Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's ...



Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives),

Volume 9, April, 1963 Iraq, Page 19323

© 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved.

General Kassem's Government overthrown by Military Coup. - Death of General Kassem. - Colonel Aref appointed President by Military Junta. - Cabinet formed by Brigadier Bakr. - Mass Arrests of Kassemites and Communists. - Agreement with Kurdish Rebels on Kurdish Autonomy.

General Kassem's Government was overthrown on Feb. 8 by a military coup in Baghdad, General Kassem himself being captured and shot. The military junta which seized power nominated Colonel Aref (who had been Vice-Premier for 2 1/2 months after the 1958 revolution) as President, and set up a Cabinet headed by Brigadier Ahmed Bakr. Details of the coup and of its political repercussions inside and outside Iraq are given below under cross-headings.

The coup was the result of a conspiracy between the Baath Party (the “ Socialist Party of the Arab Renaissance”) and a group of nationalist officers, most of them young Air Force officeRs. Many of the latter were reported to be former friends and followers of Colonel Serri (a former director of military intelligence), who was shot in 1959 on a charge of complicity in the Mosul revolt [see 17022 A].

The Baath Party was founded in Syria in 1941 by Mr. Michel Aflaq, and spread to Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, drawing its supporters mainly from the officers, the intellectuals, and the middle classes in all four countries. In recent years the party had been greatly divided over its attitude towards President Nasser's regime, although the latter's avowed aims– Arab unity, Socialism, and freedom–are identical with those of the Baathists. The Syrian Baath Party, which was primarily responsible for the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, split after the dissolution of the union three years later. The left wing, led by Mr. Akram Hourani, adopted a strongly anti-Nasserite attitude while Mr. Aflaq's faction, although more friendly to the U.A.R., expressed opposition to authoritarian rule, and insisted that any Arab confederation must be based on democratic institutions.

The Iraqi Baathists originally supported the revolution of 1958, but were driven underground after the U.A.R. broke with Iraq in March-April 1959; they nevertheless succeeded in building up a strong secret organization inside the officer corps and the universities. A group of Baathist students were responsible for the attempted murder of General Kassem in 1959 [see 17045 B; 17341 A]. The party, like that in Syria, split in 1961 over its attitude to the U.A.R.; one faction, the leading members of which took refuge in Egypt, advocated close links between Iraq and the U.A.R., whilst the other maintained that the two countries should remain friendly but independent.

Baathist students at Baghdad University began a strike in December 1962, and riotous incidents involving the striking students were mentioned on Jan. 11 in Baghdad newspapers, which at the same time published a warning by General Kassem against the strike. An attache at the Egyptian Embassy, who was alleged to have distributed seditious leaflets in the university area, was expelled from Iraq on Jan. 24, 1963.

The Government, which apparently suspected the existence of a plot, retired 58 of the Baathist “free officers” on Feb. 4; the conspirators thereupon decided to carry out their plan for a coup, which had been in preparation for over a year. The centre of the plot was the Habbaniyah air base, 60 miles west of Baghdad. Ramadan 14 (Feb. 8) was chosen as the date of the coup, as it was a Friday (the Moslem day of rest) and very few people would be on the streets; this was particularly so because in Ramadan Moslems fast during the daylight hours.

Although the first accounts of the course of the revolt were incomplete and partly contradictory, the following tidier picture emerged from the reports of foreign journalists who were first allowed to enter Iraq on Feb. 12.

Just before 8 a.m. a group of young officers seized the Baghdad radio station. Another group broke into the house of Brigadier Jalah al Awqali (C.-in-C. of the Air Force), compelled him to sign an order for an air attack on the Defence Ministry, and shot him dead immediately he had done so [According to other accounts he was shot in the street with his children]. Aircraft from Habbaniyah began operations by bombing the aircraft at the Rashid military and air base (six miles south of Baghdad), the garrison of which was known to be largely loyal to General Kassem, and completely destroying them.

The rebel aircraft then launched low-level attacks on the Defence Ministry (General Kassem's headquarters), dropping small bombs and firing rockets. About 9.30 a.m. Baghdad Radio announced that General Kassem had been “buried under the ruins of the Defence Ministry.” Contrary to his usual practice, however, General Kassem had not passed the night at his headquarters but at his mother's house in another part of the city, and after the outbreak of the revolt maintained contact with the Ministry by telephone. On hearing the announcement of his own death he left for the Ministry, deliberately showing himself to the people to prove that the report was false; as he passed through the streets he was cheered by the poorer classes, among whom he was still extremely popular.

