After the “Cherry Trees”



After the “Cherry Trees”

The primary outcomes of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which concern us are the requirement for a follow-on conference in 1930 to deal with any issues created by technological progress or the geopolitical situation, the “building” holiday (which actually applied only to the US and Japan, as the British Empire, France and Italy were authorized to build capital ships within certain limitations before 1930) and the restriction on replacing those ships retained under the Treaty prior to their reaching a service life of twenty years.

If the “building holiday” had not been included in the Treaty, there still would have been a significant delay before the laying down and completion of Treaty capital ships. The US, Japan, France and Italy all had ships on the building slips, many of which would have to be cleared away before new ships which met Treaty restrictions could be laid down. Into this delay must be added the need to provide new or revised designs, based on new requirements from the various Naval staffs and approved by their various governments, at a time when such design staffs and warship building capacity were being cut back as peacetime economy measures. The numbers of ships completed before 1931 would have been small in any case, under the rule that a replacement ship for an ship approaching twenty years service was to be laid down no earlier than the seventeenth of service of the ships being replaced. For the USN, as an example, this would have been 1928, and limited to two ships, which would have completed in 1931.

The next assumption is that the London Conference in 1930 would not have led to a treaty extending the “holiday” and/or extending the service period for capital ships from twenty to twenty-six years. The London Treaty of 1936 was signed only by the French, US and the British Empire. This Treaty reduced capital ship main armament limits to 14” guns, but essentially eliminated the cruiser and destroyer quantitative limitations imposed in the 1930 Treaty. The year before, 1935, the British had negotiated a unilateral treaty with Germany, in which Germany was brought into the Treaty structure, with a quantitative limit at 35% of the British Treaty allowance of tonnage for capital ships. The British also reached an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1937 in which the Soviets agreed to abide by the Treaties.

Eventually a succession of events would free the various navies from the Treaty structure. Japan gave notice in 1934 and left at the end of 1936. Germany left the treaty structure in 1939, when it withdrew from its agreement with the British, which had been negotiated in 1935 to replace the “Versailles” Treaty limitations which Germany had denounced in 1933,. The British Empire suspended its participation in late 1939, along with France, at the start of World War Two. France, along with Italy, had never signed the 1930 Treaty. Italy suspended its participation in 1940, having also never signed the 1930 Treaty. The USN, however, remained legally bound to the Treaty structure through the middle of 1940, through acts of Congress which authorized the strength of the Navy. The London Treaty of 1936, held because of Japan’s notice of withdrawal, also never came into effect, though only the US, France and the British Empire signed on to that Treaty.

Any construction, of course, would have had to adhere to the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1922, both in quantity built and technical characteristics. As it is, the most information available for such designs as were considered for building is for the USN between 1923 and 1939. Surprising enough, the navies with the next most amount of information on their programs are the French, Italian and German. The least amount is known about the Japanese and British programs. The Japanese programs were subject to secrecy on the part of the Japanese, but also because such programs were overcome by the design requirements for their extensive rebuilding program of their existing ships. The problem with the British is that they spent most of their design effort coming up with ‘small” battleship (less than 35,000 ton standard displacement) proposals for each naval arms limitation conference, hoping to persuade the other navies to reduce the limits of the Washington Treaty further, despite the adamant resistance of the US and Japan.

All the navies who were participants in the 1922 Washington Treaty executed modernization and reconstruction programs for their capital ships. In the case of the US, the funds authorized and appropriated certainly exceeded $900 million over a nine year period. A modernization generally left the hull and machinery unchanged, adding bulges, while updating secondary and AA armament, fire control systems, adapting superstructures and some deck protection improvements. Reconstruction added bulges and rebuilt torpedo protection systems and altered the hull size and shape, replaced the existing machinery, updated main, secondary and AA armament and fire control systems, added horizontal armor and revised the superstructure. The Washington Treaty allowed such modernization, to a total of a 3,000 ton displacement increase. Changes to the main armament and turrets or the vertical armor scheme (thicknesses and arrangement) were not allowed, except for the French and Italians, who could up gun their capital ships within the 3,000 ton modernization and 35,000 ton overall limit. Two factors are not clear from the historical record. The first is did the additional displacement from the modernization or reconstruction count against the Treaty quantitative limits or only the initially declared displacement. Second, would the disposal of ships replaced by new construction under these scenarios have provided additional funds beyond the historically budgets that offset the costs (and impact on aircraft carrier, cruiser and destroyer building programs and modernization) of new construction.

United States

With the confirmation of the Treaty by the Senate in 1922, US capital ship design took a hiatus until 1928, when the first studies were undertaken to provide for the authorization and appropriation for capital ship construction to begin in 1931. The US was a signatory of the 1922, 1930 and 1936 Treaties. Under the Constitution, the provisions of these treaties became US law and Congress insisted that the USN fully abide by the treaties’ provisions until 1939. When Japan refused to provide information on her future capital ship programs in 1937, the US, along with France and the British Empire invoked the “escalator” clause of the 1936 Treaty, returning the limitation on main armament to 16” guns (from 14”) and increasing the standard displacement limitation from 35,000 tons to 45,000 tons. Only in 1939, with the authorization to retain over-age ships and in 1940 when the Treaty quantitative limits, and then qualitative limits were discarded, did the USN finally escape the Treaty system which its primary opponent, the Japanese, had abandoned in 1936.

The battleships, battle cruisers, armored cruisers and monitors of the USN in service on 31 December 1923 under the limitations of the Washington Treaty of 525,000 tons (ships in service/commissioned with declared or estimated standard displacement)

|Seattle |23 September 1903 |7 August 1906 |14,500 |

|Charlotte |21 March 1905 |7 May 1908 |14,500 |

|Missoula |29 April 1905 |21 July 1908 |14,500 |

|Florida |9 March 1909 |15 September 1911 |21,825 |

|Utah |15 March 1909 |31 August 1911 |21,825 |

|Arkansas |25 January 1910 |17 September 1912 |26,000 |

|Wyoming |9 February 1910 |25 September 1912 |26,000 |

|New York |11 September 1911 |15 April 1914 |27,000 |

|Texas |17 April 1911 |12 March 1914 |27,000 |

|Nevada |4 November 1912 |11 March 1916 |27,500 |

|Oklahoma |26 October 1912 |2 May 1916 |27,500 |

|Pennsylvania |27 October 1913 |12 June 1916 |31,400 |

|Arizona |16 March 1914 |17 October 1916 |31,400 |

|New Mexico |14 October 1915 |20 May 1918 |32,000 |

|Mississippi |5 April 1915 |18 December 1917 |32,000 |

|Idaho |20 January 1915 |24 March 1919 |32,000 |

|Tennessee |14 May 1917 |3 June 1920 |32,300 |

|California |25 October 1916 |10 August 1921 |32,300 |

|Colorado |29 May 1919 |30 August 1923 |32,600 |

|Maryland |24 April 1917 |21 July 1921 |32,600 |

|West Virginia |12 April 1920 |1 December 1923 |32,600 |

Total capital ship tonnage: 569,350 tons

Tonnage of armored cruisers: 43,500 tons

Tonnage of “dreadnought” capital ships: 95,650 tons

Tonnage of “superdreadnought” capital ships: 332,400 tons

Tonnage of 16” gun armed capital ships: 97,800 tons

One of the anomalies of the Treaty was the status of the three “Tennessee” class armored cruisers. The USS Seattle remained in service, armed, as an armored cruiser, into 1931. These ships exceeded 10,000 tons in standard displacement and carried guns larger than 8”. Under the Treaty, they were “capital ships” and should have counted against the aggregate tonnage allowance for the US. There was continuing interest throughout the 1920s of modernizing these ships along the lines of reconstruction of the US battle line, but with an upgraded machinery plant. These ships would serve as peacetime flagships on secondary stations and in wartime, escort convoys and support the battle line, releasing the new heavy cruisers to scout, with the aircraft carriers, for the fleet.

Between 1926 and 1934, the US rebuilt their battle line, starting with the “Florida” and ending with the “Idaho”. The modernizations were allowed under the Treaty; up to 3,000 tons could be added to the ship’s standard displacement, to counter improvements against submarine and air attack. All the ships involved received bulges and additional horizontal armor on decks and turret roofs. The coal powered ships had their boilers replaced by oil fired boilers left over from the 1916 program. Main gun turret elevation was increased in the “Nevada”, “Pennsylvania” and “New Mexico” classes. It was planned to do this with the earlier ships (“Florida”, “Wyoming” and “New York” classes), but at the time (1926-27), the British protested and the US acceded to those protests, though they could have argued for an increase to twenty degrees, the standard elevation of British “big gun” turrets at that time. None of the ships experienced a 3,000 ton increase in displacement, as the new boilers were lighter and offset the increases of the additional armor and the bulges. In some cases, net horsepower increased, in all case, length to beam ratio decreased, and all ships showed a slight decrease in maximum sustained sea speed. The earliest plans were to replace the machinery of the battleships of the “New York” and later classes with that of the cancelled “South Dakota” battleships, but this was considered too costly, despite the great improvement in ship speed, internal compartmentalization and reliability, especially during periods of maintained maximum sea speed the use of these electro-turbine power plants would have provided. At least, the reciprocating engine machinery of the “New York” class and the “Oklahoma” could have been replaced; instead these ships remained the “lame ducks” of the Battle Force (at emergency load displacement, “Oklahoma” could barely touch 18 knots, while sustained steaming at 20 knots shook their machinery to pieces). When the “New Mexico” class was rebuilt, their machinery was replaced by modern (1931) geared turbines which slightly improved maximum speeds, but provided significant improvement in cruising range. Buying three common sets of machinery also reduced initial and life cycle costs for these ships. It was intended to do the same for the “Big Five”, but reconstruction funding disappeared until 1939. Another mistake was in spending scarce funds to modernize the “Florida” and “Wyoming” class battleships, especially after the London Treaty forced their disposal or conversion only four to five years after being rebuilt. These ships, especially the “Florida” class, added very little to the strength of the US battle line when facing a Japanese battle line with 14” and 16” guns. As it was the US spent over $900 million (1939 dollars) over a nine year period (1926-1934) on the reconstruction effort.

The USN’s original plan for modernizing its battle line started with replacing the coal burning machinery of the older battleships, using the surviving oil fired boilers from the “South Dakota” class. The oldest available plans, however, are a modernization of the “Nevada” class, which makes sense given the strategic, operational and tactical disadvantages of USS Oklahoma’s reciprocating engines. This involved packaging the entire power plant from the “South Dakota” class into the “Nevada” class hull, increasing elevation of main gun turrets, replacing the cage masts and the 5” gun secondary with 6” guns also left over from the 1916 program. The use of the turbo-electric machinery would probably have increased displacement by 1,000 tons, not just because the machinery weighed more, but because of the internal bulkheads that would be added, first in compartmentalizing the turbo-electric plant, and then in building the “five bulkhead” torpedo protection system of the “Big Five” into the existing hull. This would probably have precluded use of the 6” guns in order to get the level of horizontal protection improvement sought in the modernization. The ships would still be bulged, even with the construction of a “modern” TPS within the hull, in order to counter the increase in displacement and bring the belt back up to the desired height above the waterline at battle displacement. Had this modernization been applied to the “New York” and “Nevada” classes, the USN would have eliminated three of its “problem children” of the late 1930s, the reciprocating engines vibrating badly when held to the “new” fleet cruising speed of fifteen knots and the lack of power leaving the USS Oklahoma at 17-18 knots at emergency deep displacement. Instead, despite the bulges, the two classes would have been good for at 23 knots sustained sea speed at battle displacement and easily cruised at ten or fifteen knots.

|“New York” Mod 1922 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |28,912 tons |

|Normal Displacement |32,117 tons |

|Battle Displacement |33,028 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |35,259 tons |

|Dimensions |573’ (OA), 565’ WL x 102.5’ x 33.25’ max D |

|Guns |10 x 14”/45, 12 x 5”/51, 8 x 3”/50 AA |

|Machinery |4 s, 60,000 shp = 23 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |12” belt, 4” deck, 14” turret, 12” barbettes |

