Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs)
Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs)
Peter Jennings, the Executive Director, ASPI, posted the following article on The Strategist on 10 April 2015 :
I was prompted to email him about one particular aspect:
"Hi Peter,
I enjoyed reading your 'One Defence' article in 'The Strategist'. It prompted me to look at your earlier posts and I came across 'Integration, strategy and the ADF' from last month. In it you state:
'But I’m still looking for the convincing explanation that shows how these plans connect—the integration factor, if you will—showing how the ADF will fight as an organisation. The kinds of details which would provide for a compelling explanation here would include things like: How will the Joint Strike Fighter operate with Army’s deployed LAND 400 vehicles? [
May I suggest that the "integration factor" is a human one.
I can't speak for those Australian AFV crews who operated in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I can say from my experience as a tank troop leader in Vietnam, that it is people that make integration work. I had occasion to request the assistance of US air support while engaged in the middle of an attack on a major enemy defensive position. Nothing could have proceeded more smoothly.
My training meant that I was able to describe exactly what air delivered munitions were needed, where they were needed and when they were needed ("everything you've got ... 50 yards in front ... now!"). More than anything else, however, it was the commitment of both parties to achieve the same goal which made all the difference.
The guys 'on top' were just as much at risk as those of us on the ground. The human factor involved here is one of determination borne of confidence in your training, your equipment, your men and your allies.
I guess this is why morale is regarded as being an integral component of 'combat power'.
Peter responded to say:
"Yes, you are right. People are the most important integrating factor at all times. That’s what will make the First Principles Review succeed or fail.
The systems integration I was talking about in the earlier piece becomes an adjunct to people making the system work. There should, for example, be IT connectivity that create a common operating picture for the JSF and ground forces to deliver an even faster ground support response. Well, that’s the theory of it. But right now Land 400 (future Army vehicle fleet) and JSF aren’t really synchronising that piece – at least as I understand it."
What is the IT connectivity that he refers to? Another example he offers in The Strategist article is illustrative: "What are the integration capabilities required to provide appropriate targeting information for the many capable new weapons and platforms coming into service?"
An article was recently posted on Defence's Land Power Forum: 'War: An integrated endeavour' by Major Mark Mankowski (10 April 2015) [If the foregoing link doesn't work, Google 'Land Power Forum'.] An extract from it is:
"Both the US Army and the US Marine Corps were equipped with broadly similar weapon systems during the advance on Baghdad in 2003, but it was the Marine Corps’ command system and use of battlefield geometry that was better equipped to efficiently locate, process and prosecute target that were beyond the range of land-based weapons using airpower."
Are the requirements for LAND 400 lacking in this area as suggested by Peter Jennings? I thought that directing JSF ground support was one of the functions of the LAND 400 Phase 2 'joint fires control' vehicles. The LAND 400 Operational Requirement also states:
"For the LCVS [Land Vehicle Combat System], there will be a requirement to accept the development of emerging technologies during LOT and to operate effectively with legacy capabilities including the M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT), Land 200 Battle Management System and Land 121 Field Vehicles, Trailers and Modules (FVT&M)".
Furthermore, the 2014 Future Land Warfare Report makes the point that: "Under initiatives such as Plan Beersheba, the Army is transforming to meet a new security environment, focused on the power of joint effects and enabled by amphibious operations. Success will be measured by the Army’s capacity to prepare for, conduct, and conclude military operations as part of a joint force. Integration and interoperability will be critical issues in joint, combined and coalition operations."
Is the proposed Battlefield Operating System a disjointed one as far as Army and Air Force are concerned?
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