Draft Gl Report - NATO PA



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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Mediterranean and Middle East

Special Group

The Syrian Refugee Crisis and its Impact on the Region

Report

Raynell ANDREYCHUK (Canada)

Rapporteur

nato-pa.int November 2014

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE NATURE OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2

III. LEBANON 3

IV. JORDAN 5

V. TURKEY 5

VI. IRAQ 6

VII. THE CHALLENGE IN EUROPE 8

VIII. UNIQUE CHALLENGES FOR SYRIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN 11

IX. PUBLIC HEALTH 12

X. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 13

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY 19

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Syrian civil war has triggered a devastating humanitarian and security crisis, the end of which is extraordinarily difficult foresee, particularly now that the war has spread beyond Syria’s borders. Tens of thousands of Syrians have lost their lives and an estimated 9.5 million have fled their homes since the war started in March 2011. Three million Syrians have now fled the country, mostly to neighbouring countries Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey while another 6.5 million have been internally displaced within Syria (Schilling). In a matter of three years, Syria has moved from being a country hosting the second highest number of refugees worldwide to the largest generator of refugees.

2. The crisis has now clearly spread to Iraq. Over the last several months, close to 2 million Iraqi citizens have been either internally displaced or gone into exile largely as a result of the conflict with ISIS. Reports suggest that conditions in both countries are worsening and the journey out of Syria and Iraq is proving increasingly difficult. Exhausted and impoverished refugees confront an increasingly demanding journey, and many compelled to pay bribes at armed checkpoints along the borders. Refugees crossing the desert into eastern Jordan are paying enormous fees to smugglers.

3. Syrians are now the world’s largest refugee population under UNHRC care and the Syrian operation has become the largest in UNHCR history with 1.7 million receiving food aid and shelter in camps just in the camps (as of August 2014). This relief effort extends into Syria itself. In 2014, UNHCR has provided Core Relief Items to 3,364,267 IDP’s in Syria, while upgrading shelters for 24,176 Syrians remaining in Syria (UNHCR Syria IDP Operation 2014). The UNHCR estimates that 2.4 million Syrians will need support this coming autumn (UNHCR Press Release, 29 August 2014).

4. The movement of desperate Syrians and Iraqis fleeing violence and deprivation has transformed this national catastrophe into a regional crisis of epic proportions. Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey have been compelled to cope with millions of refugees whose growing numbers have strained national budgets, social services and, in the case of Lebanon and Jordan in particular, internal stability and national economic coherence. This massive exile has demonstrated how refugees can quickly become an accelerant of international tension and instability. More worrying still is that this regional crisis is unfolding at a moment of multiple refugee emergencies throughout the world.

5. The Syrian problem, however, is not simply a regional phenomenon. It has broad

geo-strategic implications and the movement of refugees is relevant in this regard as well. Syrian refugees have crowded into vulnerable but strategically important neighbouring countries. Because the capacity of these countries to host refugees has been virtually exhausted, these exiles have begun to move into Europe both legally and illegally. This is a subject of intense concern particularly for the European Union’s so-called “front-line” states including Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria. The Mediterranean has become an escape route for thousands of Syrians and, by extension, a critical challenge to Europe’s border management system.

6. The Syrian regime and, to varying extents, some of the myriad rebel groups operating in that country have expressly targeted civilians in this horrific war. The government has conducted a brutal scorched earth campaign against those regions and urban neighbourhoods challenging its legitimacy. The war against civilians has assumed many forms: 1) indiscriminate bombing and shelling of entire neighbourhoods, including the use of chemical weapons, with no attempt to differentiate between military and civilian targets, 2) the systematic denial of access to food and water through siege tactics, 3) the methodical denial of access to education and health services, 4) and, the widespread use of murder, incarceration, torture, rape and terror to traumatize those whose loyalty to the regime is in any way suspected. Even more horrific has been the explicit targeting of children, many of whom have been killed, arrested, jailed, raped and tortured (NATO PA, Rose Roth/GSM Seminar Report, Marrakech).

7. The conflict has grown more widespread, sectarian and complex in its most recent phases. There are an estimated 1,200 and 1,400 active armed groups operating in Syria today including foreign fighters either opposed to or fighting with the Assad regime (NATO PA Mission report, 008 JOINT 14 E). Some opposition groups are now fighting each other as well as the Assad regime, and this state of near anarchy has made life in the country all but impossible for millions of people, many of whom have had little choice but to leave their homes. One critical security problem linked to the ongoing refugee crisis is the presence of fighters among civilian exiles. There are reports that fighters are using refugee camps for “rest and relaxation”, as well as resupply, and recruitment. Turkish officials told a NATO PA delegation that they were aware of the problem and were seeking to impose stricter controls on the borders, including detailed questioning of those coming from Syria’s regime. But other authorities have adopted a different approach. In northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government has helped construct a militia of Syrian Kurds to operate in the Kurdish region of Syria.

II. THE NATURE OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS

8. The United Nations recently characterized the Syrian war as posing the “most pressing humanitarian crisis in the world”. The refugee emergency is dramatic both in its real and potential impact on the region and beyond. The conflict has recently passed the three-year mark without any prospect for a final settlement or for ending the human tragedy that unfolds on a daily basis. The UN estimates nearly three-quarters of Syria's 22.4 million population will need humanitarian aid in 2014. And as suggested above, that exodus is essentially exporting Syria’s instability to the rest of the region with potentially horrific long-term consequences. The mass exodus has occurred relatively quickly with the first refugees leaving in January 2012 and the great bulk leaving their homes after January 2013. The numbers living abroad have grown inexorably (UNHCR, 2014a ).

9. Although the media has tended to focus on life in the myriad refugee camps spread throughout the Middle East, nearly 75% of those who have left Syria are not living in sanctioned refugee camps. Many are either drawing down their savings or finding other ways to support themselves. In Lebanon, for example, most Syrian refugees have simply settled in among the general population, particularly in the Bekkaa valley. Another 10,000-22,000 are now thought to be living in the Sabra and Shatila camps, which were originally set up for Palestinian refugees (BBC, 3 April 2014). The presence of this huge refugee population has placed an enormous burden on already limited budgetary resources, public infrastructure and social services of the Lebanese state. It is hard to meet the needs of refugees living beyond the camps. Turkish officials told NATO parliamentarians that while many refugees manage to find temporary work, often in the agricultural sector, it is not clear how these people can sustain themselves over the long-term.

10. These so-called hidden refugees constitute a particular source of concern for officials in host countries as they can impose burdens on local infrastructure and social services, are difficult to track, and, in some unique cases, might pose security risks. Many of those fleeing the war are highly traumatized and some have been politically radicalized by their horrific experience in war-torn Syria. There is also evidence that Syrian fighters are frequently moving across borders. Security services across the Middle East and beyond are very concerned about the presence of fighters amidst the general refugee population. Some of these could pose security threats in host countries and further afield.

11. Conditions for those living in camps vary widely. NATO PA delegations have toured very well equipped smaller camps in Hatay province where all children receive education, food and a range of other services. Conditions were clearly tougher at the Zaatari camp in Jordan that the GSM visited in 2013. The UNHCR and the Jordanian government have made enormous efforts to improve conditions in that camp of roughly 120,000 inhabitants, but it has many of the problems of a large city in addition to the daunting and unique problems posed by refugee life. Some camps are extended shantytowns with poor social services and mafia-like informal governing structures where extremists sometimes exercise influence. In such camps, black markets are often rampant and insecurity and fear are rife.

12. Conditions in Syria continue to drive many of its citizens from their homes. According to the UN, half of those living in Syria today urgently need assistance as do those bordering countries that have generously extended shelter to Syrian refugees (UN Security Council, 7116th Meeting). This is not only logistically difficult, it is also very costly. In December 2013, the UN stated that $6.5 billion would be needed in 2014 alone to provide support to four million Syrian civil war refugees and the communities hosting them (Brunmfield).

