Verbatim Mac - The Debate Intensive



Compulsory Voting Neg2020 AdvNC – Trump LosesTrump loses – prefer the only model that’s been correct every year since 1984 Gordon 20 [Allison; 8/8/20; CNN reporter; “History professor who has accurately predicted every election since 1984 says Trump will lose,” ]History professor Allan Lichtman is used to being right.He has correctly predicted the winner of each presidential race since Ronald Reagan's reelection victory in 1984 using his "13 keys" system. (It's worth mentioning that in 2000, Lichtman predicted that Al Gore would win the election. Although Gore won the popular vote, he ultimately lost the presidency to George W. Bush after the Supreme Court ruled to stop the recount for Florida's electoral votes. Lichtman stands by validity of his prediction.)Now, Lichtman and his "13 keys" are ready to call 2020.In an interview with CNN, Lichtman was definitive in his answer: "The keys predict that Donald Trump will lose the White House this year."Lichtman bases his prediction on a model of "13 keys" that can be answered as either true or false for any given election. The "13 keys" in his system include factors such as the economy, incumbency, social unrest and scandals, as well as the candidates' personal charisma."The secret is keeping your eye on the big picture of incumbent strength and performance. And don't pay any attention to the polls, the pundits, the day-to-day ups and downs of the campaign. And that's what the keys gauge. The big picture," Lichtman explained.After 2016, Americans have been (understandingly) wary of presidential prediction models. But "dismissing Lichtman's findings would seem like sticking your head in the proverbial sand," CNN's Editor at Large Chris Cillizza said in his political audio briefing this week.When asked if the key model could account for something as cataclysmic as the Covid-19 pandemic, Lichtman remained confident. "Look, retrospectively and prospectively, the keys go all the way back to 1860. They are what we call a robust system. So, I don't fiddle with them. They've lasted through enormous changes in our politics, in our economy, in our democracy. Don't fiddle with the keys," he explained.Biden’s got it in the bagMontanaro 20 [Domenico; 8/3; NPR's senior political editor/correspondent; “2020 Electoral Map Ratings: Trump Slides, Biden Advantage Expands Over 270 Votes,” ]It's hard to believe that the hole President Trump dug for himself could get deeper, but it has.A record and widening majority of Americans disapprove of the job he's doing when it comes to handling the coronavirus pandemic; he gets poor scores on race relations; he's seen a suburban erosion despite efforts to win over suburban voters with fear; and all that has led to a worsened outlook for Trump against Democrat Joe Biden in the presidential election.As a result, in the past month and a half, the latest NPR analysis of the Electoral College has several states shifting in Biden's favor, and he now has a 297-170 advantage over Trump with exactly three months to go until Election Day. His advantage is significant AND growingFT 20 [Financial Times; 8/10/20; “Biden vs Trump: who is leading the 2020 US election polls?” ]With less than three months to go before the US presidential election, former vice-president Joe Biden, the Democratic party’s presumptive nominee, is polling ahead of incumbent Republican president Donald Trump in key battleground states. In Florida, where Covid cases have surged in recent weeks, Mr Biden leads Mr Trump by 6 percentage points. Similarly, Mr Biden has a narrow lead in Arizona, a state only one Democratic presidential candidate has won in the past 70 years. In Texas, where the difference in poll numbers between the two men is less than 5 percentage points, a few recent polls have given Mr Biden a slight advantage, suggesting a close race in November in the quintessential red state.National polls show Mr Biden at a significant advantage. The Democrat's edge over Mr Trump has grown in recent polls, with some giving him an almost double-digit lead over the president. White seniors in particular, a group that helped propel Mr Trump to victory in 2016, have shown signs of disapproval towards the president's handling of the pandemic.NC – No I/LNon-voters have roughly identical partisan preferences to voters – it can’t swing the electionGreenblatt 16 [Alan; February 2016; Senior Staff Writer for Governing; “What Would Happen If America Made Voting Mandatory?” ]Most academic research, however, has found that mandatory voting does not move the average voter to the left, according to Jason Brennan, a professor at Georgetown University and co-author of?Compulsory Voting: For and Against. “There’s a widespread belief among Democrats that compulsory voting would deliver more states to Democrats,” he says. “It turns out that’s not true. The people who vote and the people who don’t vote are roughly the same in terms of their partisan preferences.”That doesn’t mean the population of actual voters perfectly reflects the nation as a whole. The biggest difference between voters and nonvoters is not partisan ideology but information, suggests Brennan. “The crop of people who are not voting are less informed than the people who are voting right now.”That alone leads to conflicting opinions, even among members of the same party. Martin Gilens, a political scientist at Princeton University, says so-called “low-information members” of the Democratic Party hold views on issues such as gay rights, military force and free trade that are the opposite of Democrats who follow policy debates more closely.So even if partisan outcomes wouldn’t change appreciably under a mandated voting system, the political system itself would change. Supporters of compulsory voting say that would force politicians to address broader concerns, rather than appealing to narrow bases. “Ideally, a democracy will take into account the interests and views of all citizens so that its decisions represent the will of the entire people,” concludes a recent Brookings Institution paper promoting mandatory voting. “If some regularly vote while others do not, elected officials are likely to give less weight to the interests and views of nonparticipants.”Georgetown’s Brennan is dubious that appealing to the masses will be all good, though. “Compulsory voting probably reduces the quality of government by some small amount,” he says, “because you are reducing the knowledge of the median voter.”Democracy AdvNC – TurnCompulsory voting generates invalid ballots which erase inequality gains and undermine democratic legitimacyKouba and Mysicka 19 [Karel and Stanislav; 3/5/19; *Department of Politics Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové, **Department of Politics, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové; “Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?” ]ConclusionCompulsory voting is thought to increase electoral participation and thereby contribute to equalizing the political voice across income or education groups. However, a countervailing tendency of compulsory voting is to generate large proportions of invalid ballots. As invalid voting is strongly related to income inequality and low education, we conclude that whatever benefits in terms of equal voice are associated with higher turnout under compulsory voting, these are effectively erased by the high share of socioeconomically biased invalid votes that do not count for determining political representation. We presented evidence supportive of this conjecture from Ecuadorean 2009 elections where one quarter of all votes casted were invalid and one quarter of all registered voters abstained. In other words, the fact that?turnout?becomes less socioeconomically biased through compulsory voting does not automatically translate into less socioeconomically biased political?representation?(or political voice). This finding offers different lenses to the affirmation that while compulsory voting makes turnout more egalitarian, it does not make the candidate selection more equitable due its effects on invalid ballots (Cohen, 2018). Consequently, ballot spoilage generated by compulsory voting may have negative effects on the legitimacy of elected authorities, offsetting the contribution of higher turnout.Our findings give further support to arguments that focus on the weakened link between vote choice and political preferences under compulsory voting relative to voluntary voting. This research does not question the reductive effect of compulsory voting on socioeconomic biases in turnout, but notes that voters induced by voting compulsion are less likely to vote in accordance with their wants and needs (Selb & Lachat, 2009). Not only are wealth disparities in the electorate bridged by compulsory voting, but also electorates become more equal with respect to their levels of infomation, political knowledge, or apathy as the least informed, least knowledgeable, and most apathetic are thrown into the electoral process by voting compulsion (Singh, 2015). This problem is manifested in a number of ways, and invalid voting is but one of them. The equalizing effect of compulsory voting diminishes voter stratification based on political knowledge or education, and induces voters to favor parties further away from their own ideological positions relative to voluntary voting systems (Dassonneville et al., 2017). Similarly, compulsory voting serves to increase the share of uninterested and less knowledgeable voters whose vote is less consistent with their own preferences (Selb & Lachat, 2009). It has been shown to disproportionately attract voters who are unlikely to cast well-reasoned ballots because they are generally more disinterested, unengaged, and view elections as pointless (Singh, 2016). Votes under compulsory voting are cast randomly, and voters are less attached to political parties and ideological convictions (Singh, 2016). Because invalid votes under compulsory voting are cast exactly by such—less engaged and less interested voters (Singh, 2017)—such invalid ballots should be considered as poor reflections of voter preferences.This empirical evidence presented here supports some of the normative arguments against compulsory voting. In general, we claimed that presenting compulsory voting as justified (either in instrumental or intrinsic way) would clash with the deep conflict of worldviews among citizens in a democratic society. Because there are no a priori reasons to think that under the system of compulsory voting, citizens will generally identify more with the duty to vote, there is a looming danger, that making voting compulsory might lead to further alienation from democratic politics.It doesn’t socialize broader civic values but loosens legitimacy constraints on the government by making the average voter less informedSingh 16 [Shane P; Associate Professor at the University of Georgia’s Department of International Affairs; “Politically Unengaged, Distrusting, and Disaffected Individuals Drive the Link Between Compulsory Voting and Invalid Balloting,” ]About ten years ago, Blais (2006, 113) noted that “we know nothing about the microfoundations of compulsory voting.” Today, still relatively little is known about how individual-level factors interact with compulsory rules to shape outcomes. In an effort to begin filling this knowledge gap, this study examines the influence of compulsory voting on blank and spoiled balloting across both individuals and countries.I first find that, relative to voluntary voting, compulsory voting increases the incidence of blank and spoiled ballots, especially where sanctions for abstention are routinely enforced. I then demonstrate who is responsible for such an increase—compulsory voting’s positive relationship with the propensity to cast a blank or spoiled ballot is largely due to the behavior of individuals who are politically unaware and uninterested, individuals who are negatively oriented toward the democratic process, and, especially, individuals who are untrusting of democratic actors and institutions. Those in favor of compulsory voting may hail these results as evidence that politically unsophisticated, untrusting, or disaffected individuals make use of their “out” where their presence at the ballot box is forced, and they thus need not contribute to the social choice when they lack the desire or skills to do so. For their part, opponents of mandatory voting may instead argue that the relatively high rate of blank and spoiled balloting among politically unaware, uninterested, untrusting, and disillusioned individuals where participation is obligatory is evidence that compulsory voting does not socialize such individuals into embracing civic values and seeking out political knowledge, a dynamic the institution’s proponents have championed as one of its beneficial effects for over a century (see Barthélemy 1912; Broomall 1893; Engelen 2007, 32; Lacroix 2007, 194; Lijphart 1997, 10; Nerincx 1901; See 2007, 597). Seen from another angle, these results suggest that, even where compulsory voting boosts participation, leaders may feel free to behave unscrupulously when they perceive that the electorate is unlikely to observe such behavior and punish it at the next election. In the words of Carlin and Love (2015, 57), where “those weakly invested in politics” do not cast meaningful ballots under compulsory voting, “the potential for moral hazard among elites” will increase. The tradeoff with other engagement cancels out any democratic benefits but compulsion creates resentment that actively undermines legitimacy Kouba and Mysicka 19 [Karel and Stanislav; 3/5/19; *Department of Politics Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové, **Department of Politics, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové; “Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?” ]There is also significant evidence for the second association that is crucial to our argument, namely, that compulsory voting also substantially increases the rate of invalid voting. This has been the unequivocal finding of cross-national comparative studies on invalid voting (Power & Garand, 2007; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006; Uggla, 2008), although the relationship appears to be strongly conditioned by voter efficacy with compulsory voting exercising the strongest effects, when the stakes of the electoral competition are diminished (Kouba & Lysek, 2016). Although the strong correlation between compulsory voting and high rates of invalid ballots is rarely disputed, there is no consensus over the nature and meaning of such invalid ballots. Invalid votes could still signify a meaningful response of politically engaged voters to a deficient political offer (Driscoll & Nelson, 2014). However, there is also substantial evidence from the study based on the cross-national survey data that invalid voting induced by compulsory voting laws is driven by a lack of information and interest, political distrust and negative attitudes toward democracy (Singh, 2017). In Latin America, invalid voting is often most frequent among those with less education and levels of political knowledge (Katz & Levin, 2016). At the same time, it increases turnout among those voters who are less engaged in politics, and who are at the same time more likely to cast an invalid ballot (Cohen, 2018). This is consistent with other problematic attitudinal effects of compulsory voting identified by recent research. Although compulsory voting (substantively or slightly) increases trust in political institutions, yet at the same time, it negatively affects forms of societal engagement other than turnout, suggesting that the participatory effects of mandatory voting cancel each other out (Lundell, 2012). Concomitant evidence from subjective reactions among young British voters suggests that the introduction of compulsory voting might be counterproductive and serves to reinforce existing feelings of resentment (Henn & Oldfield, 2016). Such reinforcing effects of compulsory voting on the negative orientations toward democracy and system legitimacy are amply documented in another comparative study (Singh, 2018). We, therefore, view invalid voting as a product of compulsory voting through which politically disinterested, less educated, less informed, and unengaged voters express the lack of interest in the political choice, or the elections themselves. Moreover, self-reported invalid voting—from which such inferences are drawn—underestimates the extent of invalid votes due to voting compulsion because invalid votes are also likely to arise from an unintentional voting error, which the voter cannot communicate in surveys (Hill & Young, 2007; Kouba & Lysek, 2016; McAllister & Makkai, 1993; Power & Garand, 2007; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006). Such votes—that appear in the aggregate-level figures of the overall voting results, but not in individual-level survey responses—in turn are likely to be handed out by the less educated (Hill & Young, 2007; McAllister & Makkai, 1993; Power & Garand, 2007; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006) and less politically informed citizens. This only aggravates the problem. Invalid ballots induced by compulsory voting systems not only do not decide representation, but also generally fail to represent specific political interests.It structurally locks in a bloc of disgruntled voters – that makes polarization and future Trumps inevitablePolimedio 18 [Chayenne; 11/6/18; fellow with the Political Reform program at New America, former contributor to Vox; “Is voting a civic right or a civic duty?” ]Compulsory voting accomplishes the basic task it sets out to do: to get the highest percentage possible of eligible voters to leave their homes on Election Day. And yet compulsory voting isn’t the solution to low voter turnout.The simplest case against compulsory voting is that it negates the premise that while citizens ought to have the right to vote, they should also be free to choose not to vote.Voters, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, assess