Composition of the Taliban – Summer 2001



Working PaperByPeter W. Connors, PhD8165906821COLLAPSE OF THE TALIBAN IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTANFew had anticipated the rapid collapse of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Master Sergeant John Bolduc, leader of Operational Detachment Alpha 585—one of several US Army Special Forces’ elite A-teams—had expected the worst. The day before the team infiltrated Afghanistan near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh, he informed his men that they might not survive and advised them to fight to the death rather than surrender or be taken prisoner. Yet, in just over six weeks, Bolduc and approximately 100 additional special operations Soldiers assisted the Northern Alliance in both decisively defeating Taliban military forces and in liberating all six provinces of northern Afghanistan. How did this happen? What factors contributed? This chapter will examine the unique set of circumstances that ultimately shaped events in the North, beginning with President Bush’s call-to-arms and General Tommy Franks’ plan to employ multiple lines of operations. The discussion will then describe the mobilization of US forces; the opening days of the OEF bombing campaign; the infiltration of CIA and SOF teams; the overwhelming dominance of US air power; the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and Konduz; and the insurrection at Qala-i Jangi prison. Additionally, concurrent logistics, civil/military, and humanitarian relief operations will be discussed in detail. Finally, the implications of such a surprising victory over the Taliban in northern Afghanistan will be reviewed and analyzed.On 12 September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the development of realistic military options in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As chapter 3 has already established, nine days later, General Tommy R. Franks, then Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CENTCOM) submitted a plan to President Bush calling for the destruction of al-Qaeda and the illegitimate Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Subsequently, Secretary Rumsfeld approved a mission analysis/military course of action and presented the plan to the President, who then directed that combat operations commence on 7 October. General Franks proposed the simultaneous application of multiple lines of operation that included obtaining basing, staging, and over-flight rights; setting the conditions for executing and supporting sustained combat; directly attacking al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership; destroying the Taliban military and denying them safe-haven; directing operational fires using SOF; maintaining the capability of using conventional forces if necessary; and keeping the Afghan people informed. Adhering to these lines of operation allowed a small contingent of US combat forces to seize the initiative and defeat the Taliban, while avoiding the appearance of an outright invasion. On 22 December, just 78 days after combat operations began, General Franks and his wife, Cathy, attended inauguration ceremonies for President Hamid Karzai and the new Afghan interim government in Kabul. Composition of the Taliban – Summer 2001The term Taliban is typically used in reference to all enemy forces operating in Afghanistan. By the summer of 2001, three principal Taliban sub-groups, with approximately 45,000 total combatants, had emerged: indigenous Afghan Taliban, non-Afghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda (those forces trained by and associated with Osama bin Laden). The non-Afghan component was comprised predominantly of Arabs, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Central Asians. Having formed in the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban, led since the mid-1990s by ethnic Pashtun Mullah Mohammed Omar, was a militant group intent on establishing an Islamist government in Afghanistan and on driving foreign influence from the country. Affiliation with al-Qaeda in 1996 signaled the Taliban’s expanded intentions of spreading global Islamist extremism beyond Afghanistan. By 2001, the Taliban controlled an estimated 80 percent of Afghanistan.Funding for Taliban activities in Afghanistan came primarily from Pakistan; however, sympathetic worldwide Muslim organizations also contributed. Logistics support for Taliban operations originated almost entirely in Pakistan as well. Taliban forces were generally armed with Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifles, 7.62mm PK general-purpose machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, rocket and grenade launchers, mortars, makeshift armed vehicles (pickup truck cavalry), and a limited number of Soviet-era tanks and artillery pieces. Stephen Biddle, a scholar at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, summarized the overall condition of Taliban fighting forces prior to the US intervention by describing them as inexperienced with low morale, poorly trained and unmotivated, lacking Afghan support, susceptible to high levels of defections, vulnerable to surprise attacks, and overly dependent on fragile outside sources of support. Insight into the Northern Alliance The anti-Taliban Northern United Front espoused a less severe form of Islam than did the Taliban, and was led during the summer of 2001 by ousted President Borhanuddin Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud. Since its forces eventually gained control of several Northern Afghan provinces, the UF has been referred to as the Northern Alliance (NA) from 2001 onward. In 1992, mujahideen fighters loyal to Rabbani seized control of Kabul from the regime that had been previously supported by the Soviets. These forces coalesced into the organization that officially became the Northern United Front/Northern Alliance. The NA was unable to unite the country, and subsequently lost control to the Taliban in 1996. As of 2001, the Alliance controlled only the Panjshir Valley, the Shomali plain north of Kabul, and several small enclaves in the mountains of northern Afghanistan.Tragically, General Masoud was killed on 9 September 2001 in Takhar province by two al-Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. Shortly after his death, dire predictions arose regarding the possible disintegration of the Northern Alliance. Masoud, known as the “Lion of Panjshir,” had distinguished himself resisting the Soviet invasion, and was appointed Afghan Defense Minister after the 1992 recapture of Kabul. He was considered an exceptional military strategist and successfully built key, enduring coalitions among disparate anti-Taliban guerilla groups that effectively strengthened the Northern Alliance.After General Masoud’s death, four primary components emerged within the Alliance. The largest contingent was made up of ethnic Tajik forces, commanded by General Mohammed Fahim Khan. Fahim, former head of intelligence for the NA, was promoted to senior military commander immediately following General Masoud’s demise. In Ghor and Herat provinces, General Mohammed Ismael Khan took charge of additional ethnic Tajik NA forces. Known as the “Lion of Herat,” Ismael had been a mujahideen commander during the Soviet invasion and was previously governor of Herat province. Ustad Atta Mohammed was another NA Tajik general allied with Fahim in northern Afghanistan. Ethnic Uzbeks, under General Abdul Rashid Dostum, formed a third element of the Alliance. In the 1980s, General Dostum’s militia controlled six provinces in northern Afghanistan. His stronghold had been the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which he captured from the Taliban, only to lose it in 1999. The final faction of the NA was the Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party), comprised of ethnic Hazara Shi’a fighters and led by Karim Khalili. This group had been driven out of central Afghanistan in 1998 by the Taliban, yet managed to retain several locations throughout the region. During the summer of 2001 prior to the US intervention in Afghanistan, the NA was short on manpower, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped. It was capable only of maintaining stalemate conditions with the Taliban. Although troop strength estimates varied at the time, it was likely that the NA could muster only about 18,000 combat forces to support upcoming US operations. Northern Alliance