3rd Appellate Pleading Template
Wilbur Streett
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
732-888-1858
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Bruce Eden, NEXT BEST FRIEND
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Bergen County, New Jersey
Tel. 973-616-9558
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH [1]
DIVISION ____________
APRIL TERM
|Bruce Eden, | Case No.: |
|Next Best Friend, | |
|IN THE RELATION OF: | |
|Wilbur Streett | |
|Petitioner/Appellant |WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS |
|Vs. | |
|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, | |
|Et Als., | |
|Respondents, | |
| | |
State of New Jersey ]
] ss
County of Monmouth ]
In the matter of Wilbur Streett, a father; ]
] A Complaint
Application for a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, ]
TO: The Court of Common Pleas Monmouth New Jersey ]
To his honor, Chief Presiding Justice, Gerald Hermansen of the above mentioned court, of the state of New Jersey, GREETINGS:
Monmouth County ]
] Affirmed
Commonwealth of New Jersey ]
In the matter of the application of Wilbur Streett . ]
For a Writ of Habeas Corpus. ] Complaint
For Wilbur Streett ]
This is the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus, HEREBY LAWFULLY SERVED UPON THE ABOVE MENTIONED TRIBUNAL IN THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. The nature of this action is thereby lawfully stated by this document which is brought in the common law UNDER THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY “The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or the laws of this State is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State.” [N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 2012 (Birds. Rev. Stat. (1896) p. 1388 § 7).]
This writ of habeas corpus consists and contains five parts inclusive as one:
[PART ONE] Writ of Habeas Corpus (Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum et Recipiendum)
[PART TWO] Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[PART THREE] Affidavit in Support of Habeas Corpus
[PART FOUR] Order for Writ of Habeas Corpus to Issue.
[PART FIVE] DECLARATION IN FORMA PAUPERIS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The following constitutional provisions are relevant to adjudication of the instant action for habeas corpus relief.
Constitution for the United States of America:
“WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” (Preamble)
“…To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 4)
“…To constitution Tribunals Inferior to the supreme Court;” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 9)
“…To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which same shall be, for the Election of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;-- And” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 17)
“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18)
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” (Article I, Section 9, Clause 2)
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; --to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-- between Citizens of different States,-- Between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” (Article III, Section 2, Clause 1)
AMENDMENT THE FIRST: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
AMENDMENT THE FOURTH: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
AMENDMENT THE FIFTH: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”
AMENDMENT THE SIXTH: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
AMENDMENT THE SEVENTH: “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of common law.”
AMENDMENT THE EIGHTH: “Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
AMENDMENT THE NINTH: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
AMENDMENT THE TENTH: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”
Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776):
IN PROVINCIAL CONGRESS: New Jersey, Burlington, July 2, 1776. By order of Congress:
XXII. That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.
XV. That the laws of the Colony shall begin in the following style, viz. "Be it enacted by the Council and General Assembly of this Colony, and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same: " that all commissions, granted by the Governor or Vice-President, shall run thus-" The Colony of New-Jersey to A. B. &c. greeting: " and that all writs shall likewise run in the name of the Colony: and that all indictments shall conclude in the following manner, viz. "Against the peace of this Colony, the government and dignity of the same.
XVI. That all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to.
Updated Through Amendments Adopted in November, 2000
ARTICLE I
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized.
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in cases now prosecuted without indictment, or arising in the army or navy or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger.
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.
No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense. All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great.
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. It shall not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing death or purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value.
No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any action, or on any judgment found upon contract, unless in cases of fraud; nor shall any person be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.
This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.
A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system. A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law or the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature. For the purposes of this paragraph, "victim of a crime" means: a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and b) the spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a criminal homicide. Article I, paragraph 2 amended effective January 1, 1994; paragraph 9 amended effective December 4, 1973; paragraph 12 amended effective December 3, 1992; paragraph 22 added effective December 5, 1991.
ARTICLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.
ARTICLE IV
LEGISLATIVE
SECTION I
The legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and General Assembly.
SECTION V
No member of Congress, no person holding any Federal or State office or position, of profit, and no judge of any court shall be entitled to a seat in the Legislature.
Neither the Legislature nor either house thereof shall elect or appoint any executive, administrative or judicial officer except the State Auditor.
SECTION VI
Any agency or political subdivision of the State or any agency of a political subdivision thereof, which may be empowered to take or otherwise acquire private property for any public highway, parkway, airport, place, improvement, or use, may be authorized by law to take or otherwise acquire a fee simple absolute or any lesser interest, and may be authorized by law to take or otherwise acquire a fee simple absolute in, easements upon, or the benefit of restrictions upon, abutting property to preserve and protect the public highway, parkway, airport, place, improvement, or use; but such taking shall be with just compensation.
SECTION VII
No divorce shall be granted by the Legislature.
Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 2 amended effective December 2, 1999.
The Legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made.
To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.
SECTION VII
The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or local laws:
(2) Changing the law of descent.
(3) Providing for change of venue in civil or criminal causes.
(4) Selecting, drawing, summoning or empaneling grand or petit jurors.
(12) Appointing local officers or commissions to regulate municipal affairs.
SECTION VIII
Members of the Legislature shall, before they enter on the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of Senator (or member of the General Assembly) according to the best of my ability." Members-elect of the Senate or General Assembly are empowered to administer said oath or affirmation to each other.
Every officer of the Legislature shall, before he enters upon his duties, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly promise and swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully, impartially and justly perform all the duties of the office of ________________, to the best of my ability and understanding; that I will carefully preserve all records, papers, writings, or property entrusted to me for safekeeping by virtue of my office, and make such disposition of the same as may be required by law."
ARTICLE V
EXECUTIVE
SECTION I
The executive power shall be vested in a Governor.
The Governor shall not be less than thirty years of age, and shall have been for at least twenty years a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State seven years next before his election, unless he shall have been absent during that time on the public business of the United States or of this State.
No member of Congress or person holding any office or position, of profit, under this State or the United States shall be Governor.
ARTICLE VI
JUDICIAL
SECTION I
The judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, and other courts of limited jurisdiction. The other courts and their jurisdiction may from time to time be established, altered or abolished by law.
Article VI, Section I, paragraph 1 amended effective December 7, 1978.
SECTION II
The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices. Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court. In case the Chief Justice is absent or unable to serve, a presiding Justice designated in accordance with rules of the Supreme Court shall serve temporarily in his stead.
The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in the last resort in all causes provided in this Constitution.
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.
SECTION III
The Superior Court shall consist of such number of judges as may be authorized by law, each of whom shall exercise the powers of the court subject to rules of the Supreme Court. The Superior Court shall at all times consist of at least two judges who shall be assigned to sit in each of the counties of this State, and who are resident therein at the time of appointment and reappointment.
Article VI, Section III, paragraph 1 amended effective December 7, 1978.
The Superior Court shall have original general jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes.
The Superior Court shall be divided into an Appellate Division, a Law Division and a Chancery Division, which shall include a family part. Each division shall have such other parts, consist of such number of judges, and hear such causes, as may be provided by rules of the Supreme Court. At least two judges of the Superior Court shall at all times be assigned to sit in each of the counties of the State, who at the time of their appointment and reappointment were residents of that county provided, however, that the number of judges required to reside in the county wherein they sit shall be at least equal in number to the number of judges of the county court sitting in each of the counties at the adoption of this amendment.
Article VI, Section III, paragraph 3 amended effective December 8, 1983.
Subject to rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.
Article VI, Section IV, repealed effective December 7, 1978.
SECTION VI
The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall be subject to impeachment, and any judicial officer impeached shall not exercise his office until acquitted. The Judges of the Superior Court shall also be subject to removal from office by the Supreme Court for such causes and in such manner as shall be provided by law.
The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall receive for their services such salaries as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during the term of their appointment. They shall not, while in office, engage in the practice of law or other gainful pursuit.
The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall hold no other office or position, of profit, under this State or the United States. Any such justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective public office shall thereby forfeit his judicial office.
ARTICLE VII
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
SECTION I
Every State officer, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State and of the United States and to perform the duties of his office faithfully, impartially and justly to the best of his ability.
SECTION II
County prosecutors shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Their term of office shall be five years, and they shall serve until the appointment and qualification of their respective successors.
County clerks, surrogates and sheriffs shall be elected by the people of their respective counties at general elections. The term of office of county clerks and surrogates shall be five years, and of sheriffs three years. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any such office it shall be filled in the manner to be provided by law.
SECTION III
The Governor and all other State officers, while in office and for two years thereafter, shall be liable to impeachment for misdemeanor committed during their respective continuance in office.
SECTION II
The credit of the State shall not be directly or indirectly loaned in any case.
No money shall be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law.
ARTICLE X
GENERAL PROVISIONS
The seal of the State shall be kept by the Governor, or person administering the office of Governor, and used by him officially, and shall be called the Great Seal of the State of New Jersey.
All grants and commissions shall be in the name and by the authority of the State of New Jersey, sealed with the Great Seal, signed by the Governor, or person administering the office of Governor, and countersigned by the Secretary of State, and shall run thus: "The State of New Jersey, to ___________________, Greeting".
All writs shall be in the name of the State. All indictments shall conclude: "against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same".
The people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. Your petitioner Wilbur Streett comes to this lawful tribunal for instant remedy in accordance with law.
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
HABEAS CORPUS, remedies. A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or restraint.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, (1859), Vol. I, p. 573.
“It is a writ of ancient origin, and is now regarded as the greatest and most important remedy known to the law.” 39 CJS §427.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus is a Latin legal phrase, meaning: “That you have the body.” It is a writ directed to the person who is unlawfully detaining and/or restraining another of that person’s liberty. It is known as “the great writ” and directs the captor to produce the body at a certain time and place “to bring forth the body” with the day and cause of his caption, commitment and detention, and to bring both the person and writ to a lawful judge, sitting in a tribunal to test the legality of the commitment of that party so restrained.
It’s history is lost in antiquity. It was first in use before, but the first royal recognition of it is found in the Magna Charta. It was guaranteed to our English ancestors by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and was often referred to as one of the “dearest birthrights of Briton’s”. It came to our shores as a part of our inheritances as Americans from our forefathers as a free peoples, and as a guaranteed birthright to all American citizens. The great writ of habeas corpus is the most famous writ in the law; and, having for many centuries been employed to remove illegal restraint upon personal liberty, no matter by what power imposed. It is often called the great writ of liberty.
“It takes its name from the characteristic words it contained when the process and records of the English courts were written in Latin: Præcipimus tibi quod corpus A B in cusodia veatra detentum, ut dicitur, una cum causa capionis et detentionis suæ, quocunque nominee idem A B censeatur in eadem, Habeas coram nobis apud Wesim. Dec. ad subjiciendum et recipiendum ea duæ curis nostra de eo ad tunc et ibidem ordinary constigerit in hac parte, etc.
There were several other writs which contained the words habeas corpus; but they were distinguished from this and from one another by the specific terms declaring the object of the writ, which terms are still retained in the nomenclature of writs: as, habeas corpus ad respondenum, ad testicficandum, ad satisfaciendum, ad prosquendum, and ad faciendum et recipiendum, ad deliberandum at recipiendum.
This writ was in the like manner designated as habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum; but, having acquired in public esteem a marked importance by reason of the nobler uses to which it has been devoted, it has so far appropriated the generic term to itself that it is now, by way of eminence, commonly called The Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The date of its origin cannot now be ascertained. Traces of its existence are found in the Year Book 48 Ed. III 22; and it appears to have been familiar to, and well understood by, the judges of the reign of Henry VI. The ancient writ of de odio et atia and de homine relegvando furnished a remedy in particular cases. In its early history it appears to have been used as a means of relief from private restraint. The earliest precedents where it was used against the crown are in the reign of Henry VII. Afterwards, the use of it became more frequent, and in the time of Charles I, it was held an admitted constitutional remedy; Hurd, Hab. Corp. 145; Church, Hab. Corp 3. In writing of procedure in the thirteenth century the work which throws so much new light upon the early history of English law, says; “Those famous words habeas corpus are making their way into the divers writs, but for any habitual use of them for the purpose of investigating the cause of imprisonment we must wait until a later time.” There is also a reference to what is termed the use of habeas corpus “at one time a part of the ordinary mesne process in a personal action,” also referred to as “the Bractonian process which inserts a habeas corpus between attachment and distress,” which (habeas corpus between a little later seems to disappear. No other allusion is made to the subject: 2 Poll & Maitl. 551, 591.
W.W. Howe (Studies to the Civil Law 54) who is as earnest in tracing the fountains of English law to a Roman source, as the writers last quoted are indisposed to do so, says on the subject: “The presence to the Pandects of every important doctrine of habeas corpus is an interesting fact, and suggests that the proceeding probably came to England, as it did to Spain, from the Roman law. There is no evidence so far as I have been able to discover, that the process was of British or Teutonic origin. It is fully described in the forty-third book of the Pandects. The first text is the line from the ‘Perpetual Edicts,’ ‘ait prætor : quem liberum dolo malo retines, exibitas.’ The prætor declares: produce the freeman whom you unlawfully detain. The writ was called the Interdict or order ‘de homine libero exhibeas.’ After quoting this article of the Edict, the compilers of the Pandects introduced the commentary of Ulplan to the extend of perhaps two pages of a modern law book, and the leading rules which he derives from the text are law, I believe to-day in England and America. Thus he says: ‘This writ devised for the preservation of liberty, to the end that no one shall detain a free person. The word freeman includes many, whether sui juris, or under the power of another. For we only consider this: Is the person free? He who does not know that a freeman is detained in his house is not in bad faith; but as soon as he is advised of he fact he become in bad faith. The prætor says exhiteas (produce, exhibiti) to exhibit a person is to produce him publicly so that he can be seen and handled. This writ may be applied for by any person’; for no one is forbidden to act in favor of liberty.’ And to this commentary of Ulplan the compilers also add some extracts from Venuleius, who, among other things says: “A person ought not to be detained in bad faith for any time; and so to delay should be granted to the person who thus detains him.’ In other words, a writ of habeas corpus should be returnable and heard intanter. It seems certain that this writ might have been applied for in Britain during the four centuries of Roman occupation, at least when not suspended by a condition of martial law; and after the restoration of the Christian Church in the seventh century, and the occupation of judicial positions by bishops and other learned clerics familiar with such procedure, it is not unreasonable to assume that it was revived and took its place in English law.”
After the use of the writ become more common, abuses crept into the practice, which in some measure impaired the usefulness of the writ. The party imprisoning was at liberty to delay his obedience to the Great writ, and might wait till a second and third were issued before he produced the party; and many other vexatious shifts were practiced to detain state prisoners in custody; 3 Bla. Com. 135.
Greater promptitude in its execution was required to render the writ efficacious. The subject was accordingly brought forward in parliament in 1668, and renewed from time to time until 1679, when the celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Car. 11, was passed. This act has been made the theme of the highest praise and congratulations by British authors, and is even said to have “extinguished all the resources of oppression.” Hurd Hab. Corp. 93; Church, Hab. Corp 37.
As the act is limited to cases of commitments for “criminal or supposed criminal matters,” every other species of restraint of personal liberty was left in the ordinary remedy at common law, but, doubts being entertained as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the judge to inquire into the truth of the return to the writ in such cases an attempt was made. In 1757, in the house of lords, to render the jurisdiction more remedial. It was opposed by Lord Mansfield as unnecessary, and failed, for the time, of success. It was subsequently renewed, however; and the act of 56 Geo. III, c 100 supplies in England, all the needed legislation to cases no embraced by the act of 21 Car. II.; Hurd on Hab. Corp.
The English colonists in America regarded the privilege of the writ as one of the “dearest birthrights of Britons:” and sufficient indications exist that it was frequently resorted to. The denial of it in Massachusetts by Judge Dudley in 1659 to Rev John Wise, imprisoned for resisting the collection of an oppressive and illegal tax, was made the subject of a civil action against the judge, and was, moreover, denounced as one of the grievances of the people in a pamphlet published in 1689 on the authority of “the gentleman, merchants and inhabitance of ‘Boston and the county adjacent.” In New York in 1707 it served to effect the release of the Presbyterian ministers Makemie and Hampton from an illegal warrant of arrest issued by the governor, Cornbury, for preaching the gospel without license. In New Jersey in 1710 the assembly denounced one of the judges for refusing the writ to Thomas Gordon, which, they said, was the “undoubted right and great privilege of the subject.” In South Carolina in 1692 the assembly adopted the act of 21 Car. II. This act was extended in Virginia by Queen Anne early in her reign, while in the assembly of Maryland in 1725 the benefit of its provisions was claimed, independent of royal favor, as the “birthright of the inhabitants.” The refusal of parliament in 1774 to extend the law of habeas corpus to Canada was denounced by the continental congress in September of that year as oppressive, and was subsequently recounted in the Declaration of Independence as one of the manifestations on the part of the British government of tyranny over the colonies: Hurd, Hab. Corp. 109.”
“…In most of the states statutes have been passed, no only provided what courts or officers may issue the writ, but, to a considerable extent, regulating the practice under it; yet, in all of them the proceeding retains its old distinctive feature and merit,--that of a summary appeal for immediate deliverance from illegal imprisonment.
There is a discretion to be exercised in issuing the writ, even when there is power, as it involved a conflict of laws which it is desirable to avoid; Ex parte Rearick, 118 Fed. 928; and no court may properly release a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court, unless for want of jurisdiction of cause or person, or some matter rendering the proceeding void; Keizo v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146, 29 Sup. Ct. 41, 53 L.Ed. 125; but it can and should be issued and made effective when another court has acted without jurisdiction; In re Turner, 115 Fed. 231.
A proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil and not a criminal proceeding and as final orders of the circuit or district courts in such proceedings can only be reviewed by appeal, the final order of the supreme court of the Phillippine Islands in habeas corpus is viewed only by appeal and not by writ of error; Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 27 Sup. Ct. 135, 51 L.Ed. 142, 7 Ann.Case. 1018; so in People v. Dewy, 23 Misc. 267, 50 N.Y. Supp. 1013, it was said to be a civil proceeding ; and in State v. Huegin, 110 Wis., 189, 85 N.W. 1046, 62 L.R.A. 700. It is termed a suit in the nature of a civil action. It has however, been said that it is, strictly speaking, neither a civil nor criminal action, but a summary remedy having for its sole object to restore liberty to one illegality held in custody; Simmons v. Coal Co., 117 Ga. 305, 43 S.E. 780, 61 L.R.A. 789. Though it is a writ of right, it does not issue as a matter of course, but only upon such allegations as, if true, would authorize the discharge of the person in custody; id. The issue of the writ may be regulated by statute, provided the constitutional right to it is not infringed; Miskimmins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo., 392, 58 Pac. 411, 49 L.R.A. 831; if there is another appropriate remedy the writ will not be issued until application has been made for the proper relief; In re Dykes, 13 Okl. 339, 74 Pac. 506.
The purpose of the writ is to determine whether the person seeking the benefit of it is illegally restrained of his liberty: In re Moyer, 36 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 979, 117 Am St. Rep. 189. It is a common-law and not an equitable remedy; Sumner v. Sumner, 117 Ga. 229. 43 S.E. 485. It’s only office, except when used in ancillary proceedings, is to test the right to personal liberty: State v. Whitcher, 117 Wis. 665, 94 N.W. 787, 98 Am. St. Rep. 968.
It is appropriate proceeding for determining whether one held under an extradition warrant is a fugitive from justice, and he should be discharged if he shows by competent evidence, overcoming the presumptions of a properly issued warrant, that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state: Illinois v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 28 Sup. Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121.
Jurisdiction of state courts. The states being in all respects, except as to the powers delegated in the federal constitution, sovereign political communities, are limited, as to the juridical power, only by that instrument and they, accordingly, at will, create, apportion, and limit the jurisdiction of their respective courts over the writ of habeas corpus , as well as other legal process, subject only to such constitutional restriction; Church, Hab. Corp. 67.
“…Federal courts cannot grant the writ upon a petition that the person is held under the capias of a state court issued upon a judgment that has been vacated; In re Shaner, 39 Fed. 869. A district court cannot, by issuing a writ, declare a judgment of a state criminal court a nullity where such court had full jurisdiction over the crime; Ex parte Ulrich, 43 Fed. 661. But the writ can be issued to test the question as to the arrest and imprisonment of a supposed fugitive from justice on the charge of a different offence from that which he was extradited; In re Fitton, 45 Fed. 471. See also In re Cross, 43 Fed. 517. In general the writ may be issued by federal court in every case where a party is restrained of his liberty without due process of law in the territorial jurisdiction of such courts; Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed 66; In re Neagle, 135, U.S. 1; 10 Sup.Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55. The granting of the writ is within the discretion of the court and will not be reversed unless an abuse thereof be shown; U.S. v. Ronan, 33 Fed. 117. But where the petitioner had been convicted on the indictment of a grand jury impaneled by a court without authority, it was held that the writ became a writ of right and the court having power to issue it could not exercise discretion against issuing it; Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed. 66.”
The federal court may discharge a prisoner who is held for an act made criminal by the state in violation of the rights secured by the United States constitution; In re Davenport, 102 Fed. 540; but they will not discharge a prisoner convicted in a state court except in cases of emergency, but will leave him his writ of error; In re Stone, 120 Fed. 101; and except under extraordinary circumstances, a federal court will not issue the writ for release of a prisoner held under process issued by a state court in a civil case, on the ground that such court was without jurisdiction in the particular suit where it has jurisdiction over such suits in general; Mackenzie v. Barrett, 144 Fed. 954, 76 C.C.A.8.
The writ will not issue unless the court under whose warrant the accused is held is without jurisdiction, and mere objections that the indictment is too vague in general and does not sufficiently inform him of the offense charge will not be considered; In re Lewis, 114 Fed., 963.
But if a party is imprisoned by the sentence of a court judge or magistrate, which is void for want of authority, as for being under unconstitutional and void law; In re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 9 Sup.Ct. 703, 33 L.Ed. 154; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 Sup.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216; In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 Sup.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed.402; or when there was no authority in the person causing the arrest to make it; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall, (U.S.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 717; Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock, 447, Fed. Cas. No. 11,558: In re Farez, 7 Blatchf. 345, Fed. Cas. No. 4,645; In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 13 Sup.Ct. 785, 37 L.Ed. 689; In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637, 14 Sup.Ct. 225, 37 L.Ed. 1207; then there is ground for discharge under habeas corpus.
In contempt cases, habeas corpus is not issued for one adjudge in contempt, as he may have a writ of error; Perry v. Pernet, 165 Ind., 67, 74 N.E. 609, 6 Ann. Cas. 533; In re Stidger, 37 Colo. 407, 86 Pac. 219; to obtain release the judgment and the sentence must be a mere nullity; Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N.W. 1007, 9 Ann.Cas. 1191; where there is entire want of jurisdiction to issue the process for imprisonment, habeas corpus is the proper remedy and the person need not resort to an appeal; In Re Gribben, 5 Okl. 379, 47 Pac. 1074; but it cannot be used to review the proceeding in contempt, though it is proper in order to secure the discharge of one not a party and therefore not subject in the jurisdiction of the court; In re Reese, 167 Fed 942, 47 C.C.A. 87.
“…It will grant it on the application of one committed for trial in the circuit court on a criminal charge; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cra. (U.S.) 75, 2 L.Ed. 554; U.S. v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 17, 1 L.Ed. 490; and where the petitioner is committed on an insufficient warrant: Ex parte Burford. 3 Cra (U.S.) 448, 2 L.Ed. 495; and where he is detained by the marshal on a capias ad satisfaciendum after the return day of the writ; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 568, 8 L.Ed. 780; also the purpose of inquiring into the cause of the restraint of the liberty of prisoners in jail under or by color of the authority of the United States, and all persons who are in custody in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 33 L.Ed. 405.
“…It will be granted , however, where the imprisonment although by a state officer, is under or by color of the authority of the United States, as where the prisoner was arrested under a governor’s warrant as a fugitive from justice of another state, requisition having been regularly made; Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean 121, Fed. Cas. No. 12, 968; or where extradited under a treaty with a foreign country upon the charge of a certain offense for which he was afterwards tried and acquitted, and immediately thereafter he was arrested under a charge entirely separate and distinct from the former one; In re Reinitz, 39 Fed. 204, 4 L.R.A. 286. It will also be granted where United States marshals or their deputies are arrested by state authority for using force or threats in executing process of the federal courts; U.S. v. Fullhart, 47 Fed. 802; but see In re Marsh, 51 Fed. 277. Federal judges should grant writs to persons imprisoned for any act done in pursuance of a law of the United States; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55.
“…If the imprisonment be claimed by virtue of legal process, the validity and present force of such process are the only subjects of investigation; Bennac v. People, 4 Barb. (N.Y.) 31; State v. Bulzine, 4 Harr. (Del.) 575.”
“…Although the writ of habeas corpus does not lie for the determination of mere errors where a conviction has been had and the commitment thereunder is in due form, yet if he court had no jurisdiction of the offence charged, or if it affirmatively appears by the record that the prisoner was tried and sentenced for the commission of an act which under the law constitutes no crime the judgment is void and the prisoner should be discharged; In re Kowalsky, 73 Cal. 120, 14 Pac. 399; Ex parte Miraude, 73 Cal. 365, 14 Pac. 888; In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263, 32 L.Ed. 274; In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176, ( Sup. Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118; Ex parte Kitchen, 19 Nev. 178, 18 Pac. 886; Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785, 7 S.E. 120.
“…The writ is also employed to recover the custody of a person where the applicant has a legal right thereto: as, the husband for his wife, the parent for his child, the guardian for his ward, and the master for his apprentice; Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 813; Ex parte Chin King, 35 Fed. 354; (1892) App. Cas. 326. But in such cases, as the just object of he proceeding is rather to remove the illegal restraint than to enforce specifically the claims of private custody, the alleged prisoner. If an adult of sound mind is generally permitted to go at large; if an infant of sufficient age and discretion, it is usually permitted to elect in whose custody it will remain, provided that it does not elect an injurious or improper custody; and if of tender years without such discretion the court determines its custody according to what the time interests and welfare of the child may at the time require: Hurd Hab. Corp. 450.”
“If the imprisonment be illegal, it is the duty of the court to discharge the prisoner from that imprisonment; but if the court or officer hearing the habeas corpus be invested with the powers of an examining and committing magistrate in the particular case, and the evidence taken before the court, or regularly certified to it in the habeas corpus proceeding so far implicate the prisoner in the commission of crime as to justify his being held for trial, it is usual for the court , in default of bail, to commit him as upon an original examination.” 3 East 157; Ex parte Bennett, 2 Cra. (C.C.) 612 Fed. Case. No. 1,311. Where a prisoner is held under a valid sentence and commitment, the illegality of a second sentence will not be inquired into on habeas corpus till the term under the first sentence has expired; Ex parte Ryan 17 Nev. 139, 28 Pac. 1040.
Recommitment after discharge. The act of 31 Car. II. Prohibited , under the penalty of five hundred pounds, the reimprisoning for the same offence of any person set at large on habeas corpus except by the legal order and process of such court wherein such prisoner was bound by recognizance to appear, or other court having jurisdiction of the cause. Somewhat similar provisions are found in the statutes of many of the states. But these provisions are not held to prevent the subsequent arrest of the prisoner on other and more perfect process, although relating to the same criminal act; Ex parte Millburn, 9 Pet (U.S.) 701, 9 L.Ed.280; Byrd v. State, 2 Miss. 163.
See “The Story of the Habeas Corpus” by Edward Jenks in 13 L. Q. Rev. 64 (2 Sel. Essays in Anglo-Amer. L. II. 531.)
Habeas corpus is a great prerogative writ known to the common law for the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without lawful cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error to test the legality of the commitment. In re Keeler, Fed. Cas. No. 7,637 [1 Hemp. 306], Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 201.
“To obtain the writ in term at common law, an application is made by the party’s counsel, grounded on an affidavit of the circumstances, which must show some probable cause for the application to induce the court to grant the writ; but if a probable ground be shown that the party is imprisoned without just cause and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, and a rule will accordingly be granted for the writ to issue.” Hurd on Habeas Corpus, pp. 213, 214.
NOTE: “It’s an immediate remedy from unlawful restraint.” 1 Watts 67.
In this country, in the United States v. Green, (3 Mason 482). The common-law habeas corpus was issued to try the right of custody to an infant to restore it to its father. “On the hearing of a writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the custody of a minor child, it is an improper exercise of discretion to render Judgment depriving on of the custody and awarding it to another, where there is undisputed evidence of the right and fitness of the former to have such custody, and there is no evidence to the contrary.” Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114. The court itself is mandated to issue its own habeas corpus in order to return a child’s proper liberty to the care, custody and control of the natural guardian of the father: “In general, as the Father is by law clearly entitled to the custody of his child, the court will so far interfere as to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus and inquire into the circumstances of the case, in order to prevent a party entitled to the custody of a child from seeking it by force or stratagem. And the court will feel bound to restore the custody to the father, where the law has placed it, unless in a clear and strong case of unfitness on his part to have such custody.” -- Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203
“Convicted defendant, seeking to overturn final judgment by motion to vacate or habeas corpus, must allege with particularity facts of which he would have judgment overturned.” People v. Norwoods (1957) 67 C2d 589,316 P2d 1010.
“…if the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of statutory jurisdiction, outrages upon the rights of a citizen can never invoke its exercise by a federal court.” In re McDonald, (1861) Fed. Cas. No. 8,751 16 Fed. Cas. 17, 30.
NOTE: Valdez v. Cockrell, No 99-41216 (5th Cir. December 26, 2001) stated:
“The lack of a full and fair hearing during prosecution of a state crime conviction does not preclude deferential review of a federal habeas petition under 28 USC 2254.”
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE JUDICIAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
September 1, 1789
“Judiciary Act of 1789”
“Sec. 14. And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus,…And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.” Judiciary Act, Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
AN ACT CONCERNING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The People of the State of New Jersey, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
NJ The Habeas Corpus statute, R.S. 2:82-15
"a. Any person committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, within this state, for any criminal or supposed criminal matter or under any pretense whatsoever." R.S. 2:82-12.
“The Habeas Corpus statute, R.S. 2:82-15, provides that application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made by petition, signed either by the party for whose relief it is intended or by some person in his behalf, directs in detail what the petition shall in substance state and that "it must be verified by the oath of the party making the application" and -- in section 16 -- that the court or justice to whom such petition shall be presented shall grant such writ without delay "unless it shall appear from the petition itself, or from the documents annexed" thereto that the applicant is by the provisions of the statute -- not pertinent in the instant case -- prohibited from prosecuting the writ.” Edelstein v. Colville, 8 A.2d 851, 123 N.J.L. 393 (N.J. 11/03/1939)
“For the reasons stated in the opinion filed on a similar application by James Rose, 122 N.J.L. 507, submitted herewith, the petitioner is directed to be discharged from custody.”
In re Application of Allen Sterling, 6 A.2d 390, 122 N.J.L. 510 (N.J. 05/22/1939)
WHEREAS, this is a true common-law Writ of Habeas Corpus, and must not be dismissed, IGNORED or distained; as petitioner by status and by right and perfect right, demands its instant issue by this court to effect immediate and palpable substantive remedy at law and due process of law. WARNING: THIS GREAT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MUST BE ISSUED!
In U.S. v. Williamson, citied In re McDonald (1861), Fed. Cas. No. 8,751, 16 Fed.Cas. 29, the court, per Kan J., stated (in pertinent part):
“I do not, indeed, see that there can be a restriction or limitation of a privilege which may not be essentially a suspension of it, to some extent at least, or under some circumstances, or in reference to some of the parties who might otherwise have enjoyed it. And it has appeared to me, that if congress had undertaken to deny altogether the exercise of this writ by the federal court, or to limit its exercise to the few and rare cases that might per adventure find their way to some one particular court, or to declare that the writ should only issue to this or that class of cases, to the exclusion of others in which it might have issued at the common law, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that the ancient and venerated privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had not been in some degree suspended, if not annulled,…”
“Congress must provide efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege [the Writ of Habeas Corpus] should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.” Marshall, C.J., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
Your petitioner seeks justice from Almighty God and the above-mentioned tribunal that this Great Writ of Habeas Corpus, be immediately issued, for the redress so proven and contained within this documents prayer for relief.
DATED: APRIL 24, 2002
SEAL: _____________________________________
Bruce Eden, In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
Tel. 732-888-1338
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH
Division _________
APRIL Term
|Bruce Eden, | Case No.: |
|Next Best Friend, | |
|IN THE RELATION OF: | |
|Wilbur Streett, a father: |VERIFIED PEITITION FOR |
|Appellant/Petitioner |WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS |
| | |
|Vs. | |
|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, | |
|Et Als. | |
| | |
|Respondents, | |
| | |
State of New Jersey ]
] ss
County of Monmouth ]
In the matter of Wilbur Streett; ]
] Complaint
]
For a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, ]
TO: The Court of Common Pleas of Monmouth County ]
To his honor, Chief Presiding Justice, Gerald Hermansen of the above mentioned court, of the state of New Jersey, GREETINGS:
This verified petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Wilbur Streett, honorable father to his children son and daughter to wit; that said father now invokes this court under its lawful judicial powers to seek immediate remedy at law invoked by this lawful Writ of Habeas Corpus, as his children and property to which he has lawful title, and claim; superior authority, care and control over his own children and property; Wilbur Street does instantly seek justice and release from the unlawful restraint of liberty of my own person in direct contravention to the concise rule of law by THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY who has unlawfully restrained him of his liberty, in and over his direct authority, and consent.
NATURE AND CHARACTER PARTIES
1. I Wilbur Streett am the aggrieved and damaged party in this matter; the lawful father to my children and property, not an incompetent person, nor welfare enumerated; not embarrassed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791) a white Christian male adult, a natural born free man about the land, a human being; in propria persona, sui juris, a common law state Citizen for the state of New Jersey, sui juris appearing by special appearance at all times and invoking his natural, common law, and/or civil liberties in which to invoke my superior lawful authority over any respondent in this matter as a matter of right, and perfect right and hereby issues this great writ of habeas corpus as a secured liberty under the Constitution for the State of New Jersey (1776) as a matter of right as Wilbur Street has no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy to secure his release at law.
2. That Mr. Wilbur Streett is factually unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the unlawful acts and/or omissions of said respondents who fraudulently acted in the name of the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, under color of law and under color of authority; in direct opposition to his will, consent, and lawful authority.
3. Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend to Mr. Wilbur Streett is a non-fourteenth Amendment white Christian male adult of the age of majority, not an incompetent person; a common law New Jersey state Citizen, located in Bergen County in the Commonwealth of New Jersey, Propria Persona, Sui Juris and hereby signs manual with Mr. Wilbur Streett’s consent and in his best interest and brings forth this great writ of habeas corpus as a matter of right and perfect right as a secured liberty under the Constitution for the State of New Jersey (1776) for Wilbur Streett:
"State citizens can process at law documents," Grim v. Norris, 19 Cal. 140.
