Draft Gl Report



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Original: English

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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

The Global Spread of Ballistic Missile Defences

General Report

Stephen GILBERT (United Kingdom)

General Rapporteur

nato-pa.int 23 November 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1

II. Ballistic Missile Defences in Perspective 1

III. Global Overview of Ballistic Missile Defence Programmes 3

A. NATO, THE UNITED STATES, AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 3

1. NATO Ballistic Missile Defence 4

2. The US Ballistic Missile Defence System 5

3. NATO-Russia Relations on Ballistic Missile Defence 7

B. RUSSIA 8

C. NORTHEAST ASIA 9

1. China 9

2. Japan 9

3. South Korea 10

4. Taiwan 11

D. THE MIDDLE EAST 11

1. Israel 11

2. The Broader Middle East 11

E. SOUTH ASIA 12

IV. Concluding Remarks: The Potential Strategic implications 13

APPENDIX 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY 16

Introduction

1. The threat from ballistic missiles is growing across the globe. More than 30 states possess ballistic missiles or have programmes to develop or procure them. In 2014, the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in charge of the US ballistic missile defence programme, reported that “there has been an increase of over 1,200 additional ballistic missiles over the past five years. The total ballistic missiles outside the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia, and China has risen over 5,900” (US MDA, 2014). The possibility that some of these missiles could be adapted to carry warheads housing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is of great concern for the international community. To counter this emerging threat, the United States has paved the way in developing ballistic missile defences since the early 2000s. NATO has followed suit more recently, building a European NATO-wide ballistic missile defence capability. Moreover, on a global level, an increasing number of countries already possess or are in the process of acquiring ballistic missile defence capabilities – even those countries that have traditionally been very sceptical of missile defences as a destabilising factor in international or regional security.

2. While the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has examined the issue of ballistic missile defences in a number of reports and has released resolutions concerning the matter, the focus has mostly been on US and NATO missile defence capabilities in the context of Euro-Atlantic security. In contrast, this 2014 General Report of the Science and Technology Committee (STC) presents a holistic view of the global spread of ballistic missile defence systems, both to take stock of arsenals worldwide and to discuss the possible strategic implications of this trend. It does so by, first, providing a short historical background on ballistic missile defence, in order to put the phenomenon into perspective. Second, the report lays out the ballistic missile defence systems deployed or in development around the world (see also Appendix for a select list of these systems). Third, it finishes with some concluding remarks on the possible strategic implications of ballistic missile defence. The report builds in part on STC visits to Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Japan, and the United States (Alaska) over the course of 2013 and 2014.

Ballistic Missile Defences in Perspective

3. The first ballistic missile, the V-2, was developed and deployed by Germany during World War II. While the V-2 was neither an accurate nor a decisive weapon, it illustrated the tremendous technological challenge of defending against ballistic missiles. At the time, the only option for countering the V-2 was to destroy or occupy the launch sites. As a consequence, the historical trajectory of ballistic missile defence is defined by attempts to bridge the formidable capabilities gap between offensive and defensive ballistic missile technology. However, the Cold War experience showed that ballistic missile defence is more than a tactical problem to be solved by advances in technology; it is a strategic capability with significant potential impact on the stability of the international system.

4. As delivery vehicles for conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear payloads, ballistic missiles offer countries a way to project power from a distance in regional and even global settings. The ballistic missile gets its name from its ballistic (free-fall) trajectory, which includes three phases:

- Boost phase: The rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight.

- Midcourse phase: The missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity.

- Terminal phase: The missile descends towards its target.

5. Furthermore, ballistic missiles can be characterized according to their range, targeting precision, and payload. Ballistic missiles can be launched from a variety of land- and sea-based platforms. Except for some short-range missiles, ballistic missiles exit and re-enter the atmosphere during their flight. In terms of range, one normally distinguishes between four different categories:

- Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): 5,500 km

6. Ballistic missile defence encompasses “all active and passive measures designed to detect, identify, track, and defeat incoming ballistic missiles, in both strategic and theatre tactical roles, during any portion of their flight trajectory […] or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness in destroying their targets” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d). Twenty-first century ballistic missile defence involves a complex system of ground- and sea-based interceptors, sensors, radar, as well as command and control systems. Advances in information technology have helped to close the aforementioned capabilities gap between offensive ballistic missiles and missile defence systems, but ballistic missile defence continues to be an extremely difficult technical task. Ultimately, all other things being equal, the offence still has the advantage as simple countermeasures, such as decoy warheads, can confuse and likely circumvent existing ballistic missile defence systems, and great numbers of incoming missiles can still overwhelm them. Moreover, given the current rates of interception during missile defence tests, military planners are likely to assign multiple interceptors against an incoming missile, decreasing the number of incoming missiles that could be intercepted.

7. The existential threat posed by the combination of ICBMs and nuclear warheads, i.e. the capability to hold almost any target at nuclear risk, spurred the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue national missile defence capabilities in the 1950s and 1960s. Engaged in a nuclear arms race, the rivals sought to use national missile defences to both limit destruction and guarantee their second strike capabilities. However, the belief at the time was that strategic ballistic missile defence programmes undermined international stability which was based on the early Cold War’s paradigm of deterrence – mutual assured destruction (MAD). In theory, the deployment of effective national missile defences would incite offensive arms build-ups to overwhelm said defences and decrease each state’s vulnerability to attack, in effect, lowering the threshold for a nuclear first-strike.