armaments included AK-47 rifles; PK machine guns; ZGU-1 heavy machine guns; single and multi-barrel rocket launchers; and a limited number of artillery pieces, tanks, and other armored vehicles. Also, the NA retrofitted light trucks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles with 32-shot 57mm rocket pods recovered from Russian Mi-24 and Mi-25 combat helicopters. In addition, the Alliance was thought to have had at the time eight Mi-17 and six Mi-8 helicopters, along with four Soviet-built helicopter gunships. Logistics support for the Northern Alliance was difficult at best. Supply routes to Tajikistan were long, arduous, and susceptible to Taliban interdiction. Food and other perishable supplies were often purchased on the local market. The Beginning of OEF: The US Central Intelligence Agency in AfghanistanIn a televised address on 20 September 2001 to a joint session of Congress and the American people, President Bush described the 9/11terrorist attacks as “an act of war against our country.” To thunderous applause, he went on to say that the US response “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated,” and that such a response might include dramatic strikes and “covert operations, secret even in success.” Bush then issued a presidential finding authorizing the CIA to kill or capture terrorist leaders including Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members. The CIA already had extensive experience in Afghanistan, having provided covert support to the mujahideen rebels during the Soviet occupation. Since 1999, CIA paramilitary units had been operating secretly in Afghanistan and had established important contacts with Northern Alliance leaders prior to 9/11. The agency also had two Afghan war plans prepared, one titled “Going to War” and the other “Worldwide Attack Matrix.” On 13 September, Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet and J. Cofer Black, Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC), briefed these plans to President Bush. Two days later, Tenet and Black made the same presentation at a Camp David war cabinet meeting attended by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld; Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Army General Hugh Shelton; and JCS Chairman Select, Air Force General Richard Myers. After this meeting, the president authorized the CIA to proceed with their plans and gave the agency all the necessary resources, approvals, and legal authority to do so. The CIA would be the first “boots on the ground” and would lead the way for the military. Less than a week after the President’s congressional address, a team of ten CIA officers (code named JAWBREAKER and commanded by the CTC) left Dushanbe, Tajikistan in a Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter, entered Afghan airspace, crossed the Hindu Kush Mountains through the 14,500 foot-high Anjuman Pass, and landed deep in the Panjshir Valley near the village of Barak. JAWBREAKER was the first US unit of any kind to enter Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They brought three million dollars in cash with them, and would eventually receive $10 million more, all to be used in garnering support from the Northern Alliance. Their mission was to link up with the Northern Alliance and convince them to assist the CIA and the US military in hunting down bin Laden and al-Qaeda. They were also tasked with assessing the military readiness of the NA, recommending methods for improving NA capabilities, developing preliminary intelligence data, preparing initial target designation information, and laying the groundwork for the arrival of US SOF. Typically, a Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team from the CIA Special Activities Division would have been assigned a mission such as this; however, Director Tenet selected Cofer Black to assemble the new team and to direct agency activities in Afghanistan. US Forces on the MoveOn 14 September 2001, Congress authorized the use of military force against the terrorist groups responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Also, President Bush authorized the activation of 35,500 military reservists (approximately 10,000 of these were Army Soldiers). In addition, the following US active duty military units were ordered to deploy over the next few weeks:552nd Air Control Wing, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma 22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell AFB, Kansas 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale, Louisiana (B-52)5th Bomb Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota (B-52) 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth, South Dakota (B-1) 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia (F-15)20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, South Carolina (F-16) 27th Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, New Mexico ((F-16) 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah (F-16) 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp Pendleton, California 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina 10th Mountain Division, US Army, Fort Drum, New York 355th Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona (A-10) 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home, Idaho (F-15, F-16)US Army Special Operations Units, Fort Campbell, Kentucky USS Bataan Amphibious Assault Group, Norfolk, Virginia USS Carl Vinson Carrier Battle Group, Bremerton, Washington (F-14, F-18) USS Enterprise Carrier Battle Group, Norfolk, Virginia (F-14, F-18) USS Kearsage Amphibious Assault Group, Norfolk, Virginia USS Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group, Yokosuka, Japan (F-18) USS Peleliu Amphibious Assault Group, San Diego USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Battle Group, Norfolk, Virginia (F-14, F-18)The USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups were already on station in the Arabian Sea. Attached to the Enterprise Group were two submarines, two cruisers, and five destroyers with a combined capacity to launch approximately 500 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Carl Vinson was accompanied by two submarines, two cruisers, two destroyers (400 Tomahawk missiles), an amphibious assault ship and a dock landing ship, along with the USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). On the Peleliu was the special operations capable 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), plus AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft, and AH-1W (Super Cobra), CH-46, CH-53, and UH-1N helicopters. On 19 September, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group (configured similarly to the Vinson Group) and the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group with the 26th MEU on board left Norfolk for the Arabian Sea. Finally, on 30 September, the USS Kitty Hawk Battle Group departed Yokosuka, Japan for OEF duty. Onboard, however, in addition to F-14 and F-18 Navy aircraft, were Army MH-60 Blackhawk and MH-47 Chinook helicopters and USAF MH-53 Pave Low helicopters, along with nearly 1,000 special operations personnel from the US Army Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command.By the end of September, USAF long-range precision strike aircraft were ready for combat missions and many had been repositioned to forward operating bases such as Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. These aircraft included the B-2A Spirit stealth bomber based at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. With several in-flight refuelings, the B-2A was capable of flying round trip, non-stop, from Whiteman to Afghanistan and back, and could deliver thousand-pound GBU-31 and GBU-32 joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), as well as GBU-36 and GBU-37 (deep penetrating) precision guided bombs on each mission. B-1B Lancer supersonic bombers, based at Diego Garcia and in Oman, were also capable of carrying JDAM precision guided munitions, plus CBU 87/89/97 cluster bombs and Mk 82 500-pound iron bombs. Numerous B-52 Stratofortresses, also forward-deployed to Diego Garcia, had been modified to carry AGM-86C air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM), along with JDAMs and cluster bombs. Also, a large number of additional USAF aircraft (e.g. F-15s, F-16s, and KC-135 air-to-air refueling tankers) had been flown to the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan in preparation for OEF. In late September 2001, the United States secured basing rights from the Republic of Uzbekistan to use the former Soviet airbase at Karshi Kandabad (K2) about 100 miles north of the Afghan border. By early October, nearly 2,000 US military personnel were operating at K2. Among them were lead elements of Joint Special Operation Task Force-North (JSOTF-N / TF Dagger); members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR / “Night Stalkers”); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) personnel, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers to serve as a quick reaction force and provide base security; along with numerous support forces (logistics, signal, civil affairs, PSYOPs, etc.). The 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky formed the core of JSOTF-N. This group had previously been assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and its Soldiers were language qualified, culturally trained, and regionally oriented for the OEF mission. On 19-20 October, ODA 555 and ODA 595 from the 5th SFG would become the first US military units to infiltrate Afghanistan. The 160th SOAR provides aviation support for special operations forces. The Regimental mission statement asserts that the 160th will “organize, equip, train, resource, and employ Army special operations aviation forces worldwide in support of contingency missions and the warfighting commanders.” Night Stalker missions are flown under the cover of darkness whenever possible; the pilots are equipped with aviator night vision goggles and forward-looking infrared devices. Nearly 2,000 officers, men, and women serve in the 160th, which is comprised of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, three Aviation Battalions, and a Special Operations Training Company. The 1st Battalion has a Light Assault Company (MH-6 helicopters), a Light Attack Company (AH-6s), and two Assault Companies (MH-60K Blackhawks and MH-60L integrated direct action penetrator helicopters). Second Battalion, with three Heavy Assault Companies, flies MH-47E Chinooks, while 3rd Battalion has two Assault Companies (MH-60Ls) and one Heavy Assault Company (MH-47Ds). The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is the USAF component of the USSOC. AFSOC forces “conduct infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, refueling, and precision firepower missions” in support of SOF operations worldwide. Airborne broadcasting; advising foreign governments; and providing combat controllers, weathermen, and para-rescuemen are among AFSOC’s unique capabilities. Additional mission-oriented tasks include shaping the battlefield, information operations, precision engagement, SOF mobility, combat support, and aerospace interface. The most formidable aircraft in the AFSOC arsenal is the AC-130 Gunship. These aircraft are armed with side-firing weapons systems coupled with highly sophisticated sensors and can provide either “surgical firepower” or “area saturation” in support of SOF ground forces. The AC-130H (call sign Spectre) and the AC-130U (call sign Spooky) are armed with L60 40mm Bofors cannons and M102 105mm Howitzer cannons. “U” models also now have 25mm GAU-12 Gatling guns. Other AFSOC aircraft include the EC-130J Commando Solo (airborne broadcasting), HC-130P/N (search and rescue), MC-130E/H Combat Talon (infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, psyops, helicopter air refueling), MC-130P Combat Shadow (clandestine, low visibility, helicopter air refueling), MH-53J/M Pave Low helicopters (low-level, long-range penetration), U-28A (utility aircraft support), and the MQ-1 Predator (armed, remote-piloted aircraft). There are nearly 13,000 active-duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian personnel in the Air Force Special Operations Command.Additional strategic airborne assets, including the RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (Brave Axe), U-2 (Dragon Lady) High Altitude Reconnaissance aircraft, E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, EC-130 Compass Call, E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS), and RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft were also deployed to the war zone. Also, two supplementary task forces were established. Task Force Sword, comprised of Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D/Delta Force), would concentrate on capturing/killing Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, while Task Force Bowie would gather human intelligence data in support of the OEF mission. Finally, international participation in OEF was limited initially to Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey. Britain, for example, deployed units from the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), an Air Mobile Brigade, a Parachute Regiment, and the Royal Marines. British aircraft including Nimrods (air-sea rescue), Canberras (reconnaissance), E3-D Sentries (airborne early warning), VC-10s tankers, and Tristar transports; three Tomahawk cruise missile-equipped nuclear powered submarines were also dispatched to the theater. Eventually, 27 coalition countries would send more than 14,000 troops to Afghanistan in support of the United States and OEF. The Air Campaign BeginsHaving been in Afghanistan for more than a week, the JAWBREAKER team was anxious for the US bombing campaign to begin. The team had already completed a series of GPS surveys of Northern Alliance frontline positions as well as those of the opposing Taliban. This had been done in an effort to prevent possible collateral damage to NA forces. Gary Schroen, JAWBREAKER’s team leader, was convinced that:Taliban frontline positions offered a clearly defined, target-rich environment made to order for US airpower to strike, and that a concentrated bombing campaign on the Taliban lines would be devastating to their morale and effectiveness. Taliban troops had never suffered the kind of bombardment and punishment they would face from American airpower in the coming fight. Heavy casualties, continuing for days on end, would break the Taliban.” Northern Alliance General Ismail Kahn concurred, stating, “If their [Taliban] front lines are heavily damaged, my forces can complete their destruction.” He too, along with all of the NA leadership, was anxiously awaiting the promised US air strikes. At 9:10 PM on 7 October 2001, cheers and celebration erupted at the CIA camp in the Panjshir Valley. Explosions could be seen off in the direction of Kabul; the long-awaited bombing campaign had begun. Delays resulted from a number of issues involving primarily combat search and rescue capabilities, proper target designation, a shortage of approved targets, and a heavy emphasis on collateral damage avoidance. All potential targets were scrutinized in painstaking detail. In fact, military attorneys in the Pentagon, at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), at CENTCOM, and onboard Navy aircraft carriers routinely assessed potential target lists and approved raids and air strikes. Frustrated with the situation, General Franks stepped in and put a stop to at least some of the micromanagement from the Pentagon by declaring to JCS Chairman, General Richard B. Myers “that I am not going along with Washington giving tactics and targets to our kids in the cockpits and on the ground in Afghanistan.” The campaign was directed by US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) Commander and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) for OEF, Lieutenant General Charles Wald, from the newly established Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Wald’s mission statement was clear: “On order, Combined Forces Air Component Command provides air support for friendly forces working with the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces in order to defeat hostile Taliban and al-Qaeda forces and to set the conditions for regime removal and long-term regional stability.”In a televised address to the nation on 8 October, President Bush announced that “On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes.” Although effective, the first night of bombing was far from overwhelming. Only 31 preplanned strategic targets in the vicinities of Kabul, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Shibarghan were hit. No frontline Taliban positions were struck. The opening-round attacks were conducted by Air Force B-2 stealth bombers