[*NOTE: All “New Jersey Codes,” contained within this document are hereby iterated and displayed only as they are declaratory of the common law.]
I
PETITIONER IS IMBUED AT LAW WITH SUPERIOR RIGHT OVER RESPONDENTS AS THE FATHER TO HIS CHILDREN.
Respondent’s are in fact, involved in an unlawful scheme to disenfranchise Wilbur Streett rights as a father—and subordinate his lawful authority, custody, and control and care of his own children, and/or property, to that of a rogue respondents district attorney and court who fraudulently pretends to act in the best interest of the children in order that they may obtain direct and/or indirect remuneration and/or benefits from their unlawful usurpations.
As the lawful father to said children, and owner over all his property do in fact have title over his own children, and under law, and in accordance with the morality and teaching of our Christian religion under Almighty God, as invoked by the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776) am entitled to the custody so demanded by this lawful instrument. [see Ammon v. Johnson, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 263, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 149.]
The American Digest
1897 – 1906
§99 Custody of Infants
(1) In General
[a] The father is the natural guardian of his child, and will be awarded possession of his person, unless he is unworthy, and incompetent to discharge the trust imposed upon him.
(Ohio—C.C. 1899) In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208;
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905) Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786
(W.Va. 1891) Green v. Campbell 35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843
[c] (Ga. 1893)
The father is entitled to the custody of his child during minority, unless such right has been relinquished or forfeited. – Franklin v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553.
[d] (Ga. 1902)
On the hearing of a writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the custody of a minor child, it is an improper exercise of discretion to render Judgment depriving on of the custody and awarding it to another, where there is undisputed evidence of the right and fitness of the former to have such custody, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114.
Determinations of Particular issues or question – Custody of Infants.
[j] (Mass. 1834)
In general, as the Father is by law clearly entitled to the custody of his child, the court will so far interfere as to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus and inquire into the circumstances of the case, in order to prevent a party entitled to the custody of a child from seeking it by force or stratagem. And the court will feel bound to restore the custody to the father, where the law has placed it, unless in a clear and strong case of unfitness on his part to have such custody. -- Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203
[k] (Mo. 1865)
Upon a petition for Habeas Corpus to determine to whom the custody of certain minor children shall be given, the court has no authority to order the Father to pay any certain sums of money to a trustee for their Support. – Ferguson v. Ferguson 36 Mo. 197.
[American Digest, 1897 – 1906]
“The father owns the children against the mother, as well as against everyone else…” State v. Richardson, 40 NH 272.
Clearly, the state has no lawful interest nor jurisdiction over Wilbur Streetts’ children or of that of his person. Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary [68 US 510 (1925)] solidly established the precept that “…a child is not the mere creature of the state.” Thereby, under the laws to which this state is established, under the Constitution for the State of New Jersey (1776), Article I, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS:
“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.
This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.” ARTICLE I, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES; Constitution for the Commonwealth of New Jersey.
“…That the right of a parent to the use of a minor child is a right of property of which a parent cannot be deprived unless the court finds that he or she is "unfit."
Booth v. Booth, 69 Cal. App. 2d 496, 159 P.2d 93 (Cal.App.Dist.1 06/08/1945)
Self Government thereby established by a free peoples dictates that parents have a fundamental right to the education and rearing of our children [See Pierce v Society noted above at p. 535 and Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923)] In Loving v. Virginia [388 U.S. 1 (1967)] the Supreme Court of the United States held that the right of family was one of the fundamental rights possessed by free men essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness. Factually, the father is the superior lawful entity that has superior claim and controls over his own children, above all others, especially including this court and governments. Continuing this idea further, Supreme Court Justice Power wrote for that court in Moore, “Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” [Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). The father, is in fact, the leader of that tradition, and any subornation of my rights is in fact, a unlawful usurpation of our form of government and those protections secured under the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776). In Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) the Court held that this right of family as one that had “long been established as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
II
THE MONMOUTH COUNTY COURTS HAVE IN FACT, NO LAWFUL JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER[2].
It is a clear an ever present fact as advocated by maxim of law; that no judge (or person, or entity) can be a judge in its own cause. It is also a fact that all judges are in fact, harvesting fathers using the courts under various fraudulent doctrines such as the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of “being in the best interest of the child,” in which allow them to manufacture crime, enslave fathers for a profit, re-establish unlawful debtors prisons, all under color of law and under color of authority, in direct opposition to the rights, privileges, and secured liberties of a free people. This fact is exemplified by the STATE of Arkansas, OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, Pulaski County v. Joey A. TERRY case number 98-1279 ___ S.W.2d ___ in the Supreme Court of Arkansas Opinion delivered February 11, 1999:
"the collection of child support ultimately benefits the State by providing for the financial needs of its children, without having to resort to public funds to do so; thus, regardless of the financial status of the custodial parent, once the child support is assigned to the State, it becomes an obligation owed to the State, not the individual parent, by the noncustodial parent." "once the child-support rights are assigned to the State, the State has a pecuniary interest in enforcing those rights"
" rather, at all times, the OCSE attorneys represented the interest of their statutory client, the State of Arkansas, in an attempt to enforce an obligation owed to the State.”
Thereby, this habeas corpus is the correct instrument to challenge such lawful restraint of my children’s interests:
"A final adjudication on a writ of habeas corpus brought to determine the right of a parent or guardian to the care and custody of a minor child conclusively determines all questions necessarily involved, as between the same parties and on the same state of facts. From its very nature the adjudication can operate only on those existing facts and conditions that affect the well-being of the child and the rights of the parent or guardian." In re Application of Gille (1924) 65 CA 617, 224 P 784.
Case precedent(s) concurs with a near identical case:
In Bowles v. Dixon, 32 Ark. 92; a petition addressed to the judge of the eleventh judicial circuit stated in substance that petitioner John Dixon, was the father and natural guardian of two minor children, caned John M. and Elizabeth, and entitled to the care of their persons, and to have the supervision of their education. That they had no property in their own right and there was no cause whatever why he should not have the possession and custody of said children. That Elizabeth E. Bowles, of the county of Chicot, in the circuit of his honor the judge, had said children in her possession, custody and control, and withheld them from petitioner’s possession unlawfully, and without his consent and against his will; concluding with a prayer for a writ of habeas corpus commanding said Elizabeth E. Bowles, or any other person having them in custody, to bring said children before his honor at such time and place as he might appoint, and that upon a hearing they be delivered to petitioner, and for other relief in the premises, etc. Control, possession and custody of said children was awarded to petitioner.
Substantiated en bloc by the union of several states:
“Parent’s guardians, masters and husbands may have the writ [of habeas corpus] to enforce their rights, and for he protection of infants, and insane persons, and proceedings shall in all such cases, conform to the practice of habeas corpus proceedings in other cases. Horner’s Stat. Ind. (1896) § 1107. See also list of statues cited supra, note 1 p. 154, for similar provisions in other jurisdictions. See also the following cases:
District of Columbia—In re Poole, 2 MacArthur (D.C.) 583
Georgia—Payne v. Payne, 39 Ga. 174.
Indiana—Garner v. Gordon, 41 Ind. 92.
Iowa—Rivers v. Mitchell, 57 Iowa 193.
Massachusetts—McConologue’s Case, 107 Mass. 154.
Michigan—Matter of Heather Children, 50 Mich. 261.
Minnesota—Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412.
Missouri—Ferguson v. Ferguson, 36 Mo. 197.
New Jersey—State v. Clover, 16 N. J.L. 419;
State v. Baldwin, 5 N.J. Eq. 454.
New York—Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575.
Pennsylvania—Com. v. Reed, 59 Pa. St. 425.
Tennessee—Ward v. Roper, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 111;
U.S. v. Anderson, Cooke (Tenn.) 143.
Virginia—Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W.Va. 600; Mathews v. Wade, 2 W.Va. 464.
“The rule is stated in Bac. Abr. Hab. Corp. B. 10, as follows: ‘If the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to be punished, the courts are to discharge.’" In re Application of James Rose, 6 A.2d 388, 122 N.J.L. 507 (N.J. 05/22/1939)
The reason the sheriff's can't get the money of child support debtors is because the debtors don't have it and sheriff's are finding out that in order to arrest people for owing a civil child support debt they have to have probable cause to do so. See, Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995). THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE PRESENT MATTER. Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995)(Dispute that was civil in nature and could not give rise to probable cause to arrest is actionable); Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1987)(cause of action stated for false arrest and imprisonment where defendant, motivated by desire to settle private dispute, obtained arrest warrant for an act that was not illegal). In a large number of other more recent citations from all over the United States, where the U.S. Court of Appeals held that probable cause can only be used in the criminal context. There is no probable cause in civil cases. Also, most, if not all state statutes have a provision whereby law enforcement officers (including state police, county or sheriff's officers and local municipal law enforcement officers) are prohibited from arresting people in civil matters. In N.J. that statute is NJSA 40A:14-152 and 40A:14-152.2.
III
SAID STATUTE BEING BROUGHT AGAINST YOUR PETITIONER IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL[3].
A factual determination is as follows:
In Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37, 371; 25 L. Ed. 717, Mr. Justice Bradley, in speaking for the court, said:
"The validity of the judgment is assailed on the ground that the acts of Congress under which the indictments were found are unconstitutional. If the position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. It is true, if no writ of error lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. But personal liberty is of so great moment in the eye of the law that the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so conclusive but that, as we have seen, the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the writ. We are satisfied that the present is one of the cases in which this court is authorized to take such jurisdiction. We think so, because, if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the petitioner arose solely upon these laws."
Respondent’s know full well Mr. Wilbur Streett is openly challenging the STATE OF NEW JERSEY’S, (as well as the State of New York as well as the United States) “Statute(s)” regarding CHILD SUPPORT, and thereby, they are attacking and imprisoning him for a debt in which to prohibit him from effectively accessing and defending himself in the courts in which to challenge this (these) laws.
“The ordinance, in our judgment, is invalid on its face, interfering as it does with freedom of the press by regulations which restrict such freedom. The first amendment to our Federal Constitution provides, among other things, that the Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. These rights are further safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which enjoins that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The right asserted by Miss Cox is guaranteed by the first amendment and the exercise of that right may not be invaded by statute or by the local law of any municipality by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. If freedom of the press may not, under our fundamental law, be abridged, it follows that any ordinance or statute, accomplishing that purpose, as such, is invalid… A regulation of this kind has no legal force and cannot be sanctioned.” Borough of Edgewater v. Cox, 8 A.2d 375, 123 N.J.L. 212 (N.J. 09/22/1939)
However, since the Judges and Legislatures’ themselves obtain direct Title IV-D Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes, Mr. Wilbur Street as well as Father’s across this nation are placed into an impossibility of attempting to effect justice from a Feminized Organized Crime system which profits directly and/or indirectly from destroying fathers. It is an impossibility for any father to seek justice in any such “court” or tribunal.
"Persons being put in contempt of court by judges are entitled to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. A person being placed in contempt of court for conduct occurring outside of the presence of the court is entitled to a full and fair hearing, and any individual denying this right under "color of law" is responsible in an action under 42 USC 1983." Johnson v. Crumlist, 244 F.Supp. 22 (1963 DCPa).
As there is no probable cause; as there is no lawful jurisdiction; as there has been NO ABILITY TO PAY hearing as mandated by law, there is not, nor can not be any “fair hearing” in this matter, and as such, Mr. Streett must be instantly released upon this writ of habeas corpus.
IV
SAID RESPONDENT’S HAVE NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY USING ANY DOCTRINE SUCH AS THE PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE, OVER HIS LAWFUL AND SUPERIOR NATURAL BORN, COMMON LAW, AND/OR CIVIL LIBERTY RIGHTS TO THE CARE, CONTROL, AUTHORITY, AND EDUCATION OF MY CHILDREN
The first use of the inferior doctrine of parens patriae was first used by the King in his protection of lunatics [See e.g. Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev., m 894 (1966)]. Between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the court devolved into a condition to where the Lords were committing a number of abuses under this doctrine, and used this power to not only disinherit said wards, but also in which to drain freemen of their fortunes. [See e.g. Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State’s Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L. J. 887 (1975)]. The abuses which clearly are adumbrated throughout our founding fathers warning’s of the errant power and control of governments were ingrained throughout the formation of this government, and in fact were given voice within each and every state constitutions’ in which to establish a nation of free men in which to create and sustain a free nation. This in fact led to the formative Article I, Section 1 secured liberties (cited above) within the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776), as these perversions under the doctrine of parens patriae conflagrated themselves throughout not only England, but this nations laws to wit:
“However, by the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century, there was increasing criticism of the system of wardship. As part of ‘fiscal feudalism,’ wardship had become one of the major rackets of Tudor England. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, classes from the peerage through he yeomandry were liable to discover they were sleeping-tenants-in-chief of the crown. Wardship endangered family fortunes and undermined the authority of the parents. Abuses of the system were a frequent cause of complaint in the commons. In the early seventeenth century emphasis shifted from abuses, to the system itself. In 1646 the court of wards was abolished along with feudal tenures, according to Lawrence Stone, as the crown monopolized more of the profits for itself (rather than allow peers and courtiers to prey upon and patronize the gentry), and at a respect for individual freedom of choice began to be accepted, the overthrow of the court was inevitable.”
[The Law of the Father? Patriarchy in Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, by Mary Murray, ©1995, Routledge, London and New York, 11 New Fetter Lane, London, EC4P 4EE, p. 109]
Chief Justice Blackman iterated in 410 US 113, 152 (1973) that the father’s freedoms within the family were “Fundamental” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Law clearly mandates under the maxims of law and our historical common law and statutory provisions that the father has the superior right over government as well as the mother in which to provide control, custody and care of his children.
“The child knows his father’s bed the best.”
Nemo Cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio. “No one is bound to sell his property, even for a just price.” Sed vide Eminent Domain. 2 Inst. 66.
"the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." (See: Clayton Act; 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. Sect. 17, 15 U.S.C.A. Sect. 17)
“Partus seqitur ventrem.” “The offspring follow the condition of the mother. This is the law in the case of slaves and animals;” 1 Bouvier’s Institutes n. 167, 502; “But with regard to freemen, children follow the condition of the father.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
Nulli enim res sua servit jure servitutis. “No one can have a servitude over his own property.” Dig 8, 2, 26; 17 Mass. 443; 2 Bov. Inst. n. 1600.
The father’s predominance is also seen historically throughout the statuary laws within this state, as former Civil Code section 230 clearly pointed to the father as the determinant and controlling factor in his children’s life: “The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of birth.” (See Lavell v. Adoption Institute, (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 557, at page 561). As your maxim’s of law denotes above, the mother with the help of the state is being unlawfully imbued with custody, as she need support from the state, via judicial activist courts; and that symbiotic relationship between respondent’s in this matter empowers and financially remunerates them all, by their overt usurpation of the natural, common law and civil liberties of the father established both by law and precedent throughout this nation, to the distain of both fatherhood, the destruction of children and the denigration of society at large, whom are factually paying for this miscegenation of law through both taxes and other plenary social burdens conspired by said courts and respondent’s under color of authority, and under color of law.
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be a frail [home]—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!”
[William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 1708-1778, Speech in the House of Commons 1763, p. 312]
“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse; disregard the character of its own existence.” --Supreme Court Justice, Tom C. Clark “
[Quoted in Foundations of Freedom: A Living History of our Bill of Rights, by John H. Rodehamel, The Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los Angeles, © 1991, p. 97]
It is clear, that the predominant guardian of the child, by our law, our history, and by demographic example; is in fact, the father, of which I am to my own children of which I have lawful title and have never given them up, abandoned them, nor inflicted any egregious act upon. Thereby, the ultimate jurisdiction of my children fall to me, and not of that to the state, as Lord Coke exemplified by maxim:
Trying to Split Children:
“Here be two maxims of the common law. First, that no man can hold one and the same land immediately of two several lords. Secondly, that one man cannot of the same land be both lord and tenant. And it is to be observed, that it is holden for an inconvenience, that any of the maxims of the law should be broken, through a private man suffer losse; for that by infringing of a maxime, not onely a generall prejudice to many, but in the end a publike incertainty and confusion to all would follow. (Section 152b)
[Maxims of Lord Coke]
Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere. "Two cannot possess one thing in its entirety." Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, pg. 502
Thereby, ‘someone’ under law has ultimate control and authority over my children, and it is not in fact the state, nor the mother, which needs the state to gain control over the children, but rather, it is naturally vested and imbued within Wilbur Streett, by right and perfect right under law. As the law is clear, that I must do an egregious unlawful act in which to dispose of my right and authority, which is in fact, not an instance of this matter. The fraud of “Joint Custody” is factually, an impossibility under law as Coke notes above, as factually, it is an impossibility for two people to equally own fifty percent of anything. More importantly, the access and rights to Liberty and self-government are a concomitant cornerstone of the foundational essence of the New Jersey Republic and the union of the several States of which the State of New Jersey, is incorporated to, both by statute, law, and by treaty. With regards to my home and family, there must be some ultimate Lord over the property of Mr. Streetts’ children, and under, by and through law, factually, he has been endowed with the lawful responsibility (and concomitant rights) of assuming that natural station.
