ADDENDUM TO NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE BOARD OF



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (BIA)

In the matter of

XXXXX, JJJJJJJJ A#XXXXXX

Respondent

________________________________________/

George P. Mann (P-24888)

Law Offices of George P. Mann & Associates

Pineview Office Park

33505 W. Fourteen Mile Rd., Suite 20

Farmington Hills, MI 48331

(248) 932-0990

RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR LATE ACCEPTANCE OF BRIEF

RESPONDENT’S MOTION ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE CASE OR ALTERNATIVELY TO REMAND PER HASHMI

REPPONDENT’S OPPOSITION TO DHS MOTION TO DISMISS

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL

AND

REQUEST FOR PANEL

AND

OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR LATE ACCEPTANCE OF BRIEF

Respondent respectfully moves for late acceptance of brief. This is the first and only motion for late acceptance of a brief that undersigned counsel has ever made in over thirty years of practicing immigration law, except for very rare occasions when there was a delivery delay of an overnight courier service such as DHL or Fedex. See Declaration of George Mann annexed hereto as Exhibit A. In light of this exceptional instance and the availability of this extraordinary grace, it is respectfully requested that this late brief be accepted. In addition, kindly accept the incorporated Motions for remand, opposition to dismissal, motion for panel and opposition for summary affirmance. Pursuant to the EOIR practice manual, motions may be brought at any time an appeal is pending.

Respondent timely notified this honorable Board that it did not furnish the prior decision of IJ Antone and that neither Respondent nor undersigned counsel possessed any of the records or files or submissions to the Board made by Respondent’s prior counsel. The Board instructed counsel to file a freedom of information act request (Foia) to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) in order to obtain a copy of the Board’s full file. Respondent did file a FOIA request, waited for the Board to comply with the FOIA request and then received an exceptionally long record of 1,469 pages which is many times the size of typical records (200-400 pages). In addition, to piece together the entire record, Respondent did a FOIA request on USCIS and ICE for all records. One of the key issues regards whether respondent was ever given notice that she had an affirmative obligation to notify USCIS, the Court or her counsel about her divorce and remarriage to her same first marriage. As a foreigner, she was not aware of the impact of divorce and remarriage to the same individual. This resulted in a mistaken impression on the part of the IJ that Respondent had bad moral character. On or about November 5, 2009, Respondent received notice from ICE that the records were finally forthcoming and then they were received by Respondent shortly thereafter. See FOIA letter from ICE dated October 29, 2009 annexed as Exhibit B.

In light of this being undersigned counsel’s sole and first request for the extraordinary acceptance of late brief in any case during more than thirty years of practicing immigration law, the unusual great size of this record, the pursuit of the complete file from EOIR and USCIS, the fact that counsel did not know what had previously been filed with the Board by prior counsel and the compelling fact that Ms. JJJJJJ’s case is still pending and has been pending since 1991, it would be extreme and exceptional hardship to Ms. JJJJJJ and her U.S. citizen husband if she were removed after making deep ties in the United States residing here since approximately 1986, more than 20 years of residence in the U.S., and Ms. JJJJJJ having suffered psychological trauma due to her experiences in her native Yugoslavia where she was imprisoned and due to having suffered mentally cruelty by being married to a mentally abusive recidivist criminal, kindly accept this brief and incorporated motions. See Paginated Administrative Record furnished to Respondent as a result of the FOIA to EOIR (PAR) at pp 659-668 (psychological evaluation by Dr. Harry Capps (also annexed as Exhibit C for the Board’s convenience); PAR at pp 669-670 (resume of Dr. Capps, highlights include Ph.D. in counseling from Wayne State University MI, M.A. in clinical psychology University of Detroit Mercy, M.A. in counseling Central Michigan University, and M.A in Divinity from Princeton Theological Seminary). PAR pp 671-703 (affidavit of Respondent with supporting exhibits A-E).

Because this record is large, having a Paginated Administrative Record of the complete file was essential. Throughout this brief, Respondent cites to the PAR for all sorts of pleadings and evidence that was submitted. This brief would not have had clear references to the record if it was not put together and paginated by the EOIR, which Respondent deeply appreciates.

