To: Judge Walker D
EXHIBIT “A”
To: Judge Walker D. Miller,
Alfred A. Arraj United States Courthouse,
901 19th Street
Denver, Colorado 80294-3589
From: Charles F. Conces
9523 Pine Hill Dr.,
Battle Creek, Michigan 49017
Phone: 1-269-964-7025
Re: Criminal Complaint against Internal Revenue Service Operations Managers and U.S. Judges.
Dear Judge Miller:
I am hereby presenting this demand, along with many other Complainants and Witnesses, for the arrest of the named Conspirators involved in fraud and perpetrated against myself and the other Complainants. This Criminal Complaint is accompanied by various statements of authorities, and most importantly, providing Probable Cause for the arrest of the accused persons. My Oath Statement is also included. I am obligated by law to report these crimes.
18 USC Sec. 4. Misprision of felony:
“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.” MARBURY v. MADISON, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
FAILURE TO ACT
In the event that the Honorable Miller fails to act on this criminal complaint, and fails to report these allegations of crime to the Secretary of the Treasury, it shall be deemed to be a violation of 26 USC 7214 (8), and shall be reported to the U.S. House and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees. U.S. officials, who violate that statute, become subject to criminal penalties and removal from Office. I hereby make demand that you provide me with a copy of the letter that you send to the Secretary, as proof of your compliance with the law.
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, U.S. Treasury Department,
1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington D.C. 20220.
In the event that the Honorable Miller fails to act on this criminal complaint, and aids or relieves or gives comfort to the Accused Individuals, or prevents or hinders the apprehension, trial, or punishment of the said Accused Individuals, it shall be deemed to be a violation of 18 USC section 3. Any such violation of 18 USC section 3, shall be reported to the U.S. House and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees. U.S. officials, who violate that statute, become subject to criminal penalties and removal from Office.
18 USC Sec. 3. Accessory after the fact
“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or both; or if the principal is punishable by life imprisonment or death, the accessory shall be imprisoned not more than 15 years.”
In the event that the Honorable Miller fails to act on this criminal complaint, and aids or relieves or gives comfort to the Accused Individuals, or prevents or hinders the apprehension, trial, or punishment of the said accused individuals, it shall be deemed to be a violation of his Oath of Office, and as perjury on his Oath during the course of his official duties. Any such violation shall be reported to the U.S. House and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees. U.S. officials, who violate their Oath of Office, become subject to criminal penalties and removal from Office.
COOPER v. AARON, 358 U.S. 1 (1958):
“No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to support it. P. 18.”
In the event that the Honorable Miller fails to act on this criminal complaint, and acts in a manner that is violative of the Complainants’ Constitutional Protection against a Direct Un-apportioned Tax, the Honorable Miller will become subject to criminal and civil complaints in his personal capacity as stated by the United States Supreme Court:
SCHEUER v. RHODES, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974)
However, since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he
"comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 159-160. (Emphasis supplied.)
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
I, hereby, submit this criminal complaint to the Honorable Walker D. Miller, U.S. District Court judge, for the purpose of providing probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants and subsequent prosecution of the named accused.
NAMED ACCUSED
1) Dennis Parizek; Ogden Utah Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
2) Thomas Matthews, Ogden Utah Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
3) Scott B. Prentky, Ogden Compliance Center, IRS ACS,
4) Regina Owens; Cincinnati Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
5) C. Sherwood, Director, Payment Compliance, Cincinnati, Ohio 45999
6) Larry Leder; Holtsville, N.Y. Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
7) Timothy Towns; Ogden Utah Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
8) Jeffrey Eppler; Kansas City Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
9) Dan Myers; Cincinnati Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
10) Denise Bradley; Kansas City Operations Manager, IRS ACS,
11) Stephen P. Warner; Kansas City Operations Manager, IRS ACS, and
12) Susan Meredith; Fresno Operations Manager/Kansas City Operations Manager, IRS ACS.
13) R. Job (R. Johnson); Fresno Operations Manager, IRS ACS.
ADDITIONAL NAMED ACCUSED
14) Magistrate Judge Joseph Scoville, U.S. District Court of Western Michigan, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Joseph Scoville is accused on Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 13.
15) Judge David W. McKeague, U.S. District Court of Western Michigan, Lansing, Michigan. Judge McKeague is accused on Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 13.
16) Judge Robert H. Bell, U.S. District Court of Western Michigan, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Judge Bell is accused on Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 13.
LACK OF IMMUNITY
All of the Named Accused are being named in their personal capacities by reason of fraud allegations. Fraud is not an official function of a government or private individual. It is an act outside of the official capacity of the Named Accused.
“Sovereign immunity does not shield individual United States officials in their individual, as opposed to their official capacities”; Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr, 952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).
“The principal of sovereign immunity is not one which allows the sovereign to continue to inflict injury.... [sovereign immunity] does not give the sovereign the right to totally disregard the effect of it¹s actions upon the public.”² Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P2d 1037.
“Sovereign immunity does not apply where (as here) government is a lawbreaker or jurisdiction is the issue.” Arthur v. Fry, 300 F.Supp. 622 (1960).
“Knowing failure to disclose material information necessary to prevent statement from being misleading, or making representation despite knowledge that it has no reasonable basis in fact, are actionable as fraud under law.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 1990.
“Party in interest may become liable for fraud by mere silent acquiescence and partaking of benefits of fraud.” Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 1994.
AUTHORITIES AND DUTY OF THE JUDGE
Duties and Authority 1
26 USC 7214 (8) requires the judge to report the accused IRS Operations Managers to the Secretary of the Treasury, in writing. The Operations Managers, who have acted in fraud, have damaged and injured the integrity of the United States and have damaged the Constitution and laws of the United States and have committed perjury on their Oaths of Office.
26 USC 7214- criminal offenses by IRS agents:
“IRC Sec.7214. Offenses by officers and employees of the United States
“(a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents
“Any officer or employee of the United States-- (8) who, having knowledge or information of the violation of any revenue law by any person, or of fraud committed by any person against the United States under any revenue law, fails to report, in writing, such knowledge or information to the Secretary… shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”
The Honorable Miller, as an agent of the state, cannot claim good faith if he delays the implementation of complainants’ constitutional rights
“The petitioners stand in this litigation as the agents of the State, and they cannot assert their good faith as an excuse for delay in implementing the respondents' constitutional rights, when vindication of those rights has been rendered difficult or impossible by the actions of other state officials. Pp. 15-16.” COOPER v. AARON, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Duties and Authority 2
Duty to report crimes and issue arrest warrants and consequent failure to do so:
TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 3. Accessory after the fact:
“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or both; or if the principal is punishable by life imprisonment or death, the accessory shall be imprisoned not more than 15 years.”
The Honorable Miller must avoid delays, which relieves or gives comfort to the Named Accused and must promptly see to the apprehension, and the posting of bonds by the Named Accused, or it shall be construed that the Honorable Miller has become an “accessory after the fact”.
