CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Part One. Introduction to the Canadian Constitution 2
1 Introduction 2
1.1 What is a “constitution?” 2
1.6 Sources of Constitution 2
2. Canada’s path to national independence 4
Part Two - The Nature of Constitutional Law 6
Reference re: Secession of Quebec (1998 SCC) 6
Clarity Act 8
Judicial Review 8
BC v. Imperial Tobacco (2005 SCC) – rule of law constrains courts and executive branch 9
Smith piece J. Smith, “The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada” (1983) 10
Judicial Committee of Privy Council 10
Persons Case (SCC, then Appealed to Privy Council; 1928) – living tree doctrine 10
Philip Bobbitt’s six forms of argumentation on constitutional issues (from R. Elliot) 12
Court Procedure 13
Part Three - Federalism 13
Historical perspective of confederation 13
CONFEDERATION 13
Types / classification / Theories of Federalism 16
R. Simeon Article – Criteria for Choice in Federal Systems 17
Why would Canada become Federal – forces in 19th c.? 18
Philip Resnick Article – The crisis of multi-national federations: post Charlottetown 18
Interpretation Doctrine 18
Interpretation doctrines and judicial techniques summary (handout) 18
Distribution of Legislative Powers 19
Powers of the Parliament – s. 91 19
Powers of the Provincial Legislatures s.92, 92A 20
Other clauses outlining separation 21
Pith and Substance Analysis 22
Presumption of constitutionality under federal law 23
Bruce Ryder article – classical and modern paradigm 23
Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (Privy council, 1881) ( scope of power analysis 24
R. v. Morgentaler (1993 SCC) ( pith and substance analysis 25
Incidental Effects. 27
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing (1989 SCC) – necessary incidental doctrine 27
• Necessarily Incidental Doctrine (“Ancillary Doctrine”) 28
Double Aspect doctrine 29
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (SCC 1982) 30
STEPS to Double Aspect Doctrine 30
Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine 32
Steps 32
McKay v. The Queen (SCC 1965) – early IJI case 33
Bell Canada #1 (1966 SCC) – rule about federal undertakings = IJI 33
Bell Canada #2 (1988 SCC) – IJI; upholds Bell #1 34
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec AG (1989 SCC) – direct effect on vital/essential part ( IJI 35
Paramountcy 36
Background 36
Steps 36
Ross v. Register of Motor Vehicles (1975 SCC) – incompatibility of intent test 37
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 SCC) – narrow application of paramountcy doctrine 37
M & D Farm v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit (1999 SCC) – impossibility of dual compliance 37
Bank of Montreal v. Hall (1990 SCC) – incompatibility of intent; middle position 37
Husky Oil v. MNR (1995 SCC) – Interjurisdictional immunity case: see p. 270 note 6 38
Law Society of BC v. Mangat (2001 SCC) – legislative intent 38
Spraytech v. Hudson (2001 SCC) – incompatibility of intent test 38
Rothmans v. Saskatchewan (2005, SCC) 38
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (2005 SCC) 39
Part One. Introduction to the Canadian Constitution
1 Introduction
1.1 What is a “constitution?”
• sets out powers, boundaries of government and relationship to people.
• “Collection of rules, principles, practices that relate to governing of society.”
• Who can make law (legislative), enforce law (executive), interpret law (judicial);
• “mirror reflecting national soul” –Hogg
1.2 Context of constitution
• (i.e. historical basis): Preservative - ensuring some change remains in force (status quo) vs. forward thinking (eg. S. Africa) – tries to change the future
1.3 Structuring, organizing relationships (defines boundaries, roles)
1. Between different levels of govt. (provincial and federal). Each sphere is all-powerful within it own jurisdiction.
2. Between individuals and the state (mediated by Charter).
3. Aboriginal communities/individuals and Canadian State (both prov. and fed.)
a. Complex and evolving relationship
i. How evolving self-government affects #1. (Changing understanding of federalism)
ii. How S. 35 of Constitution - aboriginal rights – regulates relationship between Aboriginals and communities.
iii. How traditional arrangement of federalism deals with colonial structures and issues arising from colonial historical regulation (“Indians and their lands…”)
1.4 Distinguishing elements of Canadian Constitution
1. Parliamentary Democracy – laws made by legislature
2. Federal constitution
3. Entrenched aboriginal rights
1.5 Legislative Supremacy (e.g. Great Britain) –
1. no longer a feature of Canadian Constitution
2. Charter (1982) specified that there are certain rights that cannot be changed by any branch of government. So, demise of legislative supremacy.
3. “Notwithstanding” clause of charter (s. 33 )– certain rights can be overridden for 5 yrs by passing legislation. Only specific rights.
1.6 Sources of Constitution
(Canada has about 26 documents and it’s oral and written)
1. Written documents (over 20 statutes and orders in council are considered constitutional)
a. Imperial statutes – legislation from G.B applicable to Canada when acting in capacity of Imperial Parliament (we have 20+). Two important ones.
i. Constitution Act, 1867
1. a) created Dominion of Canada by uniting three colonies; b) Set up legislative and provincial powers; c) Gives Canada its federal structure
ii. Canada Act, 1982
1. Appended to Canada Act is Constitution Act, 1982 (which includes Charter: Const. Act is actually a Schedule)
2. This is the LAST Imperial Statute b.c. Canada didn’t have a domestic amending formula for the constitution.
b. Canadian statutes (about 8)
i. Acted by federal parliament in ordinary way, but have been deemed “constitutional.” E.g. creation of province of Alberta, Manitoba
ii. Entrenchment: not able to be changed by ordinary legislative process. See 7-50 Rule (7 provinces representing 50%). Entrenched rights. Vs. inalienable rights, which aren’t necessarily conferred a legal status. AND Constitution has supremacy over lesser legislation when there is a conflict.
c. Case Law
d. Court defined principles (sometime unwritten) which become part of constitution.
e. Case law
f. Prerogative and Privilege – understanding that there are certain inherent powers of the Crown.
i. Can be taken away and limited by ordinary statute
ii. Examples
1. Conduct of foreign affairs
2. Passport
3. Granting of the Order of Canada
4. Parliamentary Privilege – also known as absolute privilege, is a legal mechanism employed within the legislative bodies of countries whose constitutions are based on the Westminster system. In the United Kingdom, it allows members of the House of Lords and House of Commons to speak freely before those houses without fear of legal action on the grounds of libel. It also means while a member is within the grounds of the Palace of Westminster he/she cannot be arrested on civil matters; there is no immunity from arrest on criminal grounds. A consequence of the privilege of free speech is that legislators in Westminster systems are forbidden by conventions of their House from uttering certain words, such as "liar" (see unparliamentary language).
5. Example: Royal Proclamation 1763
a. The purpose of the proclamation was to organize Britain's vast new North American empire, and to stabilize relations with North American Indians through regulation of trade, settlement, and land purchases on the western frontier.
b. Issued by Crown after conquest of Quebec
c. Important for aboriginal rights
g. Conventions – critical to workings of government
i. Not written – look at norms of behavior
ii. Not legally enforceable – court will not find s.o. is in breach of constitution or law
iii. Enforced by POLITICAL SANCTION
iv. Example: Governor General showed too much power
6. In practice, GG acts by instruction of government
v. Describe obligatory, but not enforceable practices
vi. Courts recognize and describe conventions
vii. Example: Principle of Responsible Government
7. Government Ministers come out of HOC or Senate (they are elected and are responsible to House of Parliament).
8. Not written anywhere, but convention
viii. Why aren’t conventions written? Have to do with historical tie to Great Britain, where constitution isn’t written
ix. Conventions are part of constitution…written documents are read differently in light of conventions
A. Four Imperial Statutes critical to independence
a. Colonial Laws Validity Act (1865)
b. British North America Act 1867 (Constitution Act 1867)
c. Statute of Westminster (1931)
d. Canada Act 1982
B. Doctrine of Reception
a. Colonies inherit or receive laws of imperial power in place at time of settlement or establishment of colony
b. Nothing that became law AFTER that date in GB applied
c. Deals with both reception of common law and statute
i. Shut off date specifically with statute
ii. Except Imperial Statute, which applied specifically to colony or several colonies
d. After reception, colonies can make their own statutes, but must be consistent with GB
e. Doctrine of Repugnancy – laws contradictory to GB are VOID
f. Two classes of relevant British statutes
i. Laws of GB that become law after reception
1. CAN be amended by colonial legislature. Normal laws.
ii. Imperial Statutes – imposed on colonies by GB
1. CANNOT be amended or repealed by colonial legislature, only by Imperial Parliament
g. Colonial Laws Validity Act (1865)
i. Move to independence for colonies
ii. Clarified relationship between colonial governments and Britain
iii. Seen as liberalizing move.
iv. Clarified in a statute what kinds of statutes coming out of Westminster would be binding to colonies and not amendable or repealable.
v. Legislation must say so expressly or necessarily intend (1st section)
vi. Restates Doctrine of Repugnancy (2nd section)
vii. Not always obvious whether law is repugnant or not
1. Resolved by courts = judicial review
2. Canada’s path to national independence
a. Received law
i. Statute law
1. Not those unsuitable for application
2. Imperial disallowance (doctrine of repugnancy)
ii. Common law
1. Continued reception
2. 1949 discontinuance of Privy Council as last court of appeal
b. Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 – clarified the relationship between colonial governments and British laws and Imperial Statutes
i. Imperial Statutes binding only on colonies if they say so in express words or by necessary intention
ii. Doctrine of repugnancy
c. British North America Act, 1867 – Imperial statute applied to three BNA colonies (Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick) created Dominion of Canada
d. preservation of colonial status through continuation of British Crown’s reservation power
Sections 91 and 92: first instance of Federalism for Canada
e. Each government supreme in its realm of authority
i. Doctrine of repugnancy for Imperial vs. Colonial
ii. And Federal vs. Provincial
iii. BNA Act created an ORDER of government on National and Provincial level, so ANY law created in Canada that is in contrary to this Imperial Statute is repugnant.
