Sub Saharan Africa:



AFRICA ANALYTICAL GUIDANCE:

THEMES AND ISSUES TO MONITOR

Top level Countries and Regional Issues: Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and the Horn of Africa region (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia) and AFRICOM.

NIGERIA

Security:

• Main security issues in Nigeria have to do with violence in the oil-producing Niger Delta region. There is one critical militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which is made up of several factions located in the 3 main states (Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers) of the region. Watch for MEND attacks against the region’s energy infrastructure (pipelines, flowstations, crude oil loading platforms, oil tankers) as well as kidnapping of local and expatriate oil workers. Watch for Nigerian armed forces action against MEND. The main security force deployed in the Niger Delta is called the Joint Task Force (JTF). Any shift in tactics or area of operations by Nigerian forces will also be noteworthy. Similarly, watch for increased or more advanced fighting capabilities being demonstrated by MEND operations.

Political issues:

• Political parties in Nigeria are dominated by the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) but there are many factions within the PDP that should be monitored. In particular to watch for is the relationship between Northerner Nigerians (who control the presidency) and Niger Delta politicians (led by members of the region’s Ijaw tribe who control the Vice Presidency). Right now there is a tenuous power sharing agreement between the northerners and the Ijaw but we need to be watching for whether this agreement gets broken or compromised. The country will hold national (presidential, state and local) elections in April 2011, but politicians could begin campaign jockeying anytime. Niger Delta politicians have used MEND as a tool to finance their campaigns as well as force their way into power sharing at the federal level.

International Relations:

• Nigeria is the dominant power in the West Africa sub-region and considers itself one of Africa’s leading powers (South Africa being the other). Watch for how it interacts with other African countries to exert its influence.

Economics:

• ENERGY - Oil is the lifeline of Nigeria, so any and everything to do with the energy industry is useful.

SOUTH AFRICA

Security:

• Security issues in South Africa don’t threaten the government’s hold on power, but are a significant nuisance for business

• Monitoring for South Africa as a hub in Africa for drug trafficking

• There aren’t any major militant organizations operating there, but we can monitor for this to develop or for smaller South African groups to develop

Military:

• The South African military is the most competent and coherent fighting force not just in its region but on the continent. However, it is struggling to sustain itself post-Apartheid, so watch for both acquisition and training efforts as well as reports on its current fighting capabilities and efforts to improve/reform the military.

Politics:

• Watch for factions within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) to try to extend their influence

• Factions include the members of ruling coalition the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)

• Other factions include those that left the ANC (but maybe not permanently) to create the opposition Congress of the People (COPE) party

• Watch for pressures on the Jacob Zuma-led government to shift economic/business policies under pressure from coalition partners

International relations:

• Watch relations with Angola and Zimbabwe, as well as with global powers including the U.S, Russia, and China

• Watch for how the Zuma government may influence Zimbabwe’s unity government, whether Zuma influences Zimbabwe President Mugabe to retire

• Watch for how South Africa manages its relationship with a rising Angola – these are rivals and the relationship should be competitive

Economy:

• Anything related to foreign investment, particularly the mining industry

• Watch for major economic swings, up or down

ANGOLA

Security:

• There are two low level security threats in Angola but that have bigger, longer term potential

• One is the opposition party, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the other is a rebel group in the country’s oil producing Cabinda province

• UNITA is currently busy playing the role of opposition party but we should monitor for discontent or manipulation within the party and whether this could lead to the group re-acquiring a military capability

• Cabinda rebels have a tenuous ceasefire with the Angolan government, but this could always end if they believe they have more to gain by going back to fighting. The Angolan army deploys about 30,000 troops in Cabinda to keep a lid on the rebels there. Note shifts in troop disposition, deployment or reinforcements or drawdowns of this force.