8. Recognising the potential for national missile defence to undermine deterrence stability, the United States and the Soviet Union signed and ratified the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972. The restrictions introduced by the ABM Treaty effectively prevented either state from establishing national missile defence: strategic missile defences were constrained to 200 launchers and interceptors in each country, divided between two deployment areas per country. Modifications to the ABM Treaty in 1974 further reduced the legal deployment areas from two to one. The only strategic missile defence sites were thus an ABM site protecting an ICBM field in North Dakota and an ABM site protecting Moscow. While the site protecting Moscow has been continually updated and remains active today, the US site was decommissioned after only three months in 1976.

9. While the ABM Treaty limited the deployment of strategic ballistic missile defence systems, it did not hamper continued research and development. In 1983, US President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in order to determine whether national missile defences were technically feasible. The President’s motivation consisted of finding an alternative policy to nuclear deterrence and MAD – a policy which left the United States without defences against the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear weapons. In 1987, the SDI produced a national missile defence concept involving ground and space-based missile defence systems. This concept was highly controversial not only because of questions of cost and feasibility, but also because its implementation would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty.

10. The end of the Cold War, however, shifted the emphasis from national missile defence to theatre missile defence, i.e. the protection of limited areas, for example areas with forward-deployed troops. The threat upon which national missile defence programs were based was significantly reduced with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the entry into force of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). International efforts were refocused to address the changing threat environment. The establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the establishment of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 were early indicators of concerns about missile proliferation. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union provided short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to their respective allies and partners. Amended in 1993, the MTCR sought to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling transfers of equipment and technology which could potentially contribute to missile delivery systems. In other words, in the post-Cold War world, missile defence is no longer shaped by a threat emanating from a single actor or alliance.

11. At the start of the 21st century, US President George W. Bush announced the United States’ intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The President argued that “the AMB Treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks” (Bush, 2001). This move cemented the shift in ballistic missile defence to address the threats from rogue states – Iran and North Korea, in particular. The greatest concern motivating the development and deployment of ballistic missile defence systems against rogue states is that missile proliferation could undermine traditional diplomacy as well as deterrence by punishment, i.e. a strategy that attempts to prevent actors from conducting hostile actions by threatening serious harm in return. Proponents of ballistic missile defence argue that these systems offer a third way to deal with rogue states armed with ballistic missiles: deterrence by denial, i.e. a strategy that attempts to deny actors the benefits of hostile actions.

12. However, even though the United States certainly is at the technological cutting edge, it is not the only actor engaged in developing and deploying more advanced ballistic missile defence systems. More and more states that feel threatened by neighbours’ missile capabilities, possibly combined with WMD programmes, have therefore turned towards ballistic missile defence systems – either developing such systems indigenously or acquiring them from other states. The following section lays out these global ballistic missile defence efforts.

Global Overview of Ballistic Missile Defence Programmes

NATO, the United States, and Relations with Russia

13. This sub-section lays out the ballistic missile defence systems of NATO and the United States as well as NATO-Russia relations on ballistic missile defence. NATO and US systems are intimately intertwined, as part of the US system presents the core of NATO ballistic missile defence. In describing NATO and US efforts, it is necessary to understand how Russia views these systems. Russia has raised concerns that these capabilities potentially undermine its strategic nuclear arsenals. However, US and NATO missile defences are not designed to nor are they capable of shielding against the kind of large-scale ballistic missile attack that Russia is capable of launching. Their purpose is rather to be one step ahead of limited ballistic missile threats from states like North Korea and Iran in order to deter such countries from attacking the Alliance and to protect its territories if an attack does occur. The question of how to reassure Russia that this is the case has been the key concern in NATO-Russia and US-Russia relations on ballistic missile defence.

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence

14. NATO began exploring ballistic missile defence in the 1990s, with a focus on protecting deployed NATO troops (theatre missile defence). In 2002, at the NATO Summit in Prague, the Alliance expanded its investigation to include the question of whether and how to protect Allied population centres and territory (territorial missile defence). The real turning point for a NATO ballistic missile defence capability came at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. In light of the increasing proliferation of missiles to potentially hostile states, NATO “decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces” with the goal of bolstering deterrence as a core element of collective defence and contributing to the indivisible security of the Alliance (NATO, 2010). Since the Lisbon Summit, consistent progress has been made in the development and deployment of a NATO ballistic missile defence capability, and the Alliance remains committed to providing full coverage for European NATO territory. No firm timeline exists, but it is estimated that the system will reach full operational capability by the early 2020s.

15. Ballistic missile defence received relatively little attention in the public and political debate leading up the 2014 NATO Summit in Newport, Wales. One article in the German magazine Der Spiegel made headlines claiming that some NATO member states were suggesting expanding NATO’s European-based system to include protection from ballistic missile threats originating from Russia. According to the article, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were hoping that this could be discussed as a future measure to reassure them of NATO’s commitment to the defence of its eastern flank against potential Russian aggression (Der Spiegel, 2014). However, to most observers, it was clear that no such bold steps regarding missile defence expansion would be taken (or even seriously discussed) during the Summit. First, it would undermine efforts to assure Moscow that it should not be concerned about NATO’s capabilities. Second, many European NATO members have been reluctant to support measures that might unnecessarily provoke Russia. Hence, the Summit Declaration once again makes it very clear that “NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities” (NATO, 2014). Missile defence was once more affirmed to constitute an integral part of NATO’s deterrence toolbox and a key capability to ensure the collective defence against threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

16. NATO’s emerging ballistic missile defence is made up of two components. One component is the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) system for theatre missile defence. The initiative was formally launched at the 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit and reached an interim capability in early 2010. The other is the larger NATO-wide territorial missile defence system, which achieved its interim capability in 2012. Both components have now merged into a single programme with one set of milestones. The NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Office is located at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, with a substantial number of staff at the NATO Communications and Information Agency in The Hague.