the perceived costs to voting vis-à-vis its perceived gains when deciding whether or not to cast a ballot. Those costs can include, but are not limited to, issue salience, the ease with which voters are able to register to vote and to cast a ballot, a country’s electoral system, the frequency of elections, and when in the week elections are held.Other reasons why forcing individuals to cast a ballot isn’t the solution to better democracy include the fact that people make bad choices sometimes, not because they’re evil or stupid, but because they have preferences and biases and will use shortcuts instead of deeply pondering the benefits and trade-offs of any given policy pulsory voting may also lead to democratic inequalities, where the burden for not voting is highest on those who can bear it least. In Brazil, for example, those tend to be voters for whom interaction with the state is unavoidable. Anyone who’s likely to rely on transactions with the government in the form of benefits, pensions, severance pay, etc., ends up paying a higher penalty for not voting.But most importantly, voter turnout shouldn’t be the sole measure of a successful democracy. A healthy democracy depends on the quality of the governance and the candidates, too. Higher turnout doesn’t guarantee higher quality candidates or more responsiveness. More isn’t necessarily better.University of Sydney professor Simon Jackman has argued that compulsory voting “creates a steady guaranteed supply of disgruntled voters that cannot exit the system. … Those voters are typically alienated, distracted and feel as though the major parties are not speaking to them.” Alienated and distracted voters can be, in turn, more susceptible to demagoguery and protest platforms.That Brazil and Turkey, the two largest countries in the world with compulsory voting, are not shining stories of liberal democracy at the moment is worth noting. For a recent example of what alienated voters look like, look no further than Brazil’s presidential election results, where 9.5 percent of the electorate cast blank or spoiled ballots largely as a way to protest a system and a race they wanted no part in.Turkey’s voting system has been deemed the most unfair in the world because if parties don’t win at least 10 percent of the seats, they must forfeit all of their seats, which are then reallocated to the larger parties. So people are required to vote, but their votes may effectively not count.In an extensive overview of the consequences of compulsory voting, researcher Gabriela Sainati Rangel writes that “Individuals living under compulsory voting rules are also more likely to report higher rates of party attachment” which, in the American two-party system, could lead to even more polarization and winning governments with weaker governing mandates.Rangel also finds that while compulsory voting may lead parties to move away from mobilization, it doesn’t necessarily mean that it results in outreach that’s more inclusive. In fact, with compulsory voting, “parties are likely to shift their outreach strategy from mobilization to persuasion, by reaching out to voters that are less partisan and thus can be more easily persuaded.”Finally, Rangel writes that “Taken together, the voter turnout question seems to be the only dimension of the effects of compulsory voting that has found clear answers through empirical research.”Still, for those who see compulsory voting as the best way to fix turnout, low levels of enforcement seem to work just as well as high levels of enforcement, without the undesired effect of harming certain segments of the voting population.NC – Alt CauseTrump’s kleptocracy massively thumps Beachamp 17 [Vox, How Donald Trump’s kleptocracy is undermining American democracy, July 31, ]Appointing family members to powerful jobs they’re not qualified to hold. Firing officials investigating scandals. Musing about prosecuting a defeated rival. Entangling his business empire with the presidency to such a degree that he’ll literally profit from his time in the White House.The early months of the Trump presidency don’t look like what you normally see in a democracy. But they’re everyday occurrences in corrupt, undemocratic countries like Azerbaijan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or even Vladimir Putin’s Russia. And academics who study such countries increasingly worry that President Donald Trump is governing like the leader of the kind of nation Washington has long condemned — not like a president of the United States.“His refusal to fully divest himself from his business, the linkages between finances and the levers of power — those are the classic symptoms of kleptocracy,” Seva Gunitsky, a University of Toronto scholar who studies post-Soviet states, says. “It’s probably the greatest long-term threat — maybe even short-term threat — to American institutions.”To Gunitsky and other experts on authoritarian states, Trump’s behavior is setting off a lot of alarm bells. That’s not just because of clear examples of petty wrongdoing, like having his daughter Ivanka sit in for him at the G20 summit of world leaders. Rather, it’s because the thinking behind such moves is far more fundamental to the early months of his administration than it would first appear.The academics say that Trump’s instincts — like those of strongmen such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Putin — is to see the state as a personal fiefdom and a vehicle for dispensing favors to family and political allies, rather than as something that needs to follow neutral rules. They point to his appointment of son-in-law Jared Kushner to a top-level White House post despite his lack of qualifications, reports of administration threats to punish CNN and the Washington Post financially for critical coverage, and the naked attempts by foreign diplomats to buy influence by staying at the Trump Hotel in Washington.The issue raised by these scholars is not that the US under Trump is sliding toward true authoritarianism, where elections cease to be competitive, the media is muzzled, and opponents and journalists routinely disappear. It’s vital to stress all the ways Trump isn’t governing like an authoritarian: He hasn’t done anything to formally outlaw dissent or acquire dictatorial powers for the executive branch. There is no Trump plan to stop Americans from replacing him, if they so choose, in the 2020 election.Instead, these experts worry that Trump is normalizing a set of practices that are typically seen in authoritarian countries — and, by doing so, threatening to slowly and steadily hollow out American democracy. His actions are not a series of individual stories of petty wrongdoing, but rather an overall pattern that threatens the rule of law itself.“What’s striking in the US is that he gets away with stuff that would have been considered completely inconceivable five years ago,” Nicolas van de Walle, an expert on authoritarianism in Africa at Cornell University, says.Americans don’t understand the risks posed by Trump’s elevation of family and crony capitalism because they do not have a model for it in modern US history. Only when one looks abroad — to countries where corruption and plunder are the norm rather than the exception — does the danger truly become clear.Trump has structured the executive branch along authoritarian linesCitizens of democratic countries tend to divide the political world into two big categories: democracies like the US or Canada and autocracies like Russia and Egypt. But there are lots of ways to run states where people don’t choose their own leaders. Saudi Arabia’s theocratic monarchy is as different from Singapore’s secular one-party state as it is from the United States.For this reason, many scholars have tried to sort authoritarian regimes into more specific categories. Van de Walle and his co-author, Michigan State University’s Michael Bratton, have focused on what they call “neopatrimonial” regimes — a type of government that flowered in Africa after the fall of colonialism. Neopatrimonialism, they argue, is defined by the centrality of corruption to ordinary politics.“The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects),” they write in an influential 1994 article. “The chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law.”Neopatrimonial leaders rise or fall based on their ability to plunder their own country, to staff the government with loyal operatives, and to literally buy off groups that might otherwise mount a challenge to their rule. The end goal of all of this is to allow the dictator and his favored few to live as well and securely as possible. Relatives are raised to top positions in government both so they can have secure jobs and because, in a system so thoroughly corrupt, the only people the leader feels like he can truly trust is his family members and close friends.Van de Walle sees real similarities between the neopatrimonial African regimes he studies — like Mobutu Sese Seko’s 32-year reign in what’s now the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which he spent about $400 million worth of state money building a personal palace that served champagne on conveyor belts — and Trump’s lack of interest in keeping government affairs and personal interests separate.“There’s a [neopatrimonial] dimension to the current president, a kind of monarchical instinct,” Van de Walle tells me in an interview.Perhaps the most nakedly neopatrimonial regimes in the world today are clustered together in Eurasia. Many former Soviet republics were expected to transition to democracy after communism’s fall in the 1990s — but have, instead, been taken over by a coterie of strongmen who see the country they rule as a combination of a piggybank and playground.Uzbekistan’s longtime dictator, Islam Karimov, was actually elected in 1991 — but consolidated power and ran the Uzbek government as a fiefdom: his daughter Gulnara was reportedly able to extract $114 million in bribes from a single telecom company in exchange for granting them licenses to operate in the country.When Karimov died in 2016, one of his cronies — Shavkat Mirziyoyev — took over the presidency. Mirziyoyev won a sham “reelection” vote in December with 88.6 percent of the vote.Uzbekistan is by no means unique among post-Soviet states. Azerbaijan, an oil-producing country on the Caspian Sea, is another good example: Its current president, Ilham Aliyev, is the son of its last president, Heydar Aliyev. The Aliyevs run it very much like a family business.“Azerbaijan is the clearest template you get,” Gunitsky says. “You have this guy Aliyev as the president; his wife is the vice president. You can’t get any more government-as-a-family-business than that.”Like these neopatrimonial leaders, Trump has long seen fit to elevate family members to top positions. During his time in Atlantic City in the 1980s, for example, Trump hired his then-wife, Ivana, to run the Trump Castle casino even though her business experience was largely limited to working as a model. He hired his brother Robert to develop the Trump Taj Mahal, then the largest casino in the world, despite Robert’s complete lack of experience building casinos. It went bankrupt.When a president applies the same approach to staffing political organizations, you get Ivanka Trump in the White House, Middle East envoy Jared Kushner, and top campaign adviser Donald Trump Jr. (all elevated to positions that exceed their experience or qualifications).Presidents have elevated family members in the past: JFK famously appointed his brother Robert to be attorney general. But that move was controversial at the time, and the degree to which Trump relies on family members reminds American experts on Central Asia more of the countries they study than of their homeland.“We shouldn’t overblow the comparison,” says Alexander Cooley, a professor at Barnard College in New York. “But I do think that the inclination Trump seems to show is to trust family members in matters in which they might not actually have expertise or advanced education.”Trump’s crony capitalism is straight out of the authoritarian playbookTrump, of course, can’t be as flamboyantly nepotistic as an actual dictator. The legal and political climate in the United States simply makes it impossible for Trump to loot the state coffers in the style of a Mobutu or replace Vice President Mike Pence with Vice President Melania Trump. He also isn’t killing dissidents or shuttering opposition newspapers as these leaders do — nor does he show the slightest interest in doing so.The issue, instead, is the appearance of a particular type of mindset between Trump and these authoritarian leaders when it comes to the relationship between state and ruler. They both seem to have no problem with blurring the lines between personal and policy affairs, using the power and the prestige of their position for their own financial and political gain.“All of this gets back to not having walls of separation between the family business or businesses and their role in government, ” Cooley says. “It’s a mode of governing.”The consequences of this kind of politics can be quite severe.Authoritarians can’t rely solely on family members to maintain control, much as they’d like to; there just aren’t enough of them. So many of these leaders use their control over the state to manufacture loyalty — disbursing funds in such a way to make it in the interests of as many powerful factions as possible to support the regime.In modern Russia, Putin maintains his own power by privileging friendly oligarchs and security service officials, basically linking the interests of Russia’s elite with the survival of Putin’s government. The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi had a budget of $50 billion; more than half of that went to paying off various different Putin allies, according to Russia scholar Karen Dawisha.This sort of corruption goes hand in hand with the more intimate kind: looting state coffers for your own benefit and that of your friends and family. Mobutu’s family used the country’s state-owned industries and central bank as personal checking accounts, taking $71 million from the national bank for personal use in 1977 alone. The famous Panama Papers revealed that Putin and his close associates have more than $2 billion squirreled away in offshore accounts, much of which was taken from state coffers in the form of impossibly low-interest loans from state-owned banks.The United States is very far from that level of systemic corruption. But Trump shares the same basic way of thinking about the US government’s relationship to his personal interests. He has no issue with the many ways in which his administration has already entangled state power and his own personal financial/political interests, and in fact seems to want to expand it.“What is really striking is how strong these patrimonial instincts can be [in an American leader],” Van de Walle says.The most obvious example is Trump’s refusal to seriously divest from his private interests. When Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976, he gave his family’s small peanut farm and warehouse to an independent trustee to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. The Trump Organization — a multibillion-dollar corporation whose profits are far from peanuts — is currently run by Trump’s adult sons, Donald Jr. and Eric.This is the opposite of a blind trust: Trump cannot avoid talking to his children, making it impossible to believe he’s truly separated from the business. Moreover, Trump promised that his company wouldn’t make any new foreign deals in office, but the way he travels around the world and meets with foreign leaders makes it exceptionally easy for them to offer his organization a lucrative deal in exchange for favors in a private meeting (as it would be with any president whose family ran their business).This blending of the personal and the political extends to the way he manages the state’s relationship with corporations.To show that he was serious about keeping jobs in America, Trump offered the Carrier corporation $7 million in tax breaks in exchange for keeping a manufacturing plant in Indiana open rather than moving it Mexico. The deal was announced, with great public fanfare, in December. Since then, it has become clear that Carrier will move nearly half of the jobs to Mexico anyway. But since Trump already got his PR stunt, it seemed not to matter: Carrier kept its tax breaks.When companies cross Trump, by contrast, they risk being punished financially. Time Warner, which owns CNN, is currently trying to work out a merger with AT&T. The New York Times’s Michael Grynbaum reports that the Trump administration is thinking about blocking the merger if CNN’s coverage continues to be critical.“This is such a clear blending of political motives and economic institutions that is totally inappropriate in a rule-governed society,” Gunitsky says. “This is the kind of thing you see in broken states.”Whether Trump follows through on his merger threat is an open question. But the fact that the White House would even consider punishing a media organization using the federal government’s regulatory powers testifies to the degree to which the state’s role in the economy is seen as a tool for securing the president’s personal interests.In the long run, these experts warn, this kind of politically motivated crony capitalism is a serious threat to the health of American society.When nobody stops leaders from doing these kinds of things, they start to become normal, routine. If Trump gets away with staffing the White House with his children, using tax breaks to reward corporations that do him a solid, and creating systemic conflicts of interests, then the incentives for how to act, for both politicians and large corporations, becomes badly distorted. Politicians feel free to act in a pettily corrupt fashion; corporations learn to succeed by flattering the president and getting handouts from the federal government as a result.