Politics:

• Angolan President Eduardo Dos Santos has ruled since independence in 1975 and he’ll likely stand for reelection when elections are next held (which may be in 2009 but more likely in 2010). Dos Santos faces a few internal opponents but generally he rules successfully with his police state regime. The ruling MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) is basically the only political party in town. Watch for moves by the MPLA to position themselves favorably (at the expense of UNITA) for reelection. Watch for how the MPLA maneuvers in the provinces where UNITA is more popular. The MPLA wants to undermine UNITA in the provinces so as to keep the opposition as weak for as long as possible.

International Relations:

• Angola wants to rise in power on par with Nigeria and South Africa. It sees neighboring countries (Namibia, Zambia, the DR Congo, Congo-Brazzaville) as its near-abroad and will support or oppose governments there in order to defend itself against domestic and foreign threats. Monitor for relations with those countries. Angola is also seeking to develop a closer relationship with South Africa. Monitor for that developing relationship, whether in commercial terms or foreign visits etc.

• Angola will use global powers against each other to extract additional concessions and to support their rise in power. Angola will seek closer relations with Russia/US/China/Europe/South Africa. Angola will sell oil and diamonds (and other) concessions and sign other agreements with those countries to boost their rise. Monitor for foreign visits and commercial and cooperation deals struck with Luanda and foreigners.

Economy:

• Oil and diamonds are the foundation for the Angolan economy. Watch for how the Angolan government seeks to expand those economic sectors. Watch for who moves to develop those sectors. Are the Russians/Americans/South Africans/Chinese/British moving in to develop those sectors?

HORN OF AFRICA (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia)

Security:

• There are a couple of security concerns in the Horn region. One is the Islamist insurgency being waged in Somalia by a couple of groups (Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam) against the Somali government. One concern is that the Islamists will recruit Al Qaeda operatives to boost their capabilities in order to bring down and replace the Somali government with themselves. Monitor the fighting and support that the Islamists have in Somalia and foreign jihadist support they have.

• Another issue is Ethiopian activity in Somalia. Ethiopia intervened in Somalia from Dec. 2006 to Jan. 2009 to prop up the Somali government against the Islamist insurgency. Ethiopia pulled its troops back to border areas in January 2009. Ethiopia has also funded and armed a militia operating in central Somalia that is fighting for the Somali government against the Islamist insurgency. Monitor for direct Ethiopian activity in Somalia as well as indirect activity such as support of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah militia.

• Ethiopia and Eritrea going to war against each other is another security concern. They fought a war in 1998-2000 and maintain thousands of troops along their shared border. Eritrea has supported the Islamist insurgency, as well as Ethiopian rebel groups, to keep the Ethiopian government destabilized and not positioned to invade Eritrea. Monitor for Eritrean support of Somali and Ethiopian insurgents/rebel groups as well as any aggression along the shared border.

Military:

• The U.S. Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) operates out of Djibouti. Lot of special forces and clandestine operations, but keep an eye out for any deployments or operations that make it to the open source.

• Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is the U.S.-led naval squadron conducting counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. There are also NATO and EU-led squadrons in addition to various deployments. The exact composition of the multinational series of groups is constantly in flux, but note specifically Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Indian and Pakistani additions to the operation. Note specifically shifts in operations, rules of engagement, tactics – specifically more aggressive measures. Also watch for changes in pirate behavior or any indications of an order-of-magnitude leap in their impact on shipping. (They are somewhat dependent on weather, so cyclical surges and lapses in ships captured are to be expected.) Additionally, if we begin to see indications that hostages aren't being treated reasonably well (for being held by Somali pirates), that will also be noteworthy.

• Watch for more advanced weaponry (e.g. anti-tank or surface-to-air missiles) slipping into Somalia.

Politics:

• Politics in Somalia are dominated by clan and business interests. The main clans in Somalia are the Hawiye and the Darood. The Hawiye are largely found in central Somalia while the Darood are found in northern Somalia, particularly in the Puntland region. Monitor for conflict between the clans, and conflict between sub-clans with politicians maneuvering to get positions. Governance doesn’t mean much in Somalia, in terms of delivering services or establishing notions of being in control. Governments of any stripe don’t have much sway, and rather compete against warlords and clans for influence and control.