Of course, Respondent has no objection whatsoever to the government submitting a supplemental brief or order to reply to Respondent’s motion and brief in support of appeal.

MOTION TO ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE CASE OR ALTERNATIVELY TO REMAND PENDING ADJUDICATION OF PRIMA FACIE BONA FIDE I-130 BASED ON MARRIAGE TO A U.S. CITIZEN. THE IJ DENIED THE MOTION TO CONTINUE PRIOR TO PROMULGATION OF MATTER OF HASHMI.

Respondent is the beneficiary of an I-130 filed by her U.S. citizen husband Lauren Vickery. PAR 370-389 (Transcript of hearing date March 28, 2007 pp 246-285). At the hearing he established his U.S. citizenship, his love and the bona fides of his marriage to JJJJJJJJ (Respondent). See copy of I-130 based on marriage to Lauren Vickery and supporting documents annexed as Exhibit C. See PAR 445 and copy of USCIS receipt of I-130 dated February 12, 2007 annexed hereto as Exhibit D. Undersigned counsel has send requests to expedite the processing of the I-130 to USCIS and have notified USCIS that Respondent is in removal proceedings and time is of the essence. See emails to USCIS annexed as Exhibit E.

Due to the great equities in this case, the interests of family unity, it is respectfully requested that this case be administratively closed or, in the alternative remanded, to give Respondent an opportunity to adjust status based on a bona fide marriage.

Matter of Lopez-Barrios, 20 I& N Dec. 203 (BIA 1990), prevents the IJ or the BIA to administratively close a case if it is unilaterally opposed by one of the parties, i.e. even if mercurial prosecutors may object to administrative closure for any or no reason or as a matter of policy in a particular district.

Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 06-3189 (2nd Cir. February 6, 2008) held that there is no justification for the imposition of a mechanism by which DHS, an adversarial party in the proceeding, may unilaterally block a motion to reopen or administratively close a case with no effective review of the BIA. The Second Circuit invoked and relied Saar v. Gonzales, 485 F3d 354, 363 (6th Cir. April 19, 2007); see also Matter of Velarde, 23 I & N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002). This case is bound by Saar because it arises in the 6th Circuit.

The discretionary decision to hold a case in abeyance via administrative closure is akin to the discretionary decision to grant a continuance. The administrative closure decision is not one of the statutorily designated discretionary decisions that the Attorney General is delegated to exercise such as granting asylum or cancellation of removal. Imagine how rarely a continuance would be granted if the decision hinged on prosecutorial discretion not to oppose it as a first step, before the IJ or BIA ever got to rule on the application for a continuance. This is the ironic situation with administrative closure of cases. If this honorable Board refuses to administratively close this case or grant a remand solely based on opposition by DHS, then this honorable Board has failed to use any discretion. See Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 2006):

Patel also raises the argument that the BIA failed to use any discretion, in that, while it adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision, it rejected the IJ's determination that Patel was a persecutor. Because the IJ based his decision to deny Patel's request for voluntary departure exclusively on the grounds that Patel was a persecutor himself, it was illogical for the BIA ultimately to affirm the IJ's decision in full. The BIA Decision was silent on the question of voluntary departure.

The only way to make sense of the BIA Decision is to conclude that the BIA did not exercise any discretion whatsoever. We conclude that, as a matter of law, HN8when the BIA rejects the underlying reason for an IJ's decision to deny voluntary departure, and then makes no determination of its own on the voluntary departure issue, the BIA has not exercised any discretion. Therefore, we remand to the BIA so that it may exercise its discretion on the question of whether Patel is entitled to voluntary departure.

Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 2006).

The Sixth Circuit has indicated that aliens should not be beholden to the whims of

whether DHS agrees to administrative closure of a case:

The Perez-Vargas court further hypothesized that, if the immigration judge could not make the § 204(j) portability decision in the first instance, then "it would effectively deny the benefits of § 204(j) to those aliens who are in removal proceedings." Perez-Vargas, 478 F.3d at 195. The court explained: [If] an alien in removal proceedings cannot invoke the protections of § 204(j) before the IJ but, instead, must seek administrative closure of the removal proceedings and ask DHS to determine the continuing validity of his visa petition pursuant to § 204(j) . . . [then], because administrative closure requires the consent of DHS, the alien's access to § 204(j) lies within the discretion of the government. If DHS were to refuse the alien's request for administrative closure -- as it did in this case -- the alien would be unable to avail himself of the process which Congress provided in § 204(j).

Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 742 (6th Cir. 2007).

This honorable Board has held and reaffirmed recently the importance of family unity and approvable I-130’s weighing significantly. Matter of HASHMI, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009) AND Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978). The 2nd, 7th and 9th circuits have weighed the existence of approved immediate relative visa petitions heavily in petitioner’s favor. Singh v. Ganzales, 2006 U.S. App Lexis 10156 (2nd Cir. April 19, 2006); Chowdhury v. Ashcroft, 241 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2001) Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2002). These courts have held that it is an abuse of discretion for an IJ to deny reopening of a deportation order where the denial leads to the unconscionable result of deporting an individual eligible for relief from deportation. Singh v. INS, supra at 1040. Similarly, Respondent should be granted a remand, at least a limited remand, for the purposes of applying for adjustment of status after his I-130 is approved. Or, this case should be administratively closed without a removal order pending adjudication of the I-130.

The IJ abused his discretion in denying a continuance of her Individual Hearing so that the I-130 pending in this matter may be adjudicated and the I-485 considered by this Court. Respondent had a previously approved I-130 petition filed in 1994; therefore she has $245(i) coverage for the I-130 petition filed by Mr. Vickery, her U.S. Citizen spouse. Therefore she is prima facie eligible for adjustment of status under INA § 245 once the I-130 is approved by USCIS. Under Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), the Immigration Judge may continue a Master or Individual Hearing in order to allow for USCIS to make a decision in a pending I-130 as long as the Respondent is able to show that her marriage is bona fide. Evidence that Respondent’s marriage to Mr. Vickery is bona fide has been previously admitted by the Court (Exhibit #12, Tab A). Moreover, recently Respondent and Mr. Vickery purchased a home in the hope that they may establish their future in the United States. (See PAR at pp. 462 and 464-467(proof of joint home ownership).

REQUEST FOR A PANEL DECISION

AND OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

Respondent requests that a panel, pursuant to 8 CFR § 1003.1, decide his case. If the IJ had properly evaluated good moral character and the amount of hardship in this case, he would have granted NACARA relief or would have continued this case pending adjudication of the I-130 based on Respondent’s bona fide marriage to a U.S. citizen. NACARA relief has a lower burden than asylum, withholding and CAT.

Respondent requests that a panel, pursuant to 8 CFR § 1003.1(6), decide his case due to:

(ii) The need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures;

(iii) The need to review a decision by an immigration judge or the Service that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable precedents;

(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an immigration judge; or

(vi) The need to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the Service, other than a reversal under §1003.1(e) (5).

Summary affirmance is not appropriate, because, among other defects in the decision, the IJ made numerous mistakes of fact.

In S-M-J-, the BIA opened its analysis with a discussion of the unique

nature of asylum/withholding/CAT proceedings. The BIA explained:

Although we recognize that the burden of proof in asylum and withholding of deportation cases is on the applicant, we do have certain obligations under international law to extend refuge to those who qualify for such relief. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 5, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Congress incorporated the international obligation into domestic United States law when it enacted the withholding of deportation provision of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, prohibiting the refoulement of refugees. Going beyond the refoulement provision, Congress also established asylum as a discretionary form of relief for those who could meet a lesser standard of proof. See section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994). Because this Board, the Immigration Judges, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are all bound to uphold this law,  [**28]  we all bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided where such protection is warranted by the circumstances of an asylum applicant's claim.

Although the burden of proof in establishing a claim is on the applicant, the Service and the Immigration Judge have a role in introducing evidence into the record.

21 I. & N. Dec. at 723-26.

Thus, asylum and withholding of removal cases are different from other types of cases because, while the burden of proof is borne by the applicant, the IJ and the INS have a responsibility to make sure that qualified applicants are provided refuge in accordance with the obligations imposed by international law. As the Third Circuit explained in Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1998), "the" procedures for requesting asylum and withholding of deportation are not a search for a justification to deport. Justice requires that an applicant for asylum be given a meaningful opportunity to establish his or her claim." Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).

