“JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS”



“JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS”

Encyclopedia of Modern Asia, Vol. 3, Iaido to Malay-Indonesian Language, pp. 253-258.

JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The relationship between Japan and the United States, which dates from the mid-nineteenth century, is complex and multifaceted. Two of its most important aspects are security and economic relations.

Relations until World War II

When Commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan to enter into trade and diplomatic relations with the West in 1853-1854, the event was a turning point in the transformation of the Japanese political system from the shogunate to the Meiji imperial system. The United States, however, paid little attention to the Asia-Pacific area until the end of World War I.

After 1918, Japan emerged as one of the five major world powers. The United States established the Washington Treaty System to restrict Japanese territorial expansion and the arms race in the Asia-Pacific area in the 1920s. This system was sustainable as long as Chinese nationalism did not become radical enough to challenge the status quo and Japan maintained its economic prosperity through cooperation with the United States. Though the U.S. immigration law of 1924 virtually prohibited Japanese immigration and damaged U.S.-Japanese relations, the spirit of cooperation and the benefit derived from the Washington Treaty System prevailed in the early 1920s.

But the Great Depression of 1929 demolished the Treaty System and precipitated Japanese military expansion into Manchuria and the Chinese mainland. In 1931 the Japanese army occupied Mukden, Manchuria (present-day Shenyang), and eventually extended its rule over all of Manchuria. The United States had no vital interest in Manchuria, and the Hoover Administration adopted a policy of nonrecognition. In the absence of strong U.S. opposition, Japan continued its expansion and established the puppet state of Manchukuo (in Chinese, Manchguo) in 1934. In July 1937 the Japanese army advanced to the Marco Polo Bridge, beginning the full-scale Sino-Japanese war.

The United States did not intend to fight against Japan over China issues, but neither could Washington bear the prospect of the entire Asia-Pacific area under Japanese rule. In September 1940 Japan stationed its army in northern French Indochina, and in July 1941 moved into southern Indochina. The Japanese expansion in Asia, along with the expansion of Germany in Europe, would have led to a closed world, a world consisting of a series of exclusive economic blocs. In response to these developments, Washington forbade oil exports to Japan in August 1941. This prohibition significantly contributed to Japan’s final decision to go to war against the United States and attack Pearl Harbor that December.

The Occupation Era, 1945-1952 After Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II, the United States played a dominant role in carrying out the Allied Occupation policies in Japan. It first employed punitive economic policies, but later tried to establish a self-sufficient economy in Japan. In February 1949, Joseph Dodge, an American financial adviser, implemented an austerity program to balance Japan’s budget. This politically unpopular austerity program was called the Dodge Line.

The Dodge Line constituted a critical turning point in the Occupation, transforming the state-managed economy into a market-oriented, export-first economy. The fate of the Dodge Line depended on the revival of Japanese foreign trade, but with a world wide depression in 1949, Japan faced a severe economic downturn. Southeast Asian countries were Japan’s natural market because of their great demand for industrial goods and Japan’s geographical proximity. Establishing a regional economic linkage, however, required political stability in Asia. By 1949, the United States had focused its attention on bringing political stability to Southeast Asia as a prerequisite for Japanese economic recovery.

The United States also emphasized demilitarization in the early stage of the Occupation. Because this left Japan defenseless, Washington realized that to ensure Japan’s security it would have to maintain military bases and armed forces there, and in 1951 signed the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.

The United States successfully compelled Japan to accept American bases and to agree, reluctantly, to rearmament. But making military commitments is a double-edged sword, as it made the United States responsible for Japan’s security. Moreover, for the Japanese retaining American bases was a sensitive issue, because they impinged on Japan’s sovereignty. Consequently, the United States had to prevent the base issue from becoming the agenda of any heated debate in the Japanese Diet. Washington could not push Japan too hard concerning Japan’s rearmament program since it might lead to the sensitive base issue. In short, Japan’s reluctant acceptance of American bases guaranteed Japan’s security while mitigating American pressure on Japan to rearm.

The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, stimulated the Japanese economy. The Chinese Communists’ intervention in the war and their military successes increased China’s prestige in Asia. With China’s increasing status, the United States believed that it would be difficult to retain Japan’s pro-American orientation unless it took steps to preserve its own prestige. In response to these pressures, Washington articulated its commitment to maintaining Japan’s security, sanctioning the use of force if necessary. Because Japan was an unreliable former enemy, Washington could not simply count on its good will, but has to stimulate Japan’s own self-interest to encourage its alignment with the West.