Duties and Authority 3
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4:
Rule 4: Arrest Warrants
“If the complaint establishes probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to execute it.”
The Honorable Miller must issue arrest warrants on the Named Accused since probable cause is established by affidavits and sufficient pleadings.
Duties and Authorities 4
18 USC Sec. 3061. Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel:
“Postal Inspectors and other agents of the United States Postal Service designated by the Board of Governors to investigate criminal matters related to the Postal Service and the mails may--
(1) serve warrants and subpoenas issued under the authority of the United States.”
The Honorable Miller must report the postal violations to the Postmaster General of the United States, under 18 USC section 4, in order that an investigation be initiated by the Postmaster General.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
18 USC Sec. 3231. District courts.
“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
“ Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.”
“PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERALS” and PUBLIC INTEREST
The Supreme Court also held that, “[t]his and other federal courts have repeatedly held that individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as “representatives of the public interest.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968)
By common consent, the complainants may choose a “private attorney general” from among themselves or act individually as “private attorney generals”, and that such person(s) have standing in this criminal action if the DOJ attorneys do not have the inclination or time to prosecute the Named Accused. The complainants or litigants, hereby claim the status of “representatives of the public interest” in addition to the status as complainants.
WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE
Sec. 3482. Evidence and witnesses--(Rule)
See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
“Competency and privileges of witnesses and admissibility of evidence governed by principles of common law, Rule 26.”
PROBABLE CAUSE
COUNT ONE – 18 USC 1346
Fraud and conspiracy of silence. 18 USC 1346.
“18 USC Sec. 1346. Definition of ``scheme or artifice to defraud''
“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ``scheme or artifice to defraud'' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”
Fraud
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately refused to respond to all inquiries into the authority and actions of IRS agents who willfully and knowingly committed acts of fraud and entered false and fraudulent information into IRS computer systems concerning alleged liability and alleged debts owed to the United States, thereby criminally subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. See U.S. vs. Tweel and other case law.
“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking behavior by the IRS. Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the taxpayer and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government in its enforcement and collection activities.” U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932.
Fraud: “Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so intended, by inducing him to part with property or surrender some legal right. 23 Am J2d Fraud § 2. Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a word, silence, the suppression of the truth, or other device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. 23 Am J2d Fraud § 2. An affirmation of a fact rather than a promise or statement of intent to do something in the future. Miller v Sutliff, 241 111 521, 89 NE 651.”
COUNT TWO – 18 USC 242
Deprivation of Constitutional protection against an “un-apportioned” direct tax.
18 USC Sec. 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law.
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
Depriving Complainants of Constitutional Protection Against an Un-apportioned Direct Tax.
(a) The above Accused Operations Managers have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately, under color of law, deprived complainants of the Constitutional protection against a direct tax which must be “apportioned” and refused to respond to all inquiries into said Constitutional deprivation and inquiries into actions of IRS agents who willfully and knowingly entered false and fraudulent information into IRS computer systems concerning alleged liability and alleged debts owed to the United States, thereby criminally subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. See attached Brief and Internal Revenue Manual reference. Subordinates and Operations Managers refused to follow Supreme Court decisions quoted repeatedly by the complainants. (See Brief On Taxation)
Internal Revenue manual 4.10.7.2.9.8 (05-14-1999): “Importance of Court Decisions
1. “Decisions made at various levels of the court system are considered to be interpretations of tax laws and may be used by either examiners or taxpayers to support a position.
2. “Certain court cases lend more weight to a position than others. A case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court becomes the law of the land and takes precedence over decisions of lower courts. The Internal Revenue Service must follow Supreme Court decisions. For examiners, Supreme Court decisions have the same weight as the Code.”
The Named Accused attempted to create a false presumption that debts were owed by the Complainants and other citizens, using an artifice of fraud to escape the Constitutional restriction against a direct un-apportioned tax.
"It is apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions." Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239. [357 U.S. 513, 527].
Depriving State Workers of Constitutional Protections
(b) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately, under color of law, deprived state workers of the Constitutional protection against a direct tax which must be “apportioned” and refused to respond to all inquiries into said Constitutional deprivation and inquiries into actions of IRS agents who willfully and knowingly entered false and fraudulent information into IRS computer systems concerning alleged liability and alleged debts owed to the United States, thereby criminally subjecting state workers to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses.
“Pollock merely represented one application of the more general rule that neither the Federal nor the State Governments could tax income an individual directly derived from any contract with another government. 10 Not only was it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to tax a bondowner on the interest he or she received on any state bond, but it was also unconstitutional to tax a state employee on the income earned from his employment contract, Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), to tax a lessee on income derived from lands leased from a State, Burnet v. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. 393 (1932), or to impose a sales tax on proceeds a vendor derived from selling a product to a state agency, Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).” SOUTH CAROLINA v. BAKER, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
Passing False Information To State Governments
(c) The above Accused Operations Managers have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately, under color of law, deprived complainants of the Constitutional protection against a direct tax which must be “apportioned”, and refused to respond to all inquiries into said Constitutional deprivation and inquiries into actions of IRS agents, who willfully and knowingly entered false and fraudulent information into IRS computer systems concerning alleged liability and alleged debts owed to the United States, and turning over such false and fraudulent information to state governments, and thereby causing state governments to act on such false information, thereby subjecting complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses.
“We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was recognized, explained, and applied in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)”, GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Depriving Complainants of the Protections of Law.
(d) The above Accused Operations Managers and Magistrate Judge Joseph Scoville, Judge Robert H. Bell, and Judge David W. McKeague have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately, under color of law, deprived complainants of the protections of law. See Exhibit “A”.
28 USCS Sec. 455, and Marshall v Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980): "The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decision making process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 -262, 266-267 (1978). The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law."
COUNT THREE – 18 USC 1341
Mail Fraud
CHAPTER 63—MAIL FRAUD
Sec. 1341. Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Sending False Documents Through The U.S. Mail With Intent To Defraud
(a) The above Accused Operations Managers have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately sent false documents through the U.S. Mail system, containing false and malicious allegations of liability and alleged debts owed by the complainants to the United States (fraudulent notices of lien and fraudulent notices of levy and other threatening and intimidating information based on false allegations), thereby criminally subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses.
COUNT FOUR – 18 USC 242
Denial of Due Process
18 USC Sec. 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
Depriving Complainants Of Constitutional Due Process.
(a) The above Accused Operations Managers and Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge David McKeague, have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately and under color of law and regulations, deprived complainants of Due Process guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, concerning the collection of alleged debts and alleged liability for a direct tax without “apportionment” (see Brief On Taxation), thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses, including ill health and resultant deaths of family members.
“`[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.”’” Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)).
Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (Ore. 1930): “The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individual’s rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed.”
Jack Cole Co. v. MacFarland, 337 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (Tenn. 1960): “Realizing and receiving income or earnings is not a privilege that can be taxed.” “Since the right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every person, this right cannot be taxed as a privilege.”