iv. BNA only amendable by Imperial Parliament
Statute of Westminster, 1931…product of colonial dissatisfaction with powers of British Crown
f. Preamble: No imperial statute applies to a Dominion other than at the request and with consent of that Dominion
i. But, Parliamentary Supremacy says that Parl. can’t be bound…and here they are binding themselves
ii. This is a statement of a convention…creates a convention. They are aware of the conflict when writing it
iii. Preamble sets the stage and tone for interpretation of the rest of the statute
g. Repeals CLVA and the doctrine of repugnancy…Dominion can now legislate with respect to Imperial statutes
h. BNA Act Exception – needed to retain repugnancy for federalism purposes
i. DOR no longer policing colonial power, but still maintained in order to police boundary between National and Provincial govts
Abolition of appeals to English Privy Council, 1949
Patriation Reference, 1981
Canada Act, 1982 … Imperial Statute…result of much political wrangling
i. see: “The National Deal” – Richard (?)
j. Preamble says this act as request of Canada, so in compliance with Statute of Westminster
i. Constitution Act in Schedule B
ii. No act of UK Parliament passed after this shall be extended to Canadian law
iii. French version in Schedule A has equal force as English version
iv. Call it the Canada Act, 1982
k. Schedule B (7 parts)
i. Part 1 = Charter
ii. 2 = rights of Aboriginal
iii. 3 = Equalization of regional disparities
iv. 4 = Constitutional conference
v. 5 = Amending procedures
vi. 6 = Amendment to BNA act
vii. 7 = General things, but important
1. S. 52 – supremacy of constitution (same as DOR really)
a. Parts of constitution (some in another Schedule)
i. Uses word “includes” so list may not be exhaustive
Part Two - The Nature of Constitutional Law
Reference re: Secession of Quebec (1998 SCC)
A. Quebec’s Alienation
a. Quebec not part of final const. agreement of 1982.
i. 2 attempts to bring Quebec in: Meech Lake accord 1987; Charlottetown accord 1982
ii. 1995 referendum – unilateral decision sufficient to remove Q w/existing borders : 50.6 in favour
b. 1995 – Federal government (Just Minister Allan Roc) to refer three questions to Supreme Court of Canada
i. S. 53 of Supreme Court Act empowers any member of Cabinet to refer questions to SCC
ii. Seek interpretation of Constitution
iii. Challenged because Court becoming involved in politics
iv. Handout on Reference Procedures
v. BC Constitutional Questions Act empowers BC ministers to refer question to BCSC
vi. Three questions
1. According to Constitution of Canada, can Quebec unilaterally secede?
2. Does international law allow Q to secede unilaterally? (see if there’s a right of self-determination that would apply)
3. In the event of conflict, which would take precedence?
vii. Seen as illegitimate by Q, since SC appointed by Fed Govt.
1. Only people can decide Q’s future
2. No one there to argue separatist side, so appointed an Amicus Curiae
3. Sask and Manitoba, aboriginal groups, minority rights, Guy Bertrand also appear
viii. Decision
1. Critical, foundational set of issues
2. Little of decision really addresses questions, but more of an historical background on constitutional principles
a. The significance of confederation
i. Past practice and usage = historical context
ii. Respect for minorities
3. Unwritten principles of democratic system are implicit in const.
a. Gives flexible framework for expansion
b. Assist in interpreting text
c. Look at usage, custom, values affirmed by constitutional text, principles of Intl law endorsed by nation
i. Federalism: power shared by two orders of govt, recognition of autonomy
ii. Democracy: self-governance, dignity as human beings is recognized constitutionally; sovereign people’s will is supreme; individual and institutional aspect; we don’t talk about this specifically in const; obligation to engage opposition in debate
iii. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: foundation of legal liberalism; shield against arbitrary exercise of power; uniformly applied = require that everyone is subject to same law; constitutionalism = Const. is supreme law, entrenched (para 74); constitutionalism modifies democracy ( more than just ‘majority rule’
iv. Protection of Minorities: spotty history, but Charter, linguistic protections
d. Principles function in symbiosis – no one principle trumps other
4. Written text gives certainty and is first place to start
a. primacy of written textr
5. Court finds secession is unconstitutional
a. Q. #1 = no (through unwritten principles)
b. Q. #2 = no (People of Canada don’t constitute type of people protected by this international law)
6. Federal Govt and Q govt both pleased with decision
a. Q. felt court affirmed that it was a political decision, not legal
b. Felt that Canada must negotiate with Quebec about secession
7. Duty to negotiate lies with Canada as a whole
8. Federal government passes Clarity Act (2000) to specify conditions by which Ottawa would talk about secession with Q.
ix. Court decides issue without reference to written constitution
x. Quebec can hold secession reference, but is not allowed to unilaterally secede
1. Court rejects assertion that a clear ‘yes’ could be ignored (radical federalist)
2. Court rejects unilateral sovereignty (radical sovereigntist)
Clarity Act
The key points:
a. Giving the House of Commons the power to decide whether a proposed referendum question was considered clear before the public vote;
b. Specifically stating that any question not solely referring to secession was to be considered unclear;
c. Giving the House of Commons the power to determine whether or not a clear majority has expressed itself in any referendum, implying that some sort of supermajority is required for success;
d. Stating that all provinces and the First Nations were to be part of the negotiations;
e. Allowing the House of Commons to override a referendum decision if it felt the referendum violated any of the tenets of the Clarity Act.
• ordinary legislation, which specifies conditions of secession referendum
a. House of Commons, within 30 days, must consider question by resolution whether it is clear or not – will Q result in clear expression of will of province?
xi. Such a question will not be one of getting mandate to negotiate, looking at other solutions, etc.
xii. If no, Gov’t won’t negotiate
b. Government has to take into account SIZE of majority in favor when examining clarity
xiii. (but what size is enough?)
c. Restates that there is no right to unilateral secession; amendment to constitution is required (needs negotiation, involvement of all levels of gov’t)
d. Any proposal of amendment has to be proceeded by discussion of aboriginal rights, borders, national debt, minorities that would be effected by this resolution
Judicial Review
a. Courts review/overview administrative law
b. Power of courts to look at otherwise valid legislative enactments and see whether they are constitutionally valid.
i. If not in compliance, they can declare it unconstitutional and invalid
c. Based on S. 52 of Constitution Act (constitution is supreme)
d. Question about use of Judicial Review
ii. McLaughlin: unwritten principles raises for many the legitimacy of what judges are doing
1. Judges usurping legislative role, say some
2. McLaughlin says: this practice is fine (see p. 23-)
iii. Character of Judges
3. aren’t elected (PM appoints them to SC), legislators are; undemocratic character of judges
4. Federal vs. local; Supreme Court is federal body (see Quebec secession)
5. Judges don’t mirror general population; class, race, gender
iv. Are the judges doing something above the law (politics, etc.)?
6. Law and politics are different; judges should be interpreting law, not making it
v. Are texts apolitical, though? Doesn’t it matter who the judge is when making law
vi. Judges have power, so naturally there area questions about how they act
vii. One critique – made in relation to secession reference; Ted Morton
7. S.C. should never have agreed to hear the reference
8. Example of Federal Govt. using court for political purpose
a. S.C. can refuse to answer questions
9. Questions too abstract and too political
10. Federal Govt was trying to use court to achieve something indirectly, which it couldn’t do directly: lay down ground rules for secession
11. Court was forced to deal with this because constitution failed to address the secession issue
12. Outcome of secession reference is POLITICAL
13. McLaughlin argues that unwritten rules are legitimate
BC v. Imperial Tobacco (2005 SCC) – rule of law constrains courts and executive branch
• BC wants to hold Tobacco companies responsible for health damages through legislation
• Imperial said this legislation is contrary to rule of law
i. retroactivity created an unfair civil trial AND unfair to target specific sector
ii. Creative and opportunistic strategy for opposition, but rejected by Court
iii. Rule of Law is fundamental (para. 57)
• Law is supreme over officials of govt and private individuals
• Actual system of law required
• Regulates relationship of individual and state
iv. Rule of law stipulates that officials are bound by law - Collective power of state is bound by law
v. Although law may meet these principles, it is also context of law
• Advocates read into rule of law what they want and court rejects
a. Imperial wants rule of law to be more than it is – wants to add more content to rule of law
b. Want courts to prohibit “backward-looking” legislation
c. Wants to prohibit extra-territoriality
d. Wants rule of law to be more expansive, so more opportunities to declare laws unconstitutional
• Why? – Court gives two reasons
a. Already protected infringements with other statutes (eg. Charter)
i. Written constitution has primacy
ii. Unwritten principles don’t nec. apply
b. Role of courts in legislative process
i. Decisions should be made at the ballot box
• Split between what branches of government can do
a. Rule of law constrains what Judicial and Executive branch can do
i. Restrain of how exec can act
ii. Restrain of how courts can interpret
iii. BUT, doesn’t limit legislature
vi. Court is conscious of power of judicial review - This is a case where they “pull back”
Smith piece J. Smith, “The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada” (1983)
a. Judicial review isn’t a new idea
b. Difference between legislative union and federal union
i. Legislative Union: governed by central state = one government with supreme power – some originally wanted this in Canada
ii. Federal Union: government is split; each branch is sovereign in its own sphere
Judicial Committee of Privy Council
i. Historically: final appellate authority for British colonies
ii. Privy Council = historically, advisors to the Crown; includes Cabinet ministers; senior judges of England
iii. Judicial Committee = Historically: grouping of senior judges (who are members of House of Lords); usual group of 5; invite senior judges of colony in question
iv. Technically, only give advice, but PRACTICALLY decisions are binding
v. Prior to 1966, no dissenting opinions
vi. Canada abolished appeals from 1949, so SCC became final court of appeal for Canadian cases
• Used to be able to appeal from SCC up to JCPC
• Or, to skip SCC altogether
vii. Influence over Canadian Federalism
a. Section 101 of BNA provides for general Court of Appeal for Canada
b. Talks about reference procedure and statutory procedure for reference
c. Federal disallowance power – relevance to establishment of national court (see book p. 116)
viii. Ability of Federal Govt. to reserve up to one year piece of legislation and then veto any act of provincial government
ix. Did this negate Federalism???