17. The cost of deploying NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability as envisaged is split between national-paid voluntary contributions, which make up the bulk of the total cost, and NATO common funding. The estimated costs to be split between the 28 member states will add up to an estimated 800 million EUR for the ALTBMD component and about 200 million EUR for the additional territorial missile defence capability (Rasmussen, 2010). Most of the costs accrued under common funding arrangements will be spent on the command and control systems for NATO ballistic missile defence.

18. NATO’s ALTBMD capability is designed to protect deployed forces against SRBMs and MRBMs, i.e. against missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km. It will eventually consist of a multi-layered system of systems, including battle management, communications, command and control and intelligence systems; early warning sensors and radars; as well as a mix of interceptor missiles. The ALTBMD system is operated from Alliance Headquarters Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, with the Combined Air Operations Centre in Uedem, Germany as a technical backup facility.

19. Currently, several countries provide radars and missiles, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States. Additional radars and interceptors will be made available over the next few years, both by countries already contributing and by newcomers such as Denmark, Greece, and Poland. Canada is also discussing whether to contribute to the system. Ground-based anti-ballistic missile systems that target missiles in their terminal phase will make up the bulk of ALTBMD, but naval vessels could eventually contribute as well. Systems already fielded in connection with ALTBMD include the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). France has offered the SAMP/T (Sol-Air Moyenne Portée Terrestre). The United States could potentially contribute Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), jointly developed by the United States, Germany, and Italy, could potentially be used as well, although the system is struggling to find customers at this point, as the United States is withdrawing from the programme.

20. At the heart of NATO’s territorial missile defence capability is a national contribution by the United States in the form of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Announced by President Obama in 2009, the European Phased Adaptive Approach is a substantially modified version of President George W. Bush’s earlier national missile defence plan. The deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach falls into three phases. During Phase 1, launched in 2012 and planned to be completed in 2015, the United States will deploy four destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system. The Aegis system is designed to shoot down missiles in the midcourse phase. The Aegis system’s Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) is at the heart of NATO territorial missile defence. The SM-3 Block IA is the current variant in service. The Aegis-equipped destroyers will be home-ported in Rota, Spain, near Cadiz; two of which arrived in the first half of 2014. In addition, a US Army Navy/Transportable Radar (AN/TPY 2) has already been deployed to Kurecik Air Force Base in Central Turkey in 2011. The operational centre of NATO’s territorial missile defence is hosted in Ramstein as well.

21. Phase 2 is planned for deployment in 2015. In this phase, a new Aegis Ashore system will be placed in Romania, equipped with the more effective SM-3 Block IB and a SPY-1 radar, which is also used on US Aegis-equipped naval vessels. Phase 3 is planned for deployment in 2018, when an additional Aegis Ashore system will be placed in Poland. The Polish site will also feature the SPY-1 radar, but will host the SM-3 Block IIA missile variant. The SM-3 Block IIA will be the most capable missile in NATO’s territorial missile defence. The European Phased Adaptive Approach originally included a Phase 4, with even more capable SM-3 Block IIB missiles deployed in Poland. However, US defence budget cuts led to a delay until at least 2022 in developing this variant. This missile will thus not be part of NATO’s ballistic missile defence; indeed the fate of the SM-3 Block IIB programme is unclear at this point.

22. Other national contributions to reach full coverage of European NATO territory are vital to make European Phased Adaptive Approach and NATO ballistic missile defence a success. They include the aforementioned contributions to ALTBMD. Further examples are France’s development of an early-warning system for the detection of ballistic missiles and the upgrade of four Dutch frigates with Smart-L missile defence radars. Other member states are also contemplating contributions.

The US Ballistic Missile Defence System

23. Since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, it has expanded its domestic and foreign-deployed ballistic missile defences to counter the global proliferation of missiles. The MDA is the Department of Defense (DoD) agency responsible for developing, testing, and fielding the US Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The US capability consists of an integrated and layered architecture, thus providing multiple opportunities to destroy incoming missiles. The BMDS architecture includes the following elements (US MDA, 2013):

- “networked sensors (including space-based) and ground- and sea-based radars for target detection and tracking;

- ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the force of a direct collision, called ‘hit-to-kill’ technology, or an explosive blast fragmentation warhead;

- and a command, control, battle management, and communications network providing the operational commanders with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor missiles”.

24. The sensor component of the US BMDS consists of three tracking and surveillance satellites as well as an array of domestic, foreign-deployed, and sea-based radars. Early warning radars are located at bases in Alaska, California, and Massachusetts, as well as at Fylingdales in the United Kingdom and Thule Air Base on Greenland, Denmark. The United States also has nine AN/TPY 2 radars fielded; a number that will rise to 12 over the next years. The AN/TPY 2 radar is a core component of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile defence system, but can also be deployed on its own. Indeed, four of them are deployed in support of allies, with one each in Israel, Japan, Turkey, and Qatar. Two THAAD batteries are currently deployed on Hawaii and Guam in response to the rising threat of North Korean ballistic missiles. The Sea-Based X-Band 1 radar is another unique and extremely capable radar. It is mounted on a mobile, semi-submersible platform, and is deployed in the Asia Pacific region, with docking opportunities in Alaska and Hawaii. The Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers use the abovementioned SPY-1 radar for their missile defence tasks.

