First Punic War. Rome finally won - GMT Games

Rome Threatens Sardini a in the First Punic War 'The First Pun ic War began in 264 as a contest between Rome, Syracuse and Cartha ge for control of eastern Sicily. Rome defeated Syracuse early on, and the war expanded as a clash bet ween the Cartha ginian and Roman empires. However, as long as Rome lac ked a fleet, she could threaten only Sicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safe behind the patrols of the Cartha ginian navy. Punic raids were launch ed from Sardinia against the Italian coast, while the Pun ic navy brough t support to beleaguered cities on the Sicili an coast. Within the Roman Senate, the realization came that this war could never be won unless Cartha ge was challenged at sea. So, in 260 Rome built her fir st battle fleet, and with ingenio us boarding ramps (th e corvus) defeat ed the Pun ic navy at Mvlae.

In 259 the consul Lucius Cornel ius Scipio led the first Roman expedition

against Corsica and Sardinia . He had some success against the garrisons, before being driven off by a reinforc ing fleet Under H annibal, son of Gisgo. In the following year, the consul Gaius Sulpiciou s Palerculus campaigned with a Roman fleet in Sardin ian waters, defeating Hannibal and capturing or destroy ing all his ships. Hannibal was crucified by his own officers for his rep eated failures. Another Punic Fleet und er Hanno arrived to restore the situ ation, and the Romans departed.

As the long war dragged on, Roman interest in Sardin ia waned. The immediate objective of ending nav al raids on Italy had been acco mplished. Rome turned to a more dir ect strategy of invadin g Africa. When this effort was foiled by dis aster on land (the Battle of the Bagradas featur ed in SPQR) and sea (256- 55), Rome revert ed to a strategy of attrition on Sicily. Sardinia was never again threatened during the

Fir st Pun ic War. Rome finally won the long war with a naval victory at the Aegates Islands in 241. In the Pea ce of Lutatius that ended the war Cartha ge lost Sicily and had to pay an enormous indemnity, but retained control of Sardinia and Corsica.

The Rape of Sardinia The end of the First Pun ic War brough t no relief to Carthage. Hard on the heels of this war came the revolt of the mercenaries, the Tru celess War, 240-238 (featured in C3i Nr. 7). While this brutal war raged in Africa, the contag ion of rebellion spread to Cartha ge's mercenary garrison on Sardinia in 239. Thes e sold iers of fortune rose up, and slew their Carthaginian commander Bostar and his office rs. In response, Cartha ge sent an exp edit ion und er (another) Hanno to punish the rebels, but his troops deserted and joined the mutineers. The rebels crucified Hanno, then ran rampant over the island, slaying all the Carthaginian settl ers. Once the euphoria of the initial uprising had worn off, the se mercenaries began to dre ad retribution from Cartha ge. So the y sent an offer to Rome to surrender Sardinia to them.

The Roman Senate refused the offer. The senator s decided to honor the ter ms of the Peace of Lutatius, which expressly forbid taking as an ally any ally of the other power. Meanwhile, on Sardinia the mutinou s mercenaries turned on the local popula ce. Their depred ations at len gth drove the native tribes to rise up and attack them. The mercenaries were expelled fro m the island in 238 , and Sardinia was bri efly independent. Carthage, as soon as the rebel mercenaries in Africa had been suppressed, began preparing an expedition to re -conquer the isl and.

In Rome, however, there was a change of heart. The senate revers ed itself and pro clai med the annexation

of Sardinia and Corsica, in flagrant dis regard of the Treaty of Lut atius. When Carthage compla ined, Rome thr eatened war and inc reased the indemnity Carthage had to pay to keep the pea ce. This aggression became known as the Rape of Sardin ia. Rome may hav e gain ed a valuable provin ce, but she also earned the und ying hatred of Hami lcar Barca and his sons (Hannibal, Hasd rubal and Mago), a matt er of no small consequen ce.

The Roman Province Victor y in the First Punic War brough t Rome her first two overse as provin ces, Sicily and Sardin ia. The highly civi liz ed isl and of Sic ily became a pro fitable and peaceful posses sion. Wild, untamed Sardinia was another story. Cartha ge had nev er conquered the enti re island, content with coastal enclav es and dip lomatic, commercial and cultural domination of the island. Roman ways were different. A series of exp edit ions were sent to the island to pacify it comple tely. Both consuls fought on the island in 238, and after a bri ef interlude consular armies were dispat ched every year for five years, fro m 235 -231. The first of the se exp edit ions was led by the consul Titus Manlius Torquatus, of whom more wil l be heard anon .