Mr. Streett’s children’s interests are factually being abrogated by this court—and by said respondent’s—[an overt violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791 impairing Obligation of Contracts] which is to deny the care, custody and control of Mr. Streett’s own children, as their father, which said rogue courts have clearly established enmity against fatherhood, in overt violation of law. Thereby, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted under Endo Laboratories, Inc., v. Hartford Ins. Group (9th Cir. 1984) 747 F.2d 1264, 1267) that “California Civil Code section [43.1] was enacted…to create a cause of action for the benefit of the child, and to protect its interests in the even of its subsequent birth…The word ‘interests’ as used in section [43.1] means anything that his profitable or beneficial to the child,…including the right to compensation for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted by the willful or negligent acts of another person.” Clearly, denying my children the care, custody and control of their father whom has superior lawful title than that of said respondents whom act upon their own selfish pecuniary interests under the guise and overt fraud of: “Being in the Best Interests of the Child.” Thereby I by keeping his children with him and protecting their (my) property in a viable relationship with no financial burden to either party (as this court deems itself to enslave me to), is factually a superior model and in their best interests in which to place the interests of the children with Mr. Streett, their working and honorable father into custody and which factually burdens no one. Disenfranchising Streett under color of law and under color of authority is in fact in nobody’s (and all) children’s worst interests as it assures them to inherit this feminized madness under the fraud of “Being in the Best Interests of the Child.” [sic.]
By historical mandate, when either mother or father differ in who retains control or custody, that custody clearly in law defaults to the father, and not the mother “…the father is by law, clearly entitled to the custody of the child.” (See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205 (1834), as quoted in Zainaldin, supra note 208, at 1062; see also People ex rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, 642 [N.Y. 1836] (which established that when differences arise between parents, it is the right of the father which is superior under law). Clearly, my and the rights of my own children, which attach to me, hold that we have the fundamental right to privacy, to not have state interference under the subordinate Parens Patriae doctrine:
"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property.
"His rights are such as existed by the Law of the Land (Common Law) long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution.
"He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." Hale v. Hinkle 201 U.S. 43 at 89
Finally, it is a well settled doctrine that individuals are superior over government and the instigations of state compliance against unjust, perfidy, and capricious acts of government in which to extort money from Fathers “In the Best Interests” of the child.
"The statist notion that government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests". Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. 1990), citing, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 623-29, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93 (1982).
V
THE DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE IS UNDER LAW, SUBORDINATE TO MY LAWFUL AUTHORITY AS MY CHILDRENS NATURAL FATHER; MY CONSENT, WILL, CONTROL, CUSTODY AND CARE OF MY OWN CHILDREN IS ORDINATE AND PROTECTED BY LAW AS I HAVE A RIGHT TO PROTECT MY LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.
The maxim of law clearly controls and elucidates this point of law: Remisus imperanti melius paretur. “A [father] commanding not too strictly is best obeyed.” 3 Co. Inst. 233.
Clearly, it has been established that: “No court may, except for the gravest of reasons, transfer a child from its natural parent to any other person.” People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952). “The natural parents of a child have a right to the care and custody of their child that is superior to all others unless the right has been abandoned or the natural parents proved to be unfit.” People ex Rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953). “Parental custody may not be displaced in the absence of grievous necessity or cause.” Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 423 N.E.2d 361 (1981). Thus, in a custody contest between a parent and a non-parent, the issue of the child’s best interest is not reached unless first it is established that the natural parent surrendered the child, abandoned the child, was unfit, had persistently neglected the child, or that other extraordinary circumstances exist. Matter of Merrit v. Way, 58 N.Y.2d 850, 460 N.Y.S.2d 20, 446 N.E.2d 776 (1983). This is because neither law, nor policy, nor the tenets of our society allow a child to be separated from its parent unless the circumstances are compelling. “Neither the lawyers nor judges nor experts in psychology or social welfare may displace the primary responsibility of child raising that naturally and legally fall to those who conceive and bear children.” Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 40 N.Y.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277 (1976); Matter of Gomez v. Lozado, 40 N.Y.2d 839, 387 N.Y.X.2d 834, 356 N.E.2d 287 (1976).
As unemancipated minors, my children come under the Father’s lawful authority and dominion, and the doctrine of parens patriae which this court unlawfully operates, bows subordinate to Mr. Streett’s lawful command and lawful authority, as my children are not incompetents, have not been abandoned by me, nor have committed criminal acts and/or omissions.
"…the role of the state as the sovereign or quasi-sovereign guardian of persons under some form of legal disability. It authorizes the state to substitute and enforce decisions about what is believed to be in the best interests of persons who presumably cannot or will not take proper care of themselves."
[Bartol, "Parens Patriae: Poltergeist of Mental Health Law" (1981) 3 L. & Pol. Quart. 191 at 193]
As neither my children, nor I are Fourteenth Amendment citizens, that amendment nor classification does not attach to either me nor my children, whom are my lawful posterity. As they are factually not incompetents, nor as they or I have committed any crime; nor are they under any physical or mental jeopardy by me; therefore, their custodial status falls to me as their father, as a matter of right, and perfect right, protected under law. [See Parham v. J.R., 142 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (finding that while parental rights are substantial, they are not absolute when a child's physical or mental well-being are at stake and stating that the Supreme Court has "recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 801 (1944). See also Bothman v. Warren, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51-52 (Ct. App. 1979) (adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard)]. No court within the State of New Jersey can lawfully invoke either jurisdiction, nor the doctrine of parens patriae in which to usurp or abuse Mr. Streett’s natural born rights in this matter.
FATHER-. “But he is not bound, without some agreement, to pay another for maintaining them; 9 C. & P. 497; nor is he bound to pay their debts, unless he has authorized them to be contracted. 38 E. C. L. R. 195, n. See 8 Watts, R. 366, 1 Craig. & Phil. 317; Bind; Nother; Parent. This obligation ceases as soon as the child becomes of age, unless he becomes chargeable to the public. 1 Ld. Ray. 699.
The rights of the father are authority over his children, to enforce all his lawful commands, and to correct with moderation his children for disobedience. A father may delegate his power over the person of his child to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purposes of his education. This power ceases on the arrival of the child at the age of twenty-one years. Generally, the father is entitled to the services of his children during their minority.” 4 S. & R. 207; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t. --Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1856
It is a fact, that we have no agreement upon this matter, and thereby; you cannot invoke any doctrine or jurisdiction to abrogate my rights by law.
The most dramatic admission of said abuse of state power of courts invoking Parens Patriae over that of a father came in a case involving Daniel O'Connell, age 14, who was committed to the Chicago Reform School in 1870. His father subsequently demanded Daniel's release on the ground that his son had committed no crime. The Illinois Supreme Court so ordered, arguing that the boy's Constitutional rights had been violated. The parens patriae doctrine, the court opined, was subject to the restraints of divine law.
"The parent has the right to the care custody and assistance of his child," the court reasoned. "The duty to maintain and protect it is a principle of natural law…Before any abridgement of the right, gross misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part of the parent, should be clearly proved. "
“The State as parens patriae, has determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the children of the State are to be thus confined for the `good of society,' then society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free government acknowledged a failure.”
[People ex.rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. at 280-87 (1870)]
It is irrefutable, that no such unfitness has been charged against Mr. Streett, nor has anything been proved except the fact that persons want to steal from him, and coerce him to pay “Child Support.”
Moreover, several recent state court decisions have reinvigorated "the natural law defense" of family rights as a viable element of the American legal tradition. For example, in a stunning 1982 decision, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a provision of that state's Children's Rights Act which allowed for the complete termination of parental rights upon a decision by welfare authorities that "such termination will be in the child's best interest." Writing for the majority, Justice Dallin Oaks stated:
"This parental right [to rear one's children] transcends all property and economic rights, It is rooted not in state or federal statutory or constitutional law, to which it is logically and chronologically prior, but in nature and human instinct." He noted that much of the rich variety in American culture had been transmitted to children by parents "who were acting against the best interest of their children, as defined by official dogma."
[In Re J.P., document no 17386, filed June 9, 1982, The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, pp. 13, 17.]
“There was no surer way to destroy authentic pluralism,” Justice Oaks added, “than by terminating the rights of parents who violated the "trendy" definitions and "officially approved values imposed by reformers empowered to determine what is in the `best interest' of someone else's child." While not impugning evil motives, he did quote James Madison: "It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." I make the point that Madison impressed upon a nation as President of the United States, when he said:
James Madison—Address to the States, April 25, 1783
“Let it be remembered finally, that it has ever been the pride and boast of America, that the rights for which she contended, were the rights of human nature. By the blessing of the Author of these rights on the means exerted for their defense, they have prevailed against all opposition and form the basis of Thirteen Independent States. No instance has heretofore occurred, nor can any instance be expected hereafter to occur, in which the unadulterated forms of Republican government can pretend to so fair an opportunity of justifying themselves by their fruits. In this view, the citizens of the U.S. are responsible for the greatest trusts ever confided in a political society. If justice, good faith, honor, gratitude & all the other Qualities which enoble the character of a nation, and fulfill the ends of Government, the fruits of establishments, the cause of our liberty will acquire a dignity and luster, which it never yet enjoyed; and an example will be set which can no but have most favorable influence on the rights of mankind. If on the other side, our governments should be unfortunately blotted with the reverse of the Cardinal and essential Virtues, the great cause which we have negated to vindicate, will be dishonored & betrayed; the last & fairest experiment in favor of the rights of human nature will be turned against them; and their patrons & friends exposed will be insulted and silenced by the votaries of Tyranny and Usurpation.”
[Our Sacred Honor, Words of Advice from the Founders in Stories, Letters, Poems and Speeches, by William J. Bennet ©1997, Simon and Schuster, Rockefeller Center, 1230 Avenue of the America’s, New York, NY 10020, ISBN 0-684-84138-X p. 322]
Factually, all agents of the County of Monmouth, as well as the State of New Jersey (and of New York) are using a fraud, of either Parens Patriae, or: “Being in the Best Interests of the Child” doctrine, and are in fact, strangers to Mr. Streett’s children’s secured liberties, rights, wants and needs. Respondent’s have no station at law in which to intrude upon Wilbur Streetts’ care, custody and control over his own family and children:
“A stranger however, has no general privilege of interference for the protection of what he believes to be anyone's welfare...in general, the stranger interferes at his peril, regardless of worthy motives.”
[Grinberger v. Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash. 292, 22 p.2D 983; Warren v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156 N.W. 323.]
Thereby, any trespass of Mr. Streett or his children’s secured liberties, is actionable as a matter of law, and said respondent’s will have no immunity, nor remedy at law, and will be liable in the first instance for monetary damages which must be paid to me in reparation for said contempt and insolence to aforesaid freedoms and liberties, and the concise rule of law.
Finally, the Doctrine of Parens Patriae embraces societies fundamental values, and not those of radical feminism, of which these courts through said respondent’s, religiously attend to in direct violation of the foundations of our law and our society:
See In re Phillip B., 156 Cal Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that "[t]he state is the guardian of society's basic values. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has a right, indeed a duty, to protect children. State officials may interfere in family matters to safeguard the child's health, educational development and emotional well being")
See also:
"An officer [or any person in government office i.e. Judge] who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government." Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94.
Fatherhood, is that basic value that must be maintained by this court as a substantive duty and remedy at law to your petitioner/Appellant.
The condition of being a Father, does not mean that the state can divest him of his constitutional rights and secured liberties by using the respondent’s unconstitutional, patently unfair and unjust surrogate court systems: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967). Neither does it follow that the condition of being a father does not justify a kangaroo court. Respondent’s continuous enterprise denying your appellant his rights and secured liberties is in fact, ex post facto as procreating cannot be a crime:
"An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that hangs the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage." Wilensky v. Fields, Fla, 267 So.2d 1,5." [Source: 6th edition, Black's Law Dictionary, p 580.]
It is a fact, that I have the right to contract, as well as the right not to contract. Appellant/Petitioner as the lawful Father to my children and has the lawful right not to pay child support, as a remedy to defend and punish[4] the unlawful taking of my son from me by respondent’s (as respondent’s left me with no other remedy at law; and their surrogate courts were insolent to the law and would not me file lawful verified criminal complaints and act upon them):
“Glanville, however, maintained a contrary doctrine, and insisted that the action lay. “For,” said he, “the father hath an interest in every of his children, to educate them and to provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not reasonably that any should take them from him, and to do him such an injury, but that the should have his remedy to punish it.” Vaughan v. Rhodes (1822) 2 McCord 227
It is a fact, that I have the substantive right to be entitled to the custody care and control of my own children, and without the substantive right given to me, any fraud placed upon me vitiates all contracts as they are now established by said respondents’ in this matter the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY:
“A parent, however clearly he may deem himself entitled to the custody of his infant child, must not resort to force and artifice to obtain possession of it: Commonwealth v. Fee, 6 Serg. & R. 255. “He should enter through the straight gate of the law to obtain such possession, and not attempt to climb over it in some other and wrongful way.”: Jones v. Cleyborn, 54 Ga. 9, 13; Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 312; 30 Am. Rep. 593.
"Governmental power only extends to restraining each one in freedom of his conduct so as to secure perfect protection to all others from every species of danger to person, health, and property; that each individual shall be required to use his own as to inflict injury upon his neighbors; and these seem to be all immunities which can be justly claimed by one portion of of society from another, under government of constitutional limitation." In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.
"When a parent is deprived of the custody of his child, and therefore of its services and earnings, he is no longer liable for its support and education." Selfridge v. Paxton, 145 Cal. 713, 79 Pac. 425; Ex parte Miller, 109 Cal. 648, 42 Pac. 428; McKay v. McKay, 125 Cal. 65, 57 Pac. 677; Matter of McMullin, 164 Cal. 504, 129 Pac. 773; People v. Hartman, 23 Cal. App. 72, 137 Pac. 611.
It is also a fact, that said respondent’s are attempting to force upon me an unconscionable contract, illegal from its first inception[5], and is a contract which I do not agree with and thereby is void, in ab intio.
“§19.2 What makes a contract unconscionable?”
“The Code does not define unconscionability nor does its text indicate what elements go into making a contract unconscionable. The official comments suggest:
‘The basic test is whether in the light of the general background and the commercial needs of the trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract…The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise…and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.’”
[RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER UCC ARTICLE 2, by Harold Greenberg © 1987, Wiley Law Publications, John Wiley & Sons, New York, ISBN 0-471-81283-8, pp. 282-283]
VI
NO FATHER, NO MAN, NO MOTHER, NO PERSON OR EVEN AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON CAN BE IMPRISONED FOR A DEBT; NOR CAN THEY BE IMPRISONED BEFORE AN “ABILITY TO PAY HEARING”—AS SAID RESPONDENT’S HAVE FAILED TO INITIATE THIS MANDATED DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIREMENT—THEY THEREBY FORFIET JURISIDCTION IN THIS MATTER AND THIS LAWFUL HABEAS IMMEDIATELY CONTROLS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MUST IMMEDIATELY ISSUE SECURING MR. STREET’S FREEDOM
As noted in case precedent, it is a well settled doctrine:
“In this emergent appeal, the trial court's Order incarcerating an indigent child support obligor was reversed; there was no evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by the Court. The incarceration of defendant in the absence of any showing that he could pay the $10,000 purge figure set by the Court was "manifest error. A litigant may not be incarcerated for failure to pay support in accordance with the court order, except upon a showing of an ability to comply." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that he had the ability to comply with the court's order.” MCBSS o/b/o Brookins & Williams v. Tolbert, (App.Div. June 7, 2000) Before: Hon. Gerald Council, JSC (Mercer County)
See also:
“In this emergent appeal, the trial court's Order incarcerating an indigent child support obligor was reversed; there was no evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by the Court. "A litigant may not be incarcerated for failure to pay support in accordance with the court order, except upon a showing of an ability to comply." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that he had the ability to comply with the court's order.” Cruz v. Cruz, (App.Div. March 19, 2001) Before: Hon. Rosalie B. Cooper, JSC (Ocean County)
See also your bretheren’s stare decisis settled doctrine:
In this emergent appeal, the trial court's Order incarcerating an indigent child support obligor was reversed; there was no evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by the Court. A finding that an obligor has not established changed circumstances warranting modification of a support order is not synonymous with, and cannot substitute for, a finding based on substantial, credible evidence that the obligor has the ability to comply with the order. "The purpose of an order incarcerating a judgment debtor is to induce compliance with the order. In such cases, the incarcerated party has the key to freedom in his/her hands because the debtor-spouse has the ability to comply with the order as a condition for release." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that he had the ability to comply with the court's order. Bachman v. Cohen (App.Div. April 12, 2000) Before: Hon. Thomas W. Cavanaugh, Jr., JSC (Monmouth County)
See also:
“After the initial remand, a second trial court order incarcerating defendant was reversed and appellant ordered released immediately. Although the findings of the trial court as to appellant's ability to earn were affirmed, the remedy chosen (incarceration until payment of $28,163.10 towards arrears) was erroneous as the record was devoid of evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by the Court. "We disagree only with the remedy chosen by the judge. An order incarcerating a debtor-spouse ... presupposes that the judgment debtor has assets that have been secreted or otherwise placed beyond the reach of execution. R. 1:10-3." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that he had the ability to comply with the court's order.” Weinstein v. Weinstein (App.Div. April 7, 2000) Before: Hon. Louis Locascio, JSC (Monmouth County)
“The trial court erred in failing to compel parent to repay child support received after the emancipation of the child." Goldberg v. Goldberg, A- -98T2 Before: Hon. Audrey P. Blackburn, JSC (Mercer County)
As you as well as Respondent’s in this matter have knowledge of the law, you are hereby advised that Title 28 Section 2007 (a) and (b) states that no person can be imprisoned for debt on a writ issued from a federal court in any state where imprisonment for debt is outlawed/prohibited/abolished. That would create a conflict with 18 U.S.C. 228 (Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act) or New Jersey Statutes and Laws and thereby would be unconstitutional.