from Whiteman AFB, Missouri; B-1B and B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia; and by Navy F-14 and F/A-18 fighters from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea. Also, US Navy cruisers, destroyers, and submarines (along with two British submarines) launched Tomahawk missiles in support of the initial offensive. Later that first night, C-17 Globemasters from Ramstein Air Base in Germany began dropping food and medical supplies to Afghan refugees who were fleeing the cities. A US Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) had been working (since the previous summer) with refugees who were forced to leave their homes due to devastating drought conditions. An official humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan prior to the beginning of OEF. Years of war, unproductive agriculture, and failure of the government to provide basic services had left a majority of Afghanistan’s 26 million citizens impoverished. During the first four nights of the air campaign, C-17s airdropped nearly 150,000 humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) to these needy Afghans. Two and one-half million HDRs would be dropped in Afghanistan before the end of the year, and by April 2002, the World Food Program and the USAID had distributed 343,000 metric tons of food throughout the country. Surprisingly, the propaganda war had started two days before the initial OEF air strikes. On 5 October, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, from the 193rd Special Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, began broadcasting radio transmissions over Afghanistan. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), activated on 4 October at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, developed a variety (different themes, objectives, and target audiences) of Commando Solo radio scripts such as this one aimed at the Afghan people: “On September 11, 2001, thousands of people were killed en masse in the United States…policemen, firefighters, teachers, doctors, mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers all killed. Why?” The overall messages were designed to encourage the Taliban to cease support of al-Qaeda, to undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda morale, to promote the legitimacy of US operations, and to convince Afghan citizens that they were not the target of US attacks. Eventually, Commando Solo aircrews would accumulate nearly 4,000 flight hours in support of OEF.JPOTF also developed and printed hundreds of thousands of leaflets that were shipped to Diego Garcia and initially disseminated by B-52 bombers over Afghanistan beginning 15 October. Up to 80,000 leaflets could be packaged in a single MK-129 or modified Rockeye leaflet bomb. In due course, F-16, F-18, A-6, and MC-130 aircraft would also perform high altitude leaflet drops in the AOR. One such leaflet, written in both Pashto and Dari, described US intentions in Afghanistan as honorable, and pictured an Afghan man and an American Soldier shaking hands. Another portrayed radio towers and gave the frequencies for receiving Commando Solo broadcasts. Thousand of transistor radios (many tuned to the now destroyed former Taliban station frequency) were also airdropped, allowing more Afghans to listen to Commando Solo messages. Other leaflets explained how to properly use the daily rations and warned Afghans to stay clear of unexploded ordnance. Meanwhile, the goal of the initial wave of attacks was to gain uncontested control of Afghan airspace and to destroy Taliban air defense capabilities. To this end, US planners placed Scud missile launchers; surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites; early warning radars; and Taliban command-control-communications facilities, airfields, and aircraft on the primary target list. Also hit were Taliban tanks and artillery, the headquarters of two divisions, and the former bin Laden training camp south of Jalalabad. Thirty-five additional targets were attacked on the second day, and by the third day, strikes were conducted during daylight hours. On the fifth day, Air Force aircraft dropped 5,000 pound GBU-28 laser-guided bunker buster bombs on Taliban mountain cave sanctuaries for the first time. AC-130 gunships with their own combat controllers (special operations forces had as yet been unable to enter Afghanistan) and F-15E Strike Eagles from Jaber Air Base in Kuwait (the first use of land base fighters) entered the fray during the second week and began attacking Taliban troop concentrations and vehicles. During the second week of OEF, the target list expanded, signifying a shift in emphasis from preplanned to pop-up (emerging) targets, also called “targets of opportunity.” Special Operations Forces Infiltrate Extensive inclement weather, treacherous terrain, and Taliban anti-aircraft fire had delayed the helicopter insertion of Special Forces A-Teams. Since the beginning of the air campaign, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been pushing for a SOF presence in Afghanistan. “When are the Special Forces people going to get in?” he asked every day. Rumsfeld had championed using SOF, and at a news conference, he commented on the limitations of aircraft (and the bombing), stating “there are certain things they (aircraft) can’t do – they can’t crawl around on the ground and find people.” On the evening of 19-20 October, however, the first of several SF elements infiltrated Afghanistan. The 11-member ODA-555 arrived late in the evening from K2 at the Astaneh JAWBREAKER camp in the Panjshir Valley on board MH-53 Pave Low helicopters. Within a few days, ODA-555 would link up with NA General Bismullah near Baghram. That same night, ODA-595 (12 men) infiltrated the Darya-e Suf Valley on MH-47 Chinooks to join General Dostum’s forces some 70 miles south of Mazar-e Sharif. Not long after, two additional SF members joined 595 and the detachment split into four three-man teams. On the 24 October, ODA 585 landed near Dasht-e-Qaleh then moved south to join General Bariullah Khan’s NA forces near Konduz. October 31st saw the insertion of ODA 553 into Bamian to support Hazara Commander Khalili. Next an eight-man command-and-control element, Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC-53), was inserted to assist General Dostum and his staff on 3 November. On 4 November, ODA-534 landed 24 miles west of Darya-e Suf at Darya-e Balkh to support Northern Alliance General Mohammed Atta. This detachment soon split into two six-man teams; one remained with Atta’s command group, while the other moved ahead to accompany forward NA elements. Finally, ODAs 586 and 594 were flown to a remote landing zone near the Tajikistan border on 8 November. From there, 586 flew south onboard an NA Russian-built helicopter to link up with General Daoud near Farkhar. Detachment 594 moved farther south to the Panjshir Valley. The 5th Special Forces Group A-Teams had been kept in isolation facilities (ISOFAC—no family, no phones, guarded location) at Fort Campbell prior to leaving for K2. Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Commanding General of the United States Army Special Forces, met with the teams at the ISOFAC to explain their mission:Infiltrate the operational areaLink up and build rapport with the Northern AllianceKill the enemy with precision weapons or sniper riflesEquip the NA forcesRecruit and build the NA forcesPlan, advise, and coordinate the battlesProvide “ground truth” to US commanders, andSurvive.This complex mission would soon be consolidated into a single, straightforward, statement for all TF Dagger Soldiers once they reached K2: “Advise and assist the Northern Alliance in conducting combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.” This overly broad statement provided TF Dagger with freedom to command, no operational constraints, and the appropriate amount of leeway necessary to get the job done. ODA 534 team leader, Captain Mark Newman, recalled that “his entire mandate consisted of a handful of PowerPoint slides that told him to conduct unconventional warfare, render Afghanistan no longer a safe haven for terrorists, defeat al-Qaeda, and coup the Taliban.” How he accomplished those goals was up to him. “We were given an extraordinarily wonderful amount of authority to make decisions.”General Dostum Reclaims Mazar-e Sharif“Make no mistake, The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.” Those remarks by