A HISTORY PHILOSOPHY - Dominican House of Studies

A History of Philosophy by Frederick Copleston, S.J.

VOLUME I: GREECE AND ROME

From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus

VOLUME II: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

From Augustine to Duns Scotus

VOLUME III: LATE MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY

Ockham, Francis Bacon, and the Beginning of the Modern World

VOLUME IV: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From Descartes to Leibniz

VOLUME V: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The British Philosophers from Hobbes to Hume

VOLUME VI: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the French Enlightenment to Kant

"VOLUME VII: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche

"VOLUME VIII: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Empiricism, Idealism, and Pragmatism in Britain and America

"VOLUME IX: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the French Revolution to Sartre, Camus, and Levi-Strauss "Available March 1994

A HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY

A HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME IV

Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Leibniz

Frederick Copleston, S.J.

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First Image Books edition of Volume IV of The History of Philosophy published 1963 by special arrangement with The Newman Press and Burns & Oates, Ltd.

This Image edition published January 1994.

De Licentia Superioru.m Ordinis: J. D. Boyle, S.J., Praep. Provo Angliae

Nihil Obstat: J. L. Russell, S.J., Censor Deputatus

Imprimatur: Franciscus, Archiepiscopus Birmingamiensis Birmingamiae die 25 Julii 1957

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Copleston, Frederick Charles. A history of philosophy.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Contents: V. 1. Greece and Rome-[etc.]-

V. 4. From Descartes to Leibniz-v. 5. The British

philosophers from Hobbes to Hume-v. 6. From the

French Enlightenment to Kant.

1. Philosophy-History. I. Title.

B72.C62 1993

190

92-34997

ISBN 0-385-47041-X

Volume IV copyright ? 1960 by Frederick Copleston

All Rights Reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

PREFACE

Prill

xi

I. INTRODUCTION

1

Continuity and novelty: the early phase of modem philosophy in its relation to mediaeval and Renaissance thought-Continental rationalism: its nature, its relation to scepticism and to neoStoicism, its development-British empiricism: its nature and its development-The seventeenth century-The eighteenth century-Political philosophy-The rise of the philosophy of history-Immanuel Kant.

II. DESCARTES (I)

Life and works-Descartes' aim-His idea of method-The theory of innate ideas-Methodic doubt.

III. DESCARTES (2)

Cogito, "go sum-Thinking and the thinker-The criterion of truth-The existence of God-The accusation of a vicious circle-The explanation of error-The certainty of mathematics -The ontolOgIcal argument for God's existence.

IV. DESCARTES (3)

u6

The existence of bodies-Substances and their principal attributes-The relation between mind and body.

V. DESCARTES (4)

124

The qualities of bodies-Descartes and the dogma of transubstantiation-Space and place-Motion-Duration and timeThe origin of motion-The laws of motion-The divine activity in the world-Living bodies.

VI. DESCARTES (5)

139

Man's awareness of freedom-Freedom and God-Provisional ethics and moral science-The passions and their control-The nature of the good-Comments on Descartes' ethical ideasGeneral remarks about Descartes.

VII. PASCAL ?

153

Life and spirit of Pascal-The geometrical method, its scope and limits-'The heart'-Pascal's method in apologetics-The wretchedness and the greatness of man-The wager-argumentPascal as a philosopher.

VIII. CARTESIANISM: ?

174

The spread of Cartesianism-Geullncx and the problem of interaction.

vii

VIII

CONTENTS

Chapter

IX. MALEBRANCHE

Life and writings-The senses, the imagination, the understanding; avoidance of error and attainment of truth-God as the only true cause-Human liberty-The vision of eternal truths in God-Empirical knowledge of the soul-Knowledge of other minds and of the existence of bodies-God's existence and attributcs-Malebranche in relation to Spinoza, Descartes and Berkeley-The influence of Malebranche.

Page 180

X. SPINOZA (I)

205

Life-Works-The geometrical method-The influence of other

philosophies on Spinoza's thought-Interpretations of Spinoza's philosophy.

XI. SPINOZA (2)

214

Substance and its attributes-Infinite modes-The production of finite modes-Mind and body-The elimination of final causality.

XII. SPINOZA (3)

230

Spinoza's levels or degrees of knowledge-Confused experience; universal ideas; falsity-Scientific knowledge-Intuitive know-

ledge.

XIII. SPINOZA (4)

Spinoza's intention in his account of human emotions and conduct-The eonatus; pleasure and pain-The derived emotionsPassive and active emotions-Servitude and freedom-The intellectual love of God-The 'eternity' of the human mind-An inconsistency in Spinoza's ethics.

XIV. SPINOZA (5)

Natural right-The foundation of political society-Sovereignty and government-Relations between States-Freedom and toleration-Spinoza's influence and different estimates of his philosophy.

XV. LEIBNIZ (I)

Life-The De al't, combinatoria and the idea of harmonyWritings-Different interpretations of Leibniz's thought.

XVI. LEIBNIZ (2)

273

The distinction between truths of reason and truths of factTruths of reason or necessary propositions-Truths of fact or contingent propositions-The principle of perfection-Substance -The identity of indiscernibles-The law of continuity-The 'panlogism' of Leibniz.