Finding the admini stration of overse as pro vinces a burden on the limited office rs of the Roman govern ment, the number of praetors was exp anded from two to four in 227. The first pra etor of Sardinia in that year was Gains Flaminius, destined to meet his end at Hannibal's hands by Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus was dispat ched with his arm' to quell another uprising on Sardinia. His coll eague, Lucius Anielius Papus remain ed in Italy to guard against an expected Celtic invasion. Atilius Regu lus suppre ssed the Sardinian revolt and returned to Italy in tine to tak e part in the Battle of Telamon (featur ed in C3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second

Pun ic War Sardinia was a pro vince barely pacified. A generation of Roman commander s and legionnai res had the ir chief battle experience from campai gns on this island.

The Second Punic War Sardinia did not figure prominently in the opening campai gns of the Second Punic War. The island was held for Rome only by a garrison of allied troops, probab ly no more than 5,000 men. Hannibal's surprise crossing of the Alps, and his first major victor y at Trebbia, convinced the Romans that this war would be neithe r easy nor short. The Roma n senators knew that Carthage would attempt to regain Sardinia at the first opportunity. Therefore, early in 217 the praetor Aulus Cornelius Mammu la was sent to reinforce the island's garrison with Legion V, a full-strength double legion with some 1),000 foot and 800 hor se. Cornelius Mammula main tained a tenuous control of Sardinia over the next two years, as Hann ibal's continuin g string of victori es over Rome excited the anti-Roman pas sion s of the native tribes. The praetor had to exact ever inc reasing taxes and tribute from his province to support the war, which contributed greatly to the rising dis content.

The counci l in Carthage also took more dir ect action to break Sardinia

away fro m Rome's grasp. A general , Hanno, infiltrated onto the isl and as an agent pro vocateur, to fome nt reb ellion. Hanno soon made conl 111011 cause with Hallipsicora, tile leading Sardinian chieftain, to prepar e a massive island -wide insurr ection . Cornelius Mammlula, however, was a wary and circum spect govern or. Even after the Battle of Cannae, when much of southern Italy rebelled, Hanno and Hamp sicora bid ed the ir time. They awaited a more favorable moment to raise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!' .

The opportunity the y sought came soon enough. At the end of 216, the propraetor Cornelius Mammul a was rec alled to Rome, pending the arrival of his successor. The pra etor Quintus Mucius Sca evola arrived early in 215, and imme diatel y came down with a serious, incapacitating illness.

Cornelius Mammul a, alarmed by the turn of even ts, hurried back to Rome to make his report. Leader less, the Roman garrison was unable to rea ct as Hanno and Hampsi cora now unleashed the long simmering rebellion. The insurr ection quickl y spr ead across the island. Legion V hunk ered down in its bases and wai ted .

Hanno and Corneli us Plea for Rei nforcement The opposing generals, Hanno and Cornelius Mammu la, both hurried to get urgent ple as for reinforcing exp edit ions to the ir home govern ments. Cornel ius Mamm ula report ed in person to the senate on the imp ending revolt and the incapacita tion of Mucius Sca evola. Rome, unfortunatel y, had jus t about scraped the bottom of her manpower bar rel. After Cann ae in the fall of 216, Rome had bar ely managed to conscript one new consular army of two legions. Additional armi es were formed from the sur vivo rs of Cann ae and a force a sla ve and convict volunteers, the volones. Then another dis aster befell Rome in the winter of 216- 215 . The praetorian artily of two legion, in Cisalpine Gaul lea s ambushed and annihilated in the Litani forest by Celtic tribes, instigated by Hannibal. This brought to ten the number of

legions comple tely destroyed so far in the war. The senate had reluctantly con clud ed in early 216 that no additional forces could be raised, and that the Litani ambush must go un avenged for now. It was in this situation tha t Cornelius Mammula made his ple a for reinforce ment s. Despit e their many difficulties, the senate ordered a levy to be raised. Somehow, the urb an pra etor, Quintus Ful vius Flaccus, managed to scrape up a reinforced Roman legion, the XIV. Its strength was 5,000 foot and 400 horse. It was most likely com pos ed of teen-agers, old men and tho se earlier rejected as unfit for ser vice. But Legion XIV would have to do.