The above named Accused filled out or caused subordinates to fill out 1040 forms (subornation of perjury), under the name of the complainants and other citizens, which is not authorized by regulations, calling it a “substitute return”. These bogus 1040 forms are then used to falsely create an “assessment” on the complainants and other citizens. It is a well known principle of law that no citizen can be forced to sign any document under penalty of perjury. Such documents must be signed freely and without coercion.
“Our income tax system is voluntary and the Internal Revenue Service must perforce rely on the self assessment of the taxpayer.” In Re Smitt 140 B.R. 571 (1992)
Depriving Complainants Of Administrative Due Process Procedures.
(b) The above Accused Operations Managers, did not follow Internal Revenue Manual procedures in the collection, levy, lien, and seizure of property against the complainants, thereby bypassing due process of law. See Exhibit “A”.
Refusing To Verify Complainants Liability.
(c) The above Accused Operations Managers, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately and under color of law, have refused to verify the alleged liability for the alleged debt owed, thereby bypassing due process of law.
Internal Revenue Manual 5.10.1.3.1 (01-01-2003): Verifying the Liability.
1. In order to verify the liability, the revenue officer should confirm during taxpayer contact that the taxpayer understands the assessment. If the taxpayer does not understand the assessment, the revenue officer should explain the assessment and address any concerns the taxpayer has.
If the taxpayer claims the assessment is incorrect or has additional information that could impact the balance due, the case should be thoroughly investigated and the issue resolved prior to proceeding with enforcement action. The case history should be documented to reflect any concerns raised by the taxpayer and the steps taken to address them.
Unlawful Bank Deposit Seizures.
(d) The above Accused Operations Managers have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately and under color of law, made seizures of bank deposits without a court order in violation of due process under 26 USC 6332 (c). The above Accused Operations Managers issued or filed fraudulent “notices of levy”, but without actual levies as perfected under form 668-B, thereby bypassing due process of law. See Exhibit “C” for form 668-B and Court ruling.
Special rule for banks
“Any bank (as defined in section 408(n)) shall surrender (subject to an attachment or execution under judicial process) any deposits (including interest thereon) in such bank only after 21 days after service of levy.”
Internal Revenue Manual 5.11.1.1.2 (01-19-1999) Notice of Levy vs. Seizure: “There is no legal distinction between levy and seizure.”
Unlawful Seizure Of Annuities Payments.
(e) The Accused Operations Managers have violated the law prohibiting general seizures of annuities provided for the retirements of military and other persons, thereby bypassing due process of law.
Title 10 Chapter 73 Sec. 1440. – “Annuities not subject to legal process. Except as provided in section 1437(c)(3)(B) of this title, no annuity payable under this subchapter is assignable or subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.”
In Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). The U.S. Supreme Court in an unanimous decision written by Justice Blackmun said:
" Our holding also gives full and appropriate effect to ERISA's goal of protecting pension benefits. See 29 U.S.C. 1001 (b) and (c). This Court has described that goal as one [504 U.S. 753, 765} of ensuring that, " if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement - and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit - he actually will receive it." Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980). In furtherance of these principals, we recently declined in Guidry, notwithstanding strong equitable considerations to the contrary, to recognize an implied exception to ERISA's antialienation provision that would have allowed a labor union to impose a constructive trust on the pension benefits of a corrupt union official. We explained: "Section 206 (d) reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners ( and their dependents, who may be, and usually are, blameless ), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task" 493 U.S., at 376."
Issuance of Fraudulent Assessments Without Lawful Due Process.
(f) The Accused Operations Managers routinely issue fraudulent assessments on the Complainants without a return, without a 23C Assessment Certificate, without a verified amount, without a date, and without a signature, thereby bypassing due process of law.
CFR Sec. 301.6203-1 Method of assessment. “The amount of the assessment shall, in the case of tax shown on a return by the taxpayer, be the amount so shown, and in all other cases the amount of the assessment shall be the amount shown on the supporting list or record. The date of the assessment is the date the summary record is signed by an assessment officer.”
“…A signature requirement protects the taxpayer by ensuring that a responsible officer has approved the assessment…”, CURLEY v. U.S., Cite as 791 F. Supp 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
Internal Revenue Manual 3(17)(63)(14).1: (2) All tax assessments must be recorded on Form 23C Assessment Certificate. The Assessment Certificate must be signed by the Assessment Officer and dated. The Assessment Certificate is the legal document that permits collection activity…
Due Process Violation By Entering False Information Into Computer Systems
(g) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately entered false information into the Internal Revenue computer system, falsely indicating that 26 USC 6331 authorized levy and lien on the complainants, thus depriving complainants of due process, and deliberately omitting any reference to 26 USC 6331, paragraph “a”, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. See Exhibit “A”.
Illegally Bypassing Levy Requirements
(h) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately issued “notices of levy” and seized property without filling out the form 668-B, which is the procedure to perfect levies. See Exhibit “C”.
COUNT FIVE – 31 USC SECTION 0.208
Falsification Of Official Records and
Making false, misleading, or ambiguous statements.
TITLE 31—MONEY AND FINANCE: TREASURY
PART 0—DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT
Subpart B—Rules of Conduct
Sec. 0.208 Falsification of official records.
Employees shall not intentionally make false, misleading or ambiguous statements, orally or in writing, in connection with any matter of official interest. Matters of official interest include among other things: Transactions with the public, government agencies or fellow employees; application forms and other forms that serve as a basis for appointment, reassignment, promotion or other personnel action; vouchers; leave records and time and attendance records; work reports of any nature or accounts of any kind; affidavits; entry or record of any matter relating to or connected with an employee’s duties; and reports of any moneys or securities received, held or paid to, for or on behalf of the United States.
Falsifying Of Official Records Concerning Liability
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately entered false information into the Internal Revenue computer system, falsely indicating that the complainants were liable for and owed a debt to the United States (see Brief On Taxation). The nature of said false information claimed that Complainants were liable and owed an individual income tax, which is an un-apportioned direct tax and which is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, thereby criminally subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses.
Falsifying Of Official Records Concerning Implementing Regulations
(b) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately entered false information into the Internal Revenue computer system, falsely indicating that the complainants were liable for an alleged tax that had no implementing regulation and statute in the laws of the United States, thereby subjecting the Complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses.
“The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other. The charges in the information are founded on 1304 and its accompanying regulations, and the information was dismissed solely because its allegations did not state an offense under 1304, as amplified by the regulations. When the statute and regulations are so inextricably intertwined, the dismissal must be held to involve the construction of the statute.” UNITED STATES v. MERSKY, 361 U.S. 431 (1960).
“Under the Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe by regulation certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements for banks and other financial institutions in this country. Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of the issues raised by the parties, we think it important to note that the Act’s civil and criminal penalties attach only upon violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone.” CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. V. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
See also United States v. Wayte, 549 F.Supp. 1376, 1385 (C.D.Cal. 1982) (“the defendant’s argument that the court should view the applicable statute, regulations and proclamation as one statutory scheme is well founded”).
Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981): “Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation,” 644 F.2d, at 1383.
Falsifying Of Official Records Concerning Statutes At Large
(c) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately entered false information into the Internal Revenue computer system, falsely indicating that the complainants were liable for an alleged tax that had no Statute At Large or implementing regulation for the collection of the alleged debts, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. The above Accused have refused to provide any statute at large which authorizes collections on private citizens, working for private companies.
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981) held:
"All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge of the Statutes-at-Large....[I]t is well established that anyone who deals with the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority," 650 F.2d, at 1100.
Falsifying Of Official Records Concerning 26 USC 6331 (a)
(d) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately entered false information into the Internal Revenue computer system, falsely indicating that 26 USC 6331 authorized levy and lien on the Complainants, and deliberately omitting any reference to 26 USC 6331 (a), thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. See Exhibit “A”.
On 6331; Purpose – “This section was enacted to subject salaries of federal employees to same collection procedures as are available against all other taxpayers, including employees of a state.” Sims v US, W. Va. 1959, 79 S. Ct. 641, 359 US 108, and 3 L. Ed. 2d 667.
Acceding To And Aiding Falsified Records
(e) The above Accused Judges have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately acceded to and aided the entering of false information into the Internal Revenue computer system by the Operations Managers, by refusal or failure to uphold the laws of the United States and the Constitution of the United States, thereby subjecting the Complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. See Exhibit “A”.
COUNT SIX – 18 USC section 242
Conspiring to oppress, threaten, and intimidate.
Sec. 241. Conspiracy against rights
“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
“ If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured—
“ They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”
Conspiring Against Complainants’ Due Process.
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately, under color of law, statute, and regulation, conspired among themselves to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate the complainants, and to deprive complainants of Constitutional protections of Due Process by refusal to answer Constitutional issues presented by the complainants, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses, and in some cases causing ill health that led to death. Said conspiracy was aimed at a deprivation of rights secured by law to all.
“The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.” GRIFFIN v. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, (1971).
Conspiring To Refuse To Correct Erroneous Records.
(b) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately refused to correct erroneous records that were entered into IRS computer systems.
Conspiring Against Complainants In The Exercise Of Constitutional Rights.
(c) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately, under color of law, conspired to injure, hinder, and oppress the complainants, exercising a constitutionally guaranteed protection against a direct un-apportioned tax on their labor and rights. (See Brief)
Conspiring To Deny Remedies To Complainants.
(d) The above Accused, including Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge McKeague, have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately conspired among themselves to refuse to remedy wrongs and correct subordinates who cause such violations. (See Brief On Taxation)
“…defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.” (Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988).
Conspiring To Harrass
(e) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately conspired among themselves to intimidate, threaten, oppress, and harass the Complainants by using devious and malicious methods of communication. Such malicious methods have included false, misleading, and threatening statements sent from multiple Automated Collections Service Centers, in violation of the Internal Revenue Service’s stated policy of using “One Stop Service Providers” to answer questions of the complainants. Such malicious methods included sending out unsigned letters in violation of precedence law and in violation of Internal Revenue manual directives. Such malicious methods included the refusal to respond to correspondences of complainants. Such malicious methods included providing only a phone number by which to communicate, and subsequently hanging up the phone on complainants when a liability issue was brought up. Such malicious methods included the “Taxpayer Advocate” office refusing to assist or provide any help in the resolution of problems. Complainants will testify to the truth of the allegations and will provide documentation at the appropriate time.
COUNT SEVEN – 26 USC 7214 (a) (1)
Willful extortion and oppression under color of law
26 USC 7214- criminal offenses by IRS agents:
IRC Sec.7214. Offenses by officers and employees of the United States
a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents
Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States—(1) who is guilty of any extortion or willful oppression under color of law shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
Extortion and Willful Oppression of Complainants
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately committed acts of extortion and willful oppression of the complainants’ rights under “color of law”, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. The above Accused have sent threatening letters to employers, banks, etc. using fraudulent statements to induce employers, banks, etc. to surrender property or rights of the complainants, whereby, under illegal implicit or explicit threats to those institutions, the above accused were able to accomplish extortion from, and oppression of, the complainants. IRS Operations Managers have made fraudulent threats to complainants’ employers that penalties would be laid on the employer if the employer did not comply with reporting requirements.
“Under current law, IRS does not have statutory authority to impose a penalty to enforce employer compliance with the reporting requirement. The reporting requirement was promulgated in Treasury regulations.” GAO report of September 15, 2003 to Congressman, Elton Gallegly, by James R. White, Director, Strategic Issues.
(b) Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge McKeague assisted the Operations Managers in said extortion and oppression of complainant’s rights by refusing to oppose such actions.
COUNT EIGHT – VIOLATION OF 26 USC 7214 (a) (2)
Demanding Of Sums Other Than Or Greater Than Authorized By Law.
26 USC 7214- criminal offenses by IRS agents:
IRC Sec.7214. Offenses by officers and employees of the United States
“(a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents
“Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States—
“(2) who knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law, or receives any fee, compensation, or reward, except as by law prescribed, for the performance of any duty --- shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution.”
Demanding Sums Not Authorized By Law
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately demanded sums not authorized by law and sums greater than those authorized by law, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and illness sometimes leading to death. See Brief.
Unlawful Seizures
(b) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately levied and seized private pensions, military retirement benefits, and social security payments in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court directive and ruling, and in violation of the Social Security laws.
In Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). The U.S. Supreme Court in a unanimous decision written by Justice Blackmun said:
“ Our holding also gives full and appropriate effect to ERISA’s goal of protecting pension benefits. See 29 U.S.C. 1001 (b) and (c). This Court has described that goal as one [504 U.S. 753, 765} of ensuring that, “ if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement – and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit – he actually will receive it.” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980). In furtherance of these principals, we recently declined in Guidry, notwithstanding strong equitable considerations to the contrary, to recognize an implied exception to ERISA’s antialienation provision that would have allowed a labor union to impose a constructive trust on the pension benefits of a corrupt union official. We explained: “Section 206 (d) reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners ( and their dependents, who may be, and usually are, blameless ), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task” 493 U.S., at 376.”
COUNT NINE – 26 USC 7214 (a) (7)
Willfully Making And Signing Fraudulent Statements And Entries
26 USC 7214- criminal offenses by IRS agents:
IRC Sec.7214. Offenses by officers and employees of the United States
a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents
Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States—(7) who makes or signs any fraudulent entry in any book, or makes or signs any fraudulent certificate, return, or statement; shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution.
Making And Signing False Documents And Statements
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately conspired among themselves to make and sign fraudulent statements, e.g. fraudulent “notices of lien and levy”, without an actual lien or levy having been perfected, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. The above Accused signed documents containing false information, such as notices of lien and notices of levy, and other documents sent to the complainants.