A petitioner's testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain his burden of proof without corroboration. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a); see Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2001). However, where the IJ "'does not believe the applicant or does not know what to believe, the applicant's failure to corroborate his testimony can be fatal to his asylum application.'" Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2000)); see Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Corroborating evidence is essential to bolster an otherwise unconvincing case."). When corroborating evidence would reasonably be available and accessible to the applicant, e.g., evidence verifying place of birth, medical records, or evidence of publicly held office, the applicant should provide it or explain why the information was not presented. In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725-26 (BIA 1997); see Capric v. Ashcroft,355 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir.  2004); Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2003); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 290 (2d Cir. 2000). Conversely, if certain corroborating evidence is not reasonably available, it is not required. In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 725.

RESPONDENT’S FIRST ATTORNEY WAS SEVERELY REBUKED BY THE IJ FOR SUBMITTING INCOMPLETE ASYLUM/WITHHOLDING/CAT APPLICATIONS PAR AT PP. 1492

IJ to Respondent’s counsel: All this stuff that comes out all the time after the application is prepared is entirely something new than what’s on the application…It’s your responsibility to get all the information…and put it in the application…Not in every case Mr. Ajluni. It happens in every case. (emphasis added).

RESPONDENT’S FIRST ATTORNEY INTERVIEWED RESPONDENT WITHOUT AN ALBANIAN INTERPRETER , the first attorney does not speak Albanian and Respondent had poor English skills. SEE PAR AT PP 1502-1503.

Respondent showed her gunshot scar to the first IJ. Par at 1493 (lines 22-23).

RELIEF UNDER §203 NACARA

To begin, it is not disputed that Respondent has satisfied the non-discretionary, objective statutory components for relief under §203 Suspension of Deportation (“NACARA.”) Thus it is the discretionary and non-objective factors which are before the Court; namely good moral character, extreme hardship, and the Court’s discretion.

Under §203 NACARA an applicant must show that she has had good moral character for the statutory seven year period prior to the date which the application for Suspension of Deportation was filed. Thus, since Respondent filed her application for Suspension of Deportation on or about January 5, 1996 (See Exhibit #7, “fee in” stamp of “1/5/1996”), the Court may only review the seven year period from January 6, 1989 to January 5, 1996 as the period by which Respondent’s good moral character may be evaluated. Neither has Respondent committed any acts which impugn her good moral character during this statutory period, nor has the Department of Homeland Security raised specific derogatory acts which render Respondent unable to meet the good moral character threshold. Rather, Respondent turned in her own spouse to state law enforcement as she felt that he was a danger to her and society at large. Such a response is a telltale act of one who has good moral character. Moreover, Respondent has had a clean legal record since she arrived in the United States more than 20 years ago. This is remarkable considering that she was married to a serial felon. Therefore, Respondent is able to satisfy this burden.

The statutory requirements for a showing of extreme hardship for applicants for NACARA are found in 8 C.F.R. §1240.58(b). These factors are a guide and not an exhaustive list. An applicant for NACARA may meet this threshold by showing extreme hardship to either (or both) herself and a qualifying relative. Therefore, in Respondent’s case, she needs to show extreme hardship to her or her U.S. citizen spouse, Lauren Vickery, or a combination of hardships to each which cumulatively reaches the extreme hardship threshold. Respondent has shown that she can meet the extreme hardship burden under §1240.58(b) as: she was a young woman (only 20 years old) at the time of entry in the United States in 1986, (b)(1); she has no employment prospects in Serbia (Kosovo), (b)(4); she has resided continuously in the United States since 1986, (b)(5), her U.S. citizen spouse resides legally in the United States, (b)(6); the current political and economic conditions in Respondent’s country of citizenship are dire, (b)(10); Respondent has few family ties in her country of citizenship, (b)(11); and Respondent’s deep ties and integration into United States’ society, (b)(12). Furthermore, Mr. Vickery, a United States citizen, is able to show that he too would suffer extreme hardship were Respondent ordered deported as he: would suffer extreme financial loss were Respondent deported, (b)(7), to a country whose economic conditions are poor, (b)(10); has extensive family ties in the United States, (b)(6); has resided in the United States for his entire life, (b)(5); does not speak, read, or write the languages spoken in Respondent’s country of citizenship; (b)(9)- “psychological impact;” and has no family or other ties to Serbia (Kosovo), (b)(11). Finally, since USCIS has not yet scheduled Respondent and Mr. Vickery for an interview in connection with the I-130 petition filed by Mr. Vickery on Respondent’s behalf, there does not appear to be any immediate means of Respondent to adjust her status otherwise, (b)(14). Therefore, both Respondent and Mr. Vickery have shown that, cumulatively, they meet the threshold burden of extreme hardship.