“Husband’s harm was not monetary, but rather an injustice comparable to a “false imprisonment” – defined as “the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” [Civil is the same.] “It is immaterial that the deprivation may be temporary and non-final.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
The Crux for this issue can be best stated by Mr. Wilbur Street himself:
“The NJ Supreme Court specifically declares that probation may not issue a warrant for a man that owes child support, since he is not on probation…but I actually have a letter from the local prosecutor stating that >probation issued the warrant… But then I also have the prosecutor's response brief where he says that the Judge issued it.. but I also have the contract between the Division of Family Development (i.e. Welfare) and the Administrative Office of the Courts (which I can supply you with if you want), that states that Welfare generates the warrant and they are given to a Judge to sign by a probation worker…
The relevant case cite paragraphs from Lakutis v. Greenwood”:
[22] “It is argued the support order and the contempt proceedings had thereon were void because the record does not show the filing of any pleadings, the service of process or
[9 NJ Page 106]
the entry of judgment; that a county probation officer has no authority to issue a warrant of commitment for the detention of a person found guilty of contempt of court; and that a public officer acting outside the scope of his authority may be held personally liable.
[23] The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to make out a cause of action on the three grounds alleged. "The gist of false imprisonment is mere unlawful detention without more." Altana v. McCabe, 132 N.J.L. 12 (Sup. Ct. 1944). A public official may be held liable for false imprisonment where he has acted outside his authority. Collins v. Cody, 95 N.J.L.
65 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Shaefer v. Smith, 92 N.J.L. 267 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
[24] Where a person is accused without reasonable or probable cause and it can be shown the accuser was actuated by a malicious motive in making the charge, an action for malicious prosecution will lie. Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 11 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div. 1951); Vladar v. Klopman, 89 N.J.L. 575 (E. & A. 1916). The gist of an action for abuse of process is the use of court process for a purpose not justified by the law. Schneider v. Mueller, 132 N.J.L. 163 (E. & A. 1944). The complaint contains all the essential; allegations to charge the defendant on each of these three grounds.
[25] The record indicates, and the defendant does not deny, that the proceedings against the plaintiff were based on an oral order of the court which was never reduced to writing and entered as required by Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Rule 6:5-3(b). The defendant, asserting he had authority to issue the warrants for the arrest of the plaintiff, relies on R.S. 2:199-4, which provides that a probation officer may make an arrest where a probationer has violated the conditions of his probation. Here, however, the plaintiff was never on probation and thus, in respect to him, the defendant was not clothed with the authority conferred by the statute.
[9 NJ Page 107]
Irrespective of the plaintiff's liability to punishment for
contempt in failing to comply with the oral order for support, which we do not determine, it appears, on the affidavits submitted, the defendant was without authority to issue the warrants for his arrest and imprisonment. Whether or not such action was induced by malice or was willful and wrongful so as to amount to abuse of process, presents a factual question which normally the plaintiff is entitled to have submitted to a jury. Rule 3:56-3. In this posture of the cause, it was error for the court below to dismiss the complaint and enter summary judgment for the defendant. In so deciding, we are not passing on the merits of the plaintiff's basic claim in any respect, but solely on the procedure adopted by the trial court in granting the defendant's motion for dismissal.”
Lakutis v. Greenwood, 87 A.2d 23, 9 N.J. 101 (N.J. 03/10/1952)
Finally, it has been long recognized that any such abuse of imprisoning any person for a debt is opprobrious and a danger to a free peoples. It is not only settled doctrine of law, but also public policy ingrained in the foundation of this state and nation, that no person shall be imprisoned for any debt, “special” or otherwise.
"Far more horrific is the notion that a debtor may be incarcerated in order to extract payment of the debtor's liability from third parties who have no obligation to do so. It simply cannot be supposed that Congress contemplated that the exception in section 362(b)(2)(b) would be implemented by the courts in a manner analogous to medieval practices of debtor's prison and ransom."
“The horrifying aptness of the analogy of medieval debtor's prison set forth by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the above case as to the practice of shaking down relatives and friends is even more apparent when many of the people going to jail for civil matters (where there is no probable cause) are subjected to assault, rape, sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS, tuberculosis and poor jail conditions that are "unfit" for human beings.” In re Moon, (1996) 201 B.R. 79, 87-88 (Bktrcy. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
WHEREAS, YOU ARE HEREBY JUDICIALLY NOTED AND MUST PLACE ON THE RECORD THE FACT THAT YOU ARE PROHIBITED FROM MULTIPLE IMPRISONMENTS FOR ANY DEBT—AND ARE THUSLY HELD LIABLE WITH NO IMMUNITY CLIAMS NOR ANY REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES IF YOU VIOLATE SETTLED LAW IN THIS MATTER:
"It was the object of this section of the Code, as it was enacted in 1883, to prevent the abuses which were considered to have arisen in the imprisonment of persons in civil actions under the law as it previously existed; and, by this section, the time for which a person may be imprisoned under an execution or other mandate to enforce the recovery of a sum of money has been declared and restricted. And the section has been so famed as expressly to include 'a commitment upon a fine of contempt of court in the non-payment of alimony or counsel fees in a divorce case.' Then it has prescribed the length of time to which the imprisonment may be extended for such non-payment. And the section has further and finally declared that 'the prisoner shall not be again imprisoned upon a like process issued in the same action, or arrested in any action upon any judgment under which the same may have been granted.' This language in its application to this case, is broad and plain, forbidden a further imprisonment upon a like process issued in the same action; and it has direct reference to the imprisonment previously authorized and sanctioned by this section, and, by its meaning and import, restricts and limits the imprisonment to what has been before provided for and described. If that is not to be the effect of this concluding language of the section, then it has accomplished nothing for the relief of a person imprisoned for an action for divorce. For as the law previously existed, where a person had been imprisoned for a contempt for the non-payment of a sum of money, and had been discharged from imprisonment by the court for his inability to comply with the order, he count not afterwards be arrested and imprisoned for the same default. There was no necessity for legislation to secure relief in that respect; for if he person could not endure the imprisonment, or his circumstances were such that he could not comply with the order for the payment of the money, and the court terminated and relieved him from imprisonment for either of such causes, his further commitment to enforce the payment of the same sum of money was neither sanctioned nor provided for by any provision of the law; and, for the future security and protection of the person, there was no necessity, therefore, for the legislation to declare that he should not be again imprisoned for the same cause.
What was intended by the enactment of this section was to secure still further relief than that before sanction to the party who had previously been imprisoned and lawfully discharged. And that was described and directed in their language, prohibiting the person from being again imprisoned upon a like process, not for the non-payment of the same sum of money, but issued in the same action. This language is very general and entirely unrestrained, and it is obvious meaning is that no further process shall be issued against a person in an action for divorce, upon which he shall be committed to prison for the non-payment of a sum of money, after he has been once imprisoned and lawfully discharged under the preceding provisions of the section. If the enactment is not to secure this end, then it has accomplished no substantial benefit to the defendant required to pay alimony in an action for a divorce, for he may still be perpetually imprisoned if this section shall be held to permit his imprisonment after he has once been legally discharged under it. If that discharge is not to secure his protection against like proceedings afterwards instituted under the judgment, then, after he has served his first three or six months in prison and been discharged, he may be immediately arrested and committed again to prison for the non-payment of alimony accruing under the judgment while his imprisonment was endured. And this may go on from time to time through the entire period of his natural life. The intention of the law was not to permit this continued oppression and incarceration, but it was to restrict the right of imprisonment, when the period mentioned in the section should be fully endured by the party, to that imprisonment only, excluding after the power to arrest or imprison the person in default of future payments." Winton v. Winton, 53 Hun 4; 5 NYS 537, (aff. 117 NY 623, mem. 22 N.E. 379) (case in pertinent parts) [First Department, May Term, 1889] pgs 4 through 7. (cited from HUN)]
PLEASE ALSO JUDICIALLY NOTE AND PLACE ON THE RECORD THAT YOUR IMPRISONMENT IN THIS MATTER HEREBY DISCHARGES THIS DEBT AND EXPUNGES IT IN AB INTIO. AGAIN THIS IS WELL SETTLED LAW AS WELL AS PUBLIC POLICY:
"In the early age of the Republic the creditor had what Lord Coke calls a personal lien, nexus, a mortgage of the person of the debtor, and might upon his default in payment, have kept him as his slave or sold him. The gambling debts of the Germans were frequently pain in the same manner. The Common Law has adopted the modifications of the rule which was introduced in the time of Theodosius, by whom it was declared that imprisonment of a debtor for the smallest space of time was a full satisfaction: "Nec sane remuneratione precil debet exposcere cui, etiam minimi temporis spatio servitium satisfeeit ingenui." The Theory of the Common Law, by James M. Walker, Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852; p. 34
NOTE ALSO:
“It has been contended, that as a contract can only bind a man to pay to the full extent of his property, it is an implied condition that he may be discharged on surrendering the whole of it.” Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 1819
VII
THE COURTS OF THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, AND ALSO THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HAVE FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED AN IRREFUTABLE FRAUD AND EMNITY AGAINST FATHERHOOD, AND DO NOT ACT IN THE CHILDRENS BEST INTERESTS AS THE FACTS THROUGHOUT SOCIETY SHOW, THAT DENIAL OF FATHERHOOD IS IN FACT, CHILD ABUSE; AND IS BEING IMPLEMENTED AS A PROFIT SCHEME BY SAID RESPONDENT’S AND COURTS AND FACTUALLY, IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, AS UNDER LAW AND MAXIM OF LAW, MY CHILDREN FOLLOW MY CONDITION AND NOT THAT OF THE MOTHER, AND ANY ATTACK UPON ME IS AN ATTACK UPON THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS.
The respondent’s in this matter, in collusion with said courts, do in fact fraudulently conspire to set the initial tribunal in regards to this matter, in which to make this a civil matter. This is cogently and willfully done in bad faith, under the fraud and guise of “being in the best interest of the child,” when in fact, it is a ploy to force Wilbur Streett into a civil (or unknown) proceeding so that said respondent’s and court can deny Mr. Streett and his children their constitutional rights, and other protections at law. Instead, in this fraudulent equity proceeding, (or undefined) said respondents and contemnor tribunal “turn off law” in order that Mr. Streett and his children may be denied their natural born, common law and/or civil rights, all under the guise of “due process of law” and/or “equity.”
Equity. In the early history of the law, the sense affixed to this word was exceedingly vague and uncertain…It was then asserted that equity was bounded by no certain limits or rules, and that it was alone controlled by conscience and natural justice…
3.…The remedies for the redress of wrongs and for the enforcement of rights, are distinguished into two classes, first, those which are administered in courts of common law; and secondly, those which are administered in courts of equity.
Equity, Court of: …one which administers justice, where there are no legal rights…but [are] used when courts of law do not afford a complete remedy, and where the complainant has also an equitable right.
[Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1859]
Dr. Daniel Amneus in his watershed work: The Case for Father Custody openly delineates these well known facts for the reasons for establishing these rogue courts:
“Our society fails to guarantee [Father custody] support. We have a thirty percent illegitimacy rate and a sixty (no longer fifty) percent divorce rate with virtually automatic mother custody.
A judge may try a divorce case in the morning and place the children in the mother’s custody. He may try a criminal case in the afternoon and send a man to prison for robbing a liquor store. The chances are three out of four that the man he sends to prison grew up in a fatherless household like the one he created in the morning when he tried the divorce case. He sees no connection between the two cases.
Fatherless children are 5 times more likely to commit suicide, 32 times more likely to run away, 20 times more likely to have behavioral disorders, 14 times more likely to commit rape, 9 times more likely to end up in a state-operated institution, 20 times more likely to end up in prison.
Fatherless girls perpetuate the next generation of fatherlessness, encouraged by the removal of the stigma of illegitimacy and by the growth of a government Backup System which is designed to repair the damage created by fatherlessness, but which actually encourages and subsidizes it.”
[The case for Father Custody, ©1999 by Dr. Daniel Amneus, Primrose Press, Alhambra, CA. cover sheet]
These rogue feminist courts which respondent’s imbue, are in fact no friend to fatherhood, nor to we the people of the state of New Jersey. They are the enemy of my children, as factually, under their cogent tenure, they have established a fascist regime which produces the here to be mentioned social pathology in which respondent’s gain direct and/or indirect remuneration from their planned and engineered destruction of home and family through destroying fathers such as me, fraudulently done “In the Best Interests of the Child” to develop social pathology for their own profit. The facts are incontrovertible and have become a mantra throughout the populace’s experience:
FACTS
“Upwards of 25 percent of children in our society do not have a father living at home. Children in such families are over-represented in terms of reported cases of physical abuse and other forms of child maltreatment.”
[Child Maltreatment and Paternal Deprivation. A Manifesto for Research, Prevention and Treatment. By Henry Biller and Richard Solomon, (Lexington MA; D.C. Heth. 1986), p. 21]
“According to The Family in America: New Research, December, 1989, citing a Milwaukee County inter-office memo, ‘of all 1050 ongoing substantiated child abuse and neglect cases in Milwaukee County in May 1989, 83 percent involved [single female headed] households receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
“These researchers [Robert Schoen, Harry N. Greenblatt, and Robert B. Mielke] report that 78 percent of all divorce petitions in New Jersey were filed by wives…” [p. 147] [Quoting attorney Riane Eisler]: “By social convention, the vast majority of divorces were filed by women.” [p. 174]: “In New Jersey, in 1968, under the adversary system, over three-quarters of the plaintiff’s—those who initialed the legal divorce proceedings—were wives filing charges against ‘guilty’ husbands.” According to David Chambers, Making Fathers Pay (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 29, “the wife is the moving party in divorce actions seven times out of eight.” According to the Legal Beagle, February, 1986, 72 percent of divorce filings are made by wives. According to Yuanxi Ma, Chinese feminist, about 60 percent of China’s divorces are initiated by women (Off Our Backs, April, 1988). According to Joan Kelly, author of Surviving the Breakup, “Divorce is sought about three-to-one by women” (cited in Joint Custody Newsletter, January, 1988). According to Christopher Lasch, NYRB, 17 February, 1966, three-quarters of divorce are granted to women. According to Elsie Clews Parson’s The Family: An Ethnographical and Historical Outline (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906) p. 331, “A large majority of divorces are obtained by women.” According to a three-day survey by the County Clerk’s Office in Orange County, New Jersey, two of every three divorce petitions listed the wife as the plaintiff (Fathers’ Forum, August, 1987). According to court records in Marion, Howards, Hancock, Grand and Ruch counties in Indiana in 1985, of 2,033 dissolutions granted, 1599 (76.6%) were filed by wives, 474 (23.3%) were fled by husbands (National Congress for Men Network, Vol. 1, number 3).
“Judicial bias was empirically documented in a study of custody decisions making in the Colorado courts (Pearson & Ring, 1982)…”
“Given the complexity of child interviewing and assessment, judges’ lack of training and the potential for bias, it is questionable whether judges are competent to conduct such interviews (Goldstein, Freud, Solnit & Goldstein, 1986). Mental Health experts have addressed the possibility that some judges are stepping beyond their professional bounds and are acting in the capacity of mental health professionals. The issue of judicial competence was addressed by a West Virginia court, which stated that the “…intelligent determination of relative degrees of fitness requires a precision of measurement which is not possible, given the tools available to judges.” (Garska v. McCoy, 1981)
[Factors Affecting Childrens’ Power to Choose their Caretakes in Custody Proceedings, by Eric Speth, J.D. Ph.D.; Custody Newsletter, #12/13 1995, Village Publishing, 73 Valley Drive, Furlong, PA 18925.]
The proportion of children living with two parents declined from 85% in 1970 to 68% in 1996, and the proportion of children living with one parent grew from 12% to 28%. Of these single parents, in 1996, 39% were divorced, 37% had never been married, 21% were separated from their spouse, and 4% were widowed.
[U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra, note 6, at 27, 48.]
KIDNAPPING CHILDREN
This may now be the poison that is turning family discord into family destruction, with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reporting almost 1,000 parental kidnappings in this country every day. These are still overwhelmingly maternal, but if fathers begin launching pre-emptive strikes (perhaps after reading Seidenberg), even this astounding figure could increase.
[Domestic Armageddon, by DR. Steven Baskerville]
Fatherless Homes Statistics
RE: Youth Suicide and Divorce/Single parent Homes:
VARIOUS STUDIES
"In a study of 146 adolescent friends of 26 adolescent suicide victims, teens living in single-parent families are not only more likely to commit suicide but also more likely to suffer from psychological disorders, when compared to teens living in intact families." Source: David A. Brent, (et. al.) "Post-traumatic Stress Disorders in Peers of Adolescent Suicide Victims: Predisposing Factors and Phenomenology."
[Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 34 (1995): 209-215.]
"Fatherless children are at dramatically greater risk of suicide." [Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, Survey on Child Health, Washington, D.C., 1993.]
"Three out of four teenage suicides occur in households where a parent has been absent." [Source: Jean Beth Eshtain, "Family Matters: The Plight of America's Children." The Christian Century (July 1993): 14-21.]
