United States Military Academy (West Point, NY)



United States Military Academy (West Point, NY)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY, Friday, February 25, 2011 | |

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|Thank you General, for that introduction.  It’s a pleasure to be back here at West Point, although as I often say, it’s always a |

|pleasure to be away from Washington, D.C. |

|One of the greatest privileges of serving as Secretary of Defense over the last 4-plus years is the opportunity to visit the service |

|academies – to speak to and hear from the future leadership of the finest military in the world.  This will be the fourth – and final – |

|time that I address the cadets of the U.S. Military Academy as Secretary of Defense.  The last time I spoke to the entire corps of |

|cadets in 2008, it was an evening lecture on strategy and leadership that ran to nearly 50 minutes.  Rumor has it that there were a few |

|stalwart cadets still awake at the end.  Knowing most of you have been up since dawn, and knowing that the Firsties get to start their |

|100th Day weekend celebrations when I’m done here, I’ve decided to make this presentation much shorter. |

|Nonetheless, I did want to take this last opportunity to share some thoughts with you, and through you to the Army as a whole, about the|

|institution you will someday lead – the United States Army – and how it can better prepare itself, and in particular its leaders, for a |

|complex and uncertain future.  No doubt the Army’s challenges are daunting and diverse – supporting families, caring for wounded |

|warriors, dealing with post-traumatic stress, doing right by soldiers, strengthening the NCO corps, training and equipping for the |

|future, and finding a way to pay for it all.  Today, I’d like to focus on three interrelated issues: |

|The future of conflict, and the implications for the Army; |

|How best to institutionalize the diverse capabilities that will be required; and |

|The kinds of officers the Army will need for the 21st Century, and how the service must change to retain and empower those leaders. |

|When you receive your commission and walk off the parade field for the last time, you will join an Army that, more than any other part |

|of America’s military, is an institution transformed by war.  The change has been wrenching for a service that a decade ago was |

|essentially a garrison army, a smaller version of the Cold War force that faced down the Soviets in Europe and routed Saddam’s divisions|

|from Kuwait – a force mainly organized, trained, and equipped to defeat another large modern army. |

|The Army’s ability to learn and adapt in recent years allowed us to pull Iraq back from the brink of chaos in 2007 and, over the past |

|year, to roll back the Taliban from their strongholds in Afghanistan.  As one of your former professors from the SOSH department, now |

|the Army’s vice chief of staff,  General Pete Chiarelli, once said it is important that the hard fought lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan |

|are not merely “observed” but truly “learned” – incorporated into the service’s DNA and institutional memory. |

|Which leads to the first major challenge I see facing the Army: How will it structure itself – how will it train and equip – for the |

|extraordinarily diverse range of missions it will face in the future?  There has been an overwhelming tendency of our defense |

|bureaucracy to focus on preparing for future high-end conflicts – priorities often based, ironically, on what transpired in the last |

|century – as opposed to the messy fights in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But without succumbing to what I once called “next-war-itis,” I do |

|think it important to think about what the Army will look like and must be able to do after large US combat units are substantially |

|drawn down in Afghanistan – and what that means for young leaders entering the force. |

|We can’t know with absolute certainty what the future of warfare will hold, but we do know it will be exceedingly complex, |

|unpredictable, and – as they say in the staff colleges – “unstructured.”  Just think about the range of security challenges we face |

|right now beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: terrorism and terrorists in search of weapons of mass destruction, Iran, North Korea, military |

|modernization programs in Russia and China, failed and failing states, revolution in the Middle East, cyber, piracy, proliferation, |

|natural and man-made disasters, and more.  And I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military|

|engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect.  We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, |

|Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more – we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.   |

|The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and |

|Fallujah can no doubt attest.  And one of the benefits of the drawdown in Iraq is the opportunity to conduct the kind of full-spectrum |

|training – including mechanized combined arms exercises – that was neglected to meet the demands of the current wars.  Looking ahead, |

|though, in the competition for tight defense dollars within and between the services, the Army also must confront the reality that the |

|most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements – whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or|

|elsewhere.  The strategic rationale for swift-moving expeditionary forces, be they Army or Marines, airborne infantry or special |

|operations, is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, disaster response, or stability or security force |

|assistance missions.  But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army |

|into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined,” as General MacArthur so delicately put it. |

|By no means am I suggesting that the U.S. Army will – or should – turn into a Victorian nation-building constabulary – designed to chase|

|guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea.  But as the prospects for another head-on clash of large mechanized land armies seem less likely,|

|the Army will be increasingly challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy formations to those in the leadership of the|

|Pentagon, and on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, who ultimately make policy and set budgets. |