“These kinds of erosions of institutions happens in a subtle way,” Gunitsky says. “There’s no takeover of a TV station with guards. There’s no crackdown and curfew. It’s the steady, gradual erosion of the almost invisible lines of separation between institutions that are supposed to independent.”The consequences are impossible to predict in any detail, because developed countries almost never see anything like this systemic level of personalistic behavior in their leaders. But they could be wide-ranging: When the president sees the powers of the state as something he can manipulate for his personal benefit, then the possibilities for abuse are practically limitless.In late July, for example, Trump gave a speech at a Navy ceremony where he urged the assembled sailors to “call that congressman and call that senator” about health care and other Trump-backed legislation. It sounded a lot like the president using his power to order the military to gin up support for his political agenda — a no-no in any advanced democracy.“Trump’s verbal command in Norfolk, Virginia, incites the assembled troops to discard centuries of U.S. military ethics and break long-standing military rules,” Phillip Carter, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, writes at Slate. “This is what leaders do in banana republics: Instruct the people with guns to join the political fray.”The issue isn’t just that what we’re seeing is bad. It’s that things could get a whole lot worse.It makes credible leadership wholly impossible Maas 17 [has written about war, media, and national security for The New York Times Magazine, The New Yorker, and The Washington Post. He reported on both civilians and combatants during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the author of Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War, an award-winning memoir about the conflict in Bosnia, and he wrote Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil. Peter was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2012. He has taught writing at Princeton and Columbia universities, and had fellowships at the Shorenstein Center at Harvard and the American Academy in Berlin. He is on the advisory boards of the Solutions Journalism Network, and the Program for Narrative and Documentary Practice at Tufts University, HOW DONALD TRUMP COULD DESTROY THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST KLEPTOCRACY, ]AN INCREDIBLE EVENT is taking place in Paris. The playboy son of a wealthy dictator is on trial for stealing more than $100 million from his oil-rich and poverty-plagued homeland.Authorities in Europe have already seized a glitzy assortment of the allegedly ill-gotten possessions of Teodorin Obiang, whose father is nearing four decades of dictatorial rule in Equatorial Guinea. Gone is Obiang’s 250-foot yacht with a helipad and jacuzzi, as well as nine of his luxury cars (two Bugattis, two Bentleys, a Ferrari, Rolls Royce, Maserati, Porsche Carrerra, and Mercedes Maybach), 300 bottles of Chateau Petrus (at more than $2,500 a bottle, one of the world’s most expensive wines), an art collection that includes works by Degas and Rodin, and his 101-room mansion on Avenue Foch in Paris.Two dynamics make this trial remarkable. The first is that, while it is not unusual for ousted kleptocrats and their children to face trial for corruption, it is nearly unprecedented for a ruling family to be hauled before a court. Teodorin Obiang currently bears the title of vice president of Equatorial Guinea, and his father, Teodoro, is the unloved president who, in the six times he has organized facsimiles of elections since taking power in a 1979 coup, never received less than 93 percent of the votes. The trial came about due to an unusual facet of French law: Civic groups can file criminal complaints against foreign officials. Prosecutors were all but forced to take the case.Another layer of remarkableness — this one the opposite of encouraging — is that we might not see another spectacle of this sort for a long time. That’s because the Trump family, which has shown a limited regard for separating politics from business, has fully installed itself and its ethics in the White House. The consequences reach beyond American shores. A foundation for the trial in France was laid many years ago in the United States by activist organizations, congressional investigators, and, later on, federal law enforcement. In 2011 Barack Obama’s Department of Justice filed its own civil charges against Teodorin Obiang under its Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, and Obiang settled that case by forfeiting his $30 million Malibu mansion, a Ferrari, and several items of Michael Jackson memorabilia.But what are the odds that President Donald Trump and his family will criticize, let alone prosecute, a style of rule they emulate? What standing does the United States have to argue against nepotism and kleptocracy when its own government has the aroma of both?Last week, the pre-eminent anti-corruption group Global Witness issued a remarkably blunt statement that zeroed in on the Trump problem. “The importance of continuing this fight against kleptocracy around the world cannot be overstated,” said Zorka Milin, a senior legal adviser to Global Witness. She went on:America has long played a leading role in this global fight, but the future of that leadership is now coming into question, as the Trump administration disengages from a number of important international initiatives and works with Congress to dismantle critical transparency and public interest regulations at an unprecedented pace. Moreover, the moral authority of the U.S. to lead this fight is also in question, as President Trump continues to be plagued by allegations of violating an anti-corruption provision of the U.S. Constitution through his business dealings with foreign governments.NC – AT: DPTReject democratic peace – 52 years of analysis and newest models.Grabmeier ’15 (Jeff; 9/3/15; Senior Director of Research and Innovation at Ohio State University, citing a 52-year study; , “'Democratic peace' may not prevent international conflict,” )Using a new technique to analyze 52 years of international conflict, researchers suggest that there may be no such thing as a "democratic peace." In addition, a model developed with this new technique was found to predict international conflict five and even ten years in the future better than any existing model. Democratic peace is the widely held theory that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other than countries with other types of government. In the new study, researchers found that economic trade relationships and participation in international governmental organizations play a strong role in keeping the peace among countries. But democracy? Not so much. "That's a startling finding because the value of joint democracy in preventing war is what we thought was the closest thing to a law in international politics," said Skyler Cranmer, lead author of the study and The Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. "There's been empirical research supporting this theory for the past 50 years. Even U.S. presidents have touted the value of a democratic peace, but it doesn't seem to hold up, at least the way we looked at it." The study appears this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Cranmer's co-authors are Elizabeth Menninga, assistant professor of political science at the University of Iowa and recent Ph.D. graduate in political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Mucha, professor of mathematics in the College of Arts and Sciences at UNC-Chapel Hill. Along with casting doubt on democratic peace theory, the study also developed a new way to predict levels of international conflict that is more accurate than any previous model. The researchers used a new technique to examine all violent conflicts between countries during the period of 1948 to 2000. The result was a model of international conflict that was 47 percent better than the standard model at predicting the level of worldwide conflict five and even 10 years into the future. "The Department of Defense needs to know at least that far in advance what the world situation is going to be like, because it can't react in a year to changes in levels of conflict due to bureaucratic inertia and its longer funding cycle," Cranmer said. "Being able to have a sense of the global climate in five or 10 years would be extremely helpful from a policy and planning perspective." The researchers started the study with a famous idea posed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant back in 1795: that the world could enjoy a "perpetual peace" if countries would become more interconnected in three ways. The modern interpretation of those three ways is: Through the spread of democratic states, more economic interdependence through trade, and more joint membership in international governmental organizations, or IGOs. (Modern examples range from regional agricultural organizations to the European Union and NATO.) Many studies have looked at how these three elements, either together or separately, affect conflict between countries. But even when they were considered together, the impact of the three individual factors were considered additively. What makes this study unique is that the researchers were the first to use a new statistical measure developed by Mucha - called multislice community detection—to analyze all three of these components collectively. They were able to examine, for the first time, how each component was related to each other. For example, how membership in IGOs affected trade agreements between counties, and vice versa. "When we looked at these networks holistically, we found communities of countries that are similar not only in terms of their IGO memberships, or trade agreements, or in their democratic governments, but in terms of all these three elements together," Cranmer said. The separation between such communities in the world is what the researchers called "Kantian Fractionalization." "You might think of it as the number of cliques the world is split up into and how easy it is to isolate those cliques from one another," Cranmer said. But the deeper the separation between communities or cliques there are in the world at one time, the more dangerous the world becomes. By measuring these communities in the world at one specific time, the researchers could predict with better accuracy than ever before how many violent conflicts would occur in one, 5 or 10 years in the future. This study had a broad definition of conflict: any military skirmish where one country deliberately kills a member of another country. Many of the conflicts in this study were relatively small, but it also includes major wars. Predicting one year into the future, this new model was 13 percent better than the standard model at predicting levels of worldwide conflict. But it was 47 percent better at predicting conflict 5 and 10 years into the future. "We measured how fragile these networks are to breaking up into communities," Mucha said. "Remarkably, that fragility in a mathematical sense has a clear political consequence in terms of increased conflict." The linear relationship between higher levels of Kantian fractionalization and more future conflict was so strong that Cranmer couldn't believe it at first. "I threw up my hands in frustration when I first saw the results. I thought we surely must have made a mistake because you almost never see the kind of clean, linear relationship that we found outside of textbooks," Cranmer said. "But we confirmed that there is this strong relationship."Robust empirical data.Rosato ’12 (Sebastian; September 30, 2012; Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Politica Science at the University of Notre Dame; Publication, The Handbook on the Political Economy of War by Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers, Chapter 15, “On the democratic peace,” p. 287-290)Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-democratic wars: the American Civil War, the Spanish American War and the Boer War. This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a state but a union of states, and that this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle’s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable." A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic-democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely statistically significant." Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive definitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial.It’s methodologically and empirically bankrupt — democracies aren’t inherently peaceful. Layne 7 — Christopher Layne, University Distinguished Professor, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, and Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-Berkeley, 2007 (“Liberal Ideology and U.S. Grand Strategy,” The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Published by Cornell University Press, ISBN 0801474116, p. 121-122)As a theory of international politics, the democratic peace theory carries little weight.20 It rests on dubious grounds methodologically.21 More importantly, it is not valid empirically. Democratic states have gone to war with other democracies, and in crises democracies are just as prone to making military threats against other democracies as they are against nondemocracies.22 However, democratic peace theory has a lot of clout in policymaking because it plays to the Wilsonian predispositions of U.S. strategists and provides the United States a handy pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of regimes it considers troublemakers. Thus, far from being a theory of peace, democratic peace theory causes the United States to act like a "crusader state."23 America's crusader mentality springs directly from liberalism's intolerance of competing ideologies and the concomitant belief that—merely by existing—nondemocratic states threaten America's security and the safety of liberalism at home. According to Wilsonian precepts, the best way to deal [end page 121] with such states is to use American power to bring about regime change.24 The belief that the United States can only be safe in a world of liberal democracies creates real, and often otherwise avoidable, friction between the United States and nondemocratic states.Other factors (like trade, deterrence, and good relations) outweigh.Rosato ’11 – associate professor of Political science at the University of Notre Dame (Sebastian | Edward Elgar Publishing, “ The Handbook on the Political Economy of War”| The Handbook on the Political Economy of War| DOA: 7/7/17| KG)Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fi ght one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fi ght one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for confl ict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray’s suff rage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers – Britain and the United States – from the democratic ranks before World War I, thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable.11 A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23 240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars are distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic–democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I.12 If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the diff erence between three and zero wars is barely statistically signifi cant.13 Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight – a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies – makes a dramatic diff erence. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171, and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is M2471 - COYNE PRINT.indd 289 2471 - COYNE PRINT.indd 289 14/01/2011 15:22 4/01/2011 15:22 290 The handbook on the political economy of war to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive defi nitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter- democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive defi nitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the defi nition of democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial. 15.3.2 Militarized Disputes. There are at least two reasons to doubt the claim that pairs of democracies are less prone to confl ict than other pairs of states. First, despite their assertions, it is not clear that democratic peace theorists have established the existence of a powerful association between joint democracy and peace. Second, there is good evidence that factors other than democracy – many of them consistent with realist expectations – account for the peace among democratic states.14 Significance Democratic peace theorists have yet to provide clearcut evidence that there is a signifi cant relationship between their independent and dependent variables, joint democracy and peace. It is now clear, for example, that Maoz and Russett’s analysis of the Cold War period, which claims to establish the existence of a joint, separate peace, does not in fact do so. In a reassessment of that analysis, which follows the original as closely as possible save for the addition of a control for economic interdependence, Oneal et al. (1996) find that a continuous measure of democracy is not significantly correlated with peace. Moreover, a supplementary analysis of contiguous dyads – those that experience most of the confl icts – also finds no signifi - cant relationship between a continuous measure of joint democracy and peace whether a control for economic interdependence is included or not. This finding is particularly damaging because democratic peace theorists argue that “most theoretical explanations of the separate peace imply a continuous eff ect: the more democratic a pair of states, the less likely they are to become involved in confl ict” (Oneal and Ray 1997, p. 752). Oneal and Ray (1997, pp. 756–7) conclude that the original Maoz and Russett fi nding does not survive reanalysis because it is based on a joint democracy variable that, although widely used, is poorly calculated and M2471 - COYNE PRINT.indd 290 2471 - COYNE PRINT.indd 290 14/01/2011 15:22 4/01/2011 15:22 On the democratic peace 291 constructed, and they therefore propose a new democracy measure that they claim does achieve statistical significance. Their new measure of joint democracy uses the democracy score of the less democratic state in a dyad on the assumption that conflict is a function of the regime type of the less constrained of two interacting states. This “weak link” specification appears to provide powerful support for the democratic peace finding: “As the less democratic state becomes more democratic, the likelihood of confl ict declines. This is clear evidence of the pacific benefits of democracy.” The new variable provides “corroboration of the democratic peace” (Oneal and Ray 1997, pp. 764–5). Oneal and Russett concur with this conclusion in a separate analysis that also uses the weak link assumption. An increase in democracy in the state that is “freer to resort to violence, reduces the likelihood of dyadic confl ict” (Oneal and Russett 1997, p. 279). Although the weak link measure is widely accepted as the gold standard in studies of the relationship between democracy and a variety of international outcomes, it does not provide evidence that joint democracy is signifi cantly related to peace. Even as they developed it, Oneal and Ray admitted that the weak link was not a pure measure of joint democracy. What it really revealed was that the probability of confl ict was “a function of the average level of democracy in a dyad . . . [and] also the political distance separating the states along the democracy–autocracy continuum” (1997, p. 768, emphasis added). The problem, of course, is that the logics advanced to explain the democratic peace refer to the eff ects of democracy on state behavior; none refer to the eff ects of political similarity. Thus fi ndings generated using the weak link specifi cation – which is to say all the major assessments of the democratic peace – may not actually support the central democratic peace claim that it is something about the norms and institutions of democracies that enables them to remain at peace. This is precisely the conclusion that Errol Henderson reaches in his compelling assessment of Oneal and Russett’s work. His analysis replicates theirs precisely with two minor modifi cations: he includes only the fi rst year of any dispute because democratic peace theory is about the incidence of disputes, not their duration, and he introduces a political similarity variable in order to disentangle the eff ects of joint democracy and political distance on confl ict. His central result is striking: democracy “is not signifi cantly associated with the probability of dispute onset.” “What is apparent from the results,” he concludes, “is that in the light of quite reasonable, modest, and straightforward modifi cations of Oneal and Russett’s . . . research design, there is no statistically signifi cant relationship between joint democracy and a decreased likelihood of militarized interstate confl ict” (Henderson 2002, pp. 37–9). Mark Souva (2004) reaches essentially the same conclusion in an analysis of the relationship M2471 - COYNE PRINT.indd 291 2471 - COYNE PRINT.indd 291 14/01/2011 15:22 4/01/2011 15:22 292 The handbook on the political economy of war between domestic institutions and interstate confl ict using the weak link specifi cation. In a model that includes variables for political and economic institutional similarity, both of which are signifi cantly associated with peace, there is no signifi cant relationship between joint democracy and the absence of confl ict.It’s correlation, not causation. Pazienza ’14 (Toni Ann Pazienza University of South Florida, “Challenging the Democratic Peace Theory - The Role of US-China Relationship” March 2014 . Graduate Theses and Dissertations. ) GGDespite these many data sets, many realists have declared the democratic peace a fantasy. Permanent peace between mutually recognized liberal democracies, they argue, is not possible. Liberal states, like all others, must base foreign policy on the imperatives of power politics. Some realists argue that there is no theoretically compelling causal mechanism that could explain democratic peace. If neither democratic structures nor norms alone can explain the democratic peace, then there is no democratic peace (Layne 11). If there was a democratic peace, then liberal states would not make threats against each other. Christopher Layne, for instance, argues that in the case of the Union and the Confederacy, the characteristics at the heart of the democratic peace theory- remain suspect. If a democracy is tightly knit politically, economically and culturally, as the United States was in 1861, and could still split into two waning successor states, we should have little confidence that democracy will prevent great power conflicts in international polities (41). Nonetheless, realism seeks to explain power politics. It is an approach that is centered upon four propositions: anarchic international system, sovereignty, states are ration and the most important actors. States purse their own self interest and groups strive to attain as many resources as possible with a primary concern of survival. While there are no universal principles with which all states may guide their actions, a state must instead always be aware of the actions of the states around it and must use a pragmatic approach to resolve problems as they arise. As Machiavelli put it in Discourses on Livy “… it is necessary for anyone who organizes a republic and establishes laws in it to take for granted that all men are evil and that they will always act according to the wickedness of their nature whenever they have the opportunity….” (28). Moreover, Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), provides three very simple assumptions: men are equal, they interact in anarchy and the are motivated by competition, diffidence and glory (88). Hobbes’s emphasis on anarchy, or what he called “a war of all against all”, only focused on the domestic level. The international context would be developed by Edward Carr in his book, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939), which addressed the dichotomies of realism and utopianism (idealism). Carr, in short, felt strongly that the problems of war could be avoided if states exercised the proper restrain or responded to the relative constrains of the international system. In Steve Chan’s research, constraints play an important role in assessing when one will or not attack another. Chan questions Rummel in his choice of conflicts with battles that had to have battle deaths exceeding 1,000. Here he defines a conflict with the appropriate measure being by the total amount of casualty and property destruction, not just by the number of soldiers killed (624). Chan further questions the exclusion of imperialist and colonial wars (625). He also argues that a foreign attack will move the officials of a free country to a state of war. The attack can present a unifying cause that change, at least initially, the normally fragmented and contending nature of politics. Also, it would be expected that an attack against an ally of a democracy would have the same effect (Dec. 1984:637). Further, Layne, asks whether the democratic peace theory or realism is a better predictor of international outcomes” (157). In the end he concludes that it is realist factors that reduce or avoid war (159). He, like Chan, also disagrees with Rummel’s sampling set of wars in that “…several important cases of wars between democratic states are not counted for reasons that are not very persuasive” and this coincides with Chan’s research (38). He argues that the case of the Union and the Confederacy, the characteristics at the heart of the democratic peace theory failed conspicuously. If a democracy, such as the United States in 1861, could split into two warring successor states, we would have little confidence, he asserts, that democracy will prevent great power conflicts in international politics (Layne, 41). In supporting this point, Errol Henderson (1999) in “Neoidealism and the Democratic Peace”, argues that it is his neoidealists perception that it is “… a combination of factors, including bi-polarity, nuclear deterrence, alliance aggregation, and trade links…” which allowed for the formation of an international security regime (204). Henderson maintains that it is this formation, and not joint democracy, that allowed for post war joint democracy. Neoidealists argue that the actions between states with problems of market failure leads to the construction of international regimes to facilitate agreements, institutionalize rules, and provide norms for interstate reaction in a specific issue area (211). Henderson’s core tenet of neoidealism is that norms emerge from international regimes that are external to states and not beholden to political regime type. While this notion of neoidealism suggests, is that although democracies rarely fight each other they are more frequently allied in war-more than four times as frequently as the average pair of democracies, according to Nils Peters Gleditsch and Havard Hegre (1997). For example, many wars have been initiated by democracies engaged in colonial conquest. In the post-World War II period there appear to have been many more military interventions abroad conducted by democratic (Western) states than by the Soviet Union and its allies. Some interventions appear to have been justified with reference to stopping domestic violence or promoting democracy, but others are more commonly interpreted as power politics. Zeev Maoz is clear in his statement that in the real world peace exists. As he states, “Overall, there is little to support the proposition that democracies’ international relations are especially peaceful, but only that their relations with each other are relatively very peaceful” (78). This conclusion is also supported by Sebastian Rosato, who in his work The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory finds that the logics underpinning the democratic peace theory are flawed. He claims that peace is not caused by the democratic nature of states. But, causal logic or democratic norms (accountability and public constraint) combined with trust and respect is what stops conflict between democratic states, which falls in line with Russett and Oneal’s position on norms and culture. Democratic leaders will use the “norm” of diplomacy and peaceful conflict negotiation, but only if they trust and respect the other state because the other state, whether democratic or not, will respond more peacefully. It is Rosato’s position that the causal logics that underpin democratic peace theory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace with one another because the mechanisms that make up these logics do not operate as stipulated (593). In the case of normative logic, liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one another with trust and respect when their interests clash. With institutional logic, democracies are not especially accountable to peaceful loving publics or pacific interest groups. Democracies are not slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attacks, and open political competition does not guarantee that a democracy will reveal information about is levels of “resolve”. Democratic peace theorists, then, fail to take stock of the underlying forces conflict that can undermine the stability of democratic norms. Samuel Huntington, in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) claims “clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace” (321). He theorizes that the clash between civilizations will dominate global politics and describes the geo-political shift in conflict and international relations in the post-Cold War era. In this New Order, the sovereign countries of the world from East and West are assembling into regional blocs based on shared cultures and values. According to Huntington, the next major cause of conflict will not be entwined with either any particular ideology (i.e. capitalism or communism) but from differences and competitions between cultures of civilizations. Summarizing: The realist criticism of the normative and structural models of the democratic peace is two-fold: First, it questions the validity of the normative and structural explanations. Second, it argues that the factors that prevent wars between states in general, including wars between democracies, are realist in nature, particularly with respect to power balances and interests.Incentives CPNC – CPThe United States federal government ought implement automatic voter registration, Election Day registration, and ranked choice voting. It’s more effective at driving turnout than punitive measures – the aff eventually causes alienation Polimedio 18 [Chayenne; 11/6/18; fellow with the Political Reform program at New America, former contributor to Vox; “Is voting a civic right or a civic duty?” ]There are better ways to get people to vote than fining them for not votingThe solution to low turnout is to create advantages to voting that surpass any disadvantages of doing so, without punishing voters. Reforms such as Election Day registration and automatic voter registration are proven to have a positive effect on turnout and could be a start.Other proposals, like proportional representation and ranked choice voting, can elevate voters’ perception of political efficacy. As my colleague Lee Drutman has pointed out, “because more parties are competing for voters; because voters are more likely to feel like their voters matter; and because voters are more likely to have the chance to vote for a candidate they are excited about, proportional representation systems tend to have higher voter turnout — without the force of a compulsory voting system.”Rob Richie of FairVote writes that ranked-choice-voting in U.S. localities has already led to higher turnout, since it allows voters to choose their number one candidate, while also allowing them not to “waste their vote” by choosing a secondary preference for someone from among the more viable pulsory voting isn’t the surefire way of fixing the problem of turnout in the U.S. that many deem it to be. Its proponents should take into account the indirect effects that this reform would have on electoral politics, individuals’ sense of liberty, and their overall sense that government works for them and not the other way around.There are other reforms that could also lead to more demographically and ideologically diverse pools of candidates, and a representative and inclusive government that doesn’t involve forcing people to cast a ballot.Liberty NCNC – ContentionI contend that compulsory voting violates an individual’s right not to participate in the political system Abstention is a legitimate form of political expression that must be respected in a democracy. Hill 02 [LISA HILL. University of Adelaide. “Compulsory Voting: Residual Problems and Potential Solutions.” Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 437–455. 2002. Carfax Publishing, Taylor and Francis Group] AJFirst, one of my key arguments for compulsory voting rests on its capacity to keep political apathy at bay. The general trend in democratic systems worldwide over the last three decades has been one of demobilisation politically as well as socially and civically.23 Voting participation has decreased steadily in non-compul- sory systems. Compulsion provides a stable buffer against a degenerative pattern that affects some social groups more acutely than others. It is a reliable way of preventing politically marginal or ‘politically shy’ populations from losing contact with civic life.24 But people with strong conscientious objections are not apathetic in this way, and do not appear to be in any real danger of dropping off the political map. Neither are conscientious objectors anti-political; in fact they demonstrate a deeper than usual commitment to politics by publicly offering political reasons for their abstention upon which they are more than willing to act. In a sense, then, their objections and their preparedness to defend them are a form of hyper-politics, and to dismiss their concerns is to miss the whole point of democracy. But I should like to make clear here that I am not so much interested in the speci? c content of any of these arguments (even those with which I happen to agree) as in the types of arguments that the would-be abstainers are making; that is to say, in whether or not the argument is politically principled in character. For example, the argument that compulsion violates individual autonomy might be an acceptable reason for being excused not because it is true, but because it potentially quali? es as a political objection.25 Open avenues of dissent are necessary to respect the freedoms of citizens. Lawrence B. Solum [Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. “Book Review The Value of Dissent.” 85 Cornell L. Rev. 859-881 (2000) (reviewing Steven H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America (1999))] AJWhat is the relevance of pluralism and the burdens of judgment to our question about the value of dissent? If we are committed to the liberty of conscience and the freedom of discussion, then dissent is inevitable with respect to the normative evaluation of social practice: "customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities."" 4 Citizens who disagree about fundamental matters, such as religion and the na-ture of the good, will evaluate social practices. Inevitably, some citizens will dissent on almost any question of public policy or social mores." 