• Federal government has ultimate authority over provinces
x. Hasn’t been used since middle of 20th century
• Convention now exists against this section – beyond political pale
• Need amendment to get rid of this for good
c. Federalism question
xi. Centralist version
• Concern about Supreme Court set up with Judicial Review (can reduce authority of Federal govt.) ( Would give more power to Provincial
xii. Decentralist
• Waffled in support of SCC
a. Liked idea of neutral third party
b. Concerned that this party was appointed by federal government
Persons Case (SCC, then Appealed to Privy Council; 1928) – living tree doctrine
• Who gets to be appointed to Senate; Relationship between Supreme Court and Privy Council; Important piece of history
• Brought by five women (Educated and prominent public actors, Privileged, sometimes racist, anti-union, Nellie McClung, etc.); desire to have Edwards elected to Senate
• Notion of formal equality between men and women vs. substantive equality = need to look at rich context of differences between people; Law should be equal on its face;
• Common law doctrine that women were unable to hold public office; constitutionally barred from senate
• Section 24 of BNA
• Cabinet could only appoint “qualified persons” to Senate
• Other qualifications weren’t challenged
• Age, owner of property, native born in Canada, etc. not challenged
• SCC found that women were not in category of “qualified persons”
• Used historical argumentation
• ANGLIN J.
• begins with caveat, distancing himself from politics, Then, historical / textual argument
• Look at textual context of document itself. What does this word mean? What did they mean by this?
o Framers were representatives, Senate was new body, so no common law precedent
o No inherent right to be in Senate or not, since this was created in the BNA act as a new entity
o Nowhere else to go to learn about this other than the BNA – “four corners of statute”
Unicameral v. Bicameral legislature
In UK, House of Lords (upper house) has very different role than Canada Senate
In common law, women didn’t have legal capacity to hold public office
Doctrinal analysis
Looking at precedent
Treats constitution as a ordinary statute
Other statutes are binding on BNA in this respect
Different than the way the Privy Council addresses it
Found that words “qualified persons” would not include women
Prudential analysis
Would alter society in too great a way
Anglin’s analysis reveals his philosophy of the role of a judge in interpreting a document like the constitution
Lord Brougham’s Act (1850)
Masculine pronouns should be interpreted to also include women
Anglin argues that “persons” isn’t masculine at all, so doesn’t apply
In early years, SCC was very technical, prudent and cautious
Until the 1970’s, when the SCC took on a more adventurous stance
Illustration of methods in play (Bobbit’s)
Justification for sticking to framer’s intent as basis for constitutional interpretation
Some Legitimacy ( democracy
Stability and continuity
Juxtaposed with need to have a document that evolves with time
1. JCPC overturned this
a. PRIVY COUNCIL
i. Illustration of power of courts to change the interpretation of law
1. Radical departure from way this document had been previously understood
ii. Looks at External and Internal Evidence
1. External (historical analysis)
a. English tradition, Roman tradition, Lord Brougham’s Act (1850), Women historically protected from male
b. Pretty clear that “men” meant only men and not women
c. Custom dictated that women were not included
d. But, these conventions stay on longer than they are useful – become ossified
e. Appeal to history in these matters is not conclusive
f. Court should not apply these historical arguments to Canada
2. Internal (textual analysis)
a. Situated British precedents in their context, apart from Canada
b. Living Tree Doctrine
i. BNA is a “living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”
ii. Idea that usage and convention cause constitution to develop
iii. Give it a “large and liberal interpretation”
iv. Ethical interpretation ( look at role of institutions in context of people
c. The real point is whether the Governor General has the right to appoint women to the Senate, not whether anyone has a right to be summoned to the Senate
i. Can presume that the framers set out the important qualifications for Senate
ii. Precedents cited aren’t applicable
iii. Word ‘persons’ is ambiguous
1. Term “male persons” is used
2. “persons” includes both males and females
b. Supreme court right or Privy Council?
i. Argument in favor of SCC
1. Stability and continuity
2. Words mean something
3. Created by democratic process
4. Distinction between law and politics
5. Access to judicial review
ii. Privy Council
1. Constitution difficult to amend
2. Language is broad and vague
3. Minority role non-existent in drafting of constitution
4. Flexibility of constitution to speak to society to remain legitimate (within some limits)
Philip Bobbitt’s six forms of argumentation on constitutional issues (from R. Elliot)
1. Historical – what was the intent of draftsmen of constitution
2. Textual
c. Examine words of document and historical import
d. What is present sense of words in provision
3. Doctrinal – argument from previous cases
4. Prudential
a. Practical
b. Weighs costs and benefits
5. Ethical
a. Characterization of Canadian institutions and role within them of Canadian people
6. Structural
a. Logical moves from constitutional text rather than from its parts
b. About relationship between institutions to each other and within the framework
Court Procedure
a. Standing (see p. 47)
i. Courts are a limited resource, so makes decisions about who gets their time to pose questions on Constitutional law
ii. Concern about issues raised by third parties – so, restricted to your own issue
1. But, not everyone has access to courts
2. And, government must be held to rule of law
iii. Rule of Public Interest standing
b. Notice Requirement (49)
i. Must give Attorneys General notice of constitutional issues
c. Parties and Interveners (50)
i. Allows others with stake in this issue to weigh in on the constitutional issue at bar
ii. Submits written “factum”
iii. Sometimes gets to submit an oral argument to the court
Part Three - Federalism
Historical perspective of confederation
A. Many of these historical issues still come up in modern law
B. History v. memory
a. History is made up of objective facts
b. Memory is subjective historical accounting; link between past-present-future
i. A look back into how things have happened to shape who we are
ii. As much about forgetting as remembering
iii. Understand present in relation to story we tell ourselves
c. Underlying law is one version or another of a particular ideological interpretation of past – NARRATIVES ARE IMPORTANT
d. Need to question this accounting
i. Minority narratives ignored
ii. Conflicting narratives
e. Secession reference as an example of narrative (see Gaugreault-DesBiens, p. 57)
i. French-Canadian persecution
ii. Minority rights
iii. Author sees Sec. ref. as a good balance of narratives
f. Legitimacy of Canadian Constitution rests upon judicial consideration of different narratives
g. E.g. 1982 Constitution ( “night of long knives” where Quebecers were excluded
i. Rest of Canada has narrative of bumbling Quebec officials – adds legitimacy to
CONFEDERATION
I. Background
A. Arose from several reasons
i. Internal difficulties in Canada East and Canada West
1. failure of the Union Act, 1840
2. Way out of difficulties is for westward expansion
ii. Threat from the United States
1. End of US Civil War – removal of slavery controversy
iii. Need for economic development – capitalist’s motivation
iv. Termination of reciprocal trade agreement with US
B. John Macdonald
i. Pushed for federal state, confederation
C. Came about with BNA Act, 1867
D. Did three things
i. Reorganized the internal government of “Canada” in the pre-confederation sense of Ontario and Quebec
ii. United this entity with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
iii. Provided for westward expansion to the Pacific
E. On recommendation of Lord Durham’s report, Province of Canada created in 1841
i. Distinctions between common law (Upper Canada) and civil law (lower Canada) preserved
ii. Status of French language recognized
F. Principle established that govt dependent on confidence of lower house of legislature
II. The Terms of Union
I. “a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom”
II. Forces shaping Canadian Federalism
a. Agrarian radicalism was not as strong in BNA as in US
i. weak Provincial power in contrast to strong state power in US
b. Lack of formed provincial governments (easy to mold to new order)
i. Gave specified power to provincial governments
ii. Reserved unspecified, “residual” power for federal
c. Desire for access to British capital and markets and military assistance
d. Incongruity of British principles of government (monarchy) and federalism
III. Provincial power arose from demands by Quebec ( wanted some semblance of sovereignty
IV. Hierarchical systems – liked by Centrists – strong central authority
a. Reservation power for level of government directly above
b. Ottawa appoints federal judges, Privy Council has last word
V. Division of Legislative Powers
a. Central government carries out major objectives of Confederation
b. Parliament given all powers not specifically assigned to the provincial legislatures.