Hanno' s message met an entirely different respon se in Cartha ge, The way had been paved by Mago Bar ca's mission to the council following Cannae in the autu mn of 216. Mago had pou red a bushel basket of gold rin gs cut from the fingers of dead Roman nob les and knights onto the council chamber floor. Mago's request for 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry was readil y approved. When Hanno s emergency dispatch arrived, Mago Barca was on the point of sailin g for Italy with the first contingent of this lev y, 12,000 foot, 1,500 horse and 20 elephants . Arriving at nearly the same time as Hanno's plea to re-conquer Sardin ia came news of HasdrubaI Barca's disastrous defeat at Dertosa in Spain (featured in C3i Nr. 4). The council was forced to allocate resour ces amongst three competing theaters - Italy, Spain and Sardinia. The councilors' decision revealed their strategic priorities. Mago and his army were diverted to protect Spain. A mere 4,000 cavalr y and 40 e lephants were sent with Bomilcar and the home fleet to reinforce Hannibal in Italy. (It was the onl y reinforcement lie ever rec eived.) A new army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20 elephants was prepared for an exp edit ion to Sardinia.

The expeditionary army was prob ably formed of a core of sonic six thousand solid Libyan spearme n, supported by over 1,000 superb Numidi an light cavalry and heavy

Cartha ginian horse. There was also available a force of 13,850 Iberian infantry and 1,200 cavalr y from the The rsitae, Mastiani, Oretes and Olc ades trib es. ']'his unit had been posted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal, in keep ing with his policy of defending Spain with African troops and Africa with Iberians. Probably about six thousand of these Iberian foot, with supporting cavalry were assigned to the Sardinia bound army. This Iberian contingent was by now well dri lled, after three years of garrison duty in Africa.

The Commanders So both Cartha ge and Rome prepared exp edit ions for Sardinia in the spr ing of 215. But these armies needed commanders, and this pos ed a problem for both empires. The Roman Senate habitually turned to exp erienced consulares (former consuls) to lead her armies in emergencies of this nature, however, few were available. Fives consulares had already been slain in the first thr ee years of this war: Gaius Fla minius (Tr asimene); Lucius Aemi liu s Pau llus, Marcus Minucius and Gnaeus Ser vilius Geminus (Cannae); and Lucius Postumius Albinus (Litani). Tiberias Sempronius Longus (Trebbia) and Gains Terentius Varro (Canna e) were in dis grace. Quintus Fabius Maximu s and Tiberias Semproniu s Gracchus as consul s, and Marcus Claudius Marcellus as pro consul faced Hannib al, while Gnaeus and Publics Cornelius Scipio were in distant Spain. There were few tri ed leaders left. The praetor Fulvius Flaccus, charged with designating a temporary commander for Sardinia, chose Titus Manlius Torquatus.

Manlius was one of the elder states man of Rome, a stern, harsh man kno wn for his conservative, traditional views. His intran sigence pla yed a key role in the rejection of Hannibal's offer to ran som the 8,000 Roman pri soners taken at Cannae, condemnin g these men to a life of sla very. He was probably already over 60 years of age, and like Marcellus, he had probably served as a junior office r against Hamilcar Bar ca in Sicily. His first consulship

had been served in Sardinia in 235. His seco nd consulship had been in 224, leadin g a puniti ve expedit ion against the Celts after the invasion of Telamon. 'tradition dictated that no man serve more than two consul ships. Even though Fab ius, Marcellus and others ignored this pro vision and ser ved multiple consulships during the Second Pun ic War, Manlius would have non e of it. Later, in 210 , after the leadin g century had elected him, he forced the m to annul the vote and begin anew. Again in 207 lie would refuse to stand for the consul ship when it was offered. But in this case he agreed to serve temporarily as the deputy of the strick en praetor Mucius, probably as a propraetor . Manlius would return to Sardinia a full two decades sin ce hi, firs t command on the island.