5 Given this fact, it follows that respect for the political autonomy of citizens requires the toleration of dissent. From the perspec-tive of political liberalism, dissent is not the price to be paid for liberty of conscience and freedom of discussion. Rather, dissent is to be celebrated as one of the great benefits of such freedom. Dissent [it] is the product of human reason operating under conditions of freedom. Moreover, as Mill teaches us, dissent on contestable matters of "morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life"" 6 is properly seen as a great benefit by those who disagree with the dissenters.!T – Democracy BadNC – TurnPursuit of democracy under Trump causes nuclear war with China, Russia, and Iran. Even if democratic peace is true, Trump alters international calculus. Miller ’17 (Benjamin; 4/27/17; Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa; The International Security Studies Forum; “Policy Series: Will Trumpism increase the Danger of War in the International System?: IR Theory and the Illiberal Turn in World Politics”; ; DOA: 12/6/17)Some realists might, however, not see these recent developments as necessarily leading to more conflict, although they may not see them as leading to stable peace either.[22] In the eyes of these realists, the seemingly unconditional U.S. security umbrella for America’s allies has allowed them to ‘free-ride’ on the U.S. commitment and to avoid allocating the necessary resources for their own national defense.[23] Moreover, some of the allies have been provocative toward their opponents, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. This could cause unnecessary conflict. Especially provocative toward Russia, for example, was the enlargement of NATO to the east and the EU economic agreement with Ukraine in 2014. Such anti-Russian expansionist Western moves, in the realist view, compelled Moscow to behave more assertively and to annex Crimea and to intervene in Eastern Ukraine.[24] Somewhat similarly, it seems less costly for American allies in East Asia to engage in maritime conflicts with China so long they are under the U.S. protective shield. Realists believe that moving away from such ever-growing commitments will stabilize the international system, or at the very least reduce the likelihood of a great-power conflict. The realists are especially concerned about the American policies to shape the domestic character of other states, particularly by advancing democracy-promotion, “nation-building,” and the universal protection of human rights.[25] In this context they highlight what they see as disastrous American military interventions, notably, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 and also the continuously costly intervention in Afghanistan since 2001. In their eyes such military interventions are not necessary for the protection of American national interests. Moreover, such military engagements are unlikely to succeed and in many cases are de-stabilizing and are causing unnecessary conflicts. Such interventions simply increase the perceived threat posed by the U.S. to some other countries. Thus, lessening—if not completely abandoning—the U.S. commitment to advance these liberal values is likely, in realist eyes, to stabilize the international system and to serve well the American national security interests. Even though liberals see trade as a major pacifying mechanism, realists view trade—and economic interdependence more broadly—as potential sources for conflict.[26] They highlight the earlier U.S. trade conflicts with Japan and currently with Mexico and China. Thus, moving away from free trade might diffuse conflicts rather than accelerate them. Moreover, there is a growing populist opposition in the West to globalization. In this sense, it cannot work as a useful recipe for the promotion of peace. Similarly, despite the high levels of economic interdependence between Japan and China, for example, such interdependence does not prevent conflict between them and definitely does not result in stable peace even if it might have helped to prevent a shooting war between them, at least thus far. Realists are also skeptical about the ability of international institutions to advance stable peace.[27] Such institutions are not independent actors, which can influence the behavior of the member-states in important ways. International institutions just reflect the balance of power among states. States follow their national interests, and even more so in this age of rising nationalism. Thus we cannot expect much from the ability of international institutions to pacify intense conflicts, especially among the great powers. Even the most remarkable of international intuitions—the EU—has recently failed in advancing cooperation among its members with regard to the key issues of immigration, terrorism and the Euro financial crisis. Realists might be a bit skeptical about a potential reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia based on factors such as the personal friendship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin or the supposedly common traditional/illiberal values of key figures in their respective administrations. Yet, the presence of a common enemy might be a good source of friendship. In this sense the Islamic State and perhaps even China create a potential basis for cooperation and avoidance of conflict between Moscow and Washington. But on the whole this will not advance a high-level ‘warm’ peace in Europe or elsewhere; rather it may, at most, lead to some kind of an unstable spheres-of-influence arrangement, which is unlikely to endure for an extended period. In sum, while liberals offer a menu of mechanisms for promoting peace, these mechanisms seem now under assault or in some process of weakening under Trumpism and the illiberal turn in quite a few other countries. Realists, for their part, do not believe in the far-reaching peace-producing effects of such liberal mechanisms. They tend to see some level of great-power competition as the natural order under international anarchy. Realists at most expect that there will be some stabilizing effects of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, and of the balance of power among the great powers. These kind of factors might — also under Trumpism—maintain world stability and prevent war even if some level of great-power conflict is expected to endure at any rate. The most effective instrument for cooperation—applicable even under the illiberal turn– is based on common threats faced by the great powers such as large-scale terrorism or risky behavior by a small nuclear power such as North Korea and potentially Iran. Evaluation of the Realist and the Liberal Views At this stage, less than three months into the Trump administration, it is quite difficult to determine which approach is right. Still, on the whole, we might be able to distinguish between short-term versus long-term effects and among different types of peace. In the short-term, realists may have a point: the avoidance of American interventions for democracy-promotion and humanitarian interventions might stabilize the international system. The key American adversaries—Russia, China, and Iran— will be less troubled by regime–change strategies or ‘color revolutions’ advanced by the U.S. that are perceived to be posing major threats to their regimes. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, which realists argue has provoked Russia, will also stop. Such reassurances are likely to increase stability in international politics and to produce at least a ‘cold peace’ in the international system and in key regions. Collapse of democracy’s inevitable – transition to Chinese autocracy solves.Schiavenza ’17 (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; ; DOA: 12/6/17)Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. Democracy is struggling. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has fallen since reaching a peak in 2006. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become more authoritarian. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a nationalist leader whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only further solidified the Chinese Communist Party: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s most powerful since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also infected the United States and Europe. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “end liberal democracy” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have gained popularity across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his admiration for Putin, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “a strong leader”; as president-elect, he praised the Kazakh dictator Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are three main reasons. One is American hypocrisy, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to impose democracy by force in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the resurgence of China and Russia. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was because of, rather than in spite of, its autocratic government. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is wealthier and more stable than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the weaknesses embedded in modern American democracy itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had never served in government or the military and one, incidentally, who earned three million fewer votes than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, we don’t want it.’” What About China's System? There’s no doubt that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through major infrastructure projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has dazzled Westerners frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” simply as a means to get things done. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the meritocratic advantages of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: one person, one vote,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further reinforce this notion. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-four-decade run of economic growth as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to systematize its government by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to divide the responsibilities of government and ensure no one individual assumes too much power. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove advantageous to China in other ways. For one, it would weaken the democratic movement in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy leaves a vacuum in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing might fill. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that China and Russia control things. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a global foreign policy battle, and the West’s losses are China's and Russia’s gains.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now don’t understand what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the least organic and least natural way we’ve had." NR – Structural !Democracy causes great power nuclear war – backsliding solves.Muller ’15 – director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University (Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Mi?re 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).Autocracy deters aggression – 4 warrants.War finance- wars are expensive, threaten autocratic control- democracies change leadership so much it doesn’t matterCMR- civilian autorcats are afraid of coups- want weak militariesDomestic focus- the military has to be used internally AND autocrats have to appease groupsHigher costs of losing- death v losing officeRosato ’11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. MathersThere is also little evidence for Ihe other implication of the group constraint claim, namely that group constraints must be weaker in autocracies than in democracies. If the mechanism is to explain why democracies remain at peace but autocracies do not, then there must be good evidence that democratic leaders face greater group constraints. The evidence suggests, however, that autocratic leaders often respond to groups - themselves or their supporters that have powerful incentives to avoid war. One reason for autocrats to shy away from conflict is that wars are expensive and the best way to pay for them is to move to a system of consensual taxation, which in turn requires the expansion of the franchise. In other words, autocratic leaders have a powerful incentive to avoid wars lest they trigger political changes that may destroy their hold on power. Another reason to avoid war is that it allows civilian autocrats to maintain weak military establishments, thereby reducing the chances that they will be overthrown. Different considerations inhibit the war proneness of military dictators. First, because they must often devote considerable effort to domestic repression, they have fewer resources available for prosecuting foreign wars. Second, because they are used for repression their militaries often have little societal support, which makes them ill equipped to fight external wars. Third, military dictators are closely identified with the military and will therefore be cautious about waging war for fear that they will be blamed for any subsequent defeat. Finally, time spent fighting abroad is time away from other tasks on which a dictator's domestic tenure also depends. Thus there may be fewer groups with access to the foreign policy process in autocracies - in extreme cases only the autocrat himself has a say - but these often have a vested interest in avoiding war. This being the case, it is not clear that group constraints are weaker in autocracies than they are in democraciesNR – CCP Collapse !Democracy causes CCP collapse.Chen & Kinzelbach ’15 (Dingding Chen- assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Katrin Kinzelbach- associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, March 2015, “Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?” )The People's Republic of China is both a decisive blocker as well as an indifferent bystander of democratization. In this article, we looked at whether and how China countervails EU and US democracy promotion at home and in its immediate neighbourhood. In terms of domestic politics, the CCP is clearly determined to withstand, repress, outperform, and outsmart home-grown as well as external pressures for democratization. It is impossible to predict how long this approach will be sustainable. With regard to China's foreign policy, we tested the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival at home will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders as well. The case of Hong Kong confirms that a perceived risk of regime survival leads Beijing to countervail US and EU democracy support outside the Chinese mainland. Although the scope of this article did not allow for additional case studies, we consider it likely that the CCP's focus on regime-survival at home does not only trump the “one country, two systems” doctrine, but ultimately also Beijing's declared non-interference principle in foreign policy. Yet, the fact that Beijing does not seem to use its significant leverage over Myanmar to hinder democracy support is an empirical challenge to the common proposition that authoritarian China is likely to export or protect autocracy, especially in its near-abroad. Given that we view Myanmar as the most likely case with respect to strategic interests, we suggest with considerable certainty that Beijing will only counteract democratization, including US and EU democracy support, where it perceives a challenge to the CCP's survival. Where this is not the case, Beijing is likely to focus on protecting its economic and strategic interests abroad, regardless of regime type. While this finding might be taken to suggest that a focus on China's international influence should not be a priority for democracy supporters, we remain more cautious. China's economic performance has not only granted the CCP legitimacy domestically, it has also made China's development path – economic liberalization without political reform – appear desirable further afield. And the recent economic troubles in Europe and the US, in turn, have challenged the thus far common perception that democracy was required for prosperity. As democracy promoters, both the US and the EU should therefore ensure that the very real governance shortcomings in China, beyond as well as within the economic sphere, are publicly identified for what they are. Without such concerted efforts, it is likely that authoritarian China will continue to be looked at as an alternative development model, thereby challenging democracy's power of attraction. Goes nuclear.Yee & Storey ’13 (Yee and Storey 13 Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality 2013 p. 15)The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.NR – Decline InevitablePopulist resurgence.Roth ’17 (Kenneth; 2017; executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations, which operates in more than 90 countries; Human Rights Watch; “The Dangerous Rise of Populism”; ; DOA: 12/6/17)The appeal of the populists has grown with mounting public discontent over the status quo. In the West, many people feel left behind by technological change, the global economy, and growing inequality. Horrific incidents of terrorism generate apprehension and fear. Some are uneasy with societies that have become more ethnically, religiously and racially diverse. There is an increasing sense that governments and the elite ignore public concerns. In this cauldron of discontent, certain politicians are flourishing and even gaining power by portraying rights as protecting only the terrorist suspect or the asylum seeker at the expense of the safety, economic welfare, and cultural preferences of the presumed majority. They scapegoat refugees, immigrant communities, and minorities. Truth is a frequent casualty. Nativism, xenophobia, racism, and Islamophobia are on the rise. This dangerous trend threatens to reverse the accomplishments of the modern human rights movement. In its early years, that movement was preoccupied with the atrocities of World War II and the repression associated with the Cold War. Having seen the evil that governments can do, states adopted a series of human rights treaties to limit and deter future abuse. Protecting these rights was