The Beijing Consensus and China’s Political Reform



[A note: This is a very rough draft of the paper which needs revision. The draft focuses too much on how the blind ecstasy on the rise of China has undercut China’s long overdue effort to introduce meaningful political reform. When presenting I will focus more on how the arrogant publicity of the so-called China model by the propaganda machine of China may deepen the concern held by some of the American opinion makers over a potential clash with what they see as a much flawed Chinese “civilization”.]

The Rise of China and Its Consequences[i]

Yawei Liu

The China Program, The Carter Center

APSA Preconference 2011

Panel Proposal

The Political Communication of Threat and the New Public Diplomacy:

Prospects for China-US relations

Abstract:

At the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1987, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang laid out an executable plan to launch China’s political reform. If implemented, this plan would have put Deng Xiaoping’s dual-track reform into action. After all, Deng Xiaoping believed that without political reform all other reforms would eventually fail. The 1989 incident derailed the plan, sent Zhao Ziyang into political exile and almost terminated China’s economic reform as well. Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992 managed to revive the economic reform but he was never able to put political reform back on track. He had no political capital nor determined personnel to realize his vision.

In the next 15 years, through Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, despite a very brief trial with direct township magistrate elections, political reform was largely shelved. But the economy has soared and China is now the 3rd largest economy in the world. This tremendous economic growth without tinkering the political system has changed China’s discourse on the necessity of political reform and emboldened many Chinese officials and scholars to declare that the China model (or the Beijing consensus) is not only a solution for China but can be the key of development for all developing countries. This developmental hubris will further delay China’s long overdue political reform that may eventually make the glorious China model unsustainable.

This chapter argues that a political reform plan was always part of the initial reform package but its priority on the CCP agenda has been in decline as China’s economic lot continues to improve. When Joshua Cooper Ramos introduced the Beijing consensus, the Chinese who are always suspicious about political reform seized and turned it into a perfect weapon of agenda slaughter. While Westerners are largely dubious about the meaning and significance of the China model, many Chinese scholars have joined the efforts in packaging and publicizing it. The campaign to pitch the China model to both domestic and overseas audiences is so intense and effective that the need to debate political reform has been swept aside. It is uncertain how many countries will adopt the Beijing consensus in the near future; in the long term, this blind belief in China exceptionalism will put China on a collision course with the entire Western world. A true clash of civilizations will be unleashed. It is another Cold War that may be equally long but a lot harder to settle which side will eventually win.

The slow decline of CCP’s interest in political reform

By the time Mao Zedong passed away in 1976, China was inching toward a general political and economic paralysis if not a dire collapse. Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, did realize that China’s modernization must be put on the front burner but he was not able to move away from the “two whatevers”. In a series of shrewd political maneuvers, Deng Xiaoping managed to assert himself into decision-making process of the Party, the state and the military.[ii]

With senior CCP leaders coming to a tentative consensus, Deng Xiaoping presided over the historic Third Plenum of the 11th National Congress of the CCP in December 1978 and made the momentous decision to disengage in irrational class struggle and focus on economic development. The foundation for the launch of the so-called reform and opening up in December 1978 was the gigantic effort to swing back to pragmatism although it was still couched in the rhetoric of building a new socialist country of Chinese characteristics.

The next 10 years saw phenomenal economic development and impressive improvement of living conditions of the Chinese people. Deng Xiaoping had another reform agenda on his mind. He believed economic reform efforts would eventually be bottled up if political reform was not initiated. He had a strong feeling that without reforming the political structure, 1) the accomplishments of the economic reform could not be protected; 2) further deepening of the economic reform could not be secured; 3) productivity would be blunted; and 4) the four modernizations of China would be not achieved.[iii]

But Deng Xiaoping also understood how important a politically correct ideological façade was in order to deepen the reform. To move forward, he had to put himself in a politically unassailable position first. On March 3, 1979, in a speech to CCP’s theoretic work, he introduced the concept of insisting on four cardinal principles, namely 1) insisting on the socialist road; 2) insisting on the proletarian dictatorship; 3) insisting on the leadership of the CCP and 4) insisting on Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. This was as good as a political cover as one could ever get but to make each and every decision in accordance with the “four cardinal principles” alone would be self-defeating. A new framework had to be developed and it was called “one core and two fundamentals”. The core was “developing the economy is the top priority” and the two fundamentals were 1) “four cardinal principles will always be adhered to” and 2) “reform and opening up cannot be abandoned”.[iv]

By the fall of 1986, Deng Xiaoping began his push for political reform. At the 6th Plenum of the 12th National Congress of the CCP, details of the political reform began to emerge. One Chinese scholar believes that Deng had identified two main areas for the proposed political reform, namely separation of the CCP and the state in decision-making and transforming the role of the government. Another scholar lists three areas that were of extreme concern to Deng, source of legitimacy, concentration of power in the hands of the CCP and lack of a checks and balance system.[v] The final package was put out by Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the CCP at the first session of the 13th CCP National Congress. In the political report submitted to the Congress on October 25, 1988, Zhao listed eight tasks in the soon-to-be-launched political reform. Four of the eight were the most important: 1) initiate separation of the CCP and the state apparatus, 2) improve cadre selection procedures, 3) establish mechanisms for societal consultation, and 4) perfect the system of democratic politics.[vi]

The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 derailed the long planned political reform. Zhao Ziyang was removed from his position and put under house arrest. Jiang Zemin was abruptly promoted to be CCP’s new General Secretary. Jiang would be in this position until 2002 for a total of thirteen years. Busy consolidating his power and scrambling to deflect attacks from the left, Jiang made a hard turn to the left. Collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern European countries and the disintegration of the Soviet Union convinced the CCP top leadership that the train of reform had to be slowed down. Not totally sidelined but losing political clout as a result of the crackdown, Deng felt powerless and was not able to intervene and reverse the rising tide of political conservatism. Not only political reform was tabled; his economic reform was to be frozen as well.[vii]

In 1992, at the age of 87, isolated and not often consulted in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping headed south, visiting Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai where he talked to local officials. Initially, his tour was not even reported by the Beijing media outlets. When newspapers in Shenzhen and Shanghai began reporting Deng’s visits and his remarks the top Chinese military leadership vowed to escort reform and opening up. This “southern tour” jumpstarted the stalled reform.[viii] This was the second time that Deng pulled the government back to the middle from the left using pragmatist approach. He said there were only three measures that could determine if a policy was right or wrong: 1) if it was beneficial to increase socialist productivity; 2) if it was conducive to increase the comprehensive power of the nation; and 3) if it was helpful in improving the living conditions of the people. Deng’s tour caused a panic in Beijing. Jiang and his supporters stopped their turn to the left and decided to come back to the center, returning to the reform and opening up started by Deng Xiaoping back in 1978.[ix] Unfortunately, Deng Xiaoping was no longer in a position to oversee the launching of the political reform. His ideas, well defined by Zhao Ziyang in 1988, were diluted beyond recognition. China moved into a new era of economic liberalization and political tightening, a development that later would be a salient component of the so-called China model.