Japan’s primary task became to determine its minimum defense contribution without jeopardizing its ties with the United States. Japan was excellent at exploiting America’s Achilles’ heel; it manipulated U.S. security anxieties in Japan to induce more involvement in Japan’s economic recovery and security. Japan also tried to induce aid from the United States in exchange for Japan’s rearmament. As a weak ally in an unstable area surrounded by two giant Communist countries, Japan found its own perceived weakness to be the best asset with which to deal with the United States.

Postoccupation Economic Relations

During the 1950s, both the American and Japanese governments tried to reduce Japan’s trade deficit and integrate the Japanese economy into the Western bloc. Japan, however, could not enjoy full benefits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) because of restrictions imposed by other members states. Moreover, the United States severely curtailed Japanese trade with China.

Four factors helped the Japanese economic development in the early postoccupation period. First, the United States tolerated Japan’s restrictions on imports and foreign investments. Few American businesses regarded the Japanese market as important. Second, Washington facilitated Japanese access to the American market. Third, American military spending in Japan and other parts of Asia helped revitalize the Japanese economy. Fourth, Japan was able to concentrate on economic growth because it was not hampered by excessive defense spending. During the 1950s, the United States and Japan had trade frictions only in specific sectors, including textiles, sundries, and silverware. The American textile industry was especially hard hit by heavy importation of cheap Japanese products. In January 1956, Japan began to adopt self-imposed export restraint.

As American economic supremacy gradually declined in the late 1960s, Washington could no longer keep its domestic market open to Japanese goods. The U.S.-Japanese textile negotiations between 1969 and 1971, which were designed to restrain imports of Japanese textiles, were symbolic incidents of this era. Americans were alarmed to realize Japan had recovered from World War II so quickly and, by the early 1970s, had become competitive with U.S. industries. During the 1970s, however, the United States was primarily concerned with competition from Western Europe.

Japanese economic growth gradually slowed beginning in the mid-1980s, and the United States started to focus serious attention on Japan as an economic competitor. Washington emphasized not only reducing Japanese imports to the United States but also expanding U.S. exports to Japan. In addition, Washington focused on unfair Japanese trade practices, considering it imperative to change the Japanese domestic system. By the late 1980s, Japan had an enormous trade surplus and the United States a towering deficit. Between September 1989 and June 1990, the two countries devised the Structural Impediments Initiative as a way to mitigate trade problems. Unlike earlier trade agreements, this one dealt with structural issues instead of focusing on particular items.

Postoccupation Security Relations

The Security Treaty of 1951 had two major problems. First, it gave the United States the right to station its armies in Japan, but it did not oblige the U.S. to defend Japan or to consult with it over military operations. Second, the treaty allowed the American army to repress domestic rioting, a potential violation of Japan’s sovereignty. In 1960, a new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded that abrogated the United States’s right to intervene in domestic rioting and specified that the United States assumed official responsibility for Japan’s defense. In turn, Japan was obligated to protect U.S. installations in Japan if they were attacked.

Japan did not become directly involved in the Vietnam War, but as a dependable ally of the United States it made significant contributions and reaped enormous economic benefits. Okinawa became a base for B-52s and a training base for U.S. Marines. America used its bases in mainland Japan for logistics, supplies, training, and rest and recreation. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam encouraged the United States to promote closer military cooperation with Japan. In November 1978, the United States and Japan began to review various aspects of military cooperation, such as the emergency defense legislation and logistic support.

The 1990s and Afterward

The Cold War structure and America’s preeminence in the world brought stability to post-World War II U.S.-Japanese relations. The Cold War made Japan depend on the United States strategically, and America’s supreme power brought both military protection and economic well-being to Japan. However, the U.S. loss of dominance in the mid-1970s and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s undermined the basis of stability in the countries’ relations.

The 1990s were an unstable decade for U.S.-Japanese relations, a time during which these countries searched for a new principle to determine the orientation of their relationship.

During the 1990s, the U.S. economy revived, primarily due to the information technology (IT) revolution and the rapid development of IT-related industries, while Japan remained in deep political and economic turmoil. In July 1993, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, the long-term ruling party, lost its majority in the Diet, ending its thirty-eight-year rule over Japanese politics. A series of weak coalition governments followed, none bringing political stability, which contributed to Japan’s economic recession. Economic crises in Southeast Asian countries in 1997 further undermined Japanese economic conditions. Currently, the world pays close attention to Japan’s management of macroeconomic policy because of the negative effect of Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation on the performance of the world economy, especially that of Asia.