The 700 men defending the Ministry with the support of tanks, light artillery, and mortars maintained a stubborn resistance, and succeeded in shooting down one of the rebel aircraft. Although the troops at the Washash base (the other Army camp near Baghdad) had declared their support for the revolt they did not actively assist the rebels, and when tanks from the camp entered the capital in the early afternoon they did not join in the attack on the Defence Ministry. The commander of the armoured units stationed at Rashid camp, however, refused an order from General Kassem to send tanks to the latter's assistance and remained neutral. Meanwhile Baghdad Radio broadcast rebel propaganda, but the television station, which the rebels had omitted to occupy, broadcast General Kassem's communiques until it was bombed by rebel aircraft and put out of action.

An appeal by Baghdad Radio to the civilian population to demonstrate in support of the rebels produced little response; instead the poorer classes demonstrated in support of General Kassem, and street fighting broke out between them and the students and other Baathists who had been armed by the conspirators. In two new, towns about 29 miles from Baghdad, where 350,000 former slum-dwellers had been rehoused by General Kassem's Government in low-rented flats, the population threatened to march on the capital. The rebel leaders in consequence imposed a curfew at 3 p.m., announcing that all who broke it would be shot at sight, and tanks were used to drive the people from the streets.

The turning-point came at about 6.30 p.m., when tanks from a third Army camp outside Baghdad entered the city and began firing on the Defence Ministry. As a result, 600 of the defending troops surrendered, but General Kassem and a small group of staff officers still held out until 4 a.m. on Feb. 9, when their ammunition became exhausted. During the siege he had a long telephone conversation with his former friend Colonel Aref, who had been appointed President by the rebels; he offered to go into exile, but Colonel Aref refused all compromise. He was then reported to have tried to reach the Tigris, which flows near the Defence Ministry, hoping to escape in his private motor-boat; he found, however, that the budding was surrounded and the river police had seized the boat.

When the rebel troops, led by Colonel Abdul Karim Mustapha Nasrat, entered the Defence Ministry they found General Kassem in the mosque which forms the chapel of the budding. Together with three other officers–Colonel Fadhel Abbas Mahdawi (the former president of the Special Military High Court and General Kassem's cousin), Colonel Taha Sheikh Ahmad, and Major Kanaan Khalil Haddad–he was taken to the building of Radio Baghdad and given a summary “trial” by a military council at which he was accused of being responsible for the execution of the leaders of the Mosul mutiny and found guilty of “deviating from the principles of the 1958 revolution”; all four were shot by a firing squad at 1.30 p.m. in General Kassem's office in the Defence Ministry. General Kassem was said to have died courageously, refusing to have his eyes bandaged; his last words were: “You can kill inc, but my name will remain linked with the history of the Iraqi people.” His death was announced on the radio by the daughter of Brigadier Tabaqchali, who was executed for complicity in the Mosul revolt, and the four bodies were displayed on television as proof that this time General Kassem really was dead.

Lieut.-General Abdul Karim Kassem (49) was born in Baghdad, the son of a small landowner and grain merchant, graduated from the Baghdad Military Academy in 1934, and distinguished himself in the Palestine war of 1948. He became Prime Minister immediately after the 1958 revolution, and retained the position until his death.

Within a few months he quarrelled with the Baathists and pro-Egyptian Arab nationalists; the U.A.R.'s attitude to Iraq changed from friendship to violent hostility; and Communist influence greatly increased, many of General Kassem's closest advisers being officers with Communist sympathies and Communists gaining control of most of the Press and the People's Resistance Volunteers, the newly-created militia. Although later General Kassem resisted Communist demands for seats in the Cabinet, took strong measures against Communists and their sympathizers involved in the Kirkuk massacre of July 1959, and dropped some “orthodox” Communist and other left-wing Ministers from his Cabinet, he legalized a “Titoist” Communist Party in 1960 and key positions in Government departments continued to be held by Communists until the end.

Prior to the events at Kirkuk a serious revolt had occurred at Mosul in March 1959, with support from the U.A.R., and in the following October General Kassem was seriously wounded by Baathist terrorists. Although many of those concerned in these events and in pro-Egyptian conspiracies were condemned to death by the Special Military High Court, General Kassem commuted most of the sentences, and even the men who had tried to assassinate him were released after only two years’ imprisonment.

In his foreign policy he entered into close economic relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern-bloc countries, and a large number of Russians came to Iraq to help in the implementation of the economic, technical, scientific, and cultural co-operation agreements with the U.S.S.R.On the other hand his claim to Iraqi sovereignty over Kuwait, put forward in 1961, was opposed by all the other Arab countries as well as Britain, and in fact resulted in the growing isolation of his country. His relations with the United States also became increasingly strained because of his growing reliance on Soviet support, while his measures against the “orthodox” Communists offended the Soviet Union.

His discussions with the Iraq Petroleum Company [the main source of Iraq's revenue], in which he himself took a leading part, broke down finally in October 1961 after tortuous negotiations in which he himself took a leading part, broke down finally in October 1961 after tortuous negotiations in which whenever understanding was near on one point General Kassem advanced a new grievance or a fresh claim; more than 99 per cent of the group's concessions were taken away from it. but the promised benefits for Iraq failed to materialize.