Political reform did not come to a complete stop. They were continued in ways that could not and would not even leave a dent on the supremacy of the CCP. According to Xu Yansong, a Tsinghua University political scientist, political reform since 1992 has followed four trajectories: 1) improving the administrative efficiency of the government through restructuring; 2) introducing a civil servant system; 3) extensive research on source of power and its legitimacy; and 4) promoting rule of law.[x] At the same time, direct village elections were mandated by the Organic Law of the Villager Committees of the PRC, promulgated on provisional basis by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1986 and made into a basic law in November 1998.[xi]

Jiang Zemin presided over three CCP National Congresses but no new platform on political was ever introduced. The 14th CCP Congress was held in 1992 after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour. It pledged to continue the reform. Five years later, in the political report of the 15th CCP Congress, Jiang Zemin declared that CCP would build a socialist China with rule of law.[xii] Before and after the 16th CCP Congress, there was a flurry of activities. First, Jiang invented “the three represents”, effectively changing the mission of the CCP, which used to be to represent the industrial workers and farmers in China. Second, there were talks of adding “political civilization” to the two existing civilizations that CCP had vowed to build, namely “materialistic civilization” (economic activities) and “spiritual civilization” (ideological purification). In his political report delivered on November 18, 2002, Jiang Zemin outlined the tasks of political reform as the following: 1) adhere to and perfect the socialist democratic system, 2) strengthen the construction of the socialist rule of law, and 3) reform and improve CCP leadership. Jiang further added that political reform means “perfecting democratic system, enriching democratic formats, expanding channels for citizens’ orderly participation in politics, guaranteeing people’s entitlement to democratic election, democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision, making more rights and freedom available to the people, and respecting and defending human rights.” He also said that only by adhering to and perfecting the people’s congress system could laws and decisions represent the will of the people. Lastly, other democratic parties in China could only provide consultation under CCP leadership.[xiii]

After Jiang delivered his swan song report, Hu Jintao was “elected” by members of the CCP Central Committee as the new Party Secretary. In March 2003, he was “elected” by deputies to the NPC as president of China. This was the first smooth change of top leadership in the CCP history, a sign of political progress and a more institutionalized transfer of power. However, not until 2004 was Hu able to assume the chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC). What many had hoped to be a new deal began to emerge quickly. Hu Jintao acted quickly to deal with the case of Sun Zhigang, abolishing an old regulation designed to detain and deport migrants in the cities and enforced accountability through removing the mayor of Beijing for failing to prevent the SARS epidemic. However, the long anticipated political reform was not launched.

Observers of Chinese politics tended to believe Hu could not do anything in the area of political reform until he was able to consolidate his power. Since he was not able to get the CMC chairmanship until 2004, he did not have time and resources to plan for a systemic overhaul of China’s political system. All hope was pinned on the 17th CCP Congress. But the 17th CCP Congress came and went without a big bang proposal in Hu’s report. In terms of the significance of conducting political reform, Hu said that expanding socialist democracy was to serve the purpose of defending people’s interests and maintaining social fairness and justice. Without political reform, China would become politically disoriented, the Party and the state would lose their vitality and the initiative of the people could not be unleashed. On how to proceed with political reform, Hu listed a total of seven tasks, including expanding people’s democracy, promoting grassroots democracy, implementing rule of law and building a service oriented government.[xiv]

Parallel to the increasingly vague discourse on political reform in China a new concept began to emerge. This is the concept of “peaceful rise”. In 2003, at the Boao Forum, Zheng Bijian, former secretary of Hu Yaobang and vice president of the Central Party School, gave a speech entitled “The New Road of China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia.” In the speech, Zheng described the nature of China’s development. First, China has 1.3 billion people and this will make China a developing nation for a long time to come. Second, in the 25 years since the launching of reform and opening up, China has invented a new model of development. Third, this new model could be characterized as actively participating in globalization, being independent, and not seeking conquest and hegemony. China’s peaceful rise will not only solve the development issue for the most populous nation in the world but also make an enduring contribution to peace and prosperity of the world. However, in order for China not to deviate from this path, there are three strategies that have to be adopted. 1) Economic and political reform had to move forward simultaneously because market economy and political democracy are the twin engines of China’s growth. 2) There must be courage and vision in absorbing all advanced achievements of the mankind since China’s rise needs spiritual pillars. 3) Maintaining the balance of different interests groups, keeping the harmony between mankind and nature and reducing friction between domestic political need and international demand are all too important to be neglected.[xv] It must be noted that Zheng was giving equal emphasis to both market economy and political democracy. In other words, political reform is not only needed; it is a must for China to sustain its growth.

Two years later, in an article that appeared in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, Zheng Bijian tried to define the nature and orientation of the CCP. First, the CCP is different from the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union. It does not seek conquest and denounces wars. Second, it is economic globalization that has contributed to China growth miracle. Therefore, destroying the existing power balance and challenging the United States are not in the best interests of the CCP. Third, seeking three “和s” [peace] is the paramount mission of the CCP: pursuing peace outside China, building harmony domestically and seeking reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait. Zheng emphasizes that Moscow and Beijing took divergent roads largely because it was against the very essence of the Chinese culture to use force or violence to expand territorially, develop economically and influence ideologically. Yes, China is a socialist nation but its unique socialism is to increase productivity at home and wage peace abroad. CCP’s mission does not go beyond protecting territorial integrity and securing development and modernization for China.[xvi]

To a certain extent, Zheng advanced what later became a trademark of Hu Jintao, the idea of harmony. Obviously, one of Zheng’s goals was aimed at dismissing the China threat theory in general and disarming the Americans who felt uneasy about China’s phenomenal growth in particular. In the process, he actually hit something that was bigger. His treatise on China’s peaceful rise was the first step toward defining am emerging China model, building a new consensus and identifying the uniqueness of China’s development.[xvii] However, Zheng did not discredit the necessity of political reform. He was one of a few CPP thinkers that have had access to the top leadership. Like all leaders at the top, they are only absorbing ideas from their advisors selectively. Hu Jintao likes the idea of harmony but appears to dislike Zheng’s emphasis on the urgent need to carry out political reform and economic development with same force and determination. In October 2006, at the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP Congress, a resolution was adopted to go all out in pursuit of social harmony.

The idea of harmony is a new turning point for the CCP engineered by Hu Jintao. The first generation of the CCP leaders applied the ideas of continuous revolution and class struggled in pursuit of an egalitarian world. They ran into a dead end with gigantic social and human cost. Deng Xiaoping put brakes on that frenzied quest for the Communist utopia and swung the nation onto a path of creating material wealth for the people. His efforts to secure economic development through political reform were derailed by the unforeseen event in 1989. After a few years of wavering and hesitation, Jiang Zemin began to deepen the economic reform without giving too much thought to political reform. China’s GDP soared. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came in with a new playbook. They understand reckless pursuit of revolution was as bad as reckless pursuit of GDP. While it was glorious to be rich back when Deng first started the reform it was dangerous if the gap between the haves and have-nots becomes too wide. A harmonious society by way of focusing more on the people’s affairs is the way to go. Although democracy remains part of the package, it is moved to the backburner.

All in all, there is a precipitous decline of interest in political reform on the part of the CCP top leadership. [xviii] It is still on the lips of CCP leaders and flowing from the articles penned by scholars from thinks tanks to universities. But, as CCP is completing its historic transition from “war and revolution” to “peace and development”, less and less attention is being given to political reform. Deng’s success was to instill the CCP with the idea that development is the hard truth. Hu’s achievement is to inject a notion of social justice and equitable development into Deng’s formula. Deng had intended to use political reform to prepare the CCP and the government for new challenges down the road. Hu probably feels the same goal can be attained without overhauling the political system. All he needs to do is to make small adjustment and get CCP officials to pay more attention to people’s concerns and make them happy, feel indebted to the CCP and thank the top leadership for everything.

The China model/Beijing consensus talk surfaced against this backdrop. It has become increasingly high-pitched since 2008. In January 2008, there was a severe snowstorm that paralyzed most of Southern China but the Chinese government responded quickly and no riot took place. In May, the Chinese nation rallied to provide relief to the people victimized by the disastrous earthquake in Sichuan. Throughout the spring, the negative response to China’s Olympic torch relays in Europe and the United States triggered an unprecedented patriotic fervor. In August, the Beijing Summer Olympic Games awed the world. China’s economy has not sunk too low like everywhere else since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. These events have provided nutrition that feeds the China model frenzy. Before we look at this new discourse we need to look at the origins of the Beijing consensus/China model and the international reaction to it.