Notes: Had the scenario outlined above been followed, the “New York” class would have been reconstructed in 1925-1926, instead of 1926-1927. The reconstruction would have replaced the coal-fired boilers and reciprocating engines with a “South Dakota” turbo-electric plant. The superstructure would have featured ‘heavy” cage masts along the lines of the “Colorado” class, probably also salvaged from the “South Dakota” class. It was intended to replace the 5” secondary with 6” guns, but displacement limitations imposed by the increased deck protection and bulges would have required retention of the 5” guns, though with movement to the superstructure, the twin mount might have been introduced. The “New York” class was declared at a Treaty displacement of 27,000 tons. Calculations in 1923 determined the actual displacement at 23,958 tons at standard displacement. Given the declared displacement, the USN had an additional 3,042 tons to work with in modernizing the “New York” class. The turbo-electric plant from the “South Dakota” class weighed in at 2,698 ton (dry), compared to the 2,311 tons for the “New York” class. Historically, the bulges, the heavy tripods and fire control tops and the new deck armor cost 3,567 tons. The addition of the turbo-electric plant and rebuilding the interior protection into a five bulkhead torpedo protection system as in the “Big Five” would have cost an additional 1,387 tons. This would bring the calculated standard displacement to 28,912 tons. The torpedo protection system of the “Big Five” was designed to resist a 400lb TNT warhead. Adding bulges would have increased this to 700lbs. The bulges would have been designed more to offset the increased displacement and raise the belt back to the required height above the water line than improve underwater resistance. The turbo-electric plant would resolve the issue of passing steam lines from the boilers to the turbines past the No.3 turret’s magazines, which suffered from increased temperatures that adversely impacted the powder. The turbo-electric plant was rated at 60,000hp, the USN intending to operate the ship at 2/3ds power in peacetime. At trials in 1914, the USS Texas made 21.13 knots at 28,850hp at a displacement of 26,132 tons. The USS Texas would probably run trials after reconstruction at 32,117 tons. The increased displacement and the bulges should cost 2 knots, based on the historical reconstruction. The 200% increase in power on the other hand, should have added about 4.25 knots, which leaves a trials result of near 23.5 knots. The “New York” class should have been good for around 22.5 knots at battle displacement right out of dry dock. The turbo-electric plant and the additional fuel of the TPS basically doubled the range. The remaining issue would have been increased elevation of the guns. When the USN tried to increase the elevation of the guns of its first reconstructed battleships, the British objected. The USN felt it was within the Treaty allowance to increase the elevation, but the US gave in to the British objections. Range at fifteen degrees for the 14” Gun Mark 8, was 23,000 yards and at thirty degrees, 34,300 yards. Without increased turret elevation, aerial spotting could not be exploited, as the visual horizon was around 24,000 yards. The maximum ballistic range for the 15” Mark I at twenty degrees elevation, the common maximum turret elevation among British capital ships, was 23,387 yards, which explains the British concern with this proposed modification. On the other hand, the Japanese turrets were already completed at 25 degrees maximum elevation, allowing the 36cm (14”) Gun 41st Year Type to range to at least 30,000 yards. Modifications during the late 1920s, increased this to 33 degrees and range to almost 35,000 yards. Since the British had built the first ship of the “Kongo” class and continued to assist in building Japanese capital ships up to IJNS Fuso, they would have known this, and given their designation of Japan as the primary threat after WWI, their objections to the US program can only be understood as Britain’s commitment to legalism in international affairs. The “Nevada” class would be reconstructed to a similar design. Both classes would have received eight 5”/25 Mark 10 AA guns and the Mark 19 director and 15’ “height/range finder” sometime after 1928 in place of the 3” guns.

|“Nevada” Mod 1922 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |29,179 tons |

|Normal Displacement |30,820 tons |

|Battle Displacement |33,053 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |35,269 tons |

|Dimensions |583’ (OA), 575’ WL x 102.5’ x 34.5’ max D |

|Guns |10 x 14”/45, 12 x 5”/51, 8 x 3”/50 AA |

|Machinery |4 s, 60,000 shp = 23 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |13.5” belt, 5” deck, 16” turret, 13” barbettes |

The “Pennsylvania” class would be reconstructed between 1927-1929 to the historical design, while the “New Mexico” class would resemble the “Pennsylvania” class having been reconstructed between 1929 and 1931. The “New Mexico” class could still feature the historical standardized geared turbine installation, with this standard installation being extended to the next reconstruction, which would be the “Tennessee” class, which would be rebuilt between 1932 and 1934 and resemble the historical design for the “New Mexico” class. The “Colorado” class would remain unmodernized until 1938-41. All this is dependent on whether the USN would get authorization for new construction and when that new construction would be laid down, diverting funds and shipyard capacity from the reconstruction program.

This approach would have left the 12” gun ships unmodernized and used up the oil fired boilers from the “South Dakota” class. The “Pennsylvania” class would have been otherwise modernized and retained its original oil-fired plant, or the USN could have bought five, instead of three, geared turbine plants of the type historically used in the modernization of the “New Mexico” class. Since the modernization program began with the “New York” and not the “Florida” class, the last of the “New Mexico” class would have been completed in 1931, and the outcome would have resembled the historical modernization of the “Pennsylvania” class. If funding and capacity followed historical lines, two or three more battleships would have been modernized by 1934. These ships would have resembled the historical outcome of the “New Mexico” class. This would have left two to three “Colorado” class battleships to be modernized in 1938-1941.

If the Treaty had specified quantitative and qualitative limits, but no limits on when new capital ships could be laid down, the Navy would have sought to lay down new capital ships by 1924, the time needed to design a new ship to the 35,000 ton limit and then order the materiel for construction, if Congress was willing to fund new construction. If Congress instead allowed the Navy to revise the 1916 program contracts to use up the materiel already produced, or shift authorizations and appropriations, there was about 80,500 tons of materiel left over from the 1916 program ships, along with three complete and three partially complete turbo-electric machinery plants for the cancelled “South Dakota” class. There were over one hundred 16”/50 Mk.2 guns complete or in production by the end of 1922. One impact of the use of these guns to complete new capital ships would be to reduce the number the Navy eventually released to the Army for installation as coast defense guns. By 1937, the battle line would include the three “Colorado” class, four “Battleship 1923”, six “Battleship 1928” and two “Battleship 1934”. The Washington Treaty required the disposal of replaced ships and we posit here the failure of the London Conference, so the conversion of replaced ships into target or training ships is not legal. Under this scenario, the funds intended for the reconstruction of the battle line between 1926 and 1934, would have gone into new construction, as would any funds from the disposal of over-age ships. The funds for the “Omaha” class cruisers were already authorized and appropriated, so they would not have been impacted by new construction, while the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise were built with NRA economic recovery funds, so the impact would be whether USS Ranger gets built, and this program would have definitely delayed completion of eight heavy cruisers.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1925 |2 |Battleship 1923 |Florida, Utah, Wyoming |

|1927 |2 |Battleship 1923 |Arkansas, New York, Texas |

|1929 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Nevada, Oklahoma |

|1931 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Pennsylvania, Arizona, Mississippi |

|1933 |2 |Battleship 1928 |New Mexico, Idaho |

|1935 |2 |Battleship 1934 |Tennessee, California |

|1937 |2 |“North Carolina” | |

|1939 |4 |“South Dakota” (BB-57) | |

If the Treaty specified a minimum age for replacement but not a “building holiday”, the USN would have laid down two new capital ships in 1928 to replace the “Florida” class. By 1937, the battle line would include the USS West Virginia, eight “Battleship 1928”, and six “Battleship 1934”. The Vinson Acts in 1934 and 1936 might have allowed the USN to retain the USS Colorado and USS Maryland. The Washington Treaty required the disposal of replaced ships and we posit here the failure of the London Conference, so the conversion of replaced ships into target or training ships is not legal. Under this scenario, the funds intended for the reconstruction of the battle line between 1926 and 1934, would have gone into new construction, as would any funds from the disposal of over-age ships. The funds for the “Omaha” class cruisers were already authorized and appropriated, so they would not have been impacted by new construction, while the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise were built with NRA economic recovery funds, so the impact would be whether USS Ranger gets built, and this program would have definitely delayed completion of six or seven heavy cruisers.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1928 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Florida, Utah, Wyoming |

|1929 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Arkansas, New York, Texas |

|1931 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Nevada, Oklahoma |

|1933 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Pennsylvania, Arizona, Mississippi |

|1934 |2 |Battleship 1934 |New Mexico, Idaho |

|1935 |2 |Battleship 1934 |Tennessee, California |

|1936 |2 |Battleship 1934 |Colorado, Maryland |

|1937 |2 |“North Carolina” | |

|1938 |2 |“North Carolina” | |

|1939 |2 |“South Dakota” (BB-57) | |

With the end of and the failure to extend the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the US Navy looked forward to 1931, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. The London Conference had imposed a numerical limit on capital ships as well as a quantitative tonnage limit. The US had to reduce its battle line to fifteen ships. Of the remaining ships, one could be disarmed totally and converted to a target ship and another converted to a training ship, the rest being disposed of. Historically, the USS Utah became the target ship, the USS Wyoming became the training ship and the USS Florida was disposed of by 1931. In this scenario, all three are disposed of, and USS Arkansas and USS Oklahoma are converted. By 1937, the US battle line would be the three “Colorado” class, six “Battleship 1928”, and six “Battleship 1934”. In 1940, USS Utah was reconverted to a combination target and AA training ship for the US Pacific Fleet. If the London Conference had failed, the Washington Treaty required the disposal of replaced ships and we posit here the failure of the London Conference, so the conversion of replaced ships into target or training ships is not legal. The replacement schedule would remain the same as quantitative tonnage limits would have forced the disposal of the replaced ships. The Vinson Acts in 1934 and 1936 might have allowed the USN to retain the USS California. Under this scenario, the funds intended for the reconstruction of the battle line between 1926 and 1934, would have gone into new construction, as would any funds from the disposal of over-age ships. The funds for the “Omaha” class cruisers were already authorized and appropriated, so they would not have been impacted by new construction, while the funds for the USS Ranger would already be appropriated and USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise were built with NRA economic recovery funds, so the impact would be the delayed completion of five heavy cruisers. The London Treaty resolved the status of the “Tennessee” class armored cruisers and all were disposed of by 1931.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1932 |3 |Battleship 1928 |Florida, Utah, Wyoming |

|1933 |3 |Battleship 1928 |Arkansas, Nevada, Oklahoma |

|1934 |2 |Battleship 1928 |Pennsylvania, Arizona |

|1935 |2 |Battleship 1934 |Mississippi, New Mexico |

|1937 |2 |“North Carolina” | |

|1938 |2 |“North Carolina” | |

|1939 |2 |“South Dakota” (BB-57) | |

With the extension of the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the US Navy looked forward to 1937, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. In this case, there would be eight over-age battleships. In the meantime, they had to reduce the battle line to fifteen ships. The USS Florida was disposed of, USS Utah converted to a target ship and the USS Wyoming became a training ship. The historical rebuilding of the capital ships classes from the “Florida” class to the “New Mexico” class would be completed between 1926 and 1934. By 1940, when the first new construction might be complete, the US would have eleven over-age battleships. There is no way that Congress would have authorized and appropriated funds for more than three in 1937, and perhaps four in 1938, despite the Vinson Acts through 1939, which called for the authorization and appropriation of new funds for replacement of over-age ships under the Treaty. Under the Vinson Acts, the Navy could retain over-age ships, but there was no need to retain the ships from the “Florida” class through USS Oklahoma. These ships were demonstrably obsolete and retention would divert manpower and maintenance funds from new construction. They would have been disposed of or converted to other uses by 1941. The historical reconstruction of the battle line between 1926 and 1934 would have occurred, and USS Ranger and the “Yorktown” class would be built, so the main impact would have been on USS Wasp and the delayed completion of three heavy cruisers and the “Brooklyn” class light cruisers. Funds for a reconstruction program for the “Big Five” would have been appropriated in 1939.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1937 |3 |“North Carolina” | |

|1938 |3 |“North Carolina” | |

|1939 |4 |“South Dakota” (BB-57) | |

With the extension of the “building holiday” and the extension of the service age of capital ships to twenty-six years at the 1930 London Conference, the US Navy looked forward to 1937, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. In this case, there would be three over-age battleships that needed replacing under the Treaty (USS Arkansas, USS New York and USS Texas). Four more (the “Nevada” and “Pennsylvania” classes) battleships would become over-age in 1942, and replacements would need to be laid down in 1939, per the Treaty. In the meantime, they had to reduce the battle line to fifteen ships. The USS Florida was disposed of, USS Utah converted to a target ship and the USS Wyoming became a training ship. The historical rebuilding of the capital ships classes from the “Florida” class to the “New Mexico” class would be completed between 1926 and 1934. By 1940, when the first new construction might be complete, the US would have eleven over-age battleships. There is no way that Congress would have authorized and appropriated funds for more than three in 1937, and perhaps four in 1938, despite the Vinson Acts through 1939, which called for the authorization and appropriation of new funds for replacement of over-age ships under the Treaty. Under the Vinson Acts, the Navy could retain over-age ships, but there was no need to retain the ships from the “Florida” class through USS Oklahoma. These ships were demonstrably obsolete and retention would divert manpower and maintenance funds from new construction. They would have been disposed of or converted to other uses by 1941. The historical reconstruction of the battle line between 1926 and 1934 would have occurred, as would the completion without delay of the aircraft cruisers, heavy cruisers and the “10,000” ton light cruisers.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1937 |2 |“North Carolina” |Arkansas, New York |

|1938 |1 |“North Carolina” |Texas |

|1939 |4 |“South Dakota” (BB-57) |Nevada, Oklahoma, Arizona, Pennsylvania |

If the 1930 Treaty had extended the capital ship replacement period to twenty-six years, but not continued the “building holiday”, the first new US capital ship would replace the USS Arkansas in 1938.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1935 |1 |Battleship 1934 |Arkansas |

|1937 |2 |“North Carolina” |New York, Texas |

|1939 |4 |“South Dakota” (BB-57) |Nevada, Oklahoma, Arizona, Pennsylvania |

The US design for new Treaty limited battleship would be influenced and informed by the success of the final class of the “Standard Battleship”, the “South Dakota” (BB-49) class and the guns, armor, machinery and materiel left over from the cancellation of the 1916 program. The US would have sought to equal the latest British design as the RN developed its characteristics and reported them to the other Treaty participants. The design would have used the turrets and guns, along with the barbette armor of the “South Dakota” design. In many ways, it would end up looking like a slightly longer, three turret “Colorado”. Fire control would be the standard Mk.20 main directors and Mk.16 secondary directors for the 6” guns in the fire control tops on top the heavy “cage” masts. The Mk.I range keeper would be introduced, but fire control would be through “follow the pointer” in the turret. There would be two plotting rooms under and behind armor. Range finding would be through turret rangefinders for the main guns and 20’ rangefinders in the superstructure for the 6” guns. Anti-aircraft armament would be eight 3”/50 guns in dual-purpose mounts but under local control. Despite experiments with 37mm water-cooled machine cannon derived from Maxim “pom-pom” guns, there would not be any lighter anti-aircraft guns, except for, perhaps, some .30 Lewis guns mounted in the superstructure. Aircraft would be carried on “flying off” platforms. In any case, eight 5”/25 AA guns with the Mk.19 director with on-mount Mk. Range keepers and 15’ stereoscopic rangefinders mounted separately would be added at some point after 1928. Eight .50 AN/M2 water-cooled AA machine guns would be mounted in the tops or superstructure after 1933 and two catapults, one on No.3 16” gun turret and one on the quarterdeck with the crane at the stern from around 1926 for the operation of float planes. In 1940-41, the Mk.19 director would be combined with the range finder into the Director Mount Mk.1.

