IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ...

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

________________________

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAY 5, 2008

No. 07-11404 ________________________

THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 05-01219-CV-2-TFM

MAXIE D. REEVES,

Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama _________________________

(May 5, 2008) Before BLACK, CARNES and COX, Circuit Judges. BLACK, Circuit Judge:

The question presented in this case is whether an award of attorney's fees granted under 28 U.S.C. ? 2412(d)(1)(A) belongs to the party or to the party's attorney. We conclude the statute unambiguously grants an award to the "prevailing party." Accordingly, we hold the award belongs, in the first instance, to the party and not the party's attorney. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the award in the instant case belonged to the prevailing party, Maxie D. Reeves, and could therefore be offset to pay Reeves' child support debt.

I. BACKGROUND Maxie D. Reeves filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Social Security challenging a denial of disability benefits. The district court reversed the denial and remanded Reeves' case back to the Social Security Administration for further administrative proceedings. As the prevailing party in the action, Reeves petitioned the district court for an award of attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. ? 2412(a) and (d). The Commissioner agreed Reeves was entitled to an EAJA award, and the district court awarded Reeves $4,201.83 for attorney's fees and expenses associated with the action. The Social Security Administration initiated payment of the award through the Department of the Treasury, which issued a check payable to Maxie D. Reeves.

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Reeves never received the check, however, because the Treasury Department diverted the entire payment to the Chilton County Department of Human Resources to offset an unpaid child support debt owed by Reeves.

Reeves filed a motion challenging the offset. He argued the EAJA award should not have been used to offset his personal debt because the award did not belong to him personally; rather, the award belonged to his attorney. The district court, relying on this Circuit's decision in Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988), determined the award in fact belonged to Reeves as the "prevailing party" under the EAJA, and concluded the award was therefore subject to offset. Reeves appealed.

On appeal, Reeves argues the district court erred as a matter of law when it determined the EAJA award belongs to the party. Reeves maintains the award belongs to his attorney and argues the offset of the award was therefore an unlawful offset because no mutuality of debt existed between the parties.

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II. DISCUSSION To resolve this appeal we must first interpret the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. ? 2412(d)(1)(A), in order to determine whether attorney's fees awarded under the EAJA are payable to Mr. Reeves or to his attorney. We must then decide whether those fees could be offset by the Treasury Department for Reeves' unpaid child support debt. A. Whether EAJA Attorney's Fees are Awarded to the Party or to the Party's Attorney. We review the district court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006). Statutory interpretation begins and ends with the text of the statute so long as the text's meaning is clear. CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 122225 (11th Cir. 2001). "[I]f the statute speaks clearly to the precise question at issue, we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-18, 122 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Where a statute is unambiguous "we need not, and ought not, consider legislative history." Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The EAJA contains a fee shifting device applicable in civil suits against the United States. The text of the statute provides "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . ., unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. ? 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). We conclude the statute's explicit reference to the "prevailing party" unambiguously directs the award of attorney's fees to the party who incurred those fees and not to the party's attorney. Accord Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2007).

Not only is our conclusion firmly rooted in the text of the statute, it parallels our prior interpretation of identical "prevailing party" language within the very same statute. See Panola, 844 F.2d at 1509-11. In Panola, we were called on to determine whether an attorney was eligible to apply for attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. ? 2412. See id.; 28 U.S.C. ? 2412(d)(1)(B) (indicating a "party" may apply for fees and expenses if they submit an application showing they are the "prevailing party"). Relying on the "straightforward `prevailing party' language in the EAJA," we held a party's former attorney had no right to intervene in an action for the purpose of seeking attorney's fees because the attorney was not the prevailing party. Id. at 1507, 1511-15. While the question of who receives the

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