President Bush at Barksdale Air Force Base on 11 September were about to come to life on the ground in Afghanistan. In early November, Mazar-e Sharif became the first Taliban-controlled city to fall to Northern Alliance forces. Strategically situated in the Balkh River valley some 35 miles south of Uzbekistan along the 4000-year old Silk Road, Mazar is the capital of Balkh province and has been a major regional trading center since the days of Alexander the Great. As the second largest city in Afghanistan and with a population (U.N. estimate 2001) of 200,000 Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens, Mazar (tomb of the saint) was named in honor of the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, Hazarate Ali, who was enshrined there in a blue-tiled mosque built during the twelfth century. In 1997, the Taliban briefly seized control of Mazar-e Sharif from a mujahideen militia group commanded by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The Taliban were repulsed in just a few days, but returned in force the next year to re-take the city with a vengeance (“the massacre of Mazar-e Sharif”). Dostum’s militia force, along with two others, led by General Mohammed Atta and General Mohammed Mohaqqeq, respectively, were forced to withdraw south through the Balkh Valley to a number of enclaves in the Hindu Kush Mountains. A stalemate would exist between the Taliban and these militia groups, soon to be known collectively as the Northern Alliance, until US forces arrived to support the NA in the October 2001. Pakistani government resistance to the prospects of a Northern Alliance (Uzbeks and Tajiks; no Pashtuns) take-over of Kabul had resulted in the United States’ temporarily withholding SOF support of NA operations even in northern Afghanistan. By mid-late October 2001, however, that attitude had changed dramatically. Senior officials in the Bush administration realized that fully backing the NA offered the best opportunity the US had for defeating the Taliban. Meanwhile, ODA 595 had wasted little time calling in its first series of air strikes on 21 October against Taliban positions in the village of Chapchal. General Dostum was pleased with this first strike. He radioed the opposing Taliban commander and announced, “This is General Dostum speaking. I am here, and I have brought the Americans with me.” In quick succession, NA forces then took the villages of Bishqab, Cobaki, and Oimetan, assisted in great measure by numerous additional air strikes directed by ODA 595. By this time, General Dostum had his full compliment of US support personnel (CIA officers, SF teams, an SF command and control element, and Air Force terminal attack controllers who carried LST-5 satellite radios for contacting strike aircraft and Laser Acquisition Markers [SOFLAM] for pinpointing enemy targets), and he was ready to move north and re-take Mazar-e Sharif. Toward that end, US cargo aircraft dropped much needed food, ammunition, and supplies to NA forces in the Darya Suf Valley. Additionally, since no vehicles were available and terrain in the Darya Valley was so treacherous (winding mountain trails at elevations in excess of 6,000 feet) NA forces and their American counterparts were forced to travel on horseback and by mule. Next, ODA 534 linked up with General Mohammed Atta’s forces in the Balkh River Valley on 4 November. The intent at this point was for Dostum to keep moving through the Darya Suf Valley, while Atta pushed north in the Balkh. Once they met, the combined force (which also included an NA group led by General Mohammed Mohaqiq) would continue up the Balkh Valley and attack the Taliban stronghold at Tangi Gap. On 5 November, General Dostum’s men were again on the move and carried out a classic cavalry charge against well-entrenched Taliban troops at Bai Beche. The astonished Taliban defenders retreated northward toward Tangi. At about the same time, Taliban forces surrendered to General Atta at Aq Kuprok, only to retake the village in a surprise counterattack. Assisted by US air strikes, Atta’s militia was able to regain control of Aq Kuprok the next day. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements had been slaughtered by additional air strikes as they first moved south to assist at the battles of Bai Beche and Aq Kuprok, then once again as they retreated north in disarray. The next village north, Sholgerah, fell with little resistance. Then on 9 November, B-52 strikes, directed by SOF controllers, ended last-ditch efforts by the Taliban to fight at the Tangi Gap (twelve miles south of Mazar at the northern end of the Balkh Valley). Later that day, NA forces crossed the Pul-e-Imam Bukhri Bridge and seized the Beh Dadi civilian airport. The next day, General Dostum and his Special Forces advisers rode into town to the cheers of a grateful local citizenry. Fighting in the city would resume, however, when several hundred Taliban, who had taken refuge in the former Sultan Razia girl’s school, refused to surrender. An estimated 300 Taliban fighters, mostly Pakistanis and non-Afghans, were subsequently killed when US air strikes (called in by Special Forces) destroyed the school. Finally, the Northern Alliance took nearly 3,000 Taliban prisoners in Mazar-e Sharif and the surrounding area. “This is a great victory,” proclaimed NA Deputy Defense Minister, Atiiqullah Baryalai, “Our forces have captured the city. The Taliban are fleeing.” Soon thereafter, Abdul Henan Hemat, head of the Taliban Bakhtar News Agency, conceded victory to the Northern Alliance. “For seven days continuously they have been bombing Taliban positions. They used very large bombs,” Hemat acknowledged reluctantly. Victory at Mazar-e Sharif would represent Operation ENDURING FREEDOM’s first noteworthy success.Northern Alliance Captures Taloqan and KonduzThe ten-man Special Forces A-Team 585 was inserted by helicopter into a landing zone near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh close to the Tajikistan border on 25 October. From there, they made their way south to rendezvous with local Northern Alliance commander, General Bariullah Khan near the Taliban stronghold of Konduz. Their mission was to assist General Bariullah’s forces in taking several small villages and ultimately capturing Konduz. ODA 585 split into two elements on 28 October—one to help equip Bariullah’s forces with additional supplies for the move to Konduz and the other to continue directing air strikes on the Taliban trench lines and command bunkers that lie ahead. At one point, the team doubled back through Tajikistan and re-entered Afghanistan behind Taliban lines. From there, they called in devastating bombing runs on the Taliban reverse slope defensive positions. Northern Alliance fighters then overran Taliban positions at Kal-a-Khata, captured the town of Chickha, and pushed south to the perimeter of Konduz. While General Bariullah and ODA 585 were approaching Konduz from the north, A-Team 586 and Northern Alliance forces commanded by General Daoud Kahn were moving toward Konduz from the southeast. Initially, ODA 586 flew to a remote landing zone near the Tajikistan border on an MH-47E Chinook helicopter. From there, they flew on a Northern Alliance (Russian-built) helicopter to Farkhar for the link-up with General Daoud. By 11 November, the team was calling in air strikes for Daoud’s forces as they attacked the city of Taloqan. NA General Massoud had made Taloqan (located 40 miles east of Konduz) his headquarters until the Taliban seized the city in September 2000. Although an initial assault faltered, NA troops, with the help of US airpower, successfully reconquered Taloqan on 13 November. Ten days later, Daoud captured the city of Khanabad (not to be confused with K2 in Uzbekistan) fifteen miles east of Konduz. ODA 586 controllers had directed dozens of air strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda troops, trucks, tanks, mortar positions, and bunkers along the approach to Khanabad. At the same time that General Daoud was closing on Konduz from the east and General Bariullah was approaching from the north, General Dostum was moving in from the west. Thirty thousand NA troops surrounded the city. Each general conducted his own surrender negotiations. After holding out for several days, the Taliban (along with numerous Uzbeks, Chechens, Pakistanis, and Arabs) finally acknowledged the bleakness of their desperate situation and surrendered Konduz to the Northern