"A family structure index - a composite index based on the annual rate of children involved in divorce and the percentage of families with children present that are female-headed - is a strong predictor of suicide among young adult and adolescent white males." [Source: Patricia L. McCall and Kenneth C. Land, "Trends in White Male
Adolescent, Young-Adult, and Elderly Suicide: Are There Common Underlying Structural Factors?" Social Science Research 23 (1994): 57-81]
Mr. Wilbur Streett is his children’s lawful father, and of which he has their best interests in mind—he refuses to enslave either his children or himself to a system which is assured to only enslave, burden, imprison, and which unlawfully creates and expands both debtors prisons and a socialist welfare empire. Factually, this court is bound by its own words to act by their own law in Mr. Streett’s children’s “best interests”, which is clearly protecting the Father (Mr. Streett) from the state. They have an unalienable right to be under my care, custody and control over that of their mother and/or the state. Thereby, it is a well demonstrated fact, that respondent’s acting in overt collusion with each other using the fraud of “In the Child’s Best Interest” doctrine, that I will be denied full custody of my own children, be totally disenfranchised; and be conscripted into financial obligation that I do not owe in order so that respondent’s will benefit from my demise and enslavement:
Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 527, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (1945) (citations omitted). This concept still exists in Florida's family court system today; Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal recently noted that "there remains a temptation for many judges to consider the right to custody as the mother's to lose and unless her fitness is legitimately challenged, the father's right of equal consideration is often ignored." Ayyash v. Ayyash, 700 So. 2d 752, 754 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
See Also:
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS (1989), reprinted in 24 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS STUDY].
[107] See, e.g., id. at 746 (noting that "women face discriminatory attitudes and actions" regarding child custody, but failing to recognize that men face discriminatory attitudes and actions regarding child custody); id. at 748, 830 (reporting that "perceptions of gender bias may discourage fathers from seeking custody and stereotypes about fathers may sometimes affect case outcomes," but failing to examine either the perceptions or the stereotypes and how they affect fathers so that, by their own data, 93.4% of the time mothers receive primary residential custody); id. at 829 (suggesting that it is appropriate for mothers to overwhelmingly receive custody because of, in part, "the unequal sacrifice of earning potential these women make in order to be primary caretakers," yet failing to examine gender bias against men who are culturally forced into the "provider" role).
See Also:
A prime example is a 1951 study commissioned by the World Health Organization and conducted by John Bowlby, a preeminent psychoanalyst. Bowlby set up a study to follow the effects of maternal deprivation. Paternal deprivation was not studied. Yet, Bowlby felt confident enough to report that "the child's relation to his mother . . . is without doubt in ordinary circumstances, by far his most important relationship." Bowlby's findings were widely implemented by child care institutions and reinforced court findings that children should be kept with mothers at all costs. Consequently, to reduce the toddler-mother "separation anxiety" as reported by Bowlby, psychologists recommended that fathers be denied overnight visitation. Studies such as these have been incorporated into our family court system and have become unquestioned aspects of our family law. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 35-36; see also Martha J. Cox & Blair Paley, Families as Systems, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (1997) (noting that child development studies have focused on the role of the mother-child relationship); infra text accompanying note 162 (noting that as late as 1996, the guidelines in Florida's Twelfth Judicial Circuit provided that a noncustodial parent-almost always the father-could not have overnight visitation with a child until the child turned two years old)
Mr. Streett’s children’s status, which has clearly and lawfully been established by him and under his protection, does not give this court in personam jurisdiction nor subject matter jurisdiction over the parties, and in fact; brings said children under his care, custody and control as a matter of law.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Zablocki v. Redhail 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1978) that marriages couldn't be infringed upon even if someone owed back child support for children of an earlier marriage. It said: “This "collection device" rationale cannot justify the statute's broad infringement on the right to marry.”
Their best interests by the facts so stated, by your own law and maxims of law, state that they must follow Mr. Streett’s condition, and his authority, again; which is factually ordinate to respondent’s and/or any court. It is a now well-recognized fact, that it is your tribunal’s un-warranted influence under color of law, and under color of authority that is factually precipitating the jeopardy, and direct harm that his children suffer by your decisions. AT NO TIME HAS WILBUR STREETT EITHER ABANDONED NOR PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC CHARGE ANY OF HIS OWN CHILDREN:
“Not since the overthrow of the Weimar Republic have the leaders of a major democracy used their office and the mass media to disseminate invective against millions of their own citizens. In fact, it was Adolph Hitler who urged that “the state must declare the child to be the most precious treasure of the people,” and who explained, in the words of Rabbi Daniel Lapin, that “as long as government is perceived as working for the benefit of children, the people happily will endure almost any curtailment of liberty.
Using children to tug on our heartstrings may be not only a weakness of the sentimental. It also may be a ploy by those cynical and unscrupulous enough to exploit children for their own purposes. This is likely to be remembered as one of the most diabolical perversions of governmental power in our history, a time when we allowed children to be used and abused by fast-talking government officials and paid for it with our families, our social order, and our constitutional rights.”
[Insight Magazine, Quote of Dr. Steven Baskerville, Professor, Harvard University]
Clearly, respondent’s are a clear and ever present danger to the rights of Fatherhood, ergo: your appellant and petitioner in this matter; and this is a well-known, and irrefutable fact as respondent’s history of destruction to his gender thereof is being accomplished as a Title 42 U.S.C.A., Section 651-666 [Welfare “Title IV-D] profit scam and or scheme as a transfer of wealth scheme from Wilbur Streett, to respondents for their own remuneration and/or profit scam and/or scheme.
The Court uses three standards of review. First, strict scrutiny is applied to any statute based on a suspect classification or fundamental right. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (reviewing an Oklahoma statute that forbade the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 while females over 18 could purchase the beer).
[192] See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 680-82. Despite the heightened level of scrutiny, the Court has nonetheless continued to uphold some statutes that discriminate against either gender. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981) (upholding a statute subjecting men but not women to statutory rape charges when they engage in sex with a partner under the age of 18); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding the male-only draft); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (sustaining a federal statute that granted female navy members a longer time period in which to achieve a mandatory promotion); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 (1974) (upholding a Florida statute that provided a property tax exemption for widows but not widowers); Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (upholding New Jersey's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities under the state's disability insurance program). Consequently, the Court has sent mixed messages as to exactly which level of scrutiny would be used when reviewing equal protection challenges to laws. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 681-82.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[C]ourts must subject [all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group] to the most rigid scrutiny.") Government must show a necessary and compelling reason for burdening a specific race, national origin, or alienage. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1972).
Second, intermediate scrutiny is applied to any statute based on the quasi-suspect classes of gender. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) ("A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" (citation omitted)). The Court uses this level of review for invidious
(intentionally harmful) or benign (intending to help women or redress past discrimination against them) discrimination. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 679-82, 713-18. Government must show a substantially related interest to an important governmental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Third, the rational relation test is applied to any statute not based on a suspect or quasi-suspect class; the government action must bear a rational relationship to an acceptable goal sought by the government. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (3rd ed. 1986). The statute will be upheld as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, which is almost always the case. See id. Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court reviewed gender classifications using the rational relation test. See HERMA HILL KAY, SEX- BASED DISCRIMINATION 26-27 (2d ed. 1981). In 1971, the Court began to use a heightened level of scrutiny when reviewing gender-based statutes. See id.; Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.
Thereby, it is a factual truth, that it is not in Mr. Streett’s children’s best interests to have respondent’s cogently and willfully place a father forced into peonage against his will and over his consent in order to support their entry into the welfare state, as slavery and peonage is factually abolished in this nation:
USCA Title 42, Chapter 21, Subchapter 1
§ 1994. Peonage abolished
The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.
Thereby, placing Wilbur Streett into peonage, against his will, and abrogating his rights under the overt fraud of “being in the best interests of the child” doctrine, does in fact; ultimately forces his children into an ultimate peonage and slavery as they will as the maxim of law dictates above, follow the condition of the father and inherit this opprobrious system brought against me by respondents for their profit and gain.
However, because of the historic regard the State of Utah has always had for the interest and welfare of children, it is not surprising that noteworthy individuals or
groups who represent themselves as child advocates, whose sole motivation is claimed to be the protection and welfare of children, are given considerable deference in their efforts to protect if not all children, as many as possible. Likewise, the legislative proposals they advance are often accepted as beneficial and appropriate without a great deal of careful scrutiny. Few are willing to risk the public opprobrium of being cast on the wrong side of any child welfare debate. Child advocacy has become big business…
If the State of Utah, in its zeal to protect children, sought to create an enlarged child welfare system by which children could be seized from parents without a showing of probable cause, and then withheld from them permanently if the beliefs, attitudes, and ways of life of the parents did not merit official approval, as measured by state designed tests, such would be ominous indeed. The majority of Utah citizens would almost certainly not approve. Yet as described above, the 1994 Act comes dangerously close to doing just this.
[The Child Welfare Reform Act of 1994: Is the Cure Worse than the Problem? By Judge Arthur G. Christean; June 1997 edition of the Utah Bar Journal Vol. 10 No. 5, pg 30-42.]
VIII
RESPONDENT’S HAVE FACTUALLY ACTED IN BAD FAITH TO WILBUR STREETT, AND HAVE UNCLEAN HANDS, AND THEREBY; CANNOT USE THE LEGAL PROCESS AND ARE IN FACT IN AN ABUSE OF PROCESS, TO USE THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FOR A PURPOSE NEVER INTENDED NOR ALLOWED AT LAW.
Mr. Streett is his children’s own father, serve jos children’s best interests as the facts presented above concur; that he will ask nor burden either the state of New Jersey nor Welfare for “Child Support” in the raising of his own children, which is a superior doctrine, than that of “Parens Patriae” or socialist / feminist model and thereby, as a fit parent, with clean hands, he must be given superior rule and authority within my own home and within my own family.
The majority applies the doctrine of parens patriae in order to grant Patrick visitation. In Williams v. Williams, 425 NW2d 390, 393 (SD 1988), we held that trial courts have the authority and obligation to protect children from remaining in an environment detrimental to their emotional and physical well-being. See also SDCL 19-14-26 and -27. The cases where we have recognized parens patriae deal with children of the marriage whose custody is at issue because neither parent really serves the child's best interests. See Matter of Guardianship of Petrik, 544 NW2d 388, 391 (SD 1996); Jeschke v. Wockenfuss, 534 NW2d 602, 605 (SD 1995); Swenson v. Swenson, 529 NW2d 901, 904 (SD 1995); Williams, 425 NW2d at 393; Jasper v. Jasper, 351 NW2d 114, 117 (SD 1984). Tamara is not an unfit parent.
However, the New Jersey Legislature "acknowledged the importance of parental autonomy by cautioning that even an award of visitation to a stepparent 'shall not conflict with any visitation or custodial right of a natural or adoptive parent[.]'" Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 CalRptr 212, 217 (CalCtApp 1991) (quoting CalCivCode §4351.5(j)).
Using law as to implement feminist practices policies and procedures as the rule of law in the State of New Jersey:
"Parens patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act for themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Constitution for the State of New Jersey, and respondent’s do not have the right to fraudulently make the Monmouth County Consolidated Courts into a crime for profit industry:
"Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967) overturning conviction of fifteen year-old Gerald Gault who was convicted by an Arizona Juvenile court for making a "lewd and indecent phone call" and sentenced to an indeterminate period not to exceed his 21st birthday.
Respondent’s are not bowing to Mr. Streett’s lawful command and authority under law, and instead are using their unclean hands and fraudulent “expertise” as a motive for profit motive:
The Honorable Richard S. Tuthill, a Civil War Veteran, concluded opening day by instructing his makeshift staff 'not to rush "neglected and wayward" children into court, but rather to 'confer with parents, priest or pastor, using every effort to set the child right without resorting to an arrest save the final reserve', bringing children to Juvenile Court "only as a last resort."
Tanenhaus, Id. at 8 [What is the State to Do? Juvenile Justice in Historical Perspective, presented at the Chicago Council on Urban Affairs annual luncheon, July 17, 1997]
Respondent’s are factually, in bad faith using the incomprehensible power and authority of the people of the state of New Jersey, as a first resort, in the first instance against Wilbur Streett, as his children’s own father; to factually enslave and disenfranchise him, and to place him into peonage using law and the courts of the State of New Jersey as their legal instrumentalities for the sole purpose of gaining and enriching themselves, as a profit motive in direct violation to the concise rule of law and in contradistinction to our form of government.
Respondent’s, whom have acted in bad faith in this matter, as a matter of law, have no right to his children’s services while Wilbur Street is their father, thereby, child support must be completely denied. (see Pyle v. Waechter, 1926, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N.W. 926, 42 A.L.R. 557; Soper v. Igo, Walker & Co., 1905, 121 Ky. 550, 89 S.W. 538, 28 Ky.L.Rep. 519, 1 L.R.A., N.S., 362, 11 Ann.Cas. 1171, 123 Am.St.Rep. 212.) Respondents are in fact engaged in alienation of affections of his children against him, and harboring his children within the welfare system or denying him custody in direct violation of law. (See Everett v. Sherfy, 1855, 1 Iowa 356; Washburn v. Abrams, 1906, 122 Ky. 53, 90 S.W. 997; Sargent v. Mathewson, 1859, 38 N.H. 54; Caughey v. Smith, 1872, 47 N.Y. 244). There is no special privilege at law recognized to interfere with the legal and lawful custody of my child. (See Restatement of Torts, § 700, Comment).
Respondent’s have no legal right to his services. They cannot require him to work, nor have no common law remedy for his deprivation of his society, or his intercourse or affections. (See supra p. 691. “* * * “the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior * * * and therefore can suffer no loss or injury.” 3 m. 142. See also Cowen, Domestic Relations; Action for Loss of Consortium, 1951, 25 Aust.L.J. 390, 1952, 26 Aust. L.J. 358). As Respondent’s have acted in bad faith for the purposes of either direct or indirect remuneration for the purposes of profit and/or reward under Title IV-D Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes, they have unclean hands and can neither benefit by or from any court action, or profit in any way, shape or form at law in any State of New Jersey Court or tribunal:
“The doctrine [of unclean hands] promotes justice by making a [petitioner] answer for his own misconduct in the action. It prevents “a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression.” [Petitioner] must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim.” Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (E. & J. Gallo Winery) (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970.
and expects unlawful support from respondent’s as a fraudulent means to gain “joint custody” and control in order to obtain money and support in direct violation of my rights and secured liberties, and placing my children into direct jeopardy thereto, I must be given my lawful right to the full care, custody and control of my own children, as well as my property, for my best interest and thereby their best interests as well as my family which are established and come under my lawful protection.
Respondent’s lie and state that “the children cannot suffer for the sins of the parents,” however; Wilbur Streett has not sinned in any way, shape or form, and has clean hands in this matter in accordance with law and morality. Thereby, Respondent’s whom have accrued the benefit, must assume the responsibility of their unclean hands as the maxim of law states: “He who accrues the benefit, assumes the burden.”
IX
RESPONDENT’S HAVE NO PROPER AND LAWFUL INCORPORATIONS OF PROCEEDINGS, NO LAWFUL CONTRACT OR OBLIGATION OF DEBT, OR SPECIAL DEBT; OR OBLIGATION, OR SPECIAL OBLIGATION WHICH ALLEGEDLY ATTACHES TO ME, NOR PROPER JOINING OF PARTIES IN THIS MATTER, AND THEREBY, MY HOME AND FAMILY COMES UNDER MY SUPERIOR LAW AND PROTECTION.
Respondent’s have acted through fraud to attempt to coerce him into an unconscionable contract, in order to divest Mr. Streett of his rights and deny me the care, custody and control over his own children:
“§19.2 What makes a contract unconscionable?”
“The Code does not define unconscionability nor does its text indicate what elements go into making a contract unconscionable. The official comments suggest:
‘The basic test is whether in the light of the general background and the commercial needs of the trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract…The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise…and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.’”
[RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER UCC ARTICLE 2, by Harold Greenberg © 1987, Wiley Law Publications, John Wiley & Sons, New York, ISBN 0-471-81283-8, pp. 282-283]
Whereas, in bad faith and direct collusion with each other, respondent’s under color of law and under color of authority, fraudulently and unlawfully use the aegis of government through their District Attorney, to represent his child, in order to disenfranchise Mr. Streett, and thereby gain either direct or indirect U.S.C.A. Title IV-D Welfare remuneration scams and or schemes for their own purposes of profit and reward, and;
Whereas, in bad faith and direct collusion conspired against Streett, said respondent’s have fraudulently in bad faith, usurped his lawful rights and authorities, and have ‘protected’ and “represented” his children in direct opposition to his wishes, and in direct arrogance and insolence to the concise rule of law, in order to disenfranchise him and take away his opportunity to act in his children’s best interests for their own good, and for his own families good.
Respondent’s have divested him of his liberties and property, against his consent, and over his continued objections and against his best interests and his families best interests, without proper compensation to him as mandated by law:
The compensation must be made before the citizen can be divested of his rights. San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114; McCain v. Sierra County, Jan T., 1857, See also Constitution of New Jersey (1776) Art I, Id (above).
[W]e believe that when no substantial harm threatens a child's welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit." Hawk v. Hawk 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn1993)
Parents and children have a well elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Thereby, said respondent’s, using color of law, under color of authority, have divested him of substantive due process of law, and his most basic secured liberties and foundationally secured rights:
"The law has three distinct purposes: 1. To maintain the existence and well-being of society. 2. To maintain the preserve the person and property of each individual member free from all burdens which are not common to every other member. 3. To maintain and preserve the special rights of each member, and also of each member in relation to property.
[The Theory of Common Law, by James M. Walker Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852, p. 22]
As factually, no act or omission has been committed by Wilbur Streett, nor any incompetence, and by right and perfect right as the lawful father to his children, said County of Monmouth, the State of New Jersey and/or the United States and said respondent’s have not established lawful agency nor jurisdiction in this matter, and thereby; Wilbur Streett’s original natural born legal rights, secured to him under law incorporate to him as a matter of right and perfect right as I hereby do claim and establish, lawful title, and claim to his own children, and hereby demand them and control over all property, forthwith.