13. Lebanon and Jordan have assumed the greatest burden as a result of this crisis. These are small countries that are already hosting significant numbers of Palestinian refugees. Both have demonstrated enormous generosity in providing shelter, food, and social services to these refugees, but both are at, and perhaps even beyond, their capacity to provide resources for these exiles.

14. It took the international community time to recognize the extent and danger of the refugee crisis in and beyond Syria. Almost a year after the first confrontations in March 2011, UNHCR had registered roughly 30,000 refugees from Syria. In December 2012, however, some political leaders in Lebanon were still denying the existence of a refugee crisis (Eakin and Roth). Those numbers have since increased exponentially and nobody today would negate the seriousness and extent of this crisis. Even a somewhat more removed country like Egypt has taken in at least 100,000 Syrian refugees despite its own very serious internal problems. António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, told the UN Security Council in July 2013 that the international community has not seen “an outflow escalate at such a frightening rate since the Rwandan genocide” (Eakin and Roth).

15. One of the ironies of the present situation is that Syria itself had once been a haven for refugees fleeing conflicts and had taken in over 500,000 Palestinians as well as Christian and Muslim Iraqis fleeing the war in Iraq. It had also taken in 120,000 Lebanese who had lost their homes in the war between Hezbollah and Israel. Syria also harboured Sudanese, Somali and Afghan refugees. Prior to the civil war, Syria was roughly 74% Sunni, 12% Alawite and 10% Christian with significant populations of Druze, Kurds, Turkmen, Armenians and Assyrians. As this war has become more sectarian, fighters from all sides to varying extents and for different purposes have targeted this highly diverse civilian population, which has accelerated the humanitarian and refugee catastrophe that now threatens regional stability.

III. LEBANON

16. Lebanon’s 4 million population has increased by more than 25 percent over the past three years as a direct result of the Syrian crisis. To put Lebanon’s precipitous population explosion into perspective, one might imagine the United States taking in a refugee population of 80 million people over a very short time span. Not surprisingly, the effects are everywhere apparent. One in two school children in Lebanon today, for example, is Syrian (Salem, 2014). A refugee influx of this magnitude would have severe consequences anywhere in the world. In the current case, it has cast Lebanon, a relatively small and poor country, the stability of which is predicated on precarious sectarian balances, into a deep economic and political crisis.

17. Lebanon has long maintained a close if nonetheless challenging relationship with Syria. The Syrian government has habitually interfered in the politics of its much smaller neighbour and has done so through its proxies and in partnership with Iran, which directly supports Hezbollah. Lebanon’s Sunni, Shia, and Christian communities co-exist in a very delicate equilibrium, but the recent influx of Syrian refugees has plunged the country into both an economic and political maelstrom, which at times has turned violent. The two largest Lebanese political factions, the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, are ferociously for and against the Syrian regime respectively, and this has polarized the general political climate. The government has been unable to prevent Lebanese non-state actors from engaging directly in the conflict. Hezbollah, the influential Iranian and Syrian supported Lebanese Shia militia, for example, openly announced its cooperation with the Syrian army in April 2013, a decision that further polarized Lebanese politics. In this context, the influx of Syrian refugees, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, has very clearly tilted the country’s sectarian balance and this, in turn, is having an explosive impact on the domestic political climate in Lebanon. There have been several bombing attacks on Hezbollah strongholds and countless shootouts. Doubtless some of this is payback for the role that militia is playing in the war in Syria. Hezbollah is not only concerned about threats to the Assad regime, it is also worried about an influx into Lebanon of Syrian Sunni, who might tip the sectarian balance in that beleaguered country. In late June 2014, Lebanon suffered three terrorist attacks in a single week, portending a potential escalation of sectarian strife there. Lebanon’s political culture partly mirrors that of Syria and the war has further fragmented the country. Hezbollah, an Iranian supported Lebanese Shiite militia, is fighting in Syria alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad (Marquardt). With some Lebanese supporting the rebels, the risk of a proxy war along sectarian lines in Lebanon itself has mounted. The presence of Syrian fighters among the refugee population only exacerbates that risk.

18. Officially, one fifth of the people living in Lebanon today are Syrian refugees, but the figure could well be higher as it has proven very difficult to maintain an official count. As of 9 October 2014, 1,142,425 Syrian refugees had registered with UNHCR and partners in Lebanon (UNHCR, 14 August 2014). By any measure, this influx has constituted a demographic shock to a country which had a per capita income of roughly US$ 9165 in 2011 (UN Data, Lebanon). Roughly 72% of Syrians in Lebanon require assistance and refugees are dispersed in roughly 15,000 locations across the country. Nearly 300,000 of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are school-age children, and this number could well double in 2014 (Brunmfield). Lebanese schools are now working in double shifts to accommodate the sudden and massive expansion of the school age population. There are 60 agencies working in Lebanon to support these refugees but many are running up against budgetary limits. The government has made a global appeal for support given the huge budgetary shortfall it confronts and the real needs of those whom it is supporting. The UN’s appeal for funding for Lebanon stands at $1,723,878,169; yet the country has received only $287,058,664, or roughly 17% of the coverage needed to provide proper care for these refugees.

19. Overcrowding, rising community tensions and growing economic hardship are evident throughout Lebanon. Competition for scarce jobs is mounting, while living costs soar due to excess demand. It is hardly surprising that the Lebanese have begun to link the declining quality of their lives with the influx of Syrians to their country. Conditions for impoverished women have worsened noticeably as access to health care and social services deteriorate. There is also evidence of increased sexual exploitation and child labour (Lebanon: Regional Response Plan, Fact Sheet).

20. Unlike Iraq, Lebanon has so far managed not to slip into civil war, and this is, in part, because its often divisive political system nonetheless remains inclusive although in ways that are not entirely familiar to Westerners (Salem, 2014). Nevertheless, the country’s capacity to maintain delicate sectarian balances is increasingly challenged by the war along its border and the influx of Syrians. It is of utmost importance that the international community, including NATO member states, increase financial support for Lebanon by meeting UN funding targets. The international community will also have to recognize that Lebanon has a finite capacity to accept refugees and greater burden sharing will be essential here as well. If the international community fails to meet its obligations in this regard, there is a real danger that the situation in Lebanon will spiral out of control.

IV. JORDAN

21. Jordan has also assumed a grave burden as a result of the Syrian war. While roughly one in five people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee, roughly one in eleven is in Jordan (Mercycorps). This burden is all the more compelling given Jordan’s size, population and economy. Jordan has a per capita GDP of $4,556 and a population of 6,330,000. According to UNHCR, as of 9 October Jordan was hosting 619,376 refugees (UNHCR, 2014a). Most of these migrants are crowded in the North near the Syrian border in Amman, Irbid and Zaatari, which hosts the largest Syrian refugee camp in the region. There are currently 64 organizations operating in Jordan to support these refugees.

22. It is apparent that Jordan cannot bear this burden for much longer even if it receives significant foreign assistance. The Jordanian public is increasingly restive as it now must compete with this huge refugee population for scarce resources. The country’s water supply, for example, is extremely limited, and the huge refugee population has placed an enormous burden on this fragile resource. At the same time, there are concerns about the presence of foreign fighters in the camps and intermingled within Jordanian society at large, a development which adds greater uncertainty to the delicate political balances that are essential to keeping the kingdom peaceful and economically viable. Indeed, in April 2014, jihadist forces in Jordan captured the southern city of Maan, pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, told local youth to shred their Jordanian passports, and called for the death of the King (The Economist, 28 June 2014).The Royal administration is justifiably worried that growing economic strains could trigger political unrest directed against the state.

23. The economic impact of such a large refugee population is significant. The World Food Programme’s Voucher Assistance system that underwrites food purchases for refugee alone constitutes 7% of Jordan’s GDP and injects $250 million into the local economy. This sudden influx of consumers is also having an inflationary impact because of supply bottlenecks and soaring consumer demands. In other words, the supply of consumer goods is not sufficient to meet current demand, stimulated as it has been by the influx of refugees. Prices are rising as a result. Public infrastructure, hospitals and schools are suddenly overburdened and, as in Lebanon, the government has been compelled to dedicate an enormous share of its already tight budget to support the refugee community. Higher unemployment, falling salaries, overburdened budgets and rising prices have all fed public discontent and this could, in turn, prove destabilizing.