The origin of “the Beijing consensus”

Chinese officials, scholars and reporters are very adept at inventing new terms to describe and define CCP or state policies but “the Beijing consensus” or “the China model” was not invented by them. It was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a partner at the consulting firm Kissinger Associates. In 2004, Ramo wrote a paper entitled “The Beijing Consensus”. In this paper, Ramo identifies three underlying grids of the Beijing Consensus, namely 1) a strong commitment to innovation and experimentation; 2) a nice combination of increasing per capita GDP and securing sustainability and equitable distribution of wealth; and 3) a firm adherence to national self-determination which guards against Western financial encroachments and adopts an asymmetrical military strategy. [xix] It seems Ramo has coined the term “the Beijing Consensus” to deliberately offer an alternative to the so-called Washington Consensus. He writes, “China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful center of gravity.”[xx]

Since its inception, the nice and neat formulation of China’s development has been warmly received not only in China but also in many corners of the developing world. With China’s economy enjoying double-digit growth in the almost three decades and Washington’s advice of privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization and fiscal austerity leading to economic disasters in countries like Argentina, the Beijing Consensus has gained more attraction in both intellectual and policy making circles in Asian, African, Latin-American capitals. In praising the Beijing Consensus, more ideas and/or policy options are thrown into the formula. Andrew Leonard, a contributor to Slate, quoted a Nigerian journalist in his article “No Consensus on the Beijing Consensus”:

The Chinese government knows what is good for its people and therefore shapes its economic strategy accordingly. Its strategy is not informed by the Washington Consensus. China has not allowed any [IMF] or World Bank to impose on it some neo-liberal package of reforms ... their strategy has not been a neo-liberal overdose of deregulation, cutting social expenditure, privatizing everything under the sun and jettisoning the public good. They have not branded subsidy a dirty word. [xxi]

A Brazilian professor who studies China tells Chinese reporters that the China model is made up of several things, including the initiatives of the top Chinese leadership, the trust the Chinese government has in its people and the decision to build the nation up first before it opens to the outside world.[xxii] Vishwanath Pratap Singh, former Indian foreign minister, told the famous Chinese political scientist Fang Ning that the he sees the China Model as being characterized by “open-mindedness, competition and focused approach”.[xxiii] To Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, the China Model could be seen in the talent and innovation of the Chinese people and how the Chinese government manages successfully to unleash it without triggering any political violence and social instability. With this model in place, China will be ranked one of the top three powers in the next thirty years.[xxiv] In a recently released book (in Chinese and German) called China’s Megatrends: The Eight Pillars of A New Society, eighty-year old John Nesbit identifies, among other things, ideological liberalization, global integration, policy experimentation and seeking liberty and fairness as unique traits of China’s quest for reform. He said during a recent interview that what China does now is brand new in social structuring, economic development and political establishment. What he wants to describe in the book is the unprecedented and brave new world China is building.[xxv]

Robert Lawrence Kuhn, an American who wrote the definitive biography of Jiang Zemin and was given unlimited access to Chinese leaders at all levels in the past few years, is even more hyperbolic when talking about the China Model. In his view, the financial crisis has shattered the global power balance and the era of China is dawning. China used to be part of the dire problems in the world and it is now part of the much needed solution to the global crises. What is even more important is China’s mission to build and sustain harmony both at home and abroad. The pursuit of harmony has taken the breath out of those Westerners who whine about a China Threat and made the China Model much more attractive.[xxvi]

There are other foreigners who see the China Model with trepidation and even question its validity. James Mann, a former reporter stationed in China for the Los Angeles Times, wrote a scathing piece in May 2007 entitled “A Shining Model of Wealth without Liberty”. According to Mann, China “has been coming into its own as the first full-blown alternative since the end of the Cold War to Washington's model of free markets and democracy. As the U.S. model has become tarnished, China's has gained new luster.” Mann credits the rise of the China Model to two parallel developments. The first has been the foreign policy failures of the United States. “U.S. foreign policy has been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military power and has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. Not only has this failed, it has also undermined support for democracy. U.S. attempts to export free markets and political liberty by force have been unable to bring even security, much less prosperity” to Iraq and other countries. “The second key development has been the staying power and economic success of the Chinese Communist Party.” Mann sees the success and appeal of the China Model through the lens of national security for the United States. He writes, “Above all, we should approach China through the lens of our national interest. That includes not just security and prosperity but our interest in a world with open political systems and the freedom to dissent. If we don't take China's new model as seriously as the rest of the world does, we could find that we're the ones on the wrong side of history. ”[xxvii]

Ian Buruma issued a warning similar to that of James Mann. In a piece entitled “The Year of the China Model,” he writes, “To come back from near destitution and bloody tyranny in one generation is a great feat, and China should be saluted for it. But China’s success story is also the most serious challenge that liberal democracy has faced since fascism in the 1930’s.” While Buruma does not argue with China’s success he sees something is glaringly missing: “While individuals have regained many personal freedoms since the death of Maoism, they are not free to organize anything that is not controlled by the Communist Party.” What worries him even more is the appeal of the China model to nasty political players in other parts of the world: “African dictators – indeed, dictators everywhere – who walk the plush red carpets laid out for them in Beijing love it. For the model is non-Western, and the Chinese do not preach to others about democracy. It is also a source of vast amounts of money, much of which will end up in the tyrants’ pockets. By proving that authoritarianism can be successful, China is an example to autocrats everywhere, from Moscow to Dubai, from Islamabad to Khartoum.”[xxviii]

David Shambaugh, another influential American China watcher, attributes China’s success to the Chinese Communist Party. In his words, this is “a party that is full of wisdom and that conducts ceaseless self-reflection on the reasons for failure of other Communist countries with a firm determination not to follow the same downfall.”[xxix] . In the cover story for Time entitled “China’s Road to Prosperity”, he writes, China’s “hybrid model of quasi-state capitalism and semidemocratic authoritarianism — sometimes dubbed the ‘Beijing Consensus’ — has attracted attention across the developing world.” However, Shambaugh does question the cost and even danger of the China model. The China development model is causing both short-term and long-term problems for China and for the world. They include but not limited to dire environmental pollution, huge greenhouse gasses emission, serious water poisoning, severe ethnic tensions, growing gap between the city and the countryside, rising Gini coefficient and incessant riots in all corners of the nation. Shambaugh still believes the CCP will have strong grip of the power because it is “remarkably adaptable and open to elements from different countries and political systems”. It is a hybrid political party “with elements of East Asian neo-authoritarianism, Latin American corporatism and European social democracy all grafted to Confucianist-Leninist roots.” [xxx]

Ezra Vogel, former director of the Fairbank Center at Harvard University, was recently interviewed by a Chinese reporter. During the interview, he was pushed repeatedly to discuss the China model. Although less severe than Man and Buruma in expressing his concerns, he does make it clear that he has very strong reservations about the China model. First, he believes to call China’s development pattern a model is as bad as labeling America’s rise to power a model. Both nations have different culture, political system and economic elements. Second, China’s success comes against a backdrop of little freedom and liberty for individual citizens. It is similar to the situation in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore when their economy took off. Third, China’s influence in the world is so much bigger than it was before but China’s appeal to the outside world will remain limited as long as China does not address political reform issues. Finally, China’s pursuit of harmony and assumption of responsibility in the world are very good but the perceived arrogance of China and its large military budget is causing grave concerns outside China.[xxxi]

Arif Derlik, a professor of Chinese intellectual history at University of Oregon, does not think highly of Ramo’s crystallization of the Beijing Consensus. He describes Ramo's plan as a "Silicon Valley Model of Development" that ignores the fact that the exploitation of China's labor force by foreign countries is a major part of the Chinese development. In his critique paper, Derlik does not see this China model has any sustainability; on the contrary, he sees its possible demise in a short period of time. Derlik focuses his repudiation of the China model on its economic development and its political consequences. Toward the end of his critique paper, Derlik writes:

The undeniable success of the development of the Chinese economy should not blind us to the problems created by the very same success—problems which ironically are in those very areas that attract the admiration of outsiders. The PRC economy is by no means integrated but suffers from severe uneven development in both spatial and social terms. Levels of pollution have reached such severity that they have become an additional cause of public suffering and disturbance. While there has indeed been a remarkable growth of wealth in certain sectors of the population, and an explosion in the size of the urban class, the majority of the population has experienced a decline in basic welfare.[xxxii]

Although the Chinese media is working hard to inform the Chinese people that 1) the Beijing consensus is now being acknowledged by both foreign officials and scholars and 2) it is winning more and more people around the world, its acceptance is dubious at best, its appeal somewhat questionable and its potential spread a source of grave concern.[xxxiii]

The strange career of “the Beijing consensus” in China

It must be pointed out at the outset that the well informed Chinese do not seem to accept the idea of a well-defined and well received China model. The People’s Daily on line launched a poll on the China model in March 2009 during the Second Session of the 10th NPC. The numbers of the ongoing poll clearly shows there is no consensus among the netizens on the so-called Beijing Consensus. The first question is “Do you believe in the existence of China Model?” Over 65% (1487) of those who took the poll answered “no”. Only 369 (16%) believe the China Model has matured.[xxxiv] If the informed Chinese public is not engaged in this discourse, who are then telling the epic story of China providing an alternative to the Washington Consensus? How has it evolved in China?

It is beyond the scale of this paper to map the rise of the China model theory. My brief survey of the literature seems to suggest that it began as a response to Western theories such as “China will quickly collapse” and “China is a threat”. In the process, the Chinese scholars began to develop a new theory to counter these ill-intentioned prediction of China’s collapse and evil-spirited description of China as a threat, they have settled on Chinese uniqueness (or China exceptionalism). In 1994, only two years after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Justin Lin, an economics professor at Peking University and current vice governor of the World Bank, and two other scholars published a book entitled The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform. The notion of a China miracle was first introduced in this book. Five years later, Tsinghua University’s economist Hu Angang put out an article on China’s economic reform in the journal Strategy and Management. Hu believes that China possesses a very sound strategy to develop and sustain its economic development. In 2003, Kang Xiaoguang published an article in the same journal in which he declares that China’s miraculous success is due to its “successful transformation” and “successful conservatism” respectively. “Successful transformation” refers to China’s adoption of the market economy and “successful conservatism” to China’s strong adherence to the one party rule.[xxxv]

This discovery of China exceptionalism coincided with the collapse of Communist powers in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European nations and China’s economic assertiveness. It was also a time when the Washington Consensus introduced by John Williamson in 1989 did not succeed in reviving developing nation’s economy and when Westerners began to feel uneasy about an increasingly more powerful China. Furthermore, there was an urgent need to solve the China riddle: how can one explain China’s economic development, lifting hundreds of millions of its people from poverty and sustaining a double digit growth for so long when it resisted successfully changing its political structure? Joshua Cooper Ramo’s paper came out in 2004 to fill the theoretic void. Between 2004 and 2005, there were many articles in the Chinese media outlets on the decline of the Washington Consensus and the rise of the Beijing Consensus. An article in the 23rd issue of China Economic Weekly in 2004 predicted that the debate of Ramo’s theory would be become increasingly prominent. A newspaper forum orgainzed by the 21st Century Economic Report, a newspaper in Guangzhou, invited prominent scholars such as Justin Lin, Joseph Stiglitz, Fan Gang, Tang Min and Li Daokui to share their views on both the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus. An article in the China Reform Forum on April 16, 2005 described the clash of the two consensuses and its impact on China’s reform.[xxxvi]

By 2008, in the wake of the snow storm in the South, the earthquake in Sichuan, the first space walk conducted by Chinese astronauts and the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, the China model/Beijing Consensus talk has solidified among the Chinese scholars. In December 2008, Pan Wei, a US-educated professor teaching at Peking University organized an international conference called “PRC at 60 and the China Model”.[xxxvii] In the same month, Wang Shaoguang, another US-educated professor teaching at the Hong Kong Chinese University, published his speech at the conference at the China Review web site, defining the China model as PRC government’s keen desire to learn and skillful capacity to adapt.[xxxviii]

2009 marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Efforts to drum up the China model pick up momentum.[xxxix] In January 2009, Red Flag Article, a journal affiliated with CCP’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth ran an article on the status of research on the China model. According to the authors, foreign scholars began to examine China’s development model since the 1960s. Half way through China’s economic reform, many of these scholars began to question if an old and autocratic political system can coexist with a vibrant market economy. However, the advantage and strength of China’s national mobilization model (juguo tizhi) is so brilliant in overcoming the difficulties caused by the snowstorm, providing relief to earthquake victims and hosting the summer Olympic Games, the international suspicion has resided and criticisms decreased tremendously. [xl] In same month, a Chinese national living in France, Song Luzheng, put out an article that was circulated widely on many Chinese online portals. He declares in the article that democracy is not invincible but China model is.[xli] In May, People’s Daily reporter filed a story from the United Nations, using his interview with a Harvard business school professor to underscore the point that China model is challenging traditional development theories.[xlii] In June, a Guangming Daily article was called “Why is the China model so attractive in the world?”[xliii] In July, Zhang Wei-wei, who once was Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter and currently does research in a couple of European universities, was invited to the People’s Daily online to talk about the China model and its impact on problems of the world. In his view, the China model is political, economic and cultural. It is a cornucopia of solutions to most of the problems in the world.[xliv]

Into the summer and early fall, as the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic draws near, there has been a full court press in the Chinese media to publicize the China model. In August, the New China News Agency changed the title of an article penned by Francis Fukuyama in a Japanese journal into “More countries favor the China model”.[xlv] The cover story of the September issue of Liaowang Newsweekly, one of China’s most famous current affairs magazines, was on the China model. The article tries to explain why China is the only nation in the world that has edged out of the economic downturn and making a huge effort to help other nations to weather it. The China model works and it may be universal.[xlvi] On September 26, Hu Wei, professor and dean of the School of International Affairs and Public Administration at Shanghai Jiaotong University, published an article in Jiefang Daily, Shanghai’s Party newspaper, on China’s model’s special place in the world. Hu Wei writes that the China model is not only a model for economic development but also a model for political development. It is the logic result of mankind’s democratic political processes. It is the responsible gift of a rising power to the troubled world.[xlvii]

No top Chinese leader has ever been recorded of referring to the China model or the Beijing consensus in their official speeches or writings. However, this does not mean they are not approving or endorsing this idea.[xlviii] Since 2008, CCP leaders seem to more and more acknowledge or imply the China model in their speeches and remarks. In February 2009, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, made some remarks that shocked the world. When meeting with Chinese Mexicans when visiting Mexico, Xi said that China did not export revolution, did not export hunger and poverty, and did not create problems for any countries. Those foreigners who kept nitpicking China should have better things to do. Although some Chinese intellectuals were upset by the cockiness of the remarks, many interpreted this as a reflection of growing confidence in the China model.[xlix]

On March 9, 2009, in his speech to the NPC annual session, Wu Bangguo declared that the socialist political development road of Chinese characteristics is the only correct road for the Chinese people under the CCP leadership. “While actively absorbing useful achievements of political civilization of the mankind, we will never ever copy the Western style of politics, never ever adopt a multiparty system, checks and balances and a parliament divided by two chambers.”[l] Again, Wu, who ranks second in the powerful Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, did not use the term China model but who can deny that he sees a vibrant China model in operation?