Although his regime was originally described as a “partnership of Arabs and Kurds” he later broke with the Kurdish Democratic Party, at first his ally against the pro-Egyptian groups, and his attempts to exploit tribal feuds among the Kurds to weaken the Kurdish Democratic Party provoked a large-scale Kurdish rebellion. His unsuccessful conduct of the Kurdish war [see below] and his frequent purges of the officer corps (2,000 of whom were shot, imprisoned, retired, or demoted in 4 1/2 years) cost him the support of the majority of the armed forces.

The other aspects of his home policy–his military dictatorship, his arbitrary and often incompetent rule, and his failure to introduce a constitutional regime–similarly alienated all sections of organized political opinion. Since the attempt on his life he had seldom left his office in the closely guarded Defence Ministry, except for occasional night rides through the streets of Baghdad. He retained his popularity only among the poor masses, who respected his genuine idealism, the austerity of his life (he neither drank nor smoked, and never married for fear of being deviated from his mission), and his passionate concern for their welfare.

The leadership of the revolution was in the hands of a junta calling itself the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (N.C.R.C.) which in a decree issued issued on the evening of Feb. 8 assumed “supreme authority,” all legislative power, and the prerogatives hitherto exercised by General Kassem as Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Later the same evening the Council announced that Colonel Aref had been appointed President of the Republic, and that a Cabinet had been formed under the leadership of Brigadier Ahmed Hassan Bakr, with the following membership:

|Brigadier Ahmed Hassan Bakr |Prime Minister. |

|Mr. Ali Saleh Saadi |Deputy Prime Minister and Interior. |

|Lieut.-Colonel Saleh Mahdi Ammash |Defence. |

|Mr. Taleb Hussein Shabib |Foreign Affairs. |

|Lieut.-Colonel Abdul Sattar Abdul Latif |Communications. |

|Dr. Izzat Mustapha |Health. |

|Mr. Mahdi Daulai |Justice. |

|Brigadier Mahmud Khattab |Municipal Affairs. |

|Mr. Baba Ali Ibn Shaikh Mahmud |Agriculture. |

|Dr. Abdul Aziz Wattari |Oil. |

|Dr. Abdul Sattar Juwari |Education. |

|Mr. Saleh Kubba |Finance. |

|Mr. Abdul Sattar Ali Hussein |Housing. |

|Mr. Shukri Saleh Zaki |Trade. |

|Dr. Saadun Hammadi |Land Reform. |

|Mr. Harold Khalkhal |Social Affairs. |

|Dr. Muzar Rawi |National Guidance. |

|Dr. Abdul Karim Ali |Planning. |

|Brigadier Maji Taleb |Industry. |

|Brigadier Fuad Aref} |Ministers of State. |

|Mr. Hazim Jawad | |

Colonel Abdul Solam Mohammed Aref (42), then a close friend of General Kassem, played a decisive role in the 1958 revolution, when he led the brigade which stormed the royal palace and massacred the royal family. Afterwards he became Vice-Premier, but his violent attacks on both the Western and the Communist Powers and his demands for immediate union with the U.A.R. so embarrassed the Government that he was soon removed from the Cabinet and appointed Ambassador to Bonn. He did not take up this appointment, however, and after touring Europe returned unexpectedly to Baghdad where he had an interview with General Kassem at which he drew his revolver. At a secret trial in December 1958 he was acquitted of a charge of conspiracy but convicted of attempting to murder General Kassem, and was condemned to death. General Kassem, who had neither confirmed nor commuted the sentence, pardoned him in 1961, granted him his arrears of pay, and gave him permission in 1962 to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The N.C.R.C. promoted Colonel Aref on Feb. 15 to the rank of field-marshal–the first in the history of the Iraqi Army [The only other field marshals in the Arab countries are Vice-President amer of the U.A.E. President Abboud of the Sudan, and president sallal of Yemen.

Brigadier Bakr, who had been retired in 1959 on suspicion of complicity in the Mosul revolt, was believed to be the principal organizer of the coup.

All the key posts in the Cabinet, which consisted largely of young men with no previous administrative experience, were held by Baathists belonging to the non-Nasserite faction of the party, among them Brigadier Bakr himself, Air. Saudi (the party's general secretary), Colonel Ammash (the chairman of its military committee), Mr. Shabib (by profession a young engineer), Colonel Latif, and Dr. Hammadi. The only supporters of union with the U.A.R. inside the Cabinet were reported to be Dr. Mustapha, Dr. Juwari, and Mr. Zaki. The older and more experienced Ministers included Mr. Kubba, who is a banker, and Dr. Wattari, a former official of the Oil Ministry. Mr. Hazim Jawad must not be confused with General Kassem's Foreign Minister, Mr. Hashim Jawad. Mr. Baba Ali Mahmud and Brigadier Aref are Kurds, their inclusion in the Government being regarded as a gesture of goodwill to the Kurdish rebels.