Finally, the Court has discretion to grant relief under NACARA when all the other statutory components are met, and an applicant must show that she merits such favorable exercise of discretion. Respondent has been in the United States for more than 20 years, and has been embroiled in Immigration Proceedings for approximately 18 or 19 of those years. Thus, Respondent has a complicated and dated history with U.S. immigration. It would be unfair to hold that Respondent is not a credible person because she was unable to give totally consistent responses, in her testimony in 2007, to an Application for Asylum which was filed at least 18 years ago. Additionally, since Respondent’s second marriage was also to Jerry BBBBB, her understanding was that this was a continuing marriage personally as well as for immigration purposes. Such an understanding finds its roots in Respondent’s worldview and lack of formal education. Furthermore it is most telling that Respondent turned in her prior spouse, Jerry BBBBB, to the state law enforcement authorities mere weeks before her application for adjustment of status based on her marriage to Jerry BBBBB was to be adjudicated by the Immigration Court. Were Respondent truly trying to evade the immigration laws by marrying a United States citizen spouse she never would have torpedoed such a scheme by turning in Jerry BBBBB. Rather she did the right thing both for herself and for society at large by turning in her spouse, whom she loved, to state law enforcement. Finally, Respondent merits a favorable exercise of discretion because she has a bona fide marriage to a United States citizen spouse, Lauren Vickery. Although this marriage took place while Respondent was in deportation proceedings, it is the result of a years long relationship. In fact, both Respondent and Mr. Vickery testified that they did not want their marriage to cloud the merits of Respondent’s relief from removal under NACARA; thereby indicating that they did not marry in order to evade the immigration laws. Moreover, recently Respondent and Mr. Vickery purchased a home in the hope that they may establish their future in the United States. (See PAR at pp. 462 and 464-467(proof of joint home ownership). Thus, Respondent merits the Court’s discretion in granting her §203 NACARA relief.

Therefore, it is Respondent’s contention that she has met the statutory and discretionary thresholds for relief from removal under NACARA and thus merits a favorable decision in her case.

RESPONDENT WAS NEVER GIVEN NOTICE THAT SHE WAS OBLIGATED TO REPORT A DIVORCE TO USCIS. RESPONDENT DID NOT KNOW THAT HER FIRST I-130 WAS ABANDONED WHEN SHE DIVORCED HER FIRST HUSBAND AND NAIVELY BUT SINCERELY BELIEVED THAT HER REMARRIAGE TO THE FIRST HUSBAND MADE THE I-130 BASED ON MARRIAGE TO JERRY BBBBB VALID. RESPONDENT’S AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DEMONSTRATE HER HONEST BELIEF THAT SHE COULD RELY ON THE APPROVED I-130 BASED ON REMARRIARGE TO THE FIRST HUSBAND

The instructions for I-130 do not notify the applicant that they must report a divorce. Moreover, the applicant in the instant case was Respondent’s first husband. Respondent was merely the beneficiary. See instructions for I-130 annexed hereto as Exhibit F.

Moreover, the receipt for I-130 does not give notice of any reporting requirement of divorce. See receipt for I-130 petition of Jerry BBBBB (first husband) on behalf of beneficiary JJJJJJJJ (Respondent) located at PAR 985 annexed hereto as Exhibit G. Moreover, the record is replete with evidence of Jerry’s love for JJJJJJJJ and the bona fides of that marriage. PAR 851-931.