V. TURKEY

24. Turkey is the NATO member with the most immediate stake in the Syrian conflict and among the leading host countries, it has significantly more budgetary space to support exiled Syrians. Turkey has generously opened its borders to Syrians fleeing the country. Its refugee camps are generally considered as setting a kind of “gold standard” as they generally provide excellent social services, shelter and food as well as a very secure and safe space for Syrians who have fled the country; yet most Syrians in Turkey are not housed in these camps. Turkey has spent over $4.5 billion to assist refugees. UNHCR reports that there are now 869,599 registered refugees residing in Turkey as of 29 September 2014, although there are currently an estimated 1.6 million Syrians living in the country (UNHCR, 2014a ; Schilling, “Syria Report”). These numbers, however, can change quickly. The movement of ISIS forces close to the Turkish border, for example, recently resulted in dramatic increases in the number of Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey. In late September 2014, for example, 150,000 Syrians poured into Turkey over a matter of four days when ISIS forces advanced on towns near Kobani in northern Syria.

25. The Turkish government has not required Syrians entering Turkey to have a visa, and during the war, thousands have sought refuge in that country. An unknown number have done so without registering. Many of these Syrians are supporting themselves either by using their personal savings or through regular or black market jobs. Turkish officials are acutely aware that these people have finite resources and worry about what will happen when exhaust their funding resources.

26. Turkey has long advocated for Syrian unity independence and territorial integrity, but the government avowedly opposes the Assad regime, believes that regime has forfeited any claim to legitimacy, and is particularly alarmed that Assad appears to be cooperating with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian affiliate of the PKK. Early in the conflict, Syrian forces fired shells into Turkey, and in a show of Alliance solidarity, NATO deployed Patriot missile battalions to reinforce Turkey’s defence in the face of that particular threat. Turkey recognizes that the presence of large numbers of Syrians on its territory represents a potential vulnerability. Still it has pursued an open door policy for those fleeing violence in Syria. It has constructed a number of camps in southern Turkey that provide schools, health care, press services, language training and other activities for those in need. Syrians in the Turkish camps are living in secure environments and are reportedly benefitting from very good services. Of course, the numbers of Syrians living outside of the camps is far greater, but it is difficult to generalize about their living conditions and access to services (NATO PA Mission Report, 008 JOINT 14 E).

27. Like other frontline states, Turkey is urgently appealing for greater assistance in sharing this huge burden. It is one of the countries offering the greatest level of aid to Syrians after the United States and the European Union and provided roughly $4.5 billion in support of Syrian refugees based on U.N standards). Obviously, Turkey is a significantly larger and wealthier country than either Jordan or Lebanon, and so its burden is more manageable. At the same time, however, its leaders are clearly concerned about the cost of the support it is extending, the growing likelihood that these refugee communities will remain in Turkey for the foreseeable future and the potential for this to become a source of instability in Turkey itself.

28. The Turkish state classifies Syrians residing within its borders as people under temporary protection. Turkish officials are very aware that Syria has become a breeding ground for terrorist groups and fighters, many of whom are potentially poised to export what they have learned beyond Syria’s borders. The Turkish Minister of the Interior told a NATO PA delegation that the longer the conflict persists, the more these groups will be positioned to operate with strength and flexibility. Turkish officials are deeply concerned that this exodus is destabilizing to the region, and posing a range of threats Turkey itself. More than any other country in NATO, Turkey’s views on Syria have leaned toward a doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its leaders have expressed some frustration that only the use of chemical weapons succeeded in mobilizing the international community to action. It has also linked the fight against ISIS to the fight against the Assad regime. At the same time, it has had problems with some foreign fighters using its territory as a jumping off point into the Syrian conflict. This has compelled it to exercise greater control over its border with Syria including greater scrutiny of those moving from Turkey into Syria and vice versa (NATO PA Mission Report, 008 JOINT 14 E).

VI. IRAQ

29. The Syrian war has had a profoundly destabilizing impact on Iraq, which is currently in the midst of a deep political and security crisis, which is partly linked to the movement of fighters across the borders of the two countries. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between the Syrian and Iraq crisis as both countries are now dealing with the sudden rise of ISIS and its apparent consolidation of a large swathe of contiguous territory in both countries. Iraq’s greatest challenge initially lay in the fact that 215,000 Syrian refugees had moved into its Kurdish region. Today the situation is far worse, as the war has essentially spilled over into Iraq and, in some respects, has become a sectarian uprising of Iraqi Sunnis against the Shia dominated government. Over 1.8 million Iraqis are now internally displaced, and an estimated 91,000 Iraqi refugees are currently registered in neighbouring countries. That number will very likely to rise (Schilling).

30. Iraq not only borders a country where government institutions have collapsed, communal tensions are rife and extremist ideologies have taken hold, it increasingly looks to be afflicted with a similar set of problems. Although Iraq hosts fewer registered Syrian refugees than Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey (217,192 as of 22 July 2014), the movement of fighters and military equipment across the border and increasingly apparent breakdown of central government authority has allowed the so-called IS to advance rapidly into northern Iraq in recent months. IS fighters have sought to trigger a sectarian war in Iraq by attacking Shiite shrines and a range of minority communities. Iraq has, for all intents and purposes, returned to a state of civil war. According to the UN, in May 2014, 800 died as a result of the IS incursion into northern Iraq, in June 2014, 2,400 died and at least 1,737 people, mostly civilians, were killed in July (AP, 1 August 2014). This fighting has displaced many refugees from Syria, Iran and Turkey, residing in Iraq and this “secondary displacement” is only worsening conditions for this highly vulnerable group of people living in country which is once again riddled by conflict.

31. The IS would not have been likely to achieve such a rapid advance had Nuri al-Maliki’s government not alienated Iraq’s Sunni community through years of repression and neglect. The current conflict in Iraq is thus not simply a product of the Syrian civil war. Maliki’s growing authoritarianism and exclusion of the Sunni minority as well as his use of the state’s security apparatus as a source of patronage helped create a vacuum that goes far in explaining the success of battle hardened IS forces (International Crisis Group, June 2014). Given the crucial role that Sunni tribal forces played under the Awakening Councils in rooting out al-Qaeda from Anbar province in 2006, it now seems apparent that new power-sharing deals struck among Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish communities will one essential element of coping with this profound security challenge.

32. The rapid advance of IS forces into north western, Sunni-dominated Iraq is directly related to their retreat from the Syrian battlefield (Stratfor, 2014). Ironically, the rapid success of the IS in Iraq has bolstered support for it in Syria, where some rebel groups are now declaring allegiance to IS due in large measure to its successful acquisition of arms and cash.

33. The Kurdish question adds another element of complexity to this particular narrative. The ratification of a new Iraqi constitution in 2005 failed to quell Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for independence, although it bolstered the autonomy of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The Kurdish autonomous region became “an island of stability in comparison with the rest of strife-torn Iraq” (Jabary and Hira). Important disputes between Baghdad and the KRG persisted, especially with regard to the status of the city of Kirkuk and the ownership and control of key oil resources. Nearly all Syrians fleeing to Iraq have gone to the Kurdish autonomous region, particularly Duhok province, where the Domiz camp is located. This situation has created new tensions by encouraging aspirations for Kurdish separatism while drawing the KRG into the conflict between Islamists and Kurds in north-eastern Syria (Eakin and Roth). The KRG is particularly wary of allowing Arab populations to move into the Kurdish autonomous region. The Kurdish Peshmerga have taken control of Kirkuk and are now fighting the IS, which has attacked Kurdish towns and, in the summer of 2014, launched a genocidal attack against the minority Yazidi community. Although Peshmerga forces were overwhelmed in initial battles with the IS, significant US air support has helped fend of well-equipped IS rebels near the city of Irbil. But these gains need to be set against recent losses in Diyala Province, where the IS routed Peshmerga forces and seized the town of Jalawla.