25. In the US interceptor arsenal, the aforementioned SM-3 missiles aim to shoot down ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase. They are hosted on Navy cruisers and destroyers, but a ground-based variant is, as noted, in development for NATO ballistic missile defence. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system employs the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), which is the flagship interceptor and targets missiles when they are in the midcourse phase. The GBI has experienced some testing trouble in recent years: overall, nine of 17 tests were successful, but the last three tests were failures, indicating problems with the so-called exoatmospheric kill vehicle, which seeks out the incoming missile at the edge of space. However, in June 2014, the US military successfully intercepted a target ballistic missile with a re-designed exoatmospheric kill vehicle which has now been cleared for production. GBIs are hosted at two sites in the United States: 26 missiles are located at Fort Greely in Alaska, and four of them are hosted at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. In March 2013, the US administration announced that it would bring the numbers at Fort Greely up to 40 missiles, in response to the growing North Korean threat. In the terminal phase of a missile’s course, a varied set of land-based PAC-3 and THAAD missiles as well as sea-based terminal defence missiles, for example predecessors of the SM-3, serve as the last line of defence against certain missile threats.

26. In 2013, the US Congress mandated a review of possible locations for a third site of missile defences on the East Coast of the United States, and the DoD is currently conducting follow-up environmental impact studies for four sites in Maine, Michigan, New York, and Ohio. However, the US administration, including the DoD, is not convinced that a third site is necessary at this point. It argues that the two West Coast sites are sufficient and that a third site would add a large financial burden on strained defence budgets. Under the George W. Bush administration, it was planned to have such a third site located Europe, with GBIs stationed in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic. However, this plan was cancelled by the Obama administration when it announced the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

27. Concurrent with US-NATO co-operation on missile defence are other US efforts to engage international partners and deploy regional ballistic missile defence systems. Through the development of unique regional ballistic missile defence systems, the United States “seeks to create an environment in which the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks” (US DoD, 2010). To this end, the United States is first strengthening regional deterrence architectures, then pursuing a phased adaptive approach within targeted regions. Those efforts are laid out in the below sections, except for co-operation between the United States and Australia on missile defence because this initiative is in the early stages of consultation.

NATO-Russia Relations on Ballistic Missile Defence

28. A third ballistic missile defence activity pursued by NATO, in addition to ALTBMD and territorial missile defence, has been co-operation with Russia. Russia already suspended its co-operation in October 2013, and in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO has suspended virtually all practical civilian and military co-operation with Russia, including on missile defence. At this point, Roberto Zadra, Head of the Ballistic Missile Defence section, writing in his personal capacity, therefore argues that the project of potential NATO-Russia missile defence co-operation “is not only suspended, but has probably reached its end” (Zadra, 2014).

29. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO invited Russia to co-operate on territorial missile defence. NATO had previously been co-operating with Russia on theatre missile defence since 2003, and NATO wanted to continue missile defence co-operation “in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence” (NATO, 2010). Indeed, the Allies reaffirmed their “readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defence systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways”. The Missile Defence Working Group, already established under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council for discussions on theatre missile defence, has been the forum for these explorations. Russia, for its part, created an interagency working group to explore further co-operation in 2011 (which was dissolved again in October 2013). Among the concrete joint efforts undertaken by NATO and Russia was work on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, which remains uncompleted, and a 2012 computer-assisted exercise.

30. However, common ground between Russia and NATO on ballistic missile defence remains thin. Russia believes that these capabilities undermine its strategic nuclear arsenal and constitute indeed an offensive system (or could in the future). As Zadra argues, writing in a private capacity, Russia’s real concern centres on the combination of US ballistic missile defence efforts as a whole, combined with US space dominance and the development of conventional prompt global strike capabilities, rather than NATO or US efforts in isolation (Zadra, 2014). To allay Russia’s fears, NATO proposed a combined missile defence architecture, which would include substantial integration and day-to-day interaction between NATO’s and Russia’s ballistic missile defence systems. Two joint missile defence centres would be at the heart of the NATO-proposed approach: a NATO-Russia Data Fusion Centre and a NATO-Russia Planning and Operations Centre. Separate chains of command would be maintained. Russia, however, wants a ‘sectorial’ approach, which would make Russia responsible for the protection of some Allies. This would be contrary to the Alliance’s responsibility to protect the entire NATO territory. Russia also wants to limit the numbers, deployment areas, and technical characteristics of the future phases of the US capability, including through a legally binding treaty. This is unacceptable to the US administration.

31. The cancellation of European Phased Adaptive Approach’s Phase 4, with which Russia was most concerned, has not changed its position that NATO’s capability would undermine deterrence. Indeed, Russia has already taken steps to counter the perceived threat and has further plans to do so. It is stationing Iskander theatre ballistic missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads, in the Western Military District. However, Russia has said that they are not in Kaliningrad, which is part of the district – an action it has repeatedly threatened to carry out. In mid-2014, it is thus unimaginable that renewed NATO-Russia and US-Russia discussions on ballistic missile defence could take place before a resolution of the Ukrainian crisis. However even then, it is unlikely that all sides would be willing to discuss missile defence co-operation, given the lack of progress in recent years and the deteriorating NATO-Russia and especially US-Russia relationship. Indeed, after the Wales Summit re-confirmed NATO’s commitment to missile defence, President Putin explicitly referred to US and NATO efforts to develop its BMD capabilities as an important reason for Russia to invest in the upgrade of its nuclear, conventional, and ballistic missile defence capabilities, which Putin announced on 10 September 2014 (Associated Press, 2014; Herszenhorn, 2014). Hence, all efforts to assure Russia notwithstanding, it seems that Russia is using US and NATO efforts as a pretext to scale up its unconventional arsenals to ensure that it retains a “guaranteed nuclear deterrent” (Associated Press, 2014).