XVII. LEIBNIZ (3)

295

Simple substances or monads-Entelechies and prime matterExtension-Body and corporeal substance-Space and timeThe pre-established harmony-Perception and appetite-Soul and body-Innate ideas.

CONTENTS

IX

Chapter

XVIII. LEIBNIZ (4)

The ontological argument-The argument to God's existence

from eternal truths-The argument from truths of fact-The

argument from the pre-established harmony-The problem of evil-Progress and history.

ApPENDIX: A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

333

INDEX

347

PREFACE

AT the end of Volume III of this History of Philosophy I expressed the hope of covering the period from Descartes up to and including Kant in the fourth volume. I meant, of course, that I hoped to discuss the whole of this part of modem philosophy in one book. This hope, however, has not been fulfilled. I have found myself compelled to devote three books to the period in question. And for the sake of convenience I have made each of these three books a separate volume. Volume IV, Descartes to Leibniz, deals with the great rationalist systems of philosophy on the Continent in the pre-Kantian period. In Volume V, Hobbes to Hume, I discuss the development of British philosophy from Hobbes up to and including the Scottish philosophy of common sense. In Volume VI, Wolff to Kant, I shall treat of the French Enlightenment and of Rousseau, of the German Enlightenment, of the rise of the philosophy of history from Vico to Herder, and finally of the system of Immanuel Kant. The title, Wolff to Kant, is certainly not ideal; but in view of the fact that in his pre-critical days Kant stood in the Wolffian tradition there is at least something to be said in its favour, whereas a title such as Voltaire to Kant would be extremely odd.

As in former volumes, I have divided the matter according to philosophers rather than by following out the development of first one and then another philosophical problem. Furthermore, I have treated some philosophers at considerable length. And though I think that division of the matter according to philosophers is the most convenient division for the readers whom I have principally in mind, this method certainly has its disadvantages. Faced by a number of different thinkers and by more or less detailed descriptions of their ideas, the reader may fail to grasp the general picture. Further, though I think that the old division into continental rationalism and British empiricism is justified, provided that a number of qualifications are added, a rigid adherence to this scheme is apt to give the impression that continental philosophy and British philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries moved on two sets of parallel straight lines, each developing in entire independence of the other. And this is an erroneous impression. Descartes exercised a modest

xi

XII

PREFACE

influence on British thought; Berkeley was influenced by Malcbranche; Spinoza's political ideas owed something to Hobbes; and the philosophy of Locke, who wrote in the seventeenth century, exercised a great influence on the thought of the French Enlightenment in the eighteenth century.

As a partial remedy for the disadvantages attending the method of division which I have chosen I decided to write an introductory chapter designed to give the reader a general picture of the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It thus covers the matter discussed in Volumes IV, V and VI, which, as I have said, I originally hoped to deal with in one volume. I have, of course, placed this introduction at the beginning of Volume IV; and there will therefore be no introductory chapters in Volumes V and VI. A descriptive introduction of this sort inevitably involves a good deal of repetition. That is to say, ideas which are discussed in later chapters at greater length and in more detail are roughly outlined in the introduction. None the less, I consider that the advantages to be gained by including a general descriptive introduction greatly outweigh the accompanying disadvantages.

At the end of each of the three previous volumes I have added a 'Concluding Review'. But just as the introduction covers the matter dealt with in Volumes IV, V and VI, so will the Concluding Review. It will therefore be placed at the end of Volume VI, that is, after the exposition of Kant's philosophy. In the course of this Concluding Review I propose to discuss, not only from an historical but also from a more philosophical point of view, the nature, importance and value of the various styles of philosophizing of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I think that it is better to reserve such discussion until after the historical exposition of the thought of the period than to interrupt this exposition with general philosophical reflections.

Finally a word about references. References such as 'Vol. II, ch. XL' or 'See vol. III, pp. 322-4' refer to this History of Philosophy. As for references to the writings of the philosophers with whom I deal, I have tried to give these in a form which will be of use to the student who wishes to look them up. Some historians and expositors have the practice of giving references according to volume and page of the recognized critical edition, when such exists, of the writings of the philosopher in question. But I am doubtful of the wisdom of adhering exclusively to this practice in

PREFACE

XIII

a volume such as the present. In the chapters on Descartes, for example, I have indeed cited the volume and page of the AdamTannery edition; but I have also given references, where feasible, according to chapter and section or part and section of the work in question. The number of people who have easy access to the Adam-Tannery edition is extremely limited, just as few people possess the recent splendid critical edition of Berkeley. But cheap editions of the more important writings of the leading philosophers are easily obtainable; and in my opinion references should be given with a view to the convenience of students who possess such editions rather than to that of the few who possess or have access to the recognized critical editions.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Continuity and novelty: the early phase of modern PhilosoPhy in its relation to mediaeval and Renaissance thought-Continental rationalism: its nature, its relation to scepticism and to neo-Stoicism, its developme1u-British empiricism: its nature and its development-The seventeenth centur:;I-The eighteenth

century-Political philosophy-The rise of the Philosophy 0/

history-Immanuel Kant.