On January 1, 2009, Qiushi magazine published Hu Jintao’s speech on the outlook of scientific development. Hu writes that in the article that raising high the flag of socialism of Chinese characteristics is a must for every CCP member in the nation.[li] In July, the newly created China mega think tank, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges headed by former State Councilor Zeng Peiyan, had its inauguration meeting with a specific focus on examining the meaning of the China model during worldwide economic downturn. In endorsing the conference that was attended by think tank representative around the world, Vice Premier Li Keqiang delivered a keynote speech[lii].

In a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on September 20, 2009, President Hu Jintao says which road of political development a nation chooses is decided by the nature and circumstances of this particular nation. The socialist road of political development of Chinese characteristics is a road that has been traveled by the Chinese people under CCP leadership. It is a road that fits China’s circumstances, follows the global trend, maintains CCP supremacy, makes people masters of their own country and upholds rule of law. He repeats what Wu Bangguo said back in March: China does not reject working governance formula from other countries but will never adopt Western political system in a wholesale manner.[liii]

Four days later, Hu Jintao was addressing the general assembly of the United Nations. He mentioned “three insistences” in his speech, namely insisting on making decision in accordance with Chinese circumstances, insisting on taking the socialist road of Chinese characteristics, and insisting that building a China that is civilized economically, politically, socially and ecologically through continuous reform. He says that the more developed China is the more contribution it will make to the world and the more opportunities it will provide to the world.[liv]

This brief review indicates that the chorus of the China model/Beijing consensus inside China is orchestrated by the Chinese government. Many Chinese scholars and media workers have participated to broaden and deepen the campaign. The top CCP leadership not only endorses the China model talk but also speaks collectively on the uniqueness of China’s development model. But why do most of the people polled not support this brave new model? In fact, a few Chinese scholars have openly criticized the China model, its impact on China and its possible application outside China. On what grounds have they rendered their critique? We need to take a quick look at the contents of the China model/Beijing consensus as specified by the Chinese scholars.

The goods in the Beijing consensus basket

When Chinese officials and scholars describe the China model/Beijing consensus, they go far beyond Ramo’s initial definition. They simplify the Washington consensus as a combination liberal democracy and market economy and frame the China model as the very opposite of it. During a recent interview, Ma Zhengang, China’s former ambassador to the United Kingdom and president of the Chinese Institute of International Affairs, said the core of the Western model is political democratization and economic liberalization. Without political democratization, economic development can be secured. China has taken a different path and scored big successes. That was why Westerners are dumbfounded, upset and scared. He then said two very important components of the China model are a strong and firm CCP leadership and the people’s keen desire to see the rise of China.[lv] Fang Ning, director of the Institute of Political Science under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) said that two fundamental characteristics of the China model are 1) protecting people’s right to pursue happiness and 2) centralizing power at the top. The first has unleashed people’s energies and initiatives and the second is the key in improving decision-making process and marshalling resources to achieve predetermined goals.[lvi] Some scholars go as far as saying that the shaping of the China model is merely the outcome of applying Marist theory to the special circumstances of China. Xu Chongwen, a CASS senior researcher said in a recent interview that China’s contribution to the world is to have sinifyied Marxism and solved problems that cannot be effectively dealt with by any other ideology or political system in the world. This is a new path in pursuing progress of civilization, producing a developmental alternative to the one offered by developed nations whose rise was built on hurting other nations politically and economically, and securing global harmony and world peace. What else can explain China’s achievement in becoming the third largest economy and reducing poverty in such a dramatic manner?[lvii]

Hu Wei is more interested in examining the political component of the China model. He outlines two Western theories in his recent article. One, according to Hu Wei, is that China is doing relatively well economically but its political development is quite backward. The other theory is that China cannot sustain its economic growth without liberalizing politically. He uses Nesbit’s recent book to buttress his view that China has not only managed to adapt to economic globalization but also weathered the political challenge from the West. Whereas Western nations have horizontal democracy China has introduced vertical democracy. Since all democratic nations have different formats of democracy, China is by all means entitled to have its own democratic system. The China model should not be narrowly defined as one-dimensional. It includes a unique political system that will enrich the arsenal of democracy in the world.[lviii]

Some scholars see the China model as an epic battle to crush the Western monopoly on the discourse of development and human progress and to secure a safe place for the China development experience that can be easily identified and understood by other developing nations. Wang Hui, a Tsinghua University professor, feels the key to the success of this battle is CCP’s courage to maintain independence and focus on developing China in its own unique way.[lix] Zhang Wei-wei summarizes the China model as “strong government”, “pragmatic approach”, “people focused” and “gradual reform”. He even challenges both Chinese scholars and Western experts to identity a single nation that has used Western political system to have successfully turned itself into a more advanced nation. In his views, there are two benchmarks to measure if a nation is successful: elimination of corruption and achieving modernization. He sees three major trends in the world in the past thirty years. The first is the rise of radical Islam which has led the current war on terrorism. The second is the so-called third wave of democratization. Countries that have become democratic during this wave, particularly Eastern European nations, are now facing serious challenges. The third is the modernization drive led by China. It has triggered seismic reactions and will eventually impact the political landscape of the world.[lx]

Other scholars see other unique aspects of the China model. He Xuefeng, an influential researcher on China’s rural development, believes that China’s economic takeoff is due to the artificial and deliberate division of urban centers and the countryside. Farmers can migrate to the cities when jobs are available and return home when life becomes unbearable. The availability of this large army of cheap labor and the fact that their land provides a safety valve give China a unique master key to open the door of development without paying too high a price.[lxi] Zhang Yu, an economics Professor of Renmin University of China defines China model as 1) combining strong and large state owned businesses with a vibrant private sector, 2) running a market economy that is subject to tough state regulations, and 3) opening to the outside world gradually with state control.[lxii]

Many believe China model is a comprehensive tool box that can solve different problems, a set of experiences and practices that can be borrowed and applied by different nations facing different challenges, and a new paradigm shift whose impact is going to be felt in many years to come. Pan Wei, who early this year called Chinese scholars to declare war on the Western civilization, divides the China model into three sub-models, social, economic and political. The four pillars that support the political sub model are 1) the adept application of populist democracy, 2) a leadership group that is progressive, unselfish and unified, 3) a meritocratic civil servant system, and 4) a system of effective checks and balances and efficient self-corrective capacity. These four pillars make up the brain of modern-day China. China’s different social structure constitutes the body. The economic sub model provides two strong feet and huge wings for China.[lxiii]

Finally, the China model/Beijing consensus is not something that suddenly burst into China and became the beacon for its development. It is the cumulative learning, adaptation and exploration by several generations of CCP leaders. It began with Mao’s heroic effort to choose and pick what was useful for China from the classics of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. It moved a step further with Deng Xiaoping placing bricks of pragmatism in Mao’s theoretical warehouse. Jiang Zemin came along and supplied “the three represents” to the CCP inventory. Hu Jintao introduces the outlook of scientific development and harmony to this development treasure house. None of the four have severed the relationship with Marxism but all have made creative and positive adjustments and contributions.[lxiv] As indicated by the CCP Resolution adopted on September 18, 2009 at the 4th Plenum of the 17th CCP National Congress, 88 years after it was founded, 60 years after it came to power, and 30 years after it launched reform, the CCP has transformed China from a weak, poor and pathetic country into a great power of peace, prosperity and harmony. This is an unprecedented achievement of CCP through understanding and transforming the world. This is an unsurpassable glory of changing China and making contributions to universal human progress. Without the CCP, there would have been no new China, no socialist road of Chinese characteristics. In other words, the China model is undeniably a CCP invention.[lxv]

