A2 Sight Picture…



Lt Gen D.A. Deptula Remarks

AF Strategy and Transformation Bfast (AF Defense Strategy Series), Cap Hill, DC 27 Apr 07

Congressman Miller, thanks very much for that kind introduction. General Reimer, and other distinguished guests, let me add my thanks for taking time out of your busy schedules to be here. I’m really pleased to have the opportunity to showcase what the great men and women of the Air Force ISR community are doing for our nation’s security.

This is also a timely occasion to address a subject that’s getting some attention of late—namely, how DoD can move to the next level of jointness—service interdependence—by designating the Air Force as Executive Agent for medium and high altitude UAVs. So I’ll give you my thoughts on that topic as well.

Related to all of the above, this seminar title of “Transformation” has particular significance with regard to AF ISR. That’s where I’d like to start…

Threats we face today are more complex than the predictable one we faced in the Soviet Union. This reality—combined with fiscal imperatives, and the maturation of our aerospace capability—is the driving force behind your Air Force reforms and realignments in the realm of ISR.

We spent the last Century figuring out how to rapidly strike any target; anywhere on the face of the globe; with precision; day or night; in any kind of weather. Today the real challenge is no longer “how” to engage, but rather what kind of effect does one want to achieve—lethal or non-lethal—against what, or whom, and where?

In other words, today we may be witnessing a transformation in the relationship between supported and supporting with respect to the traditional notions of “operations,” and “intelligence.”

By way of example, when we took out Musab al-Zarkawi in Iraq last June, that “operation” consisted of over 600 hours of Predator time, followed by about ten minutes of F-16 time. The find, fix, track, and target part of the equation in this case took far longer, and was much more complex than the engage part. So was “operations” supported by intel, or was intel supported by “operations?”

I would tell you that in the 21st Century, Intelligence IS operations!

This is part of the rationale behind the AF Chief of Staff establishing the AF/A2 as a 3-star Deputy for the first time in history. Previously in the Air Force, intel had been a two-star.

This move is a reflection of how critical AF ISR is as we face future security challenges. Today we need to ferret out our enemies from among civil populations, mountain caves, tents in the desert… They’re not massing on the other side of the Fulda Gap. They’re diffuse, deceptive, and elusive.

As a result, Air Force ISR is one of the most critical weapons we have at our disposal. Accordingly, Gen Moseley charged me to develop an A2 Way Ahead after assessing where we’ve been, where we are, and where we need to go.

I parsed that task into three major study areas: “ISR Capabilities,” “Organization,” and “Personnel,” made recommendations to the Chief that he accepted, and we are now on our way moving forward with major muscle moves in these areas. Let me offer some insights into where we are going with each of these.

In terms of “ISR Capabilities,” we are making a major modification in how we manage our AF ISR resources. Historically we tend to define ISR capability by program elements (PEs). These Program Elements are structured according to platforms. So we’ve worked the planning, programming, and even employment aspects of ISR based on platform types; U-2s, RC-135s, Predators, and so on.

Now we’re embarking on an ISR resource management approach based on capabilities. After all, it’s a capability that a Joint Force Commander is looking for to achieve an objective—the platform that supplies it is immaterial.

There are still a number of details we’re working to implement this new construct, but the end-state is the governance, planning, and programming of ISR as a consolidated, functional area.

The platform approach has too often resulted in difficulties ranging from lost potential synergies, to the fielding of system components that can’t talk to each other.

In the fight against today’s enemy, we can’t afford to bleed off any airspeed–-and some of the problems created by thinking “platform” vice “capability” are akin to flying with the speed break up…

One aspect of transforming ISR Capabilities does deal with platforms, and with ensuring we maintain our technological edge over our adversaries.

While we have a virtually limitless capacity for high-tech innovation, we are constrained by what are NOT limitless fiscal resources.

So while we’re going forward with developing new technologies and fielding new capabilities, we are simultaneously extending the useful lives of the ISR work-horses you’ve already become familiar with.

Our Nation’s premier airborne signals intelligence platform—the RC-135, for example, is undergoing spiral upgrades and modifications that guarantee its valuable contribution for years to come. And we’re looking into exploiting the ISR potential of our targeting pods that virtually every combat aircraft now carry.