|BB 1923 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |35,000 tons |

|Normal Displacement |38,000 tons |

|Battle Displacement |41,000 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |44,000 tons |

|Dimensions |644’ (OA), 620’ WL x 102.5’ x 35’ max D |

|Guns |9 x 16”/50, 12 x 6”/53, 8 x 3”/50 AA |

|Machinery |4 s, 60,000 shp = 23 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |13.5” belt, 4.5” decks |

There was a limited improvement in ship construction technology, such as the integration of armor into the hull structure and the use of construction steel like “STS”, which came close to the performance of the USN’s Class B homogenous armor plates. Improvement in machinery technology would have seen the use of geared turbines, in place of the heavier turbo-electric plant. This resulted in “Battleship 1928”, a “spring” design (a “spring” design was the name US warship designers used for a developed design to meet specified characteristics, just short of developing building plans) to meet the General Board’s defined characteristics for new US capital ships. The design would have used the turrets and guns, along with the barbette armor of the “South Dakota” design. In many ways, it would end up looking like a slightly longer, three turret “Colorado”. Fire control would be the standard Mk.20 main directors and Mk.16 secondary directors for the 6” guns in the fire control tops on top the heavy tripod masts. The Mk.VIII range keeper would be introduced, but fire control would be through “follow the pointer” in the turret. There would be two plotting rooms under and behind armor. Range finding would be through turret rangefinders for the main guns and 20’ rangefinders in the superstructure for the 6” guns. Anti-aircraft armament would be eight 5”/25 AA guns with the Mk.19 director with on-mount Mk. Range keepers and 15’ stereoscopic rangefinders mounted separately. Eight .50 AN/M2 water-cooled AA machine guns would be mounted in the tops or superstructure after 1933. Two catapults, one on No.3 16” gun turret and one on the quarterdeck with the crane at the stern would be integrated into the design for the operation of float planes. In 1940-41, the Mk.19 director would be combined with the range finder into the Director Mount Mk.1.

|BB 1928 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |35,000 tons |

|Normal Displacement |38,500 tons |

|Battle Displacement |41,500 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |44,500 tons |

|Dimensions |644’ (OA), 620’ WL x 104.5’ x 35’ max D |

|Guns |9 x 16”/50, 12 x 6”/53, 8 x 5”/25 or 16 x 5.3”/40 DP |

|Machinery |4 s, 90,000 shp = 25 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |13.5” belt, 5.25” decks |

The capital ships built between 1934 and 1938 could have included “battle cruisers” as the USN became more concerned over the speed of the Japanese battle line and some of the European ships being built at the time. Much of the technology, which reached fruition with the “North Carolina” class would have been applied to this class also. Aviation arrangements would have been similar to the contemporary “Brooklyn” class, with a stern hanger and elevator, rather than the exposed set up of the battleships or the amidships hangers of the heavy cruisers. Engineering plants similar to that of the “Yorktown” class could have been used, along with either the 5”/38 or the notional 5.3”/40 DP guns. Mk.34 main gun directors and Mk.33 (before 1937) or Mk.37 (after 1937) DP directors would have been installed on “tower” bridges. The alternative would have been an updated “Battleship 1928” with a lighter geared turbine machinery plant giving the same sea speed and greater endurance, “tower” bridge, 16”/50 three gun turrets, DP secondary armament, fire controls similar to the “Brooklyn” class cruisers.

|BB 1934 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |35,000 tons |

|Normal Displacement |38,500 tons |

|Battle Displacement |41,500 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |44,500 tons |

|Dimensions |730’ OA, 710’ WL x 101.5’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |9 x 14”/50, 12 x 5.3”/40 DP or 14 x 5”/38 DP |

|Machinery |4 s, 150,000 shp = 32 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |12.75” belt, 4.75” deck |

All these ships would have been subject to the increased pace of modernization from 1940, especially those modifications driven by the findings of the King Board. By mid-1941, all would have four, locally controlled 3”/50 Mk.10, two replacing the single, open mount 5”/51 or 6”/53 forward, starboard and port in the older ships. Some would have been equipped with CXAM or CXAM-1 air search radar. By the end of 1941 and early 1942, if war did not intervene, they would have had their four quad 1.1” automatic AA guns (replacing the 3” single AA guns), with the .50 water-cooled heavy machine guns being replaced by 20mm Oerlikon automatic cannon. With the advent of war, 40mm quad and twin mounts would began appearing in late 1942, more 20mm guns, more radar, including Mk.3 (FC) in early 1942 and Mk.4 (FD) in mid-1942. Wartime modifications along the lines of the older US battleships in World War II would have been executed as resources and ship down time became available.

It can be seen from these designs that the “North Carolina” class of 1941 was the result of an evolutionary process driven by technological change. If the ships designed between 1928 and 1934 had been built, if the USN had adopted a 5.3” DP gun, which was notional in these designs and if there had been no London Treaty of 1936, the “North Carolina” design would have looked slightly different. First, it would seem unlikely, that having ships in service with the 16”/50 Mk.2 gun, the USN would go back to a 16”/45, even a more modern version like the Mk.6. The Mk.2 was redesigned into the Mk.7, just as the Mk.1 had been redesigned into the Mk.6, using new technology to produce a lighter weapon with less interior demands on space in the turret. Use of the 16”/50 Mk.7 would have added 189 tons. One issue for the “North Carolina” class beside the torsional vibration suffered in the aft part of the ship throughout the service life of these ships, was a mismatch between boilers and turbines. A last minute decision to install high temperature (850 F) and pressure (575 PSI) boilers was not accompanied by replacing the turbines, which meant the boilers generated steam at a rate the turbines couldn’t use. Redesign and replacement of the turbines would have added three to six months to construction and probably added about a knot of speed and 10% greater endurance (As a comparison, the boilers of the geared turbine plant installed in the “New Mexico” plant ran at 472 F, 300 PSI). The use of advanced geared turbine plants gave the USN an advantage in lighter machinery, both higher output per ton and lower weight per output, greater reliability and more efficient use of fuel, giving greater endurance. Another major advance was the use of AC power, which made for greater use of synchronized fire controls and mounts and simpler distribution. The Germans also adopted AC power, but went further in the use of high temperature/high pressure marine machinery, but probably went too far for the available technology, as they suffered from reliability and maintenance issues.

|North Carolina Design | |

|Standard Displacement |37,674 tons |

|Normal Displacement |40,778 tons |

|Battle Displacement |43,781 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |46,985 tons |

|Dimensions |729’ OA, 713.7’ WL x 108.3’ WL x 34’ Max D |

|Guns |9 x 16”/50, 16 x 5.3”/40 DP or 20 x 5”/38 DP |

|Machinery |4 s, 130,000 shp = 27.6 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |12.75” inclined belt, 4.35” deck |

One of the driving factors of the design and construction of USN capital ships in the late 1930s was the decryption in 1936 of an older message from 1922 that informed the Japanese Naval Ministry that the “Nagato” had made over 26 knots at trials displacement during her initial service trials. Trials displacement for the Japanese was close to the expected battle displacement, which meant the USN was facing the prospect of a 26 knot Japanese battle line after spending the inter-war years believing its 20 knot battle line was sufficient to face a Japanese 22.5 knot battle line. During those years, the USN did not consider “fast” battleships or battle cruisers a necessity, believing superior engagement ranges and tactics would off-set the Japanese battle cruisers and the superior speed of the Japanese battle line. A “fast” battleship to the USN meant a sustained battle speed of 23 knots. Given the obvious interest in aerial gunnery of the Japanese and a 26 knot battle line, it now looked like the USN would have great difficulty applying its numerical superiority, operationally or tactically. The lack of real information on Japanese warships and on the outcome of the rebuilding program that was documented by USN and other assets and nations forced the assumption that a future USN battle line needed to achieve battle speeds of 27 knots. This meant that the USN would have to build a completely new battle line of at least fifteen battleships between 1937 and 1948, maneuvering within Treaty limits and Congressional authorizations. Another design driver was the General Board’s desire for a division of “fast” capital ships as a counter to the Japanese “Kongo” class, protecting the battle line from being turned or raked by a Japanese “fast” squadron, protecting US lines of communication from Japanese raiders and raiding Japanese LoCs and finally, providing capital ship support to the aircraft carriers.

Japan

Japan is a harder nut to crack, related first to its secrecy about its naval programs and the loss of documentation at the end of the war. Japan signed the 1922 and 1930 Treaties, but walked out on the 1936 conference, having already given notice of withdrawing from the Treaties in December 1934 and formerly withdrawing in December 1936. From that point, Japan was no longer restricted in the numbers or characteristics of her warships.

The capital ships (as defined by the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922), battleships, battle cruisers and armored cruisers of the IJN on 31 December 1923 under the Washington Treaty limitation of 315,000 tons (ships in service/commissioned and building, with declared or estimated standard displacement, which exceeded 10,000 tons in standard displacement and/or were armed with guns with a bore greater than 8”. This does not include ships initially built as one of the types above, but disarmed and assigned or converted to other tasks)

 

|Kasuga | |7 January 1904 |6,500 |

|Kongo |17 January 1911 |16 August 1913 |27,000 |

|Hiei |4 November 1911 |4 August 1914 |27,000 |

|Haruna |16 March 1912 |19 April 1915 |27,000 |

|Kirishima |17 March 1912 |19 April 1915 |27,000 |

|Fuso |11 March 1912 |8 November 1915 |30,600 |

|Yamashiro |20 November 1913 |31 March 1917 |30,600 |

|Ise |10 May 1915 |15 December 1917 |31,260 |

|Hyuga |6 May 1915 |30 April 1918 |31,260 |

|Nagato |28 August 1917 |25 November 1920 |33,800 |

|Mutsu |1 June 1918 |24 October 1921 |33,800 |

 

Total capital ship tonnage: 299,320 tons

Tonnage of armored cruisers: 6,500 tons

Tonnage of “dreadnought” capital ships: 0 tons

Tonnage of “superdreadnought” capital ships: 231,720 tons

Tonnage of 16” gun armed capital ships: 67,600 tons

As far as the Tosa and Kaga are concerned, the published maximum fuel load and full load displacement figures should have precluded retaining these ships under the Treaty, as they probably displaced around 36,000 tons standard. Given that the Japanese were prepared to declare the “Akagi” and “Kaga” as aircraft carriers at a displacement at least 5,000 tons less than the actual, it wouldn’t seem a stretch that they would misstate the displacement of the “Tosa” and “Kaga” as battleships, probably at the 35,000 limit, given that “Nagato” and “Mutsu” were declared at 33,800 metric tons. In the early part of the Treaty period, while Japanese governments were under the control of more democratic oriented political groups, the Japanese were less inclined to play fast and loose with the Treaty rules, despite the example of the converted carriers, though if the Japanese used the USN’s interpretation of the rules, they could complete the “Tosa” class at as much as 38,000 tons standard. The cost against the aggregate quantitative limits would have been the disposal of at least two of the “Kongo” class. But the “Tosa” class was not going to be completed as battleships. The off-set for the USN would be two or three more 16” gun battleships to be built as soon as possible, which given the need to clear the building slips and design a new ship, but retaining the “Washington”, meant that a new ship couldn’t be laid down before 1924. It also meant the RN would probably have to be permitted two more new 35,000 ton battleships for completion by 1929. The costs and funding of doing this would not have gotten past Congress or Parliament, so the retention of the “Tosa” class under the Treaty was a dead issue.

The Japanese reconstruction of their battle line was an immense project, costly in resources. Each ship was gutted, new machinery (lighter and more powerful) installed, new horizontal armor laid down, additional vertical armor added to barbettes and turrets, the turrets removed and modified for greater elevation, the secondary armament repositioned, new fire controls installed, new anti-aircraft armament shipped, better integrated aviation facilities, and then the hull lengthened, to maintain the length to beam ratio when bulges were added. This program encompassed six battleships and four battle cruisers (and two aircraft carriers which had been converted from capital ships). As a comparison, while the US modernized thirteen battleships, only three, the “New Mexico” class, approached the sophistication of the Japanese reconstructions. The British modernized five battleships and one battlecruisers, but only the “Warspite”, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown were reconstructed to this level of modernization. Finally, the Italians reconstructed their four old battleships to a standard equal to the Japanese effort. It should be noted that the reconstruction of these ships violated the Treaties, the limit of 3,000 tons for modernization being ignored, with the “Nagato” class ending up 5,300 tons above the previously declared standard displacement.