|What we can expect in the future is that potential adversaries – be they terrorists, insurgents, militia groups, rogue states, or |

|emerging powers – will seek to frustrate America’s traditional advantages, in particular our ability to shoot, move and communicate with|

|speed and precision.  From the look of things, the Army will not repeat the mistakes of the past, where irregular warfare was shunted to|

|the side after Vietnam.  The odds of repeating another Afghanistan or Iraq – invading, pacifying, and administering a large third world |

|country – may be low.  But in what General Casey has called “an era of persistent conflict,” those unconventional capabilities will |

|still be needed at various levels and in various locations.  Most critically to prevent festering problems from growing into full-blown |

|crises which require costly – and controversial – large-scale American military intervention. |

|A second challenge that I believe faces today’s and tomorrow’s Army – your Army – is whether and how the Army can adapt its practices |

|and culture to these strategic realities.  From the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, our soldiers and junior- and |

|mid-level leaders down range have been adjusting and improvising to the complex and evolving challenges on the ground – in many cases |

|using the Internet, especially tools of social media, to share tactical lessons learned in real time with their colleagues at the front |

|or preparing to deploy back here in the United States. |

|As one would expect, it took some time for the bureaucracies here at home – an Army and a Defense Department structured primarily to |

|prepare for war, not to wage war – to respond with remotely similar agility.  But with inspired leadership and creative thinking the |

|progress has been real.  For example, the doctrine for the new Advise and Assist Brigades was developed and fielded in a couple of |

|months, and over the past two years these reconfigured units have played a key role in the successful transition to full Iraqi security |

|responsibility. |

|But the important question then is:  how can the Army prepare, train, and retain officers with the necessary multifaceted experience to |

|take on a broad range of missions and roles?  Where there is not one, but many doctrines in play, often simultaneously.  For example, |

|given the ongoing and prospective requirements to train, equip and advise foreign armies and police, how do we institutionalize security|

|force assistance into the Army’s regular force structure, and make the related experience and skill set a career enhancing pursuit? |

|I hope you take some instruction and inspiration from the career of Russell Volckmann, Class of 1934.  At the outbreak of World War II |

|Volckmann was serving as a full-time embed in the Philippine army.  After the Japanese invasion, Volckmann fought alongside his |

|Philippine unit, and rather than surrender, he disappeared into the jungles and raised a guerrilla army of more than 22,000 men that |

|fought the Japanese for the next three years.  When the Japanese commander finally decided to surrender, he made the initial overtures |

|not to General MacArthur, but to Volckmann, who went on after the war to help create the Green Berets.  My point: if you chart a |

|different path, there’s no telling the impact you could have – on the Army, and on history. |

|Indeed, the Army has always needed entrepreneurial leaders with a broad perspective and a diverse range of skills.  As President Kennedy|

|put it, speaking on these grounds half a century ago, “your military responsibilities will require a versatility and an adaptability |

|never before required in war or in peace.”  And for an era of full spectrum conflict, when we confront security dilemmas that Kennedy |

|called “new in intensity, ancient in origin,” America can succeed only with leaders who are themselves full-spectrum in their thinking. |

|The military will not be able to train or educate you to have all the right answers – as you might find in a manual – but you should |

|look for those experiences and pursuits in your career that will help you at least ask the right questions. |

|Maxwell Taylor, class of ’22, was an Asia foreign area specialist in the 1930s before becoming the famed commander of the 101st |

|airborne, superintendent of West Point, and later Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  He once observed of his fellow |

|academy grads that, “the goats of my acquaintance who have leapfrogged their classmates are men who continue their intellectual growth |

|after graduation.” |

|So in addition to the essential troop command and staff assignments, you should look for opportunities that in the past were off the |

|beaten path, if not a career dead end – and the institutional Army should not only tolerate, but encourage you in the effort.  Such |

|opportunities might include further study at grad school, teaching at this or another-first rate university, spending time at a think |

|tank, being a congressional fellow, working in a different government agency, or becoming a foreign area specialist.  On that last note,|

|I would encourage you to become a master of other languages and cultures, a priority of mine since taking this post.  A pilot program |

|begun in 2008 to incentivize ROTC cadets to learn foreign languages has grown from a couple dozen participants to some 1,800 today. |

|It is incumbent on the Army to promote – in every sense of the word – these choices and experiences for its next generation of leaders –|

|the junior- and mid-grade officers in Army ranks who represent the most battle-tested group in its history.  More so, in fact, than many|

|of the superiors they might report to.   The U.S. military has always distinguished itself from other countries by the degree of trust |

|and responsibility placed on its small unit leaders.  But Iraq and Afghanistan – called the “captains’ wars” – have taken this trend to |

|a new level, where officers of lower and lower rank were put in the position of making decisions of higher and higher degrees of |