c. “Peace, Order, and Good Government”
d. Federal Powers include:
i. Tax and borrow
ii. Tariff and commercial policy
iii. Banking and currency
iv. Postal, weights and measures, patents and copyrights
v. Criminal law
e. Provincial Powers include:
i. Administration of Justice (apart from criminal)
ii. Organization of the courts
iii. Municipal institutions
iv. Education
v. The family
vi. Social institutions
vii. Law relating to property and civil rights
viii. Certain economic matters
1. Shared jurisdiction over agriculture
2. Borrow on own credit
3. Incorporate companies
4. Roads, bridges, etc., not under federal jur.
ix. Ownership of natural resources
VI. John Macdonald
a. Principal author of Quebec Resolutions and BNA Act
b. PM 1867-73; 1878-1891
c. Hamiltonian conservative
i. State could and should play an autonomous and creative role, rather than merely reflecting the social diversity that lay beneath it
VII. French Reaction
a. Guarantees for autonomy of nationality must come before all else in federal constitution
b. Anything close to a legislative union will not be accepted by French Canadians
c. As long as there was only a single legislature for the two Canadas, Rep by Pop would have put “our civil law and religious institutions at the mercy of the fanatics”
d. Confederation would eliminate this danger
What emerged (at least in writing) was a strong central government
People had a strong regional identity, diverse populations
Confederation balanced these things
III. Silver, A. The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation
a. Provincial autonomy was the safeguard for the French
b. They didn’t want a strong central government
• Wanted a strong, autonomous government that wouldn’t be messed with by Feds
• Jurisdiction on own territory would be absolute
• Federal matters won’t be about Quebec
c. Rhetoric that persuaded them talked about provincial independence
d. Concerns that animate English Canadians can be quite different than those that are important to French Canadians with regards to confederation
IV. Unitary State
a. One national authority with jurisdiction over all law
b. Local and regional authorities are subordinate to national authority (think relationship of city to provincial govt.)
c. E.g. UK and New Zealand
V. Federal State
a. Division of legislative powers between autonomous levels of government
b. Not to be confused with separation of powers (legislative, executive, judicial)
c. Recognized by Greeks, Romans – long history
d. Many federal states, including all of N. America
e. Different ways of distributing power; different tensions between powers, regions
VI. Characteristics of Federal State
a. Definition: government power distributed between central and regional authorities, so that individuals living in those regions are subject to both levels of government authority
b. Distribution of powers is necessary, but not sufficient condition
• Also need lack of subordination - one is not subordinate to the other
• Power of disallowance in BNA act is a problem, but this is no longer used
Types / classification / Theories of Federalism
a. Every country has different set of tensions and so there are different models in use
b. Many different kinds of federalist states in operation
• E.g. Australia, Germany – strong central government
• US – Federal involvement in welfare, but different criminal codes in each state
c. Edwin Black (Canadian political scientist of 20th c.)
d. Canada’s Features / characteristics
i. Divided Federalism – levels of government more separated
ii. Four Features
1. Division on powers – clearly divided sets of power between federal and provinces
2. Fiscal Arrangements –
a. Each level of government given some level of taxing power
b. Federal Government makes equalization payments to poorer provinces – subject of some debate
c. Federal grants to provinces (health, education, income assistance)
3. Inter-governmental relations
a. High degree of coordination between different levels
b. Executive federalism – high-level executives make decisions
4. Intrastate Federalism
a. Is not a formal bridge that links federal and provinces
b. No institutional mechanism for airing provincial interests to federal
c. Instead, provincial governments are vocal about needs
d. Premiers become national politicians somewhat
iii. Models dominant in Canadian History (where does real power lie?)
5. Centralist Model (originally envisioned by framers)
a. Strong central government
b. Federal disallowance power
c. Power over inter-provincial transportation, communication
d. Power to declare any local work to be federal [S. 92 (10)(a)]
e. Residual power to federal government
6. Compact Model (Quebec’s preference)
a. Provinces joined, and as part of agreement decided to delegate power to federal government
b. Provinces are primary source of power
c. Central government “creature” of provinces
7. Dualist Theory
a. Two nations (French & English) informed structure of federalism
b. Coming together of two nations
c. Two powers “make a deal” and give to provinces what each felt needed to survive
d. Characteristics of both appear in current system
e. e.g. Quebec veto
f. Criticism: ignoring aboriginal people – leaving them out of the calculus of creating a new nation
8. Coordinate (cooperative) model
a. Each level of government is equal to each other and sovereign in its own realm
b. Dominant theory now
iv. Symmetrical
9. All provinces are equal in terms of jurisdiction
10. Distribution of power across provinces is equal
11. Other provinces than Quebec call for ideal of symmetrical federalism
12. Western Separatist Movement – regions feeling left out of power – would be in favor of Symmetrical
a. Illustrates tensions inherent in federalism in large country
v. Asymmetrical
13. Each province is unique
14. Power is separated unequally
15. Specifically applies to Quebec
a. power to control immigration, etc.
b. Other provinces symmetrical
16. Terms put into Constitution that recognize Quebec as being unique
R. Simeon Article – Criteria for Choice in Federal Systems
a. Link between Federalism and Democracy
• What are impacts on participation, liberty, equality?
• Approaches
1. Protect citizens from government
a. Decentralization and competing governments
2. Smaller units of government are better for citizen participation
• Critiques
1. Executive federalism (where relations between governments are conducted between politicians, limiting citizen participation)
2. Frustrates majority rule by denying one level of government jurisdiction
3. Less accountability (who is responsible for this?)
4. E.g. child tax benefit
a. Supplement from federal, but provinces take that back
b. Whose fault is it that money gets pulled back? Federal? Provincial?
c. Actually, interaction between the two – who do you sue? how do you vote?
b. Functional effectiveness
• Approaches
1. Division of labor between government bodies
2. Evaluated on ability to respond to the needs of citizens
3. Realm of economists and public administrators
4. Can tailor policy and responses to the level where they make the most sense
• Critiques
1. Difficult to avoid overlap between bodies of government
2. Excessive coordination costs, joint decision track
3. Competition of laws between levels
4. Territorial conflict – conflicts become inflamed
c. Community maintenance
• Interacts with community concerns
• Ability of federalism to defend and maintain a balance between regional and national political communities
1. Country-building
2. province-building
3. two-nation, or Quebec nation –building
4. Realm of sociologists
Why would Canada become Federal – forces in 19th c.?
a. Discreet units, but close together
b. Shared heritage, except for Quebec
c. Shared fear of annexation
d. Desire for autonomy
e. Quebec’s desire for retaining language and religion
f. Presence of indigenous people on territory (not really considered back then, but important now)
Philip Resnick Article – The crisis of multi-national federations: post Charlottetown
a. First Nations are an important part of Canada
b. Quebec / Canada tension doesn’t exhaust issues for Canadian Federalism
c. Difficulties of Federalism in countries that are ethnically, linguistically divided
d. English and French STILL have different visions of federalism says Resnick
e. Now, Harper government in favor of more provincial power
• Change in late ‘90s, early 21st c.
• Politics of provincialism
f. Separating nations and states
g. Three ideas on how Canada can improve tensions between nation and province
• Con-federal, like EU
Bruce Ryder Piece (p.237-239) – classical and modern paradign
a. Court has to decide whether power lies with federal or provincial government
b. Provide framework for shifting from classical to modern paradigm
c. Judicial philosophies about how balance should be distributed
Interpretation Doctrine
Interpretation doctrines and judicial techniques summary (handout)
I. Interpretation doctrine: reference to general principles and methods used in interpretation
a. Doctrinal analysis to determine separation of power between provincial and federal
b. Set of interpretation techniques courts can use
c. Use cases to reveal rules and formulas for application to other questions
II. Three perspectives / characterizations of doctrine
a. Validity
i. Whether or not law survives constitutional challenge
ii. No constitutional authority for that level of government to pass that kind of law