If the Treaty had specified quantitative and qualitative limits, but no limits on when new capital ships could be laid down, the IJN would have sought to lay down new capital ships by 1924, the time needed to design a new ship to the 35,000 ton limit and then order the materiel for construction, if Parliament was willing to fund new construction. With a demonstrated completion rate of up to 1.33 ships a year under the pressure of the pre-war arms race, it is probable that under post-war conditions, no more than one ship a year would have been funded. If Parliament instead allowed the Navy to revise the “8-8-8” program contracts to use up the materiel already produced, or shift authorizations and appropriations, there was about 60,000 tons of materiel left over from the “8-8-8” program ships, along with two complete and two partially complete machinery plants for the cancelled ships.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1924 |2 |“Mod. Tosa” |Kongo |

|1926 |1 |“Mod. Tosa” |Haruna |

|1927 |1 |“Mod. Tosa” |Kirishima |

|1928 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Hiei |

|1929 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Fuso |

|1930 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Yamashiro |

|1931 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Ise |

|1932 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Hyuga |

|1933 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Nagato, Mutsu |

|1937 |2 |“A-140J” | |

|1939 |2 |“Yamato” | |

If the Treaty specified a minimum age for replacement but not a “building holiday”, the IJN would have laid down a new capital ship in 1930 to replace the IJNS Kongo. If the first IJN capital ship under the Treaty was delayed to 1930, most of the infrastructure renovation and expansion program would have been completed, and there would have been minimal delay to the heavy cruiser building program, perhaps a year or two. The funding and shipbuilding capacity for this first ship would have been found from not modernizing the “Kongo” class. The funds and capacity for rebuilding the battle cruisers and part of the battle line would now be diverted to new ships, while funding and capacity would be available for rebuilding IJNS Kaga and Akagi. It is possible with the Japanese withdrawing from the Treaty in December 1936, that IJNS Ise might have been retained. The “Ise” and “Nagato” classes would have received minimal modifications, mostly involving adding aviation capability and increasing AA armament. The capacity to reconstruct one or two capital ships might be available between 1938 and 1941. The investment in renovation and expansion of the infrastructure would allow the IJN to lay down two 65,000 standard ton displacement battleships and two 25,000 ton aircraft carriers in 1937.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1930 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Kongo |

|1931 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Haruna |

|1932 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Kirishima |

|1933 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Hiei |

|1934 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Fuso |

|1935 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Yamashiro |

|1936 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Ise |

|1937 |2 |“Yamato” | |

|1939 |2 |“Yamato” | |

With the end of and the failure to extend the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the IJN looked forward to 1931, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. The London Conference had imposed a numerical limit on capital ships as well as a quantitative tonnage limit. The IJN had to reduce its battle line and battle cruisers to nine ships. Of the remaining ships, one could be disarmed totally and converted to a target ship and another converted to a training ship, the rest being disposed of. Historically, the IJN had already converted IJNS Settsu into a target ship, so the IJNS Hiei became the training ship by 1931. The infrastructure renovation and expansion program would have been completed in the 1920s, there would have been no delay to the heavy cruiser building program and the four “Kongo” battle cruisers would be rebuilt in the late 1920s. The funds and capacity for rebuilding the battle cruisers and the battle line would be diverted to new ships, while funding and capacity would be available for rebuilding the aircraft carriers IJNS Kaga and Akagi. The question is how many new ships could be bought with reconstruction funds, which ships the Japanese would dispose of while they were still constrained by the Treaty and what/if any older ships would be constructed. While the battle line was the highest priority, the “Kongo” class battle cruisers had an important role in the “Decisive Battle”. If the “Kongo” class battle cruisers were retained and reconstructed, it is probable that there would be funding for no more than six, more likely four new battleships. Certainly the Japanese would have to publically dispose of at least three or four older battleships in the period 1932 to 1935, before their withdrawal from the Treaty in December 1936 would allow them to play loose with the Treaty limitations in 1936. So there were the following likely outcomes:

1. Build eight new battleships.

1a. Retain two unmodernized “Nagato” class battleships or

1b. Retain two unmodernized “Kongo” class battlecruisers in 1936.

2. Build six new battleships.

2a. Reconstruct two “Nagato” class battleships, retain two unmodernized “Kongo” class battlecruisers in 1936

2b. Reconstruct two “Kongo” class battlecruisers, retain two unmodernized “Nagato” class battleships in 1936

2c. Reconstruct two “Kongo” class battlecruisers and retain two unmodernized “Kongo class” battlecruisers

3. Build four new battleships.

3a. Reconstruct all four “Kongo” class battlecruisers, retain two unmodernized “Nagato” class battleships

3b. Reconstruct the “Nagato” class battleships, two “Kongo” class battlecruisers and retain two unmodernized “Kongo” class battlecruisers.

The investment in renovation and expansion of the infrastructure in the 1920s would allow the IJN to lay down two 65,000 standard ton displacement battleships and two 25,000 ton aircraft carriers in 1937. An option with IJNS Hiei is to convert it to an aircraft carrier or seaplane carrier, given the disposal of its other class members.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1932 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Kongo vs Fuso |

|1933 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Haruna vs Yamashiro |

|1934 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Kirishima vs Ise |

|1935 |1 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” |Hiei vs Hyuga |

|1936 |2 |“Hiraga/Fujimoto” | |

|1937 |2 |“Yamato” | |

|1939 |2 |“Yamato” | |

With the extension of the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the IJN looked forward to 1937 when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. The London Conference had imposed a numerical limit on capital ships as well as a quantitative tonnage limit. The IJN had to reduce its battle line and battle cruisers to nine ships. Of the remaining ships, one could be disarmed totally and converted to a target ship and another converted to a training ship, the rest being disposed of. Historically, the IJN had already converted IJNS Settsu into a target ship, so the IJNS Hiei became the training ship by 1931. All of the infrastructure renovation and expansion program would have been completed, and there would have been no delay to the heavy cruiser building program. The historical reconstruction of the Japanese capital ships would be completed between 1933 and 1940. The investment in renovation and expansion of the infrastructure would allow the IJN to lay down two 65,000 standard ton displacement battleships and two 25,000 ton aircraft carriers in 1937. As it was, the service age for capital ships was extended to twenty-six years, so that the first replacement capital ship the IJN could lay down under the Treaty would be in 1936, but with the extension of the “building holiday”, it would be 1937 before the IJN could lay down new capital ships. In any case, the Japanese had withdrawn from the Treaty as of December 1936. It would be possible to still convert IJNS Hiei to an aircraft or seaplane carrier, but probably not, as she would make a uniform class with her sisters restored as a battle cruiser.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1937 |2 |“Yamato” | |

|1939 |2 |“Yamato” | |

Had the “building holiday” not been extended, the Japanese would have laid down new capital ships in 1936, a time period during which they were still legally constrained by the Treaty limitations. Would the Japanese have simply laid down the “Yamato” class one year early, or laid down a pair of updated “Hiraga/Fujimoto” class battleships and laid down the first “Yamato” class ships in 1938, with completion dates in 1942 and 1943.

The starting point for Japanese capital ship building if it continued under the Treaty were the “Nagato” and “Tosa” classes. The design could have built up from the “Nagato” class which had been declared at 33,800 metric tons under the Treaty. This left 1,400 tons for additional armor or other priorities. Before 1933, the Japanese government and navy did try to design ships to the Treaty limits. The Japanese demonstrated an inability during this period to remain with design constraints, adding military characteristics that ended up over-loading the design. They would then announce the design at the original target standard displacement, whether by design or a simple inability to admit their design errors and failures. Possibly, the only time they may have deliberately played loose with the rules was with the standard displacement of the IJNS Akagi and Kaga, which, if their standard displacement after their reconstructions that were completed in 1938 and 1935 were accurate, meant that both ships were several thousand tons over the declared displacement of 27,500 tons. They were also increasingly beyond the allowed 3,000 tons limit on increased displacement for modification to capital ships in their reconstruction program for their capital ships (the “Nagato” class went from 33,800 tons to 39,100 tons). So it is probable that this design would have come out over the 35,000 ton limit, given that the “Tosa” class itself was pretty close to 35,000 metric tons at standard displacement. Eventually, these ships would receive modified AA armament, such as 12.7cm Type 89, 25mm Type 96 and 13.2mm Type 93 AA guns with the Type 94 directors. One or more catapults and observation and scout aircraft would have been embarked. The reconstructed battleships had their torpedo tubes removed, but the above water tubes in this design were for 61cm torpedoes. If the torpedo tubes had been retained, the ships could have been equipped with oxygen fueled Type 93 torpedoes with a maximum range consistent with the maximum ballistic and effective ranges of the main guns.

|1923 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |36,500 tons |

|Normal Displacement |38,700tons |

|Battle Displacement |40,900 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |43,100 tons |

|Dimensions |750’ OA, 741’ WL x 101’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |10 x 41cm/45, 18 x 14cm/50, 4 x 8cm AA |

|Machinery |4 s, 80,000 shp = 25 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |28cm inclined belt, 10cm deck |

The 1930 designs by ADM Hiraga and CAPT Fujimoto for replacing the “Kongo” class when capital ship construction resumed are the start point for the period from 1931 to 1935. The ships laid down in 1930 through 1934 would have followed one of the known designs with some modifications, or an amalgamation of the two designs. In any case, the three gun turret for the main armament and multiple gun mountings for the secondary armament would be introduced along with a tower bridge. It is doubtful there would have been casemated mounts for the secondary armament. Above water torpedo tubes were quite possible. Aviation requirements would be better integrated into the design. Much of the particulars of the design must be inferred from a comparison of Japanese design practice in 1922, represented by the “Nagato” and the “Yamato” of 1937-1941 and the areas of concentration during the reconstruction of Japanese capital ships between 1933 and 1940. The ships would have been overweight, despite design and technology innovations, both from a demonstrated inability of Japanese naval designers and construction engineers to exercise design and building discipline, the continued uninformed demands of the Naval General Staff for more guns, armor and speed on limited displacement and the beginning of a program of deliberate misinformation and “cheating” on Treaty rules. Later modifications, such as the addition of twin and/or triple 25mm automatic AA guns and, much later, radar, would follow the historical pre-war and World War II patterns.

|1930 Design | |

|Standard Displacement |36,500 tons |

|Normal Displacement |38,700tons |

|Battle Displacement |40,900 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |43,100 tons |

|Dimensions |770’ OA, 761’ WL x 105’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |10 x 41cm/45, 12 x 14cm/50, 8 x 12.7cm DP |

|Machinery |4 s, 80,000 shp = 25 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |28cm inclined belt, 12cm deck |

When the Japanese delivered their intent to withdraw from the Naval Limitation treaties in 1934, it was with the intention of building an unlimited navy. From the first, doctrine and tactics would be melded with technology to produce a qualitative superiority matched to Japanese spiritual superiority that would overcome even the massive US potential to produce quantitative superiority. Unfortunately for the ultranationalist “Big” Navy faction, Japan’s resources precluded building the sort of navy they desired in numbers able to use the desired qualitative superiority to overcome the numbers of ships the US was capable of building. Even worse, was the lack of flexibility of weapons systems designed specifically into a single operationally based doctrine. The “Yamato” class was a mighty endeavor, yet for all its massive guns and armor, there were flaws in design, concept and execution. Even the “Yamato” class suffered from limitations. Draft, limited to insure access to Japanese harbors, was too shallow to be fully efficient for the hull design and displacement was constrained because of the need for shallow draft. More importantly, the long range of the 46cm guns could only be exploited under conditions of complete air supremacy, allowing the use of floatplanes as “over the horizon” target acquisition. Without aerial spotting, the “Yamato” class was reduced to the optical initial engagement range in clear weather. Even more important, is that in the period the Japanese built the “Yamato” and “Musashi” (1941-1942), the US built six 35,000 ton (nominal) battleships, or a three to one margin. Without extended range of aerial spotting, the Japanese faced the prospect of trading eighteen 3,219lbs shells a minute against the US delivery of fifty-four 2,700lbs shells per minute at visual range, around 24,000 yards. For every hit “Yamato” landed on her target, she would receive three. Despite the level of her armor protection, the number of shells involved would have eventually found or created a weak spot, such as the secondary armament and magazines. The situation was worse than it seemed as the continued development of integrated and automated fire control systems by the USN would have increased their hit rate over that of the Japanese. Finally, a technology not envisioned when the “Yamato” was designed, radar, would impact the balance between the US and the Japanese. “Yamato” had a maximum night engagement range of 22,000 yards. With the Mark 8 10cm fire control radar and SG 10cm surface search radar, the US battleships would acquire the Japanese at 60,000 to 80,000 yards. The Mark 8 and the integrated fire control system of Mark VIII range keeper, Mark 52 stable vertical, the Mark 38 director and remote power control would allow a fire control solution to be processed between 30,000 and 40,000 yards. The US battleships could engage the Japanese with “over the horizon” gunnery without the need for aerial spotting at ranges from which the Japanese could not effectively respond. Of course, a pure battleship on battleship encounter was unlikely, as escorting destroyers and cruisers would have been involved, air strikes were being conducted and both battle lines faced the threats of torpedoes and armor piercing bombs. It would seem that the Japanese concept of quality over quantity was flawed.

Perfect hindsight tells us that it would probably have been better to build more carriers with the resources used by the “Yamato” class. The problem was that Japan’s shipbuilding infrastructure, despite the massive investment of the 1920s, was still constrained. There were a limited number, basically four, building slips and docks that could take a ship design over 800’ in length. In 1937, it was decided to build two “Yamato” class battleships in two, and two “Shokaku” class large fast fleet carriers in the other two. Moreover, the Japanese could produce four capital ship/large carrier machinery plants every four years, which meant that the Japanese were limited to building two more “Shokaku” class carriers in lieu of the “Yamato” class, despite the disparity in total displacement. The Japanese could also have gone with a smaller design for their battleship. The reduction in requirements on the gun foundries and armor production might have allowed the completion of a third battleship in early 1944, with work further along on the fourth, but the positive impact of one more 45,000 ton battleship by mid-1944 on Japan’s chances of winning her war with the US are negligible.