The lingering doubt about the China model

The China model talk is largely an intellectual exercise conducted away from most of the informed Chinese. From the CCP perspective, it is something that is very useful in injecting a sense of pride to the Chinese people and strengthening the legitimacy of the government. It may also be useful in competing with the West in the area of development discourse, which used be monopolized by Western scholars and experts. It further builds a wall against any sinister attempts of “Color Revolution” by evil Westerners led by Washington. Zheng Yongnian, a China policy analyst and director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore detects Western fear of the China model. According to Zheng, this fear originates from two primary sources. First, the rise of China is different from the rise of any other Western nations. Second, Westerners consider their values as universal and applicable to other nations. When China rises from a different path, they are concerned that their value system as well as their way of making economy work and government clean will eventually be replaced by the China model. Westerners, particularly Americans, are mission oriented. They have spent large quantity of resources, used huge manpower and even conducted military operations to expand their democratic system to other countries. When China rises, it has begun to expand to developing nations with no strings attached. A world fixated on the China model is a different and possibly scary world. Zheng also sees a third source of fear which is the simplification of the China model. Many Westerns draw an equal sign between the China model and China’s poor human rights record, neglect of individual liberty and non-interference in nations where there are abuses of human rights or abundant corruption. However, Zheng feels that Westerners should not be terribly worried by the rise of China and the development path associated with this rise. They should understand that China’s rise is largely due to a global system established by Westerners and that each nation is entitled to its own way of developing the economy and building legitimacy for its government.[lxvi] Zheng does not believe the West can contain the spread of the China model. In his analysis, to block the expansion of the Beijing model is as futile as the earlier attempt by the West to block China’s economic rise. It is understandable that British professor Martin Jacques predicts the rise of the middle kingdom and the end of the Western world but the West can do what China has done in the past thirty years, i.e. learning from the West while preserving what is still working in China. Managing international relations is not a zero sum game. If China and the West work together, a gentler and kinder world may emerge. [lxvii]

Not all Chinese scholars are as optimistic as Zheng Yongnian. A few of them have serious issues with the China model. Some have raised their concerns in a very public manner. Others may not have the courage or platform to have their voices heard. Ding Xueliang, a US-educated professor at the Hong Kong Institute of Technology wrote an article in September 2008 raising the concern that the China model cannot be easily promoted outside China. Ding centers his concern on two questions: 1) What did this model achieve? and 2) How did it get there? He believes that the social cost of the China model is so high that it is impossible for any other nation to adopt it. This sky high cost is shown in three areas: lack of social justice and fairness, environmental degradation and administrative cost. Ding writes that in no normal nation where collective bargaining is not allowed. But in China those who try to bargain and defend their interests will go straight to jail. Industrial workers are not respected and farmers’ interests are not protected at all. Under the doctrine of maintaining stability is paramount any Chinese who dares to take on the government will be harassed and silenced. Environmental degradation is so serious that it is doubtful if China can overcome its water crisis any time soon. China’s governance through national mobilization is effective all right but its cost is mind-boggling and can never be applied in any country where spending taxpayers’ money requires debate and approval. The cost of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was four and five times higher than that of the Athens and Sydney Summer Games and this does not include expenses paid by other government agencies in China. Ding uses Hu’s outlook of scientific development to issue his serious warning: it is perfectly all right to acknowledge the amazing achievements of the thirty-year-old reform but it is criminal to be blind to the gigantic cost of these achievements. Without lowering the cost, not only the China model will be irrelevant to other nations the sustainability of China’s own reform may be questionable.[lxviii]

An article in Study Times, a journal edited and published by the Central Party School, echoes Ding Xueliang’s view. According the author, Qiu Gengtian, there is a price for any successful experiment. What attracts the world about the China model is the scale and speed of the economic development; what the world has yet to notice is the high price China has paid for this economic development. China’s wealth and progress have indeed come at a huge expense of human and environmental degradation. This is neither acceptable to China nor tolerable to the world. China must seek a low-cost development road. Otherwise, the global warning of yet another China threat will be just around the corner.[lxix] Yu Keping, vice president of the CCP Central Bureau of Translation, does not think the China model is a finished model. First, China is still in the process of finding new solutions to sustain its economy. Second, China’s circumstances are so special this model cannot be easily applied to other nations. [lxx] Li Jianhua cautions Chinese scholars not to be so enthralled by the China model and lose perspective. According to him, it is absurd to try to spread the China model through a think tank summit. It is ironic for a nation that has always denied universality of any development models to trumpet the China model as an attractive model to other nations. China itself has suffered a great deal in adopting development methods from the Soviet Union. It is hard to understand why so many Chinese officials and scholars are in such a hurry to sell the China model. It is a dangerous business.[lxxi]

Wang Jingjun, a doctoral student at Peking University, thinks that there are key differences between the Beijing consensus and the Washington consensus. Whereas Beijing consensus is designed to explain what China has done in the past the Washington consensus is basically a forward looking formula intended for reform and reconstruction. The Beijing consensus connotes experiences of a developing nation but Washington consensus sheds light on the practices of a developed nation which is the sole superpower in the world. While it is hard to say with certainty that the two consensuses are on a collision course, it is easy to see that the Beijing consensus has the tendency to deny individual aspirations that are built on universal values such as liberty and equality. [lxxii] Can China move from economic reform which deals with people’s physical survival and improving living standards to political reform that respects human rights and political liberty?

The most serious criticism of the China model rendered by the Chinese scholars is the absence of political reform/democratization components. Gao Ren, a columnist for the China elections & governance web site, declares that it is a violation of the Hu Jintao Doctrine of scientific development to say that the China model is perfect for China and the world. The China model is just going through the stage of primitive molding. It was not introduced until a few years ago. As it stands now, it is a model that saves no place for political reform. Without meaningful political reform, this model creates inequitable distribution of wealth, expands the gap between the rich and the poor, breeds rampant corruption and turns the Chinese government into an agency that believes superficial stability is consent to legitimacy.[lxxiii] In 2006, Yang Guang published an article in the Journal of Contemporary China in which he questions the absence of political reform in the China model. In the conclusion of his paper, he writes, “In today’s China, there will be very few people believing that there is absolute no need for political reform. Political reform will be launched sooner or later in China and its breakthrough probably will come when people realize the China model cannot be sustained exactly because it shuns political reform.[lxxiv]

Tentative conclusions

If we compare the Soviet reform to the China reform, the key difference is that Moscow began its reform in the political arena and Beijing refused to put political reform ahead of economic reform. From the Chinese perspective, that is exactly why the Soviet Union quickly collapsed and China has territorial integrity, one-party supremacy and economic development miracle. But, this priority shift only came after 1989. When reform and opening was launched in 1978, Deng had a two-step plan and he believed the success of all reforms would hinge on the success of political reform. 1989 not only saw the plan of political reform dashed but also witnessed a hard left turn in the economic sector. This retreat from reform was finally reversed by Deng in 1992 by which time he was too old and too tired to push forward his political reform. As China’s economic performance continues to shine year after year, the CCP, whose top leadership and many rank and file members are afraid of any real political reform, has begun to push political reform to the side. The China model/Beijing consensus provides a perfect theoretical framework and a practical excuse to postpone political reform or even to declare it totally unnecessary. This is something Joshua Cooper Ramo probably has never expected when he first introduced the Beijing Consensus in 2004.

The China model/Beijing consensus is neither a sound theory nor a good set of benchmarks to design reform and measure its success. It is a highly effective system under the domination of one political party through which resources can be marshaled, dissent silenced or crushed, land grabbed, lakes and rivers dammed, international events paid and organized without looking into any human or ecological cost as long as the outcome of the activity makes the state and the Party look good. It is a system whose declared mission is to serve the people but whose possible abuse of power cannot be checked and balanced. It is a system responsive to the people when pressured but it always blames the people for all the problems in the society. It is a system whose output has awed many foreigners, delighted millions of Chinese and appealed to leaders and elite in other developing countries but the cost of this “miraculous” output is staggering and long-term. It is a system that does not acknowledge the existence of universal values, trashes democratic arrangements to hold government officials accountable and sees a constant Western conspiracy to destroy people’s China. It is a system that recognizes constant talent at the top, demands total obedience at the bottom and uses incentives or fear to rein in those in the middle. It is a system that may elevate China to the global stage of national wealth and power but it will not be able to make China a nation where individual pursuit of happiness is guaranteed and protected. It is a system that cannot resolve the tension between an autocratic government and the people who want more say in their quest for individual rights. The China model is an effective weapon to shatter political reform need into pieces. The Beijing consensus is an artificial consensus that democratization will bring about harm and even destruction to China.