Russia

32. Russia’s current ballistic missile defence systems appear to continue serving their Cold War purpose of countering missile threats originating from the United States and/or NATO. In Russian strategic thinking ballistic missile defence has traditionally been seen as potentially destabilising. However, in recent years, the modernisation of Russia’s aerospace defence system is receiving organizational priority to enhance the survivability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. These efforts include measures to ensure the detection of ballistic and long-range cruise missiles in the boost phase, the updating of existing anti-ballistic missile defence systems, as well as the development of advanced air defence systems.

33. Missile defence in the Russian Federation is the task of the Aerospace Defence Forces (VKO), established in 2011 as a new branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Broadly speaking, the VKO is responsible for Russia’s missile defence systems, early missile warning and space control systems, as well as launches of spacecraft. The key functions of the VKO with respect to missile defence are as follows (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation):

- “Providing Command Authorities with highly accurate information on detection of BM [ballistic missile] launches and prevention of missile attacks”;

- “Destruction of the BM warheads of the conditional enemy in case of crucial governmental facilities being attacked”;

- “Defence of the Major Command control stations and governmental facilities, armed formations, the most important industrial and economic centres and other installations against enemy’s joint air- and space-based strike weapons […] in the zone of probable damage”.

34. In order to fulfil these missions, Russia deploys fixed and mobile land-based and ship-based missile defence systems. These existing capabilities will be updated and expanded as a part of the country’s efforts to modernise its armed forces by 2020. Indeed, Russia has announced it will invest about 40 billion EUR in new weapons and upgrades to its existing aerospace defence systems. At the heart of these new capabilities are two new anti-ballistic missile capable surface-to-air missiles. The S-400 air defence system, with the ability to defend against SRBMs and MRBMs, is slowly coming into service with full deployment planned for 2020. Furthermore, the S-500 system, designed against ICBMs, sub-marine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and hypersonic missiles, is currently being developed. Russian official sources state that the first system will be deployed in the Moscow region for tests in 2016. However, as these assessments of future capabilities and corresponding timelines are based on Russian claims they may be exaggerated. Several new radar systems and sites are under construction or in planning as well. Some variants of the older S-300 system also have limited ballistic missile defence capabilities, similar to earlier PAC variants. Russia sells them to customers abroad and lets others develop indigenous systems from these variants as well (some examples are included below).

Northeast Asia

China

35. In April 2014, China’s President Xi Jinping urged the country’s air force, for the first time, to adopt an integrated air and space defence capability. The details of what role ballistic missile defence will play in this effort are very unclear at this time, as little concrete is known about the programme. One expert suggests that Chinese “attitudes have evolved from criticism of US and Soviet policy, to countermeasures against US BMD [ballistic missile defence], and ultimately to conforming through China’s development of its own BMD capabilities” (Saalman, 2012). Indeed, China has made important progress over the last number of years in ballistic missile defence capabilities. Two eminent experts have recently argued that “Chinese ABM development is on par with US efforts technologically, only lagging behind in deployment. China could meet or exceed US ABM deployment levels within the next decade, but [anti-tactical ballistic missile] deployment remains harder to evaluate” (Fisher and O’Connor, 2014). China’s efforts to advance its anti-satellite and ballistic missile defence capabilities are, at least in part, in response to the US missile defence policy and deepening defence co-operation with its East Asian allies. Generally, China’s development of missile defence technology appears to be in alignment with broader modernisation efforts.

36. In recent years, China has been testing anti-satellite and ballistic missile defence technology. According to experts, nine known or suspected anti-satellite and ballistic missile defence tests have taken place over the last decade (Fisher and O’Connor, 2014). Anti-satellite tests rely on modern kinetic ‘hit-to-kill’ vehicles, and the technology could thus be adapted to ballistic missile defence technology.

37. Although precise information is difficult to acquire, it is clear that China has some limited ballistic missile defence assets already. For one, it possesses variants of the Russian S-300. In contrast, the HQ-9 missile system is an indigenously developed medium- to long-range air defence system with ballistic missile defence capabilities against SRBMs, according to China. The HQ-9 has recently made headlines, as the system is in competition with European and US systems in Turkey’s bid to modernise its air defences. Also in development are the HQ-19, supposed to rival the US THAAD system, the HQ-26, comparable to the SM-3, and the HQ-29, similar to certain PAC-3 variants (Fisher and O’Connor, 2014). Another important development is that President Putin has authorized in principle the sale of the S-400 system, which would make China the first country to import this new system. The S-400 would give China a potent ballistic missile defence capability in a regional context. In addition to acquiring anti-ballistic missiles, China has also invested in developing new radar capabilities.

Japan

38. Japan is one of the United States’ most active partners in the field of missile defence. Tokyo currently deploys a multi-layered missile defence system composed of Aegis-equipped vessels, ground-based PAC-3 systems, and a AN/TPY 2 radar, which is deployed by the United States. By the end of 2020, the Japanese government aims to have built two additional Aegis destroyers, bringing the total number to eight. The SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptor, which is being co-developed by the Raytheon and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, could become the cornerstone of its ballistic missile defence capability, once fully developed. While the threat from North Korea is the prime motivator for Japan’s ballistic missile defence programme, concerns over China’s military modernisation and escalating antagonism over disputed territories in the East China Sea are also a contributing factor. A second US AN/TPY 2 radar is set to be deployed to Japan by the end of 2014. Furthermore, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently announced the additional deployment of two US Aegis-equipped destroyers to Japan by 2017, in order to bolster Japanese and US defences against North Korean ballistic missile threats. The United States already stations five such destroyers in Japan. Furthermore in June 2014, the Japanese Ministry of Defence launched a study and consultations with the United States to explore the possibility of acquiring a US THAAD system or ground-based SM-3 missiles.

39. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken several steps to bolster Japanese defence capabilities. In March 2014, the government relaxed Japan’s rules on sales of military equipment. The newly-eased principles prohibit the country from arms exports to states involved in conflict and to those that violate United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, this is a major change in Japanese defence policy, as a virtual ban on arms exports with very few exceptions existed before. This development could perhaps have significance in terms of ballistic missile defence systems, as Japan develops some systems with the United States, which could be exported to countries in the region, for example to South Korea. In another important, but controversial, step, the Japanese government has decided to re-interpret the Constitution’s Article 9 – the so-called pacifist clause – in such a way that Japan could now resort to the “use of force to the minimum extent necessary” when an ally is attacked in a way that threatens Japan’s survival. This would open the way to more defence co-operation with allies and partners, including on missile defence. More concretely, it would allow Japan, for example, to intercept a ballistic missile aimed at the United States.

South Korea

40. South Korea, unlike Japan, does not engage in bilateral ballistic missile defence co-operation with the United States. Rather, it has gradually acquired and fielded the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system since the late 2000s, elements of which contain US equipment. While the United States is supportive of South Korea’s missile defence programme, sources indicate South Korea “has been under quiet but intense pressure from its US ally to contribute to the missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific” (Keck, 2013). In particular, the US government is exploring whether a deployment of a THAAD battery could contribute to security in the region (Rowland, 2014). In 2014, US officials have increased their call for trilateral co-operation on ballistic missile defences between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Indeed, the US House of Representatives, in its version of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, has mandated the US Secretary of Defense to assess options of how to increase such trilateral co-operation. With strained political relations between Japan and South Korea, it is unclear whether such co-operation could come to fruition.

41. South Korea’s ballistic missile defence programme is designed to protect the state against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea, and it has therefore been suggested that its resistance to US pressure is likely “out of concern that such a move would antagonize China, which is South Korea’s largest trading partner” (Keck, 2013). South Korea’s defence planners are trying to speed up the KAMD system, in light of the growing threat from North Korea, but it remains unclear when it will be fully operational.

42. South Korea’s KAMD system includes second-hand PAC-2 Patriot batteries, land-based early warning radars, based on the Green Pine radar developed by Israel and the United States, and Aegis-equipped KDX-III destroyers with SPY-1 radars. Seoul is intent on upgrading and expanding its current systems with plans to purchase PAC-3 missiles after 2015. South Korea will also deploy three additional Aegis-equipped ships by 2027. Reports furthermore indicate that the country wants to equip its existing destroyers with SM-3 missiles. This would significantly add to South Korea’s ballistic missile defence capability as its current Aegis-equipped vessels are not equipped with interceptors. South Korea is also developing the Cheolmae system in co-operation with a Russian company, based on S-300 and S-400 technology. Moreover, South Korea is pursuing a reconnaissance satellite program to be ready by the mid-2020s. With this capability, South Korea plans to be able to detect missile threats from North Korea in such a timely manner that it could act pre-emptively.

Taiwan

43. Taiwan’s missile defence systems are designed to intercept and defend against a cross-Strait attack originating from mainland China. Indeed, almost all of mainland China’s SRBMs are targeting Taiwan; more than 1,100 according to a 2013 DoD report (US DoD, 2013). Consequently, Taiwan has spent great efforts and resources on acquiring ballistic missile defence systems that can intercept these SRBMs. Despite somewhat warming relations with China, Taiwan aims to continue the modernisation of its ballistic missile defence capability. In August 2014, the government announced that it would spend around USD 2.5 billion over the next nine years to modernise its air defences. This includes replacing its aged surface-to-air missile systems with the Taiwanese-made Tien Kung 3, which can also intercept tactical ballistic missiles (AFP, 2014).

44. While it has long been interested in acquiring the Aegis combat system, it appears unlikely that the United States will sell it to Taiwan. The George W. Bush administration rejected such a request in 2001. Instead, the Taiwanese system is centred around PAC-2 and PAC-3 systems, sold to Taiwan by the United States in the 1990s and from 2008 to 2010 respectively. Taiwan’s early warning radar, built by Raytheon, is reportedly one of the most powerful radars in the world. Going beyond the needs of air and missile defence, it is indeed a broader intelligence asset. Experts judge that is “capable of tracking air-breathing targets – including cruise missiles – and ballistic missiles at 3,000 km, depending on the target” (Minnick, 2013).

The Middle East

Israel

45. Within the broader Middle East, Israel has the most advanced ballistic missile defence programme Its multi-layered defence can counter diverse potential regional adversaries. Indeed, the large number of threats faced by Israel from states and non-state actors was the motivation to develop ballistic missile defences in the 1980s, often against its military leadership, which thought missile defences could undermine traditional deterrence.