Highlighting the need to focus on capabilities vice platforms – we are programming the introduction of new resources to ensure our ISR capability portfolio will increase overall.

It’s important to remember that the capabilities resident in a platform rolling off the line today are much greater than the platforms of the past on a one-for-one basis. This is a significant point that some overlook when assessing “bang for the buck” of various Air Force platforms…instead they only focus on the “buck” piece…

For example, as we begin to retire our U-2s from service—service that started in the 1950s—we’ll have already brought Global Hawk on-line. Relative to the U-2, the technological advances of Global Hawk will allow us to increase the duration of one mission from a nominal 8 hours to over 24 hours, increase range, provide greater area coverage, more sensor availability, and conduct signals, radar, and imagery collection simultaneously from one aircraft on a single mission—all capabilities that will result in greater ISR effects for our joint warfighters.

While I’m on it, a prime example of how far astray the myopic “platform / price” logic will lead you is evident with the F-22. There has been no shortage of F-22 criticism claiming that “It’s too high-tech (read: expensive) for today’s enemy,” or “There’s no enemy fighter to justify the F-22.”

Regarding the lack of a comparable enemy fighter, would these critics rather we make our weapons choices in favor of the ones where the enemy has the same or better equipment?

But more to the point of capabilities, these arguments only consider the F-22 as an air-to-air fighter – the implication being that if there is no significant air threat, it’s an unnecessary expense. However, the F-22 is not just an “air-to-air” platform—and here is where traditional nomenclature constrains understanding of capability—It’s not an F-22, it’s an F-, A-, B-, E-, EA-, RC-, AWACS….22.

It’s a flying ISR sensor that will allow us to conduct network-centric warfare inside adversary battlespace from the first moments of any conflict in addition to its vast array of attack capabilities; and, the fact that it’s not opposed by like fighters means we can make use of those robust capabilities all the more!

From that angle, the “expense” argument loses steam pretty quickly, as does the “no comparable enemy jet” argument.

It’s the focus on capabilities that will dispel the myth that there is no place for the F-22 in securing our Nation’s future security. It’s more accurate to say there’s no place it CAN’T go.

My point is that our focus needs to be not on platforms, but on providing optimal, maximized, and seamless ISR capabilities for the benefit of our Nation, and that is where we are headed in the Air Force.

Now… regarding what General Moseley refers to as “our most precious resource”—our Personnel—we’ve undertaken a number of initiatives to maximize their contributions.

We’ve updated and modernized existing courses to better reflect the new operating environment; and we’ve created entirely new training programs based on feedback from the field.

We are continuing to invest in technologies and architectures that give us the ability to “reach-back,” vice “deploy forward.” Our Distributed Common Ground Stations—perhaps more descriptively called ISR exploitation centers—have been a real success story in this regard, and an exemplar of transforming the notion of having to deploy personnel in order to achieve warfighting effects.

Benefits include faster and higher quality intelligence processing, reduced deployment frequency for our people, and thus improved quality of life, and increased opportunities for additional training.

Such “reach-back” allows us to keep the bulk of our footprint at home, while delivering effects and capabilities to anywhere on the globe. In other words, this system allows us to project capability without projecting vulnerability.

A significant personnel concern that we are addressing is the need to better position our Officer Corps to assume Joint and National leadership positions in the Intelligence Community.

Consider that over 50% of our 19,000-plus Total Force Intel Airmen are assigned to agencies outside the AF, but that only 4 of approximately 40 general officer positions in the Joint and National communities are filled by Air Force officers.

In fact, the last time a combatant command J2 was an Air Force officer was over 6 years ago! That’s simply not desirable from a joint perspective.

To that end, the Air Force is planning to build a bigger bench of intel general officers viable to compete for Senior Joint and National intel positions.

In the realm of Organization, a precursor to implementing the new ISR resource management construct is the organizational restructuring that it necessitates. But there are other elements to the “Organization” piece of ISR Transformation.

Most notably, we are realigning some of our most significant ISR organizations and elements across the Air Force.

