Timing and Personalities - musketmedia



Major Joe Granducci

Timing and Personalities

A Short Look at two factors in the Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe

Few military units have been studied more than the German Luftwaffe during World War II. A common format for studying the Luftwaffe is to look at its “Rise and Fall”. The term ‘rise and fall’ is particularly appropriate in the case of the study of the Luftwaffe. The organization had a meteoric rise during the interwar period to the beginning of WW II, and a subsequently sudden decline. In any ‘what-if’ scenario, or study of what went wrong for Germany in the war, the Luftwaffe plays a prominent role. What were some of the factors involved in the rise and fall of the Luftwaffe? Although there are many factors that affected the Luftwaffe's rise and fall, this paper will address two specifically.

Timing and personalities are two important factors that affected all Air Forces, indeed, all militaries in WW II. However, in the Luftwaffes case they are particularly instrumental in helping to explain its rise and fall. The effects of two examples of timing and personalities will be addressed. First, the timing and goals of the war as a strategic problem and the timing and development of a weapon as a tactical problem will be discussed. Secondly, the role of two personalities in the rise and fall of the Luftwaffe will be addressed. Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring’s personal effect on the conduct of Luftwaffe operations is instrumental in explaining the rise and fall of the fabled Luftwaffe.

The timing of World War II affected the Luftwaffe more than any other German military branch. It both set up the initial impressive victories and became a factor in the later defeats of the newest branch of the German military. The seeds of the timing issue were planted in the Versailles treaty after World War I. The severe limits established on German military aviation, basically it was abolished, ensured that when the German military eventually began to reform, any new Air Force would be forced to develop at a lighting quick pace in order to be ready to support Hitler’s agenda. Why was the timing of the war so instrumental? Because not only did the Luftwaffe need to rebuild, it was rebuilding in a newly independent form. It was also ‘rebuilding’ from scratch a basically new military weapon. The airplane was certainly significant in World War I, but the airpower visionaries that arose between the wars, Douhet, Mitchel, Trenchard and the rest, promised great things from air power in the next conflict. German leadership believed a great deal of these claims to be true, although tempered with a healthy dose of Prussian military practicality. (Perhaps more than any other air force, the Luftwaffe was built as a combined arms force, better integrated with the ground forces than any other in the beginning). The Army on the other hand had a long history of organization and doctrine to fall back on. So, the relatively late start for the Luftwaffe in preparing for the conflict would make the exact timing of the war extremely important to its performance.

Hitler chose 1939 as the year to start hostilities. He had told his senior leaders it would not happen until 1942. For the Luftwaffe, an early start was disastrous. The already accelerated plan to bring the Air Force up to strength by 1942 was cut short by an early start. It is true that the Luftwaffe was dominant early in the war. However, it lacked depth in reserves, both pilot and materiel.

“Blitzkrieg had failed and Hitler, with a war of attrition on his hands, was at last forced to take the measures he had so long deferred; the first decrees were issued restricting production of consumer goods and rationalizing arms production”. [1]

The early start ensured dominance in the near term against ill prepared foes, but laid the groundwork for defeat by ensuring the force was not resilient or deep enough to continue a long war. The Battle of Britain proved that the Luftwaffe was ill prepared for long-term operations against a well-prepared foe with comparable equipment.

A case study of timing in the tactical sense can be made in regards to the development and use of the Stuka dive Bomber. The infamous Stuka was at the forefront of the German Blitzkrieg of 1939-40.

“Without his Panzers on the ground and his Stukas in the air, Hitler’s “blitz” campaigns at the beginning of World War II would have been unthinkable. Again and again it was the JU 87B dive bomber that struck the mortal blow”. [2]

The Stuka’s importance and performance in the early stages of the war would be hard to downplay. How did it come to this prominent role? And why was it eventually overshadowed? The timing of its development is the answer, which is also tied into the timing of the war. The Luftwaffe Technical Office developed the Stuka requirement in 1935. The newly formed, and secret, Luftwaffe wanted an aircraft to perform the dive-bombing role. It must be said that this particular tactic was not well thought of by most aviators. The aircraft of the day were poorly suited to the rigors of steep dives, and pulling out. However, the accuracy of dive-bombing was though to be worth the risks. The Junkers Company would start with a clear advantage.