34. In the midst of the civil war that broke out in Iraq after the 2003 American intervention, Iraqi refugees flooded into Syria. That flow has now been reversed, and Iraq is currently hosting about 220,000 Syrian refugees. Iraq already had an estimated 1.3 million IDPs at the end of 2013. Even before the widespread displacement caused by the June 2014 IS offensive, Iraq’s overcrowded refugee camps were confronted with daunting problems, including limited access to education and decent shelter (Ferris, Kirisci and Shaikh). Baghdad’s refusal to carry out budget transfers to the Kurdish Regional Government in the context of ongoing tensions between the two authorities has impeded the latter’s capacity to meet the refugee challenge. Iraq’s rapid descent into civil war and the internal displacement of million Iraqis since January 2014, including half a million that same year, has essentially annihilated Iraq’s capacity to support this refugee and IDP population, prompting a UN appeal for an additional $312 million.

VII. THE CHALLENGE IN EUROPE

35. It is worth noting that while estimated 3 million Syrians have left their country as a result of the war, less than 5% have moved out of the immediate region. There are, for example, ten times more Syrians in Turkey today than there are in all European countries combined (Schilling) Most refugees have either sought to remain close to the borders or have felt they had no choice but to do so. It would be an act of complacency, however, to assume that this state of affairs will endure. As more Syrians leave the country and as conditions worsen in neighbouring countries, the pressure to move beyond the immediate region will rise. Europe will very likely detect growing numbers of Syrians seeking to cross its borders.

36. Southern Europe has been the focal point of Syrian arrivals with a total of 58,000 arriving in 2014 as of August 2014. In 2013, 32,681 thousand Syrians arrived in Italy by sea with 11,907 coming in 2014, while the figures for Greece are 23,565 and 9,942 respectively. Asylum applications to the EU 28 stood at 52,264 for 2014 to August as compared to 48,877 for 2013. Spain, Albania, Malta, Portugal and Cyprus have also seen increasing numbers of Syrians arriving by sea over the past year (UNHCR Internal Monthly Fact Sheet, September 2014). Between April 2011 and June 2014, 123,011 Syrians had filed Asylum applications in the EU, Norway and Switzerland while the figure for 2014 as of June stood at 41,569. Together Germany and Sweden have processed 56% of the applications. Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands follow on the list (UNHCR, Syrian New Asylum Applications)

37. Many of the Syrians making their way to Europe are doing so in an irregular fashion across the Mediterranean. It is a very dangerous journey and criminal traffickers play a key role managing this mass exodus. As many as 2% of those crossing the Mediterranean to seek refuge in Europe die along the way. This points to the horrific and unsafe conditions in which these people are compelled to travel and the grotesque exploitation they face at the hands of traffickers who show scant regard for the lives with which they are essentially entrusted.

38. Frontex is the EU institution responsible for supporting, coordinating and developing European border management in line with relevant EU laws and rights. It seeks to facilitate interoperability and shared responses to irregular migratory phenomena like the current massive migration across the Mediterranean. It conducts joint operations covering air, land and sea borders and also manages return operations for those who have sought to cross EU borders in an irregular fashion. Frontex has also dedicated significant energy to countering organized criminal groups engaged in human trafficking—a low risk, high profit enterprise particularly given the difficulties prosecutors have confronted in gathering evidence and successfully prosecuting cases. Many of these criminal groups also smuggle drugs, arms, and commodities like oil and cigarettes.

39. Frontex has seen a very significant spike in the number of sea-based apprehensions of migrants. The number has risen from 18,064 in 2012 to 173,222 in September 2014. It has also seen a significant shift in sea routes with the Central Mediterranean route now constituting the most important path for illegal border crossing. There are also substantial movements from Turkey to the Greek islands (Vourekas). According to Frontex, 54,744 migrants were detected attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2013, including: 40,304 who moved across the central Mediterranean from Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Malta, 11,831 who followed the Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece and Cyprus by sea; and 2,609 who followed the Western Mediterranean route to Spain by sea. Syrians represented a quarter of the total detected illegal crossings and were also the leading nationality applying for asylum in Europe. This broad increase in illegal border crossings is not simply due to instability in Syria but reflects a range of other developments including growing instability in Western Africa and a range of security and related economic problems throughout the Saharan region and Sub-Saharan Africa. Frontex officials suggest that “everything points to a heightened likelihood of large numbers of illegal border-crossings into the EU” in the future (Frontex, 2014).

40. Europe has formally admitted only a small proportion of those fleeing Syria, while the precise number of those who have arrived in an irregular fashion is unknown (Pichon). In total,

50,096 Syrians requested asylum in Europe in 2013. This number of applications was twice the number of asylum applications submitted in 2012, but remains small relative to the total number of refugees. In 2013, more than two thirds of all Syrian applications were submitted in Sweden, Germany, and Bulgaria (Frontex, 2014), even though the majority of Syrian entries were recorded along the Greek-Turkish land border (Migration Policy Centre).

41. The EU and its member states confront a serious humanitarian and security challenge in the movement of these migrants and need to formulate a more coherent strategy for coping with it. Europe is clearly obligated to defend its borders from irregular migration but has found that doing so on the high seas poses a set of difficult humanitarian, budgetary and technical challenges. Governments also need to clarify more sharply the line between economic migrants and persons moving to Europe who are fleeing war or persecution; both types of migrants often use the same channels. One reason for this is that there are few opportunities for people who are entitled to international protection, such as Syrians fleeing the civil war, to move legally to Europe, for example through resettlement programmes. Indeed, in 2013, more Syrians were admitted to Europe after having crossed the border illegally and only then applying for asylum than through regularized resettlement and humanitarian admissions programmes. This large and unregulated movement of migrants makes it increasingly difficult for European states to guarantee the protection of those fleeing conflict. Frontex reports that the number of migrants and refugees arriving in Italy through the Mediterranean rose by 500% over the first seven months of 2014 compared with 2013 (AFP). All of this is seriously straining the credibility of the asylum as well as border defense systems in Europe. Critics of EU migration policy claim that the European countries’ regional agreements on migration management aim principally to externalize the problem of border protection, often to the detriment of migrants who deserve international protection.

42. The massive increase in trans-Mediterranean migration has compelled the EU and several front-line states to bolster patrols along the littoral. The situation is enormously dangerous. There have been 19,142 deaths along the EU’s borders over the last 20 years, including the death of 1,500 migrants fleeing Libya in 2011 alone (Dimitriadi, 2014). Some argue that this is simply a ‘side-effect’ of the fortification of EU borders and the closure of legal routes to migration for low-skilled migrants, but, of course, it is also a reflection of a massive movement of people from highly unstable regions to Europe’s south (SIgona). Three hundred and thirty-six migrants travelling from Libya to Italy in October 2013 died after their boat caught fire and sank off the coast of Lampedusa. That tragedy has come to symbolize the dangers of these crossings and the need for Europe and countries along the southern littoral to take this matter very seriously and to respond with increased patrols and enhanced search and rescue capacity.

43. Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum, undertaken in response to the Lampedusa incident seeks to enhance the Italian Navy’s situational awareness to better prepare the Italian state to undertake search and rescue missions, and meet security threats linked to the massive movement of people. The operation has demonstrated that the boundaries between humanitarian and military operations can at times be unclear and require novel definitions and new approaches to security/humanitarian challenges. The shifting situation also demands tighter collaboration between the Ministries of Defence and the Ministries of Interior. It is also worth noting that there have been concerns that Europe’s manifold instruments of border control and surveillance under the Integrated Border Management (IBM) system have placed a disproportionate emphasis on preventing irregular entries through deterrence and return rather than on saving lives (Dimitriadi, 2014), even though it is undeniable that Operation Mare Nostrum has saved thousands of lives since October 2013 (40,000 in May 2014) (Triandafyllidou). Any effort to create legal avenues for migration must accompany border surveillance and rescue missions in order to prevent the tragic loss of migrant lives at sea. This is recognized, at least in principle, in the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which establishes responses to legal and illegal migration (Papagianni).

