Chapter 13 Explanation and the Study of Religion

1

1

2

2

3

Chapter 13

3

4

4

5

5

6

Explanation and the Study of Religion

6

7

7

8

8

9

Egil Asprem and Ann Taves

9

10

10

11

11

12

Introduction

12

13

13

14 The rise of the evolutionary and cognitive science of religion in the last two dec- 14

15 ades has sparked a resurgence of interest in explaining religion. Predictably, these 15

16 efforts have prompted rehearsals of longstanding debates over whether religious 16

17 phenomena can or should be explained in nonreligious terms. Little attention 17

18 has been devoted to the nature of explanation, methods of explanation, or what 18

19 should count as an adequate explanation.

19

20 The lack of attention to explanation is further aggravated by a concomitant 20

21 lack of attention to what we mean by theory in the study of religion. As has been 21

22 the case in anthropology (Ellen 2010), we routinely discuss theories of religion 22

23 without discussing what counts as a theory. For some, theory is associated with 23

24 the range of classical and contemporary theories of religion included in intro- 24

25 ductory texts (see for example Pals 2014 or Stausberg 2009). For others, including 25

26 many in the humanities, theory is associated with "critical theory," of either the 26

27 literary or social science variety.

27

28 As Stausberg (2009: 2?3) indicates, there are, however, many competing views 28

29 of and controversies over the meaning of theory in the different sciences and 29

30 disciplines. For our purposes, it is enough to note (1) the distinction between the 30

31 colloquial and scientific definitions of the term and (2) the intimate connection 31

32 between scientific theories and explanation. The American Heritage Dictionary (as 32

33 cited by Reznick 2010: 220) makes the basic distinction we will presume here. 33

34 Colloquially, theory typically refers to abstract reasoning, speculation, hypothe- 34

35 sis or supposition. In the sciences, however, it refers to "systematically organized 35

36 knowledge applicable in a relatively wide variety of circumstances; especially, a 36

37 system of assumptions, accepted principles, and rules of procedure divided to 37

38 analyze, predict, or otherwise explain the nature or behavior of a specified set of 38

39 phenomena" (ibid.). Scientific theories, in other words, seek to "explain the nature 39

40 or behavior of a specified set of phenomena ... [in light of] a system of assump- 40

41 tions, accepted principles, and rules of procedure" (ibid.). Whether the theories 41

42 have been viewed as scientific or not, much of the debate regarding explanation 42

43 in religious studies has centered on two issues, one explicit and the other not: 43

44 (1) the debate over reductionism, i.e., whether theories of religion can or should 44

45 explain religion in nonreligious terms, and (2) a tacit debate over "scientism," i.e., 45

134?Egil Asprem and Ann Taves

1 over whether anything resembling scientific methods and lines of theorizing is 1

2 desirable or possible in the humanities (see for example Stenmark 1997).

2

3 In what follows, we assume the legitimacy of attempts to explain religious phe- 3

4 nomena in nonreligious terms in light of the assumptions, principles and rules 4

5 of procedure in the social and natural sciences. Building on Proudfoot's (1985) 5

6 distinction between descriptive and explanatory reduction, we presuppose the 6

7 legitimacy and importance of the latter. We will directly engage the issue of 7

8 "scientism," which we view as a dismissive term typically directed at perceived 8

9 over-extensions of scientific inquiry, through our discussion of historical and 9

10 contemporary explanation in the philosophy of science. In doing so, we want to 10

11 make the point that there are various views of explanation in the sciences, some 11

12 of which we consider more appropriate for explaining socioculturally-informed 12

13 human behavior than others. Specifically, we argue that the new mechanistic-causal 13

14 approach commonly presupposed in the "special sciences" (biology, the neuro- 14

15 sciences, and psychology), referred to by philosophers of science as "the new mech- 15

16 anism," can be extended to the study of religion following the lead of researchers 16

17 who are extending it to the social sciences.

17

18 Our aim in making this case is, first, to move the discussion in religious stud- 18

19 ies beyond general worries about "reductionism" and "scientism" (or "positiv- 19

20 ism") and, second, to ground theorizing about human experience in a broadly 20

21 evolutionary base. We do so recognizing that any discussion of mechanisms in 21

22 the social sciences and history must take account of complexities typically not 22

23 encountered (or dealt with) in the natural sciences. Our goal, in other words, is 23

24 not to subsume or subordinate the humanities to the natural and social sciences, 24

25 but to connect them in a spirit of consilience (Slingerland and Collard 2011). 25

26 In the sections that follow, we will discuss explanation in theories of reli- 26

27 gion (?1), the nature and limitations of the "old mechanism" and other older 27

28 approaches to explanation in the philosophy of science (?2), and how the "new 28

29 mechanism" overcomes these difficulties (?3). Throughout this discussion we will 29

30 highlight the complexities that will need to be addressed in extending the new 30

31 mechanist approach to explanation to the humanistic social sciences.