(b) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately conspired among themselves to make and sign fraudulent statements, e.g. fraudulent “penalties”, thereby subjecting the complainants to endless harassment, threats of levies, property seizures, notices of liens, public humiliation, intimidation, interference with normal business transactions, slander, and other serious unwarranted abuses. The above Accused signed documents containing false information, i.e. penalties that had no implementing regulations, and other documents sent to the complainants.
“The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other. The charges in the information are founded on 1304 and its accompanying regulations, and the information was dismissed solely because its allegations did not state an offense under 1304, as amplified by the regulations. When the statute and regulations are so inextricably intertwined, the dismissal must be held to involve the construction of the statute.” UNITED STATES v. MERSKY, 361 U.S. 431 (1960).
“Under the Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe by regulation certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements for banks and other financial institutions in this country. Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of the issues raised by the parties, we think it important to note that the Act’s civil and criminal penalties attach only upon violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone.” CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. V. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
COUNT TEN – 26 USC 7214 (a) (8)
Willful Failure To Report Fraud
IRC Sec.7214. Offenses by officers and employees of the United States
Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents
Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States—(8) who, having knowledge or information of the violation of any revenue law by any person, or of fraud committed by any person against the United States under any revenue law, fails to report, in writing, such knowledge or information to the Secretary; shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution.
Refusal To Report Fraud And Violations Of Law
(a) The above Accused, including Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge McKeague, have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately refused to report fraud and violations of the Internal Revenue laws by subordinates or other employees or agents of the United States, to the Secretary of the Treasury in writing. These subordinate have been reported to the named Accused Operations Managers repeatedly by complainants. Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge McKeague were notified of these criminal actions in previous communications. Complainants are prepared to give testimony and evidence to such effect. See Exhibits “A”, “B”, and “C” for violations.
COUNT ELEVEN – BANK FRAUD
Willfully Executing and Attempting To Execute
Schemes and Artifices of Bank Fraud.
TITLE 18 Section 1344 . Bank fraud
“Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”
Schemes And Artifices
(a) The above Accused have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately conspired among themselves to execute and to attempt to execute schemes and artifices to obtain money and funds under the custody and control of financial institutions by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations. The above Accused did issue false notices of levy to banks and other financial institutions, without a court order as required by 26 USC 6332 (c).
26 USC 6332 (c) Special rule for banks;
“Any bank (as defined in section 408(n)) shall surrender (subject to an attachment or execution under judicial process) any deposits (including interest thereon) in such bank only after 21 days after service of levy.”
Extortion
(b) The above Accused IRS Operations Managers, under color of law, did obtain moneys, funds, and other assets, under extortionist threats to financial institutions, by means of fraudulent “notices of levy”, without an actual levy having been perfected with form 668-B, as required by court rule and law. See Exhibit “C” for Court ruling and form 668-B.
COUNT TWELVE
Accessory After The Fact
18 USC Sec. 3. Accessory after the fact:
“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or both; or if the principal is punishable by life imprisonment or death, the accessory shall be imprisoned not more than 15 years.”
Relieving, Comforting, and Assisting Offenders
(a) The above Accused, including Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge McKeague, have knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately relieved, comforted, or assisted perpetrators of fraud, as listed in the above Counts, in order to hinder or prevent the apprehension, trial, and punishment of said perpetrators.
COUNT THIRTEEN
PERJURY
18 USC Sec. 1621. Perjury generally
Whoever--
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.
Perjury On Oaths of Office
(a) The above Accused, including Judge Scoville, Judge Bell, and Judge McKeague, have taken an Oath to Uphold the Laws and the Constitution of the United States during their terms of Office or employment, and thereafter knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and deliberately committed acts in violation of their Oaths of Office during the course of their official duties and thereby perjured their Oaths.
COUNT FOURTEEN
Subornation Of Perjury
Sec. 1622. Subornation of perjury
Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(a) The above Accused Operations Managers have knowingly, willingly, maliciously, and deliberately attempted to procure and have, in fact, procured false statements, under threat of serious financial and familial harm, from complainants and other citizens, under penalty of perjury. Such perjury being the false statements being compelled under serious threat, to fill out W-4 forms as a condition of employment or in a manner that requires such employees to commit perjury, and threatening employers that do not seize employees’ money, sometimes at rates of 85% of the employee’s paycheck, with penalties not authorized by law.
“The court held it unconstitutional, saying: 'The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he will. He may select not only his employer, but also his associates.” COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
“any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer, who shall require any employee, or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into an agreement, either written or verbal, …or shall threaten any employee with loss of employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any employee . . . is hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof . . . shall be punished for each offense by a fine…”. COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
(b) The above Accused Operations Managers have knowingly, willingly, maliciously, and deliberately attempted to procure and have, in fact, procured false statements, under threat of serious financial and familial harm, from complainants, under penalty of perjury. Such perjury being the false statements and/or documents being compelled under serious threat, to fill out or cause subordinates to fill out 1040 forms under the name of the Complainants and other citizens, which is not authorized by regulations, calling it a “substitute return”. These bogus 1040 forms are then used to falsely create an “assessment” on the complainants and other citizens. It is a well known principle of law that no citizen can be forced to sign any document under penalty of perjury. Such documents must be signed freely and without coercion.
“Our income tax system is voluntary and the Internal Revenue Service must perforce rely on the self assessment of the taxpayer.” In Re Smitt 140 B.R. 571 (1992)
COMPLAINANTS’ AND WITNESSES” STATEMENTS AND SIGNATURES
This criminal complaint contains multiple allegations and complainants will submit affidavits and evidence to support this criminal complaint. The complainants are entitled to know the findings and conclusions of the Court.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORTS AUTHORITY et al., certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit. No. 01-46. Argued February 25, 2002—Decided May 28, 2002:
“The proceedings are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitutes the exclusive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.” Ibid. (citations omitted).”
Signed this date: ____________, 2005
Signature _______________________________
Printed Name: Charles F. Conces
Notary statement: The above signed has properly identified himself and has signed in my presence.
Exhibit “A”
The Operations Managers are the persons in charge of the Automated Collection Service. They are responsible to make corrections to the records kept by them and they are also responsible for notifying IRS agents who illegally misapply the law or violate the protections of law. They have refused to answer complainants’ repeated notification of these violations and have refused to make the necessary corrections.
26 USC 6331 (a), Levy may not be made on private individuals. See Exhibit “B” and Brief. Paragraph (a) does not state that Levy may be made on all U.S. citizens.
RUSSELLO v. UNITED STATES, 464 U.S. 16 (1983):"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972). See United States v. Wooten, 688 F.2d 941, 950 (CA4 1982).
