Krebs and Jackson Revisited: Rhetorical Coercion Theory in ...



center4500452120Krebs and Jackson Revisited: Rhetorical Coercion Theory in the Age of Social Media11540067000Krebs and Jackson Revisited: Rhetorical Coercion Theory in the Age of Social MediacenterbottomAnalysis of International Politics?|?POSC56001154000Analysis of International Politics?|?POSC5600center790007945755Ben Zupnick1154000Ben Zupnickright2300231140Fall 201376009800Fall 2013Intro: From Communicative Action to Rhetorical CoercionOnes journey in life is often thought of as a quest for some undeniable and irrefutable truth. This search for the truth is arguably no more prevalent than for those going into the field of International Relations. These brave souls seek to not only explain the “truth” behind the actions of individuals, but a common “truth” which can explain the complex interactions between societies which make-up international affairs. Notably among these truth seekers was Jürgen Habermas, the man behind the theory of communicative action. According to “communicative action” theory, political discourse is a search for truth. Politics, in its ideal form, is “less about contest than consensus, less about powering than puzzling, and deliberative exchange consequently takes center stage…Ideally, actors leave power and rank at the door, and they seek to persuade others and are themselves open to persuasion.” However, Habermas himself admits this is not an empirically accurate portrayal of political discourse, but rather a normative desire. If anything, Habermas’s communicative action theory more closely represents academic discourse than political discourse.According to Hans Morgenthau, “the search for statesmen’s motives ‘futile’ because ‘motives are the most illusive of psychological data’” While beliefs and motives undeniably exist, there are no methodological means for determining them. It is impossible to tell the difference between someone fundamentally changing their beliefs and someone making a calculated decision that saying they have changed their beliefs is in their best interests. Ultimately, politicians will say what they want others to believe. While there is probably some penalty for repeatedly deviating from what one says (particularly in more accountable government structures), that penalty occurs at some undetermined point in the future. Given the short-term timeframe relevant to most politicians, the cost of saying something without meaning it is much lower than the cost of saying the wrong thing at the wrong time (which can effectively end a politician’s career). In short, a person in power says things with the goal of staying in power or strengthening their grip on power. “Political actors can rarely take tangible steps or advance policy positions without justifying those stances and behaviors — in short, without framing. Meanings, however, cannot be imposed unilaterally or through the exercise of material power alone. They are, by their very nature, intersubjective and the effort to forge shared meaning implicates some audience in the process.” This difficulty of pinning down politicians true motives underpins Krebs and Jackson’s theory of “Rhetorical Coercion”. This theory “seek(s) to minimize the place of motives as driving forces in our accounts of political processes and outcomes… by shifting the emphasis from consciousness to conversation, from action to interaction, from selves to sociabilities.”Rhetorical coercion theory is based on a model consisting of three actors: the claimant (C), the opposition (O), and the public (P). The claimant is the one challenging a move made by the opposition, which is usually the party in power. Both of these parties must be able to frame the issue in a way which is socially acceptable to the public.Rhetorical coercion only works in certain contexts. “C’s power is rooted in its credible threat, implicit or explicit, to bring P in on its side; C’s ability to do so deprives O of the option of refusing to respond to or even acknowledge C’s claims. If C cannot issue its threat credibly, then O can safely ignore C’s claims, no matter how they are framed.” The ability to reach the “public”, either internationally or domestically, is as important as framing the issue correctly. This paper will follow with an in-depth analysis of Rhetorical Coercion theory. Although rhetorical coercion theory is a new concept (the paper was published in 2007), it predates the proliferation of social media. I will argue that the proliferation of social media has made it harder for the party in power to ignore claims against it, bolstering rhetorical coercion’s explanatory power of political outcomes. In an attempt to isolate the effects of social media, I will analyze empirical examples where the “opposition” has the “hard power” advantage, and controls traditional media outlets. Rhetorical Coercion Theory in the Age of Social Media “While political contestants unquestionably further their agenda by exploiting material resources, they generally at the same time ‘frame’ their political activity, explaining the purposes to which their material power is put. While claimants may deploy arguments in the hope that they will eventually persuade, their more immediate task is, through skillful framing, to leave their opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal. ‘Rhetorical coercion’ occurs when this strategy proves successful: when the claimant’s opponents have been talked into a corner, compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject.”The public ultimately holds the power to decide a “winner” in rhetorical coercion theory. This theory assumes that the public does not have pre-conceived notions in advance to the issues