31

32

32

33

1 Explanation in Theories of Religion

33

34

34

35 "Explanation" has several different meanings in ordinary English (Craver 2014: 35

36 30?35):

36

37 38 39 40

1 It can refer to a communicative act. The professor explained (communicates) the material to her students. The text explains (communicates) what you need to know. (

37 38 39 40

41 2 It can refer to a cause or a factor that produces a phenomenon. (

41

42 43 44 45

3 It can refer to a mental representation or model of the causes that produce a phenomenon. The model explains (represents) the (causal) explanation.

42 43 44 45

Explanation and the Study of Religion?135

1 Explanations in the first and third senses are known as epistemic explanations. They 1

2 involve humans or other intentional creatures trying to communicate ("explain") 2

3 something to an audience. Explanations in the second sense are known as ontic 3

4 explanations. They presuppose a view of reality (an ontology) which assumes that 4

5 certain entities and processes exist in the world "whether or not anyone discov- 5

6 ers or describes them" (Salmon 1989: 133, quoted in Craver 2014: 31), and assumes 6

7 that there exist ontic structures (e.g. mechanisms and causes) that explain the 7

8 production and behavior of various phenomena.

8

9

9

10 1.1 Theories of Religion

10

11

11

12 Explanation in the second sense allows us to distinguish between phenomeno- 12

13 logical and explanatory models. Phenomenological models describe or redescribe 13

14 (i.e., interpret) a phenomenon "without revealing the ontic structures that pro- 14

15 duce it" (Craver 2014: 40). We can distinguish three broad types of theories:

15

16 17

1 Phenomenological theories of religion.

16 17

18 2 Supernaturalistic causal theories of religion.

18

19

19

20 3 Naturalistic causal theories of religion.

20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Phenomenological theories of religion, associated historically with figures such as Chantepie de la Saussaye, Otto, Kristensen, van der Leeuw and, more recently, with Ninian Smart and Mircea Eliade, are only loosely connected with philosophical phenomenologists, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleu-Ponty. All, however, give priority to human experience from the first person point of view (Smith 2013). Some who hold to this approach bracket their own ontological views and limit themselves to describing or interpreting the ontological claims of their subjects. Such theories, typically characterized as phenomenological or interpretive (hermeneutical), describe the causal explanations of those they study, but refrain from offering causal explanations (i.e., ontic claims) of their own.

Phenomenological bracketing has given rise to "methodological agnosticism" (see for example Porpora 2006), which we, like others (Martin forthcoming), find problematic. We do however endorse the idea of a first step in which researchers temporarily hold back their own explanations in order to describe the phenomenon one wants to explain and avoid descriptive reduction (see discussion of Proudfoot below).

In so far as the phenomenological is construed as the only step, however, it is tied to the notion of religion as a sui generis phenomenon. This view holds that to the extent that religion can be explained, it must be explained "on its own terms," that is, it cannot be reduced to something that is not religion. The simplest version of sui generis theorizing holds simply that, in Daniel Pals's words, "one ought to accord them [religious phenomena] a certain independence" from other human activities and experiences (Pals 1987: 259). Thus one can explain religious phenomena in terms presumed to be internal to the religious field (e.g.,

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

136?Egil Asprem and Ann Taves

1 "the holy," "the sacred," "mana," or "power"), but not in terms of "external" fac- 1

2 tors, such as social alienation, latent neuroses, or evolved cooperative strategies. 2

3 We question whether such internal explanations are explanations at all. Worse 3

4 still, as it seeks such "internal" explanations, the sui generis approach has often 4

5 developed into forms of crypto-theology that essentially produce supernatural- 5

6 istic causal explanations.

6

7 Supernaturalistic causal theories of religion are premised on the idea that not only 7

8 is religion a thing apart, but this thing is ultimately rooted in an ontologically 8

9 real dimension of sacrality, transcendence, or the supernatural. In so far as phe- 9

10 nomenological theorists of religion (e.g., Otto, van der Leeuw, Eliade) embrace the 10

11 ontological claims they are describing as sui generis, their theories take on an 11

12 implicit or explicit supernaturalist quality. These theories postulate the existence 12

13 of an ontologically real religious reality that humans respond to but do not create. 13

14 These theories implicitly or explicitly include this ontological reality as a poten- 14

15 tial factor in their causal explanations of events. In a sense, they reverse the order 15

16 of explanation: Instead of mundane events in the material world explaining the 16

17 emergence and activities of "religions," the manifestation of "religious" power 17

18 explains events in the mundane world such as revelations, sacred place, or char- 18

19 ismatic authority.