• Politics in Ethiopia are dominated by the ruling regime’s need for security. Human rights and democracy are left by the wayside while Addis Ababa deals with domestic and foreign national security threats (Eritrea, Somalia). Monitor for how Addis Ababa manages its tight grip on power that has been criticized by human rights supporters and pro-democracy folks.

• Politics in Eritrea is driven by its national security concerns and fears. It maintains a militarized footing at home to quell any domestic opposition as well as to be ready in case Ethiopia ever tries to invade it. Monitor for Asmara’s grip on government at home and any tightening (or relaxing) of its militarized footing.

International relations:

• Somalia doesn’t have much of a foreign policy of its own, and is dominated by security interests of others. Somali factions will cooperate with or antagonize others to get support and attention. Monitor for how Somali factions work with or antagonize foreign governments (like the Somali government hyping the AQ connection to get the support of the US, or the Islamists hyping the involvement of the US and Ethiopia to get grassroots and jihadist support). Monitor for US, Ethiopian, Eritrean, Kenya, Russian, and Middle Eastern support or lack of support of the Somali government and Islamists.

• Ethiopian foreign relations are dominated by its national security concerns which are dominated by Eritrea and Somali concerns. Monitor its relations with Eritrea, Somalia, the United States, as well as secondary countries like Sudan, Kenya and European donors.

• Eritrea is somewhat isolated in terms of international relations, is sort of a pariah state due to its involvement in Somalia as well as its militarized posture. Monitor for who it relies on to get donor and military support.

Economy:

• The Somali economy is basically one big black market. Piracy is one part of it that is found in the northern Puntland region. Corruption, counterfeiting, smuggling and stealing relief supplies is another part. Monitor for means of the Somali government, warlords, and Islamists to finance their activities.

• The Ethiopian economy is largely agrarian (stuff like coffee) though they are also exploring for oil in the country’s Ogaden region. Ethiopia is also land-locked and is dependent on port facilities in Djibouti after having lots port facilities of its own when Eritrea became independent. Monitor for oil and gas exploration in the Ogaden.

• The Eritrean economy is largely agrarian, and the country is very poor. Monitor for developments in what little economic activity goes on there.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

• AFRICOM, the Pentagon command for Africa, launched in 2008, is currently headquartered in Stuggart, Germany. US officials wanted to locate it to Africa, but opposition in Africa has so far kept it in Germany.

• Watch for an actual headquarters basing decision, work on lillypads and other logistical preparations around the continent and other initiatives

• Monitor for training to disaster relief preparations -- being pushed by the command even before it establishes a presence on the continent.

• Monitor for US Navy deployments made under the Africa Partnership Station banner

• Monitor for US counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa based out of Djibouti, and counterterrorism operations in West Africa

Mid-rank Countries:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Security:

• The DRC government struggles to extend its writ across the entire country. As a result, distant regions/provinces are pretty autonomous and are subject to foreign interference. Eastern DRC is subject to Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan interference, while southern DRC is subject to Angolan and South African interference. Some of these countries support the DRC government while some oppose it. Monitor for foreign military activity and movements in the DRC, as well as DRC armed forces deployments.

Political issues:

• Governance is weak in the DRC but we need to monitor for how much autonomy the central government lets the distant provinces/regions have. In particular monitor relations between Kinshasa and the mineral-rich Katanga and Kasai regions of the south, as well as with the Kivu (North and South) provinces of the east.

International Relations:

• The DRC government is basically pretty weak and is subject to the interferences of foreign states. It will sell concessions to foreign governments and businesses to gain money which it uses to buy support as well as weapons. It has maintained friendly relations with Angola in particular (and with Zimbabwe, the US, China, and others) to support it and defend it. Relations with Rwanda and Uganda are strained, with those two countries in recent years supporting rebel groups to oppose Kinshasa. Monitor for movement in relations with Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, China, France, South Africa, the US, Belgium.