|consequence and complexity.  Officers now poised to take what they’ve learned to shape the institution to which they’ve given so much – |

|as some are now doing as your instructors here at West Point.  The diversity of experiences and essential adaptability of this |

|generation are crucial to dealing the complexity of conflict in this century. |

|Which brings me to the third and greatest challenge facing your Army, and frankly, my main worry.  How can the Army can break-up the |

|institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion processes, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire|

|its best, brightest, and most-battled tested young officers to lead the service in the future?  After the major Afghan troop deployments|

|end in 2014, how do we keep you and those 5 or 10 years older than you in our Army?  This is something I’ve discussed many times with |

|the current service leadership and with General Dempsey, the TRADOC commander, before recommending him to the President as the next Army|

|Chief of Staff. |

|The context for this discussion is that the institutional Army, for the better part of the past decade has understandably, and |

|appropriately, been consumed by “force generation” – manning units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in response to the orders of |

|America’s civilian leadership.  I will never forget one of my first decisions as Secretary of Defense in early 2007, which was to extend|

|Army combat tours from 12 to 15 months, including for units that had spent less than a year at home.  This was perhaps my most difficult|

|decision over the past four years because I knew the hardship this would place on those who had already borne so much for this country. |

|But the alternative was a disaster for our country and for Iraq.  And the Army did as ordered and much more.  One result is that you |

|will be joining a force that has been decisively engaged for nearly a decade.  And while it is resilient, it is also stressed and tired.|

|The effect of the Army’s necessary focus on preparing and manning units for Iraq or Afghanistan has provided younger officers, |

|especially those in high demand combat and support specialties, little opportunity to do more than catch their breath and then get ready|

|for the next deployment.  And on top of the repeat deployments, there is the garrison mindset and personnel bureaucracy that awaits them|

|back home – often cited as primary factors causing promising officers to leave the Army just as they are best positioned to have a |

|positive impact on the institution. |

|Consider that, in theater, junior leaders are given extraordinary opportunities to be innovative, take risks, and be responsible and |

|recognized for the consequences.  The opposite is too often true in the rear-echelon headquarters and stateside bureaucracies in which |

|so many of our mid-level officers are warehoused.  Men and women in the prime of their professional lives, who may have been responsible|

|for the lives of scores or hundreds of troops, or millions of dollars in assistance, or engaging in reconciling warring tribes, they may|

|find themselves in a cube all day re-formatting power point slides, preparing quarterly training briefs, or assigned an ever expanding |

|array of clerical duties.  The consequences of this terrify me. |

|Furthermore, the creation and increasing number of autonomous Brigade Combat Teams, the substantive growth of other agencies, |

|headquarters and support bureaucracies, and simply meeting the needs of a bigger Army at war have created a voracious demand for |

|mid-level staff officers.  The result of meeting these shortfalls has been essentially automatic promotion for elevation to Major and |

|Lieutenant Colonel.  |

|A few years ago a brigade commander in Baghdad – Colonel, now Brigadier General, J.B. Burton – wrote a memo reflecting on the feedback |

|he was getting from some of his officers about the factors that influenced them to stay in or leave.  They talked about finding respite |

|from the deployment treadmill, getting an opportunity to start or re-acquaint themselves with their families, to develop themselves |

|intellectually through graduate education or other non-conventional assignments.  One of the chief complaints was that the personnel |

|system was, “Numb to individual performance and [had] begun to see every officer as equal." |

|One thing I have learned from decades of leading large public organizations is that it is important to really focus on the top 20 |

|percent of your people and, though it may be politically incorrect to say so, the bottom 20 percent as well.  The former to elevate and |

|give more responsibility and opportunity, the latter to transition out, albeit with consideration and respect for the service they have |

|rendered.  Failure to do this risks frustrating, demoralizing and ultimately losing the leaders we will most need for the future. |

|The promotion rates have started to decrease and, as a matter of course, will decrease further as overseas deployments wind down.  I’ve |

|tried to do my small part to alleviate this situation by ordering the military to pare down the size and number of its headquarters |

|along with reducing the number of general and admirals by nearly 100 – and twice as many civilian executives.  One hoped for effect of |

|these reforms is to reduce the number of personal staff and support positions, and in turn alleviate somewhat the demand on the military|

|services to produce the field grade officers to fill those billets.  This is an effort I’ve encouraged the services to continue, |

|including the Army, in the years ahead. |

|A more merit-based, more individualized approach to officer evaluations could also do much to combat the risk-averse, zero-defect |

|culture that can take over any large, hierarchical organization.  One that too often incentivizes officers to keep their head down, |

|avoid making waves, or disagree with superiors.  The Army has been fortunate throughout its history to have officers who, at critical |