44. The EU and its member states are cooperating closely with a number of southern Mediterranean littoral countries in matters of migration. For example, Morocco has worked closely with Spain and other European countries to exchange information and cooperate on these kinds of challenges. The EU has signed Mobility Partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia and is currently negotiating such an agreement with Jordan (European Commission, 2014). The Western Mediterranean Forum or the Five plus Five Dialogue, an informal sub-regional forum of countries geographically situated on the western rim of the Euro-Mediterranean littoral including, Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia, has increasingly focused on this migratory challenge, although the Western Mediterranean is not a primary path for Syrians seeking refuge in Europe.

45. Within the EU, Italy and Greece have clearly borne the brunt of fleeing Syrians seeking to enter EU space across the sea and this has led to calls for more equitable burden sharing within Europe to cope with what is clearly a challenge for all. Indeed, many of those coming into Greece and Italy illegally actually intend to move to northern Europe (Yardley and Pianigiani). The Dublin II and III agreements originally aimed to solve the problem of “asylum shopping”. Previously migrants would apply to multiple European countries for asylum in order to bolster their chance of obtaining a positive decision. Under current procedures, however, the first EU country of entry must process asylum requests. Unsurprisingly, these new rules place a disproportionate share of the burden of processing asylum seeking applications and hosting those making these applications upon Europe’s southern member states. One possible solution would be to implement a joint processing of asylum requests through the European Asylum Support Office and establish mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions across the EU, allowing recognized refugees to move to other European countries in order to reduce the burden on frontline states. (Triandafyllidou).

46. Greece is the closest and easiest access point to Western Europe and has had to cope with this crisis at a moment of compelling economic and political tension. There have been problems with enforced deportation, detention in overcrowded cells, and complaints that asylum seekers are not permitted to work and receive inadequate support (Apostolou). The UNHCR has been particularly critical of the Greek practice of detaining migrants who cannot legally be deported without sufficient justification and who are detained under conditions that do not meet minimum international standards. In 2012, 7,927 Syrians were taken into custody in Greece (UNHCR Office in Greece, 2013). On the other hand, the UNHCR recognizes that the establishment of new Asylum and First Reception Services in Greece represents “substantial progress” in the quality of the asylum procedure in Greece (UNHCR Office in Greece, 2014). Migrants arriving in Greece, however, must cope with an economy that is only beginning to emerge from an extraordinarily deep crisis. At the end of 2012, Unemployment for migrant men from non-EU countries residing in Greece stood at 40% compared to the overall unemployment rate of 26%. Traditionally, foreign workers in Greece have experienced very low unemployment levels so the current problem is quite indicative of the depth of Greece’s economic difficulties (Triandafyllidou and Gropas).

47. The crisis has also generated social and political tensions, and there have been reports of neo-Nazi groups launching violent attacks against immigrants both in Greece and Bulgaria (Lynch). Syrian refugees began arriving in Bulgaria in the summer of 2013, after Greece constructed a fence along its border and reinforced border controls (Higgins). Like Greece, Bulgaria has confronted serious economic difficulties and has had problems absorbing the high number of refugees entering the country. Refugee camps in Bulgaria were quickly overcrowded and there have been reports of violence and forced family separations. The government also implemented a ‘pushback’ policy in an effort to dissuade refugees in Turkey from moving into Bulgaria (Kenyon, 2014).

48. Despite these daunting difficulties, both the UN and the European Commission have warned that mitigating the humanitarian, economic and political crisis posed by millions of Syrian refugees is only possible if the international community does more to support this huge population, including opening its doors to those fleeing the violence. There is a question of equity here. By January 2014, Turkey alone had received ten times the number of Syrian refugees as all EU member states combined (Chulov and Grant). Not surprisingly, many Syrian refugees see Europe as an impenetrable fortress. In September 2013, Sweden offered permanent residency to Syrian refugees, and it has become the EU’s most important host country for Syrian refugees. As of March 2014, 30,000 Syrians had entered Sweden and applied for asylum and refugee status there (Rothschild). The UNHCR has proposed that countries beyond the region admit another 30,000 Syrian refugees on resettlement, humanitarian admission, or other programmes by the end of 2014. Germany has agreed to accept 25,000, Sweden 1,200, Austria 1,500, Canada 1,300 Norway, 1,000, and Finland, France, Australia and Switzerland 500 each. The number for the United States remains open ended (Fitzgerald).

VIII. UNIQUE CHALLENGES FOR SYRIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN

49. The problems Syrian women and children confront in this war constitute a grave humanitarian and security challenge to which the international community must also respond. In December 2013, the UN estimated that 76% of Syrian refugees fleeing the country were women and children (UNHCR, 23 December 2013), and the most recent estimates suggest that 51% of all Syrian refugees are children (UNHCR Internal Monthly Fact Sheet). Women and children confront formidable challenges. There are four key gender based violations Syrian female refugees commonly face: forced and early marriage, domestic violence, “survival sex”, and sexual violence (Zaatari). In Lebanon, for example, Human Rights Watch reports that women refugees from Syria are often sexually harassed and tend not to report incidents to local authorities due to lack of confidence in government institutions and fear of reprisals by the abusers or even arrest for not having a valid residency permit (HRW, 2013). The uncertain legal status of these refugees directly affects their personal security and their capacity to take measures that might prevent abuse in the first place. The problem extends to the work place where, again, the uncertainty of refugee status reduces the capacity of women refugees to counter sexual abuse as to do so could imperil desperately needed employment (HRW, 2013).

50. In Jordan, many observers have pointed out that female Syrian refugees have had to cope with sexual exploitation at refugee camps. There are, for example, reports of numerous early marriages (Shama), although it should be noted that early marriages are relatively common in parts of rural Syria. Nevertheless, young Syrian women are at acute risk of exploitation and trafficking through forced marriage (Shama; Harper). Jordanian law is applied in the refugee camps, and the Jordanian court system will not recognize marriages involving anyone under 18. Syrian girls subject to hidden early marriage have virtually no legal protection and are more vulnerable as a result (Harper). Far too often, marriages are not consensual, lack legal standing and lead to abandonment and even forced prostitution. Reports from the Zaatari camp suggest that kidnapping and rape have occurred with far too much frequency, although Jordan has stepped up efforts to police the camp in a more effective fashion (Rubin). The difficult circumstances in which families are compelled to live place greater stress on family structures and lead to problems such as domestic abuse. Cultural norms are also apparently complicating assistance efforts. Discussing internal family issues with strangers can be considered taboo. This obviously militates against the kind of assistance counselling might offer (Dettmer).

51. Between 1995 and 2011, Syria’s population grew by 65%, and when civil war broke out, roughly four out of every ten Syrians were under the age of 15 (Eakin and Roth). This youth bulge is clearly evident in the refugee population; the camps outside of Syria are teeming with children who have very specific needs and whose presence in such difficult circumstances ensures that the exile experience will have very long-term implications for this population and Syria as a whole. The problem is evident in host countries as well. As suggested above, the number of school age Syrian children living in Lebanon has likely passed the number of Lebanese school age children. In Jordan, it is estimated that roughly two thirds of Syrian children are not attending schools and many are compelled to work. Girls who are not in school confront increased pressure to marry early, and this exacts a huge long-term cost on the society (Eakin and Roth).

52. As of February 2014, more than one million Syrian children were refugees. Syria itself has become one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a child. The armed conflict had led to the death of 11,500 children, half of whom had died because of the direct bombing of homes, schools, and health centres. An estimated 1,500 children have been executed, shot or tortured to death and another 128 children were killed in the Syrian government launched chemical weapons attacks of August 2013 (Sparrow). There are also countless cases of sexual exploitation and gender-based violence, particularly in regions beset by heavy fighting. An estimated 2.8 million children are no longer in school and many have not received vaccinations. An appalling number of children arrive at camps without their parents (UNICEF, “Syrian Children under Siege”).