understood as necessary for individuals to live in dignity. Growing respect for rights laid the foundation for freer, safer, and more prosperous societies. But today, a growing number of people have come to see rights not as protecting them from the state but as undermining governmental efforts to defend them. In the United States and Europe, the perceived threat at the top of the list is migration, where concerns about cultural identity, economic opportunity, and terrorism intersect. Encouraged by populists, an expanding segment of the public sees rights as protecting only these “other” people, not themselves, and thus as dispensable. If the majority wants to limit the rights of refugees, migrants, or minorities, the populists suggest, it should be free to do so. That international treaties and institutions stand in the way only intensifies this antipathy toward rights in a world where nativism is often prized over globalism. It is perhaps human nature that it is harder to identify with people who differ from oneself, and easier to accept violation of their rights. People take solace in the hazardous assumption that the selective enforcement of rights is possible—that the rights of others can be compromised while their own remain secure. But rights by their nature do not admit an à la carte approach. You may not like your neighbors, but if you sacrifice their rights today, you jeopardize your own tomorrow, because ultimately rights are grounded on the reciprocal duty to treat others as you would want to be treated yourself. To violate the rights of some is to erode the edifice of rights that inevitably will be needed by members of the presumed majority in whose name current violations occur. We forget at our peril the demagogues of yesteryear—the fascists, communists, and their ilk who claimed privileged insight into the majority’s interest but ended up crushing the individual. When populists treat rights as an obstacle to their vision of the majority will, it is only a matter of time before they turn on those who disagree with their agenda. The risk only heightens when populists attack the independence of the judiciary for upholding the rule of law—that is, for enforcing the limits on governmental conduct that rights impose. Such claims of unfettered majoritarianism, and the attacks on the checks and balances that constrain governmental power, are perhaps the greatest danger today to the future of democracy in the West. Spreading Threat and Tepid Response Rather than confronting this populist surge, too many Western political leaders seem to have lost confidence in human rights values, offering only tepid support. Few leaders have been willing to offer a vigorous defense, with the notable exception, at times, of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and US President Barack Obama. Some leaders seem to have buried their heads in the sand, hoping the winds of populism will blow over. Others, if not seeking to profit from populist passions, seem to wish that emulation of the populists might temper their ascendancy. British Prime Minister Theresa May denounced “activist left wing human rights lawyers” who dare to challenge British forces for torture in Iraq. French President Fran?ois Hollande borrowed from the National Front playbook to try to make depriving French-born dual citizens of their nationality a central part of his counterterrorism policy, an initiative he later abandoned and said he regretted. The Dutch government supports restrictions on face veils for Muslim women. Many European leaders now back the call of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to close Europe’s borders, leaving refugees in the lurch. Such mimicry of the populists only reinforces and legitimizes the politicians attacking human rights values. A similar trend can be found outside the West. Indeed, the rise of Western populists seems to have emboldened several leaders to intensify their flouting of human rights. The Kremlin, for example, has eagerly defended President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule as no worse than the West’s increasingly troubled human rights record. China's Xi Jinping, like Putin, has pursued the toughest crackdown on critical voices in two decades. President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an of Turkey took advantage of a coup attempt to crush opposition voices. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt intensified the crackdown begun after his own coup. President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines has openly called for summary executions of suspected drug dealers and users—and even of human rights activists who defend them. Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India tried to shut down critical civic groups as he closed his eyes to intimidation and hate crimes by Hindu nationalist groups against religious and ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, confident that there is little to fear in the West’s occasional protests, Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, backed by Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, has shredded the international laws of war, ruthlessly attacking civilians in opposition-held parts of the country including eastern Aleppo. Several African leaders, feeling vulnerable to domestic or international prosecution themselves, have harshly criticized the International Criminal Court and, in three cases, announced their intention to withdraw from it. Trump.Klaas ’17 (Brian Klaas, “The five ways President Trump has already damaged democracy at home and abroad,” Washington Post, 4/28/17, ) In just 100 days, President Trump has damaged American democracy while simultaneously accelerating democracy’s global decline. No, Trump is not a dictator or a fascist, as some wrongly claimed. But he certainly has authoritarian tendencies and a baffling admiration for despots. He has a penchant for attacking democratic institutions and appears willing to sacrifice them in a heartbeat on the altar of his ego. And he has spouted several dangerous lies that a sizable portion of his political base unfortunately believes to be true. As a result, he has already managed to do major damage to democracy at home and abroad in five important ways. First, he has undercut the integrity of U.S. elections. Trump falsely claimed that millions of people voted illegally last year. That’s not true. Every serious study into voter fraud has concluded that it is a minuscule problem. North Carolina conducted a vote audit for 2016, and found one case of in-person voter impersonation — out of millions of ballots cast. And yet tens of millions of Americans now wrongly believe that millions voted illegally. That is a serious challenge to public faith in the bedrock of American democracy. Trump also actively solicited and took advantage of Russian meddling in U.S. elections. He invited Russia to hack and publish Hillary Clinton’s emails. He mentioned WikiLeaks 164 times in the final month of the campaign (Trump’s CIA director subsequently labeled WikiLeaks as a “hostile intelligence service“). The hacking of the Democratic National Committee was a brazen cyberattack on U.S. democracy and yet Trump has consistently been an apologist who plays down the hack rather than working to ensure it never happens again. (By the way, there is still an active FBI investigation into whether he or his campaign colluded with Russia in that attack). Second, he has attacked democratic institutions such as the free press and the independent judiciary. He has repeatedly dismissed credible, corroborated, truthful reporting as “fake news.” But Trump has also maligned judges in highly personal and reckless ways simply because they ruled against his administration. His White house claimed that some judges (who were simply doing their job) provided a “gift to the criminal gang and cartel element in our country.” He has called others “so-called judges” and claimed that it would be the fault of the courts if a terrorist attacked occurred during his presidency. This incendiary language is unacceptable and erodes public trust in checks and balances that are at the core of the U.S. democratic system. Third, he has brazenly violated basic standards of transparency and government ethics. Democracy requires transparency. If citizens are not informed about the workings of their government, they cannot hold it accountable. Just take his continuing refusal to release his tax returns — something that has been done by every presidential candidate since the 1970s. At first he used the extraordinarily flimsy excuse of an audit, but now he has even abandoned that fig leaf. Until Trump issues his tax returns, we don’t know whether he is governing for American interests or his bank account. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has announced that it won’t release White House visitor logs — so nobody can see who is coming and going to meet the president. Is there an endless stream of lobbyists? Or perhaps some high-profile foreign agents, like the ones he previously hired for his campaign? We have no clue, because Trump reversed an Obama-era policy to tell the American people who is coming to the taxpayer-funded White House. This lack of transparency also bleeds into ethics violations and conflicts of interest that have gone unpunished — from using taxpayer dollars to promote Trump businesses to currying favor with foreign leaders apparently to receive lucrative trademarks abroad. Fourth, Trump has hurt democracy abroad by leaving pro-democracy reformers out in the cold. When protesters took to the streets in Belarus and Russia demanding democratic reforms, Trump said nothing. That was a strategic mistake. These were protests in favor of democracy and against regimes that oppose the United States, so it should have been a no-brainer. Instead, Trump stayed silent as protesters were beaten in the streets. It was a missed opportunity and a gift to the forces that seek to undermine democratic reform abroad. Fifth, Trump has endorsed and applauded dictators and despots, giving awful rulers a free pass to destroy democracy and violate human rights. He uncritically embraced President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi of Egypt, a military dictator who routinely tortures dissidents. He called to congratulate President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on winning a rigged referendum that dismantled democracy in a NATO member state. Those signals have certainly not been lost on authoritarian rulers around the world who recognize that Trump does not care about democracy or human rights abroad. As a result, a decade of decline for democracy around the world will almost certainly accelerate. Donald Trump is a unique threat to democracy in a way that we haven’t experienced before. Initial fears may have been overblown, but it’s clear that he already is slowly but meaningfully eroding democracy at home and abroad. We must be vigilant. There are 1,361 days left. Trump’s “America First” philosophy crushes any chance at international democracy promotion Haldevang 17 --- geopolitics reporter for Quartz who focuses on the Trump administration and foreign affairs (Max de Haldevang, "Trump's "America First" foreign policy is not official. Here's what it says," Quartz, 1/20/17, )//AN If for some reason Donald Trump’s stormy inauguration speech didn’t convince you that the US is abdicating from its global leadership role, perhaps the newly-published “America First Foreign Policy” manifesto will. Published minutes after the inauguration on the revamped , the first line reads: “The Trump Administration is committed to a foreign policy focused on American interests and American national security.” It’s a far cry from Jimmy Carter’s “foreign policy of human rights,” George W. Bush’s democracy promotion or Barack Obama’s cautious pragmatism. Where other presidents have focused on bringing international harmony through either better trade relations, support for civil society institutions, or bolstering international institutions, Trump’s credo is “peace through strength.” The slogan “America First” itself is highly divisive—in its first iteration, it was a rallying cry for anti-semitic groups campaigning to stop the US fighting in World War II. The Anti-Defamation League, started in 1913 to combat anti-semitism, urged Trump to stop using it in April last year. Here are the four ways Trump plans to deliver on the policy: Beating ISIL and other “radical Islamic terror groups” At a time when the US has been under literal attacks from another country in the cyber realm, beating Islamic terrorism will be the Trump administration’s “highest priority,” implying that terrorism is the greatest threat to the country. This section does, coincidentally, contain the document’s only reference to cyber warfare—but in the context of nullifying terrorist groups’ propaganda and recruitment networks. A massive military spending program “Our military dominance must be unquestioned,” the manifesto asserts, noting that the size of the US Navy and Air Force have shrunk since 1991. Given that America’s defense budget is bigger than the next 10 countries combined, this would seem a pretty moot point—but it’s a big populist crowd pleaser from the new strongman president. The size of the Air Force and Navy are perhaps odd examples to pick, however, since warfare has changed considerably in recent decades, moving toward “nonlinear war” from old-fashioned big battles, and privileging the ability to rapidly respond to military provocations and being able to weaponize information. Reoriented diplomacy “The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies,” the manifesto reads. This sentence more than anything encapsulates how the world order could change under Trump. “Old enemies” becoming friends is a clear olive branch to Russia, while support for current allies (whom he hasn’t shied away from disparaging) is notably absent. Trump has long said he thinks America is being ripped off in the current alliances like NATO that define the global order, and favors a new deal-making approach where he can see tangible benefits from relations with countries, like Russia. Redefining global trade The second half of the manifesto retreads Trump’s oft-repeated trade priorities, with the message being that global trade must benefit the American worker. It’s a radically statist approach to an issue seen by recent presidents as benefiting the entire world economy and helping create peaceful bilateral relations. The memo’s language confirms that; there’s not a single sentence about how trade deals affect relations with other countries or subtle global power balances. Instead, the new administration says it will take a zero-sum approach—with every negotiation starting from the basis of how American workers will be helped. The president is “committed to renegotiating NAFTA,” its says. “If our partners refuse a renegotiation that gives American workers a fair deal, then the President will give notice of the United States’ intent to withdraw from NAFTA.” While China isn’t mentioned directly, expect a Cold War-era approach to relations with the world’s other superpower. Leader of the free world no more In sum, the warm, fuzzy conceit of America, the well-meaning, soft-blundering global super-cop trying to spread democracy has officially disappeared. Today’s foreign policy announcements reveal an administration that sees international relations as a dog-eat-dog realm. As Trump argued in his inauguration speech, “it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone but rather to let it shine as an example.” That example? Pure self-interest.NR – TransitionChinese global governance creates institutions and interdependence.Tao ’16 – Tao, Institute of World Economics and Politics senior fellow, 2016 (Ma, “China needs to push its role in global governance”, 8-24, )For the first time, the Trade and Investment Working Group is among the Group of 20's (G20) working groups, demonstrating the increasingly important role trade and economic governance plays in global governance. G20 nations should enhance the global trade vitality by proactively participating in this governance and China can also play an active part in the restructuring and policymaking of trade and economic rules. China should let its contributions be guided in various ways by this year's G20 summit theme: "Toward an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy." First, China's pilot free trade zones (FTZ) strategy demonstrates an institutional innovation needed at the G20 summit. The FTZ policies include measures of the management approach of negative lists, trade facilitation and further opening up of financial services. China has been pushing for the implementation of these methods in pilot FTZs in Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong Province and Fujian Province, which is part of China's effort to contribute to global governance, build better bilateral free trade agreements and construct a more open world economy. Second, China has spared no effort in buoying global economic growth through long-term institutionalization in G20 members in an attempt to keep global trade invigorated. G20 nations should agree to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) under World Trade Organization (WTO) soon so they can better develop a multilateral trading system. China joining the TFA is a significant move which fosters trade liberalization, protects WTO's central status as a multilateral trading system and is an incentive for all G20 countries to participate in international trade governance. Third, the Belt and Road initiative strengthens ties among route countries and has allowed China to take a leading role in regional governance. The value chains formed along the route further make the impacted economies interconnected. Fourth, efforts to establish global value chains (GVCs) demonstrate the inclusiveness at the center of global trade and economic governance. The G20 Trade and Investment Working Group aims to strengthen the capability of