The “Yamato” class was certainly the most powerful battleship design to be built, but even such a large ship had constraints. One was maximum draft limits for the use of Japanese ports and naval infrastructure which resulted in less efficient translation of power into speed. Despite the heavy armor protection, there were weak spots such as the secondary mount protection, their barbettes and their magazines. During the air attacks on the IJNS Yamato in 1945, a 1,600lb AP bomb pierced the forward secondary mount roof, passed down within the barbette and exploded near the magazine, causing a fire that eventually exploded the secondary, and then forward main armament magazines. Another well known weakness was the torpedo protection system, which was designed to resist 880lbs of TNT. By mid-1943, the USN had introduced TORPEX, an explosive 50% more effective than TNT. The Mk.13 aerial torpedo, which had just had its warhead increased to 600lbs, now boasted a warhead equivalent to 900lbs of TNT. The standard USN submarine torpedo, the Mk.14, carried at 668lb TORPEX warhead, equivalent to 1,000lbs of TNT. In December 1943, the IJNS Yamato was hit by a single Mk.14 alongside the No.3 turret, which blew a 5 meter by 25 meter hole in the TPS and flooding the No.3 upper magazine with 3,000 tons of water. The TPS featured a heavy armored bulkhead to resist “diving” shells and this bulkhead was riveted to the bottom of the internal belt. The joint failed under stress and the TPS was breached. Finally, armor thicknesses were such that the Japanese had difficulty with quality control. The USN felt that 13.5 inches was the maximum thickness of cemented and non-cemented armor for which contract specifications could be reliably met.

|“Yamato” | |

|Standard Displacement |62,315 tons |

|Normal Displacement |64,900 tons |

|Battle Displacement |67,123 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |69,990 tons |

|Dimensions |862.75’ OA, 839.93’ WL x 121.08’ WL x 34.08’ Max D |

|Guns |9 x 46cm/45, 12 x 15.5cm/60, 12 x 12.7cm DP |

|Machinery |4 s, 150,000 shp = 27 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |41cm inclined belt, 20cm deck |

During the design phase, the IJN explored the characteristics of a battleship designed to a nominal displacement of 45,000 tons.

|Design A-140-J | |

|Standard Displacement |48,250 tons |

|Normal Displacement |50,300 tons |

|Battle Displacement |52,268 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |54,300 tons |

|Dimensions |825’ OA, 801’ WL x 120’ WL x 34’ Max D |

|Guns |9 x 41cm/45, 9 x 15.5cm/60, 12 x 12.7cm DP |

|Machinery |4 s, 128,000 shp = 27 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |36cm inclined belt, 15cm deck |

British Empire

The British Empire was a signatory of the 1922 Washington, 1930 London and 1936 London Treaty.

The capital ships (as defined by the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922), battleships, armored cruisers, coast defense ships and monitors of the RN on 31 December 1923 (ships in service/commissioned and building, with declared or estimated standard displacement, which exceeded 10,000 tons in standard displacement and/or were armed with guns with a bore greater than 8”. This does not include ships initially built as one of the types above, but disarmed and assigned or converted to other tasks)

|Erebus |12 October 1915 |15 September 1916 |8,000 |

|Terror |26 October 1915 |15 August 1916 |8,000 |

|Orion |29 November 1909 |2 January 1912 |22,500 |

|Monarch |1 April 1910 |27 April 1912 |22,500 |

|Conqueror |5 April 1910 |1 December 1912 |22,500 |

|Thunderer |13 April 1910 |15 June 1912 |22,500 |

|King George V |16 January 1911 |15 November 1912 |23,000 |

|Centurion |16 January 1911 |15 May 1913 |23,000 |

|Ajax |27 February 1911 |31 October 1913 |23,000 |

|Iron Duke |12 January 1912 |15 March 1914 |25,000 |

|Marlborough |25 January 1912 |15 June 1914 |25,000 |

|Benbow |30 May 1912 |15 October 1914 |25,000 |

|Emperor of India |31 May 1912 |15 November 1914 |25,000 |

|Queen Elizabeth |21 October 1912 |22 December 1914 |27,500 |

|Warspite |31 October 1912 |8 March 1915 |27,500 |

|Barham |24 February 1913 |19 October 1915 |27,500 |

|Malaya |20 October 1913 |1 February 1916 |27,500 |

|Valiant |31 January 1913 |13 January 1916 |27,500 |

|Revenge |22 December 1913 |1 February 1916 |25,750 |

|Resolution |29 November 1913 |30 December 1916 |25,750 |

|Ramillies |12 November 1913 |1 September 1917 |25,750 |

|Royal Oak |25 January 1914 |1 May 1916 |25,750 |

|Royal Soveriegn |25 January 1914 |18 April 1916 |25,750 |

|Tiger |6 June 1912 |3 October 1914 |28,500 |

|Repulse |25 January 1915 |18 August 1916 |26,500 |

|Renown |25 January 1915 |20 September 1916 |26,500 |

|Glorious |1 May 1915 |14 October 1916 |18,000 |

|Courageous |28 March 1915 |28 October 1916 |18,000 |

|Hood |31 May 1916 |15 May 1920 |41,200 |

Total capital ship tonnage: 699,950 tons

Tonnage of armored cruisers: 0 tons

Tonnage of “dreadnought” capital ships: 0 tons

Tonnage of “superdreadnought” capital ships: 683,950 tons

Tonnage of 16” gun armed capital ships: 0 tons

The British found themselves in 1923 with war weary fleet, many of the classes of ships being a generation or so behind the US and Japanese or designed around a fleet action in the North Sea. The RN did have the lead, temporarily, in naval aviation, and its current destroyer classes were superior to any other navies. The most modern battleships were, possibly, slightly inferior to the latest US and Japanese battleships and its battle cruisers were fragile beasts. Only HMS Hood stood out, but she was flawed, having been designed before Jutland, and the updated design couldn’t meet all the requirements of a “fast” battleship. In the economic and political conditions following the “War to End All Wars”, it was inevitable that some form of naval limitation would be negotiated with the other powers, but the British took the retrenchment even farther with the “Ten Year” rule. In 1919, it made sense that with the US as a friendly neutral and only the Japanese in any position to threaten the Empire, the government would limit defense spending with the strategy built around the lack of the possibility of a war in the next ten years. The problem for the RN was that rule was “rolled over” each year until 1932, restricting new construction and modernization programs. During the 1920s, the RN basically patched up its capital ships to correct deficiencies discovered during war service that it could and extending their service life while hoping to build new capital ships at some time in the future. Only HMS Renown underwent a significant modernization between 1922 and 1926. In the 1930s, the British began modernizing their battle line. Most effort was directed at the “Queen Elizabeth” class, despite being older than the “Revenge” class, their size made them more flexible. Starting with HMS Barham, the class underwent increasingly more sophisticated reconstructions, with the “Queen Elizabeth” and “Valiant” being almost completely rebuilt. Their new machinery restored some of their speed, especially as they came out lighter than they went in. But even 24 knots wasn’t sufficient to maintain contact with the Italians, whose capitals hips could sustain 26 knots at a minimum. Some effort was made with the “Revenge” class, and HMS Renown was reconstructed to the standard of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, but HMS Repulse received a less thorough reconstruction and HMS Hood was not modernized at all. In fact, by 1941, HMS Hood, along with the “Revenge” class, had the least effective main armament fire control system among the British capital ships. It might have been better for the British to have substituted HMS Hood and HMS Repulse for HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant and spent no time or effort on the “Revenge” class, redirecting those resources to the “Queen Elizabeth” class or even the “Nelson” class. Given the shortage of 5.25” mounts, it is probable that if HMS Hood was modernized between 1938 and 1941, she would have received ten 4.5” BD twin gun mounts. Certainly HMS Hood suffered from the same reluctance to take a major asset out of service in turbulent times that prevented the USN from properly modernizing the “Lexington” class carriers before WW2.

If the Treaty had specified quantitative and qualitative limits, but no limits on when new capital ships could be laid down, the RN would have sought to lay down new capital ships by 1924, the time needed to design a new ship to the 35,000 ton limit and then order the materiel for construction, if Parliament was willing to fund new construction. During the pre-war arms race, the British industry was able to lay down four ships a year, though these ships were smaller than the 35,000 ton limit to which the new ships would be designed. It is probable that based on historical precedent, Parliament would have funded two ships every two years. In addition, HMS Glorious and HMS Courageous would be converted to aircraft carriers. The various modifications to the older ships during the 1920s would have been deferred as the ships would have been eventually disposed of. The primary British capital ship reconstruction program did not begin until 1933. The completion of new ships through 1938 would have delayed or cancelled those modernizations and reconstructions performed between 1933 and 1936. This means that only HMS Warspite, HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Valiant and HMS Renown would have been modernized and/or reconstructed. Of all the navies, the RN was the most obsessive over meeting Treaty limitations and, willing or not, constrained the military characteristics of its warships in this period to insure it met the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1923 |2 |“Nelson” |Conqueror, Thunderer, Monarch |

|1925 |2 |“Nelson” |Orion, King George V, Ajax |

|1927 |2 |“Nelson” |Centurion, Iron Duke, Marlborough |

|1929 |2 |“Mod. Nelson” |Emperor of India, Benbow, Tiger |

|1931 |2 |“Mod. Nelson” |Revenge, Resolution |

|1933 |2 |“Mod. Nelson” |Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign |

|1935 |2 |“Mod. Nelson” |Barham, Ramillies |

|1937 |3 |“KGV” | |

|1938 |2 |“KGV” | |

|1939 |2 |“Lion” | |

If the Treaty specified a minimum age for replacement but not a “building holiday”, the RN would have legally laid down five new capital ships in 1929 to replace the “Orion” class and HMS King George V. It is probable that Parliament would not fund more than two ships every two years, despite the Treaty allowance of five in 1929, two in 1930 and six in 1931. In this situation, the historical Treaty allowance for building of two new ships armed with 16” guns as soon as Parliament provided funds as a balance to the completion of 16” gun armed capital ships by the US and Japan would certainly have been put in place. The various modifications to the older ships executed from 1924 through 1928 would have been completed, but work historically performed between 1929 and 1936 would have been deferred, delayed or cancelled as the ships would have been eventually disposed of. The primary British capital ship reconstruction program did not begin until 1933. The completion of new ships through 1938 would have delayed or cancelled those modernizations and reconstructions performed between 1933 and 1936. This means that only HMS Warspite, HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Valiant and HMS Renown would have been modernized and/or reconstructed.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1923 |2 |“Nelson” |Conqueror, Thunderer, Monarch |

|1929 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Orion, King George V, Ajax |

|1931 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Centurion, Iron Duke, Marlborough |

|1933 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Emperor of India, Benbow, Tiger |

|1935 |2 |“Mod. Nelson” |Revenge, Royal Sovereign |

|1937 |3 |“KGV” | |

|1938 |2 |“KGV” | |

|1939 |2 |“Lion” | |

With the end of and the failure to extend the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the RN looked forward to 1931, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. The London Conference had imposed a numerical limit on capital ships as well as a quantitative tonnage limit. The RN had to reduce its battle line and battle cruisers to fifteen ships. Of the remaining ships, one could be disarmed totally and converted to a target ship and another converted to a training ship, the rest being disposed of. The RN converted HMS Centurion into a target ship, and the HMS Iron Duke became the training ship by 1931. Those ships built before the “Queen Elizabeth” class were disposed of, leaving the RN with twelve battleships and three battle cruisers. In this situation, the historical Treaty allowance for building of two new ships armed with 16” guns as soon as Parliament provided funds as a balance to the completion of 16” gun armed capital ships by the US and Japan would certainly have been put in place. The various modifications to the older ships executed from 1924 through 1928 would have been completed, but work historically performed between 1929 and 1936 would have been deferred, delayed or cancelled as the ships would have been eventually disposed of. The primary British capital ship reconstruction program did not begin until 1933. The completion of new ships through 1938 would have delayed or cancelled those modernizations and reconstructions performed between 1933 and 1936. This means that only HMS Warspite, HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Valiant and HMS Renown would have been modernized and/or reconstructed.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1923 |2 |“Nelson” |Conqueror, Thunderer, Monarch |

|1931 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Revenge, Royal Sovereign |

|1933 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Royal Oak, Resolution |

|1935 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Ramillies, Barham |

|1937 |3 |“KGV” | |

|1938 |2 |“KGV” | |

|1939 |2 |“Lion” | |

With the extension of the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the RN looked forward to 1937 when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. By 1937, the RN could legally lay down eleven new capital ships. The London Conference had imposed a numerical limit on capital ships as well as a quantitative tonnage limit. The RN had to reduce its battle line and battle cruisers to fifteen ships. Of the remaining ships, one could be disarmed totally and converted to a target ship and another converted to a training ship, the rest being disposed of. The RN converted HMS Centurion into a target ship, and the HMS Iron Duke became the training ship by 1931. Those ships built before the “Queen Elizabeth” class were disposed of, leaving the RN with twelve battleships and three battle cruisers. In this situation, the historical Treaty allowance for building of two new ships armed with 16” guns as soon as Parliament provided funds as a balance to the completion of 16” gun armed capital ships by the US and Japan would certainly have been put in place. The various modifications to the older ships executed from 1924 through 1932 and the primary British capital ship reconstruction program that began in 1933 would have been completed.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1923 |2 |“Nelson” |Conqueror, Thunderer, Monarch |

|1937 |3 |“KGV” | |

|1938 |2 |“KGV” | |

|1939 |2 |“Lion” | |

Had the “building holiday” not been extended, but the service age extended to twenty-six years, the RN would have laid down new capital ships in 1935.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1923 |2 |“Nelson” |Conqueror, Thunderer, Monarch |

|1935 |2 |“Mod.Nelson” |Revenge, Royal Soveriegn |

|1937 |3 |“KGV” | |

|1938 |2 |“KGV” | |

|1939 |2 |“Lion” | |

When the RN received funds for building two new capital ships in 1923 under the Treaty limitations, they decided to start with the G3 design and work their way down to 35,000 tons. Because of strict design and construction discipline, the Nelson and Rodney, both completed in 1927, were significantly under weight. When inclined after completion, neither ship exceeded 33,700 tons. This was an experience replicated by both the RN and the USN in the design and construction of their first “Treaty” cruisers. As it was, this extra displacement could have been useful for eliminating a theoretical “soft spot” in their armor scheme between the internal inclined belt and the armor bulkhead in the side protection system or for a more powerful engineering plant for an increase to 25 knots.

|Nelson, 1927 | |

|Standard Displacement |33,500 tons |

|Normal Displacement |36,100tons |

|Battle Displacement |38,700 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |41,250 tons |

|Dimensions |710’ OA, 700’ WL x 106’ WL x 35’ Max D |

|Guns |9 x 16”/45, 12 x 6”/50, 6 x 4.7”/40 AA |

|Machinery |2 s, 45,000 shp = 23 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |13.5” inclined belt, 4.25” deck |

It is difficult to determine what a British capital ship between the Nelson of 1927 and the King George V of 1937 would have looked like. The British spent a lot of effort trying to convince (very unsuccessfully) the other navies to adopt “small” battleships from 20,000 tons to 28,000 tons in displacement. Many resources went into proposed designs of these types to prove that sufficient protection against the threat from the submarine and the aircraft, and speed, range and firepower effective against 35,000 ton battleships could be achieved on such displacements. All went for naught, as no navy was willing to place itself at risk, especially with the RN having just completed the only two “modern” battleships. There is a design proposal for battleships after the “Nelson” class. It reduces main armament to eight 16”/45 guns in four two-gun turrets. It includes a dual-purpose secondary armament. Length would have been similar to the “Nelson”, as that class was longer than the combined requirements of armament and machinery required, to reduce machinery power (and weight) required to reach 23 knots. With the main gun turrets equally disposed fore and aft, the machinery spaces had to be re-arranged and armor, having to cover more space, reduced in thickness. Speed would have been 23 knots or perhaps 25 knots, dependent on marine engineering technology improvements available at the time the ships were laid down. A follow-on class to the “Nelson” could have used the technology improvements made between 1923 and 1929 to re-arrange the main armament to have the forward masked turret moved aft and use the available tonnage to absorb the increase in weights, though armor thicknesses would probably have had to be reduced.