53. Other challenges include separation from families, rampant child labour, exposure to sustained physical and psychological violence, and limited access to child protection services. Despite reduction in procedural barriers to birth registration, refugee children are also at heightened risk of statelessness. The UN and other leading agencies caring for refugees beyond Syria’s borders have developed special programs to cope with child trauma and to meet the educational needs of these children. War often utterly disrupts the education of young people and this, of course, has very long-term implications for the children and for society as a whole. UNICEF is the lead institution coping with the unique problems Syrian children face. It has worked with partners to immunize more than 20 million children in the region following a polio outbreak. It is also providing safe drinking water, education support, physical protection, psychological support and clothing for those children it can reach.

54. Disrupted schooling, the absence of parents, many of whom have been killed, economic marginalization and serious trauma continue to complicate the lives of young Syrian refugees. At the sprawling Zaatari camp in northern Jordan, for example, many young people refuse to attend school and there have been problems of violence, vandalism and other manifestations of anti-social behaviour doubtless worsened by the trauma of war. Administrators admit that this is a serious challenge for authorities responsible for the camp and it illustrates the long-term challenge of coping with a generation of traumatized and exiled youth.

IX. PUBLIC HEALTH

55. The public health crisis in Syria represents one of the least reported consequences of the Syrian war, but it actually ranks among the most dangerous. The Syrian health care system has utterly collapsed under the weight of the fighting and as a matter of war policy. War-related trauma, disease and malnutrition have been made worse by a wilful scorched earth policy to induce mass suffering upon those communities that have broken with the regime. This is a key source of the refugee crisis, but it has also triggered a public health crisis that has begun to flow over Syria’s border.

56. A number of infectious diseases are increasingly evident in Syria including dysentery, diphtheria, whooping cough, hepatitis, measles and tuberculosis. An estimated 1,000 Syrians have contracted leishmaniasis, a parasitic skin disease. Perhaps most worrying of all, polio, a disease that many had hoped was on the verge of eradication, is now becoming epidemic. As of February 2014, there were reports of 90 cases of children with the disease, most of whom were under two years of age. This, of course, reflects the cancellation of vaccination programmes across the country. More worrisome still is that public health experts estimate that for every reported polio case, there could be 1,000 hidden carriers. This means that at least 90,000 Syrians could be spreading the disease and, of course, the mass exodus of Syrians means that this problem is spilling over the border (Sparrow).

57. The Assad government no longer provides sanitation and safe water services in areas that it considers unfriendly. It has also denied routine immunizations for preventable childhood diseases. The Syrian government’s scorched earth tactics have targeted doctors and many have been fled the country. The number of doctors working in Syria has fallen from roughly 30,000 to 5,000. Most doctors in exile are not allowed to practice, at least formally, in host countries. The movement of millions of Syrians into horrific, dangerous and unsanitary conditions both in and outside of Syria and the regime’s attacks on doctors, hospitals and clinics has thus created a perfect environment for the spread of diseases. Thousands of children born in 2010 or afterwards have not received polio vaccines and are thus vulnerable to that disease. Highly unsanitary living conditions among IDP’s and those who have left the country as well inadequate nutrition have clearly created fertile conditions for the spread of polio and other diseases.

X. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

58. Helping displaced Syrians gain access to basic needs including food water electricity and medical supplies, is posing one of the greatest logistical and financial challenges the international community currently faces. The need is perhaps greatest in Syria itself, but it obviously extends to the many countries in which Syrians are taking refuge. Millions have lost their homes, their jobs and the means to support their families. Many of these people are now surviving only through international support. In a major and often dangerous logistical undertaking, the World Food Program is currently dispatching 700 food trucks a month to distribution points across Syria while an array of international actors are providing food, shelter, water, power and social services in camps throughout the Middle East (Syria: Overview, World Food Program website).

59. In February 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 to facilitate aid delivery to Syrians. It called for an end to attacks against civilians in Syria and to the siege then underway on the city of Homs, which has had dreadful humanitarian consequences. In the resolution, the Council demanded that all parties allow humanitarian aid deliveries from UN agencies and its partners, even across conflict lines. It added that this aid should be delivered via the most direct routes. It also strongly condemned attacks by terrorist groups while calling for all parties to work toward the implementation of the 2012 Geneva Communique.

60. The Security Council mandate has created a legal foundation to move food into remote and previously inaccessible regions where hunger has become a growing problem, particularly in those Syrian regions under siege. The UN’s World Food Program is now working to deliver food to the estimated 4.24 million vulnerable people across Syria, including those residing in locations controlled by anti-government forces. In April 2014, for example, a 17-truck convoy delivered food rations to 47,500 people in the besieged town of Talbiseh in the Homs Region for the first time in six months. It also delivered food to Idleb, an area that had previously been inaccessible. Clearance for these convoys, however, requires long and difficult negotiations with the government and with various warring factions.

61. Part of the problem these agencies confront is that the population is constantly on the move. Military activity in north-western Aleppo, south-western Quneitra and Dar’a, and central Hama have triggered large-scale population movements. More than 120,000 people recently moved to Idleb after heavy fighting in nearby Aleppo and Hama. These mass movements require the World Food Programme to reassess constantly shifting conditions on the ground and to anticipate and identify where the most vulnerable populations are moving (WFP, 16-19 April 2014). This would be difficult under normal circumstances; it is acutely challenging in the midst of such a fractured and brutal civil war.

62. UNHCR is coordinating the international humanitarian community’s response to the crisis and is working with 155 organizations, UN bodies and partners to carry out this function. A number of UN agencies including UNHCR, the World Food Program, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, UN Habitat, UNOPS, UNRWA, WHO, UN Women and UNFPA are all engaged in these countries and working with a range of governmental and non-governmental agencies to provide housing, food, water, electricity, blankets, clothing, sanitation, education and health services to this huge exiled population. UNHCR is also coordinating efforts to assist internally displaced Syrians and has reached over 3.1 million people in 2014 alone both in government and opposition controlled areas. The UN, however, cannot reach millions of other Syrians due to the country’s horrendous security situation. The coordination effort alone is formidable given that so many groups are engaged in providing support, although under different conditions, and guided by divergent rules and scale and sometimes with different motives.

63. The inter-agency Syria Regional Response Plan has recently appealed for US$ 3,7 billion to cover the anticipated needs of millions of refugees fleeing Syria and residing in host communities in the region. As of 23 September 2014, it had received $1,9 billion and the funding gap stood at 51%, (UNHCR Syria Regional Response Plan, 23 September 2014). This underfunding has already begun to impinge upon this broad humanitarian effort. The World Food Program, for example, has recently announced that it has no choice but to reduce food distribution within Syria and in host countries (a 60% reduction in October and 40% in November) if funds are not forthcoming (Schilling). Refugee flows are not expected to diminish and virtually every host country has come to recognize that the refugees are likely to remain in exile for a long period of time (Seely). This means that the international community must gird itself to provide sustained support to these refugee communities. It will also need to think creatively to ways to help these refugees generate income on their own.

64. Since the end of 2011, the European Commission has mobilised €615 million in humanitarian assistance for Syria and neighbouring countries. It generated a further €526 million through other EU instruments (i.e. for education, support to host communities etc.), bringing the total EU funding to over €1.1 billion. This included the €165 million offered at the International Pledging Conference on 15 January 2014 known as Kuwait II. In addition, EU member states have individually provided over €1.1 billion in humanitarian aid to Syrians affected by the conflict, which, with the overall pledge at Kuwait II from member states, brings the total contribution emanating from the EU space to over €2.6 billion. Certain member states – Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Slovakia, Norway, Austria and Luxembourg - also provided in-kind assistance through the EU's Emergency Response Centre.