The Japan-U.S. Framework for New Economic Partnership began in 1993 in order to redress trade imbalances. The negotiations stressed macroeconomic concerns, area-specific issues, structural problems, and a result-oriented approach. Washington demanded that Japan set the numerical target for its increase of imports, arguing that since the Japanese market was closed, the United States could not expand its exports to Japan. Japan strongly opposed this request on the grounds that it could lead to managed trade, and insisted that U.S. firms conduct more effective market research and produce goods suitable for Japanese consumers.

The gross national products (GNPs) of the United States and Japan combined constitute more than 40 percent of the world’s total GNP, and their economic assistance makes up approximately 50 percent of the total amount of aid. Since U.S.-Japanese economic relations will continue to have a decisive impact on the health of the global economy, the U.S.-Japan Twenty-first Century Committee was established in July 1996 as a bilateral private-sector forum for dialogue and the consideration of policy proposals. Moreover, the two nations have worked together on such global threats as the deterioration of the earth’s environment, communicable diseases, natural calamities, and terrorism.

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 reaffirmed the importance of the U.S. bases in Japan. The war forced the United States to restructure its strategic policy toward Asia as a whole. In February 1995 the United States published the Nye Initiative, a report on U.S. security strategy toward East Asia and the Pacific area compiled by defense expert Joseph Nye. It claimed there were 100,000 Americans associated with the military in Asia, of whom 60,000 were in Japan. The Nye Initiative defined U.S.-Japanese relations as the most important bilateral relationship in Asia, and Japanese security as the linchpin of U.S. security policy there.

Suspicions in 1994 that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons prompted Japan to reconsider its security policies. In September 1995, the abduction and rape of a twelve-year-old Japanese girl in Okinawa by American Marines sparked renewed criticism of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. The threat of military conflicts among China, Taiwan, and the United States in 1995 and 1996 demonstrated military instability in Asia.

In Asia 1996, President Clinton held a summit with Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, with security as the principal agenda. They issued new guidelines for closer U.S.-Japan military cooperation. In May 1999 the Japanese Diet passed legislation supporting the guidelines. Japan formally approved conducting military-related action outside of Japan, including rear-area logistic support but not active combat operations, to enhance its own security interests.

Japan’s neighbors, especially China, are closely watching the expanding role of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the Asia-Pacific area and worry that Japan might again become a great military power. In the post-Cold War era, Washington redefined the security treaty with Japan to maintain a military presence in Japan partly because the continuous presence of the U.S. army would curb Japan’s military behavior.

The Near-Term Outlook

In 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Washington to meet with President George W. Bush, taking with him the sad statistics of the nation’s economy. Japan faces the highest level of deflation since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and government debt has risen to 130 percent of the gross national product. Banks are the most important problem for Koizumi. Nonperforming loans total hundreds of billions of dollars. Koizumi openly expressed his pro-U.S. position in public, looking for outside support to implement his potentially unpopular reform agenda. President Bush, for his part, demonstrated support for Koizumi’s economic reform policy. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 further promoted military cooperation between Japan and the United States. Japanese-U.S. relations continue to be one of the most important bilateral relationships in the twenty-first century, especially in the Asia-Pacific area. The peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific area depend on Japanese-U.S. cooperation and their efforts to contain destabilizing factors in this area.

Yoneyuki Sugita

Further Reading

Borden, William S. (1984) The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin press.

Buckley, Roger. (1992) U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, Jerome B., ed. (1972) Pacific Partnership: Unites States-Japan Trade: Prospects and Recommendations for the Seventies. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Destler, I. M., et al. (1976) Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

. (1979) The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Dower, John (1999) Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W. W. Norton.

Forsberg, Aaron. (2000) America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan’s Postwar Economic Revival, 1950-1960. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Green, Michael J. (1995) Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hunsberger, Warren S. (1964) Japan and the United States in World Trade. New York: Harper & Row.

Iriye, Akira. (1972) Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

. (1981) Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Koshiro, Yukiko. (1999) Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan. New York: Columbia University Press.

LaFeber, Walter. (1997) The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations. New York: W. W. Norton.

Lincoln, Edward J. (1999) Troubled Times: U.S.-Japan Trade Relations in the 1990s. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Mckinnon, Ronald I., and Kenichi Ohno. (1997) Dollar and Yen: Resolving Economic Conflict between the United States and Japan. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Neumann, William. (1963) America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Schaller, Micheal. (1997) Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation. New York: Oxford University Press

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