The Operations Managers have levied pensioners in violation of 26 USC 6331 (a):
“We explained: "Section 206 (d) reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners ( and their dependents, who may be, and usually are, blameless ), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task" 493 U.S., at 376." Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
26 USC 6332 (c), Levy may not be made on bank deposits without a court order.
26 USC 6331 (h), Continuing levies are limited to 15% of each pay period.
26 USC 6330 (a), “Intent to levy notice” is often not done before seizure.
26 USC 6330 (c) (2) (A) requires investigation of challenges to underlying tax liability. IRS agents routinely refuse to even consider such challenges.
26 USC 6330 (c) (3) (A), Appeals officers routinely do not verify that the tax liability investigation was ever done.
26 USC 6330 (c) (3) (B), Appeals officers routinely do not even consider the arguments and claims by the person appealing.
26 USC 3401 (c), Definition of “employee” is misapplied, as including all employees in the United States. These definitions limit the scope of application of the W-4 form to said defined “employees” in 26 USC 3401 – 3406.
(c) Employee
“For purposes of this chapter, the term ``employee'' includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ``employee'' also includes an officer of a corporation.”
GOULD v. GOULD , 245 U.S. 151 (1917): “In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen. United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 , 12 S. Sup. Ct. 55; Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38, 55 , 24 S. Sup. Ct. 189.”
Michigan Attorney General’s Opinion No. 6628 which states, “… it is a common maxim of statutory construction that ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius,’ express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.”
RUSSELLO v. UNITED STATES, 464 U.S. 16 (1983):"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972). See United States v. Wooten, 688 F.2d 941, 950 (CA4 1982).
26 USC 6331 (h), IRS agents violate the definition of “specified payments” and misapply the law as to include any payment by any private or state agency. See Russello v. United States, 464 US 16, 23.
Exhibit “B”
Two letters from U.S. Congressmen verifying that levies may not be applied to private individuals working for private companies under 26 USC 6331.
Exhibit “C”
Form 668-B, showing the actual form for the perfection of levy and the attendant requirements.
"Under the 1939 Code, effective with respect to distraint and seizure and sale actions prior to January 1, 1955, levy or distraint on personal or real property in the possession of a taxpayer was authorized by a signed Warrant for Distraint, Form 69, which commanded the collection officer to take the necessary distraint action. Under the 1954 Code, effective with respect to all collection actions after December 31, 1954, the levy and distraint action will be authorized by a new form, Levy, Form 668-B, January 1955. This form (668-B, not 668-W, notice of levy), properly executed, directs the collection officer to levy upon, and to sell so much of the property and rights to property, either real or personal, of the taxpayer liable, as may be necessary to satisfy the taxes enumerated in the levy. The Form will not require any accompanying documents, since the Form, properly prepared, will contain all information necessary to meet the statutory requirements (emphasis added)." Henderson v. Internal Revenue Service, Kleinrock's Tax Court Reported, 1994-486, S.D.Indiana, Case # IP 93-1699-C, Filed May 31, 1994).
"A 'Levy' requires that property be brought into legal custody through seizure, actual or constructive, and is absolute appropriation in law of property levied on, and MERE NOTICE OF INTENT TO LEVY IS INSUFFICIENT" (Emphasis added). United States v. O'Dell, 160 F. 2d 304, 307 (6th Circuit 1947).
AFFIDAVIT OF TRUTH
I, Charles F. Conces, living at 9523 Pine Hill Dr., in County of Calhoun and in the state of Michigan, do solemnly swear or affirm that the statements below are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I am a competent witness.
1. I am an individual and not a corporation. I am not liable for the corporate income tax, which is an excise tax, as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court.
2. I am subject to the individual income tax, which is a direct tax, only when it has been “apportioned”, in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.
3. I have not been notified that an “apportioned” direct tax has been applied to me, nor am I aware of any direct “apportioned” tax being applied to me.
4. I have never received a verified, dated, and signed statement from the Internal Revenue Service that verifies that I owe a debt to the United States for “income” taxes.
5. The Accused Operations Managers have acted in fraud by refusing to answer correspondences in violation of plain principles of honesty.
6. A “notice of lien” has been placed on property owned Charles F. Conces without the required certification and without due process of law.
7. I have received multiple threatening letters that are not signed, that are sent from multiple Service Centers, and the Service Centers refuse to respond to my communications.
8. I stand ready to present the documents, which I have in my possession, proving the various operations of fraud perpetrated by the IRS Operations Managers, and of which they stand accused.
9. I stand ready to give testimony to those facts, issues, and documents, which may prove the fraud perpetrated by the IRS Operations Managers, and of which they stand accused.
10. I stand ready to give testimony against the Accused Judges and Operations Managers and present any evidence that shall be admissible at trial.
11. I have many documents in my possession that will prove that the Operations Managers are engaged in a conspiracy of fraud and extortion.
12. I have researched the Supreme Court rulings that are presented in this Criminal Complaint and stand ready to verify the accuracy of such rulings.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. If any statement can be shown to be inaccurate or incorrect, I will make necessary corrections.
Signed: __________________________
Printed Name: Charles F. Conces
Dated: ______________________, 2005
Notary Statement: The above signed has presented himself before me and made the proper identification and has signed in my presence.
BRIEF ON TAXATION
At one point in history, most educated men believed that the world was flat. Today, many lawyers and judges believe that the 16th Amendment conferred a new taxing power on the federal government. The second erroneous belief is the subject of this Criminal Complaint.
The taxing authorities are listed in the United States Constitution and are clarified and explained by the United States Supreme Court.
In 1864, a tax act was passed that authorized taxation on an individual’s portion of corporate earnings. The act did not impose a tax on the non-corporate portion of the individual’s earnings.
“ (The) Income Tax Act of June 30, 1864 (chapter 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281, 282), under which this court held, in Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 16, that an individual was taxable upon his proportion of the earnings of the corporation although not declared as dividends. That decision was based upon the very special language of a clause of section 117 of the act (13 Stat. 282) that 'the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in this section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.” SOUTHERN PAC CO. v. LOWE , 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918).
In Butcher’s Union, the 10 years prior to Pollack, i.e. 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
“The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or hinderance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright. It has been well said that 'the property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him.” Butcher's Union Co. v. Cresent City Co., 111 US 746 (1884).
Taxation Key, West 53 – “The legislature cannot name something to be a taxable privilege unless it is first a privilege.”
Taxation Key, West 933 – “The Right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every person and realization and receipts of income is therefore not a "privilege that can be taxed".
Two years after the 16th Amendment was passed, the Supreme Court ruled that it was unlawful to force any employee to enter into any agreement as a condition of employment. Such prohibition would also apply to the W-4 form.
“The court held it unconstitutional, saying: 'The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he will. He may select not only his employer, but also his associates.” COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
“any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer, who shall require any employee, or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into an agreement, either written or verbal, …or shall threaten any employee with loss of employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any employee . . . is hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof . . . shall be punished for each offense by a fine…”. COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
As recently as 1943, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
“A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.” MURDOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 319 US 105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at 1298 (1943).