The British did get the US and French to agree to a 14” gun limit at the London Treaty of 1936, but this too came to nothing when Japan refused to go along with any restrictions whatsoever. The process of designing the “King George V” class was long and involved, like the design development of the other second generation Treaty capital ships. In this case, we know that in the end the RN chose protection, speed and gun power, in that order, given the outcome of the design process. The choice of the 14” gun was the result of the London Treaty of 1936. Given that Japan had given notice of withdrawal from the Treaty structure in December 1934 with an effective date of December 1936 and had given no evidence of wanting to participate in any Treaty system that placed any qualitative limits on her navy or quantitative limits that did not make her an equal of the US or the British Empire, and given that the Italians had already announced the intent to build battleships with 15” guns and the French and Germans would soon follow, the choice to retain 35,000 tons and reduce permissible main gun armament to 14” (356mm) seems delusional in the extreme. The “KGV” class would have been served with a bit less armor and more gun power, say nine 15” guns or eight 16” guns. While the limitation of the “Lion” class to 40,000 tons was seen as a political move on the part of the British to try and salvage as much of the Treaty system as possible and constrain other powers through moral persuasion of constraining the British program, it was also the result of the constraints imposed by British warship building capacity and naval sustainment infrastructure. The “Lion” class was the largest design that could be accommodated in any of the RN’s own dry docks. Commercial dry docks at Southampton, Liverpool, Tilbury, Malta, Gibralter, Durban, Quebec, Esquimalt and St.Johns could handle these ships, but the commercial dry dock in Singapore was not complete until 1935. They would have stressed the port facilities of the RN throughout the world.

|King George V, 14” guns | |

|Standard Displacement |35,300 tons |

|Normal Displacement |36,100tons |

|Battle Displacement |38,700 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |41,250 tons |

|Dimensions |710’ OA, 700’ WL x 106’ WL x 35’ Max D |

|Guns |10 x 14”/45, 16 x 5.25”/50 DP |

|Machinery |2 s, 45,000 shp = 29 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |13.5” inclined belt, 4.25” deck |

France

The capital ships (as defined by the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922), battleships, battle cruisers and armored cruisers of the French Navy on 31 December 1923 (ships in service/commissioned and building, with declared or estimated standard displacement, which exceeded 10,000 tons in standard displacement and/or were armed with guns with a bore greater than 8”. This does not include ships initially built as one of the types above, but disarmed and assigned or converted to other tasks)

|Victor Hugo | | |11,500 |

|Jules Ferry |August 1901 |September 1905 |11,500 |

|Diderot |23 August 1907 |25 July 1911 |18,900 |

|Condorcet |23 August 1907 |25 July 1911 |18,900 |

|Courbet |1 September 1910 |19 November 1913 |23,500 |

|Jean Bart |15 November 1910 |5 June 1913 |23,500 |

|Paris |10 November 1911 |1 August 1914 |23,500 |

|Bretagne |16 February 1920 |10 February 1916 |23,500 |

|Lorraine |7 November 1912 |10 March 1916 |23,500 |

|Provence |21 May 1912 |1 March 1916 |23,500 |

Total capital ship tonnage: 201,000 tons

Tonnage of armored cruisers: 23,000 tons

Tonnage of “predreadnought” capital ships: 37,000 tons

Tonnage of “dreadnought” capital ships: 70,500 tons

Tonnage of “superdreadnought” capital ships: 70,500 tons

Tonnage of 16” gun armed capital ships: 0 tons

Of all the pre-War naval powers, France was probably the worst off. Her pre-war designs had been limited by industrial and financial constraints and a mistaken belief on the part of the Naval staff that combat would be at short (8,000 yards) ranges. The four years of war with priority to defending France from the Germans saw her naval stores, manpower and materiel given over to the Army. Much of her industry in north-eastern France was destroyed. What ships there were left on the slips were obsolete by any standard compared to those being built by other powers, even the Italians. She came out of the war in near collapse, financially and industrially, her morale and national confidence severely damaged.

Historically, under the Treaty, France was allowed to build capital ships before the “building holiday” ended and regardless of the “twenty year” rule. Two ships were authorized to be laid down, one in 1927 and one in 1929 (for completion in 1930 and 1932). The French did not exercise this allowance. All the extant “Normandie” class battleships (one was converted to an aircraft carrier) were scrapped and construction was not undertaken again until 1932. With the Germans prostrate from the war and the Versailles Treaty and Italy as exhausted as they were, the French saw no reason to build capital ships.

The French accepted tonnage equality with Italy very reluctantly. The French saw their needs in defending a world-wide empire and facing the possibility (unlikely, but still a possible scenario to be addressed) of a two or even three front war against Germany, Italy and Japan or some combination of the three in the future. They accepted equality because Germany was supine and emasculated, Japan constrained by Treaty (and the threat of intervention by the British and/or US) and Italy was as exhausted as France, there was not the slightest chance of war with the US and Britain was an (uncertain and unsure) ally. They saw real difficulty in ever reaching a force level of five 35,000 ton capital ships, much less some higher number. It is possible, though, that like de Gaulle in a later time, French obstinacy could have gained them the higher limit, say seven to Japan’s nine and Italy’s five. This would most assuredly be the price for bringing Germany into the Treaty and allowing them any capital ships at all. This would bring France’s allowance under the Treaty to 245,000 tons.

The French would have needed time to design a new ship to the 35,000 ton limit and then order the materiel for construction, if the government was willing to fund new construction. The first issue was the geopolitical situation. As long as Italy did not build new ships and Germany was allowed no capital ships over 10,000 tons, France would feel no need to build new ships. If Germany was allowed to retain a couple of older ships as an off-set to a revolutionary Russia, France might still not feel the need to build new ships as long as she was sure of a British alliance against Germany. The second issue was the condition of France’s warship building industry and naval infrastructure. Without significant renovation and expansion, France’s ability to build 35,000 ton capital ships would continue to be constrained. There would also be significant delays as new guns, turrets, fire control systems and machinery were designed and built. It could easily be 1927 before France could lay down a new capital ship, even one designed to a smaller displacement. As it was, France had some time to recover, as Germany did not trigger a need for new capital ships until the early 1930s, while Italy retired her capital ships and concentrated on building cruisers, destroyers and submarines. If France had laid down a capital ship in 1927 and 1929 as allowed under the Treaty, they would have probably been 25,000 to 27,000 tons in displacement, which was the optimum capacity of French industry at the time. If the Germans were under the Treaty and had been allowed to retain one or two of their older capital ships and/or build one or two capital ships during this period, the French would still probably have gone with the smaller design, which would still have been superior to the older ships or equal to any new ships the Germans could afford to build, but for the moment, leaving the Germans to the RN. The French would go to 35,000 tons after the Italians, who would take the step up after they built their own restricted capital ships in 1927 and 1929. In both cases, the building of capital ships in 1927 and 1929 would be at the expense of the limited French modernization program for their older ships and the French and Italian cruiser programs of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

If the Treaty had specified quantitative and qualitative limits, but no limits on when new capital ships could be laid down, the French programs would be responding to German and Italian moves. France had already determined to complete “Bearn” as an aircraft carrier. The four remaining ships of the “Normandie” class were obsolescent, if not obsolete. Their guns had already been diverted to the Army. Other than as scrap steel that could be re-processed, there was really not much that could be recovered from these ships for new construction. The Italians had already scrapped the “Carracciolo” class except for the name ship. While the Italians continued to explore the option to finish her as an aircraft carrier, a lack of funds continued to constrain such action. This same lack of funds would restrain the Italians from laying down new ships. If the Germans were part of the Treaty, they had the industrial capacity to lay down new ships, but they were suffering from political turmoil and the economic collapse in the aftermath of the war. What limited funds these countries had would go to minor modernizations of their capital ships and primarily to cruiser, destroyer and submarine construction.

175,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Jean Bart |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Paris |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Bretagne |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

175,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Courbet |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Jean Bart |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” | |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Jean Bart |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Paris |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” | |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Courbet |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

If the Treaty specified a minimum age for replacement but not a “building holiday”, the French would have been allowed to lay down two new capital ships in 1928 to replace the pre-dreadnoughts, though one or more of the “Courbet” dreadnoughts would have also been dropped under the 175,000 ton limit. At the 245,000 ton limit, only the pre-dreadnoughts would be replaced. Given the state of French warship building capacity, these capital ships would have probably have been a 25,000 to 27,000 ton design. The options were a modernized, better armed and armored version of the “Normandie” to remain tactically compatible with the modernized older ships or a balanced battle cruiser design, still superior to the Italian dreadnoughts, but better adapted to France’s imperial defense needs. If the Germans were under the Versailles Treaty, they would still introduce the “Panzerschiff” in the early 1930s, which this ship would be admirably capable of countering. If the Germans were under the Treaty, they might be building a 15” gun, 35,000 ton updated “Ersatz Yorck”, which would require a French response, if the French felt isolated and without British support. If they were sure of British support, they could let the RN worry about Germany while they focused on Italy and, perhaps, Japan in concert with the Dutch. These ships would be the perfect supports for French cruisers, contre-destroyers, destroyers and torpedo boats against the similar, almost “mirror image” of the Italian Navy. These ships would, of course, provoke a 35,000 ton battleship response from the Italians. It is possible the French would forego capital ship construction under this scenario until the Germans unveiled their “Panzerschiff” or the Italians began new construction. Any capital ship construction between 1927 and 1931 would come at the reduction or elimination of modernization of older ships and the cruiser building program.

175,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Jean Bart |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Paris |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Bretagne |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

175,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Courbet |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Jean Bart |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 tons Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” | |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Jean Bart |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Paris |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 tons Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” | |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Courbet |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

With the end of and the failure to extend the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the French would look forward to 1931, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships, if they had not exercised their exemption to lay down new capital ships in 1927 and 1929. Much of our discussion of French capabilities, capacities, requirements and intentions from previous scenarios remains valid here. Under the Treaty, France was reduced to five (or seven) capital ships. The French would have had to convert two of their capital ships into a target ship and a training ship. The Treaty would resolve the issue of some countries having retained armored cruisers and the “Victor Hugo” and “Jules Ferry” would be disposed of by 1931. Historically, the French did not sign the 1930 Treaty and were not bound by its provisions.

175,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Jean Bart |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Paris |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Bretagne |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Provence |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

175,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Jean Bart |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Paris |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” | |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Jean Bart |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Paris |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,500 ton” | |

|1933 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1935 |1 |“Strabourg” |Courbet |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

With the extension of the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the French would look forward to 1937 when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. This scenario gives the French the opportunity to modernize their older ships based on the historical programs, but in this case, some of the industrial capacity and funds would be dedicated to the ships laid down in 1927 and 1929. Historically, the French did not sign the 1930 Treaty and were not bound by its provisions.

175,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Jean Bart |

|1937 |2 |“Dunkerque” | |

|1938 |2 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

175,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1937 |2 |“Dunkerque” | |

|1938 |2 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1937 |2 |“Dunkerque” | |

|1938 |2 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1937 |2 |“Dunkerque” | |

|1938 |2 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

Had the “building holiday” not been extended, but the service age extended to twenty-six years, the French would have laid down new capital ships in 1934. If the French had taken the opportunity under the Treaty to build new ships, this scenario would have seen none of the older ships being modernized. If not, then the modernizations of the older ships in the 1920s would have been complete. Historically, the French did not sign the 1930 Treaty and were not bound by its provisions.