JJJJJJJJ’s case had been administratively closed by the Immigration Judge (looks like the name Judge Well) on March 22, 1999. PAR 987 and 990.

JJJJJJJJ had no reason to reactivate her case. She could have just sat quietly. If she thought her divorce and remarriage to Jerry BBBBB invalidated her I-130, she certainly should not have tried to reactivate her removal case after it was administratively closed.

But JJJJJJJJ, Respondent, affirmatively moved to re calendar her case because of her honest belief that she could adjust her status based on the approved I-130 based on marriage to Jerry BBBBB, who she was, in fact, then remarried to. PAR 979-989. JJJJJJJJ had never been given notice of the impact of divorce and remarriage on an I-130 and it is respectfully submitted that this honorable grant Respondent discretion, because she never had notice and it appeared to her that she was proceeding on an I-130 based on marriage to the same man that originally petitioned for her.

If JJJJJJJJ, Respondent, had realized that the I-130 was not valid, she would never have moved to re calendar.

As a matter of fact, Respondent acted with a sense of responsibility in affirmatively notifying the immigration court when her husband was released from jail and that they were living as man and wife. Respondent dutifully notified the immigration court in a timely fashion when she was reunited with her husband Jerry BBBBB.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS FRAUD, IT IS NOT MATERIAL TO THE NACARA APPLICATION AND ON BALANCE WITH THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE AS SET FORTH ABOVE, NACARA SHOULD BE GRANTED.

JJJJJJJJ has been in the U.S. for over 20 years. She has a strong work ethic, working hard and long hours. Respondent has never been convicted of a crime in the U.S. She has a clean record. She has managed to pull her life together after having a relationship with someone who was toxic to her. She owns property in the U.S. and is currently married to genuinely loving and kind man.

Even where a showing of good moral character is required, the BIA has “long held that good moral character does not mean moral excellence and that it is not destroyed by ‘a single incident.’” Matter of Sanchez-Linn, 20 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1991).

Obviously, the Respondent is not a perfect person and has made some serious mistakes during the course of these proceedings. To the extent that it was a serious mistake on JJJJJJJJ’s part not to report her divorce, it is not a fraud material to the NACARA application. Respondent asks that the Board to reweigh the equities in light of other substantial equitable factors weighing heavily in favor of a discretionary grant which were overlooked. Also, to the extent that there was inconsistency between the NACARA application and the live testimony, it should be kept in mind that the first attorney had a track record of preparing scanty applications with omissions AND the first attorney did not speak Albanian, did not employ an interpreter and Respondent spoke poor English. PAR 1492 and 1503.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully requested that this honorable Board:

1. Grant the Motion to Accept this brief.

2. Does not employ summary affirmance;

3. Adjudicates this appeal by a panel of three Board members;

4. Grant NACARA relief; or

5. Administratively close this case, or

6. Remand this case pending adjudication of the I-130

7. Or, grants such other relief as the Board deems appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted on November 16, 2009.

________________________

George P. Mann

Attorney for Respondent

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (BIA)

In the matter of

JJJJJJ, JJJJJJJJ A -XXXXXXX

Respondent

________________________________________/

George P. Mann (P-24888)

Law Offices of George P. Mann & Associates

Pineview Office Park

33505 W. Fourteen Mile Rd., Suite 20

Farmington Hills, MI 48331

(248) 932-0990

I certify that a copy of the foregoing:

RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR LATE ACCEPTANCE OF BRIEF, RESPONDENT’S MOTION ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE CASE OR ALTERNATIVELY TO REMAND PER HASHMI, REPPONDENT’S OPPOSITION TO DHS MOTION TO DISMISS, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL AND REQUEST FOR PANEL AND OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE.

was served by pre-paid first class mail on the ICE on November 16, 2009 to ICE Office of Chief Counsel that is located at the following address:

Office of Chief Counsel

333 Mount Elliott Street

Detroit, Michigan 48207

Dated this November 16, 2009 ____________________

George P. Mann

Law Offices of George P. Mann & Associates, P.C.

33505 W. Fourteen Mile Rd., Suite 20

Farmington Hills, Michigan 48331

Telephone: (248) 932-0990

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