The only person whose membership of the N.C.R.C. was officially admitted was President Aref. Mr. Shabib claimed on Feb. 13 that although policy was formulated by co-operation between the N.C.R.C. and the Cabinet, which acted as the country's legislative and executive organs respectively, he himself did not know who the members of the former were; President Aref stated on the same day that they wished to remain anonymous because they wished to retain links with “countries not yet fully free or independent.” According to unofficial reports, the military members of the N.C.R.C. included Brigadier Bakr, Colonel Ammash, Colonel Abdul Karim Mustapha Nasrat, Brigadier Abdul Razzak, Major-General Taher Yahya, Major-General Rashid Mosleh, and Major-General Khaled Hashimi, and the civilian members Mr. Saadi, Mr. Shabib, Dr. Juwari, and Mr. Jawad.

Colonel Nasrat, a 35-year-old parachute officer retired in 1960 because of his Baathist views, led the attack on the Defence Ministry as stated above, whilst Brigadier Razzak commanded the air units which took part in the attack. Generals Yahya, Mosleh, and Hashimi were respectively appointed Chief of Staff, Military Governor of Baghdad, and Military Governor-General of Iraq on Feb. 8.

The first communique issued by the N.C.R.C. on Feb. 8 stated that “the National Council wishes to form a Government based on the people, with the mission of realizing the true aims of the revolution of July 14, 1958. This Government will undertake to respect the decisions of the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. It will support all liberation movements in the Arab countries and the struggle of all peoples against imperialism. Finally, this Government guarantees to all foreign companies complete freedom to exploit Iraq's oil resources.” Another announcement said that all political prisoners and detainees had been released from the Rashid prison camp.

Mr. Jawad, who acted as the Government's official spokesman, said at a press conference on Feb. 15 that the Government recognized that Socialism could not be imposed overnight, and that there must first be a period of industrialization and “protection of the national bourgeoisie.” The “improvised and futile projects introduced by Kassem to glorify himself” would be suspended, and land reform, which, he alleged, had been misapplied in the landlords’ interests, would be corrected. Democratic liberties would be restored and political parties allowed to function when conditions returned to normal. The Government would respect its agreements with the oil companies, and if there was room for improvement in them negotiations would be opened.

The N.C.R.C. dissolved on Feb. 8 the Council of Sovereignty, the committee of three which had exercised presidential functions since the 1958 revolution. General Rubai, the chairman of the latter, who had been abroad since December 1962, returned to Iraq on Feb. 14.

Strict measures were taken to control news, the N.C.R.C.'s official organ Al Jamahir being the only newspaper permitted until Feb. 19. Although foreign journalists were admitted to Iraq on Feb. 12, four days later a strict censorship was imposed on all letters, telegrams, and telephone messages leaving the country, on the ground that there had been “a campaign of denigration and calumny abroad to win the Communists the sympathy of international opinion.”

The N.C.R.C. declared in a communique issued during the evening of Feb. 8 that “Communist agents are making desperate attempts to provoke chaos”; ordered the armed forces to “annihilate” them; and called on the public to co-operate in “denouncing and wiping out these criminals.” In Baghdad this led to a manhunt for supporters of General Kassem and alleged Communists, in which gangs of armed youths who had been enrolled in a newly formed National Guard collaborated with the armed forces. Western travellers who arrived in Beirut on Feb. 10 reported that fighting was still going on in the centre of the city, and that the streets were strewn with bodies. In order to avoid anarchy, the Government ordered civilians on Feb. 11 to surrender all guns, knives, and other weapons, under penalty of three years’ imprisonment. The Kassemites and Communists nevertheless continued to fight back desperately for several days, the main centres of resistance being the working-class quarters of Kazimieh and Sheikh-Omar, east and north of the city respectively; organized resistance ended only when these areas were ringed round with tanks.

When foreign correspondents were again allowed to enter Iraq on Feb. 12 they reported, however, that Baghdad was completely calm, that life had almost returned to normal, that civilians wearing green armbands as members of the National Guard were helping the police, and that, apart from a section of the Defence Ministry, the damage in the city was much less than had been expected.

The total number of casualties during the fighting in Baghdad was unknown. The Foreign Ministry, while stating its inability to give an exact figure, said on Feb. 12 that there might have been 40 killed; the lowest unofficial estimate, however, which was quoted in Western papers as coming from serious sources put the number of dead at 1,000 at least.