46. In spite of Israel’s large technological lead over its neighbours, it continues to improve its existing missile defence systems and produce new systems. Israel is building a three-layered air and missile defence system, which will be operational by mid-decade. The domestically developed Iron Dome system is already deployed and has seen extensive use in recent conflicts with Hamas. It does not protect against ballistic missiles, but against small, very short-range threats, for example rockets fired by terrorists and artillery shells. The David’s Sling system covers SRBM threats. The first David’s Sling systems is planned to be introduced in 2014, but reports indicate that further deployments are being delayed due to budget cuts. The Arrow system, first launched in the mid-1980s, will have both Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 missiles in its arsenal by 2016. The Arrow 3 will protect against missile threats from up to 2,500 km away, approaching IRBM range. Arrow and David’s Sling were both jointly developed with the United States. Israel also possesses PAC-3 systems and hosts a US AN/TPY 2 radar.

The Broader Middle East

47. Beyond Israel, a number of Middle Eastern countries have purchased and deploy systems with theatre ballistic missile defence capability. Concerned about the growing threat from Iran, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – all field PAC-2 and/or PAC-3 systems. The only exception is Oman, which has, however, recently signed a deal with Raytheon to purchase a modern air defence system, without a ballistic missile defence capability. Qatar and the UAE have ordered US THAAD systems. Saudi Arabia also appears to be interested in purchasing THAADs. Presently, US sales to members of the GCC occur on a bilateral basis. However, the United States has long urged the GCC countries to combine their ballistic missile defence systems to counter the Iranian threat. While the prospects for such extensive co-operation are still slim at this point, the GCC decided to establish a Joint Military Command in late 2013, which could allow for the eventual creation of a joint system. US allies Egypt and Jordan deploy the PAC-3 and PAC-2 system respectively, with Jordan seeking to procure PAC-3. Jordan also intermittently hosts US PAC-3 systems during joint exercises with the United States.

48. Russia was set to sell the S-300 system to Iran, but the deal was cancelled in 2010, due to the UN sanctions placed on the country in connection with its nuclear programme. Iran is exploring to procure Russian air defence alternatives as well as developing an indigenous capability, based on S-300 technology. Syria has also ordered Russian S-300 systems. At this point, it is unclear whether Russian has delivered the systems. There have been unconfirmed reports that Israel has destroyed a shipment of these systems in a Syrian port. In contrast, Russian officials have given contradicting statements on the fate of these missiles, which they say are still in Russia: some argue that they will be scrapped; others suggest that they could be sold to other customers.

South Asia

49. In South Asia, India is the only regional power developing a ballistic missile defence system. Its traditional rival Pakistan for the moment seems content to develop a very robust nuclear weapons programme to counter Indian conventional military superiority. India’s ballistic missile defence programme is designed to defend against incoming attacks from both China and Pakistan. Experts argue that its programme is primarily motivated by the fear of Pakistan’s “tendency to pursue low intensity conflicts and foment terrorism under the shield of its nuclear arsenal”, the possibility of unintentional launch, and the hope to bolster its second-strike capability (O’Donnell and Joshi, 2013). However, some analysts caution that advances in India’s missile defence programme may renew an India-Pakistan arms race and destabilise the sub-continent.

50. India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) began conceptualising a missile defence plan in the 1990s, but the programme was beset by test failures throughout the 2000s. A series of successful tests beginning in 2010 led the DRDO in 2012 to announce that its ballistic missile defence system would be ready in the 2013-2014 timeframe, but despite a successful interceptor test in April 2014, initial deployment appears to be delayed.

51. Indian missile defence is a two-tiered system combining the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system, apparently designed for mid-course interception, and the Advanced Air-Defense (AAD) system, designed for terminal-phase interception. Presently, these systems appear to be capable of protecting two cities from missile threats of up to 2,000 km. India’s radar system called Swordfish, developed jointly with Israel, allows it to simultaneously track “more than 200 objects with diameters of no less than two inches at a range of 600 to 800 km” (O’Donnell and Joshi, 2013).

52. Historically, India’s ballistic missile defence capabilities have been developed with help from France, Israel, Russia, and the United States. In recent years, US-India and Israel-India co-operation has increased, as the country is intent on expanding its current missile defence capabilities. The second phase of its missile defence programme is designed to intercept missiles with a range of up to 5,000 km, thus approaching ICBM ranges. The Indian Defence Ministry recently concluded an agreement with Israel to integrate Indian and Israeli assets into a layered ballistic missile defence network. A full contract is not expected until late 2014, but the programme will likely see Israeli companies team up with Indian state-owned companies. Indeed, India appears to be interested in Israel’s Arrow ballistic missile defence system.

Concluding Remarks: The Potential Strategic implications

53. The discussion on the impact of ballistic missile defence on deterrence and international stability emerged early in the Cold War. However, even now, no clear consensus exists among analysts whether or in what circumstances the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems has a destabilising or stabilising effect on regional security and on international security writ large. As the overview of global ballistic missile defence systems shows, states that deploy or seek such systems do so because they believe it will stabilise their deterrence postures. They ground this belief in a variety of arguments, depending on their specific situation. First, perhaps the most convincing argument that these states put forward is that the ability of ballistic missile defence systems to deter by denial complements traditional deterrence by punishment. In this view, rogue states with newly acquired ballistic missile capabilities are less predictable in their behaviour. The chance that they might not be deterred by the threat of a retaliatory attack cannot be dismissed. With a limited ballistic missile defence, such rogue states may be deterred by the prospect of wasting limited offensive resources on an attack that has a low probability of success. Second, even if deterrence against rogue states fails, ballistic missile defence systems will mitigate the damage caused by a limited ballistic missile attack. In short, ballistic missile defence systems provide an added layer of defence. Third, if a limited number of missiles are launched accidentally or unintentionally, for example by rogue elements within a state, the damage and the pressure to retaliate with a counter-attack can be reduced. Fourth, some experts argue that some states pursue ballistic missile defence at least in part to understand how to penetrate or overwhelm a potential adversary’s defences, i.e. to improve their offensive missile capability.

