reduce U.S. military presence in Korea – they should have to specify
Kim 99 - Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (Sung-Han Kim, “Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research Agenda,” The University of California at San Diego, 5/26-27/99, )
Force Restructuring
When an expanded role for regional cooperation between Korea and the United States and the responsibility and scope of such an alliance are specified, it will be necessary to resolve issues related to force restructuring. Possible scenarios related to the restructuring of U.S. forces in Korea include a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea; a pullout of U.S. ground troops with U.S. air and naval forces remaining in Korea; and the continued presence of U.S. air and naval forces with a reduced number of ground troops.
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38 U.S. Policy Toward the Korea Peninsula
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