iii. Pith and substance – dominant characteristic of statute
1. Does it fall under S. 91 or 92?
2. See Swinton article
iv. Ultra vires (outside jurisdiction) vs. intra vires (inside jurisdiction)
v. If true: Entire law is invalid
b. Applicability
i. Even if the statute is valid, will it be applicable in this area
ii. Application may have to be reduced
iii. Called: interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine
iv. Still will be a core area where this law will be applicable
v. If true: law has reduced applicability
c. Operability
i. Applies as a consequence of the conflict of provincial and federal legislations
ii. Even if law is valid and applicable, there are circumstances where it will be inoperable
iii. While conflict exists between fed and provincial, provincial law is rendered inoperable
iv. Federal paramouncy
|Distribution of Legislative Powers |
| |
|Powers of the Parliament – s. 91 |
| |
|91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good |
|Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the |
|Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that |
|(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of |
|Subjects |
|1. |
|Repealed. (44) |
| |
|1A. |
|The Public Debt and Property. (45) |
| |
|2. |
|The Regulation of Trade and Commerce. |
| |
|2A. |
|Unemployment insurance. (46) |
| |
|3. |
|The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation. |
| |
|4. |
|The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit. |
| |
|5. |
|Postal Service. |
| |
|6. |
|The Census and Statistics. |
| |
|7. |
|Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence. |
| |
|8. |
|The fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and other Officers of the Government of Canada. |
| |
|9. |
|Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island. |
| |
|10. |
|Navigation and Shipping. |
| |
|11. |
|Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals. |
| |
|12. |
|Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries. |
| |
|13. |
|Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign Country or between Two Provinces. |
| |
|14. |
|Currency and Coinage. |
| |
|15. |
|Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money. |
| |
|16. |
|Savings Banks. |
| |
|17. |
|Weights and Measures. |
| |
|18. |
|Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. |
| |
|19. |
|Interest. |
| |
|20. |
|Legal Tender. |
| |
|21. |
|Bankruptcy and Insolvency. |
| |
|22. |
|Patents of Invention and Discovery. |
| |
|23. |
|Copyrights. |
| |
|24. |
|Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians. |
| |
|25. |
|Naturalization and Aliens. |
| |
|26. |
|Marriage and Divorce. |
| |
|27. |
|The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. |
| |
|28. |
|The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Penitentiaries. |
| |
|29. |
|Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of |
|the Provinces. |
| |
|And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local |
|or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces. (47) |
|Exclusivity of list in S.91 |
| |
| |
|Powers of the Provincial Legislatures s.92, 92A |
|92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; |
|that is to say, |
| |
|List of powers of provinces |
| |
|1. |
|Repealed. (48) |
| |
|2. |
|Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes. |
| |
|3. |
|The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province |
| |
|4. |
|The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers. |
| |
|5. |
|The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon. |
| |
|6. |
|The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Public and Reformatory Prisons in and for the Province. |
| |
|7. |
|The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine |
|Hospitals. |
| |
|8. |
|Municipal Institutions in the Province. |
| |
|9. |
|Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes. |
| |
|10. |
|Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes: |
| |
| |
|(a) |
|Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the |
|Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province: |
| |
|(b) |
|Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country: |
| |
|(c) |
|Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general |
|Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces. |
| |
|Unilateral grabbing of jurisdiction by federal = CENTRALIST government. Not to be confused with disallowance power, which negates a particular law (fell |
|into disuse). This – the DECLARATORY POWER – has been used quite frequently. Doesn’t mean the fed govt owns the work, only regulates it. |
| |
|11. |
|The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects. |
| |
|12. |
|The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province. |
| |
|13. |
|Property and Civil Rights in the Province. |
|Important |
| |
|14. |
|The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of |
|Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts. |
| |
|15. |
|The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of |
|the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section. |
| |
|16. |
|Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province. |
| |
|Laws respecting |92A. |
|non-renewable natural |(1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to |
|resources, forestry |(a) |
|resources and electrical |exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province; |
|energy | |
| |(b) |
| |development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province, |
| |including laws in relation to the rate of primary production therefrom; and |
| | |
| |(c) |
| |development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the generation and production of |
| |electrical energy. |
| | |
|Export from provinces of |(2) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the export from the province to another part of |
|resources |Canada of the primary production from non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the |
| |production from facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy, but such laws may not authorize or |
| |provide for discrimination in prices or in supplies exported to another part of Canada. |
|Authority of Parliament |(3) Nothing in subsection (2) derogates from the authority of Parliament to enact laws in relation to the matters |
| |referred to in that subsection and, where such a law of Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of |
| |Parliament prevails to the extent of the conflict. |
|Taxation of resources |(4) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the raising of money by any mode or system of |
| |taxation in respect of |
| |(a) |
| |non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the primary production therefrom, and |
| | |
| |(b) |
| |sites and facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy and the production therefrom, |
| | |
| |whether or not such production is exported in whole or in part from the province, but such laws may not authorize or |
| |provide for taxation that differentiates between production exported to another part of Canada and production not |
| |exported from the province. |
|"Primary production" |(5) The expression "primary production" has the meaning assigned by the Sixth Schedule. |
| |(6) Nothing in subsections (1) to (5) derogates from any powers or rights that a legislature or government of a province|
| |had immediately before the coming into force of this section. (49) |
|Existing powers or rights | |
This was an amendment.
Concurrency – jurisdiction over same thing, but Federal Government has paramouncy
Other clauses outlining separation
a. S. 93 ( education
v. Wanted by Quebec
1. Wants it mostly to be about linguistic
b. S. 94 ( Uniform code for Common Law provinces, but only with
c. S. 94 A ( amendment, concurrency re pensions, paramouncy with provinces
d. S. 95 ( Agriculture and immigration
e. Plus, aboriginal self-government adds another element to this equation.
III. Stages and terminology re: test for validity
a. Does legislation fall within heads of power assigned to government
i. General issue or area legislated upon
ii. Determine what the matter is
iii. Take that determination and see which head of power in which it fits
iv. E.g. Morganthaler case (p. 213) ( argued: this law isn’t about health care, it’s about criminal behaviour.
v. ‘Class of power’ = ‘head of power’
vi. This is a process of classification
1. Matched up to head of power in list
vii. List is not exhaustive, though – new matters have arisen since S. 91 and 92 written in 1867
viii. No science, but it’s an art (Swinton, Lederman, Morgentaler case)
b. Ryder
i. Two schools of thought
1. If in 91, can’t be in 92
2. There is some overlap
Pith and Substance Analysis
i. Identify matter of legislation = main issue of legislation
1. What is pith and substance
2. Dominant characteristic of impugned law
3. Legal and practical effect of law
4. Looks at
a. Legal effect of law – four corners
i. What is legal impact on individuals?
b. Purpose of legislation – beyond four corners
i. What harm will it address?
ii. What does preamble say?
iii. In past, wouldn’t look to policy papers, Hansard, other process – increasingly brought in, though.
c. Practical effects
i. More contextual review
ii. How does it affect everyday life given people’s unique circumstances?
iii. Given different weights by different judges
5. Courts NOT looking at value of law or whether they like it, only whether it is VALID
d. Is this really true, though?
6. These things are given different weights by different judges, political landscape, philosophy of constitutionalism
ii. Scope of heads of power
7. What area does it delineate
8. Statutes are written generally, so courts are often asked to decide where it applies currently
9. Are these watertight compartments?
e. Tightly discreet categories or overlap
f. Swinton: latitude of judges due to S.91, 92 jurisdiction is over areas of law making (classes of subjects), not classes of persons
i. Refers not to concrete, discrete facts of world, but larger classes of subjects
ii. But, bound by precedent, historical sense of words
iii. Does matter of law fit into this scope?
10. Not scientific process, again – it’s often POLITICAL
11. Remember Simeon piece – different values at stake in federalism, balance of power, which community? which makes functional sense of dealing with this issue?
g. These issues can play into who should have jurisdiction
h. E.g. regulation of fisheries
i. Community
1. Building national community?
2. Provincial community?
3. First Nations?
ii. Functionality - Who can regulate best?
iii. Democracy - Ottawa is too far away
Presumption of constitutionality under federal law
c. THREE PRACTICES (not Charter cases, though)
i. Relies on presumption of constitutionality
1. Court does best to give laws understanding so that it is constitutional
a. If there are two conflicting interpretations, will give it the constitutional one
b. Politics of judicial review
c. Judicial restraint – give deference to legislature
i. reduced judicial activism
d. Courts less willing to overturn laws
2. If law is open to wide and narrow interpretation, and narrow would be constitutional, court adopts narrow interpretation
a. Reading down
3. If validity of law relies on finding of fact, court will accept government’s statement of relevant facts (see anti-inflation case)
a. As long as some reasonable basis for the facts
b. vs. correctness (courts decide what is best)
Bruce Ryder article – classical and modern paradigm
a. Competing frameworks of vision
i. Classical Paradigm
1. More dominant early on in Canada’s history
2. Division of power sets out mutually exclusive levels of government
3. No overlap between federal and provincial heads of power
4. Watertight compartments
5. Would find law invalid or Read it Down
6. No toleration of laws that encroach into other jurisdiction
7. Disadvantage: may be some things we want to regulate, but can’t with “watertight” interpretation
c. May make it impossible to create effective legislation
8. Creates a more active judiciary, since they are knocking down “messy” laws = judicial activist
9. Economic politics – state should keep out of economic regulation – laissez faire
ii. Modern Paradigm
1. More dominant later on, but this chronology is not FIXED: there are classical instances now – generally speaking, though, modern is predominant
2. Layers can overlap and infringe on each other some – with SECONDARY effects = spillover effects = incidental effects
3. More judicial restraint = more tolerant of laws
d. If dominant characteristic is in wrong jurisdiction, will still be found invalid
e. Secondary effects, though, will be more tolerated
f. Legislative exhaustiveness is furthered because can have more complex laws
4. Economic regulation by provinces is tolerated
iii. Invoked by courts in all stages of constitutional rule
iv. Not really a change in pith and substance, but more about conclusions reached about validity
v. Responsible government
1. Federalism – divided
2. Authority of government from parliament
3. Any or all laws are possible by one level of government
a. Modified by Charter
b. In general, 1867 gave things to each level
Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (Privy council, 1881) ( scope of power analysis
• Provincial statute – must include conditions, in certain ink– consumer protection; Parsons has national insurance and then disaster – wants to collect; Can’t collect because didn’t comply with conditions of policy; Says doesn’t apply because not in correct type, as Ontario law says; Company says doesn’t apply to them – corporate understanding of regulation ( Ultra vires; Government says jurisdiction lies in Federal Trade and Commerce head of power, Could also be captured in federal POGG power
• Parsons and province argument
i. Says it’s a contract
ii. Property and civil rights head of power, Could also be other sections
vi. This case is example of classical paradigm ( it’s an EITHER OR question
1. Exclusivity – two lists are exclusive of each other
vii. Mutual modification – court takes overlapping heads of power and changes them both so that they don’t conflict
1. Idea is that drafters couldn’t have intended the two to conflict ( watertight compartments
2. Presumption: if in provincial list, won’t be in the federal list and vice versa
3. Why is this done from provincial to federal direction in this case?
c. Politics says Ryder
d. Court draws distinction between provincial civil rights and federal trade and commerce
viii. Application of three steps
1. What is the matter?
a. Dominant characteristic is regulation of insurance contracts wholly situate in province ( property in province
i. But, doesn’t most activity take place in one province?
ii. Federal jurisdiction has to be acted out on provincial territory anyway
1. b.c. federal doesn’t have same borders as provinces do
2. Only a few exclusive federal areas in country
3. Illogical then
2. What is the scope of potential heads of power
b. Usually start with heads of power of enacting government
iii. Looks at S.92(13) ( property and civil rights
1. “Civil rights” needs to be defined broadly
2. Used Quebec as example ( idea must be that Q has jurisdiction to create own civil code
c. Then, federal
iv. What is scope of trade and commerce?