65. In Syria, the European Commission's humanitarian funding provides medical emergency relief, food-nutritional assistance, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and logistics services. Beyond the Syrian border, the funding is directed toward life-saving assistance such as health, food, shelter, hygiene kits, water and sanitation services. At this stage, the breakdown of EU funding is: 44% inside Syria, 26% in Lebanon, 22.5% in Jordan while the remainder is distributed between Iraq and Turkey. Save the Children ECHO funding is channelled through the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, various NGOs and UN humanitarian agencies, including UNHCR and those organizations whose mandate focuses on the protection and assistance of women and children, such as UNICEF, UNFPA and Save the Children (ECHO).

66. On 30 July 2014, the US Secretary of State announced that the United States will provide $378 million in additional assistance to those affected by the war in Syria. This puts the total US humanitarian assistance since the Syrian crisis began at $2.4 billion, including support for host countries, $191 million in food assistance, $152 million for reproductive health services, gender-based violence response and water, sanitation and hygiene support and another $35 million for general health care services, and emergency relief items (USAID website).

67. Although the United States is consumed with a politically contentious domestic immigration debate, the Obama Administration announced in February that it would take measures to allow more Syrians to take refuge in the United States. Between October 2012 and October 2013, the United States only admitted 31 Syrian refugees and by April 2014 the total number stood at 121. This highly restrictive policy has been partially driven by concerns about allowing anyone associated with the fighting into the United States (Zengerle). Provisions in the US immigration laws make any contact whatsoever with armed groups as potentially disqualifying for those seeking refuge in the United States. The Obama Administration has now allowed for case-by- case adjudications, but this requires very extensive background checks that obviously have hindered a more comprehensive contribution to this important dimension of international burden-sharing (Acer). The problem is that immigration/refugee policy today is caught up in the gridlock of Washington politics and the prospects for fundamental change, at least for the moment, are rather dim.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS

68. As a starting point, it is essential to understand the Syrian-Iraq refugee crisis as a long-term challenge. No permanent resolution of this humanitarian crisis will be possible as long as these wars endure, and today the prospect for ending the violence besetting these two countries is remote. This was already evident when the UN Secretary General’s chief negotiator for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, resigned in frustration at the refusal of the Syrian regime and elements of the opposition to move toward compromise. The precipitous rise of ISIS has only worsened prospects for a swift conclusion to this conflict. So far, the international community has been unable to achieve an agreed posture toward Assad, his regime will not sit down with its opponents and the moderate opposition is increasingly fractured and ceding the battle to extremists. Fighting between the government and rebels and even among rebel groups has dramatically constrained the space for innocent civilians and the war has spread to Iraq. A massive and dangerous power vacuum now lies in the heart of the Middle East. The international community must exercise great vigilance to prevent what is no longer a single conflict but rather a series of conflicts from spreading even further. That in itself is no small task and the recent decision to provide air support to groups fighting ISIS in Syria could be the first step in a new direction.

69. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey have been extraordinarily generous in opening their respective territories to Syrians fleeing horrific violence. All require extraordinary external support to ensure that they do not have to bear this burden alone. Lebanon and Jordan, in particular, confront very serious economic and budgetary problems and an ongoing influx of refugees into these two countries is demographically consequential and has greatly exacerbated domestic political and economic tensions. Social services in both countries have suffered tremendously as scarce resources must now be shared with a very large refugee population. Schools are overcrowded, hospital beds are filled and food, medicine banks and even water supplies are stretched to the limited.

70. Once the capacity of these countries to meet the needs of this refugee community is exhausted, these refugees could well move onward, and would very likely do so in an unregulated fashion. Europe will be a likely destination. In fact, this migration is already underway, albeit on a relatively small scale relative to the sheer numbers of Syrian refugees. Italian monitors, for example, report a very substantial increase in the number of Syrians attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Italy and Europe. A higher degree of Western solidarity with the countries bordering Syria is essential as countries like Jordan and Lebanon have reached the limits of what they can do for a burgeoning refugee population which now threatens institutional coherence. In practical terms, this means that Western countries will need to provide far more financial and in- kind support to this huge refugee community.

71. This support must also be generous. There is a real risk that instability could spread to these vulnerable receiving countries if the international community fails to extend sufficient funding and in-kind support to help them meet the basic needs of the Syrian and now Iraqi communities in their midst. Turkey is a much larger and more prosperous country, but it too has accepted a very significant burden and needs allied and international support to help underwrite the costs of providing for such a large Syrian exile community. As noted above, there is currently a significant 51% gap in UNHCR funding for its Syria Regional Response Plan (UNHCR Internal Monthly Factsheet). The international community must close this gap and the countries of the Alliance must do their part in this regard.

72. Managing border patrol in the Mediterranean poses yet another serious challenge particularly to the European Union, its allies and its regional partners. Here the influx of Syrians into Europe is only part of a broader trend. Although patrolling these waters is essential to defending the viability of European borders, it is not by any means a solution to the broader humanitarian challenge. Of course, the ultimate solution lies in improving security and economic conditions in the countries from which these migrants are fleeing. But in the case of Syria, the situation has only grown worse in recent months. The refugee crisis will likely endure into the foreseeable future and it is thus time to work out long-term strategies for coping with this crisis and mobilizing resources to make a strategic approach possible.

73. There is a risk that simply closing down approaches to European shores may end up compelling people to take ever more dangerous routes and doing so at the hands of highly unscrupulous criminal traffickers. Thousands of people are taking all manner of risk each year to escape violence, persecution and war. Rendering the voyage more dangerous will not solve the problem and is highly questionable in humanitarian terms. Yet some in Europe are calling for an end to rescue missions on the sea. Creative approaches to managing the problem are needed. One possibility might be extending short term visas to Europe and North America to families in need. This is not a permanent solution, but it could help lower the burden on the bordering countries and reduce the pressures of irregular migration, which is highly dangerous for the refugees, a security and health risk for the countries of destination and empowering to criminal groups.

74. Governments will need to review asylum procedures as well as the kind of support extended to the front-line border-states, which are now at their limit and are themselves vulnerable to grave instability as a result of this influx. The level of financial resources available to agencies like UNHCR that are directly charged with coping with this crisis need to be commensurate with the burdens these institutions are taking on. UNHCR has called for states to provide an additional 100,000 resettlement places for Syrian refugees in 2015-2016 with a focus on the most vulnerable, especially women and girls, older people and those with medical needs, refugees at risk due to their sexual orientation and those facing persecution due to their religious or ethnic identity. A recent UN report points to mounting evidence of refugee “pushback” policies that simply shunt the problem elsewhere but that do nothing to ease the general crisis. (UNHCR, 11/7/14) NATO member governments must do all in their power to help the UNHCR achieve its targets for alleviating this humanitarian catastrophe.

75. For Europe, the Dublin II asylum procedures have meant that the country where the initial point of entry is located is also responsible for housing and supporting those refugees through the asylum process. This has placed an enormous burden on frontline states and the results have sometimes been irrational. Critics of the Dublin II Regulations have pointed to a number of problems: 1) serious delays in the examination of asylum claims; 2) excessive use of detention to enforce transfers of asylum seekers; 3) enforced family separations in asylum processing; 4) the lack of an effective system for appealing transfers; 5) limited use of discretionary provisions within the regulations to alleviate specific problems of asylum seekers; 6) compelling refugees to go through the claim process in the country of entry rather than in countries where they may have family or other connections; 7) the enormous burdens therefore placed on front-line Mediterranean EU member states (most notably, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Malta) The so-called Dublin III regulations sought to address some of these problems. These regulations strengthened the rights of asylum seekers to gain information about their status in the process and to launch appeals. But it has not changed the fundamental structural problems that have so burdened Europe’s frontline states.