Economics:

• The DRC economy is driven by mineral extraction. Money generated by mineral extraction has been used by the DRC government to reinforce its influence and not to improve the lives of DRC citizens. Monitor for what mineral concessions are sold to whom (foreign countries/companies).

Cote d'Ivoire

Security:

• The country faces a low-level rebellion in the northern half of the country, as well as low-level unrest in the southern half and in the commercial capital, Abidjan. There are French and UN peacekeepers who monitor a ceasefire line across the middle belt of the country. Monitor the rebellion in the north, and unrest in the south and how the country’s security forces respond.

Political issues:

• There is a power sharing agreement between the southern-based party of President Laurent Gbagbo and the leader of the northern-based rebel New Forces, Guillaume Soro, who is now Prime Minister. Monitor for developments in the power sharing agreement (status/stability). There are a handful of opposition politicians, including a former president and a former prime minister, who will likely stand in presidential elections that may be held at the end of 2009. Those opposition politicians don’t have much in the way of a security/armed capability, and thus they may get undermined by the very security conscious president Gbagbo. Monitor for how the government undermines the opposition politicians, and how the opposition politicians maneuver to try to campaign.

• The Ivorian government has also been slow to extend citizenship documents to residents in the northern half of the country. The government argues that residents in the north are largely citizens of neighboring countries and thus do not justify Ivorian citizenship. At heart this is an issue manipulated by politicians for gaining or blocking votes. Monitor for how the Gbagbo government extends voter registration exercises in the north.

International Relations:

• The country keeps a pretty low profile internationally and is more occupied with internal issues. Monitor for what international developments they do do.

Economics:

• The Ivorian economy is largely agrarian, and it is the world’s #1 cocoa producer and is a significant coffee producer as well. Cocoa production largely takes place in the southern half of the country. Monitor for cocoa production, interruptions, movement of foreign investment or divestment.

Zimbabwe

Security:

• There is low-level unrest in Zimbabwe aimed at the government of President Robert Mugabe. So far the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party and its supporters have not acquired an armed capability. Weapons and the use of weapons remains a monopoly of the Mugabe government. Monitor for cracks in the country’s security establishment for whether security personnel may ever ignore the orders of the Mugabe government, join the opposition, permit the opposition to mobilize, or whether the MDC acquires an armed capability to try to oppose the Mugabe regime.

Political issues:

• There is a power sharing agreement in Zimbabwe between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). President Robert Mugabe leads ZANU-PF while Morgan Tsvangirai leads the MDC. There is a secondary, lesser MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara who holds the rank of deputy prime minister. The power sharing agreement does not equitably share power: ZANU-PF dominates the effective tools of power, such as the security, media, communications, and Reserve Bank portfolios, while the MDC holds soft power portfolios. Monitor for any shifts in power or changes in portfolios between ZANU-PF and MDC.

• ZANU-PF has its internal factions. Some are supportive of President Mugabe while some want to succeed him. None want to see the Tsvangirai-led MDC take over power. Monitor for developments and competition between ZANU-PF factions and maneuverings to succeed him.

International Relations:

• Zimbabwe is pretty dependent on foreign donors and governments for assistance and protection. Friendly governments include China, Namibia, Angola, the DR Congo, that the Mugabe regime can use to support themselves in power. Governments critical of the Mugabe regime include Kenya, Botswana, and most of the West (such as the US and UK). South Africa is on the fence, is not really supportive of Mugabe but is not supportive of Tsvangirai either. South Africa would prefer a change in leadership but not a regime change. Monitor for how South Africa influences Zimbabwe’s power sharing government and internal ZANU-PF maneuverings to succeed Mugabe. Monitor for whether South Africa presses for Mugabe to retire (perhaps including an offer of sanctuary in South Africa). Monitor for what relations ZANU-PF seek to defend/support themselves (like deploying troops in the DRC to defend the Congo government, in return for mineral concessions that the Mugabe regime uses to finance themselves).