being contested. Winning or losing an argument is not about universal truths, but rather about “framing” the issue in a way which is acceptable to the public, while leaving the opposition without a socially acceptable rebuttal. In analyzing rhetorical coercion theory in the age of social media, I will focus on the actions of the three actors in traditional rhetorical coercion theory (C, O, and P), as well as another actor, the Media (M). C, O, and M all participate in framing, albeit for different reasons; C and O for a political outcome, and M for the purpose of making profits. The media, (M), in this case can refer to both traditional media and social media outlets. In the age of social media, every traditional news source has a social media outlet, blurring the lines of between traditional and social media, and “hard” and “soft” news. This blurring of lines is not new, nor is it unique to social media, nor is it unintentional. In 1965, Mathew Baum found that “by transforming political issues involving scandal or violence into entertainment, the "soft news" media have actually captured more viewers who will now follow news about foreign crises, due to its entertainment value, even if they remain uninterested in foreign policy.” The differences between “hard” and “soft” news was examined by a group of European scholars, in hopes of providing conceptual clarity. However, their findings centered on the content of the article; the topic, its focus, and the style of the writing. I believe that social media has further blurred the lines between soft and hard news. It is not only the content of the article that determines soft and hard media, it is also the medium through which that information is shared. Any given article presented through traditional media may seem “boring”, while seeing that same article on a Facebook or Twitter feed may interest a different audience. A Recent study by the Pew research center found that 30% of Americans consume news through social media. In countries with less independent media outlets, this percentage is likely higher. The goal of “mediatic diplomacy” is to “acquire the maximum relevance for achieving foreign policy objectives…In all cases political discourse aims to transmit a frame (directly to the audience in the case of institutional media, or to foreign media in other cases).” Obviously, part of acquiring maximum relevance is reaching the largest possible audience. Social media has created another channel for rhetorical coercion--mediatic diplomacy--by allowing otherwise-cut-off groups (“claimants”) to frame their grievances in a way that will trigger a reaction from a larger international audience. In other words, social media has overcome a monopoly that parties in power historically had over traditional media outlets, particularly authoritarian regimes trying to stymy news from flowing out of a conflict region.Social media, by enabling “mediatic diplomacy” rhetorical coercion, has international relations implications. According to Krebs and Jackson, “rhetorical coercion is more likely as social ties in political communities, domestic and even international, grow increasingly extensive and dense. On the whole, however, rhetorical coercion will operate less effectively and less frequently in international settings…It is not the imposing capacity of foreign publics, let alone some elusive global public, to sanction state action that makes rhetorical coercion potentially successful on the international scene. When rhetorical coercion is operative internationally, the critical punishing agent is more often a domestic audience prepared to exact costs for violations of standards of rhetorical appropriateness.” Regardless of the existence of “some elusive global community”, by exposing international publics to the realities facing claimants abroad, it is more likely that this international audience will exert political pressure on their elected leaders to react in a way they feel is appropriate. If “ignorance is bliss”, social media removes this ignorance, prompting a response by international actors. Social Media Penetration:To what extent has social media penetration taken place? One enabling prerequisite of social media connectivity is internet connectivity--without it one remains disconnected from social media networks. Empirical evidence surrounding internet penetration are quite astounding. As of December 31st, 2000, roughly 361 million people were connected to the internet. As of June 30th, 2012, that number has risen almost 800% to over 2.4 billion.Penetration rates have grown in all regions, although more-so in some than in others. North America has a 78.6% penetration rate, Europe 63.2%, L.A / Caribbean 42.9%, the Middle East 40.2%, Asia 27.5%, and Africa 15.6%. Those areas with the lowest penetration (Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa) have seen the highest growth rates over the past 12 years. Given the development linkages associated with internet connectivity, these regions are likely to continue to play “catch-up”, driving up global internet penetration while [arguably] creating the very “elusive global public” Krebs and Jackson could not foresee.Alongside the quantitative increase in internet usage, there have been qualitative changes as well. In the last decade, internet has changed from “dial-up” to high speed and wireless. Not only are more people connected today than a decade ago, but the way in which they are connected has fundamentally changed. With relatively standard technology (even for the developing world), people can now communicate in real time over the internet, through social media / instant messaging outlets. In tandem with internet penetration, social media penetration