Alliance over a four day period from 23-26 November. Dostum set Afghan Taliban free, while foreign fighters and al-Qaeda were held prisoner. With the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and Konduz, the entire northern tier of Afghanistan was now in the hands of Northern Alliance forces. Much of this success was accomplished through devastating US airpower coupled with SOF operators on the ground pinpointing lucrative targets. “The more people we get on the ground, the better the targeting information is,” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld explained after the siege of Konduz. An unusual series of events transpired during the last few days of the Konduz fight. Northern Alliance forces claimed that several Pakistani aircraft had flown into Konduz to rescue Pakistanis who had been fighting along side the Taliban. Observers claimed that the planes were flown by the Pakistani Army Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and that those evacuated included Pakistani generals, intelligence agents, and al-Qaeda leaders. Both the US and Pakistani governments denied the reports. JCS Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, responded to a Pentagon news conference question by declaring that “the runway there is not usable….[too]short for your standard transport aircraft. So we’re not sure where the reports are coming from.” Nevertheless, apparently a significant number of potentially valuable human intelligence sources were able to elude capture. Eventually, many would conclude that the US allowed the airlift in exchange for Pakistan’s continued support in the War on Terrorism. Qala-i Jangi Prison UprisingAfter the Taliban collapse in northern Afghanistan, thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters surrendered to victorious Northern Alliance forces. True to the Afghan fighting tradition, NA leaders accepted at face value the word of the captured Taliban that they would not engage in any further hostilities. As such, the captives were never thoroughly searched for weapons. What the NA may have failed to realize, however, was that the majority of those surrendering were non-Afghan Taliban (Pakistanis, Chechens, and al-Qaeda) who would neither abide by Afghan custom, nor honor their pledge of surrender. About 500 of these prisoners were taken to the 19th-century Qala-i Jangi fortress (six miles west of Mazar-e Sharif) that had served as a Taliban military base and most recently as General Dostum’s headquarters. On 24 November, the day of their arrival at the makeshift Qala detention facililty, Taliban captives killed two NA commanders in separate hand grenade suicide attacks. Despite these unexpected attacks, the NA failed to expand the force guarding the prison (only about 100 NA soldiers). The next morning, two CIA officers, unaccompanied by security, arrived to interrogate the Taliban and to search for al-Qaeda members. Rather than questioning prisoners one-on-one in private, the officers interrogated small groups of Taliban outdoors in the central courtyard of the prison complex. Several Taliban wandered freely within the compound, having been untied by the guards in order to wash and pray. The American presence provoked the Taliban and one attacked a guard with a rock and grabbed the guard’s AK-47. Within minutes, the Taliban seized control of the prison and the remaining guards fled. One of the CIA officers escaped; however the other, 32 year-old Johnny Michael Spann, after having shot three Taliban, was killed in the uprising, thus becoming the first American hostile-fire casualty in Afghanistan. Later that afternoon, US Special Forces and British SAS soldiers arrived at Qala-i Jangi and took control of the situation. For the rest of the day, they called in air strikes on the south end of the compound where the Taliban had concentrated. On 26 November, additional SF troops and Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division (having been flown in from K2 to serve as a quick reaction force) joined the US and British forces at the prison. They established a new command post and positioned an NA tank in the northeast corner of the facility. Unfortunately, a misdirected 2,000 pound bomb struck the north wall of the command post later that morning, killing several NA soldiers and wounding five US and two SAS Soldiers. That evening, two AC-130 Spectre gunships strafed the Taliban end of the prison with cannon fire for more than two hours. By the next day, the surviving Taliban were nearly out of food, water, and ammunition. NA tanks shelled a building where the remaining prisoners held out. By late that afternoon, the fighting ended and a Special Forces team was able to recover “Mike” Spann’s body. A group of Taliban survived, however, by hiding in the basement of the prison complex. For several days they refused to come out despite being doused with burning oil. Finally, on 1 December, 86 Taliban emerged and surrendered after the basement was flooded with frigid well-water. Among the survivors was the so-called “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh, who then was treated at the Afghan hospital in Sheberghan, detained for debriefing at Camp Rhino (the US Marine Corps base in southern Afghanistan), and held in solitary confinement aboard the USS Peleliu in the Arabian Sea before being handed over to the US Justice Department. Many of the Taliban involved in the Qala-i Jangi insurrection were among the first arrivals at the newly established Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.General Dostum felt betrayed by the Taliban uprising at the prison. He had hoped that his humane treatment of the prisoners would be seen as a gesture of reconciliation. As a result, he chose to not search the prisoners as thoroughly as he should have. “We treated them humanely….we did not search them well enough because we trusted them,” he would later remark. “That was a mistake.” Dominance of SOF Directed Air Power in Support of the Northern AllianceSOF-directed joint air power was clearly the decisive factor in the early Northern Alliance victories in Afghanistan. During the first three months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 120 stationary targets, 400 vehicles, and numerous Taliban/al-Qaeda troop concentrations were destroyed in US bombing attacks. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 6,500 strike sorties and dropped 17,500 munitions (57% were precision-guided) on Taliban targets. Carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft accounted for 75% (4,900) of strike sorties flown, while US Air Force fighters, bombers, and special operations aircraft flew 11%, 10%, and 3% of strike sorties, respectively (Figures 1 and 2). Interestingly, however, despite flying fewer sorties, Air Force aircraft delivered more than 70% of the ordnance dropped during the October to December 2001 timeframe. This was due primarily to the large payload capacity of the eight B-1 and 10 B-52 bombers that were deployed at Diego Garcia and their extended loiter-time capabilities—missions often lasted up to 15 hours. In addition, B-1s dropped the majority of JDAMs (2,800), more than all other aircraft combined. In one instance, four B-1s delivered 96 JDAM bombs in a 20 minute period. Conversely, B-52 bombers delivered the preponderance of Mk 82 500-pound, free-fall, unguided general purpose (dumb) bombs (approximately 6,000). Mk 82 accuracy had improved significantly since Operation DESERT STORM due principally to radar improvements and new weapons ballistics computers on the aircraft. Above and beyond the OEF strike sorties, more than 17,000 aerial support missions took place in the initial months of the conflict. The United States and Germany flew 125,000 tons of military materiel and humanitarian relief supplies to the AOR (4,800 airlift missions). Also, the Air Force, Navy, and Royal Air Force flew 8,000 tanker missions in support of the air war. The extended-range operations undertaken for OEF could not have been accomplished without the sustained in-flight refueling capability that tankers provided. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights accounted for an additional 1,300 sorties, flown by Predator, Global Hawk, U-2, RC-135, E-3, E-8, and EC-130 aircraft. Finally, Coalition aviation components flew a wide variety of OEF-related missions (approximately 3,000).Increased use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) emerged as the dominant trend in the Afghanistan air campaign. Having represented only nine percent of the ordnance used in Operation DESERT STORM, PGMs now accounted for 57 percent of the bombs dropped during the early stages of OEF. Likewise, the ratio of PGMs to sorties rose from 0.32 during DESERT STORM to 1.66 for OEF. Discussions at the CAOC would now address how many targets could be destroyed during a single mission as opposed to how many missions would be required to destroy a single target. Logistics Challenges Encountered During Early OEF Combat Operations Currently, the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has a more robust organic logistics support capability than it did in the early months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Prior to OEF, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) were accustomed to deploying/operating in small teams. As a result, their logistics needs were fairly limited. At the time, the existing, non-deployable, Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) with one support battalion, two forward support companies, and one headquarters company was sufficient to meet ARSOF team-oriented logistics requirements. However, when the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to K2, the assigned forward support element (members of “A” Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion) was nearly overwhelmed with the enormity of logistics requests. There were only approximately 400 Soldiers in the entire 528th Support Battalion to provide combat service support for 15,000 Special Operations Forces in ARSOF. This ratio appears inadequate in contrast to conventional force levels (3,300 support personnel for a 15,000 troop heavy division, for example). Nevertheless, the 528th performed admirably at K2 by quickly establishing a warehouse, a clothing distribution center, a 24/7 dining facility, and ration and refueling points. The 507th Corps Support Command replaced the 528th in December 2001 after SF combat operations in northern Afghanistan had subsided. Soldiers and Army civilians from the 200th Materiel Management Center (MMC), 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) in Kaiserslautern, Germany also provided much needed logistics support to CIA and SOF personnel during the early days of OEF. A special OEF cell was established at 200th MMC headquarters to provide, as they claimed, “corner-cutting, on-the-fly, I-want-it-now, customer-driven” support services as “unconventional as the war being fought.” The cell operated 24 hours a day and was in direct contact with US troops on the ground in Afghanistan via satellite phones and email. When certain items were not readily available in the system, MMC members used their government credit cards to make the necessary purchases on the local German economy. When cargo parachutes were in short supply, the cell had hundreds more sent to Germany by Federal Express. During the first 60 days of OEF, the 21st TSC air-dropped dozens of western saddles, 12,000 pounds of horse feed, two million humanitarian meals, two million pounds of wheat, 93,000 blankets, specialized batteries, nonmilitary tactical gear, camping equipment, mountaineering clothing, plus tons of extra equipment and supplies. Without doubt, the workhorse airlift aircraft thus far in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was the C-17 Globemaster III. The Air Force had recently purchased 80 of these aircraft to replace the aging C-141 fleet for intertheater mobility missions. C-17s carried a larger payload and could operate from smaller, unimproved, airfields. Typically, C-5 Galaxy or commercial aircraft airlifted personnel and equipment from US aerial ports of embarkation to staging bases. To accommodate this movement, the Air Force established two air bridges—one flowing eastward from Moron Air Base in Spain, Rhein-Main and Ramstein air bases in Germany, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; the other moved westward from Andersen Air Base on Guam to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. At these intermediate staging bases, aircrews transferred cargo from the larger C-5s to C-17s for delivery to the theater. Unfortunately, a single C-17 could not accommodate all the cargo from a C-5 transport. This discrepancy caused considerable backlog and congestion at the various staging bases and resulted in split theater shipments. From the beginning of the air war until mid-December 2001, C-17s air-dropped more than two million humanitarian daily rations for the Afghan people. Since there were no in-theater bases initially, these food drop missions often lasted up to 30 hours and required a third pilot joining the C-17 crews in order to rotate rest periods. Despite the fact that there had been no CENTCOM or Air Mobility Command off-the-shelf plan for airlift to Afghanistan, the U.S Air Force executed this phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (and dealt with the various problems that arose) in a highly professional manner. Concurrent Civil Military OperationsSince the principal objective of OEF was to disrupt, destroy, and defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, CENTCOM did not consider nation building and stability operations to be high priority issues. As a result, CENTCOM planners did not include a robust civil military operations (CMO) component in the OEF plan. Nevertheless, to support humanitarian relief assistance for the Afghan people, CENTCOM requested that the US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) establish an appropriate organization to coordinate these relief activities. A Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), composed of elements from the 377th Theater Support Command, the 122nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, subsequently formed in Atlanta and Tampa, then moved to Kuwait, and eventually deployed to Kabul in early December 2001. Relatedly, just four days after the OEF air war began, an officer from the 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command deployed to Islamabad, Pakistan to establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and to organize Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC), the primary functions of which were to de-conflict humanitarian vs. combat operations, conduct assessments, and identify potential relief projects. Also, a Liaison Officer and several Civil Affairs teams from the 96th CA deployed to K2 during the October-December timeframe in support of the 5th Special Forces Group. Two of these teams relocated to Bagram and Mazar-e Sharif, respectively, in late November.During this same time period, Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams from the 96th CA joined infiltrated SOF A-Teams. Their mission was to assist Northern Alliance leaders (and their families) and to initiate collaborative efforts with local Afghan civilian leadership groups. Some Survey Team members began wearing civilian clothes in an effort to blend in with Afghans. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complained about this practice, however, thinking that locals would be unable to distinguish between Soldiers (in civilian attire) and NGO personnel. Shortly thereafter, CENTCOM ordered CA Soldiers in Afghanistan back into uniform. After the NA victory in Mazar-e Sharif, 96th CA, 5th SFG, and 10th Mountain Division Soldiers began working to open a new hospital and to rebuild the Sultan Rasia girl’s school. Analysis of the Sudden Taliban Collapse in Northern AfghanistanMany US civilian and military officials had expected that defeating the Taliban in northern Afghanistan would take much longer than it actually did. However, the speed with which the Northern Alliance routed the Taliban resulted from a unique combination of military effects that had never previously been employed together. Special Operations Forces directed precision-guided munitions air strikes in support of an indigenous ally (the NA) against enemy forces (Taliban) while often not even in contact. Precision directed US airpower was the combat multiplier that enabled an outnumbered NA to destroy Taliban infantry and armor and to liberate northern Afghanistan in just over six weeks. Despite al-Qaeda-led counterattacks at Bai Beche and Konduz, US SOF suffered no casualties in the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, and Taloqan. The principal reason for the lack of casualties was that Air