Scholars and media workers both inside and outside China have played a very important role in building the myth of the China model/Beijing consensus. We praise those who constantly question the validity and applicability of the China model and raise doubts about its usefulness. We are appalled by those who have joined the China model chorus without sound judgment or with no judgment at all. When scholars are working with the state and party apparatus to advance something that may eventually hurt the wellbeing of the nation and erode the liberty of the people, they are colluding with power in a reckless way. Many Chinese and Western scholars are trumpeting the China model which, unless it is modified significantly down the road, will hurt both China and those nations which decide to experiment with it.

The China miracle is not just an outcome of the China model, of China’s unique political, economic, social and cultural peculiarities. To a large extent, China’s successes, as pointed out by Zheng Bijian, are due to existing economic globalization and rule of law, all achievements of the West currently under the leadership of the United States. The China model should not be the opposite of this system, defined by the Washington Consensus. The two development models should complement each other and benefit from each other. Many Chinese scholars have shown a rare arrogance in describing the significance of the China model and downgrading the usefulness of the Washington consensus. What they may not be aware of is that China’s political system and treatment of its people cannot be easily accepted as it is by the developed Western nations and even by developing countries. China may never collapse but its way of life can pose a threat to Western countries and their values. In other words, if China does not change course and deviates from the now fixed path called the Beijing consensus, it may certainly be on a collision course with the Washington consensus. It is difficult to predict the fallout of this collision but it is not going to be pretty. It will be an economic confrontation, a cultural clash and a war between political systems. For China to avoid this clash, it is necessary to revive the political reform that was on the CCP agenda but rendered inactive by the China model. Yes, China will have a democratic system different from the United States, the United Kingdom, Republic of France, South Africa, Japan or South Korea but it has to have a system that can be defined as truly democratic.

-----------------------

[i] In this paper, the China model and the Beijing consensus are used interchangeably. Sometimes, they are put next to each other.

[ii] “Two whatevers” refers to Hua Guofeng’s declaration that 1) Whatever Mao has decided we will carry through and 2) whatever Mao has said we will obey”. For details of Deng and his supporters’ epic battle to move China away from old ideology and quest for socialist purity, see Su Shuangbi, “Liangge fanshi shi zenme bei fouding de” [How the “two whatevers” were negated], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], July 21, 2008.

[iii] See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. III, p. 164 and 176.

[iv] For the Chinese language description of the pillars of Deng’s reform, please see “Sixiang jiben yuanze” [Four cardinal principles] at ; accessed September 18, 2009.

[v] See Xu Yansong, “Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige zhihou de yuanyin fenxi” [Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform], August 20, 2003 in the China elections & governance web site at ; accessed September 17, 2009. For details of Deng’s political reform agenda, Xu cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. II, p. 176 and p. 213. The second scholar, Cao Youqin’s article is entitled “Chaozhe deng Xiaoping sheji de zhengzhi1gaige fangxiang qianjin” [March toward goals of political reform set by Deng Xiaoping], Zhonggai luntan [China Reform Forum], at ; accessed September 5, 2009. Cao cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Vol. II, p. 328 and Vol. III, p. 131,

[vi] The section on political reform in Zhao Ziyang’s historic political report is available at ; accessed on September 17, 2009.

[vii] See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform”.

[viii] For details of Deng Xiaoping’s talking points during his southern tour, see “Deng Xiaoping nanxun tanhua yaodian” [Summary of Deng Xiaoping’s talks during the southern tour], People’s Daily online, February 6, 2006, ; accessed on September 23, 2009.

[ix] See Qin Xiaoying, “Deng Xiaoping lilun yu hexie shehui” [Deng Xiaoping’s theory and the harmonious society], Ta Kung Pao, January 26, 2007.

[x] See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform”.

[xi] For details of the history of direct village elections in China, see Yawei Liu, “Consequences of village elections,” China Perspective, Fall Issue, 2000.

[xii] For details for China’s slow move toward political reform in terms of changing ideas and adopting new thinking, see Yu Keping, “Sixiang Jiefang yu zhengzhi jinbu” [Mind emancipation and political progress], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], September 17, 2007.

[xiii] For details of political reform advanced by Jiang Zemin at the 6th CCP Congress, see ; accessed September 17, 2009.

[xiv] Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th CCP Nationa Congress is at ; accessed September 20, 2009. To see differences of the political reform agenda of the 13th CCP Congress and 17th CPP Congress, see Wang Xiao, “Shisanda baogao yu shiqida baogao de bijiao” [Comparing the political reports of the 13th CCP Congress and the 17th CCP Congress], , November 16, 2007; acceded September 16, 2009.

[xv] Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo heping jueqi xindaolu he yazhou de weilai” [The new road of China’s peaceful rise and the future of Asia], November 23, 2003, ; accessed September 22, 2009.

[xvi] Zheng Bijian, “Zhonguo gongchandang zai ershiyi shiji de zouxiang”, Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], November 22, 2005, ; accessed September 19, 2009.

[xvii] See Hong Zhaohui, “Zhongguo tesulun yu zhongguo fazhan lujing” [China uniqueness and China’s path of development], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 2, 2004 at .

[xviii] Qian Gang wrote in his article “Where is ‘political reform” that one of the most prominent developments was the disappearance of the term “political reform” in current CCP rhetoric. Qian came to this conclusion through looking at the use and frequency of key words related to political reform in the Party reports, resolutions and speeches. According to him, “political reform” appeared in the political reports of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th CCP National Congresses but was replaced by “democratic politics” in the political report of the 17th CCP National Congress. See Qian Gang, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige zai nali”, , November 11, 2007, accessed September 21, 2009.

[xix] See details at ; accessed September 1, 2009.

[xx] Quoted in ; accessed September 10, 2009.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Quoted in Zhongguo wei quanshijie tigong le yangben [China has supplied a model for the entire world], in , accessed September 15, 2009.

[xxiii] Quoted in Tang Yaoguo, “Jiema zhongguo moshi” [Deciphering the China model], Liaowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook Magazine], September 8, 2009.

[xxiv] Jiang Guopeng and Kui Jing, “Interview with Brzezinski”, Huanqiu [Globe Magazine], August 12, 2009.

[xxv] Wu Bo and Weng Tianbing, “Nesbit: China Megatrends”, Guangzhou ribao [Guangzhou Daily], September 9, 2009.

[xxvi] Mei Zhiqing and Cao Si, “Zhongguo yi wancheng xiandaihua shishi de sanfenzhier” [China has completed two thirds of its epic modernization], Nanfang ribao [Nanfang Daily], September 16, 2009.

[xxvii] James Mann, “A Shinning Model of Wealth Without Liberty”, Washington Post, May 20, 2007.

[xxviii] Ian Buruma, “The Year of the China Model”, Project Syndicate, January 2008, ; accessed September 27, 2009.

[xxix] Quoted in Sunny Lee, “Why Chinese Communist Party Lasts”, Korean Times, September 18, 2009, ; accessed September 18, 2009.

[xxx] David Shambaugh, “China’s Road to Prosperity”, Time, September 28, 2009, ; accessed September 18, 2009.

[xxxi] Zun Zhongxin, “Hafo zhongguo tong tan zhongguo yanjiu yu zhonguo moshi” [A Harvard China watcher talks about China research and the China model], Zhongguo shehui kexue xuebao [The China Social Science Journal], September 21, 2009.