Economy:

• The Zimbabwe economy is broken. Historically it is an agrarian economy (was the breadbasket of southern Africa), with other sectors including tourism, mining, and light manufacturing. Monitor for foreign investment, whether it picks up and in what sectors, in light of the power sharing government. Monitor for foreign development and humanitarian assistance that can be used to support or undermine political parties in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe government needs an estimated $100-150 million per month to operate, and is seeking $10 billion in infrastructure development assistance.

Kenya

Security:

• There is low-level unrest in Kenya between supporters of the two parties central to the government of national unity. Supporters between President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) have clashes over perks and distribution of power. Monitor for clashes, especially during the run-up to 2011 national elections.

• Kenya is concerned with the ongoing insurgency in neighboring Somalia. Kenya maintains security forces along its shared border with Somalia but has not intervened inside Somalia apart from maintaining an intelligence network. Monitor for Kenyan involvement in Somalia, its forces along the border, its support of the Somali government.

• Kenya has a significant Muslim population, found along its Indian Ocean coast. AQ terrorists hid here when they planned the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as hiding there when they carried out the 2002 attacks against an Israeli airliner and hotel in Mombasa. Monitor for AQ developments among the Kenyan Muslim population.

• Kenya is also a hub for smuggling in the region, particularly in and out of Somalia. Monitor for smuggling of weapons or other items that can be used by Somali Islamists to finance their insurgency.

Military:

• Kenya is going through some efforts to modernize its military a bit (e.g. buying old Soviet hardware through Ukraine). Keep an eye out for any further acquisitions, shifts in doctrine or other reforms.

Political issues:

• Kenya’s government of national unity is divided. There are issues between the Party of National Unity led by President Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement led by Prime Minister Raila Odinga over who should control what government portfolio. Currently they are only criticizing each other and are not acting out on their disagreements. Monitor for whether the disagreements turns to violence. There was considerable violence following national elections held in December 2007.

International Relations:

• Kenya was considered the dominant power in East Africa but this got compromised following the outbreak of violence after the December 2007 national elections. Kenya is climbing back out of that rut. Monitor for relations with neighboring countries especially Uganda and Tanzania, for how Kenya may try to ensure it remains the dominant power in the region and not see it lose its influence to those neighbors.

• Kenya was considered a critical partner of the United States in East Africa. This took a hit during the violence occurring in Kenya following the December 2007 elections. The US still relies on Kenya as a hub for East Africa regional activity. Monitor for US support (or lack thereof) of the Kenyan government and in particular factions of the Kenyan government, especially the Odinga-led ODM. As the country gears up for 2011 elections, monitor for whether the US pushes to see Odinga become president.

Economy:

• The Kenyan economy includes agriculture, light manufacturing, tourism, as well as being a hub for regional diplomatic, humanitarian, and supply chain activity. Visitors and investors stayed away during much of the first half of 2008 during violence that broke out following the December 2007 elections. Monitor for economic developments.

Sudan

Security:

• Sudan faces several security issues. One is conflict in the country’s Darfur region. There it faces a number of rebel groups, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). There are also factions of JEM and SLA. For its part, Sudan relies not only on its armed forces but some rebel groups of its own, including a Chadian rebel group called the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), and a tribal militia called the Janjaweed, to try to dominate Darfur. The Sudanese government needs to oppose the Darfur rebel groups so that those groups don’t get entrenched and compromise Sudanese control in other contested areas of the country. Monitor for conflict in Darfur and the shared border region with Chad. Monitor for rebel group movements outside of Darfur (whether JEM/SLA make a move towards Khartoum or other regions, like the south, or whether Khartoum-supported groups move deeper into Chad).