A look at POLLOCK is crucial because, as Complainants shall show this Honorable Court, the Complainants in this Criminal Complaint fall under the ruling of POLLOCK and not under the 16th Amendment.
In POLLACK v FARMERS’ LOAN & TRUST CO., 157 US 429 (1895), addressed the issue of direct taxes. The Court quoting the Constitution: “No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census….” And,
“As to the states and their municipalities, this (contributions to expense of government) is reached largely through the imposition of direct taxes. As to the federal government, it is attained in part through excises and indirect taxes upon luxuries and consumption generally, to which direct taxation may be added to the extent the rule of apportionment allows.”
Pollock vs. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 629 (1895):
"Excise' is defined to be an inland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, and sometimes upon the retail sale; sometimes upon the manufacturer, and sometimes upon the vendor.”
POLLACK v FARMERS’ LOAN & TRUST CO., 157 US 429, 436 - 441 (1895) on apportionment:
'Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.' This was amended by the second section of the fourteenth amendment, declared ratified July 28, 1868, so that the whole number of persons in each state should be counted, Indians not taxed excluded, and the provision, as thus amended, remains in force. The actual enumeration was prescribed to be made within three years after the first meeting of congress, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as should be directed.”
The enjoyment of the right to work and earn a living existed long before the establishment of governments, and was not taken away from citizens by this government.
In Knowlton vs. Moore, the Supreme Court defined direct taxes.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 US 41, 47 (1900): "Direct Taxes bear upon persons, upon possession and the enjoyment of rights".
The Code of Federal Regulations cites direct and indirect taxes in 19 CFR 351.102 Definitions:
Direct tax. ``Direct tax'' means a tax on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, a tax on the ownership of real property, or a social welfare charge.
Occupations of “Common right” are rights, not privileges.
In Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720, 733 (1925):
"[T]he Legislature has no power to declare as a privilege and tax for revenue purposes occupations that are of common right, but it does have the power to declare as privileges and tax as such for state revenue purposes those pursuits and occupations that are not matters of common right..."
POLLOCK stated, “...that such tax is a direct tax, and void because imposed without regard to the rule of apportionment; and that by reason thereof the whole law is invalidated.” It is also stated in the U.S. Constitution: Article 1, sec. 9, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” These two prohibitions and limitations on federal taxing authority were never repealed and remain in force in the main body of the Constitution.
POLLOCK also stated the intention of the framers of the Constitution:
“Nothing can be clearer than that what the constitution intended to guard against was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons and property within any state through a majority made up from the other states.” Pollock vs. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 582 (1895).
POLLOCK also ruled that the Constitution clearly recognized the two classes of taxation: “Thus, in the matter of taxation, the constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely, the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts, and excises.” Pollock, 157 US 429, 556 (1895).
“From the foregoing it is apparent (1) that the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of the constitution and those who adopted it; (2) that, under the state system of taxation, all taxes on real estate or personal property or the rents or income thereof were regarded as direct taxes; (3) that the rules of apportionment and of uniformity were adopted in view of that distinction and those systems…” Pollock, 157 US 429, 573.
The notion that a federal income tax where one person pays one amount and another person pays nothing, was ruled against by POLLOCK as having violated “apportionment”.
“The income tax law under consideration is marked by discriminating features which affect the whole law. It discriminates between those who receive an income of $4,000 and those who do not. It thus vitiates, in my judgment, by this arbitrary discrimination, the whole legislation.” Pollock, 157 US 429, 595.
Butcher’s Union and Pollock were in complete agreement and not in contradiction. This was in sum, the relevant taxing authority that was in existence in 1895.
In 1909, the Corporate Excise Tax Act was passed and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this met the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. There can be no question that the 1909 tax was passed in order to impose on corporations, an “income tax”, placed on the privilege of incorporation, and fell under the category of excise tax, and therefore was an indirect tax, not subject to the rule of “apportionment”. Complainants are not subject to excises laid on corporate privileges.
In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the taxing authority on corporate privileges in FLINT v STONE TRACY, 220 US 107 (1911):
“Excises are ‘taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges.’ Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 680.”
In 1913, STRATTON’S INDEPENDENCE addressed the intent of congress in passing the 16th Amendment, while also addressing the corporate excise tax act of 1909.
STRATTON'S INDEPENDENCE, LTD. v. HOWBERT, 231 U.S. 399, 417 (1913):
“Evidently Congress adopted the income as the measure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in corporate form because it desired that the excise should be imposed, approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit presumably derived by such corporations from the current operations of the government. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 165 , 55 S. L. ed. 107, 419, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise [231 U.S. 399, 417] or privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although derived in part from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable.”
“As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation.”
STRATTON’S went on to say that corporations receive a government conferred benefit and that such benefit could be taxed as a corporate privilege.
“Corporations engaged in such business share in the benefits of the federal government, and ought as reasonably to contribute to the support of that government as corporations that conduct other kinds of profitable business.”
“… the annual gains of such corporations are certainly to be taken as income for the purpose of measuring the amount of the tax.”
In 1916, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed once again that the 16th Amendment conferred no new taxing powers in its ruling in STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103 (1916):
“Not being within the authority of the 16th Amendment, the tax is therefore, within the ruling of Pollack… a direct tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment.”
“…it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation..”
“…it was settled in Stratton’s Independence… that such tax is not a tax upon property… but a true excise levied on the result of the business..”
Also in 1916, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed prior rulings on the 16th Amendment:
BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1 (1916):
“…the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it…”
In BRUSHABER, the Court remarked on the confusion that would multiply if the contentions of radical new taxing powers were acceded to:
BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1, 12 (1916):
“… the contentions under it (the 16th Amendment), if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. … This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power … would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.”
BRUSHABER went on to rule on the purpose of the 16th Amendment and the necessity of maintaining and harmonizing the 16th Amendment with the “apportionment” requirements:
“…the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source…”
“…on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation.”
In 1918, the High Court confirmed prior decisions in PECK v LOWE, 247 US 165 (1918):
“As pointed out in recent decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects…”
In 1918, the U.S. Supreme Court once again addressed taxation authorized under the 16th Amendment.
“ (The) Income Tax Act of June 30, 1864 (chapter 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281, 282), under which this court held, in Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 16, that an individual was taxable upon his proportion of the earnings of the corporation although not declared as dividends. That decision was based upon the very special language of a clause of section 117 of the act (13 Stat. 282) that 'the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in this section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.' The act of 1913 contains no similar language, but on the contrary deals with dividends as a particular item of income, leaving them free from the normal tax imposed upon individuals, subjecting them to the graduated surtaxes only when received as dividends (38 Stat. 167, paragraph B), and subjecting the interest of an individual shareholder in the undivided gains and profits of his corporation to these taxes only in case the company is formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax by permitting gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.” SOUTHERN PAC CO. v. LOWE , 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
In Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179 (1918):
"An examination of these and other provisions of the Act (The 16th Amendment) make it plain that the legislative purpose was not to tax property as such, or the mere conversion of property, but to tax the conduct of the business of corporations organized for profit upon the gainful returns from their business operations."