“What the Luftwaffe wanted had already been projected on the drawing-board by its chief engineer Pohlmann, in 1933. It was in fact the Ju 87, which embraced all the present military-cum-technical requirements. The first prototype could be built at once”.[3]

The Junkers Company had impeccable timing. While several other companies vied for the contract, most notably Heinkel with its He 118, Junkers would win the contract. So it was, at the beginning of the war in September 1939, that the Ju 87B was fully developed, fielded and ready to take part in Hitler’s opening campaigns of WW II. It was in those early days, a resounding success.

“So it went on – hour after hour, day after day – all along the van of the 10th Army’s front. For the first time in history a powerful air force was taking a direct part in ground operations. Its telling effect surprised both friend and foe”.[4]

Through every campaign until the Battle of Britain the Ju 87 proved itself again and again. It was the perfect weapon to execute the aerial portion of blitzkrieg, and the Germans held enough numbers of the machine to ensure its impact. However, the perfect timing that put it in the starring role early in the war led to its undoing. The type had to be pulled from the Battle of Britain as it was not survivable against the modern British fighters and their well planned and executed defensive system. It rebounded temporarily on the eastern front where the Luftwaffe enjoyed air supremacy during the opening moves of Barbarossa. By the middle of the war, despite several upgrades in power plants and minor structural changes, the Ju 87 was obsolete and yet continued to be used, much like the rest of the Luftwaffe. Timing had played a key role in the rise and fall of the Stuka, and so went the Luftwaffe as well.

Personalities also greatly affected the rise and the fall of the Luftwaffe. More than any other Air Force, a few strong personalities exercised incredible amounts of influence on the use and design of the Luftwaffe. Two individuals especially should be studied in relation to the rise and fall of the Luftwaffe. Hitler and Göring had a major impact on the initial success and subsequent failure of the Luftwaffe.

Hitler’s influence in all facets of German military operations is well documented. But his personal direction (interference?) in many decisions involving the Luftwaffe led directly to its rise and fall. Hitler wanted his Luftwaffe to be the centerpiece of his new military. It would be the Luftwaffe that would be used to bully the European nations into doing what Hitler wanted. It would also be the Luftwaffe that would hammer them if they did not comply. His personal influence affected many programs, and two points serve to indicate how he may have helped the Luftwaffe fall.

The first is his involvement in jet aircraft development and operations. Jet aircraft were in development from the beginning of the war, and German efforts were at the forefront. A prime example is the Me-262; an excellent design which was first unveiled in August 1939, and was the world’s first operational jet fighter. Hitler was convinced the jet would be an excellent weapon, unfortunately for the Luftwaffe he was convinced it would be best suited for bombing.

“Hitler had dallied too long in developing the jet. When Germany’s aeronautical experts unveiled the world’s first model in August of 1939, four days before the start of the war, the Fuhrer was so confident of an early victory in the coming conflict that he paid little attention to the enormous military potential of the jet. By November of 1943, when the Me-262 reached the stage when it could be mass produced and employed as a fighter, Hitler was so obsessed with pressing offensive action against the Allies that he had only one question to ask about the plane; “Can this aircraft carry bombs?” And when his compliant Luftwaffe chief, Goring, answered, “Yes, my Fuhrer, theoretically yes”. Hitler ordered the Me-262 put into production – but as a fighter bomber”.[5]

As the Luftwaffe searched for answers to the increasing numbers of bombers streaming from bases in Britain, Hitler ignored the best option, jet interceptors, in favor of developing jet bombers. His constant involvement in the program delayed and diverted the final result until it was too late for the aircraft to help the air situation.