has risen as well. eMarketer’s report “Worldwide Social Network Users: 2013 Forecast and Comparative Estimates” points to 1.47 billion social media users in 2012, a projected 1.73 billion in 2013, and a projected 2.55 billion in 2017. These related trends are not surprising; social media remains one of the most popular uses of the internet. Once people are connected, one of their first stops is likely to be a social media outlet. In instances where governments try to censor traditional social media sites, local alternatives have sprung up. One of the largest is China’s “Weibo”, a twitter-like service. As Eric Schmidt, Google’s Executive Chairman put it after meeting with Chinese leaders; “The most interesting thing about talking to the government, from the president all the way to the governors, is that they are obsessed with the Internet, which is why they passed these [censorship] laws… You simply cannot imprison enough Chinese people when they all agree to something," he said. "You won't be able to stop it even if you don't like it, and it will cause a liberalization." In Iran, a country known for media restrictions, Culture Minister Ali Jannati recently challenged Iran’s social media bans, calling them ineffective. “Jannati, who in October came out against Iran’s easily-circumvented ban on Facebook and Twitter, offered a comparison with the country’s prohibition of video cassettes in the eighties – a regulation he called ‘ridiculous.’ ‘Maybe in five years we will laugh at today’s actions,’ Jannati told state news agency IRNA in the interview.”Not only is social media popular, but people are willing to pursue extra-legal means to access social media when need be. In some ways, restrictions probably increases the allure of social media. In many places where social media is restricted, the social “utility”—the usefulness of being connected to social media networks— is undeniably greater. Social media can be used to organize social movements, expose corruption, fill the information gaps traditionally filled by independent media, and to hold governments accountable for their responsibilities. Empirical Examples:Kosovo:The Kosovo Civil War was fought between the Serbian Government forces and the Kosovar Albanians. The beginning of the conflict can be traced to 1989, when then Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of Kosovo, bringing it under the direct control of Serbia. By 1998, the Serbian military and Kosovar Albanian forces were in open conflict. Concerned about human suffering and regional stability, the international community, stepped in. “Of particular concern to NATO countries and to the international community as a whole, from the outset of the crisis, has been the situation of the Kosovar Albanians remaining in Kosovo…all indications pointed to organised persecution involving mass executions; exploitation as human shields; rape; mass expulsions; burning and looting of homes and villages…and many other abuses of human rights and international norms of civilised behavior.” By June 1999, due to 72 days of NATO airstrikes, the war in Kosovo was over.According to “Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century”; “From the experiences during the Kosovo crisis, we suggest the advent of the ‘Internet Syndrome’: when newspapers and radio stations were shut down by Serbian leaders, and Western journalists’ reports banned, information reached the rest of the world by e-mail and through numerous sites, message boards, and chat rooms. The Kosovo military conflict was called the ‘first internet war.’ Short of totally cutting off telephone lines to the providence, the Belgrade regime was simply unable to stop the flow to the outside world of uncensored information from hideouts in Kosovo…while traditional media (newspapers, radio, and, especially television) remain for the time being the dominant news sources for the mass public and policy-makers, future research must pay increasing attention to the content and impact of emerging types of media.”Perhaps nowhere was the dominance of “traditional media” more apparent than within Serbia itself. According to journalist Milica Pesic, “The regime was sending messages through the mainstream media - particularly, of course, through Television Serbia - the NATO actions were illegitimate, Serbs were united and the Serbs were unbeatable. I think it was very successful because the only actual source of information you had during the conflict was basically Television Serbia… Look at the very end - Milosevic is still trying to sell the story of Kosovo as a success and a victory.” Controlling media reports does not itself win wars, but it is a tactic to buy time, shift public support, and build morale. It also precludes the claimant’s ability engage in rhetorical coercion, by allowing the “opposition” to block their message from the public. Even if Kosovo was, as the authors of “Decisionmaking in a Glass House” wrote in 2000, the “first internet war”, the ability of the internet to shape public opinion was still in its infancy. As discussed in earlier, there were qualitative and quantitative issue preventing social media from enabling true public (those affected by a crisis)-to-public (“global public”) communication. However, the forward-looking authors were correct to assume that this emerging medium—the internet—would have a large impact on reporting and public opinion in future conflicts.Syria:The Syrian Civil War began as peaceful protests by the Syrian people for human rights and democratic governance. Initially, President Assad tried to say the right things to defuse protests, despite his beliefs which would ultimately come to the forefront. Among Assad’s initial appeasements, on April 