175,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Jean Bart |

|1934 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Paris |

|1935 |1 |“Strasbourg” |Provence |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

175,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1934 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Courbet |

|1935 |1 |“Strasbourg” |Jean Bart |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (Ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1929 |1 |“26,500 ton” |Courbet |

|1934 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Jean Bart |

|1935 |1 |“Strasbourg” |Paris |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

245,000 ton Limit (No ships laid down in 1927 and 1929)

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1934 |1 |“Dunkerque” |Diderot, Condorcet |

|1935 |1 |“Strasbourg” |Courbet |

|1937 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1938 |1 |“Richelieu” | |

|1939 |1 |“Gasconge” | |

At the beginning of 1923, France had five “Normandie” class battleships on the stocks. These ships compared unfavorably in protection, speed and gun power with ships of their generation and with those bring completed and which the RN would build. At 25,000 tons standard displacement, the French had provided sufficient guns with three quadruple turrets, but these guns were ill-served by the available fire control systems and their restricted elevation. The French naval staff had believed in 1914 that the maximum effective range for such ships was 8,000 meters (8,800 yards) and this class, and their successors, which only reached the design stage, reflected this decision, retaining the 34cm gun when other powers had gone to 16”, because at 8,800 yards, it offered sufficient penetration, and with quadruple turrets, the French could place large numbers on displacement and size constrained ships, the next design after the “Normandie” class having no less than sixteen 34cm guns. The armor scheme reflected this doctrine, looking more to the pre-war systems, since the French expected medium guns, which these two classes of battleships were provided with in some number, to be effective at the decisive engagement range of 6,600 yards. In 1922, the French were left with six “dreadnoughts” and “super-dreadnoughts” in service and five building, which were totally unsuited to a world where the opening range was the effective horizon (24-25,000 yards) and deck armor and long range accuracy were critical parts of battleship design and performance. Add that their machinery plant, a combined direct turbines and reciprocating engine using coal and oil, was obsolescent, and the French had a lot of “sunk” investment that required drastic modernization or be written off with a new start. As far as modernization, the French (and Italians) were allowed to change their main armament and armor schemes and thicknesses on their “existing” ships within the 3,000 ton limit. Improvements in metallurgy and manufacturing could have allowed the replacement of the 30.5cm and 34.3cm guns with those of larger bore, but similar exterior dimensions and weight, but the cost of rebuilding the ammunition handling machinery and the gun mounts for higher elevation and heavier shells and powder charges was probably would have been excessive. The French did eliminate some armor, such as that at the bow, to improve sea-keeping, but did not really revise the scheme as best as possible into an “all or nothing” system or exchange weight in vertical armor for additional weight for horizontal armor. The following charts are an estimate of what the French could have done with the “Normandie” class under the Treaty.

|“Mod. Normandie” Design | |

|Standard Displacement |25,500 tons |

|Normal Displacement |27,600 tons |

|Battle Displacement |28,700 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |30,250 tons |

|Dimensions |590’ OA, 576.17’ WL x 95’ WL x 30.5’ Max D |

|Guns |12 x 343mm/45, 18 x 139mm/53, 8 x 75mm AA |

|Machinery |4 s, 60,000 shp = 23 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |33cm belt, 10cm deck, 34cm turrets & barbettes |

The various design outlines reviewed by the French in the 1920s looked at what could be built with French resources at the 35,000 ton limit and at certain lower limits that would allow the maximum use of their 175,000 ton limit. At 35,000 tons, the French would be limited to five ships. At around 29,000 tons, they could build six and at 25,000 tons, they could build seven. The designs looked at the maximum characteristics French industry could produce at each displacement and its relative capabilities compared to contemporary capital ships and its ability to withstand 16” guns.

|“26,500 ton” Design | |

|Standard Displacement |26,500 tons |

|Normal Displacement |27,600 tons |

|Battle Displacement |28,700 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |29,800 tons |

|Dimensions |670’ OA, 656’ WL x 89.4’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |8 x 34.3cm/50, 12 x 15.2cm/53 |

|Machinery |4 s, 105,000 shp = 29 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |25cm belt, 10cm deck |

The “Dunkerque” and “Strasbourg” were responses to the completion of the German “Panzerschiffe”. They combined speed, gun power and protection in an affordable package within France’s current warship construction capability and support infrastructure. Individually, they were equal or superior to any capital ship in their speed class, except, possibly, the “Hood”. They would have matched up well to the “Scharnhorst” class as built, or a modernized “Mackensen” had the Germans been incorporated in the Treaty structure and allowed to build capital ships before 1933. They completely out-classed Italy’s older capital ships and were still arguably superior even after those ships were rebuilt.

The “Richelieu” class was France’s answer to Italy’s “Littorio” class, an expansion of the “Dunkerque” concept that matched up well with the other powers’ pre-WW2 “Treaty” designs. They were, however, at the edge of France’s capability and capacity to build capital ships and there was no possibility of France building 45,000 ton displacement capital ships without significant resources being directed to renovation and expansion of the French warship building industry and naval support infrastructure.

Italy

Italy was suffering through the same financial and political crisis that her former allies, Britain and France were going through, and the Italian Navy’s capital ship program had been frozen and the guns diverted to monitors and the Army. But she had on the slips some very powerful “fast” battleships, which with some modifications within the limits of the Treaty would have been the equal of any other warship built in the period. Italy’s problem was funding. She actually allowed her battle fleet to atrophy through the 1920’s and 1930’s, while studying plans for building battle cruisers and modernizing the older battleships she had retained. Still, Italy’s building programs were tied to the French programs, and if the French had built capital ships to counter German programs, the Italians would feel compelled to respond. Historically, the Italians did not sign the 1930 or 1936 London Treaties, but remained a signatory of the 1922 Washington Treaty until WW II.

Between 1933 and 1940, the Italians completely built their remaining older capital ships. The outcome was four ships that were still vulnerable to battleships and battlecruisers armed with 15” and 16” guns, but fast enough to run away from the existing battleships that carried that firepower, leaving them at risk against a small number of battle cruisers, which might not be available to be employed against them. They were certainly superior to France’s old battleships and may have been not significantly inferior to the “Dunkerque” class. Some have argued that the resources would have been spent accelerating the completion of the “Littorio” class or adding more ships to that program. The reconstruction of these ships did not compete for resources with the “Littorio” program, except in the way of the 90mm AA guns and their fire control system. The Italians did not have another graving dock or building slip capable of handling a “Littorio” size capital ship. The reconstruction program was built around unused and available dock yard capacity and industrial resources. If there was an alternative program, it would have been converting these ships to aircraft carriers or using the resources to build additional cruisers, though the reboring of the old guns suggests a lack of capacity to manufacture new 20.3cm or 15.2cm guns, though the eight three gun 135mm turrets might have gone into two cruisers using the machinery of two of the capital ships. The funds for this program were in addition to the historical new construction capital ship, cruiser and destroyer programs. If new construction in the 1920s and 1930s diverted funding from the historical cruiser and destroyer programs, then the funds and resources for this reconstruction program might have been used instead to complete these deferred programs. In any case, the ships might have been disposed of by 1937 due to new construction.

Italian Capital Ships completed and in service under the 45,000 ton standard displacement individual ship limit and the aggregate either a 225,000 ton limit.

|Varese |21 April 1898 |5 April 1905 |6,750 |

|Francesco Ferruccio |19 August 1899 |1 September 1905 |6,750 |

|Pisa |20 February 1905 |1 September 1909 |8,500 |

|San Marco |2 January 1907 |7 February 1911 |9,000 |

|San Giorgio |4 July 1904 |1 July 1910 |9,000 |

|Regina Elena |27 March 1901 |11 September 1907 |12,600 |

|Roma |20 September 1903 |17 December 1908 |12,600 |

|Napoli |21 October 1903 |1 September 1908 |12,600 |

|Vittorio Emanuele |18 September 1901 |1 August 1908 |12,600 |

|Dante Aligheri |6 June 1909 |15 January 1913 |19,500 |

|Conte di Cavour |10 August 1910 |1 April 1915 |22,500 |

|Giulio Cesare |24 June 1910 |14 May 1914 |22,500 |

|Andrea Dorea |24 March 1912 |13 March 1916 |22,700 |

|Caio Duilio |24 February 1912 |10 May 1915 |22,700 |

Total capital ship tonnage: 200,300 tons

Tonnage of armored cruisers: 40,000 tons

Tonnage of “predreadnought” capital ships: 50,400 tons

Tonnage of “dreadnought” capital ships: 109,900 tons

Tonnage of “superdreadnought” capital ships: 0 tons

Tonnage of 16” gun armed capital ships: 0 tons

If the Treaty had specified quantitative and qualitative limits, but no limits on when new capital ships could be laid down, the Italian programs would be responding to French decisions. . If Parliament instead allowed the Navy to use up the materiel already produced, or shift authorizations and appropriations, there was about 15,000 tons of materiel left over from the “Caracciolo” class. While the name ship of this class had been launched in 1920, she had not been declared under the Treaty and had not been built to the design and purpose of a capital ship before being launched, the intention being to convert her to an aircraft carrier. It is probable that the Italians would have redesigned the “Caracciolo” class for construction under the Treaty, but the availability of funding, along with the production capacity for high powered machinery and for turrets and guns would have delayed the laying down of such ships. Such funding and capacity would have been diverted from a program of building desperately needed modern cruisers and destroyers. The Italian Navy had retired their capital ships into a reserve status to concentrate funding on this program. Certainly the heavy cruisers would have been eliminated or deferred until the 1930s to afford even two such ships. The Italian Navy also looked at other options, including smaller battleships, battle cruisers and “cruiser-killers”. All such construction would divert funding and capacity from the cruiser and destroyer building program.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1925 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Regina Elena, Roma, Napoli |

|1926 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Vittorio Emanuele, Dante Aligheri |

|1927 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Conte di Cavour, Giulio Cesare |

|1928 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Andrea Doria |

|1935 |1 |“Littorio” |Caio Duilio |

|1937 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1938 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1939 |1 |“Littorio” | |

Completing some or all the “Caracciolo” class would have drawn funding from cruiser and destroyer construction, but these programs could have caught up later through diverting the funding for modernizing the “Cavour” and “Doria” classes, which would have not been needed. This relies on the Italians retaining the four ships of the “Caracciolo” class on the building slips until 1922. The ships would have been completed sufficiently to launch and then laid up until funds were accumulated to complete them. This could have resulted at variations in the design, as each ship would have been completed a year or two apart. We could expect one ship completed in 1926, with the rest following at one year (more or less) intervals through 1930. Had the Italians retained this class and completed them, there probably would not have been any exception to the “building holiday” for Italy and her next capital ship could not be laid down until 1931. It is possible that the Italians would complete one of this class as an aircraft carrier, depending on when the conversion was executed, since when Mussolini took power, the Italian Navy was forbidden carriers until experience in war forced a change in policy in 1941.

If the Treaty specified a minimum age for replacement but not a “building holiday”, the Italians would have been allowed to lay down four new capital ships in 1924 to 1925, replacing the pre-dreadnoughts. Depending on the displacement of such ships, up to three of Italy’s “dreadnought” class battleships would have also had to be disposed of under the 175,000 ton limit.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1925 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Regina Elena, Roma, Napoli |

|1926 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Vittorio Emanuele, Dante Aligheri |

|1927 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Conte di Cavour, Giulio Cesare |

|1928 |1 |“Mod. Caracciolo” |Andrea Doria |

|1935 |1 |“Littorio” |Caio Duilio |

|1937 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1938 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1939 |1 |“Littorio” | |

With the end of and the failure to extend the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference (or, as historically, the Italians did not sign on to the 1930 Treaty), the Italians would look forward to 1931, when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships, if they had not exercised their exemption to lay down new capital ships in 1927 and 1929. The first table shows a capital ship being laid down in 1927 and 1929 at the cost of the cruiser and destroyer program. The second table shows the outcome of the Italians not exercising their options under the Washington Treaty. Again, ships built out of historical baseline (1931 and 1933) would adversely impact other programs.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Regina Elena, Roma |

|1929 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Napoli, Vittorio Emanuele |

|1931 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Dante Aligheri |

|1933 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Conte di Cavour |

|1935 |1 |“Littorio” |Giulio Cesare |

|1937 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1938 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1939 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1931 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Regina Elena, Roma |

|1933 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Napoli, Vittorio Emanuele |

|1935 |1 |“Littorio” |Dante Aligheri |

|1937 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1938 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1939 |1 |“Littorio” | |

With the extension of the “building holiday” and no extension on the service age of capital ships at the 1930 London Conference, the Italians would look forward to 1937 when they would be allowed to lay down new capital ships to replace over-age battleships. Historically, the Italians did not sign on to the 1930 or 1936 Treaty. The first table looks at Italy exercising their options to lay down capital ships in 1927 and 1929, the second table shows the outcome of not exercising their options under the 1922 Treaty.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Regina Elena, Roma |

|1929 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Napoli, Vittorio Emanuele |

|1937 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1938 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1939 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1937 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1938 |1 |“Littorio” | |

|1939 |1 |“Littorio” | |

Had the “building holiday” not been extended, but the service age extended to twenty-six years, the Italians could have laid down new capital ships in 1933. Historically, the Italians did not sign on to the 1930 or 1936 Treaty. The first table looks at Italy exercising their options to lay down capital ships in 1927 and 1929, the second table shows the outcome of not exercising their options under the 1922 Treaty.