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. v. LOWE, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) ruled that everything that comes in, cannot necessarily be included in “income”:
"We must reject in this case, as we have rejected in cases arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, the broad contention submitted on behalf of the government that all receipts, everything that comes in, are income within the proper definition of the term 'gross income'. Certainly the term 'income' has no broader meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 than in that of 1909, and for the present purpose we assume there is no difference in its meaning as used in the two acts."
In EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189 (1920), the High Court confirmed prior rulings:
“The 16th Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted.”
“As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects…”
“…it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and is not ‘income’, as the term is there used..”
“…we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909…(Stratton’s and Doyle)”
EISNER v MACOMBER also ruled that congress cannot change the definition of “income”:
“In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.”
In 1920, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the compensation as being not subject to tax in EVANS v GORE, 253 US 245 (1920):
“If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the taxation of other income as to which there is no prohibition; for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits.”
EVANS further ruled that the 16th Amendment did not authorize new taxing powers over subjects and the government agreed that this was so:
“Does the Sixteenth Amendment authorize and support this tax and the attendant diminution; that is to say, does it bring within the taxing powers subjects theretofore excepted? The court below answered in the negative; and counsel for the government say: ‘It is not, in view of recent decisions, contended that this amendment rendered anything taxable as income that was not so taxable before’.”
BOWERS v. KERBAUGH-EMPIRE CO., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926):
“The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income, 'from whatever source derived' without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power.”
INCOME
In 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the definition of the word “income” in MERCHANTS’ LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509 (1921):
“The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, was not an income tax law, but a definition of the word ‘income’ was so necessary in its administration…”
“It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the word ‘income’ has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of meaning was in effect decided in Southern Pacific v Lowe…, where it was assumed for the purpose of decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913. When we add to this, Eisner v Macomber…the definition of ‘income’ which was applied was adopted from Stratton’s Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909… there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.”
The High Court, in SMIETANKA, seemed as if it had become exasperated that the question of the definition of the word “income” had repeatedly been raised.
The word “income” has been wrongfully used by the IRS, as including all wages, compensation, and earnings of the citizenry when not engaged in a corporate enterprise. In Doyle vs. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court made the clear and unequivocal statement:
“Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS. CO. , 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918).
The general public, being unaware of the legal definition of “income”, has been misled into a wrongful use of the word and has been also misled into believing that they had “income’, although not participating in a government conferred corporate benefit.
Once again in Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 U.S. 170 (1926):
"Income has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the 16th Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed."
In TAFT v. BOWERS, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929), the Court ruled:
“The Sixteenth Amendment provides:
'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.'
Income is the thing which may be taxed-income from any source. The amendment does not attempt to define income or to designate how taxes may be laid thereon, or how they may be enforced. Under former decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income.”
In 1943, HELVERING v. EDISON BROTHERS' STORES, 8 Cir. 133 F2d 575 (1943) ruled on the limitation of the definition of “income”:
"The Treasury cannot by interpretive regulation make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax that which is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment."
As late as 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in FLORA v US, 362 US 145 (1960):
“Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint.”
The definition of distraint in the legal dictionary, “to seize a person’s goods as security for an obligation.”
In 1976, in U.S. v. BALLARD, 535 F2d 400: “Gross income and not ‘gross receipts’ is the foundation of income tax liability…” BALLARD gives us two useful explanations:
At 404, “The general term ‘income’ is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code.” At 404, BALLARD further ruled that “… ‘gross income’ means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any income from investments and from incidental or outside operations or sources.”
Thus, it is shown by these U.S. Supreme Court rulings that the Plaintiffs, in this action, did not have “income” as the meaning of the word is intended in the 16th Amendment.
INESCAPABLE CONCLUSIONS
[pic]The individual income tax is a direct tax subject to apportionment.
[pic]The corporate ‘income’ tax is an indirect tax (excise tax), not subject to apportionment. Plaintiffs are not subject to excises laid on corporate privileges.
[pic]The 16th amendment only applies to ‘income’ as defined by the US Supreme Court, as pertaining only to corporations and government conferred privileges.
[pic]Occupations of “common right” cannot be hindered and are rights of freedom necessarily covered by the common law of the U.S. Constitution.
[pic] The word ‘income’ is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
[pic] The 16th amendment did not authorize any new taxing powers.
[pic] The taxing powers of the federal government were the same after the passage of the 16th amendment as were existent before the passage.
[pic] The IRS agents are guilty of fraud by refusing to respond to questions from Plaintiffs, according to court ruling precedence.
[pic] The 16th amendment kept the corporate excise tax in the category of indirect tax and did not affect the apportionment requirement of the Constitution.
Former IRS Agent, Tommy Henderson, testified before the Senate and this was reported by the National Center for Public Policy:
Even the Powerful Can Be Victims of Abuse
By National Center for Public Policy Research
Special
May 13, 2003
(Editor's Note: The following is the 46th of 100 stories regarding government regulation from the book Shattered Dreams, written by the National Center for Public Policy Research. will publish an additional story each day.)
"IRS management does what it wants, to whom it wants, when it wants, how it wants with almost complete immunity," retired Internal Revenue Service official Tommy Henderson told the U.S. Senate Finance Committee. (Empahsis Added)
One of Henderson's agents attempted to frame former U.S. Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, former U.S. Representative James H. Quillen and Tennessee prosecutor David Crockett on money-laundering and bribery charges, apparently in an attempt to promote his own career. When Henderson attempted to correct the abuse, it was Henderson, not the agent, who lost his job.
"What I had uncovered was an attempt to create an unfounded criminal investigation on two national political figures for no reason other than to redeem this agent's own career and ingratiate himself with his supervisors," Henderson testified. Henderson attempted to reign in the rogue agent by taking away his gun and his credentials, but he failed. The agent, Henderson told the committee, had a friend in IRS upper management.
In fact, Henderson was told that management had lost confidence in him. He believed that if he did not resign, he would be fired. Henderson resigned. "I had violated an unwritten law. I had exposed the illegal actions of another agent," Henderson testified.
Eventually, the agent was fired - but not for illegal actions within in the IRS. He was arrested on cocaine charges and subsequently fired because the arrest was public knowledge.
Sources: Testimony of Tommy Henderson to the Senate Finance Committee, the Washington Post
Copyright 2003, National Center for Public Policy Research
____________________________________________
Complainants disagree with the conclusions of Tommy Henderson that the IRS can violate the law with impunity. This Honorable Court should agree with Complainants as a matter of Constitution and law.
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related searches
- letter to judge requesting hearing
- character letter to judge for family member
- letters to judge from mother
- letter to judge from family
- letter to judge template
- letter to judge before sentencing sample
- leniency letter to judge prior sentencing
- sentencing letter to judge examples
- sample letter to judge for leniency
- letter to judge sample
- reference letter to judge sentencing
- letter to judge from parent