• Sudan faces another conflict in the southern part of the country. Khartoum fought a twenty+ year long war with southern Sudanese that culminated in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005. The CPA calls for a power sharing government in which Khartoum controls the presidency but the southerners get the vice presidency plus an autonomous government in the South. The CPA also calls for troop pullbacks, and the sharing of revenues from oil extracted in areas of overlap between the north and the south. Khartoum has been maneuvering to keep the upperhand over these agreements and revenues, though. The CPA also calls for national elections in 2009 and a referendum in the south in 2011 for whether the region should become independent. Monitor for relations between the north and the south, troop movements between the north and the south, oil revenue sharing, oil production, and national elections as well as the referendum on independence.

• Related to the security issue with the southern part of the country: Sudan and Uganda fought a proxy war to keep each other off balance. Uganda supported the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), the armed wing of the southerners, while Khartoum supported the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) based in northern Uganda, to keep Kampala off balance. That support, on both sides, has been reduced, but the SPLA and the LRA are still active. Monitor for support of those groups by the respective governments.

• There is a security concern in Khartoum city itself. Once in a while a terrorist attack occurs there, like the killing of a USAID worker in December 2007. Monitor for security issues in Khartoum.

• There is also the concern that Sudan harbors AQ. Monitor for linkages between the Khartoum government and AQ.

• There is a latent security threat from a rebel group called the Eastern Front, located in the country’s north-east along the Red Sea. A peace agreement currently holds with the Eastern Front. Monitor for any developments with that peace agreement.

• There is also a concern that Sudan is being used as a transshipment hub of weapons from Middle Eastern suppliers (possibly Iran) to Hezbollah. There were reports of an Iranian arms shipment being destroyed in the Sudanese desert by Israeli or American aircraft back in January. Monitor for weapons being smuggled through Sudan for Hezbollah or other militants.

• There is a concern for Darfur rebel groups attacking oil infrastructure in Sudan. JEM and SLA have in the past attacked Chinese sites in regions adjacent to Darfur. Monitor for rebel attacks against Sudanese oil infrastructure. Monitor for reactions by the Chinese (or other foreign oil operators) as for how they boost their own security capabilities (like bringing in Chinese security contractors) or by demanding more security guarantees from Khartoum.

Political issues:

• Political issues in Sudan are dominated by security concerns emanating from the country’s various regions. See above.

• The Sudanese government led by President Omar al Bashir must also take into consideration the interests of radical Islamists. Bashir came to power in coalition with radical Islamists, but broke from them in the late 1990s. Some radical Islamists oppose Bashir and would like to replace him and install a hardline Islamist government. Monitor for Bashir cooperation with radical Islamists – does he try to incorporate their interests in order to blunt this threat.

• Sudanese President Bashir is also under an indictment (over war crimes in Darfur) issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) based at The Hague. So far the Sudanese government has opposed any efforts to comply with the ICC indictment. Bashir has traveled abroad but only to “safe” countries that also would not comply with the ICC indictment. Monitor for developments regarding the ICC indictment and whether it leads to Bashir’s downfall. Monitor for whether the ICC indictment triggers a faction of the Sudanese government to overthrow Bashir.

International Relations:

• Khartoum seeks to maintain relations in two camps, Africa and the Middle East. Monitor for how it plays up its Islamist heritage in order to defend itself against domestic Islamists threats (for not being hardline enough).

• Sudan has strained relations particularly with Chad. Both support rebel groups in the shared border region between the two countries, rebel groups that are opposed to each other. Khartoum supports the Chadian rebel group UFDD (see above) to try to overthrow the Chadian government. Chad supports the JEM and SLA in Darfur to try to overthrow the Sudanese government. Monitor for support of the rebel groups between the two countries, and relations between the two governments to get an idea of the threat level between the two countries. About one a year one of the various rebel groups will launch a cross-country invasion against the other.

