At approximatey - New York State Department of Transportation



NEW YORK STATE

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

RAIL SAFETY SECTION

ABBREVIATED REPORT

CASE NUMBER: 10001

DATE OF ACCIDENT: November 19, 2008

CARRIER: MTA Long Island Rail Road

TYPE OF ACCIDENT: Collision

SYNOPSIS: On Wednesday, November 19, 2008, at approximately 7:37 a.m., Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) train #31was proceeding westbound out of Jamaica Station when it was struck by westbound LIRR train #607 which passed a stop signal that was displayed at Signal 30L. Due to the converging track configuration, contact was limited to the left front corner of the lead car on train #607 and the sides of the second thru fourth cars of train #31. At the time of the accident, there were approximately 600 passengers onboard train #607 and another 400 passengers onboard train #31. Five passengers on train #31 claimed injury and were treated by EMS and FDNY at the scene and released.

The Accident:

Train #31 consisted of six M-7 cars and left from Babylon, New York at 6:42 a.m. At Jamaica, the train arrived on station track #2 and preformed a complete station stop. The arrival on station track #2 was contrary to the scheduled arrival on station track #4, but was necessitated by track problems and delays further west in Queens. The Jay Tower train director, who controls the train movements west of Jamaica Station, set the route for train # 31 from station track #2 to mainline track #3. The engineer of train #31 stated when interviewed, that as he departed Jamaica Station he checked his route and began to accelerate to a speed not exceeding 15 mph until he was told to stop by the Tower Director. The engineer of train #31 claimed that he never felt the impact of train #607 with his train.

Train # 607 consisting of four C-3 coach cars and an engine pushing on the east end, departed Port Jefferson Station at 5:59 a.m. bound for Hunterspoint Avenue in Queens. Train #607 arrived at Jamaica Station on track #1 at 7:34 a.m., approximately twenty minutes late due to the track problems in Queens. Train #607 normally arrives on track #2. Upon arrival on track #1, train #607 performed a complete station stop and the engineer received a two buzzer signal from the conductor indicating boarding was complete and it was okay to proceed west when authorized.

After receiving the two buzzer signal, the engineer proceeded west. The first signal the engineer on train #607 encountered was signal #36L that displayed a signal indicating “slow approach” to exit the station. The engineer stated that he applied power to the train and began to move the train out of the station, focusing on the route ahead by checking the position of the switch points. When the engineer realized he did not have the proper switch alignment, he looked up and noticed the stop signal displayed on signal # 30L approximately 20 feet ahead. The engineer stated that he immediately placed the master controller into emergency braking position but the train proceeded past the stop signal sideswiping train #31.

The Jay Tower Train Director controls train movements through the interlocking. In a statement taken after the accident, the Director said that he did not request a route for train #607; only for train #31. After hearing the noise of the collision, the Director looked out of the tower window; saw the two trains rocking from the collision; and immediately gave the order to stop to train #31. The force of the collision caused the cab car of train #607 and one wheel of car #7682 on train #31 to lift off the rail approximately 2 inches. The cars were rerailed and removed to the Hillside repair facility for further inspection. The total estimate for all the repairs to LIRR equipment damaged was estimated over $25,000.

At approximately 8:09 a.m., the passengers onboard train #607 were moved to the three east cars of the consist which were uncoupled and returned back to Jamaica Station on track #1 where they detrained. At 8:25 a.m., LIRR train #2401 arrived and, after unloading all passengers, was used as a reach train behind train # 31 to allow those passengers to walk back through the reach train to the station platform for track #2. The evacuation was complete at 8:37 a.m. without any recorded incidents.

The engineers of both trains submitted to a drug and alcohol screening test and the results were negative. Post accident inspection of the switches and signals by the LIRR signal personnel revealed that all LIRR equipment was working as intended. The weather on November 18, 2008, was sunny and around 32 F degrees. The PTSB does not believe weather to be a factor in this accident

Conclusion:

The Public Transportation Safety Board staff finds that the most probable cause of the collision was the improper operation of train #607 by the engineer who proceeded west failing to stop at #30L signal that was displaying a stop indication; violating Long Island Rail Road Operating Department Rule #292. As a result, the engineer was charged with the violation of Rule 292 and received a thirty day suspension.

The Public Transportation Safety Board staff concurs with the actions taken by the Long Island Rail Road to prevent further accidents of this type from recurring and makes no recommendations regarding this accident.

NAME OF INVESTIGATOR: David Hess DATE SUBMITTED: December 31, 2008

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________

Jerry Shook, Acting Director

Rail Safety Bureau

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download