The situation in the provinces remained more obscure than that in the capital. The garrisons of Mosul and Kirkuk were reported on Feb. 8 to have rallied to the revolution, and in northern Iraq there was apparently no serious opposition to the now regime. South of Baghdad, however, resistance continued for a number of days. At Basra Communists stormed the prison on Feb. 10, releasing several hundred political prisoners, and street fighting caused heavy casualties; after Communists had attempted to set fire to oil installations, the military governor of the city gave warning on Feb. 12 that saboteurs would be executed on the spot. Persian sources reported on Feb. 14 that two generals had rallied troops loyal to General Kassem at Amara (on the Tigris, north of Basra), and on Feb. 18 that fighting was going on in Karbala and Najaf (south of Baghdad).

The coup was followed by mass arrests of General Kassem's supporters and of Communists. About 800 people were interned at the Rashid prison camp, including all the members of General Kassem's Cabinet and some 400 officers. Four high-ranking officers–Colonel Hosni Khidr Douri (a former member of the Special Military High Court), Brigadier Abdul Majid Jamil, Brigadier Daoud Jannabi, and Lieut.-Colonel Ibrahim Kazim Moussawi–were shot on Feb. 11 after a summary trial; all four had been retired by General Kassem because of their pro-Communist views. A list of about 100 prominent supporters of the former regime whose property had been confiscated was published on the same day; among them were most of General Kassem's Ministers, officers, lawyers, journalists, and businessmen. A drastic purge of the officer corps and the Civil Service was carried out; in the Oil Ministry, for example, the entire staff was arrested, down to the office boys, with only two exceptions.

The hunt for Communists continued in Baghdad after organized resistance had ended, most of the country's leading Communists being either killed or arrested. Mr. Abdul Qader Ismail Bustani (editor of the party organ Ittihad al Shaab) and Mr. Aziz al-Sherif (general secretary of the “Partisans of Peace”) were arrested in Baghdad on Feb. 14, whilst on the following day Colonel Majid Mohammed Amin (formerly prosecutor in the Special Military High Court) and Mr. Tewfik Munir (vice-president of the “Partisans of Peace”) were shot dead while trying to escape. For several nights troops and police cordoned off the working class areas of Baghdad and carried out systematic house-to-house searches, suspected Communists being rounded up and taken to prison camps. Although Mr. Jawad maintained on Feb. 17 that there were only a few hundred people detained in the camps, unofficial estimates gave the number as several thousand.

Three members of the Communist Party's central committee –Mr. Hassan Radawi (the general secretary), Mr. Mohammed Hussein Abdul Iss, and Mr. Hassan Uwainah–were found guilty by a court martial of inciting people against the Government and hanged on March 7. A military court sentenced two lieutenants and 23 soldiers to be shot and a civilian to be hanged on March 10 for resisting the coup; all were executed on the following day. Mass trials before military tribunals continued throughout the following fortnight.

The Kurdish rebels led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who during 1962 had consolidated their hold on northern Iraq, suspended their activities after the coup and opened negotiations with the new Government.

A swiss journalist who had previously spent six weeks in Kurdistan described the situation as follows on Aug. 15, 1962: “The Iraqi defences all along the Turkish and Persian frontiers have completely collapsed. The police have joined the partisans, and in the few villages or small towns where they are still in uniform they openly collaborate with the Kurds. The Army has left a few symbolic garrisons which are practically the insurgents’ prisoners. To leave their camps officers need a permit from the partisans…. Students, lawyers, and Kurds from the towns are fighting side by side with the mountaineers. The Kurds are beginning to wear a khaki uniform. Former Army officers of Kurdish origin are organizing their radio communications and supply services…. What is saving the Army is that the Kurds have no artillery heavier than 50 mm. mortars. The Kurds are not receiving any foreign aid. They began the revolt with their own weapons, French rifles dating from the last century, old German mausers, and sporting guns. Now they have police rifles, many revolvers and bren guns, and a good number of Soviet weapons captured from the Iraqi Army. Thanks to their light and mobile infantry, commanded by skilful leaders, they cut the Army's supply lines, flood the valleys, block the roads, and starve out individual units….”

The armed forces replied to the rebels’ guerrilla tactics by shelling villages and small towns, or attacking them from the air with rockets and napalm bombs, burning the Kurds’ food stocks, and killing their flocks. These terror raids, in which according to Kurdish sources 3,000 people were killed and 120,000 rendered homeless, did much to unite the Kurds in support of the rebellion; it was reported in August 1962 that the insurgent forces had increased from 7,000 to 20,000 men in the past year. Whereas support for previous Kurdish revolts had been limited by tribal feuds, Mullah Barzani succeeded in uniting a broader section of Kurdish opinion behind him than any of his predecessors, and in giving the revolt the character of a national uprising. Support for the revolt was not unanimous, however, and the Army received the co-operation of a number of tribes hostile to the Barzanis, who headed the revolt.