[xxxii] ; accessed September 18, 2009.

[xxxiii] A lead article on September 18, 2009 in the tabloid Global Times entitled “The 4th Plenum and PRC 60th Birthday attracts global attention to the CCP” cites so many quotes to support this claim. It is interesting to note that when they used David Shambaugh’s series of books to make the point of him warming up to the idea of China exceptionalism, the word “atrophy” was dropped from the title of his most recent book. See Ding Gang, et. al., “Quanqiu jujiao gongchandang”, Global Times, September 18, 2009.

[xxxiv] I used the term “informed Chinese” to include Chinese who are not only well educated but also frequent the web sites. There are four questions in the poll. Only a significant number of people chose to answer the first question “Do you believe in the existence of the China Model”. The other three questions are on the nature and contents of the China model and have been barely answered. The numbers to the first question on September 24, 2009 are as follows: there is a China model (369, 16.2%); it is a model still in development (400, 17.5%); there is China model but yet to win official recognition (28, 1.2%) and there is no China model (1487, 65.1%). The result is at ; accessed September 24, 2009.

[xxxv] For books and articles on China’s possible collapse and China as a threat, see Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publisher, 2000)ÿNicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1994)ÿNicholas Kristof, The China；Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1994)；Nicholas Kristof, “The China Threat?”, New York Times, December 20, 2003, Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House，2001), Richard Berstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A.Knopf，1997). Lin Yifu et. al., Zhongguo de qiji [China’s miracle] (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), Hu Angang, “Zhongguo jingji zhengzang de xianzhuang, quanqi qianjing ji changqi qushi”[The current status, short-term and long term prospect of the Chinese economy], Zhanglve yu guangli [Strategy and Management], Issue 3, 1999 and Kang Xiaoguang, “Zhongguo teshulun”[Chinese Exceptionalism], Zhanglve yu guangli, Issue 4, 2004. For a summary of the theory of China exceptionalism, see Hong Zhaohui, “China Exceptionalism and China’s path for development”.

[xxxvi] Zhao Xiao, “Cong huashangdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus], China Economic Weekly, Issue 23, 2004; Wang Zi, “From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus”, Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao [21st Century Economic Report, March 28, 2005]; and Xie Minggan, “Cong huashengdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi jiantan zhongguo gaige jingyan jiaoxu” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus and lessons of the Chinese reform], China Reform Forum, April 16, 2005, ; accessed September 25, 2009.

[xxxvii] Minutes of this conference were published at Kaifang shidai [Open Times], Issue 4, 2009, pp. 140-148.

[xxxviii] Wang Shaoguang, “Lun zhongguo zhengfu de xuexi jizhi yu shiying nengli” [On Chinese government’s mechanism of learning and capacity to adapt], ; accessed September 22, 2009.

[xxxix] A search for articles that contain “China model” in the title at the China elections & governance web site in 2009 () generates more than forty entries.

[xl] Zhuang Junju and Zhang Xili, “Jinqi youguan zhongguo moshi yanjiu guandian zongshu” [A examination of viewpoints in recent research on the China model], Hongqi wengao [Red Flag Articles], January 21, 2009.

[xli] Song Luzheng, “Minzhu bisheng haishi zhongguo moshi bisheng” [Is democracy or China model invincible], , accessed September 23, 2009.

[xlii] Wu Yun, “Zhongguo moshi tiaozhan chuantong lilun” [China model is challenging traditional development theories], People’s Daily on line, May 8, 2009.

[xliii] Wang Jiabo, “Zhongguo moshi yuanhe dui shijie chongman meili” [Why is the China model so attractive in the world], Guangming ribao [Guangming Daily], June 27, 2009.

[xliv] Zhang Wei-wei, “Zhongguo moshi beihou de linian ji dui jiejue shijie wenti de1 yingxiang” [The ideas behind the China model and its impact on solving problems of the world], People’s Daily on line, July 17, 2009.

[xlv] See the Xinhua story at ; accessed September 20, 2009.

[xlvi] Tang Yaoguo, “Zhongguo jiazhi--Jiema zhongguo moshi: quanqiu weiji zhong de zhongguo re ” [Deciphering the China model: the China wave amidst global crisis ], Liaowang Newsweekly, September 2009.

[xlvii] Hu Wei, “Zhongguo moshi de shenceng hanyi yu shijie yiyi” [The deeper meaning of the China model and its global significance], Jiefang Ribao [Lieberation Daily], September 26, 2009.

[xlviii] When the term “peaceful rise” was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, it was wildly popular. However, it eventually became “peaceful development” in official speeches and writings. As a Chinese scholar told the author, Hu Jintao felt the term “peaceful rise” sounds arrogant. By the same token, for top Chinese leaders to echo China model or Beijing consensus in their speeches does not project an image of modesty. After all, by many measures, China is still a developing country.

[xlix] Qin Henhai, “Xi Jinping tong pi” [Zi Jinping criticizes harshly], , ; accessed September 22, 2009.

[l] Wu Bangguo, “Gongzuo baogao” [Work report], , March 9, 2009.

[li] Hu Jintao, “Guanche luoshi kexue fazhan guan” [Carry out and implement the outlook of scientific development], Qiushi [Seeking truth], January, 1, 2009.

[lii] Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], July 4, 2009

[liii] Hu Jintao, “Zai qingzhu zhengxie liushi zhoiunian dahui shang de jianghua”[Speech on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of CPPCC], , September 20, 2009.

[liv] Hu Jintao, “Tongzhou gongji gon chuang weilai” [Let’s build a brave new future together], .cn, September 24, 2009.

[lv] See Tang Yaoguo.

[lvi] Ibid.

[lvii] Ibid.

[lviii] See Hu Wei.

[lix] See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li.

[lx] See Zhang Wei-wei.

[lxi] See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li.

[lxii] Ibid.

[lxiii] Ibid.

[lxiv] Yan Shuhan, “Zhongong daolu de shijie yingxiang” [The global impact of the Chinese Road], Liaowang [Outlook newsweekly], September 8, 2009.

[lxv] CCP Central Committee, “Guanyu dangjian luogan zhongda wenti de jueding” [Several major decisions on CCP construction], September 18, 2009, ; accessed September 27, 2009.

[lxvi] Zhang Yongnian, “Xifang weihe jupa zhngguo moshi” [Why the West is afraid of the China model], Liahe zaobao [International Herald Tribune], April10, 2009

[lxvii] Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo moshi neng bei xifang weidu ma” [Can the West contain the China model?], Lianhe zaobao [United Daily], September 9, 2009.

[lxviii] Ding Xueliang, “Zhongguo moshi weishenme bu hao tuiguang” [Why is it difficult to promote the China model], Financial Times Chinese online edition, September 19, 2009.

[lxix] Qiu Gegntian, “Zhongguo moshi de didaijia fazhan zhilu” [The low-cost development road of the China model ], Xuexi shibao [Study Times], September 14, 2009.

[lxx] Yu Keping, “Zhongguo moshi bing meiyou dingxin” [The China model is yet to be completed], Jiaoyu yuren [Journal for the Teachers ], Issue 9, 2009.

[lxxi] Li Jianhua, “Bubi mangzhe gei fazhan zhong guojia chuanshou zhongguo moshi” [No need to busy ourselves selling the China model to developing nations], Changjiang Ribao [Yangzi River Daily], June 30, 2009.

[lxxii] Wang Jingjun, “Zhongguo moshi he zhongguo fazhan zhilu” [The China model and China’s development road], March 5, 2007, September 18, 2009.

[lxxiii] Gao Ren, “Mei ren weidu zhongguo moshi” [No one is containing the China model], September 10, 2009, ; accessed September 20, 2009.

[lxxiv] Yang Guang, “Zhengzhi gaige: zhongguo moshi de nandi” [Political reform: the difficult issue of the China model], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 10, 2006.

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download