76. The current system makes it very difficult for those seeking asylum to live with family members in a European country if that country was not the point of entry. This only increases the burden on already over-stretched countries of entry. The Mediterranean is a European border and not simply the border of Italy and Greece. It may be time to re-examine an apparently anachronistic asylum system and to reform the way refugee reception is managed and the burden is shared. The current system is simply not adequate to the challenges posed by the current crisis. Innovative ideas are needed. It might be possible, for example, to organize EU reception facilities for refugees in Italy or Greece. This would alter procedures and protocols, thus reducing the burden on these two countries. It would also seem to make sense to allowing asylum seekers to join their families living in Europe while their cases are under review and to review those cases in the country where the family resides rather than at the point of entry. Short term visas might also help at the margins. That said, there is a great deal of resistance to such ideas from many non-frontline states. An open and frank discussion is essential within Europe about this problem. At the same time, North America must also make more of a contribution to alleviate the stress on refugees, the frontline states in the region and the frontline European Mediterranean states.

77. National legal standards for prosecuting human traffickers need to be more closely aligned among European countries. Too often, traffickers have escaped prosecution only to return immediately to their illegal and immoral activities. Improved cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries is also essential in this regard. Greater intelligence sharing and improved efforts to share evidence could be very helpful.

78. The breakdown of health care systems in Syria poses an enormous threat to that population but also to the global health system. The spread of tuberculosis, polio and other disease constitute a major setback to containing these diseases. The onset of Ebola in West Africa could be a harbinger of an even more consequential health threat. More resources and personnel are needed to meet the health care needs of the refugee populations from Syria and Iraq. Ways are also needed to provide care to those who are migrating in an irregular manner and who are thus skipping initial health screening procedures.

79. A great effort is needed to identify unregistered refugees dispersed in host countries. It is very difficult to provide support to unregistered refugees and it complicates the task of host country governments. Working with refugees who are dispersed in the host community involves different governmental agencies. It is hard to identify who the target population is and even harder to assist host communities, especially in the absence of a comprehensive systematic need assessment exercise. There are also compelling security challenges linked to this particular problem.

80. This crisis has once again exposed the unique problems women face in conflict. There is an urgent need to raise awareness of the dangers of early marriage, which can ultimately lead to economic hardship, particularly when it takes the form of enslavement. Strategies are needed to end these kinds of practices.

81. Efforts are needed to empower the refugee population by enhancing its capacity to become self-reliant. This requires the extension of the right to work in host countries, including Europe and North America. It also demands that host countries with broad backing of the international community provide ample support for education and skills development. The experience of Syrian refugees will ultimately shape Syria’s future, and this consideration should help shape the international community’s approach to training and education. At the same time, illegal labour markets in Europe have acted as a catalyst for human trafficking and have nourished false promises for economic migrants. These markets need to be shut down, and this should be made apparent in those communities, for example, in Africa, where such false promises inspire young people to undertake very dangerous and often fruitless voyages.

82. The international community must insist on maintaining open humanitarian corridors in Syria and Iraq to help those who remain to meet their basic needs and live in a modicum of security. This is obviously no easy task and in many cases, it will be impossible to carry out. But it should remain a goal where this is possible. Syrian officials and rebel groups should be held accountable for using food, water and health services as weapons of war. According to the UN, 4,4 million Syrians currently lack access to adequate clean water supplies and the situation is worsening.

83. Indeed, ISIS has made water control a key element of its military strategy in Iraq and has cut off supplies to villages resisting their rule. Should it capture a major dam, the consequences could be horrific for the civilian population (Cunningham). Decontaminating water, treating sewage, and restoring sanitation are essential to restoring basic health standards. It is, however, highly unlikely that the Syrian government or ISIS will respond to external pressure to alter what each perversely sees as part of its respective military strategy. If this is the case, then the international community should gird itself for more cross border humanitarian operations. Efforts should be made to lay the legal and practical groundwork to make this possible. Not coincidentally, such an effort ought to be very closely related to any strategy to slow the movement of refugees and IDPs.

84. International support for proper food and health care delivery to the millions of Syrian refugees who have been compelled to leave their country is crucial. This requires enormous and sustained financial and in kind support on a heretofore unprecedented level. It is also essential to begin to reinforce refugee housing so that millions are not compelled to live in facilities that fail to provide adequate protection from the elements.

85. It is critical to ramp up vaccination programs both in Syria and beyond to prevent a massive public health crisis that would not be contained to Syria itself. Nutrition programmes are also essential. For example, starving children remain highly vulnerable to infectious diseases. Public health experts have suggested that an effective response to polio must involve a significant increase in the quantity and quality of food delivered to all areas in need, regardless of the military force controlling the area. The international community must also pressure the regime as well as other participants in this conflict to take steps to restore some degree of a public health system including a vaccination program. The Syrian government must ultimately be held accountable for denying basic health care to millions of its own citizens as should those rebel groups that have essentially adopted a scorched earth approach to this civil conflict. Russia and China should be encouraged to use their leverage for these humanitarian ends.

86. The Syrian government is poorly disposed to meeting the basic requirements of millions of its people and these needs will not be met if all international assistance must be channelled through Damascus. Of course, this ultimately requires a reconsideration of the international community’s fundamental approach to the crisis and to the Syrian state, the legitimacy of which is now seriously questionable given the crimes it is committing against its own people.

87. Italy’s Mare Nostrum mission to save highly endangered refugees on the Mediterranean and to counter human trafficking has been a great success, although its range has been limited. It is nevertheless estimated that the operation has saved more than 130 thousand individuals, including 25,000 Syrians. That mission has also resulted in the arrest of 600 traffickers, the confiscation of a large amount of contraband and significant acquisition of evidence for eventual criminal prosecution (Bubbico). Mare Nostrum will end in November 2014 and will be succeeded by a Frontex operation called Triton that critics argue will not be sufficiently ambitious to deal with the increased number of refugees fleeing countries such as Libya, Syria, Iraq and Eritrea. Triton will only operate 30 nautical miles off of European shores. In contrast to Mare Nostrum, it will not have an explicit search and rescue mandate, while its budget will be one third of the budget for Mare Nostrum. This effectively downgrades the broad humanitarian mission of Mare Nostrum in a year when an estimated 3,000 people have died attempting to reach Europe across the Mediterranean– more than double the previous peak in 2011 (Robinson).

88. Italy has called on its European partners to make a more significant contribution, and its leaders have expressed frustration with the lack of a better coordinated and more comprehensive response. Their frustration is justified. It is time to launch a far more ambitious follow-up mission engaging more European – and possibly even non EU – naval assets while including a specific search and rescue component in the mission. A broad humanitarian mission on the Mediterranean to continue Mare Nostrum’s policy of protecting refugees on the sea and to counter human trafficking is essential. To continue this critical support would be an expression of solidarity both with these Europe’s “frontline” countries and with the refugees themselves. This, however, should be part of a comprehensive strategy that at its core seeks to limit the numbers of people taking this highly dangerous path to find a modicum of security.

89. Finally, refugee matters are often treated as a secondary issue in the security field. The current crisis in the Middle East suggests that these issues, in fact, pose extraordinarily compelling security as well as humanitarian challenges. Both NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly need to monitor these matters more closely. It essential that that Allied nations begin to develop a more comprehensive approach to a refugee crisis that is fomenting conflict and undermining the collective security interests of this Alliance. The support of allied countries for a follow-up to model European operation Mare Nostrum would be one way to contribute. Ideally this should be undertaken by the EU itself, but NATO might be positioned to provide additional support. Although NATO’s only explicit engagement in the Syrian crisis has been to deploy missile defence assets on Turkey’s borders, member governments should consider ways to provide humanitarian relief to victims of this cruel war. NATO has impressive crisis management capacities, including logistics and infrastructure support systems that could be put to use to help manage this burgeoning and deeply threatening humanitarian crisis. NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), is a partnership tool for civil emergency planning. NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Committee oversees EADRCC which has established a working relationship with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Turkey and Jordan asked for emergency supplies and financial assistances through EADRCC in 2012 and Turkey did so again in 2014. NATO member governments should explore the possibility of further expanding EADRCC’s role in assisting allies and partners in the region which have been so overwhelmed by this refugee crisis.

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