The rebels periodically sabotaged the Iraq Petroleum Company's installations to demonstrate their ability to bring its activities to a halt at any time. On Aug. 30, 1962, they blew up the company's pipeline seven miles from Kirkuk; the Government, however, accused the Lebanese Construction and Trading Company of being responsible, and its chairman, the late Mr. Emile Bustani, was sentenced to death in absentia on Nov. 20. Two British technicians employed by the I.P.C. were kidnapped by the rebels on Oct. 10 and Nov. 26 respectively, apparently in order to attract international attention to their claims; both were released unharmed some weeks later. I.P.C. officials subsequently warned Europeans living in Kirkuk not to leave their homes after sunset.

During operations against the rebels Iraqi aircraft bombed a Turkish frontier post on July 9, 1962, and another post and a village on Aug. 15, when two Turkish soldiers were killed. The Iraqi Government apologized for the incidents, which it claimed to have been accidental, on Aug. 16. On the same day, however, Turkish fighters which had been ordered to patrol the frontier shot down an Iraqi plane, killing the pilot; an Iraqi protest of Aug. 18 alleged that this incident had taken place 45 miles inside Iraq, and that “outlaws” in Turkey were organizing disorders in Iraq, either with the Turkish Government's connivance or because it could not control its frontiers. [This allegation apparently referred to reports that the Kurdish minority in Turkey were amuggling arms to the rebels.] The Turkish Government, which completely denied the Iraqi allegations, recalled its Ambassador in Baghdad on Aug. 23.

General Kassem had offered the rebels a general amnesty in March 1962, on condition that they laid down their arms. In his reply, issued on April 20, 1962, Mullah Barzani stated that the rebels would accept a cease-fire only if the Kurds were granted” an autonomy guaranteeing them their legitimate political, economic, social, and cultural rights within a constitutionally governed Iraq,” and if General Kassem’s” incompetent dictatorship” were replaced by a democratic regime. According to unofficial reports, talks took place in Baghdad in July between General Kassem and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani (the rebel leader's brother), but without result. General Kassem ‘again offered the rebels an amnesty on Jan. 10, 1963, on condition that they surrendered within 10 days, and when this period expired extended it till the end of the month.

Mullah Barzani's manifesto of April 20, 1962, which emphasized that his aim was Kurdish autonomy inside Iraq and not independence, greatly strengthened sympathy for the rebels among the Arab population. A statement supporting the rebels’ demands, which was published a few days later, was signed by 11 prominent political leaders, including Dr. Ibrahim Kubba (a former member of General Kassem's Cabinet) and Mr. Kamel Chaderchi (president of the National Democratic Party). The Communists also announced their support for Kurdish autonomy, but Mullah Barzani maintained a strictly independent attitude towards the Communists, and was reported in August 1962 to have dismissed Mr. Ibrahim Ahmad (a Communist sympathizer) as general secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Following the Baghdad coup, both the N.C.R.C. and its opponents sought to win Kurdish support; the former issued a communique on Feb. 8, 1963, appealing for the ending of “the glorious insurrection of the Kurds,” whilst anti-Government broadcasts heard in Teheran appealed for Kurdish aid against the new regime. The Kurdish leaders, however, while welcoming General Kassem's overthrow, refused to commit themselves to support for President Aref's Government unless their demands were granted.

The Committee for the Defence of the Kurdish People's Rights, which represents the Kurdish national movement abroad and has its headquarters at Lausanne, said in a statement issued on Feb. 12 that any association between Arabs and Kurds must be based on (1) the creation of an autonomous Kurdish Government; (2) the evacuation of Kurdistan by Iraqi troops; (3) an equitable division of State revenues, and particularly of oil royalties, between Kurdish and Arab Iraq. A second statement issued on Feb. 15 denied that the Kurdish national movement had any connexion with Communism, and added: “As for the new Baghdad regime, the committee expects it to define clearly its attitude to the claims to autonomy and other objectives defined in a recent communique. The recent massacres of thousands of Arab Iraqis, however, cannot be a matter of indifference to the Kurdish revolution, one of the objectives of which remains the re-establishment of democratic and other liberties in Iraq.”

Negotiations began in Baghdad on Feb. 19 between the new Government and a Kurdish delegation consisting of Mr. Jalal Talabani (the rebel commander in the Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya areas) and Mr. Salem Abdullah Youssefi. They were adjourned on Feb. 21, when Mr. Talabani left Baghdad with a Government delegation to visit Cairo and Algiers [see below]; while he was in Cairo President Nasser was reported to have assured him of his sympathy for the Kurdish peoples aspirations. [This marked a significant reversal of the U.A.R.'s privious policy; when Egypt and Syria were united the Government of the U.A.R. had refused to recognize the Syrian Kurds and a cultural minority and had suppressed Kurdish Nationalist agitation.] The talks were resumed in Baghdad on Feb. 25, and again suspended on March 1, when Mr. Talabani returned to the north to report to Mullah Barzani.

