China’s cage gets rattled by India (and Vietnam) in the ...



China gets rattled by India in the South China Sea

by David Scott

On February 1 2016 the Global Times carried an article by Shi Lancha, based at Tsinghua University, entitled “India-Vietnam Bond Brings Doubtful Payoff”. The Global Times is the populist-nationalist offshoot of the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In dismissing these India-Vietnam links, the Chinese author revealed underlying Chinese concerns about growing Indian involvement in the South China Sea; most of which is claimed by China, but which cut across claims there by Vietnam.

Lin’s article was sparked by the announcement on January 25 by Indian officials that New Delhi was setting up a new satellite tracking and imaging station in southern Vietnam, a civilian project under the aegis of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The significance of this development had been quickly picked up in the Indian Media, the station seen as an “strategic asset” (Economic Times, January 4) for India in the South China Sea, enabling India to keep an “eye on China” (Business Standard, January 25).

In China, the government was officially non-committal about the station, but Lin accurately noted the dual purpose character of such satellite tracking/imagery; “the significance of the episode will go far beyond technology, especially given the geopolitical sensitivities of the region as well as the enormous military value of the high-resolution satellite images” provided by the station for India and also for Vietnam.

Geoeconomically, Lin was ready to point out how energy issues remain an issue bringing India and Vietnam together against China, with India signing exploration deals in oil fields held by Vietnam but claimed by China; “the two countries’ energy cooperation mainly concerns offshore drilling in the South China Sea - and in disputed waters - where satellite images can be put in great use”.

Geopolitically, Lin profiled India as “as a rising giant” which “also shares a nervousness about China”, in which “in order to balance China's” arrival in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, “New Delhi looked into East and Southeast Asia and developed a series of geostrategic policies … clearly directed at China”. Quite accurately Lin argued that “India plays the Vietnam card proactively in order to gain a counterweight against Beijing”, with the satellite station a “countermove to break into China's backyard”.

Lin’s evaluation so far was accurate with regard to Indian motives and wider significance. However with regards to its strategic significance, India’s abilities, and Chinese motives, Lin’s evaluation was questionable.

With regard to the strategic importance of the station Lin argued that “although the satellite station can be a perfect move to serve both India and Vietnam's short-term purposes, its strategic value is doubtful”. Such dismissal contradicted his own preceding words on the station’s “enormous military value”.

India-Vietnam links were also dismissed; “New Delhi may believe it has targeted Beijing's weak spot, but actually Indo-Vietnamese relations are never a major concern for China”. It is true that relations with the US and Japan are of greater importance for China, but India has significantly increased in importance for China in recent years from a previous marginality for China. China’s own “anti-encirclement struggle” (Garver) remains a priority to stop restraining partnerships being established around it – of which the India-Japan linkage is important in its own right and even more important as part of a parallel India-Vietnam-Japan-US formation.

Finally, India’s significance for the South China Sea dynamics was dismissed, “after all, India is not a South China Sea country, nor does it have substantial interests in the region”. However this ignores the fact that India has a growing military (naval deployements), political (security partnerships with Vietnama and China) and economic (oil exploration) presence in the South China, and as such has growing

interests in these waters.

With regard to India’s abilities; Lin was dismissive “India's limited political and military strength can hardly manage long-distance power projection like the US” and “nor can Indian science and economic standing qualify it as an appealing sponsor”.

Certainly India does not have long distance power projection like the US, but then neither does China, and India’s “extended neighbourhood” projection is bringing it outside South Asia; in particular across the Indo-Pacific reaches of the Indian Ocean-South China Sea-Western Pacific waters.

Lin’s final strand concerned Indian perceptions of China; “New Delhi’s calculation is largely based on the presupposition that China deliberately contains India”. This is indeed an accurate summary of Indian perceptions of China; a palbable fear of “encirclement” by China through its direct military presence northwards along the Himalayas and southwards in the Indian Ocean, and indirectly through its partnership with Paksitan and other South Asian neighbours of India, as well as Indian Ocean microstates in the so-called String of Pearls scenario. This does not involve bases as such, but does involve growing Chinese political, military and economic presence across the Indo-Pacific, which in the case of the South China Sea is turning into direct exertion of control over claimed waters. This unease over China’s growing presence is why the Indian government has been notably unwilling to endorse China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative that was pushed by Beijing throughout 2015.

Having pinpointed Indian fears of such Chinese penetration quite accurately, Lin went on to dismiss their validity, India’s “assumption is groundless”. However, this general unease in India is not groundless. After all, Lin did not deny China’s growing presence around India, but pitched them in benign economic terms; “the Chinese presences in India's neighboring countries are more of a consequence of Beijing's intense economic ties with countries in the region, rather than a plot to deploy "a string of pearls" to check India”. For India, talk of China’s “intense” economic ties with its neighbours undermine its sense of its own natural pre-eminence in its own strategic backyard; the Indian subcontinent as “India’s subcontinent”, the Indian Ocean as “India’s Ocean”. Thus, Lin’s reassurance that “after all, China's enormous energy import and manufactured goods export go round India continuously” is as troublesome as it is reassuring for India, given the ongoing encirclement worries felt in India.

David Scott is an ongoing consultant-analyst and prolific writer on India and China foreign policy, having retired from teaching at Brunel University in 2015. He can be contacted at davidscott366@.

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download