• Sudan has strained (but not to the degree of the Chadian relationship) relations with Ethiopia and Uganda. All around these countries have supported rebel groups aimed at toppling the respective regimes. Sudan supported the LRA against Uganda; Uganda supported the SPLA against Sudan; there was lose support of the Eastern Front by Ethiopia; Sudan loosely support the Oromo Liberation Front (and possibly the Ogaden National Liberation Front) against Ethiopia. Monitor for movement in relations with Ethiopia and Uganda.

• Sudan has sought strong commercial relations with China. In return for selling oil concessions to China, Sudan gets weapons supplies. China is probably Sudan’s #1 arms supplier. Monitor for movement in Sino-Sudanese relations.

• Sudan has had a strained relationship with the US. The US has criticized Sudan over Darfur, accusing it of conducting genocide there. The US is also concerned that Khartoum is harboring AQ operatives. The US has also worked with the Sudanese government to share intelligence on foreign jihadists fighting in Iraq and elsewhere. The US has also recently opened a consulate in the southern capital, Juba. Monitor for relations between Sudan and the US.

Economy

• Crude oil is the foundation for the Sudanese economy. There is also agriculture (including wheat farming) and light manufacturing. There are a number of international oil companies operating in Sudan, but popular pressure in the West has led to some Western oil companies to withdraw from fields in central Sudan. China has maintained and expanded their activity in Sudanese oil fields. The Southern Sudanese government wants to cut their own commercial deals (including oil concessions) with no involvement by Khartoum in areas under Southern influence. Monitor for movement in oil concessions in central Sudan (are the Chinese getting more active, or are Westerners returning?). Monitor for oil concessions or other economic deals struck in Southern Sudan (are Westerners going into Southern Sudan?). Monitor for other economic developments like large scale wheat farming for foreigners? Monitor for what the US is doing in terms of commercial deals with southern Sudan.

Chad

Security:

• There is a rebellion in eastern Chad that is supported by the Sudanese government. About once a year the Sudanese supported rebel group Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) will launch a cross-country raid aiming to overthrow the government of President Idriss Deby. Monitor for Chadian army movements as well as UFDD movements.

• The United Nations/European Union and France maintain a few thousand peacekeepers in central and eastern Chad. These peacekeepers do not directly protect the Deby government but indirectly they are a tripwire for the Deby government to monitor the movements and positions of the UFDD. France likely provides intelligence and advice to the Chadian army. Monitor for peacekeeper movements and developments.

Political issues:

• Politics in Chad are highly personalized and tribalized. President Deby comes from the Zaghawa tribe found in the border region between Chad and Sudan. Deby is not very popular but he doesn’t really care about that, as long as he maintains the upper hand in terms of security. Elections in Chad don’t really matter – regime change is through the barrel of a gun not the ballot box. Monitor for fractures within the Zaghawa for whether they’ll try to overthrow Deby. Monitor for factions within the army and whether they move to overthrow Deby.

International Relations:

• Core international relations are with Sudan, Libya, Nigeria, and France. Relations with Sudan are usually hostile. Relations with Libya are infrequently hostile, due to Libya wanting a greater role in regional affairs, as well as territorial expansion at the expense of Chad. Relations with Nigeria are cordial, with Nigeria viewing Chad as a weak government that falls within its zone of regional influence. Relations with France are uneasy but not necessarily strained. France is Chad’s former colonial power, and France maintains about a thousand troops in Chad. The Sarkozy government has said its troops are not in Chad to prop up the Deby government, but at the same time the French troops have provided intelligence and weaponry to the Chadian army when it has been threatened by the UFDD.

Economy:

• Chad is a very poor country and its only significant economic asset is oil found in the southern part of the country, around the town of Doba. Oil extracted there flows through a pipeline across Cameroon to an export terminal in the Gulf of Guinea. The revenues from the oil fields are tightly controlled by the Deby regime. Oil revenues don’t finance development but Deby’s grip on power. Monitor for how the Deby regime uses the oil revenues (buying more weapons?) as well as any developments in the oil sector.