I. MODERN philosophy is generally said to have begun with Descartes (1596-1650) or with Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England and with Descartes in France. It is not perhaps immediately evident with what justification the term 'modern' is applied to the thought of the seventeenth century. But its use clearly implies that there is a break between mediaeval and postmediaeval philosophy and that each possesses important characteristics which the other does not possess. And the seventeenthcentury philosophers were certainly convinced that there was a sharp division between the old philosophical traditions and what they themselves were trying to do. Men like Francis Bacon and Descartes were thoroughly persuaded that they were making a new start.

If for a long time the views of Renaissance and post-Renaissance philosophers were accepted at their face value, this was partly due to a conviction that in the Middle Ages there was really nothing which merited the name of philosophy. The flame of independent and creative philosophical reflection which had burned so brightly in ancient Greece was practically extinguished until it was revived at the Renaissance and rose in splendour in the seventeenth century.

But when at last more attention came to be paid to mediaeval philosophy, it was seen that this view was exaggerated. And some writers emphasized the continuity between mediaeval and postmediaeval thought. That phenomena of continuity can be observed in the political and social spheres is obvious enough. The patterns of society and of political organization in the seventeenth century clearly did not spring into being without any historical

I

2

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY-IV

antecedents. We can observe, for instance, the gradual formation of the various national States, the emergence of the great monarchies and the growth of the middle class. Even in the field of science the discontinuity is not quite so great as was once supposed. Recent research has shown the existence of a limited interest in empirical science within the mediaeval period itself. And attention was drawn in the third volume of this History! to the wider implications of the impetus theory of motion as presented by certain fourteenth-century physicists. Similarly, a certain continuity can be observed within the philosophical sphere. We can see philosophy in the Middle Ages gradually winning recognition as a separate branch of study. And we can see lines of thought emerging which anticipate later philosophical developments. For example, the characteristic philosophical movement of the fourteenth century, generally known as the nominalist movement,2 anticipated later empiricism in several important respects. Again, the speCUlative philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa,3 with its anticipations of some theses of Leibniz, forms a link between mediaeval, Renaissance and pre-Kantian modern thought. Again, scholars have shown that thinkers such as Francis Bacon, Descartes and Locke were subject to the influence of the past to a greater degree than they themselves realized.

This emphasis on continuity was doubtless needed as a corrective to a too facile acceptance of the claims to novelty advanced by Renaissance and seventeenth-century philosophers. It expresses an understanding of the fact that there was such a thing as mediaeval philosophy and a recognition of its position as an integral part of European philosophy in general. At the same time, if discontinuity can be over-emphasized, so can continuity. 11 we compare the patterns of social and political life in the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, obvious differences in the structure of society at once strike the eye. Again, though the historical factors which contributed to the occurrence of the Reformation can be traced, the Reformation was none the less in some sense an explosion, shattering the religious unity of mediaeval Christendom. And even though the seeds of later science can be discovered in the intellectual soil of mediaeval Europe, the results of research have not been such as to necessitate any substantial change of view about the importance of Renaissance science. Similarly, when all that can legitimately be said to illustrate the continuity

lpp. 165-7?

I Vol. Ill, chs. III-IX.

? Vol. III, ch. XV.

INTRODUCTION

3

between mediaeval and post-mediaeval philosophy has been said, it remains true that there were considerable differences between them. For the matter of that, though Descartes was undoubtedly influenced by Scholastic ways of thought, he himself pointed out that the use of terms taken from Scholastic philosophy did not necessarily mean that the terms were being used in the same senses in which they had been used by the Scholastics. And though Locke was influenced in his theory of natural law by Hooker,l who had himself been influenced by mediaeval thought, the Lockean idea of natural law is not precisely the same as that of St. Thomas Aquinas.

We can, of course, become the slaves of words or labels. That is to say, because we divide history into periods, we may tend to lose sight of continuity and of gradual transitions, especially when we are looking at historical events from a great distance in time. But this does not mean that it is altogether improper to speak of historical periods or that no major changes take place.

And if the general cultural situation of the post-Renaissance world was in important respects different from that of the mediaeval world, it is only natural that the changes should have been reflected in philosophic thought. At the same time, just as changes in the social and political spheres, even when they seem to have been more or less abrupt, presupposed an already existing situation out of which they developed, so also new attitudes and aims and ways of thought in the field of philosophy presupposed an already existing situation with which they were in some degree linked. In other words, we are not faced with a simple choice between two sharply contrasted alternatives, the assertion of discontinuity and the assertion of continuity. Both elements have to be taken into account. There are change and novelty; but change is not creation out of nothing.

The situation, therefore, seems to be this. The old emp'lasis on discontinuity was largely due to failure to recognize that there was in the Middle Ages any philosophy worthy of the name. Subsequent recognition of the existence and importance of mediaeval philosophy produced an emphasis on continuity. But we now see that what is required is an attempt to illustrate both the elements of continuity and the peculiar characteristics of different periods. And what is true in regard to our consideration of different periods is true also, of course, in regard to different

1 See vol. III, pp. 322-4.

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