THAT IMPRISONMENT RESTRICTS WILBUR STREETT’S ACCESS TO THE COURTS:
“The courts of the state are open to every citizen for the redress of his wrongs, and unless he is at liberty to seek such redress without rendering himself liable in damages to defendant, in case he shall fail to establish his complaint, this right would in many instances be a barren privilege.” Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 547.
“On several occasions this Court has held that a person's inability to pay money demanded by the State does not justify the total deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, the Court held that the State's legitimate purposes in collecting filing fees for divorce actions were insufficient under the Due Process Clause to deprive the indigent of access to the courts where that access was necessary to dissolve the marital relationship. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, the Court held that an indigent offender could not have his term of imprisonment increased, and his liberty curtailed, simply by reason of his inability to pay a fine. See Id: Zablocki v. Redhail 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1978)
PLEASE NOTE THAT THE NEW JERSEY AND FEDERAL LAWS IN REGARDS TO THIS MATTER ARE GOING TO BE CHALLENGED CONSTITUTIONALITY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF FATHERHOOD
"Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right. Therefore, a law which forbids the use of a certain kind of property, strips it of an essential attribute and in actual result proscribes its ownership." Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513
To secure property was one of the great ends for which men entered into society. The right to acquire and own property, and to deal with it and use it as the owner choose, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural right. It does not owe its origin to constitutions. It existed before them. It is a part of the citizen's natural liberty--an expression of his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate by every American Bill of Rights." Spann supra.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW:
"A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule." McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99, 47 S.Ct. 259, 260, 71 L.Ed. 556 (1927)
IMPRISONMENT FOR ANY TIME IS A FULL DISCHARGE OF THE DEBT.
"In the early age of the Republic the creditor had what Lord Coke calls a personal lien, nexus, a mortgage of the person of the debtor, and might upon his default in payment, have kept him as his slave or sold him. The gambling debts of the Germans were frequently pain in the same manner. The Common Law has adopted the modifications of the rule which was introduced in the time of Theodosius, by whom it was declared that imprisonment of a debtor for the smallest space of time was a full satisfaction: "Nec sane remuneratione precil debet exposcere cui, etiam minimi temporis spatio servitium satisfeeit ingenui." The Theory of the Common Law, by James M. Walker, Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852; p. 34
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREAS, your petitioner and Appellant in this matter, the accused Wilbur Street, the truly damaged and aggrieved party in this matter, comes before Almighty God and his tribunal, seeking justice under the law. He hereby therefore, supplicates the following prayer for just relief under law from this tribunal:
1. That I be instantly be returned to my own lawful custody and freed immediately from this unlawful restraint of my liberty.
2. That this lawful Habeas Corpus issue immediately AND IF NOT ISSUED WITHIN 48 HOURS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED TRIBUNAL AND ALL ITS ASSIGNS WAIVES ALL CLAIMS TO IMMUNITY AND HAS NO OTHER REMEDY AT LAW OR DEFENSE IN WHICH TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, AND THEREBY A DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED ON THIS HABEAS CORPUS AND RELEASE WILL BE SECURED BY A HIGHER COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
3. That if the above mentioned respondents do not either hear or issue this Writ of Habeas Corpus THEY WILL BE IN DEFAULT WITH NO FURTHER REMEDY OR RIGHTS AT LAW.
4. That I retain my families privacy in this matter, and said Monmouth County Family Courts or the Monmouth County Courts as well as The State of New Jersey should be recused from any further interference and damage to my family.
5. That I be allowed to raise my children as a father, with sole independent care, control and authority over that of my own children and own home in accordance with law.
6. That I be allowed to enjoy, control, defend and use my own property as I see fit, in accordance with law.
7. That I be allowed to live in freedom and peace AND THAT SAID RESPONDENTS AND/OR THEIR AGENTS BE PROHIBITED FROM FURTHER ATTACKS ON ME AND MY FAMILY.
8. That the County of Monmouth et als, as well as the State of New Jersey, or the United States stop attacking me due to Child Support issues as I have suffered enough on these matters.
9. If this Habeas Corpus is either denied, mitigated or ignored; that the above-mentioned tribunal will in the first instance remit written response to Wilbur Streets lawful Demand for Statement of Decision showing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law supporting said denial.
10. That this court grant any other further relief that this court deems fair and just.
SEAL: Dated this 24th day of April, 2002
| | |
| |Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend of: |
| |Wilbur Streett |
| |In Propria Persona, Sui Juris |
| |Monmouth County Judicial District |
| |16 Crescent PL |
| |Hazlet, New Jersey |
| |RESERVING ALL RIGHTS, Giving up NONE |
VERIFICATION
State of New Jersey, County of Monmouth:
I, Bruce Eden for the undersigned, being first sworn, say:
I Bruce Eden for Wilbur Streett., In Propria Persona, Sui Juris; am the petitioner/Appellant in this matter. All facts alleged in the above document not otherwise supported by citations to the record, exhibits, or other documents, are true of my own personal knowledge and/or belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on Twenty-Fourth day of April, at Monmouth County, Commonwealth of New Jersey State.
SEAL: ______________________________
Bruce Eden Next Best Friend
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Reserving All Rights, Giving Up None
SUBSCRIPTION
Subscribed and sworn before Almighty God, on this Twenty-Fourth day of April, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ year Two-Thousand-and-two.
SEAL: ______________________________
Bruce Eden Next Best Friend
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
P.O. BOX 431
Hazlet, New Jersey
XII. MAXIM’S OF LAW, VIOLATED BY RESPONDENT’S AND THAT DIRECTLY APPLY IN ISSUING THIS HABEAS CORPUS:
❑ Jus et fradem numquam cohabitant. “Right and fraud never go together.
❑ Jus ex injuria non oritur. “A right cannot arise from a wrong.” 4 Bin 639.
❑ Judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti. “ judgement given by an improper judge is of no moment. 11 Co. 76.
❑ Judici oficium suum excedenti non paretur. “To a judge who exceeds his office or jurisdiction no obedience is due. Jenk. Cent. 139.
❑ Qui male agit, odit lucem. “He who acts badly, hates the light. 7 Co. 66.
❑ Judex non potest inuriam sibi datum punier. “A judge cannot punish a wrong done to himself.” 12 Co. 113.
❑ Lex punit mendacium. “The law pnishes falsehood.”
❑ Lex semper dabit remedium. “The law always gives a remedy.” 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 2411.
❑ Lex nemini facit injuriam. “The Law does wrong to no one.” Lex nemini operatur inquum, nemini facit injuriam. “The law never works an injury, or does him a wrong. Jenk. Cent. 22.
❑ Melius est recurrere quam malo currere. “It is better to recede than to proceed in evil.” 4 Inst. 176.
❑ Nemo admittendus est inhabilitare seipsum. “No one is allowed to incapacitate himself.” Jenk. Cent. 40.
❑ Nemo Cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio. “No one is bound to sell his property, even for a just price.” Sed vide Eminent Domain. 2 Inst. 66.
❑ Nulli enim res sua servit jure servitutis. “No one can have a servitude over his own property.” Dig 8, 2, 26; 17 Mass. 443; 2 Bov. Inst. n. 1600.
❑ Nul ne doit s’enrichir aux depens des autres. “no one ought to enrich himself at the expense of others.”
❑ Nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne. “No one shall take advantage of his own wrong.”
❑ Nemo ex suo delecto melioroem suam conditionem facere potest. “No one can improve his condition by a crime.” Dig. 50, 17, 137.
❑ Nemo punitur pro alieno delecto. “No one is to be punished for the crime or wrong of another. Bouviers Law Dictionary, pg 38.
❑ Nemo punitur sine injuria facto, seu defalto. “No one is punished unless for some wrong act or default.” 2 Co. Inst. 287.
❑ Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex praescripto minantis aliquid immutavit. “He does not appear to have retained his consent, if he have changed anything through the means of a party threatening.” Bacon’s Max. Reg. 33.
❑ Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet. “A citizen cannot be taken by force from his house to be conducted before a judge or to prison. Dig. 50, 17.
❑ Nemo tenetur sssseipsum accusare. “No man is bound to accuse himself.” Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1856, pg 40.
❑ Quod initio vitiosum est, non potest tractu temporis convalescere. “Time cannot render valid an act void in its origin.” Dig. 50, 17, 29.
❑ Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse negatum. “What is proved by the record, ought not to be denied.” Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1856, pg. 62.
❑ Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. “In default of the law, the maxim rules.” Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1856, pg. 65.
❑ Remisus imperanti melius paretur. “A [father] commanding not too strictly is best obeyed.” 3 Co. Inst. 233.
❑ Si quis custos fraudem pupillo fecerit, a tutela removendus est. “If a guardian behave fraudulently to [her] ward, [she] shall be removed from guardianship Jenk. Cent. 39.
❑ Solemnitas juris sunt observandae. “The solemnities of law are to be observed.” Jenk.Cent. 13.
❑ Sublato fundamento cadit opus. “Remove the foundation, the structure or work fall.” Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1856, pg. 72.
❑ Sublato principali tollitur adjunctum. “If the principal be taken away, the adjunct is also taken away.” Co.Litt. 389.
❑ Ubi non est condendi auctorias ibi non est parendi necessitas. “Where there is no authority to enforce, there is no authority to obey.” Dav. 69.
❑ Que sentit commodum, sentiere debet et onus. “He who derives a benefit from a thing, ought to feel the disadvantages attending it.” 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1433.
❑ Officia magistrates non debent esse venalia. “The offices of magistrates ought not to be sold.” Col.Litt. 234.
❑ Omne actum ab intentione agentis est judicandum. “Every ct is to be estimated by the intention of the doer.” Bouvier’s Dictionary, 1856, pg. 45.
❑ Once a fraud, always a fraud. 13 Vin. Ab. 539.
❑ Partus sequitur ventrem. “The offspring follow the condition of the mother, This is the case of slaves and animals.; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 167, 502; but with regard to freemen, children follow the condition of the father.”
❑ Pecata contra naturam sunt gravissima. “Offenses against nature are the gravest. 3 Co. Inst. 20.
❑ Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. “It is dangerous to introduce new and dangerous things.” Co.Litt. 379.
❑ Paena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat. “A punishment inflicted on a few, causes a dread to all.” 22 Vin. Ab. 550.
❑ Potestas stricte interpretatur. “Power ought to be strictly interpreted.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856, pg. 52.
❑ Quae praeter consuetudinem et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent, necque recta videntur. “What is done contrary to the custom of our ancestors, neither pleases nor appears right.” 4 Co. 78.
❑ Quae contra ratioonem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam. “Things introducted contrary to the reason of the law, ought not to be drawn into precedents.” 12 Co. 75.
❑ “When the common law and the stature law concur, the common law is to be preferred.” 4 Co. 71.
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
Tel. 732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH
Division _________
APRIL Term
|Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend for | Case No.: |
|IN THE RELATION OF: | |
|Wilbur Streett, | |
|Petitioner/Appellant, |AFFIDAVIT IN |
| |SUPPORT OF |
|Vs. |WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS |
|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, | |
|Et Als. | |
| | |
|Respondents, | |
| | |
State of New Jersey ]
] Affirmed
County of Monmouth ]
In the matter of Wilbur Streett, a father; ]
And ] Complaint
]
TO: The Court of Common Pleas Monmouth County ]
I, Bruce Eden (for Wilbur Streett), being duly sworn states:
I. That deponent is the Next Best Friend for the petitioner in the above entitled action.
II. That the Appellant/Petitioner name is Wilbur Streett. It is his only name and is not spelled at any time or accepted in any way if in all capital letters or any derivative thereof. Mr. Wilbur Street demands that it must be spelled and capitalized exactly as stated here: Wilbur Streett. I am not a fiction nor an a person nor an “artificial person.” I am a human being of correct lawful status aforementioned.
III. I am a free white Christian male adult, a state Citizen of the Commonwealth state of New Jersey. I am not an incompetent, and am Sui Juris, a man about the land living during a profound time of peace.
IV. That this petitioner/Appellant is presented to the above mentioned court on behalf of the said Wilbur Streett, In Propria Persona, Sui Juris.
V. I have personal knowledge of Mr. Wilbur Streett, and know that he is of good standing and character, and of the circumstances contained therein in regards to this issue.
VI. I have factual knowledge to know that Mr. Wilbur Streett is a good father, and a good husband, in good standing with the community and of good moral character and testament.
VII. That I, Bruce Eden for the said Wilbur Streett, knows that he is the lawful father to his children. He is a loving father and is not irresponsible nor a “deadbeat.”
VIII. I have personal knowledge that Mr. Wilbur Streett is not working at this time, and has undergone incredible hardships at the hands of the said respondents in this matter.
IX. That as Mr. Wilbur Streett is his children’s lawful father, Bruce Eden has lawful standing in which to bring this petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Wilbur Streett as he is factually incarcerated unlawfully by the above mentioned respondent’s.
X. That on or about April 23, 2002, I did find out that Wilbur Street had been unlawfully arrested and imprisoned while serving papers in court in order to lawfully pursue this matter in court. This is a overt and direct violation of Conflict of Resolution law which allows a person to go to and from his home in safety when having or pursuing court business.
XI. That I did help in and draw up this Habeas Corpus for Mr. Wilbur Streett in his best interests and know and understand that this is what he wants.
XII. That I have personal knowledge of the events surrounding this illegal arrest and imprisonment and unlawful restraint against Mr. Wilbur Streett’s liberty, and thereby, know the following facts:
XIII. That Mr. Wilbur Streett is and has been addressing these issues of “Child Support” against the State of New Jersey; and others.
XIV. That Mr. Wilbur Streett is and has been addressing these issues of “Child Support” against the State of New York;
XV. That Mr. Wilbur Streett is and has been addressing these issues of “Child Support” against the United States;
XVI. That Mr. Streett has continually, and arduously, with great effort and with no bad faith to the court, been accessing any and all courts, in which to seek out lawful redress of grievances, and substantive due process of law;
XVII. That I have first-hand knowledge that Mr. Wilbur Street is attempting to access all lawful avenues in which to obtain substantive redress of grievances, and will not atrophy or avert himself from this confrontation. Mr. Streett wants to get this issue in front of a court of justice in which to attack the legality and constitutionality of the present draconian and unlawful “Child Support” laws and system.
XVIII. I believe the respondent’s are in fact attempting to stop Mr. Streett from bringing this issue into the courts. I also believe that the respondent’s in this matter want to denigrate or restrict any and all of Mr. Streetts’ ability to defend himself.
XIX. That Mr. Wilbur Streett is lawfully not submitting to respondent’s illegal acts and/or omissions and coercions as his liberty of conscience, as well as his moral conscience will not allow him to do that irresponsible and illegal act. “No man is required to participate in his own destruction.” [Maxim of Law]
XX. Mr. Wilbur Streett is well-known in the community, and a nationally recognized Fathers’ Rights advocate. [I do believe this is why he is being unlawfully arrested and imprisoned.]
XXI. He is not a flight risk.
XXII. He is no danger to the community.
XXIII. That his family is undergoing incredible hardships directly due to respondent’s illegal acts and/or omissions in this matter. His children are suffering due both to respondent’s and the overt actions, acts and/or omissions by the court and all its officers.
XXIV. That this false arrest and unlawful incarceration and restraint of Mr. Streett’s liberty is needless, and a waste of taxpayer monies.
XXV. Mr. Streett loves his children, and has not abandoned them.
XXVI. Mr. Streett has never abused his children.
XXVII. There has been no lawful filing of abandonment of any children against Mr. Wilbur Streett.
XXVIII. There has been no lawful abuse charges against Mr. Streett “abusing” any of his children.
XXIX. Mr. Streett is not violent nor has he been violent against his children.
XXX. Mr. Streett has not nor ever will either abandon, or desert his children, he has not ever abused them, and he refuses to give up ownership of his own children. He has done nothing egregious to warrant attack by the state or any relinquishment of any of his rights.
XXXI. That respondent and said courts are not acting in the best interests of the children, and are in fact in direct opposition to the laws of the Commonwealth of New Jersey—and that said acts and/or omissions are in direct contradistinction to a republican form of government or free American form of government.
XXXII. That issuance of this Writ of Habeas Corpus is not only mandatory and lawful, that it is also reasonable.
Thereby, in accordance with law, this great Writ of Habeas Corpus must not be distained, nor delayed in any way shape or form, and must be acted upon immediately, in the first instance.
April 24, 2002
SEAL ________________________________
Bruce Eden, Sui Juris
In Propria Persona
Bergen County, New Jersey
VERIFICATION
Monmouth County ]
] ss.
State of New Jersey ]
I, Bruce Eden, for Wilbur Streett being the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:
I am the Next Best Friend for the petitioner, Wilbur Streett In Propria Persona, Sui Juris and declare under penalty of perjury the following. That I have read the foregoing Writ of Habeas Corpus and any and all attachments, and know and understand their contents, and having personal knowledge thereto, know them to be true. As to those matters submitted therein upon information and/or belief, as to those matters, I also believe them true.
Executed this Twenty-Fourth day of April, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, year Two-Thousand-two.
DATED: April 24, 2002
SEAL: _____________________________
Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Wilbur Streett– AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
SUBSCRIPTION
Subscribed this nineteenth day of January, under exigent circumstances, before Almighty God, this Twenty-Fourth day of April, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, year Two-Thousand-two.
April 24, 2002
SEAL: _____________________________
Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Wilbur Streett– AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Reserving All Rights, Giving Up None
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
Tel. 732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH
Division _________
________ Term
|Bruce Eden, | Case No.: |
|Next Best Friend, | |
|IN THE RELATION OF: | |
|Wilbur Street, a father; |ORDER FOR |
| |WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS |
|Petitioner/Appellant | |
|Vs. | |
|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, | |
| | |
|Respondents, | |
| | |
AT THE SPECIAL TERM of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, held at the court-house in ______________, in the county of Monmouth, on the _________________ day of _____________________, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, Two Thousand-two.