1. Reading it down so that it doesn’t cover broad reading of property and civil rights
2. Look at UK law
3. If ‘trade’ is so broad, why do they also list ‘banking’ and ‘bills exchange’, etc.?
4. Trade and commerce covers three things
a. Regulation of trade requiring sanction of parliament
b. “First and second branches” of trade and commerce power
i. Regulation of inter-provincial and international trade
ii. General regulation of trade affecting whole dominion
5. Parsons is seen as limiting trade and commerce
a. Gives more power to provincial property and civil rights
3. Takes legislation and matching it up
d. Legislation falls under provincial property and civil rights
e. Parsons wins
R. v. Morgentaler (1993 SCC) ( pith and substance analysis
a. Background
i. About politics around abortion after striking down federal abortion legislation
ii. Nova Scotia passes law ( abortions (and other procedures) done outside of hospital illegal
• Summary offence, fine of $10,000 - 50,000 (very large for provincial)
iii. Morgentaler charged under this law
iv. Challenges this law as being unconstitutional
v. Court finds pith and substance of this law is criminal law
• In this case, dispute is about first stage of process (what is the matter?)
vi. Activist decision
vii. Example of modern paradigm
• Decision doesn’t say that there is a clear, bright lineeg
b. Dixon, J. for Court
i. Three steps in classification
ii. This is an “interlocking process”
• The steps are going to interact with each other
iii. Mix of politics
c. Three steps
i. What is the matter ( pith and substance?
• Look to purpose of legislation and effect
• Legal effect
a. What are legal terms of the legislation?
b. Four corners of law
• Practical effect
a. How does this affect society as a whole – what actually happens?
i. To define these two things, also look outside of text ( extrinsic materials (not all judges are open to this, however)
v. Hansard debates – records of debates and speeches
vi. Government reports, white papers
vii. Course of events
• Looks to evidence and concludes that dominant characteristic is to restrict abortion
• Rejects provinces argument that it’s about health and hospitals
a. No evidence that abortions are dangerous
b. Wasn’t until second reading of bill that concerns about privatization were raised
c. No evidence of study about cost/quality
d. List of procedures that are not allowed outside of hospitals are unrelated to each other
• Severe penalties are allowed, but atypical of provincial penalties ( need to look regulatory, not punitive
a. Each piece of evidence raises inference that this law intrudes on federal criminal power
i. Legal effect
1. Four corners
a. Prohibit activity that is traditionally thought to be within federal jurisdiction
b. Actually replicates wording of federal code
2. Extrinsic evidence
a. Wording is same as criminal code
b. Timing of legislation is suspicious
i. Right after Morgentaler announces opening of clinic
ii. Hasty legislation
c. History of legislation itself
i. Indicates central concern of legislators was to stop Morgentaler
d. Colourability
ii. Sometimes governments pass laws made to look like it falls under its jurisdiction ( “colourable”
iii. Government of Nova Scotia “dressed” up law to make it look like health care, when it knew it couldn’t legislate this
iv. Supreme Court doesn’t come out and say this, however
4. Legislation is so wrong on its face, it couldn’t be colourable
5. It’s pretty bad to say a law is colourable
6. Instead, merely says it’s ultra vires
Incidental Effects.
a. Dickson, J: Pith and Substance Doctrine
i. Looks at dominant characteristics and tolerate incidental effects
ii. A law that is in its p and s can remain valid even if it has these incidental effects outside its jurisdiction
iii. Federal laws may be valid even if they have an effect in provincial jurisdiction
iv. vice-versa with provincial laws
b. Dominant vs. Incidental effects
c. Dickson: Bottom of page 226
i. Overlap expected and accommodated in a federal state
ii. Judicial restraint in knocking down such legislation
iii. Doctrine is part of modern paradigm
d. Setting up possibility of conflict between federal and provincial
e. Examples
i. Street solicitation for sex
1. Province passes regulation of public nuisance
a. Incidental effects of punishing / prohibiting prostitution (normally federal)
ii. Navigation and shipping
1. Federal regulates
a. Incidental effect of labour (provincial)
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing (1989 SCC) – necessary incidental doctrine
• Sometimes will be a “bold foray” into other jurisdiction
• Compare this to incidental effects
• Special handling of this by courts
• Trade and Commerce case
• Illustration of Modern Paradigm
• Challenge to Federal Competition Act (formerly Combines Investigation Act)
• Federal government tried to enact anti-monopoly legislation in between 1st and 2nd World Wars under various powers
• Repeatedly frustrated by courts
• Successful in setting it up under criminal law power
• Challenge to S.33.1 ( civil action authorized for remedy
• Normally, this would fall under provincial jurisdiction
• Why would criminal statute create civil remedy (policy point of view)?
• Different burden of proof
• Public policing of each other
• Effective and cost-effective enforcement
• Used as a “test case” by attorney general
o Didn’t like narrowing of trade and commerce power
o Argued that civil part of act was valid exercise of power
• Offensive provision isn’t too intrusive and sufficiently part of otherwise valid legislation
• Dickson (a centrist) – re: “Watertight Compartments” (p. 227)
• Undertow against strong pull of pith and substance
• Pith and Substance is dominant paradigm
• Most of time courts will permit some overlap and uphold the law even if it affects incidentally.
• Facts
• CNL leasing trucks, most of which financed through GMAC; Alleges GMAC is giving better deals to competitors; Violates price discrimination provisions; Sues GM
• GM argues that part of statute is outside powers of federal legislation
o Most provinces agree (except Quebec)
• Federal government says not only constitutional, but is so under Trade and Commerce power
• Whole statute not impuned, only this one provision that sets up civil action
• Reasoning
• Necessarily Incidental Doctrine (“Ancillary Doctrine”)
– three step process
o ONE: Does challenged provision intrude on other jurisdiction? If so, how much? Look at it ALONE…
▪ Does it have a matter, dominant characteristic that is in the other jurisdiction
▪ If NO, you’re done.
▪ If YES, how much does it intrude into power of other jurisdiction?
• Spectrum1: Minimum, moderate, high?
▪ GM case: clear intrusion, but not that serious
• Remedial
• Limited scope
• Federal govt. not precluded from creating civil action
o TWO: Is whole statute constitutionally valid?
▪ Is there a head of power under which the rest of statute falls?
▪ If NO, you’re done
▪ GM case: Legislation falls under Trade and Commerce – it’s valid
o THREE: If one and two are true, see how integrated, connected the challenged provision is to the whole statute
▪ Based on integration and degree of intrusion, is it constitutional?
• Put the conclusions of stage ONE and TWO and put them together
• Is there a significant connection between the provision and the statute as a whole?
• Is the provision “functionally related to the general objective of the legislation, and to the structure and the content of the scheme”?
• Spectrum 2: “tacked on” to “integral”
o If highly intrusive, you need high standard of integration
• Sufficiency of integration is matching up degree of intrusion with degree of integration
• GM case: provision meets the test – limited intrusion and functionally significant integration; not really major upset in the big scheme of things
• What is difference between Pith and Substance doctrine and Necessarily Incidental?
o Not really clear, but seems to be a matter of degree
▪ How much does statute intrude (what is impact of legislation)?
• If a lot, might need to use NID analysis
• If not too much, might just ignore incidental effects
Double Aspect doctrine
a. Lederman excerpt on p. 231
i. Mutual modification as a way of eliminating some of the encroachment of the lists in ss. 91 and 92 on each other…uses the example from Parsons to illustrate this…
ii. imparts, he argues, a degree of exclusivity…
iii. nevertheless some overlapping remains…three things have then been done
1. Tolerate it
a. overlapping nature of the challenged law has been ignored as only an incidental affect and the law classified in terms of its dominant effect within its own jurisdiction
i. decision that the feature of the law that overlaps is unimportant relative to its intra vires feature
b. This is Pith and Substance doctrine
2. Ancillary Doctrine
a. Not mentioned by Lederman…
b. If overlapping feature is significant, direct intrusion into other jurisdiction, then have option of using ancillary doctrine as set out in GM to save it…
3. What if the contrast between the two features is not sharp enough to dismiss one or the other as incidental effect? or, what if one is not clearly a minor part of a larger scheme?
a. Ancillary doctrine doesn’t seem workable then
b. Courts have come up with the double-aspect doctrine…conclusion that challenged rule can be enacted by either fed or prov…that it has a federal aspect and a separate provincial aspect…
i. --under this understanding may well be a valid fed law dealing with same persons about some things also dealt with by valid prov law…
ii. Associated with Ryder’s modern paradigm
1. tolerates overlap between the fed and prov jurisdictions
c. Law has essentially two matters - one federal and the other provincial.
d. And the court considers the fed and prov features of the law to be of roughly equivalent importance, such that neither can be ignored or termed incidental for the purposes of classification of the law.
e. No other guideline exists for determining that a ct will find the situation to be a double aspect one, rather than choose between the federal and provincial features of the challenged law.
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (SCC 1982)
a. Deals with issue of overlap and provides discussion of double aspect doctrine
b. Different from the cases we have looked at so far in one important aspect? - 2 pieces of legislation – (required for double aspect)
FACTS:
• MA = federally incorporated company, incorporated under CBCA which contains prohibitions against insider trading...
• Charges brought against Pres McCutcheon, a director and two senior officers for violating provisions against insider trading in the Ontario Securities legislation...
• Brought at the instance of the company...provisions of Ont leg provide that any person who is a shareholder can apply to the court and ask for an order compelling the securities commission to proceed against the wrongdoers on behalf of the corporation.
• Federal Companies Act does the same thing - Different regulatory mechanism, but basically a shareholder can get a judicial order that compels a fed official to investigate...
• Pres and directors of MA used their inside knowledge of an upcoming deal between MA and Canadian Marconi...brought stock in their own company in anticipation of deal...bought law...then sold high when deal became known and raised stock prices...
• Charged under Ont. Legislation...
