M. Aaily~ CPT, USA A I June 1976

[Pages:30]Te/I

The Development of American Tank Dentroyers ,During World War IIl the Impaot of Doctrine, Combat Experience, and Teohnology on Materief Acquisition*

(/ Charles M.Aaily~ CPT, USA -.- U.S. A iui?-e- n- and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report I June 1976"

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e

Approved for public relesan; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the facully of the ULS. Army Command and General Staff College # Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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4. TITLE (ad Subti.t)IThe Development of American Tank

Destroyers Durizig World War IIt the Impact of

Doctrine, Combat Experience, and Technology on

Materiel Acquisition

/

7- -AUTHOR(s)

-aily, Charles M., CPT, USA

S. TYPE- OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final Report 11 Jun, 76

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Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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1S, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at CGSC in

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124. ANWACr rdst~esasiv ervmt she it nowesemy sent fdeldfy by block numb.r)

T'he sucoess of Germany's armored formations during the early years of World War II forced the US Army to reexamine the problem of antitank warfare. The result of that reexamination was a uniquely AmericaSn66s0o2l7utionthe tank destroyers.

tank destroyers was based on the concept of mobile antitank gune, organized in battalions, which could move and mass au necoesary to defeat enemy tanks. ~

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early 1942, the US Army had developed organizations and detailed doctrine 'y implement General McNair's concepts. However, an intrinsic problem, d veloping equipment for the units, had yet to be solved.

\DThis study focuses on the development of guns and gun motor carriages for the tank destroyers. 'Pie Tank Destroyer Center used a twofold approach to solve its equipment problems: first, adapt what was immediately available as expedient equipment, and, secondt begin development of an ideal tank destroyer designed to fit their doctrine. Circumstances forced the US Army to thrust its tank destroyers into combat before the ideal tank destroyer was available.

The tank destroyers in combat theaters were never employed according

to their doctrine. Misemployment and the limitations of expedient equipment

created dissatisfaction among overseas commanders concerning tank destroyers

Pressure from overseas effected doctrine, organization, and development

efforts in the United States. The US Army forced the Tank Destroyer Center

to adopt and dvvelop weapons unsuitable, in the latter's

view, for tank

destroyer doctrine-towed guns.

A technological tVreat from heavy German tanks caused development efforts in the United States to incorporate bigger guns. The US Army's

failure to properly as-iess the ms itude of the threat resulted in a scaroity of adequate anti tank weapons in Northwest Europe. When the ideal

tank destroyer, the M-,8 lHellcatk finally reached Europe; it proved to be undergunned.

The study co oludes that the development of equipment is not strictly a technological pr cess. Doctrine and combat experience alter the path of development. Perso alties and the pressure of war accentuate different vcireewastinagnd neawlsoequoifpfme etnt ledvemelaonpdmedentb.y dToeccthrinnoelogaynd dciocmtabtaets etxhpeerisepneceed. of

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D

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M AT O

O T IN , c m A

XEI N E

N

DURING WORLD WAR lIt

OF AMERICAN TANK DESTROYERS

fTHE DEVELOPMENT

TECHNOLOGY ON MATERIEL ACQUISITION

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1976

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN TANK DESTPROYER.) JA~IRNG WOURd) THE IMPACT OF DOCTRINE, COMBAT EXPHIENCE, AND

''AN II.

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TECHNOLOGY ON MATERIEL ACQ.UISITION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE'

by

C. M. BAILY, CPT, USA B.S.# United States Military Academy, 1966

M.A., Duke University, 1975

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1IUTII1TI0U/AVAjLA~jLITV CM

Fort Leavenworvh, Kansas ~ 1976

AVAIL oaVrp

Oi,' I ]AIT'A Y AHT AND -,C:[IqNC I,

'!1: :IVNOVAI PAM.:~

*World

Naint, of ("afllilid-ltv

M.~~~LW*t~I LY__________

r'itlc' of thuB ic Thnu lcvelopment of Amr:rican Tank Dinotro~yn~r Diuirlnc.

War Ile the Tmpact of Doctrine,_ Combat 2,xperience, and

Tiechnolopy on Materiel Acquisitioni

Artoroved by:

Research Advisor Member, Graduate Research Faculty lember, Graduate R'eBearch Faculty

Accepted this 3 day o f X14 97

Director, Niaufer of Miilitary ArY and Soiene

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author arnd do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference, to this study should include the-foregoing statement.)

I BS'P RACT

The success of Germany's armored formations dur;nr the

early years of World War II forced the US Army to reexate (he nroblem of antitank warfare. The result of that reexamination was

a uniquely American solution-the tank destroyers. Primarily the brainchild of General Lesley J. MdcNair, the

doctrine of tank destroyers was based on the concept of mobile

antitank guns, organized in battalions, which could move and mass

as necessary to defeat enemy tanks. By early 1942, the US Army

had developed orpanizations and detailed doctrine to imnlement

General McNair's concepts. However, an intrinsic nroblem, develop-

irr equipment for the units, had yet to he solved.

This study focuses on the development of puns and i-un motor

'I

carriages for the tank destroyers. The Tr~nk Destroyer Centex, used a

twofold annroach to solve its equipment problems% first, adapt what

was immediately available as expedient equipment, and, second, begin

development of an ideal tank destroyer designed to fit their doQtrine. Circumstances forced the 1US Army to thrust its tank de-

stroyers into combat before the ideal tank destroyer was available.

The tank destroyers in combat theaters were never employed according to their doctrine. Misemployment and the limitations of

* ?expedient

equipment created dissatisfaction among overseas command-

ers conoerninp tank destroyers. Pressure from overseas effected

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ii..*

I'I

doctrine, orpanization, and development efforts in the United

States. The US Army forced the Tank Destroyer Center to adIcnt and

develop weapons unsuitable, in the latter's

view, for tank destroyer

doctrine---towrd runs. A technolot,:ical threat from heavy German tanks caused

development efforts in the United 'States to incorporate bigper p?.ns,

The US Army's failure to properly assess the maf'nitude of the threat

resulted in a scarcity of adequate antitank weapons in Northwest

Europe. When the ideal tank destroyer, the M-18 "Hellcat," finally

reached Europel it proved to be underpunned. The study concludes that the development of equiiument is not

strictly

a technolopical nrocess. Doctrine and combat experience

alter the path of development. Personalties and the pressure of

war accentuate different views and also effect development. Tech-

nolol-v dictates the tipeed of' oreatin, new equipment dfmanded by doctrine and combat experience.

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