Phil 122 – Anderson Study Questions on Rawls’ Chapter Two



Phil 122 – Anderson Study Questions on Rawls’ Chapter Two

Section Ten

(a) Social justice is concerned with the “basic structure” of society, by which Rawls means the arrangement of its major social institutions, the rights and duties people have within those institutions, and the way they distribute benefits and burdens. Give a few examples of major social institutions. Is CSUS a major institution (or a part of one)? Is a shopping mall or perhaps, the set of all retail stores in a given geographical area? Are the organized churches a major institution? The Internet? The mass media? The Fortune 500 (largest corporations)?

(b) Can a person be a participant in a major social institution and not know it?

(c) The principles of justice for institutions, Rawls warns us, should not be confused with the principles of justice for individuals and their actions. Give an example of the latter that shows the difference in the two types of principles.

Section Eleven

(a) Give some examples of the basic liberties that everyone has an equal right to according to his first principle of justice. What sorts of liberties would be non-basic?

(b) The difference principle is concerned with the distribution of “primary goods”. What sorts of things are these? Are there any notable omissions from his list of primary goods?

(c) The equal basic liberties principle takes absolute priority over the difference principle in the sense that justice forbids giving up some of the basic liberties in anticipation of increased material gain or increased security. Give an example, actual or hypothetical, of this sort of prohibited move.

Section Twelve (You can skip the subsection titled “The Principle of Efficiency”.)

(a) Many political conservatives endorse something like what Rawls calls the system of “Natural Liberty”. What are the central features of this system?

(b) Likewise, many political liberals endorse something like what Rawls calls the system of “Liberal Equality”. What are its central features?

(c) One key difference between the two foregoing systems is the way equality of opportunity is understood. What is the difference between formal equality of opportunity (in the system of Natural Liberty) and fair equality of opportunity (as in Liberal Equality)?

(d) Rawls argues that the system of Liberal Equality is “unstable” (in a conceptual sense) because it falls short of realizing true social justice even when it is possible to get closer to that goal. As Rawls sees it, a just society would try to minimize the “contingencies of life”; those sorts of barriers to living a good life that individuals are powerless to do something about but that society acting collectively can correct for. The system of Liberal Equality attempts to minimize the effects of class differences (of wealth, status and power) through fair equality of opportunity. But even if that is done, differences in the natural distribution of talents and abilities can still have a profound effect on one’s expectations in life. The difference principle is needed as a way of correcting for those differences in what Rawls calls the system of Democratic Equality. Just how the difference principle is supposed to work has yet to be explained, but we can still ask at this point ‘Does a just society really have to correct somehow for natural differences of talent and ability?’

Section Thirteen

The difference principle stipulates that the higher expectations of the more well off must work to the advantage of the least well off. Most of this section is only devoted to showing that the difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency. This seems to me a fairly uninteresting and unchallenging point to make, given the way efficiency is defined (as Pareto optimality). So let’s move on.

Section Fourteen

(a) Fair equality of opportunity is often defended by liberals for, among other reasons, the fact that it increases productivity. Rawls insists that that is not the primary rationale for fair equality of opportunity. What is the primary rationale?

(b) What are the differences between pure, perfect, and imperfect procedural justice? A society having fair equality of opportunity is a case of imperfect procedural justice. Explain why this is so.

Section Fifteen

Utilitarian accounts of social justice require the making of assessments of how well off one person is relative to another, since the ultimate goal, for the utilitarian, is to maximize either the well-being of society overall or the average level of well-being per capita. But measuring relative well-being seems to require the making of interpersonal comparisons of people’s happiness (or satisfaction, overall pleasure, or other cognitive/emotive state). This is a notoriously controversial problem in philosophy and the social sciences. Can we say, in any objectively measurable sense, for example, that Jones gets twice as much satisfaction or enjoyment out of his job as Wilson gets out of his? Rawls is able to sidestep this problem by introducing the idea of primary social goods. Primary social goods are things a rational person can be expected to want whatever else he wants. Since they are things like basic liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, there is no difficulty in making assessments of their relative distribution. One question Rawls does leave unanswered however is this: Are there any notable candidates for being a primary social good that Rawls leaves off his list?

Section Sixteen

The difference principle tells us that inequalities are arbitrary (unjust) unless they work to the advantage of the “least well off”. How is the least well-off person (or representative least well-off person) to be identified? Rawls offers some suggested criteria on page 84, but does not pursue the question in any depth. What are his suggested criteria?

Section Seventeen

More insight into the logic of the difference principle.

- The difference principle is not a principle of redress. The intent is neither to handicap the more talented nor to boost the abilities of the less talented (how could we even do that?) so as to ensure everyone starts at the same line on the playing field.

- The natural distribution of talents and abilities is neither just nor unjust; it is simply a natural fact. Every generation will have some degree of natural distribution. (Reminder: the distribution of liberties, wealth, power, etc. is not a natural fact. It is the result of how people have acted over time and can be modified by a deliberate change in social policies.)

- No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. Caution: Do not misconstrue this as implying no one has a right to their natural assets; “To be sure, the more advantaged have a right to their natural assets, as does everyone else; this right is covered by the first principle under the basic liberty protecting the integrity of the person.” (89)

- But why then does justice require any response at all to this natural fact of differences in talents and abilities? Why shouldn’t each person be expected to live with the hand they were dealt in life? That would be the libertarian attitude toward social responsibility: a society is just an aggregate of individuals who owe nothing to each other beyond respect for their life, liberty and property. Rawls sees things quite differently: “The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution.” (87)

- Objection: Isn’t the Difference Principle biased in favor of the least well-off? Rawls’ reply: “The more advantaged, when they view the matter from a general perspective, recognize that the well-being of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life...” (88)

- One merit of Democratic Equality over the systems of Natural Liberty and Liberal Equality is it avoids becoming a meritocracy, where equal opportunity amounts only to “...an equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the personal quest for influence and social position.” (91)

Section Eighteen

In this section and the next, Rawls shifts the focus from principles for institutions to principles for individuals. It is common in moral theory to distinguish obligations from duties. The former consist of moral responsibilities that one person owes to certain others as a result of some voluntary act (given the background conditions are just), most promissory obligations being a case in point. (97) Natural duties, on the other hand, are imposed on us regardless of any prior voluntary act.

- Rawls argues that all of our legitimate obligations are accounted for by the principle of fairness. What is this principle? (96) How successful is Nozick’s critique of the principle of fairness in Anarchy, State, and Utopia?

Section Nineteen

How does Rawls characterize the natural duties? (98) One of our natural duties is to support and comply with just institutions. Assuming the participants in the original position would agree on this as a natural duty, Rawls can argue that our responsibility to obey just laws does not rest on a social contract in the way Locke, Rousseau and Kant held. Note Rawls important comment (98) that citizens (as opposed to officeholders) do not have a general obligation to obey every law, as opposed to just laws.

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