Carthage had as yet los t no senior commanders in this war. Nevertheles s, Carthage was also short of exp erienced generals. The veteran comman ders of the Iberian conquest had all acco mpanied Hannib al. Hasdrubal, his chief of staff, Hanno, son of Bomilcar, Mah arbal, Mago Saunites, Hamilcar and Carthalo were all with the army in Italy. Hasdrubal Barca, his deputy Himilco and his brother Mago were engaged in Spain. With the best commander s already committed, the council in Carthage selected Hasdrubal the Bald to lead the Sardinian expedition. He does not seem to hav e been a veteran of the Iberian campai gns, but Hasdrubal may hav e camp aign ed against the tribes on Cartha ge's Africa n frontier. The council as signed Hasdrubal a deputy commander, Mago. This general was said to be a clo se relative of Hannibal, probab ly a cousin. Hasdrubal could also rely on the support of the gen eral Hanno, already in Sardinia.

and besiege the leaderless Roma n troops in their bases. But fate took a hand. When in the open sea between Carthage and Sardinia, Hasdrubal's fleet was caught by a savage stor m and hurled some 300 miles west onto the Baleari c Islands. Loss of life was not severe, but Hasd rubal found he had to rep air many of his ships before continuin g the journey. Hasdrubal took advantage of this une xpected diversion to reinforce his army with a strong bod y of the reno wned Balearic slinge rs.

While the Carthaginian s cooled their heels in the Balearics, Manlius set out with his 5,400 men escorted by some 40 quinquer emes. The Roman voyage to Sardinia was une ventful, and Manlius put in at the provincial capitol, Caralis (modern Cagliari). The Romans had won the rac e, with a helping hand from Neptune. But Manlius still faced a serious situation, with the island in full revolt and the garrison disheartened and demoralized. Manlius took command of Mucius ' Legion V and added the

The Race is On

Cartha ginian and Roman expeditions were both prepared for Sardinia in the spring of 215. The question was,

whi ch would arrive first? Hasdrubal set out first from Cartha ge, his army of 13,500 escorted by 60 quinqu eremes.

If he could arrive first, he could join the rebel Sardinian army to his own

ori ginal garr ison allied troops to his green Roman Legion XIV to form a second double legion. This gave him a full consular army of about 18,000 infantry, but with only 1,200 cavalry. Manlius was not satisfied. To swell his ranks, he grounded his fleet and pre ssed the marines and rowers into ser vice as infantry. The crews of 40 quinquereme s would pro vide over 1,500 marines and 8,000 rowers. Manlius formed the marine s into cohorts, and selected some 2,500 of the most capable rowers to serve as lightl y armed veli tes. This added 4,000 men to his army, bringing his for ce up to 22,000 foot and 1,200 hor se.

Manlius undoubtedly would have appreciated some time to drill his for ce and develo p more cohesion amongst his V and XIV Legions, garrison troops and naval infantry, but there was no time to spare. Manlius had to suppress the Sardinian rebellion, before the rumored Cartha gini an expedition

arrived. So Manlius led his dis jointed army out of Caralis, seeking the main rebel concentratio n. As fate would lave it, when Manlius came upon the rain reb el host, Hamp sicora was away, recruiting amongst the Goatskin tribes of the mountains. He had left his son Hostus in command of the army, which may have numbered 15,000 men. Hostus was young and rec kless and imme diatel y attacked the larger Roman army when it approached. Manliu s predic tably routed the rebel army. Its losses were only 3,000 killed and 800 taken pri soner, indicating that most of the rebels fled before the figh ting got too hot .

Hasdrubal and Company Arrive Hampsicora established a new base at Cornus with his Goatskin light infantry and began collecting the scattered remn ants of his army. Manlius, as soon as lie learned of Hampsi cora's location, advanced on Cornus to finish off the insurr ection . The war in Sardinia would have been over, but just then word came that a Cartha ginian fleet had landed on the Western coast. Hasdrubal the Bald quickly dis embarked his force of over 14,000 men, then dis missed his fleet. Manlius chose a cautious course, abandoned the field and withdrew bac k to his base at Caralis. Hasdrubal joined with Hampsicora, who by now had rallied an army of over 12,000 Sardinian trib esmen to reinforce the Cartha gini an expedi tion. The combined armies now numbered nearly 27,000 men.

Manlius' hasty retreat seems a hit pre mature in retrospect. A more aggressiv e commander could have held the field and possibly prevented the junctur e of Hasd rubal and Hampsi cora. Manlius, however, was not chosen for his aggressiveness. It was his steady, cautious nature that the Roman senate counted on. Manlius knew well that ten Roma n legions had already been lost in this war. He wasn 't about to los e two more. A younger noble, in his first pra etorship or consulship, migh t have felt compelled to risk battle to est abli sh his reputation. Manliu s already had his share of glor y, and

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