|times, exercise respectful, principled dissent.  Men like General George Marshall, who rose to high rank and greatness even as he told |

|blunt truths to superiors ranging from Blackjack Pershing to Franklin D. Roosevelt.  But no doubt that takes courage, and entails real |

|risk, especially given the current system. In an article for Military Review following his tenure as a corps commander in Iraq, General |

|Chiarelli suggested that, while the opinions of an officer’s superiors should hold the most sway, it’s time that the Army’s officer |

|evaluations also consider input from peers and, yes, subordinates – in my view the people hardest to fool by posturing, B.S. and |

|flattery.  And as two Iraq veterans, then-Lieutenant Colonels John Nagl and Paul Yingling, wrote in a professional journal some years |

|ago, “the best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the |

|officer corps.  The army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion." |

|Several years ago, it caused something of a stir when we brought General Petraeus back from Iraq to chair a promotion board, to make |

|sure that those colonels who had distinguished themselves in war – including those who advised Iraqi and Afghan forces – got due |

|consideration for elevation to brigadier general.  And since then, due to statutory changes and cultural shifts, officers who don’t have|

|cookie-cutter backgrounds, who may not have punched all the traditional tickets, have more of an opportunity to reach higher rank.  But |

|the tendency of any big bureaucracy is to revert to business as usual at the first opportunity – and for the military, that opportunity |

|is, if not peacetime, then the unwinding of sustained combat. |

|There have been a variety of suggestions and ideas put on the table in various venues and publications to give officers – after their |

|initial platoon, company or battalion-level tours – greater voice in their assignments and flexibility to develop themselves personally |

|and professionally in a way that enhances their career and promotion prospects.  For example, instead of being assigned to new positions|

|every two or three years, officers would be able to apply for job openings in a competitive system more akin to what happens in large |

|organizations in the private sector.  The former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, class of ‘76, |

|has written that, “in a smaller professional force competing for talent with the Googles of the world,” reforming this system is a “must|

|do” for the Army to keep its best and brightest leaders. |

|Having said that, when all is said and done, this is the United States Army.  It’s not Apple.  It’s not General Electric. And it’s not |

|the Red Cross.  Taking that oath and accepting that commission means doing what you are told and going where you are needed.  And as |

|practical matter, one cannot manage tens of thousands of officers based on “What color is your parachute?”  But just as the Army has |

|reset and reformed itself when it comes to doctrine, equipment, and training, it must use the eventual slackening of overseas |

|deployments as an opportunity to attack the institutional and bureaucratic constipation of Big Army, and re-think the way it deals with |

|the outstanding young leaders in its lower- and middle-ranks. |

|I have spent the last few minutes addressing some of the real challenges facing the Army, and discussed some of the frustrations |

|experienced by bright young leaders working in any large bureaucracy.  But I would like to close by telling you why I believe you made |

|the right choice, and indeed are fortunate, to have chosen this path.  Because beyond the hardship, heartbreak, and the sacrifice – and |

|they are very real – there is another side to military service.  You have an extraordinary opportunity – not just to protect the lives |

|of your fellow soldiers, but for missions and decisions that may change the course of history.  You will be challenged to go outside |

|your comfort zone and take a risk in every sense of the word.  To expand what you thought you were capable of doing when it comes to |

|leadership, friendship, responsibility, agility, selflessness, and above all, courage.  And you will be doing all of this at an age when|

|many of your peers are reading spreadsheets and making photocopies. |

|One of my favorite quotes from the Revolutionary War era is from a letter Abigail Adams wrote to her son, John Quincy Adams. She wrote |

|him, “these are times in which a genius would wish to live.  It is not in the still calm of life or [in] the repose of a pacific station|

|that great characters are formed. …great necessities call out great virtues.” |

|I typically use that quote in commencement addresses encouraging public service at civilian universities, but those words apply most of |

|all to you, on whose brave and broad young shoulders this era’s “great necessities” will be borne.  Each of you – with your talents, |

|your intelligence, your record of accomplishments – could have chosen something easier or safer and of course better-paid.  But you took|

|on the mantle of duty, honor and country; you passed down the Long Gray Line of men and women who have walked these halls and strode |

|these grounds before you – more than 80 of whom have fallen in battle since 9/11.  For that, you have the profound gratitude and eternal|

|admiration of the American people. |

|As some of you have heard me say before, you need to know that I feel personally responsible for each and every one of you, as if you |

|were my own sons and daughters, for as long as I am Secretary of Defense that will remain true.  My only prayer is that you serve with |

|honor and return home safely.  I personally thank you for your service from the bottom of my heart, I bid you farewell and ask God to |

|bless every one of you. |

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