The People of the state of New Jersey ]
Wilbur Streett ]
On the Relation of his children ]
By Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend ] Affirmed
Against ]
]
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ]
Et Als. ]
Present, the Honourable Presiding Justice of the aforementioned court:
WHEREAS, with good cause, and probable cause hereby being shown, a Writ of Habeas Corpus has been heretofore issued on the application of the people of the state of New Jersey, on the relation of Wilbur Street, In Propria Persona, Sui Juris, by lawful service of Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend, directed to Respondent’s: THE COUNTY OF Monmouth, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et als. and other Respondent’s commanding them to bring up the body of the said petitioner/appellant: Wilbur Streett. for the purpose of challenging his unlawful restrainment of his natural liberty.
It is hereby ordered that respondent’s have Mr. Wilbur Street immediately brought before the said court by the custodian who has him, and bring forth this writ; for an instant examination into the cause of the unlawful detention of the said restraint of liberty of Wilbur Streett. Said respondents, the state of New Jersey, et al., by said respondents THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, through their attorney and/or agents, and/or the COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, COURTS SYSTEM, and/or THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, and that said custody and restraint of liberty, is unlawful that it is an unlawful restraint of liberty as stated throughout this document, and prohibits the best interests and effective redress of grievances and access to the courts. Now, therefore, after hearing Wilbur Streett, and viewing the complete record with supporting and comprehensive evidence submitted by said petitioner acting In Propria Persona, Sui Juris;
IT IS HEREBY SO ORDERED, that the said Wilbur Streett be immediately produced and his is hereby forthwith unconditionally discharged from the custody of said respondents of the COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, STATE OF NEW JERSEY and that said respondents et al. be restrained from further acts and/or omissions against aforesaid petitioner, Wilbur Streett and that his life, liberty and property be returned to him forthwith.
DATED: ______________________________________
JUDGE, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SEAL:
__________________________________________
CLERK OF THE COURT
SUPERIOR COURT, MONMOUTH COUNTY CONSOLIDATED COURTS
DATED:
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH [6]
DIVISION ____________
APRIL TERM
Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend ]
] No.
IN THE RELATION OF: ]
Wilbur Streett, ]
Appellant/Petitioner ]
]
Against ] DEMAND FOR STATEMENT
Court of Pleas, State of New Jersey, ] OF DECISION
County of Monmouth ]
]
Respondent ] FINDINGS OF FACTS
] AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR
By their attorney, ] DENIAL OF:
District Attorney for the COUNTY OF MONMOUTH ] Writ of Habeas Corpus
]
(unknown) ]
]
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ]
]
Respondent(s) ]
________________________________________________]
FOR THE MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT: To the honourable presiding Justice and the honourable associate Justices of the Court Pleas of the State of New Jersey, for the Monmouth Judicial District, GREETINGS:
Your Petitioner, Bruce Eden., In Propria Persona, Sui Juris, Next Best Friend for Mr. William Street who only appeared by special appearance by the aforesaid motion in the above-entitled action, in a matter which in the MONMOUTH COUNTY COURTS, petitioner/Appellant hereby demands that the court issue a statement of decision in writing, returnable to me; explaining the factual, lawful and legal basis and findings of fact and conclusions of law, for its decision regarding the following decision on applied motion; in its controverted issues: [Note: This statement of decision does not have to be completed if this court grants the motion or document so submitted by petitioner.]
1. Your petitioner, who brings this petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus, brings said writ in good faith, with no bad faith to aforementioned tribunal, and thereby, demands an answer at law; as silence is hereby impermissible, and unacceptable and as hereby noted, a direct violation of law. Thereby, this judicial powers court, owes your petitioner a duty at law, to inform me fully of the applied law used to deny aforementioned Writ of Habeas Corps at law.
2. Upon what lawful grounds was the writ denied?
3. What was the venue of this tribunal which led to this writ’s denial?
4. What was the specific jurisdiction of this tribunal which led to this writ’s denial?
5. What was the term at law for the above mentioned court, and its judges?
6. Who was the specific “judge” (or “judges”) who denied aforesaid writ? [Please remit names, when duly elected, the date; and date of lawful oath of office; and bond number(s)].
7. In the above submitted writ, how was the controverted issue adjudicated within alignment of the concise rule of law as enumerated as a secured liberty and birthright by the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776)?
8. What is the precise Article and section which this court used as enumerated by the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776)?
9. If any other statute or cite of law was used, what is the exact verification in law where said statute or cite is in precise alignment with the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776)?
DATED: April 24, 2001 _____________________________________
SEAL: Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend.—AT LAW
For
Wilbur Streett, In Propria Persona,
Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
(732) 888-1858
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH [7]
DIVISION ____________
___________ TERM
Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend ]
] No.
IN THE RELATION OF: ]
Wilbur Streett, ]
Appellant/Petitioner ]
] PROPOSAL AS TO CONTENT
Against ] FOR STATEMENT
Court of Pleas, State of New Jersey, ] OF DECISION
County of Monmouth ]
]
Respondent ] FINDINGS OF FACTS
] AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR
By their attorney, ] DENIAL OF:
District Attorney for the COUNTY OF MONMOUTH ] Writ of Habeas Corpus
]
(unknown) ]
]
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ]
]
Respondent(s) ]
________________________________________________]
I, Wilbur Streett., the accused and greatly damaged and aggrieved party in this matter, who appeared by special appearance and did lawfully submit this motion for due consideration to the above mentioned action and tribunal, hereby demands that the court issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal bases for its decision regarding the following controverted issues:
1. Your petitioner, Wilbur Streett is the accused and greatly aggrieved and damaged party in this matter, serving self-representation as In Propria Persona, Sui Juris, as a matter of right. Your petitioner is a white Christian Male adult, not welfare enumerated, and not embarrassed by the Amendment Fourteen, to the Constitution for the United States. Your petitioner, who brings this petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus, brings said writ in good faith, with no bad faith to aforementioned tribunal, and thereby, demands an answer at law; as silence is hereby impermissible, and unacceptable and as hereby noted, a direct violation of law as this court owes me a duty at law, and if denied, thereby; denies itself the right to claim any immunity at any other court proceeding; and is factually in default and in violation of law. Thereby, this judicial powers court, owes your petitioner a substantive duty at law, to inform me fully of the applied law used to deny aforementioned Writ of Habeas Corps at law.
2. The Respondent’s who enjoin this court and are co-members and officers of this court thereof, owe me, Wilbur Streett your petitioner a duty at law in accordance with their oaths of office and public bonds therewith.
3. That the factual and legal bases for the court’s decision regarding the controverted issue of denial of this Writ of Habeas Corpus be explained as follows:
a. What concise facts did this court base it’s decision?
b. What was the venue of the court which made this decision?
c. What was the lawful jurisdiction of the court which made this decision?
d. Was the court in a common law venue and jurisdiction with a rule of law consistent therewith?
e. Was the court in an admiralty venue and jurisdiction with a rule of law consistent therewith?
f. Was the court in a corporate venue and jurisdiction with a rule of law consistent therewith?
g. Was the court in a military venue and jurisdiction with a rule of law consistent therewith?
h. Was the “judge” or “judges” properly sitting with a proper and lawful oath and affirmation as mandated by the rule of law? Yes or No?
i. Was the “judge” or “judges” properly bonded as mandated and required by the concise rule of law? Yes or No?
j. What was aforesaid “judge” or “judges” bond number(s)? _____________
k. Was the “judge” or “judges” of good moral character? Yes or No?
l. Was the “judge” or “judges” sitting in good behavior? Yes or No?
4. What was the concise rule of law, as enumerated by the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776), which allowed the denial of aforesaid Writ of Habeas Corpus?
5. What was the article and section depended upon in the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776)?
6. If any other statute or cite of law was used, what is the exact verification in law where said statute or cite is in precise alignment with the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776)?
Please immediately remit to me in writing at the above mentioned address your responses to these questions and show the substantive and concise rule of law you used in denying my lawful Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DATED: April 24, 2001 _____________________________________
SEAL: Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend.—AT LAW
For
Wilbur Streett, In Propria Persona,
Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
(732) 888-1858
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
____________ Term
Wilbur Streett ]
] No.
Petitioner-Appellant, ]
]
vs ] MOTION FOR LEAVE
] TO PROCEED
] IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ]
]
Respondent-Appellee, ]
]
________________________________________]
This is a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS in support of attached Writ of Habeas Corpus; from an unjust and unlawful judgment from the Consolidated Courts of Monmouth County, Superior Court, County of Butte. Petitioner is unable, because of the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY and their attorney, County of Monmouth District Attorney, et al., has continually, and maliciously civilly murdered your petitioner in overt violation of law for the purposes of profit and reward, thereby intentionally leaving him in a state of poverty. Petitioner is unable because of this extortion and poverty to pay the costs of appeal or to give security for this Writ of Habeas Corpus, but believes that he is entitled to the redress sought as a matter of right, and as a matter of right and perfect right: as his status as a free white state Citizen of New Jersey, obtains substantive due process of law as a secured liberty. Therefore, your petitioner demands leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis in accordance with Title 28, USC section 1915, and Fed R App P 24 (a). This motion is based on the attached affidavit.
Petitioner is under extreme duress and coercion by the respondents in this matter and is under a constant state of war during a profound time of peace in the land, in direct and overt violation of law and your petitioner’s constitutionally secured liberties and substantive rights. No previous applications for in forma pauperis status have been made to this Court.
DATED: April 24, 2001
SEAL: _______________________________
Bruce Eden, —AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
For
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent Place
Hazlet, New Jersey
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
____________ Term
Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend ]
In the relation of: ]
]
Wilbur Streett ]
] No.
Petitioner-Appellant, ]
] AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
vs ] MOTION TO PROCEED ON
] WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
] IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ]
]
Respondent, ]
]
____________________________________________]
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
TO SUPPORT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I, Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am acting for the appellant Wilbur Streett in the above-entitled case; that in support of the attached Writ of Habeas Corpus without being required to prepay fees, costs or give costs of said proceeding or to give security therefore; that I believe Mr. Wilbur Streett is entitled to redress of grievances; and that he has a constitutionally secured liberty to substantive due process of law as a matter of right and perfect right, and thereby, I state that because of Mr. Wilbur Streetts’ poverty that he is unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefore; that I believe he is entitled to this reasonable redress; and has a perfect right to substantive due process of law, and that the issues which are presented are numerated within the attached Habeas Corpus. Good cause having been shown in accordance to the law of the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776), and the Constitution for the united States (1787-1791) and that defendant and accused and greatly aggrieved party in this matter, has reasonable, palpable, constitutional, jurisdictional and substantive due process grounds for Habeas Corpus review of the legality of his unlawful restraint of liberty in the above entitled matter. I, Bruce Eden being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the accused and greatly aggrieved party Mr. Wilbur Streett Next Best Friend in the above entitled matter; that in support of his motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefore, I state that because of his poverty, intentionally inflicted by the organized crime syndicate, within the aegis of government embodied throughout the prosecution and the aforementioned court(s) and respondent’s by overt act and/or omission making needless war against Wilbur Streett during a time of profound peace, all in order to gain profit and/or remuneration(s) either directly or indirectly in direct violation to their oath of office and the concise rule of law acting as a domestic enemy therewith; that because of this needless war, Mr. Wilbur Street is unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefore; that I believe I am entitled to redress of grievances and substantive due process of law (which I have so far been denied); and that the issues which have been framed and will bring up on appeal and/or Constitutional challenge are so egregious and palpable to a free nation and in support to the rule of law, that they are a foundational reasons to grant this motion to issue said Writ of Habeas Corpus.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS in support of WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I further swear that the responses which I have made to the questions and instructions below relating to Mr. Wilbur Streetts’ ability to pay the cost of prosecuting this Habeas Corpus are true to the best of my reason and/or belief. I Bruce Eden Next Best Friend for Wilbur Streett being first duly sworn, depose and say that Mr. Wilbur Street is the Defendant, the accused and greatly aggrieved party in this matter; that in support of this Writ of Habeas Corpus without being required to prepay fees, costs, or give security therefore, I state that because of Mr. Streetts’ poverty and indigency, that he is unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefore; that I believe I am entitled to redress of grievances; as well as the right of privacy; and am allowed substantive due process of law as a matter of right and perfect right; and that the issues I hereby have framed for Habeas relief, are palpable and mandate this Motion to Proceed on Writ of Habeas In Forma Pauperis.
1. Mr. Streett is not presently employed. To my knowledge he reserves all rights and give up none. Since this fraud being perpetrated by the prosecution, the COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, and/or THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, (or others) is about money, Wilbur Streett can give nobody any information in regards to his finances in accordance with Amendment the Fifth of the Constitution for the united States (1787-1791): “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”
2. Mr. Streett’s Family is dependent on his support and is presently undergoing incredible and sustained hardship because of respondent’s irresponsible and illegal acts and/or omissions in this matter.
3. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this affidavit will subject me to penalties of perjury.
DATED: April 24, 2001
SEAL: _______________________________
Bruce Eden, —AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
For
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent Place
Hazlet, New Jersey
VERIFICATION
Monmouth County ]
] ss.
State of New Jersey ]
I, Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend for Wilbur Streett being the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:
That the afore-going Document(s), Affidavit(s), Declaration(s), and/or Materials, Id., including referenced and/or attached documents, and/or duplicates of such documents are exacting copies of the originals in this matter. That I have read the foregoing document(s) and attachments, and know and understand their contents, and having personal knowledge, know them to be true. As to those matters submitted therein upon information and/or belief, as to those matters, I also believe them true.
Executed this nineteenth day of January, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, year Two-Thousand-two.
SEAL: ____________________________________
Bruce Eden, —AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
For
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent Place
Hazlet, New Jersey
SUBSCRIPTION
Subscribed this nineteenth day of January, under exigent circumstances, before Almighty God, this Twenty-Fourth day of April, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, year Two-Thousand-two.
SEAL: ____________________________________
Bruce Eden– AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Reserving All Rights, Giving Up None
Wilbur Streett
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Monmouth Judicial District
16 Crescent PL
Hazlet, New Jersey
732-888-1858
IN THE COURT OF PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
____________ Term
Bruce Eden, Next Best Friend ]
In the relation of: ]
]
Wilbur Streett ]
] No.
Petitioner-Appellant, ]
] ORDER GRANTING
vs ] MOTION TO PROCEED ON
] WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
] IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ]
]
Respondent, ]
]
____________________________________________]
Petitioner, the accused and aggrieved party in this matter, Wilbur Street., has asked this court to authorize him to prosecute this Writ of Habeas Corpus from the unlawful restraint of his liberty, effected by respondent’s on or about January 13, 2002. That motion was supported by petitioners affidavit, stating that he is unable to pay the costs of this writ or give security therefore. Because it appears to the court that the motion should be granted, IT IS ORDERED, that appellant/petitioner Wilbur Streett. is permitted to prosecute this Habeas Corpus in forma pauperis.
DATED: ________________________ APPELLATE JUDGE, THIRD DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEAL-THIRD DISTRICT
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________
CLERK OF THE COURT SEAL:
COURT OF APPEAL-THIRD DISTRICT
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
SACRAMENTO, NEW JERSEY
DATED:
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[1] The “SUPERIOR COURT OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH [MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT]” shall be Concurrent with and Equivalent to the district court as created in Article I, Section 1, Constitution for New Jersey of 1776, see: Stats. 1872, ch. CXIV, p. 116 and Digest of Laws of New Jersey – XXII. COURTS OF JUSTICE, III.-THE DISTRICT COURTS, Article 632, Section 12, No. 15. [Am. April 25, 1857; R.S.St. 1855, 117; St. 1854, 74; St. 1853, 289; St. 1851, 11; St. 1850, 93; C.L. 740.]
[2] “A stranger however, has no general privilege of interference for the protection of what he believes to be anyone's welfare...in general, the stranger interferes at his peril, regardless of worthy motives.” [Grinberger v. Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash. 292, 22 p.2D 983; Warren v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156 N.W. 323.]
[3] “The court has long held that the constitution must be construed liberally in view of its purpose.” Colorado Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 04/15/1991)
[4] A secured liberty under Article I, section 1 “All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Clause.
[5] When "mis-information given, its self evident of fraud," U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d (1970); U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, and "fraud, vitiates, nullifies, and abrogates anything to which it attaches, including the most solemn agreements, contracts, and judgments." U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61-71 (1878).
[6] The “SUPERIOR COURT OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE [MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT]” shall be Concurrent with and Equivalent to the district court as created in Article I, Section 1, Constitution for New Jersey of 1776, see: Stats. 1872, ch. CXIV, p. 116 and Digest of Laws of New Jersey – XXII. COURTS OF JUSTICE, III.-THE DISTRICT ,OURTS, Article 632, Section 12, No. 15. [Am. April 25, 1857; R.S.St. 1855, 117; St. 1854, 74; St. 1853, 289; St. 1851, 11; St. 1850, 93; C.L. 740.]
[7] The “SUPERIOR COURT OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE [MONMOUTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT]” shall be Concurrent with and Equivalent to the district court as created in Article I, Section 1, Constitution for New Jersey of 1776, see: Stats. 1872, ch. CXIV, p. 116 and Digest of Laws of New Jersey – XXII. COURTS OF JUSTICE, III.-THE DISTRICT ,OURTS, Article 632, Section 12, No. 15. [Am. April 25, 1857; R.S.St. 1855, 117; St. 1854, 74; St. 1853, 289; St. 1851, 11; St. 1850, 93; C.L. 740.]
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