GVCs, which will drive trade and investment and push participation from developing countries and small and medium-sized enterprises. The G20 summit is also an opportunity to exercise China's discourse power in establishing international trade rules. Recently, two major trade agreements have taken shape: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Both mark American-led integration efforts to press ahead with new rules for regional trade and investment as multilateral trade regimes hit roadblocks. In doing so, the US and Europe are seeking to regain dominance over international rules, while weakening influence from emerging markets through thresholds for access to high-level, high-standard regional arrangements. A group of 23 WTO members have been involved in negotiations on the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), according to the European Commission. The negotiations aim to update relevant rules related to trade in services under the WTO framework to implement high levels of free trade in service sectors. China needs to proactively avail itself of the G20 global governance platform to take part in various regional trade arrangements as well as foster the development of multilateral trade systems. Presently, negotiations over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), talks about a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between China and the US as well as gearing up for the domestic implementation of FTZs all require active involvement from China. It can't be denied that an increasing number of trade rules are of great importance to China. As such, the country must actively respond and seize the initiative. China should accelerate opening up all around - from ramping up the building of FTZs to implementing the national initiative for the One Belt, One Road - in an effort to integrate a new array of international trade rules in the country and acclimate to high-standard trade and investment policy. The G20 not only serves as a platform for governing the global economy, but acts as an effective route in setting up international trade rules. As the host of this year's summit, China should wholly undertake a leader's role in guiding G20 agenda setting which will profoundly influence the future of international trade governance. Right now, the global economy suffers lackluster growth while regional economic and trade cooperation evolves in a complicated way and new international rules keep coming up. These present opportunities and challenges for countries seeking to boost economic and trade power. The development of global governance is intimately connected to China's ambitions to turn itself into a global economic and trade power. The future development of China's foreign trade will be intertwined with newly sealed international trade rules, which means China will need to take an active role in regional integration negotiations and in understanding the new rules and standards which will be incorporated into the idea of global governance under the G20 framework.NR – AT: Pursuit InevitableThis is factually not true – Trump’s de-emphasizing democracy promotion.Rogin ’17 (Josh; 8/1/17; political analyst; The Washington Post; “State Department considers scrubbing democracy promotion from its mission”; ; DOA: 12/7/17)Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has ordered his department to redefine its mission and issue a new statement of purpose to the world. The draft statements under review right now are similar to the old mission statement, except for one thing — any mention of promoting democracy is being eliminated. According to an internal email that went out Friday, which I obtained, the State Department’s Executive Steering Committee convened a meeting of leaders to draft new statements on the department’s purpose, mission and ambition, as part of the overall reorganization of the State Department and USAID. (The draft statements were being circulated for comment Friday and could change before being finalized.) Multiple actions confirm.Klaas ’17 (Brian Klaas, “The five ways President Trump has already damaged democracy at home and abroad,” Washington Post, 4/28/17, ) In just 100 days, President Trump has damaged American democracy while simultaneously accelerating democracy’s global decline. No, Trump is not a dictator or a fascist, as some wrongly claimed. But he certainly has authoritarian tendencies and a baffling admiration for despots. He has a penchant for attacking democratic institutions and appears willing to sacrifice them in a heartbeat on the altar of his ego. And he has spouted several dangerous lies that a sizable portion of his political base unfortunately believes to be true. As a result, he has already managed to do major damage to democracy at home and abroad in five important ways. First, he has undercut the integrity of U.S. elections. Trump falsely claimed that millions of people voted illegally last year. That’s not true. Every serious study into voter fraud has concluded that it is a minuscule problem. North Carolina conducted a vote audit for 2016, and found one case of in-person voter impersonation — out of millions of ballots cast. And yet tens of millions of Americans now wrongly believe that millions voted illegally. That is a serious challenge to public faith in the bedrock of American democracy. Trump also actively solicited and took advantage of Russian meddling in U.S. elections. He invited Russia to hack and publish Hillary Clinton’s emails. He mentioned WikiLeaks 164 times in the final month of the campaign (Trump’s CIA director subsequently labeled WikiLeaks as a “hostile intelligence service“). The hacking of the Democratic National Committee was a brazen cyberattack on U.S. democracy and yet Trump has consistently been an apologist who plays down the hack rather than working to ensure it never happens again. (By the way, there is still an active FBI investigation into whether he or his campaign colluded with Russia in that attack). Second, he has attacked democratic institutions such as the free press and the independent judiciary. He has repeatedly dismissed credible, corroborated, truthful reporting as “fake news.” But Trump has also maligned judges in highly personal and reckless ways simply because they ruled against his administration. His White house claimed that some judges (who were simply doing their job) provided a “gift to the criminal gang and cartel element in our country.” He has called others “so-called judges” and claimed that it would be the fault of the courts if a terrorist attacked occurred during his presidency. This incendiary language is unacceptable and erodes public trust in checks and balances that are at the core of the U.S. democratic system. Third, he has brazenly violated basic standards of transparency and government ethics. Democracy requires transparency. If citizens are not informed about the workings of their government, they cannot hold it accountable. Just take his continuing refusal to release his tax returns — something that has been done by every presidential candidate since the 1970s. At first he used the extraordinarily flimsy excuse of an audit, but now he has even abandoned that fig leaf. Until Trump issues his tax returns, we don’t know whether he is governing for American interests or his bank account. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has announced that it won’t release White House visitor logs — so nobody can see who is coming and going to meet the president. Is there an endless stream of lobbyists? Or perhaps some high-profile foreign agents, like the ones he previously hired for his campaign? We have no clue, because Trump reversed an Obama-era policy to tell the American people who is coming to the taxpayer-funded White House. This lack of transparency also bleeds into ethics violations and conflicts of interest that have gone unpunished — from using taxpayer dollars to promote Trump businesses to currying favor with foreign leaders apparently to receive lucrative trademarks abroad. Fourth, Trump has hurt democracy abroad by leaving pro-democracy reformers out in the cold. When protesters took to the streets in Belarus and Russia demanding democratic reforms, Trump said nothing. That was a strategic mistake. These were protests in favor of democracy and against regimes that oppose the United States, so it should have been a no-brainer. Instead, Trump stayed silent as protesters were beaten in the streets. It was a missed opportunity and a gift to the forces that seek to undermine democratic reform abroad. Fifth, Trump has endorsed and applauded dictators and despots, giving awful rulers a free pass to destroy democracy and violate human rights. He uncritically embraced President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi of Egypt, a military dictator who routinely tortures dissidents. He called to congratulate President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on winning a rigged referendum that dismantled democracy in a NATO member state. Those signals have certainly not been lost on authoritarian rulers around the world who recognize that Trump does not care about democracy or human rights abroad. As a result, a decade of decline for democracy around the world will almost certainly accelerate. Donald Trump is a unique threat to democracy in a way that we haven’t experienced before. Initial fears may have been overblown, but it’s clear that he already is slowly but meaningfully eroding democracy at home and abroad. We must be vigilant. There are 1,361 days left. Trump’s “America First” philosophy crushes any chance at international democracy promotion Haldevang 17 --- geopolitics reporter for Quartz who focuses on the Trump administration and foreign affairs (Max de Haldevang, "Trump's "America First" foreign policy is not official. Here's what it says," Quartz, 1/20/17, )//AN If for some reason Donald Trump’s stormy inauguration speech didn’t convince you that the US is abdicating from its global leadership role, perhaps the newly-published “America First Foreign Policy” manifesto will. Published minutes after the inauguration on the revamped , the first line reads: “The Trump Administration is committed to a foreign policy focused on American interests and American national security.” It’s a far cry from Jimmy Carter’s “foreign policy of human rights,” George W. Bush’s democracy promotion or Barack Obama’s cautious pragmatism. Where other presidents have focused on bringing international harmony through either better trade relations, support for civil society institutions, or bolstering international institutions, Trump’s credo is “peace through strength.” The slogan “America First” itself is highly divisive—in its first iteration, it was a rallying cry for anti-semitic groups campaigning to stop the US fighting in World War II. The Anti-Defamation League, started in 1913 to combat anti-semitism, urged Trump to stop using it in April last year. Here are the four ways Trump plans to deliver on the policy: Beating ISIL and other “radical Islamic terror groups” At a time when the US has been under literal attacks from another country in the cyber realm, beating Islamic terrorism will be the Trump administration’s “highest priority,” implying that terrorism is the greatest threat to the country. This section does, coincidentally, contain the document’s only reference to cyber warfare—but in the context of nullifying terrorist groups’ propaganda and recruitment networks. A massive military spending program “Our military dominance must be unquestioned,” the manifesto asserts, noting that the size of the US Navy and Air Force have shrunk since 1991. Given that America’s defense budget is bigger than the next 10 countries combined, this would seem a pretty moot point—but it’s a big populist crowd pleaser from the new strongman president. The size of the Air Force and Navy are perhaps odd examples to pick, however, since warfare has changed considerably in recent decades, moving toward “nonlinear war” from old-fashioned big battles, and privileging the ability to rapidly respond to military provocations and being able to weaponize information. Reoriented diplomacy “The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies,” the manifesto reads. This sentence more than anything encapsulates how the world order could change under Trump. “Old enemies” becoming friends is a clear olive branch to Russia, while support for current allies (whom he hasn’t shied away from disparaging) is notably absent. Trump has long said he thinks America is being ripped off in the current alliances like NATO that define the global order, and favors a new deal-making approach where he can see tangible benefits from relations with countries, like Russia. Redefining global trade The second half of the manifesto retreads Trump’s oft-repeated trade priorities, with the message being that global trade must benefit the American worker. It’s a radically statist approach to an issue seen by recent presidents as benefiting the entire world economy and helping create peaceful bilateral relations. The memo’s language confirms that; there’s not a single sentence about how trade deals affect relations with other countries or subtle global power balances. Instead, the new administration says it will take a zero-sum approach—with every negotiation starting from the basis of how American workers will be helped. The president is “committed to renegotiating NAFTA,” its says. “If our partners refuse a renegotiation that gives American workers a fair deal, then the President will give notice of the United States’ intent to withdraw from NAFTA.” While China isn’t mentioned directly, expect a Cold War-era approach to relations with the world’s other superpower. Leader of the free world no more In sum, the warm, fuzzy conceit of America, the well-meaning, soft-blundering global super-cop trying to spread democracy has officially disappeared. Today’s foreign policy announcements reveal an administration that sees international relations as a dog-eat-dog realm. As Trump argued in his inauguration speech, “it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone but rather to let it shine as an example.” That example? Pure self-interest.NR – China Fill InTransition to Chinese autocracy’s coming, but it depends on loss of US democracy – 3 reasons.Zhao ’10 (Suisheng; June 2010; Professor and Executive Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Journal of Contemporary China; “The China Model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?”; ; DOA: 12/6/17)The ‘Third Road’ of transformation is the essence of the China model. Because it is a non-ideological, pragmatic, and experimental approach to spur both social stability and economic growth while not compromising the party’s authority to rule, the China model has not only gained ground among leaders of some developing countries. The appeal of the China model has come largely due to the following three developments in the past decade. First, China has been successful in boasting the world’s fastest-growing economy under the one-party rule. The China model is thus presented as a fast track for economic growth without visible social and political disorder that often comes as a by-product of democratization. As one observer indicates, Today’s China demonstrates that a regime can suppress organized opposition and need not establish its legitimacy through elections. It shows that a ruling party can maintain considerable control over information and the Internet without slowing economic growth. And it indicates that a nation’s elite can be bought off with comfortable apartments, the chance to make money, and advances in personal, non-political freedoms (clothes, entertainment, sex, travel abroad).36 Comparing the appeal of Islam and the China model, another observer points out that radical Islamism may appeal to millions of Muslims, but it cannot reach beyond the faithful, except by conversion. More important, it cannot plausibly claim to be associated with economic, technological or cultural modernity. By contrast, the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, like the skyscrapers of Shanghai, shows us authoritarian capitalism already staking that claim. In the Bird’s Nest stadium, the latest audiovisual high-tech was placed at the service of a hyper-disciplined collectivist fantasy, made possible by financial resources that no democracy would have dared devote to such a purpose.37 It is from this perspective that Joseph Nye holds that the success of China’s political economy has made it attractive to many developing countries. In parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’ on authoritarian government plus a market economy has become more popular than the previously dominant ‘Washington Consensus’ of market economics with democratic government.38 Only three decades ago, China was as poor as some of the poorest third world countries. While most of the latter remains among the poorest in the world, China’s economy has expanded rapidly. Given the many problems confronting developing countries, China seems to offer a new model on how to fight poverty and ensure good governance, albeit one that challenges the conventional wisdom offered by Western countries and the international financial institutions they control. The second development is the declining attractiveness of the Western model of modernization due to the US economic, political and foreign policy failures in the recent decade. Economically, the US is now deeply in debt to China and its very solvency is put in question. In particular, the financial meltdown sweeping across the globe in 2008–2009 to a great extent raised serious questions about some important aspects of the neo-classic economic approach toward development and confirmed some aspects of the China model. As one observer said, ‘While there have been vigorous debates in academic circles about their respective efficacy, the ongoing financial turmoil seems to favor the Beijing approach’.39 Politically and diplomatically, the American model treats less developed non-Western