21st, 2011 he issued a decree "regulating the right to peaceful protest, as one of the basic human rights guaranteed by the Syrian Constitution." However, when Assad’s words were not backed up by action, protests continued. Assad responded to these protests with violence, sparking a Civil War which continues to this day, over two and a half years later.One of the first moves Assad made in response to riots against his rule was to expel foreign journalists. As in Kosovo, Assad tried to dictate the Syrian Civil War narrative by monopolizing the media in Syria. Unlike in Kosovo, social media had matured to a point where such a monopoly was no longer possible. “‘The difficulty of getting into Syria, the shrunken foreign correspondent corps, and the audience gains for social media make it likely this story will be consumed differently by the American public than tensions or conflicts in past years,’ said Ann Marie Lipinski, the curator of the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard.”Since Assad could not censor those making claims against him, he instead had to address them in order to turn public opinion (both domestic and foreign) in his favor. Despite military advantages, if domestic public opinion fully shifted against Assad, he would not be able to maintain his grip on power. Furthermore, if foreign public opinion shifted strongly enough against him, he would have to deal with foreign military intervention, which would almost certainly have lost him the war.Assad continues to rely on both his military advantage as well as skillfully framing the Civil War— both hard and soft power. Assad regularly refers to the rebels as “terrorists”, and invokes concepts such as “national sovereignty” and “security” to justify gross human rights violations. Furthermore, he has dissuaded that U.S. from intervening, by raising the specter of faulty intelligence regarding “weapons of mass destruction”, which lead to a costly and unpopular invasion of Iraq. Assad is many things—his opponents refer to him as “The Butcher of Damascus”. But he is also undeniably a brilliant statesman, who has successfully utilized rhetoric coercion to dissuade foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict. This has caused a stalemate, which continues to marginalize Assad’s moderate opponents while bolstering the role of extremist groups. By dissuading foreign intervention, Assad created a self-fulfilling narrative of his regime defending Syrians against terrorist factions. Egypt:The Egyptian revolution began with nationwide demonstrations—organized through twitter--to replace longtime dictator Hosni Mubarak with a democratically elected regime. Mubarak actually attempted to stymy the revolution by shutting down the internet, but this proved to be too little too late. Protests led the removal of Mubarak and the first democratically elected President in Egyptian history in June 2012, Mohamed Morsi of the previously persecuted Muslim Brotherhood.Morsi’s rule was contentious from the beginning. His opponents accused him of mismanaging the Egyptian economy and attempting to enshrine Islamic law in the Egyptian constitution. His supporters argue that the “deep state”--the military, police and judiciary,--undermined his rule. Regardless, in July 2013, the military ousted Morsi in response to protests against his ineffective rule. Following Morsi’s removal was a bloody crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in over 1,000 deaths of Brotherhood members at the hands of the Egyptian Military. Alongside this massacre, the interim government attempted to silence the Brotherhood and any other dissenters by shutting down their news stations. Furthermore, “Senior government officials publicly scolded Western correspondents in two news conferences and a public statement for failing to portray the crackdown in the government’s terms: as a war against violent terrorists.” As in Syria, the Egyptian government could not silence its critics. Therefore, the government had to frame its actions in a socially acceptable way. Like in Syria, the Egyptian government framed its coup and massacre as upholding “the will of the people”, and necessary actions to restore “security” from its “terrorists” opposition. As in Syria, international inaction has marginalized the moderate opposition, while creating a self-fulfilling narrative of fighting terrorism. Conclusion:The search for universal “truths” is ultimately a fool’s errand. Because of the impossibility of determining the difference between a change in beliefs and a political calculation, Krebs and Jackson minimalized the importance of this variable by creating rhetorical coercion theory. To successfully employ rhetorical coercion, the “claimant” must do two things. First, they must succeed in engaging the “opposition” in a public debate. Second, they must frame the issue in a way which is socially acceptable, while simultaneously depriving their opposition with a socially acceptable rebuttal.Social media has opened up another channel for “mediatic diplomacy”, the act of engaging an international audience with the hopes of changing a foreign policy outcome. Social media enables person-to-person communication globally in real-time. Not only does the “opposition” have to frame its actions in a way that is socially acceptable to a domestic audience, they must also frame it in a way that is acceptable to an international audience as well.Some governments have reacted to social media rhetorical coercion by softening their grip on power. Thomas Friedman, a NYT columnist, refers to these countries as “The Other Arab Awakening”. “…The role of the Internet was overrated in Egypt and Tunisia. But it is underrated in the Gulf, where, in these more closed societies, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are providing vast uncontrolled spaces for men and women to talk to each other — and back at their leaders. ‘I don’t read any local newspapers anymore,’ a young Saudi techie told me. ‘I get all my news from Twitter.’ So much for government-controlled newspapers…Again, this is not about democracy. It’s about leaders feeling the need to earn their legitimacy. But when one leader does it, others feel the pressure to copy. And that leads to more transparency and more accountability. And that, and more Twitter, leads to who knows what.” Others regimes have utilized rhetorical coercion to strengthen their grip on power, notably President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria and General El-Sisi of Egypt. Both leaders have invoked the ideas of “security”, “sovereignty” and “terrorism” to dissuade international intervention. Assad went one step further, but invoking the “false intelligence” rhetoric of the American invasion of Iraq, to dissuade American intervention after alleged chemical strikes crossed Obama’s “red-line” for intervention. General Sisi continually points to “the will of the people”, something democratic audiences are likely to identify with.In both Egypt and Syria, we have seen that over time, the terrorist-fighting narrative becomes self-fulfilling. With rhetorically-induced western inaction, moderate Islamic factions look for someone to fill the void of international assistance. This void is ultimately filled by extremist factions who see an opportunity to gain power. It is true that Western powers have not intervened in either Syria or Egypt. This is not a rejection of rhetorical coercion, but rather evidence than authoritarian regimes have effectively embraced rhetorical coercion for their own ends. Western powers must be cognizant of this embrace, and not baffled into inaction by it. The cost of deviating from stated goals does not exist in authoritarian regimes as it does for democratically elected leaders. Rhetorical coercion has proven so widely applicable that it must be merged with political psychologist’s emphasis on “target” and “source” of statements, in order to form sensible foreign policy responses. This merging is ironic, because it was this diversion away from rhetorical interplay by political psychologists which (at least partially) led Krebs and Jackson to develop rhetorical coercion theory. On second thought, perhaps this phenomenon is not so ironic; often deriving the most useful theories is not an issue of one-or-the-other, but rather requires merging the most relevant parts of seemingly competing theories. Works CitedAbdel-Hady, Zakaryya. "Egypt: After the 'Massacre'" Al Jazeera. N.p., 16 Aug. 2013. Web. <, Charles. "Egypt Cuts Off Internet Access." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 2011. Web. <;."Assad Grants "conditional" Freedom to Media - Asia News." SYRIA Assad Grants "conditional" Freedom to Media - Asia News. N.p., 29 Aug. 2011. Web. <, Maria Luisa. "Framing as a Tool for Mediatic Diplomacy Analysis: Study of George W. Bush's Political Discourse in the "War on Terror"" Comunicación Y Sociedad 26.2 (2013): 176-97. Web.Barnard, Anne, Mohammad Ghannam, and Hwaidi Saad. "Disillusionment Grows Among Syrian Opposition as Fighting Drags On." New York Times. N.p., 28 Nov. 2013. Web. <, Matthew. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003. Web.BBC News. BBC, n.d. Web. <, Kit. "Assad: Syria Is A Sovereign Country Fighting Al-Qaeda." Infowars. N.p., 27 Aug. 2013. Web. <;."Egypt's Nilesat Shut down 10 'sectarian' Islamist Channels in 2013 - Politics - Egypt - Ahram Online." Ahram Online. N.p., 15 Dec. 2013. Web. <, Kareem, and Mayy El Sheikh. "As Pressure Builds, Egypt’s Police Experience a New Feeling: Fear." . New York Times, 17 Dec. 2013. Web. <, Shaimaa, and Michael Georgy. "Egypt Moderates under Fire from Mubarak Loyalists, Islamists." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 25 Nov. 2013. Web. <, Thomas. "The Other Arab Awakening." . New York Times, 30 Nov. 2013. Web. <, Sam. "Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire." . Conde Nast Digital, 11 Feb. 2011. Web. <, David D. "Egypt Lashes Out at Foreign News Media’s Coverage." . New York Times, 18 Aug. 2013. Web. <, R. R., and P. T. Jackson. "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." European Journal of International Relations 13.1 (2007): 35-66. Print.Laird, Katie. "WAR OF WORDS: SOCIAL MEDIA’S ROLE IN INCITING REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE." Schipul - The Web Marketing Company. Public Relations Tactics, Apr. 2011. Web. <, Ingrid. "Pew Social Media Study: 30% Of The U.S. Gets News Via Facebook; Reddit Has The Most News-Hungry Regular Users." TechCrunch. Pew Research Center, 14 Nov. 2013. Web. <, Brigitte Lebens., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. Web."NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview." NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview. N.p., 15 July 1999. Web. <, Michael. "Caution IconAttention." Iran Government Minister: Media Bans May Seem 'laughable' in 5 Years. N.p., 19 Dec. 2013. Web. <, Carsten, James Stayner, Sebastian Scherr, and Guido Legante. "Hard and Soft News: A Review of Concepts, Operationalizations, and Key Findings." Journalism 13.2 (2011): 221-39. Print.Sandle, Paul. "Social Media Will Drive Chinese Liberalization : Google's Schmidt." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 25 Nov. 2013. Web. <, Ben. "For News From Syrian Battleground, a Reliance on Social Media." N.p., 30 Aug. 2013. Web. <;."Syria Civil War Fast Facts." CNN Library. 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