The goal here is two-fold: first, to streamline the unwieldy wiring diagrams that have evolved over time. These structures were complex, slow down information flow, and in some cases resulted in convoluted chain-of-command linkages.

Second, we needed to give Air Force ISR a single “voice.” With a complex “spaghetti” like organizational structure, there was no ISR focal point, no distinct entity poised to paint a coherent picture of our capabilities for Joint, National, and Coalition partners.

Therefore I requested, and the Chief of Staff approved, designating the Air Force A2, as the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The intent is to provide a single ISR focal point at Headquarters Air Force, minimize process seams, and establish an advocate for ISR.

This last point raps up my broad brush overview of the major near term muscle moves of our way ahead…there are many others that I plan on addressing with a longer term horizon …

For example, our Nation’s aerospace forces now have the ability to impose effects at a rate much greater than we can assess those effects using traditional BDA methods, so I have charged my staff to explore how we might accomplish effects-based assessment.

We need to figure out how to task our growing stable of ISR capabilities resident on platforms we traditionally associate with other tasks—also know as non-traditional ISR. Effectively doing so will get to the heart of what I touched on earlier regarding a capabilities-based approach to planning and employment. And there are others…

But this is a good branching off point to the other main topic I want to touch on, and that’s General Moseley’s proposal that the Air Force be assigned Executive Agent responsibilities for medium- and high-altitude UAVs.

First, given some of the misinformed statements that are floating around on this subject, I think it’s instructive to briefly review the way America fights wars, which summarized, essentially boils down to this: Our individual services do not fight wars—we have combatant commands who appoint a Joint Force Commander who is responsible for doing that.

Jointness means that among our four services, a separate array of capabilities is provided to a Joint Force Commander—his or her job is to assemble a plan from among this “menu” of capabilities, applying the right force, at the right place, at the right time for a particular contingency.

It does not mean four separate services deploy to a fight, and simply align under a single Commander. Nor does Jointness mean everybody necessarily gets an equal share of the action.

The reason Joint Force operations create synergies is because this INTERDEPENDENT approach allows each service to focus on, hone, and offer its core competencies.

The notion can be likened to doctors concentrating on healing the sick, and firemen focusing on rescuing people from burning buildings.

Drawing out this analogy, such an approach means Joint Force Commanders have at their disposal the abilities to both put out fires, and to cure sick people, no matter which is needed where—and both of these important tasks are being performed by specialists in their fields.

The unfavorable alternative to interdependence is to have firemen also attempting surgical procedures, and physicians darting in and out of blazing structures between seeing patients…

When a single Service attempts to achieve warfighting independence instead of embracing interdependence, “Jointness” unravels, warfighting effectiveness is reduced, and costly redundancies and gaps likely abound.

The last thing we need to do is turn back the clock on Goldwater-Nichols by allowing Services to develop redundant capabilities, thereby rejecting the premise of Joint warfighting.

General Moseley’s request for appointment of the Air Force as the Executive Agent for medium- and high-altitude UAVs aims to harness the Air Force’s proven experience and success in this mission area.

The benefits of the proposal fall in three areas: First, it seeks to deliver the greatest possible UAV ISR product to our soldiers, sailors, airman, and Marines by optimizing the use of med and high altitude UAVs; second, it aims to achieve increased acquisition effectiveness by unifying procurement of med and high altitude UAVs through an executive agent; and third, it champions interoperability by creating an agency with the authority to synchronize architectures, data links, and radios for all UAVs operating above the coordination altitude for a particular theater.

Let’s briefly look at the rationale behind each of these areas, starting with the request for designating the Air Force as executive agent for medium and high altitude UAVs.

The primary focus of the executive agent would be on programs where the majority of DoD near-term investments are being made—MQ-1A Predator, MQ-1C Warrior, RQ-4 Global Hawk, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), and MQ-9 Reaper.

Today for these systems the DOD has—or will have—multiple UAV program offices, multiple independent training operations, multiple logistics and maintenance operations, multiple intelligence support facilities, and multiple procurement contracts.

As executive agent, the Air Force would merge and streamline these separate efforts, eliminating costly duplication, and decreasing per-unit procurement costs resulting from greater economies of scale. Savings would accrue, but how much?