countries as developed societies in which Western institutions could automatically take root. It imposed liberalization before safety nets are set up; privatization before regulatory frameworks are put in place; and democratization before a culture of political tolerance and rule of law is established. The result has often been discouraging or even devastating. In a 2008 book on the struggle to build democracies in the world, Larry Diamond blamed the US policy of trying to accomplish democratization by international coercion as partial responsible for what he called ‘democratic recession’ in many parts of the world.40 Another study also attributed the failed US policy for the trend ‘underlying the erosion of democracy and Western influence in the post-communist region’.41 Indeed, the failure of US foreign policy, symbolized by the war in Iraq, damaged the Western model of modernization. As James Mann points out, ‘US foreign policy ... has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. This has not only failed but also undermined support for democracy’.42 As a result, many developing nations have been increasingly fed up with the doctrinaire Western model of democratic promotion and increasingly impressed by a Chinese model that emphasized pragmatism, economic growth and political stability. The third development is China’s ‘value-free’ diplomacy toward many developing countries. Unlike Western diplomacy that sets moral principles such as good governance, democracy, transparency, rule of law, and respect for human rights as one of several foreign policy objectives, China’s diplomacy is guided mostly by economic and strategic interests. Consequently, China has developed friendly relations with many developing countries without any preconditions. For example, in its global search for energy resources, China has pursued deals with countries that are off-limits to Western companies because of sanctions and the threat of bad publicity. Beijing has justified this policy on the grounds of non-interference in domestic affairs. With such ‘value-free’ diplomacy, China awarded Zimbabwe’s dictator Robert Mugabe an honorary professorship at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2005 and signed economic-cooperation agreements with Uzbekistan a few days after the country’s Interior Ministry fired into the crowd of peaceful demonstrators in May 2005.43 Given China’s rising power status, political leaders in these countries may readily use Beijing as a hedge against American power. As a result, many political leaders in third world countries have welcomed the Chinese development model together with its value-free diplomacy as an alternative to the European and US versions of both. China has reinforced this attraction by economic aid and access to its growing market. Offering no-strings-attached financial aid and economic assistance to Africa and to Southeast, South, and Central Asia has become a central part of China’s foreign and trade policies. It is due to the above three developments that the China model has become an alternative model of development by default. History has been ruthless. Less than two decades after Francis Fukuyama announced the ‘end of history’, more and more observers now see a ‘post American world’ in which many political leaders in developing countries favor China’s approach of state-led economic reforms with limited political reforms and also take heed of China’s pragmatic approach to reforms. A Chinese analyst cites the Chinese–African summit that gathered about 50 African heads of states in Beijing in the fall of 2006 as an example to suggest that ‘many of the African leaders coming here for the Chinese–African summit meeting are attracted not only by opportunities for aid and trade, but also by the Chinese model of development’. According to him, what they usually need is not a liberal democratic government, but a good government capable of fighting poverty and delivering basic services and basic security because the paramount task for most developing countries is how to eradicate poverty, a root cause of conflicts and various forms of extremism. So long as the American model remains unable to deliver the desired outcome, the Chinese model will become more appealing to the world’s poor.44NR – AT: Transition WarsTransition to democracy is worse than the transition to democracy.Mansfield and Snyder ‘2 (Edward Mansfield- Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics @ Upenn, Jack Snyder- Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations @ Columbia University, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” International Organization Journal, vol 56, issue 2)Employing a more refined research design than in our prior work, we aim here to identify more precisely the conditions under which democratization stimulates hostilities. We find that the heightened danger of war grows primarily out of the transition from an autocratic regime to one that is partly democratic. The specter of war during this phase of democratization looms especially large when governmental institutions, including those regulating political participation, are especially weak. Under these conditions, elites commonly employ nationalist rhetoric to mobilize mass support but then become drawn into the belligerent foreign policies unleashed by this process. We find, in contrast, that transitions that quickly culminate in a fully coherent democracy are much less perilous. 8 Further, our results refute the view that transitional democracies are simply inviting targets of attack because of their temporary weakness. In fact, they tend to be the initiators of war. We also refute the view that any regime change is likely to precipitate the outbreak of war. We find that transitions toward democracy are significantly more likely to generate hostilities than transitions toward autocracy. [End Page 298] The early stages of democratization unleash intense competition among myriad social groups and interests. Many transitional democracies lack state institutions that are sufficiently strong and coherent to effectively regulate this mass political competition. To use Samuel Huntington's terminology, such countries frequently suffer from a gap between high levels of political participation and weak political institutions. 9 The weaker these institutions, the greater the likelihood that war-provoking nationalism will emerge in democratizing countries. 10 Belligerent nationalism is likely to arise in this setting for two related reasons. The first and more general reason is that political leaders try to use nationalism as an ideological motivator of national collective action in the absence of effective political institutions. Leaders of various stripes find that appeals to national sentiment are essential for mobilizing popular support when more routine instruments of legitimacy and governance—parties, legislatures, courts, and independent news media—are in their infancy. Both old and new elites share this incentive to play the nationalist card. Often such appeals depend for their success on exaggerating foreign threats. Allegations that internal foes have treasonous ties to these external enemies of the nation help the regime hold on to power despite the weakness of governmental institutions. At the outset of the French Revolution, for example, mass nationalism was weak, but soon the leaders of various republican factions found that the rhetoric of war and treason was indispensable to their political survival in the revolutionary institutional wasteland. 11 Newspapers tied to political factions inflamed public opinion with the paired themes of war and treason. A second reason democratization often fosters belligerent nationalism is that the breakup of authoritarian regimes threatens powerful interests, including military bureaucracies and economic actors that derive a parochial benefit from war and empire. To salvage their position, threatened interests frequently try to recruit mass support, typically by resorting to nationalist appeals that allow them to claim to rule in the name of the people, but without instituting full democratic accountability to the average voter. Exploiting what remains of their governmental, economic, and media power, these elites may succeed in establishing terms of inclusion in politics that force opposition groups to accept nationalism as the common currency of public discourse. For example, Bismarck and his successors in Prussia and Germany used nationalist, military, and colonial issues to rally middle class and rural voters against the working classes while perpetuating a system of rule that kept the power to name [End Page 299] government ministers in the hands of the hereditary Kaiser rather than the elected legislature. 12 Moreover, while federalism may generate certain benefits for mature democracies, the decentralization and fragmentation of power in newly democratizing regimes is likely to exacerbate the problems attendant to democratic transitions. As the bloody breakups of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union show, divisive nationalism is especially likely when the state's power is dispersed among ethnically defined federal regions. Hence, none of the mechanisms that produce the democratic peace among mature democracies operate in the same fashion in newly democratizing states. Indeed, in their imperfect condition, these mechanisms have the opposite effect. In short, newly democratizing countries often experience a weakening of central state institutions because their old institutions have eroded and their new ones are only partially developed. Autocratic power is in decline vis-à-vis both elite interest groups and mass groups, and democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views. Not all newly democratizing states suffer from institutional weakness, but for those that do the resulting political dynamic creates conditions that encourage hostilities. In the face of this institutional deficit, political leaders rely on expedient strategies to cope with the political impasse of democratization. Such tactics, which often include the appeasement of nationalist veto groups or competition among factions in nationalist bidding wars (or both), can breed reckless foreign policies and the resort to war.Transitions to democracy fuel terrorism and organized crime – makes peaceful transition impossible and causes great-power draw-in.Burcher and Perotti ’17 (Catalina* and Victoria**; 9/15/2017; *program officer for democracy, conflict and security at International IDEA, **associate program officer at International IDEA; “Is democracy good for peace?” ; Date Accessed: 12/24/2017; DS)While democracy provides avenues to prevent and manage conflicts peacefully by allowing different voices to chime in on public debate, the current situation in Kenya makes us doubt its merits. Rising tensions and violence following the Supreme Court’s surprise decision to overturn the August presidential election resurrected painful memories from the 2007 election. The ensuing chaos and bloodshed that year “left over 1,000 dead and up to 500,000 internally displaced persons,” according to Human Rights Watch. When we look at the big picture, democracy seems to catalyze the best and worst in our societies. We know that democratic transitions, such as when a country first introduces elections, typically generate instability and can trigger violence. But we also know that the more democratic a country is, the less likely it is to engage in conflict. This means that, while introducing democracy can generate short-term state fragility, the long-term benefits seem to outweigh the risks. All in all, democracy pays off. As the world changes, however, so does the democracy-peace equation. According to a recent United Nations University report, in the past decade wars between states across the world have been decreasing. Yet wars within states are on the rise. Alas, these wars are also becoming deadlier, with a sixfold increase in battle deaths since 2011. Violence is also far likelier to return: 60 percent of conflicts in the early 2000s reemerged within five years. In short, internal conflicts are now more frequent, deadlier and more recurrent. In emerging democracies, weak institutions and political and economic exclusion stand out as important drivers of conflict. They fuel violent extremists and organized criminals, both of which present increasing challenges to conflict prevention. Violent extremists are particularly problematic because, even though they pursue political agendas, their radical tilt allows little space to negotiate realistic solutions. Organized criminal networks, for their part, pursue financial agendas rather than political ones, making them immune to the kind of political avenues normally used to deal with traditional armed actors. Most worrisome, crime groups thrive in contexts of state fragility. Their talent for corruption, which they use to buy elections and infiltrate political parties, further hollows out government institutions. Today’s internal conflicts also complicate the story. Syria is a case in point. While the government and rebel groups are the ones officially fighting the war, the world’s great powers are also deeply involved. These international interests limit the reach that strengthening internal democratic institutions and processes can have to resolve the conflict.Transition to democracy is most likely to cause war –?multiple empirics.Manan ’15 (Munafrizal- Professor of IR @ University of Al Azhar Indonesia, Hubungan International Journal, cites a bunch of profs and scholars of DPT, “The Democratic Peace Theory and Its Problems,” )A third problem with the democratic peace is it is not supported by the case of states in the early phases of transitions to democracy. As Mansfield and Snyder argue, these states are more likely become involved in war than other states due to weak political institutions (such as an effective state, the rule of law, organized parties that compete in fair election, and professional news media) which are needed to make democracy work. 199 The advocates of the democratic peace theory are inclined to deny the importance of political institutions because they are likely to believe that the best way to build democracy is just start. For Mansfield and Snyder, ‘this argument is incorrect and dangerously so’ because ‘ill-prepared attempts to democratize weak states—such as the cases of Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Burundi—may lead to costly warfare in the shot run, and may delay or prevent real progress toward democracy over the long term’. 200 They conclude that ‘in the short run, however, the beginning stages of transition to democracy often give rise to war rather than peace’. 201 The path of democracy is not an easy way, indeed. The failure of new emerging democratic countries to achieve a consolidated democracy has a historical root and hence it is not new phenomena. As Mansfield and Snyder explains: Since the French Revolution, the earliest phases of democratization have triggered some of the world's bloodiest nationalist struggles. Similarly, during the 1990s, intense armed violence broke out in a number of regions that had just begun to experiment with electoral democracy and more pluralistic public discourse. In some cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Indonesia , transition from dictatorship to more pluralistic political systems coincide with the rise of national independence movements, spurring separatist warfare that often spilled across international borders. In other cases, transitional regime clashed in interstate warfare. Ethiopia and Eritrea, both moving toward more pluralistic forms of government in the 1990s, fought a bloody border war from 1998 to 2000. The elected regimes of India and Pakistan battled during 1999 in the mountainous borderlands of Kashmir. Peru and Ecuador, democratizing in fits and starts during 1980s and 1990s, culminated a series of armed clashes with a small war in the upper Amazon in 1995.202 Mansfield and Snyder observe that the ‘elite in newly democratizing states often use nationalist appeals to attract mass support without submitting to full democratic accountability and that the institutional weakness of transitional states creates the opportunity for such war causing strategies to succeed’.203 For this reason, the establishment of political institutions is needed before promoting democracy in autocratic countries. In the words of Mansfield and Snyder, ‘before pressuring autocrats to hold fully competitive elections, the international community should first promote the rule of law, the formation of impartial courts and election commissiion, the professionalization of independent journalist, and the training of competent bureucrats’. Beside, economic and social modernization is also important in order to build democracy. As Gat shows, democracy in itself is not able to lead to a democratic peace unless such factors have fulfilled in advance. In this regard, ‘it has been found that economically developed democracies have been far more likely than poor democracies to be peaceful toward one another’.205 Similar to Mansfield and Snyder, Meierhenrich also has the same conclusion. He argues that ‘the new millennium saw further evidence of the dangers of democratization. The pro-democratic intervention in Afghanistan, following the attacks of 11 September 2001, has spurred insurgent warfare not only in that country, but in neighbouring Pakistan as well’. 206 Therefore, ‘democracy, if not handled with care, can underwrite democratic war rather than democratic peace’ and ‘democratic rights become democratic wrongs, and policies of perpetual peace become prescriptions for perpetual war’. 207 In short, some cases have shown that the logic of democratic peace does not work appropriately. In the words of Snyder, ‘none of the mechanisms that produce the democratic peace among mature democracies operate in the same fashion in newly democratizing states’. 208 ................
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