19

20 Naturalistic causal theories of religion offer (reductionistic) explanations based on 20

21 language or discourse (literary and cultural theories), collective processes (social 21

22 theories), mental processes (cognitive theories), and/or biological processes (evo- 22

23 lutionary theories). Some theorists want to limit their explanations to one type 23

24 of cause or privilege one type of cause over the others. Others view these causes 24

25 as interacting and want to figure out how they are related. In current practice, 25

26 however, the boundary between phenomenological and naturalistic causal the- 26

27 ories of religion is blurry because, on the one hand, scholars are not clear on the 27

28 distinction between description, interpretation, and explanation and are worried 28

29 about appearing reductionistic, scientistic, or positivist, on the other.

29

30 Ontologically, there is a divide between those who view (scientific) expla- 30

31 nations as being grounded in mind- and language-independent structures in 31

32 the world (realists) and those that view (scientific) explanations as entirely 32

33 contingent on communicative processes, with only an arbitrary relation to a 33

34 language-independent world (constructionists). In light of our definitions of 34

35 explanation above, realists are after ontic explanations, while constructionists 35

36 typically insist that epistemic explanations are all we've got and "the best we 36

37 can do is contribute intelligently to the conversations of our time" (von Stuckrad 37

38 2010: 158). While we acknowledge the importance and value of constructionist 38

39 explanations, we agree with theorists like Engler (2004) and Hjelm (2014), who 39

40 emphasize that constructionism does not preclude realism or entail radical rela- 40

41 tivism. Thus we prefer to locate constructionist approaches within a critical nat- 41

42 uralistic (and hence realist) framework (see Asprem 2014: 80?86), premised on the 42

43 view that humans evolved. We, thus, presuppose that scientific theories of reli- 43

44 gion offer causal explanations of human behaviors that are ultimately grounded 44

45 in an evolutionary (rather than transcendental) framework.

45

Explanation and the Study of Religion?137

1 To specify what that means more carefully, we need to clarify our approach to 1

2 two other widely discussed problems in the study of religion: what is meant by 2

3 religion and what is meant by reduction and reductionism.

3

4

4

5 'H?QLQJ5HOLJLRQ

5

6

6

7 In the discussion so far, we have proceeded as if we could shift the ontological 7

8 ground of "religion" from the transcendental to the social-cultural realm without 8

9 incurring any difficulties. In fact, this is not the case. Those who ground religion 9

10 in ontological reality are able to offer essentialist definitions of religion based on 10

11 their understanding of the sacred, transcendent, or supernatural, which they typ- 11

12 ically derive from tradition or revelation. Scholars who want to treat religion as 12

13 a socio-cultural phenomenon without grounding it ontologically typically stip- 13

14 ulate a definition of religion that then constitutes the phenomenon they seek 14

15 to describe and/or explain (Platvoet 1999; Arnal 2000), which then imposes a 15

16 scholarly definition on the range of religion-related terms mobilized by different 16

17 groups on the ground.

17

18 As Stausberg (2009: 3?6) points out, theories that take religion as their object 18

19 of study of necessity make implicit or explicit claims regarding the specificity of 19

20 religion(s):

20

21 22

Only if religion can be said to have or to be identified with any specific properties, to possess its own regularities, or to be communicated as a specific code, can one

21 22

23

be sure to recognize religion in observation, unless one makes it a point to ana-

23

24 lyze only instances of religion identified by social actors as "religion." (Stausberg 24

25 2009: 3)

25

26

26

27 As researchers, we are interested in the latter and so choose to analyze the use of 27

28 religion-related terms by social actors. We view "religion" and related terms (e.g., 28

29 spirituality, magic, superstition, the esoteric, and the occult) as complex cultural 29

30 concepts (CCCs), that is, as abstract nouns with unstable, overlapping meanings 30

31 that vary within and across social formations (see Asprem and Taves 2017).1 Here, 31

32 in other words, we are in agreement with constructionist approaches to "reli- 32

33 gion": as a CCC, "it" does not exist apart from human communicative actions, and 33

34 being "identified by social actors as `religion'." Given this, we, like Beckford (2003) 34

35 in sociology and Bloch (2010) in anthropology, question whether it is possible to 35

36 construct a theory of religion per se.

36

37 "Religion" is, of course, not unusual in this regard. Indeed, we think that 37

38 human experience is typically expressed in terms of complex cultural concepts 38

39 and embedded in social formations. Because CCCs are embedded in social forma- 39

40 tions that determine their meaning, we do not think it is possible to explain CCCs 40

41 (as such) in scientific terms. The emergence of meanings and uses of these con- 41

42 cepts is the subject matter of discursive, constructionist approaches. However, 42

43 studying CCCs is not the only thing we can do. The building block approach (BBA) 43

44 is premised on the idea that we can explain human experience, by first rede- 44

45 scribing phenomena of interest in behavioral terms, and then decomposing them 45

 ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download