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1927 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Regina Elena, Roma |

|1929 |1 |“26,000 ton CB” |Napoli, Vittorio Emanuele |

|1934 |2 |“Littorio” |Dante Aligheri |

|1938 |2 |“Littorio” | |

|Year Laid Down |# |Design |Replaces |

|1934 |2 |“Littorio” |Regina Elena, Roma, Napoli, Vittorio Emanuele, Dante Aligheri |

|1938 |2 |“Littorio” | |

The original design probably would have come in at 28,500 tons, thanks to lesser endurance the Italians required from their ships, which meant less of the hull weights would have been dedicated to fuel and feed water tanks. There was probably little room to expand the design to 35,000 tons, so the completed ships probably would have come in at 31,000 to 32,000 tons standard displacement, the additional tonnage devoted to the modification of the side protection system, armament, and more powerful machinery. The 38cm/40 guns originally programmed for this ship were diverted to monitors and the Army. Both Italian firms, Ansaldo and OTO Melara had close relationships with the British armaments manufacturers, Armstrong and Vickers. Vickers produced 15”/45 guns for Spain in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s. Interesting enough, these guns use an AP shell the same weight as the Italian M34 15”/50 at a velocity acceptable for such a shell in a gun five calibers shorter. The single casemated 6” guns would have been replaced by 6” guns in twin turrets, while 3.9”/47 AA guns in twin mounts were added. The submerged torpedo tubes would have been abandoned, especially in light of the need to bulge the hull. The bridge structure would have followed the design used for the “Trento” class heavy cruisers, while a catapult could have been fitted on the fore deck as in the cruisers or possibly amidships in the superstructure. It is doubtful additional ships could have been funded without severe adverse impact on Italy’s cruiser and destroyer construction programs.

|“Caracciolo” Design | |

|Standard Displacement |32,000 tons |

|Normal Displacement |33,200 tons |

|Battle Displacement |36,400 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |37,500 tons |

|Dimensions |700’ OA, 680’ WL x 103’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |8 x 38cm/45, 12 x 15.2cm/53, 12 x 10cm/47 AA |

|Machinery |4 s, 105,000 shp = 27 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |30cm belt, 10cm deck |

Of course, if the Italians had decided that the funding situation kept them from retaining the “Caracciolo” class hulls and completing them on a delayed schedule and since the French didn’t build new capital ships until laying down the “Dunkerque” in 1932, we revert to the historical scenario, despite the Treaty authorization to lay down new capital ships in 1927 and 1929. One divergent scenario has the Italians building new battle cruisers between 1927 and 1933, while divesting all their older ships. Such an action would have provoked a French response, leading to the Italian decision to build 35,000 ton battleships in 1934. The other alternate scenario could diverge when the French begin building capital ships again with the laying down of the “Dunkerque” in 1932, with the Italians deciding not to reconstruct their older ships and instead use the funding and shipbuilding capacity used in the reconstructions to complete three battle cruisers of 26,500 tons between 1937 and 1939. These ships were designed as responses to the “Dunkerque”, which class was superior to the Italian old battleships even after being modernized. As such, foregoing modernization and building new and comparable ships might have been a better deal for the Italians, though the suspicion is that they modernized the old battleships because they didn’t have the resources (probably in gun and turret production) to build new ones on top of the preparation for and building of the “Littorio” class. Here is the data for the battle cruisers.

|“26,500 ton” Design | |

|Standard Displacement |26,500 tons |

|Normal Displacement |27,600 tons |

|Battle Displacement |28,700 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |29,800 tons |

|Dimensions |670’ OA, 656’ WL x 89.4’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |8 x 34.3cm/50, 12 x 15.2cm/53 |

|Machinery |4 s, 105,000 shp = 29 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |25cm belt, 10cm deck |

In the end, the Italians built the “Littorio” class battleships, one of the most powerful classes of the “35,000 ton” Treaty designs. It should always be remembered, though, that the Italians had what could be a significant advantage in that their capital ships, being designed strictly for the Mediterranean area of operations, could trade endurance for other important characteristics. Again, this is another reminder why the standard displacement definition was a major victory for the USN and its need for great range, by eliminating fuel and reserve feed water from the calculations of standard displacement.

Germany

Germany is, of course, a special case. With the Versailles Treaty in place, there isn’t much to do except accept the historical scenario, with building the “Panzerschiffe”, the “Scharnhorst” class battle cruisers and the “Bismarck” class battleships.

There were still alternatives, of course, with building coastal defense ships instead of “Panzerschiffe”. Then there is the option of building the upgraded “Panzerschiffe” instead of or before the construction of the “Scharnhorst” class or arming the “Scharnhorst” class with eight 35cm or six 38cm guns.

An alternative is for Germany to be included in the Washington Treaty system, as she eventually was, through the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935. The political reasoning would be to establish Germany as a bulwark against revolutionary Russia. This alternative treaty would not put the German Navy into the same quantitative limits as the French and Italian, and if it did, the French would have fought even harder for a larger quota than the Italians. The possible allowance would range from 0 to 175,000 tons. Given the Russian strength in the Baltic before the revolution, 105,000 tons would be the minimum to ensure superiority over any navy the Soviet revolutionaries could eventually salvage from the wreckage of their civil war. Implementing this from 1922 would give the Germans 175,000 to 182,000 tons of capital ships. So what’s next?

If the Germans had been included in the invitations to the Treaty negotiations, the three or four of the “Mackensen” class hulls might still have been available for completion. On the other hand, the Germans owed the Greeks for a “mini-super-dreadnought” and the Dutch might have been buyers looking for a cheap way to augment the defense of the Netherlands East Indies. A couple of “Bayern” class battleships would have been enough to face the Soviets in the Baltic, but the hulls were gone by 1921. Given the opportunity to start fresh and the Treaty allowance and industrial capacity for two or three 35,000 ton capital ships, what sort of capital ship would the Germans have produced. The last completed battleship design was for the “Bayern” class battleships which came in at about 28,000 tons at standard displacement and the last completed battlecruiser design was for the “Ersatz Yorck” class which displaced about 33,000 tons standard. The issue would remain that any capital ship more powerful than really needed to off-set the Soviets could salvage from the “Gangut” class would create friction with both the French and British. If the Soviets actually completed a “Borodino” class ship or two, even at a less powerful armament, the argument would be there for a class of 35,000 ton “fast” battleships, but otherwise, it would probably be politically more palatable if the Germans produced something around 26,500 to 30,000 tons.

|“Ersatz Yorck” Design | |

|Standard Displacement |35,000 tons |

|Normal Displacement |37,100 tons |

|Battle Displacement |39,200 tons |

|Full (Emergency) Displacement |41,300 tons |

|Dimensions |760’ OA, 747’ WL x 105.8’ WL x 33’ Max D |

|Guns |8 x 38cm/42, 12 x 15cm/55, 8 x 10.5cm/42 AA |

|Machinery |3 s, 120,000 shp = 28 kts @ battle disp |

|Armor |30cm belt, 9cm deck |

Continued capital ship evolution would be based around German internal politics, economic strength and the vision of threat from the Soviet Union and/or France. If the Germans had built something like a modernized “Mackensen”, the French might have avoided building 35,000 ton capital ships in response as long as Italy refrained from such a building program. The next step, since the Germans were under the provisions of the Treaty and their ships would have been recently built, would be determined by what the Soviets did in the Baltic and the internal political situation in Germany.

Noting that Hitler or any other conservative government in Germany would want to maintain good relations with the British, any sort of “Riskflotte” strategy would have been avoided. This is supported by Hitler’s willingness to temporarily join the Treaty system in 1935 with a bi-lateral treaty with the British. If the Soviets did not lay down any capital ships until the late 1930s, the Germans would probably been satisfied with their situation, though they could try to re-negotiate their quantitative limits upwards from 1933 on. With Germany in the Washington Treaty system, the situation that produced the “Panzerschiffe” and the historical construction program would probably not have arisen.

Under the 1922 Washington and the 1930 London Treaties, the Germans could not lay down new capital ships until the late 1940s, unless they re-negotiated their quantitative limits or, like the Japanese, denounced the Treaty and ended their participation in 1936. An analysis of the German capital ship program before 1940 indicates that given their resource constraints and demands, the maximum capacity until 1939 would be two nominally 35,000 ton capital ships every two years. After 1939, this capacity would rise to two 50-55,000 ton standard displacement capital ships every two years. Temporarily reassigning priorities for resources as the Germans did in 1938-39, they could have laid down a pair of 50-55,000 ton standard displacement battleships each year from 1939, but the political and military cost in restraining the expansion of the army and air force would have been too much when faced with the immediate threat of war in 1939 versus 1942 or 1944. The following scenarios are possible.

1. With the quantitative limits eliminated in the 1936 London Treaty, the Germans could have laid down any number of ships within the qualitative limitations of 35,000 tons and 14” guns. Two such ships would be laid down in 1936, looking something like the “Scharnhorst” class with 35cm guns. Two more would be laid down in 1938, looking like “Bismarck” class battleships. Finally two “H-39” class battleships would be laid down in 1940.

2. Even under a bi-lateral treaty with the British, where they achieved a limit of 35% of the RN’s tonnage, they could have laid down new capital ships, which they certainly would do with the news that the Soviets were building new ships. This would have resulted in a similar program as in scenario 1 above, but having already built 90,000 tons in the 1920s, the Germans would have only 85,000 tons within their limits until 1939. Trying to keep the British at least neutral to their program of consolidation and expansion, the Germans would have laid down a pair of nominally 35,000 ton battleships in 1936 and a second pair in 1938, with a pair of “H-39” class battleships being laid down in 1940.

3. If the Germans left the Treaty structure in 1936, they could lay down a pair of “Bismarck” class battleships in 1936, and if priority of resources was given to the Navy, a pair of “H-38/39” battleships would be laid down in 1938 and 1940.

Soviet Union

The complete dissolution of capital ship building capability in the Soviet Union, during and after the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921 precluded any construction, much less modernization of capital ships before 1930. In fact it is probably true to say that the Soviet Union had very little in the way of capital ship construction capability until after the Third Five Year Plan revitalized Russian heavy industry after 1932. Given the demonstration of weakness of the Soviet naval shipbuilding industry in the 1920s as evident from the lack of modernization of existing ships and lack of production on new ships and the scale of modernizations of the “Gangut” class battleships in the 1930s.

Once the Soviet Union’s economy recovered and expanded enough to entertain a program of capital ship building, the dysfunctional nature of Soviet naval policy formulation at the time resulted in a lengthy decision-making process that arrived at the “Sovyetsky Soyuz” class battleship. Had an earlier decision been made on a smaller ship in the 35,000 to 45,000 ton range, one or two of such ships would have been completed prior to 22 June 1941.

After the “Cherry Trees”, Part II

The Third (Washington was the first, the inconclusive talks in Geneva in 1927-28, the second) Naval Arms Limitation Conference opened in London on 21 January 1930. All the provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 were still in effect. The new Treaty was signed on 22 April 1930 and, in effect, continued the Washington Treaty, it included reductions in numbers of ships authorized the signatories and the further postponement of capital ship construction until 31 December 1936.

The second conference in Geneva had floundered under the British demands for additional cruiser tonnage and US demands for total equality with the British. The Great Depression had reduced government budgets based on the traditional response of reducing revenue (ie. taxes) and spending. This was each government’s initial response, which changed on the part of the US, Germans, Japanese and Italians. First, the election of FDR brought a non-traditional approach of increased government spending to produce jobs and stimulate the economy through government and consumer spending, and, as a consequence, reduce the possibilities of social and political turmoil. Though some funds found their way to the military (National Recovery Administration funding built the carriers, USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise), most was directed toward civilian purposes. Germany, Japan and Italy, on the other hand, found themselves in the control of militarist, authoritarian governments who sought to realign the balance of power in the world, and saw military strength as the primary tool to achieve their goals. Their military programs reduced unemployment through enlarged military-industrial complexes, the diversion of manpower into uniform and in combination with improving (relatively speaking) economic conditions and totalitarian control, ensured domestic social and political tranquility.

Without the London Treaty it is still uncertain if capital ships would have been built, as the limited resources, historically available, would have required the navies that built them to forego other programs, such as carriers, cruisers and/or destroyers or modernization programs for a variety of warships. On the other hand, the possibility of additional funding, sufficient to support a low level of production of capital ships, was certainly higher in the 1930’s, with the increase in international tensions and the need to provide job relief to maintain political and social stability, than in the 1920’s. In addition, there were the capital ship modernization and reconstruction programs of the major powers, which funding could have been instead used for new construction after 1931 if the Treaty was rejected. The French and Italians, who participated in the treaty negotiations, refused to sign the Treaty, leaving them under the original limitations of the Washington Treaty. The Germans and Soviets were not invited. It was always possible that Japan would not sign or that the Diet would not consent to the Treaty. If the “Treaty” faction in the IJN lost control of the navy to the “Big Navy” faction in 1930-1931, the IJN could withdraw its active duty admiral from the cabinet, causing the government to fall and refusing to appoint a new Navy Minister until the government rejected the Treaty. The United States would not accept the limitations of the Treaty if the Japanese rejected it. The failure of the London Treaty would leave the participants still under the limitations of the Washington Treaty, but without a continued pause in capital ship construction and with the service life of capital ships still restricted to twenty years.

The US spent almost $1 billion (in 1926 dollars) to reconstruct thirteen capital ships from 1926 to 1934. The Japanese spent almost as much when they reconstructed ten capital ships and two aircraft carriers converted from capital ships between 1933 and 1940, though the majority (ten ships) were rebuilt between 1933 and 1936. The British modernized or reconstructed nine ships between 1931 and 1941. The French modernized six capital ships between 1929 and 1935. The Italians totally reconstructed four capital ships between 1933 and 1940. Almost all these reconstructions required the use of building docks, the production of new machinery, non-cemented armor for decks and roofs of turrets and conning towers, fitting bulges, lengthening the hulls and modifying the turrets and mounts of the primary and secondary armaments. New construction would have cost more per ship, yet the steel from the ships being replaced, the re-use of cemented armor plates and the turrets, mounts and guns would have reduced costs and resources needed to build new ships, as would the stored boilers, machinery, turrets, guns and armor held over from the programs cancelled in 1922.

Certainly the US could have produced up to ten new capitals ships, the Japanese at least eight, and the British as many as six from the resources applied to these reconstructions programs, without diverting funding for any other programs.

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