The current Jane’s Defense Weekly cites Mr. Krieg, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics as stating that consolidating Warrior and Predator alone under one acquisition program has the potential to save $400-600M. That does not address consolidation of BAMS and Global Hawk or MQ-9. Additional savings could be achieved through common basing, training, sustainment, and employment.

The beneficiaries of this move include the American taxpayer, the DoD, and the Services by freeing up resources for them to invest in their own core competencies.

With respect to the rationale for interoperability, it’s important to understand that the Air Force believes that each of the services should be able to field as many small UAVs with local effects as they want—to meet the needs of their units.

UAV flights, like manned aircraft flights, must be coordinated to ensure deconfliction with other airspace users, and to assure area air defense. To do that a theater coordination altitude is used—above which all aircraft must be visible to the airspace control authority.

Assigning executive agent responsibilities to a single Service will facilitate interoperability between the different Services’ platforms, and the Joint Force Air Component by assigning that as one of its responsibilities.

Finally, the most important element of the Air Force position is optimizing the effectiveness of medium and high altitude UAVs for the benefit of our joint warfighters.  

Joint Publication 2.0, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, states, "Because intelligence needs will always exceed intelligence capabilities, prioritization of efforts and ISR resource allocation are vital aspects of intelligence planning."

The AF agrees that demand for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles exceeds supply, and will continue to exceed it even after the services build all their programmed UAVs.

This reinforces the notion that the best possible way to get ISR from medium and high altitude UAVs to our joint warriors is by allocating the capability to where it is needed most across the entire theater. It argues against assigning medium/high altitude UAVs organically to units that will preclude their benefit to the entire theater joint fight.

Consider the analogy of a city made up of 50 blocks, where the mayor owns five fire trucks.  If the mayor designated one truck to one block, those five fire trucks would be assigned to only five blocks—that’s the Army approach.

The joint approach that the Air Force supports would leave it up to the mayor—or Joint Force Commander—where to allocate the five fire trucks based on which blocks needed them most.

Today, every operationally designated medium- and high-altitude UAV in the Air Force is dedicated to Central Command where there are no such things as Air Force targets—there are only targets that are part of the joint campaign. The appropriate joint task force commanders—who are Army Generals in Iraq and Afghanistan—allocate those …NOT the Air Force. So if the Army has a problem with the way those medium- and high-altitude UAVs are allocated, it has an issue with the Army joint task force commanders, not the Air Force.

It is also important to recall that the war on terrorism by definition is “Global.” At some point Med/Hi alt UAVs will be allocated to theaters other than only Central Command—perhaps in locations without a significant U.S. ground presence.

Now, the Army plans to assign medium altitude UAVs to each division, which means if a division isn't in the war zone then neither are the UAVs.  A joint approach applicable in any region of the world is already part of all combatant commands joint force air component operational concepts.

The objective of the Air Force approach is to get med/hi alt UAV ISR distribution to be as transparent as the GPS signal is to all the services. GPS is 100% owned by the Air Force; and 100% operated by the Air Force, and yet it is used by all the service components without any concern… We can do that with medium- and high-altitude UAVs.

It is instructive to note how medium- and high-altitude UAVs are actually used today. Air Force component provided Predators are routinely tasked to conduct tactical operations for our forces on the ground. When a sniper was pinning down Marine ground forces in Iraq, a Predator UAV flown by Air Force personnel from Nevada, spotted and identified the insurgent. The Predator delivered video of the sniper’s location directly to a Marine controller in the fight, and he used that video to direct a Navy F/A-18 into the vicinity. Then the Navy jets’ laser bombs were guided to the enemy position by the Air Force Predator laser designation of the target, eliminating the sniper. This engagement took less than 2 minutes.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is what joint warfare is all about, and the Air Force proposal on UAVs is all about getting the most out of our ISR resources to increase this kind of capability for America’s sons and daughters on the ground, at sea, and in the air, while promoting service interdependency, and the wisest use of American’s tax dollars.

That concludes my prepared remarks, and I’m guessing I’ve left little doubt as to how I feel about our need to embrace a Joint approach to warfighting…

But I’d be happy to entertain any questions you might have, and would be interested in hearing your thoughts as well.

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