• Once in a while the Deby government will crack down on the oil sector, imposing new regulations or overturning original agreements that established the oil sector, in order to extract more money to finance his grip on power. Monitor for regulatory developments on the Chadian oil sector.

Mali

Security:

• There is a low-level rebellion in northern Mali involving the country’s ethnic Tuareg population. There is also low-level conflict in northern Mali with elements of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) franchise that has been fighting in Algeria. Monitor these two conflicts separately and for any cooperation between the Tuareg and AQIM. The conflicts have largely been limited to the northern part of the country and against Malian government and military outposts. Monitor for any spread of this conflict.

• The U.S. has provided counterterrorism cooperation to the Malian government in the conflict with the Tuareg and AQIM. Monitor for US counterterrorism cooperation in Mali (and related cooperation with Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco).

Political issues:

• The Malian government is relatively decently run, but historically it has ignored anything to do with the northern part of the country, which includes the Tuareg population. This has led to a low-level rebellion by the Tuareg who believe they need to rebel to get what they want. The Malian government, based in the capital Bamako located far in the country’s south-west, simply did not have the money or attention to devote to anything occurring in the Sahara desert deep in the country’s north. Monitor for any developments between the Bamako-based government and the northern Tuareg.

International Relations:

• Mali tries to be unobtrusive in its international relations. It doesn’t have any hostile relations. It cooperates with the US, especially in terms of counterterrorism operations in the Sahara. It has good but not necessarily strategic relations with China and France (the latter the former colonial power). Monitor its relations with these countries.

Economy:

• The Malian economy has traditionally been agrarian (largely cotton-based) but there has been an uptick in gold mining interest in the country. A number of foreign mining companies, from South Africa to Australia to Canada, are active in Mali’s gold mining sector. Monitor for developments in Mali’s gold mining sector.

Equatorial Guinea

Security:

• Equatorial Guinea is run pretty much as a police state, with the government of President Teodoro Obiang paranoid about threats towards it. There was an unsuccessful coup against the Obiang government in 2004, in which South African mercenaries were hired. There may have been a coup attempt against Obiang in February 2009 when unknown gunmen attacked sites in Malabo. Obiang does not tolerate dissent, and opponents are exiled, killed or scared into submission. Monitor for coup threats and for movements among internal factions who could hire mercenaries to try to overthrow Obiang.

Political issues:

• Equatorial Guinea is run as a personal fiefdom by President Obiang and his family. Elections and governance doesn’t matter for Obiang – regime change would occur from the barrel of a gun. Monitor for how Obiang manages family relationships/dynamics within the regime rather than for social services he may or may not deliver.

International Relations:

• Equatorial Guinea doesn’t have rosy relations with anyone, but it has working relations with a number of governments including Nigeria, Angola, Spain, and the United States. Most foreign countries are interested in Equatorial Guinea’s oil and gas reserves. In addition to oil and gas interests, Nigeria is also interested in Equatorial Guinea as it falls within Nigeria’s zone of influence. U.S. energy companies are active in Equatorial Guinea and the US is interested in further developing the country’s oil and gas sector. Monitor US and Nigerian influence in Equatorial Guinea.

• President Obiang has been criticized in Europe and by human rights supporters of being dictatorial and corrupt. A French judge may investigate Obiang corruption in France. It’s not likely to lead to Obiang leaving power or adjusting his way of governing, but it will strain relations with France or other counties that may investigate him. Monitor for whether Obiang shifts preferences in international relations if he gets investigated (perhaps steering oil and gas concessions away from Europeans towards others like the Americans).

Economy:

• Oil and gas are the mainstays of the Equatorial Guinea economy. The oil and gas sectors are managed closely by President Obiang. Not much happens there without his approval. Monitor for developments in the oil and gas sector and which countries get concessions.

 

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