• Argue that leg is ultra vires Ont...or, alternatively and more convincingly, that the federal legislation is paramount and therefore the Ont legislation is suspended...(latter is their major defence).
• Note: Ont provisions and fed provision are almost exactly the same...mirror images of each other...duplication
• Also, can't be charged under the fed scheme because statute of limitations...time for feds to charge has expired...so if they manage to escape liability under Ont leg, then go free
ANALYSIS
• Both pieces of legislation regulate the same behaviour: insider trading
• Ultimately, this case is about paramountcy rule: if there are two pieces of conflicting legislation then the federal is paramount.
STEPS to Double Aspect Doctrine
1) Look at each of the two pieces of legislation on its own
2) Is it intra or ultra vires?
a. essentially, do a pith and substance analysis of each
b. Looked at the federal legislation
i. Is it in pith and substance related to a federal head of power?
1. If not, then strike down
c. If it is, conduct similar inquiry in relation to provincial leg alone.
d. If you have two pieces of equally valid legislation of roughly equal importance, then move on to the parmountcy stage of the inquiry.
Note: The Court's question of what is the pith and substance of each piece of leg is not the same question as what is the field
i. In the field of real life activity, what is being regulated is insider trading.
ii. The pith and substance of the fed leg is fundamental corporate relationships: duties and obligations of directors and senior officers to shareholders.
iii. The pith and substance of provincial legislation is trading in securities, a broader head of power.
iv. Different matters or different pith and subst can attach to the same field.
Field = area of human activity being regulated. Not the same as matter – has to do with activity - In this case, field = insider trading
v. What is this federal company law power? Dickson points to a 1915 cases, Wharton, in which JCPC said that feds can set up statutes for incorporation of companies under both general branch of s. 91(2) and POGG...so this is just part of this jurisdiction...power goes well beyond incorporation…extends to matters such as protection of creditors, interests of shareholders…aspects of internal ordering…see discussion on middle of p. 243…
e. Concludes: Insider trading is a double aspect field...
i. has a prov securities aspect and a fed companies law aspect...and that both are of roughly equivalent importance...two different things going on in the same field…regulation of corporate relations and regulation of insider trading…
ii. Court is cautious about the identification of double aspect field... doesn’t undermine the division of powers divide that much...not everything will have a double aspect...
iii. Some examples of limited number of double aspect field...temperance, insolvency, highways, trading stamps, observance of Sunday...
f. Dickson: can't just stop and say that cross jurisdictional effects are simply only incidental effects and can be tolerated...can't do this as have both fed and prov occupying the field...extensive overlap
i. Court says on p. 235: Double aspect doctrine is applicable when the contrast between the relative importance of the two features is not so sharp…here corporate-security fed and prov characteristics of insider trading leg are roughly equal in importance…so keep both valid…
ii. If ct doesn’t want to find is a double aspect field
1. find one law ultra vires…labour regulation good example where this happens…
iii. Whether ct will or won’t find double aspect depends on ct’s attitude towards behaviour under regulation (Dickson in case talks about social undesirability of insider trading) as well as on theory of federalism or theory of state… (Centralism, modern paradigm)
g. Defendants tried another argument in addition to federal Paramountcy – Interjurisdictional Immunity
i. MA is a fed regulated company being charged under a prov law...argue that fed regulated entities are immune from such prov regulations...have iji
ii. Dickson rejects this argument...says only have immunity to extent that prov rules sterilise or impair companies...this fed law doesn't prevent company from functioning as a company so no iji
iii. Dickson also says that prov leg in no way singles out fed companies for special, targeted treatment...if prov did this, would be another way of offending division of powers...doctrine of singling out...
iv. Instead, prov law is a law of general application (applies to all companies) which happens to incidentally affect federal entities...
h. So Dickson, after these detours, turns to the main argument, the argument about Paramountcy...articulates express conflict test for when paramountcy applies
i. why doesn’t Dickson simply treat this as a pith and substance/incidental effect situation for each law?
i. Can’t do this where actually have two laws that potentially conflict…use incidental effect when have just one law and the spillover is into jurisdiction that other gov’t hasn’t legislated over or filled up…or if have two laws and no real possibility of conflict or overlap…
Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine
I. Background
a. So far, what we’ve covered talks about validity
1. Now, talking about applicability
a. Shift in consequences
i. If legislation is read down, rendered inapplicable to the extent that it touches area it’s not supposed to touch
b. Immunizes federal legislation
c. Only provincial law is read down
b. Pith and Substance has tolerance for incidental effects
i. IJI is big exception to allowing overlap of legislation
c. Provides to some areas of federal legislation IMMUNITY from any effect of provincial legislation (even incidental)
d. More in line with Classical paradigm – watertight compartments
i. Dickson characterizes this as “undertow” – not dominant tide
e. Criticized
i. Not available to provincial jurisdiction
ii. Watertight aspect
Steps
a. Start with Pith and substance analysis of provincial legislation
iii. If not valid, stop there – law is invalid
b. If it’s valid, but incidental effects in federal jurisdiction
c. Is this an area of Interjurisdictional Immunity?
iv. If yes, then area where provincial law touches federal it is invalid
v. Will invalidate incidental effects
vi. Technique is READING DOWN
1. Given interpretation that takes away those effects
d. How do you know what areas?
vii. Look at case law
1. Regulation over Indians and lands reserved for Indians
2. Federal regulation of companies
3. See McKay
e. Controversial
viii. Doesn’t apply to provinces
f. If there wasn’t this provision, though federal govt could pass its own law and claim paramountcy
McKay v. The Queen (SCC 1965) – early IJI case
a. Facts
i. Charged with displaying an election sign in violation of municipal bylaw
ii. Challenged that this is covered under federal, not provincial
iii. Municipalities are creatures of provincial government
1. Power comes from provincial jurisdiction
b. Pre-charter protection of civil rights case
i. Freedom of speech, expression
ii. Can infringement of this right happen at the provincial level
iii. Courts say such rights can only be infringed at federal level
c. Cartwright, J says two rules
i. One: general rules should be given meaning that best suits the scope of the legislation
ii. Two: if possible, will give interpretation that is reasonable and constitutional = judicial restraint
d. What kind of interpretation should be given to this statute when a broad reading would prohibit this sign?
i. Any activity that infringes on election would be ultra vires a province
ii. Legislation can’t do something indirectly that it can’t do directly
1. If it singled out federal election signs – would be invalid
2. Can’t do this indirectly either
iii. Statute has to be interpreted so that federal election signs aren’t covered
1. Reads law down
e. This is a case of inter-jurisdictional immunity
i. This area of federal jurisdiction is immunized
ii. Statute is read down to protect the federal jurisdiction
f. Martland – Dissent
i. Parliament hasn’t ruled on this subject, so no conflict
ii. No exclusive jurisdiction of federal government in this area
iii. No rule that provincial legislation can’t incidentally limit speech
Bell Canada #1 (1966 SCC) – rule about federal undertakings = IJI
a. Facts
i. Provincial Legislation regulating minimum wage, working conditions, etc.
ii. Wants to escape regulation, so uses federalism to get out of provisions of provincial legislation
iii. Provincial government argues their statute does apply
1. At least until a federal law comes out
2. If doesn’t apply, no regulation for Bell
iv. What matters fall in 92(10)?
b. Martland –
i. 91(29)
3. Matters lie within exclusive jurisdiction of federal
ii. What lies in jurisdiction of federal govt.
4. Area of federal jurisdiction that is exclusive control
5. Must have complete, sole control over what is vitally part of that undertaking
iii. Grant of immunity over federally regulated undertaking
6. That is at the vital core of this
iv. Is this a minor aspect or vital part of the undertaking
7. If so, immunity issue
v. Minimum wage IS vital part, so provinces can’t regulate this
8. Legislation touches vital or essential part of running of federally regulated operation, so lies immunized from provincial impact
c. Legislation is Read Down so not applicable to that area
i. Reading down is permanent
Bell Canada #2 (1988 SCC) – IJI; upholds Bell #1
a. Provincial law – pregnant woman has right to move away from computer monitor
i. A pattern emerges of provinces trying to protect under-represented populations
b. Beetz, J –
ii. Summary of relevant rules (propositions 1-5)
• Provincial jurisdiction over health
• Provincial jurisdiction over labour relations and working conditions
• Federal jurisdiction over labour relations and working conditions in federal undertakings
o Federal jurisdiction in this area is exclusive
▪ Prohibits legislation that affects labour relations directly
o IJI applies to some, but not all, areas of federal jurisdiction
▪ Read the cases to know which
▪ E.g. railways, lands reserved for Indians, etc.