At a press conference on Feb. 28 Mr. Talabani said that although he was still optimistic about a peaceful outcome to the negotiations the Kurdish revolution continued, and that the cease-fire which had been observed since the coup was intended to give the Government a chance to solve the problem peacefully if they wanted to. The Kurds would accept central control of the armed forces and foreign policy, but demanded that all other Kurdish affairs should be handled by an autonomous Kurdistan. Promises had been made, but Mullah Barzani had asked for a formal pledge signed by the N.C.R.C. Asked about reports that Mullah Barzani would resume operations if he did not receive satisfaction within 10 days, Mr. Talabani merely said: “It is natural he wants a definite answer.”

On March 4 a Government delegation headed by General Yahya, and including Mr. Mahmud and Brigadier Aref (the two Kurdish Ministers), flew to the headquarters of Mullah Barzani near Sulaimaniya for further talks, at which a compromise agreement was reached, and the N.C.R.C. announced on March 10 that it had agreed to grant the Kurds national rights “on a basis of decentralization.” Mr. Saadi stated on March 11 that the Kurds would remain attached to the Central Government for foreign, military, and economic affairs.

Mr. Youssefi said in Baghdad on March 11 that the Kurds would accept decentralization, which was “nearly the same thing” as autonomy; they would be “ruling themselves more than ever before,” and would be represented on a Government committee which would be set up to arrange the details. He pointed out, however, that although the Kurds had released all their prisoners, only 10 per cent of the Kurds held by the Government had been freed, and declared that Mullah Barzani was “not prepared to give way one inch” on this matter. Mr. Jawad commented that many of the Government's Kurdish prisoners had already been released, and that a law pardoning the rebels would soon be announced.

The new regime was recognized by the U.A.R., Yemen, and Kuwait on Feb. 8; by Algeria and Syria on Feb. 9; by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the Sudan on Feb. 10; and by Lebanon and Tunisia on Feb. 11. Reactions to the coup in some of the other Arab States are summarized below.

The U.A.R. From noon on Feb. 8 Cairo Radio broadcast statements unreservedly supporting the coup; the “Voice of the Arabs” programme described General Kassem as “the tyrant” and declared that “Kassem has disappeared as all the enemies of the Arab people will end by disappearing “–an obvious reference to the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Messages of greeting were exchanged later the same day between President Nasser and President Aref.

The ban on the sale of Egyptian newspapers and magazines, which had been enforced in Iraq since the Mosul revolt, was lifted on Feb. 16, although, as stated above, all Iraqi newspapers except Al Jamahir remained banned until three days later. On the other hand, the new Government forbade on Feb. 11 the distribution, sale, or display of photographs of Iraqi or other Arab leaders, the latter being interpreted as applying especially to pictures of President Nasser.

Jordan. King Hussein held an emergency Cabinet meeting, which was attended by the Army C.-in-C., on Feb. 8 to discuss developments in Iraq, the Army subsequently being placed on the alert. In a communique issued on Feb. 9 the Jordanian Premier, Mr. Wasfi Tell, stated that Jordan regarded the coup as the concern of the Iraqi people alone, and would not “remain indifferent to any foreign intervention aimed at exploiting the events in Iraq for the advantage of another country.”

Syria. The Syrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Assad Mahassen, said in a broadcast on Feb. 14 that the revolution had been greeted in Syria with “total support and satisfaction,” because it had overthrown the former “dictatorial regime.” He went on: “Nothing now hinders federation with Iraq, a federation which will be able to form the nucleus of a union grouping all the Arab countries in a single State.” Dr. Mahassen's federation proposals, however, met with no response from Iraq, and a statement made by Mr. Jawad on Feb. 17 that the Government would strengthen relations with the “newly liberated countries,” such as the U.A.R., Yemen, and Algeria, was interpreted as a rebuff fo the Syrian Government.

Algeria. The Algerian Foreign Minister, M. Khemisti, announced the Government's decision to recognize the new regime at a press conference held during the night of Feb. 8–9, and in a message of congratulation sent to President Aref the Algerian Government expressed its conviction that the new regime would “enable the Iraqi people to recover their liberty and security.”

Kuwait. The Sheikh of Kuwait recognized the new Government immediately after its establishment, and sent a message of greetings to President Aref. The members of the new Iraqi Government, however, remained non-committal in their references to the question of General Kassem's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait, Mr. Shabib declaring on Feb. 13 that a “satisfactory compromise” between Kuwait and Iraq was “possible.” When asked at his first press conference on Feb. 13 whether his Government recognized Kuwait's independence, President Aref said: “The Kuwait affair is a purely Arab question. It concerns only the Arabs. Besides, there is only one Arab nation, not several.” In an interview with Al Ahram on Feb. 19 he said that the people of Iraq and Kuwait were one, and that “if Kuwait does not wish to join us then we will join her.”