Force terminal attack controllers attached to SF A-Teams used laser illuminators and GPS equipment to engage Taliban fighters at significant stand-off distances. For example, controllers were able to acquire Taliban targets at ranges of up to 10 kilometers at the village of Bishqab and five kilometers at Ac’capruk. The resulting technique took on a new name, ground-directed interdiction (GDI), and differed from typical close air support in which supported forces are normally in direct contact with the enemy. GDI facilitated attacks on moving targets, ensured compliance with CENTCOM rules of engagement, and enabled the concentration of devastating effects without concentrating physical forces. US Army Colonel Mike Findley (former Commander, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command) argued. however, that although the mix of players in the GDI equation was unprecedented, the Northern Alliance (along with its SOF advisers) was essentially no different than any other conventional ground maneuver force requiring periodic joint fire support. Matching concentrated fire power with nimble ground maneuver elements to vanquish an enemy force has always been a principle factor for success in warfare. As such, JSOTF-North became by default the functional ground force (supported) commander directing A-Team/NA maneuver units against the Taliban and employing complementary US air support whenever needed. In addition, some have suggested that the Taliban was simply a rag-tag, poorly-trained, incompetent, and reluctant-to-fight enemy force. This may have been true during the first few days of special operations forces (SOF)-directed US bombing, when the enemy was exposed and easily acquired. The Taliban learned quickly however, and by November 2001 had adopted a variety of cover-and-concealment techniques and began taking cover and dispersing their troops. These efforts proved at least partially successful in minimizing the devastating effects of American air strikes, and would serve the Taliban well in future operations such as Tora Bora and Anaconda. Also, although Afghan Taliban were often hesitant to stand and fight, the al-Qaeda forces—many of whom had received sophisticated military training—were significantly more likely to engage in combat, and proved to be formidable adversaries (as demonstrated at Bai Beche and Konduz, for example).Furthermore, there were a number of noteworthy aviation component accomplishments during the initial months of OEF in addition to the unique SOF/strike aircraft teamwork described above. The expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Predator and Global Hawk) provided both faster reaction times and longer dwell times than did traditional orbital assets. This enabled significantly improved ISR data fusion, near constant surveillance of Taliban activity, a substantial shortening of the kill chain, and major reductions in sensor-to-shooter link times. Unfortunately, teams on the ground could not communicate directly with UAV operators. Overall, however, improved capability to communicate data permitted aircrews to retarget in flight and to re-strike targets if necessary. Despite some initial growing pains, the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base provided an unprecedented level (quality and quantity) of timely air support for Special Forces A-Teams and the Northern Alliance. Joint service cooperation/integration (Air Force/Navy) was harmonious from the start, as all CAOC members focused on sharing information and on the common objective of defeating the Taliban. Improved technology provided CAOC operators with proximate real-time theater connectivity, situational awareness, and the ability to deliver devastating firepower on demand. A few controversies did arise, however. Military/civilian personnel at CENTCOM and in Washington may have exercised undue levels of centralized control over mission planning and execution, thereby interfering with timely target approval decision cycles. This, coupled with excessively restrictive rules of engagement (JAG officers influencing target choices), rear-area scrutinizing of live Predator data, inherently lengthy mission distances (up to15 hours from Diego Garcia), limited loiter capability, and the fact that CENTCOM and CAOC were separated by eight time zones may have detracted from air power reaction times as new targets emerged. Additionally, the CIA often secretly flew armed Predators within the AOR in support covert SOF/other governmental organization (OGA) operations without advising the CAOC. To address this issue, liaison officers at CENTCOM, CAOC, and JSOTF-N developed a broad-based coordination plan that integrated all friendly OEF participants—SOF, covert SOF, OGA, and the Northern Alliance. Eventually, JSOTF-N established a limited Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) to coordinate joint fires and began using killbox procedures along with blue-force tracking to help eliminate friendly-fire incidents. Fortunately, commanders quickly resolved the few difficulties that arose early on in OEF. For example, JSOTF-N’s assumption of the role of “supported” command clarified command relationships among the participants. Also, CENTCOM requested the first time ever use of commercial satellites to address skyrocketing data transmission bandwidth demand. This, however, did not completely alleviate occasional range and reliability problems with targeting systems, data links, and FM tactical radios encountered by infiltrated special operations forces. In addition, extensive mountain flying operations revealed high-altitude lift limitations with MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Although Black Hawk crews flew hundreds of dangerous OEF support missions, several such missions involving flights into mountainous terrain were, of necessity, shifted to MH-47 Chinooks (maximum gross weight of 50,000 pounds vs. 22,000 pounds for the Black Hawk). Taking time to assess variations in aircraft capabilities complicated mission planning for SOF commanders. Special Forces teams also had to contend with minor language barrier issues. ODA-534 was advised that General Atta spoke Arabic. No problems were anticipated, since several team members spoke the language. Shortly after their insertion into the Balkh River Valley, 534 learned that Atta in fact spoke Pashto and Dari, but not Arabic. The team quickly improvised by finding a few older NA soldiers who spoke Russian. These Afghans then served as translators for ODA-534 (most team members spoke Russian) for the remainder of the mission. In fewer than two months, the Northern Alliance, supported by US SOF and air power, decisively defeated the Taliban, put al-Qaeda on the run, and liberated six northern provinces, seven key cities, and nearly 50 additional smaller towns and villages. NA forces killed nearly ten thousand enemy soldiers and took several thousand more prisoners. A rare fusion of small SOF teams (trained eyes on the ground), strike aircraft/bombers, and precision-guided munitions brought about the remarkable accomplishments realized during combat operations in northern Afghanistan. SOF also provided tactics, techniques, and procedures advice to the NA and dealt adroitly with various Afghan factions, rivalries, and tensions. Only roughly 100 SF Soldiers infiltrated northern Afghanistan (seven A-Teams and one ODC), thereby adhering to “limited footprint” directives and proving that devastating firepower can be brought to bear by small, highly trained, units. Also, American forces gained valuable insight into how the Taliban and al-Qaeda would fight. Moreover, CENTCOM had demonstrated to doubters that the US could rapidly project destructive land, sea, and air power over exceptionally long distances. In addition, US combat participants proved the concept of “jointness” both viable and workable, as all—CIA, SOF, conventional Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—cooperated unselfishly in support of the OEF mission. Finally, both the Mazar-e Sharif airport and the Freedom Bridge to Uzbekistan reopened, thus enabling large inbound shipments of humanitarian assistance. Afghan refugees were able to return in significant numbers to Takhar, Konduz, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab provinces. Would the battles for Kandahar and Tora Bora, or Operation Anaconda be as successful? ................
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