▪ IJI applies to CORE of federal juris. over these things
▪ We’re dealing with core of federally-regulated undertakings
• Fourth proposition – summary of case law
• Fifth proposition – summary of double-aspect doctrine
o Later in the decision, says double-aspect isn’t relevant here
o One ought to be cautious when finding double-aspect areas
▪ Would end up with one big jurisdiction
▪ Would be resolved with paramountcy
▪ Risky for keeping up a strong provincial jurisdiction because it ends up in favor of federal
iii. Upholds Bell #1
• Had been criticized
o because IJI is contrary to modern paradigm
o Why do you have to give immunity to fed, since they have paramountcy
• Explicitly says this is federal exclusivity
o Part of unassailable exclusivity
o To deny this would undermine the federal government from having exclusive jurisdiction in this area
• P. 250 Concurrent powers
▪ Different than overlapping powers
▪ Different from double-aspect
▪ In practice, this is the same, but the term should be reserved for those concurrent
• Paramountcy
o Although it enables federal government to pass its own legislation, that is often ineffective and inefficient
• Bell #2 adds new twist
o Federally regulated and federally incorporated are not the same
▪ Federal jurisdiction comes from different place
▪ Different grants of power [S. 91(29) and 92(10)]
o In past, they were treated alike re: iji
▪ Needed to show “impairment or sterilization”
o Now, there is a specific test for federally regulated undertaking
▪ Test for “vital and essential” part
▪ This is a less stringent test
• Provincial leg. doesn’t necessary have to impair or sterilize now
▪ Impairment or sterilization test isn’t necessary
▪ Example of impairment or sterilization
• Province passes law that prevents company from exerting federally legislated rights
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec AG (1989 SCC) – direct effect on vital/essential part ( IJI
o Facts
▪ Province regulating market actor again
• Limiting / regulating television advertising to kids
▪ Regulated commercial expression as well as iji issue
o Further qualification to the test
▪ In relation to Vital and Essential Part test
• Effect on federal legislation must be DIRECT – then IJI
• If indirect effect – even if it has impact on vital and essential part – NO IJI
• What is difference between direct and indirect
o Direct regulation is for advertiser
o Indirect effect is for broadcaster (federally regulated undertaking)
o Is it about regulating this particular entity (direct)?
▪ What about relation to Impair and Sterilization test?
• That effect can be direct or indirect
• Pith and substance tolerates incidental effects, IJI doesn’t
o Pith and substance applies more often
o IJI applies when provincial legislation hits in power that DEFINES federal jurisdiction
Paramountcy
Background
i. Several doctrines tolerate overlap between federal and provincial
1. pith and substance
2. ancillary
3. double-aspect
ii. When there’s a conflict – use paramountcy
iii. Framers understood 91 and 92 to be watertight compartments, so no explicit stipulation on what to do
iv. Judiciary set up own response to this problem = federal paramountcy
v. Paramountcy ( where there is a conflict, the federal law will be paramount; the provincial legislation will be inoperative as so far as the conflict.
1. What is a conflict?
2. The solution is provincial leg. is INOPERATIVE, not invalid
3. MUST have two pieces of legislation: federal and provincial
Steps
i. First, PITH and SUBSTANCE on each piece of legislation on its own – is it valid?
1. If one is invalid, no problem ( no more conflict
ii. Second, is there a conflict between them (THIS is the paramountcy doctrine)
2. Continuum of positions on conflict taken by courts (narrow to broad, from high threshold in defining conflict to low threshold)
a. e.g. Fed leg: .08 alc; Prov leg: .06
b. Express Conflict ( impossibility of dual compliance
i. E.g. Multiple Access v. McCutcheon
ii. Focus on individual – can ind. obey both laws together?
iii. High threshold of where conflict arises
iv. Permits more overlap
c. Incompatibility of Intent ( range of analysis in the middle
i. Look at more than whether federal govt. is present
ii. Look at federal intent, records ( why law was made
d. Covering the Field ( negative implication; presence of federal government in the field means federal govt intends to cover the field
i. Focus is on whether there is a federal law or not
ii. Broad understanding, threshold of conflict
iii. Tolerates no overlap
iv. e.g. Bank of Montreal v. Hall
iii. Provincial law is inoperable ( cannot have effect on federal jurisdiction where there is a conflict
3. Not permanently inoperable, since if federal law is removed there won’t be a conflict
4. Inapplicability is permanent ( law cannot apply to that area of jurisdiction (for Interjurisdictional immunity)
e. Only inapplicable to area where govt. is immunized
f. Happens even when there isn’t a federal law on the books
Ross v. Register of Motor Vehicles (1975 SCC) – incompatibility of intent test
• Facts – guy convicted of drunk driving. Federal judge says license not suspended, province suspended it anyway
• Analysis
1. Both found to be intra vires
2. Judge rules thing that he didn’t have right to – ultra vires in that part
3. Applies “covering the field” test and decides ‘NO’, govt. isn’t trying to exclude all legislation
4. Applies incompatibility of intent test
a. Was it the intention of the fed govt. that this should be the only law?
b. Toleration of overlap for highway safety issues – policy
c. Court discusses the Australian rule of fed Paramountcy...inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two laws but in the intention of the paramount leg to express by its enactment what shall be the law governing a particular conduct or activity...when a fed statute discloses such an intention, it is inconsistent with it for the law of a state to govern the same conduct...p. 258
d. Court says if were to apply this question...would say that Parl did not intend to state exhaustively the law in this area...therefore would find no conflict...and prov order stands
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 SCC) – narrow application of paramountcy doctrine
• Two pieces of legislation almost identically overlapping
• Analysis
➢ Under coving the field, there would be no question
➢ Decides a conflict will only exist in very few cases
➢ Lots of overlap will be tolerated
➢ Modern paradigm
➢ Paramountcy does not apply – can comply with both laws without problem
➢ “Watershed” cases – new approach to conflict under paramountcy
➢ Can regulated individual meet requirements of both laws?
M & D Farm v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit (1999 SCC) – impossibility of dual compliance
iv. Court being asked under federal stay proceedings to stop action by bank, province asks proceedings to commence
5. Bank could wait until stay ended and commence new proceedings
6. Instead, asked court to go ahead at same time - conflict
v. Impossibility of dual compliance
7. Provincial law inoperative
Bank of Montreal v. Hall (1990 SCC) – incompatibility of intent; middle position
➢ Farmer has loan and defaults; Federal has jurisdiction over banks; Statute states that if farmer defaults, bank can seize equipment immediately; Provincial law says that creditor must serve notice on debtor first; General application – not just banks; Bank takes foreclosure proceedings without notice
➢ Analysis
o Bank COULD comply with both if it served notice, acting by stricter regime – so no imcompatibility (?)
o Looks at intent of parliament
▪ To facilitate regime of lending money to farmers
▪ Wanted to give powers to banks to reclaim money more easily
▪ Point was to remove any delay or protection of debtor if default
▪ That is the conflict
o Not occupying field test, not express conflict test
vi. Decision – provincial law inoperative
Husky Oil v. MNR (1995 SCC) – Interjurisdictional immunity case: see p. 270 note 6
• Case was resolved using IJI (applicability) rather than paramountcy
• Sask. Worker’s compensation law found inapplicable to bankruptcies
Law Society of BC v. Mangat (2001 SCC) – legislative intent
• Can non lawyers appear before immigration hearings?
• Analysis
i. Court says a double-aspect to this
1. Statutes from both levels can coexist as long as there is no conflict
a. If conflict, provincial law is inoperable
b. What is intent of the federal law?
c. Representing without a fee indicates it’s parliament’s intention to broaden the number of people who can be at these hearings
Spraytech v. Hudson (2001 SCC) – incompatibility of intent test
• Pesticide use, federal say can use , provincial law says not; company uses it
• Analysis
1. Incompatibility of intent test – examination of intent is CLUE
a. Bank of Montreal v. Hall approach.
2. Federal law is permissive, not mandatory
3. So, no conflict; no federal paramountcy
4. Purpose of federal legislation is not that you HAVE to use the pesticide, but that you’re allowed to use it.
5. It is okay that bylaw goes further
I. Continuum reviewed
a. Court doesn’t use the “occupying the field” test any longer
b. More often used
i. Dual compliance (see Multiple Access)
1. Is it possible to comply with both?
ii. Frustration of Parliamentary Intent (see Bank of Montreal)
1. Despite the fact that dual compliance is possible, does the provincial legislation frustrate the intent of the federal law
2. E.g. Mangat
a. Could comply with both laws, but the federal intent was to have greater access to immigration system
b. Wanted to set up system that was less formal
3. Contrast to Spraytech (which wasn’t Frustration ex.)
a. Legislation was permissive
b. Fed didn’t care whether pesticide was used or not
Rothmans v. Saskatchewan (2005, SCC)
a. Overview
i. Tries to render inoperative provincial laws that limit advertising in places where kids go
ii. Two pieces of legislation, federal and provincial
iii. Saskatchewan sets out parameters, Rothmans says it’s inoperative
b. Analysis
i. Court First looks at dual compliance
ii. Then, looks at the frustration factor
iii. para. 14: A provincial enactment must not frustrate the purpose of a federal enactment, whether by making it possible to comply with the latter or by some other means. In this way, impossibility of dual compliance is sufficient but not the only test for inconsistency
iv. Then – if there can be dual compliance, does the provincial legislation frustrate the intent of the federal legislation
v. Look at general and specific provision
vi. Finds that dual compliance is possible, and does not frustrate the federal intent
vii. Attorney General of Canada says there is no inconsistency also – helpful, but not conclusive
II. Reading down under paramountcy
a. It’s not permanent
b. If the conflict is removed, there is no longer a problem
c. However, interpretation of heads of power is permanent
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (2005 SCC)
Does federal government have jurisdiction to grant maternity benefits and parental benefits to individuals who take time off of work? As a result of this decision, Quebec got an agreement to run its own program with expansive benefits.
Pith and substance analysis – look at what is being challenged (if that fails, go to necessarily incidental, or just incidental effect)
Para 8: rare that subjects fall entirely in one head of power
Outlines pith and substance
Not watertight compartments
Discussion of double-aspect, necessarily incidental
Living tree metaphor – model was, generally, women weren’t in the workforce; this has changed
Characteristics of federalism may vary, one court to another, and involves POLITICS
para 15. Pith and substance: purpose, practical and legal effects
23: Purpose of benefits –
27: Effects – used to assess constitutional validity
34: Dominant characteristic – replace employment income of women
36: What head of power?
45+ :Give progressive and dynamic interpretation to that head of power
Ongoing politics of people relying on progressive interpretation to argue for more federal involvement in maternity benefits
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Schedule A
Con Act, 1982
Canada Act, 1982
Schedule
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