The second example is his decision to start the war in 1939, instead of waiting until 1942 like he had told Göring. In addition, his decision to open a second front against Russia before a decision could be forced in the west. Starting the war in 1939 forced his Air Force to fight before it was completely ready, while opening a second front took a force already stretched thin by operations against Britain in the west and North Africa and pushed it to the breaking point. The Luftwaffe in 1939 was built and ready to fight one front, in a limited time period. It was ill prepared for protracted conflict, let alone protracted conflict on two fronts. The proof of this was already apparent in the polish campaign.

“Co-operation between the Luftwaffe and the Army in the Polish campaign laid the pattern for future “blitz” operations. However, the campaign also showed that the Luftwaffe was strong enough only for a war which was limited in length and conducted on a single front”.[6]

Hitler considered himself to be a great military strategist. His initial successes seem to bear this out. However, his dabbling in every facet of Luftwaffe planning and operations and his ill advised decisions to fight on several fronts led directly to stretching his Air Force to the breaking point and beyond.

Hermann Göring was another of the personalities who directly affected the Luftwaffe’s rise and fall. He was one of Hitler’s most important military commanders, in charge of the Luftwaffe. He created in short order an impressive Air Force which performed admirably early in the war. Unfortunately his behavior and leadership became more and more erratic as the war progressed. A prime example of his negative effect can be seen in an excerpt from a conversation between Göring and his commanders in regards to the conduct of the Battle of Britain. Göring was not pleased with the progress of the campaign and held a meeting to find out what was happening. The Luftwaffe War Diaries record the following conversation between Lieutenant Colonel Osterkamp and Göring.

“The English have adopted new tactics. They are now using powerful fighter formations to attack in force. From our radio-intercept service we know that their orders are strictly to attack our bombers. Yesterday these new tactics took us by surprise.”

“That’s what we want!” Goering blustered. “If they come at us in droves, we can shoot them down in droves!”

In the face of such arguments no fruitful discussion was possible. The Luftwaffes supreme commander had lost touch, to a disturbing degree, with operational problems. He dwelt in a world of illusions and the men who had waged their bitter struggle tirelessly in the English skies – these men were now heaped with reproaches”.[7]

Göring’s strong will brought the Luftwaffe to an impressive strength in a short amount of time. He also led the Air Force to many victories early in the war. But his erratic behavior and leadership were directly responsible for its poor performance in the latter half of the war.

“During the Second War he certainly devoted far more time to buying, exchanging and plundering paintings and works of art than he did to running the Luftwaffe”.[8]

In the end, there are many reasons and factors that contributed to the rise and fall of the Luftwaffe. Two of the most significant reasons are the timing of the Luftwaffe’s build up and the start of the war, as well as the personalities involved in leading it. Timing enabled the early victories, but led to later defeats when the personalities involved failed to make the correct decisions.

Bibliography

Bailey, Ronald H. and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Air War in Europe. Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Virginia, 1979, 208 p.

Bekkar, Cajus. The Luftwaffe War Diaries. Da Capo Press, Inc., New York, 399 p.

Deighton, Len. Blood Tears and Folly. Castle Books. Edison, NJ, 1999, 653 p.

Chant, Christopher. Warfare and the Third Reich. Barnes and Noble Books, New York, 1998, 451 p.

Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower; The Creation of Armageddon. Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1987, 435p.

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[1] Chant, Christopher. Warfare and the Third Reich. Barnes and Noble Books, New York, 1998, 451 p.42

[2] Bekkar, Cajus. The Luftwaffe War Diaries. Da Capo Press, Inc., New York, Pg 38

[3] Bekkar, Cajus. Pg 41

[4] Bekkar, Cajus. Pg 45

[5] Bailey, Ronald H. and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Air War in Europe. Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Virginia, 1979, Pg 185.

[6] Bekkar, Cajus. 399 p.

[7] Bekkar, Cajus. Pg 175.

[8] Deighton, Len. Blood Tears and Folly. Castle Books. Edison, NJ, 1999, Pg 328.

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