Communications with Kuwait, which had been suspended since June 1961, were reopened on Feb. 19 to enable the unemployed from Basra to find work in the Kuwait oil refineries. A Kuwaiti delegation, led by the Foreign Minister, arrived in Baghdad on March 21 for discussions with President Aref and Mr. Shabib.

A Government delegation headed by Mr. Saadi and including Colonel Ammash, Mr. Shabib, Brigadier Aref, and Mr. Talabani visited Cairo on Feb. 21–23 for the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the union of Egypt and Syria. At the conclusion of the visit Mr. Saadi said that their talks with President Nasser had been extremely successful, and that a basis had been found for “positive effective co-operation between the U.A.R. and Iraq in such a way as to lead ultimately to the realization of unity in the Arab nation.” Mr. Shabib added that there would soon be contacts between Iraq, the U.A.R., Algeria, and Yemen in preparation for “an important joint meeting of the four liberated Arab countries to discuss Arab problems and co-ordinate work between them.” The delegation afterwards visited Algiers on Feb. 23–25 for talks with the Algerian Government.

A delegation from the Syrian Baath Party, led by Mr. Aflaq, had talks with Mr. Saadi and Mr. Shabib in Baghdad on Feb. 19–21; Mr. Aflaq had been received by President Nasser in Cairo earlier in the month. It was stated in Baghdad that the talks had revealed the “unity of doctrine” between the Iraqi Government, the U.A.R., and the Syrian Baath Party.

Of the non- Arab countries, Yugoslavia recognized the new Iraqî Government on Feb. 10; the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, Turkey, Persia, Western Germany, Italy, and Pakistan on Feb. 11; and India, China, Japan, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia on Feb. 12.

In London Mr. Heath, the Lord Privy Seal, said in the House of Commons on Feb. 11 that all the evidence indicated that the new regime had the support of the armed forces and the bulk of the population and was in effective control of the country. As it had already stated that it would comply with Iraq's international commitments and treaties, the criteria on which Britain normally based its decision to recognize a now regime had all been satisfactorily met. He also welcomed the new Government's “realistic” attitude towards foreign oil interests.

In Washington, State Department spokesmen welcomed the new Government's promise to honour Iraq's international obligations and expressed the hope that the “traditional tics of friendship” between the two countries could be expanded and strengthened.

Although the Soviet Ambassador in Baghdad, Mr. Mikhail Yakovlev, said when announcing his Government's recognition of the new regime that the Soviet Union wished to develop further “the friendship and all-round co-operation which have been established between our countries,” the persecution of Communists in Iraq quickly led to a serious deterioration in relations between the new Government and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet press and radio at first abstained from comment on the events in Iraq, merely quoting protests from other countries, but on Feb. 14 Moscow Radio said that the persecution of Iraqi Communists was “gravely disturbing” to Soviet opinion; Pravda commented in similar terms on the following day; and the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party issued a statement on Feb. 16 strongly condemning the “bloody terror” in Iraq.

Al Jamahir declared on Feb. 13 that the shooting of Iraqi Communists was “in no way ideological” and did not reflect the Government's attitude towards the Soviet Union, with which it wished to maintain friendly relations. As a result of protests lodged by the Soviet Embassy on Feb. 14, Baghdad Radio ceased to mention the nightly raids on working-class suburbs, and began describing the opponents of the regime as “anarchists” instead of “Communists.” Mr. Jawad reiterated on Feb. 17 that the Government was opposed not to “Communist ideology” but to Communists who had resisted the coup, and that its measures against them did not affect relations with Communist countries; Al Jamahir, however, violently attacked the Communist countries on the same day as the “deep enemy” of the Iraqi people. After a two-hour meeting with Mr. Shabib on Feb. 18, which was reported to have been stormy, Mr. Yakovlev left for Moscow to report on the situation, and during the following week unofficial protests were made by all the Communist countries except Yugoslavia. Mr. Jawad commented on Feb. 24 that a continuation of their “aggressive propaganda campaign” would inevitably affect Iraq's relations with them.

About 1,500 people, including Iraqi and other Arab students, demonstrated outside the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow for four hours on March 14, breaking some of the windows. About 200 police defended the building, but reinforcements had to be summoned to prevent the demonstrators from breaking in. The Iraqi Government presented a protest to the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad on March 16.

In Paris the French Minister of Information, M. Peyrefitte, stated on Feb. 13 that the negotiations which had been going on before General Kassem's death for the implementation of the decision to resume Franco-Iraqi diplomatic relations could be continued as soon as the new Iraqi Government had settled don.–(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Le Monde) (Prev. rep. 18535 A.)

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