54. In contrast to arguments that see ballistic missile defences as a positive factor in security relations, there are those analysts and indeed states which argue that ballistic missile defences – especially when they are highly capable and deployed in large numbers – have the potential to be a destabilising force in the international system or in regional security complexes. They do so based on the following assumptions. First, they believe that ballistic missile defences can cause a security dilemma in which the defensive actions of one state, regardless of intentions, heighten perceptions of insecurity among other states. This would undermine confidence in mutual deterrence and spur competitive arms build-ups, they argue. Second, analysts posit that established nuclear powers that see their strategic position undermined by another side’s ballistic missile defence capabilities will be less likely to participate in strategic arms reduction or non-proliferation initiatives, because they want to assure their second-strike capability through higher numbers. The counter-argument put forth is that the widespread deployment of ballistic missile defence systems could actually facilitate disarmament, as two fundamental problems associated with strategic disarmament could be ameliorated: verification need not be fool-proof anymore, as ballistic missile defences could guard against limited cheating on disarmament, and the pressures of renewed arms races would be reduced, again because defences provide some protection against limited rearmament of the other side. Third, critics of ballistic missile defence argue that risk-acceptant rogue states will not be significantly more deterred from launching ballistic missiles against stronger states if the other side has ballistic missile defence capabilities. Indeed, ballistic missile defence could create a sense of false security.

55. In light of the arguments that ballistic missile defence capabilities are destabilising, what steps should states that do pursue them take to reassure states that are critical of their programmes? After all, international security affairs depend on the actions of states, which in turn depend on the states’ perceptions. In order to convince other states that a particular missile defence system does not undermine stability or deterrence and to avoid an arms race, these states should assure the other side through diplomatic means. Most importantly, states should increase the transparency of their ballistic missile defence programmes. The more transparent a state is, the less the other side can claim that the system undermines stability. Furthermore, closer co-operation on ballistic missile defences with the other side can build confidence that the system cannot credibly threaten the other side. However, transparency and co-operation cannot take place in a vacuum; both sides need to talk to and consult with each other. In recent years, NATO has taken a prudent course on ballistic missile defence in this regard. By seeking co-operation with Russia, NATO has demonstrating that its ballistic missile defences are only targeted against limited missile strikes by rogue actors. Unfortunately, Russia has not been convinced yet, and its stance appears to be hardening. While this is unfortunate, NATO should continue to emphasise that it seeks transparency and co-operation with Russia as it builds its defences if political relations improve sufficiently. As recent Russian policy announcements already indicate, the danger is that Russia uses NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability as a pretext to build up further capabilities targeted at the Alliance.

56. In conclusion, the spread of ballistic missile defence capabilities is a relatively new and very dynamic phenomenon in international security affairs. As this short analysis has shown, not all strategic implications have become clear yet. However, what is clear is the irreversibility of the trend: ever-more capable ballistic missile defence systems will be an integral part of the future security environment. It is therefore imperative to continue to think through the consequences of their global build-up, especially as the world is slowly becoming multipolar. The Science and Technology Committee will therefore continue to follow the issue throughout 2014 and beyond.

APPENDIX

Table: Select List of Ballistic Missile Defence Capabilities

|SYSTEM |MISSILE |BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE PURPOSE |

|LAND-BASED | | |

|Terminal Intercept | | |

|Patriot Advanced Capability-3 |PAC-3 missile |SRBM defence |

|(PAC-3) | | |

|SAMP/T (Sol-Air Moyenne Portée|Aster 30 |SRBM defence |

|Terrestre) – Aster 30 version | | |

|Terminal High Altitude Area |THAAD missile |SRBM and MRBM defence |

|Defense (THAAD) | | |

|Medium Extended Air Defense |PAC-3 missile |SRBM and MRBM defence |

|System (MEADS) | | |

|S-300 |different missiles |SRBM defence |

|(multiple variants) | | |

|S-400 |different missiles |SRBM and MRBM defence |

|(multiple variants) | | |

|S-500 |Unknown |ICBM defence |

|HQ-12 |KS-1A |SRBM defence |

|HQ-9 |Unknown |SRBM defence |

|(multiple variants) | | |

|Prithvi Air Defence |Prithvi missile |(possibly midcourse) SRBM defence |

| |(explosive warhead | |

| |technology) | |

|Advanced Air Defense |Akash |SRBM defence |

| |(explosive warhead | |

| |technology) | |

|David’s Sling |Stunner |SRBM defence (focused on close range ballistic missiles) |

|Arrow |Arrow 2 |SRBM and MRBM defence |

|(multiple variants) | | |

| |Arrow 3 |SRBM and MRBM defence (close to IRBM range) |

|Midcourse Intercept | | |

|Ground-Based Midcourse Defense|Ground-Based Interceptor|IRBM and ICBM defence |

| |(GBI) | |

|SEA-BASED | | |

|Midcourse Intercept | | |

|Aegis combat system (multiple |SM-3 Block IA |initial capability vs. SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs |

|variants; land-based Aegis | | |

|Ashore in development) | | |

| |SM-3 Block IB |robust capability vs. SRBMs, MRBMs; initial capability vs. IRBMs |

| |SM-3 Block IIA |robust capability vs. SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs |

| |SM-3 Block IIB |robust capability vs. SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBMs |

| |(in limbo) | |

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