Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant , 1724-1804 ...



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Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant , 1724-1804, (see syllabus for bib)

Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, edited with introduction by Vasilis Politis, 559 pages, including index, historical and biographical context and suggestions for further readings (London: Everyman Library, printed by Guernsey Press, 1996 [1934]).

Report by Rich Hogan

Apologia

The book ordered at Von’s (Critique of Practical Reason--see syllabus) is shorter and less expensive than the Everyman edition of Critique of Pure Reason (see bib, above), but it may be less appropriate for our purposes and may be difficult to appreciate without having first read the longer and more expensive book Having struggled through the former without the benefit of the latter, I returned to Von’s and purchased the latter. For present purposes, the editor’s introduction is probably sufficient, although the interested reader might want to wade through the text of the critique (as I did). My impression is that the careful study of this book would be useful for a philosopher or a theologian, while a sociologist is likely to find the critique tedious, and a casual reader is likely to lose the forest in the trees. Having experienced both problems I have decided to forego a book report and to offer a brief statement of the significance of Kant, particularly as he relates to Comte and Hegel.

Kant

Kant’s contribution to the development of sociological theory is twofold. Within philosophy, he provides a path for moving beyond the debate between rationalism and empiricism. Within science, he provides a path for moving beyond the conflict between science and religion. In both contributions, he paves the way for the development of positivist sociology, particularly the work of August Comte.

On the first point, Kant rejects the rationalist assertion that knowledge is purely a mental construction (concepts), along with the empiricist assertion that knowledge is limited to experience (objects). He argues that knowledge is produced neither in a purely mental process of abstract/speculative conceptualization nor in a purely empirical process of experience/perception. He argues that concepts and experience are necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. “[A]ll human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from these to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses in relation to all three elements, sources of knowledge a priori, which seem at first to transcend the limits of experience, a thorough-going criticism demonstrates, that speculative reason can never … pass the bounds of possible experience …” (p. 465). Thus Kant establishes the path toward deductive theorizing and inductive proof, which characterizes the positivist, scientific method.

On the second point, Kant concedes that theoretical philosophy cannot definitively prove or disprove the existence of God or of a world that is beyond our experience (see Book II, Chapter III). He thus distinguishes the domains of science (the realm of the potentially experienced or observed) and morality (or “transcendental theology” (p. 432)). In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not expound on how moral laws do “not merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but also … demand or postulate it—although only from a practical point of view” (p. 429).

In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant returns to this discussion and develops this argument. He argues that God and immortality are assumed in the concept of freedom, without which, morality is impossible. “Consequently, in the practical point of view their possibility must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it” (p. 14). Ultimately, Kant identifies “faith” or “rational faith” as the basis for moral judgement (p. 152). He concludes, ultimately, that science should not undermine faith but, instead, should support and be supported by faith.

“In a word, science (critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we understand by this not merely what one ought to do, but what ought to serve teachers as a guide to construct well and clearly the road to wisdom which everyone should travel, and to secure others from going astray.” (p. 193).

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German philosopher and scientist who developed "critical philosophy" (challenged Hume's experiential/empiricist base of reality), precedent for Hegel's dialectical theory;

Lived in Prussia under Frederick the Great in world of great artistic and intellectual life but without any sort of political freedom

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