ELUSIVE KNOWLEDGE' David Lewis We know a lot. I know ...

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EELLUUSSIIVVEE KKNNOOWLEDGGEE"'

DDaavviidd LLeewwiiss

WWee kknnooww aa lloott.. II kknnooww wwhhaat ffoooodd ppeenngguuinns eeaatt.. II kknnooww tthhaatt pphhoonneess uusseedd ttoo rriinngg,, bbuutt nnoowwadays ssqquueal, wwhenn ssoommeeoonnee ccaallllss uupp.. II kknnooww tthhaat EEsssseennddon wwoonn tthhee 11999933 GGrraanndd FFiinnaall.. II kknnooww tthhaat hheerree iiss aa hhaannd, aanndd hheerree iiss aannoothher.

WWe hhaavvee aallll ssoorts ooff eevveerryyddaayy kknnoowwledge, aanndd we hhaavve iitt iinn aabbundance. TTo ddoubt thhat would be aabsurd. At aannyy raatee, ttoo ddoubt iitt iinn aanny sseerioous aannd llaassttiinngg wway wwould bee aabbsurd; aannd eevveenn philoosophical aannd tteemmporary ddoubt, under tthhee iinnfflluueennccee oof aarrggument, iiss more than a litttllee peculiar. IIt iss a Moorean factt that we know a lot.. IIt is one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument too the contrary.

Besides knowing a lot that is everyday and trite, I myself think that we know a lot that is interesting and esoteric and controversial. We know a lot about things unseen: tiny particles and pervasive fields, not to mention one anotheerr's underwweeaar. Sometimes we even know whaat an author meant by his writings. But on these questions, let us agree to disagree peacefully with the champions of 'post-knowledgeismm''. The most trite and ordinary parrttss off our knowwledge wwill be problem enougghh.

FFoor nno sooonneerr do wwee engage in epistemology - the systemmaattiicc pphhilosopphhiiccaal exammiinnaattionn off kknnoowwlleeddggee - thaann wwe mmeeeet a commppeellling argummeenntt thaatt wwee kknoww nnext to nnoothhinngg. TThhe scepptical arguummeenntt is nnoothhingg nneww or fancy. It is juusstt this: it seemmss as if kknnoowwlleeddggee mmuusstt bbee bbyy ddeeffiinnition innfaallible. Iff yyoouu cclaim tthhaatt SS kknnoowwss tthhaatt PP,, aanndd yyeet yyoouu ggrraanntt tthhaatt SS ccaannnnoott eellimmiinnaattee aa cceerrttaaiinn ppoossssiibbiilliittyy inn wwhhiicchh nnoott--PP,, it cceerrttaaiinnllyy sseeeemmss aass iff yyoouu hhaavvee ggrraanntteedd tthhaatt SS ddooeess nnoott aafftteerr aalll kknnooww tthhaatt PP.. TToo ssppeeaakk ooff ffaalllible kknnoowwlleeddggee,, ooff kknnoowwll-eeddggee ddeessppiittee uunneelliimmiinnaatteedd ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess ooff eerrrroorr,, jjuusstt soouunnddss ccoonnttrraaddiiccttoorryy..

BBlliinndd FFrreeddddyy ccaann sseeee wwhheerree tthhiiss wwiillll lleeaadd.. LLeett yyoouurr ppaarraannooiidd ffaannttaassiieess rriipp -- CCIIAA pplloottss,, hhaalllluucciinnooggeennss iinn tthhee ttaapp wwaatteerr,, ccoonnssppiirraacciieess ttoo ddeecceeiivvee,, oolldd NNiicckk hhiimmsellff - aanndd ssoooonn yyoouu ffiinndd tthhaatt uunneelliimmiinnaatteedd ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess ooff eerrrroorr aarree eevveerryywwhheerree.. TThhoossee ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess ooff eerrrroorr aarree ffaarr--ffeettcchheedd,, ooff ccoouurrssee,, bbuutt ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess aallll tthhee ssaammee.. TThheeyy bbiittee iinnttoo eevveenn oouurr mmoosstt eevveerryyddaayy kknnoowwlleeddggee.. WWee nneevveerr hhaavvee iinnffaalllliibbllee kknnoowwlleeddggee..

NNeevveerr -- wweellll,, hhaarrddllyy eevveerr.. SSoommee ssaayy wwee hhaavvee iinnffaalllliibbllee kknnoowwlleeddggee ooff aa ffeeww ssiimmppllee,, aaxxiioommaattiicc nneecceessssaarryy ttrruutthhss;; aanndd ooff oouurr oowwnn pprreesseenntt eexxppeerriieennccee.. TThheeyy ssaayy tthhaatt II ssiimmppllyy ccaannnnoott bbee wwrroonngg tthhaatt aappaarrtt ooff aappaarrtt ooffssoommeetthhiinngg iiss iittsseellff aa ppaarrtt oofftthhaatt tthhiinngg;; oorr tthhaatt iitt sseeeemmss ttoo mmee nnooww ((aass II ssiitt hheerree aatt tthhee kkeeyybbooaarrdd)) eexxaaccttllyy aass iiffII aamm hheeaarriinngg cclliicckkiinnggnnooiisseess oonnttoopp ooffaasstteeaaddyywwhhiirrrriinngg.. SSoommeessaayyssoo.. OOtthheerrss ddeennyy iitt.. NNoo mmaattteerr;; lleettiittbbeeggrraanntteedd,, aatt lleeaasstt ffoorr tthhee ssaakkee ooff tthhee aarrgguummeenntt.. IItt iiss nnoott nneeaarrllyy eennoouugghh.. IIffwwee hhaavvee oonnllyy tthhaatt mmuucchh

TThhaannkkssttoommaannyyffoorrvvaalluuaabblele ddiissccuussssiioonnssoofftthhiissmmaatteerriiaall.. TThhaannkkssaabboovveeaalllttooPPeetteerrUUnnggeerr;; aanndd ttoo SStteewwaarrtt CCoohheenn,, MMiicchhaaeell DDeevviittt,,AAllaann HHaajjeekk,, SStteepphheenn HHeetthheerrininggtotonn,, DDeenniiss RRoobbiinnssoonn,, EErrnneesstt SSoossaa,,RRoobbeerrttSSttaalnlnaakkeerr,,JJoonnaaththaannVVooggeell,,aannddaarreeffeerreeeeffoorrththiissJJoouurrnnaal.l. TThhaannkkssaallssoototoththeeBBooyyccee GGibibssoonnMMeemmoorriaiallLLibibrraarryyaannddtotoOOrrmmoonnddCCoolleleggee..

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EElusive KKnowledge

iinnffaallllibblee kknnoowwlleeddggee,, yyeett kknnoowwlleeddggee iiss bbyy ddeeffiinniittioonn iinnffaalllliibbllee, tthheenn wwee hhaavvee vveerryy lliitttle kknnoowwlleeddggee iinnddeeeedd -- nnoott tthhee aabbuunnddaanntt eevveerryyddaayy kknnoowwlleeddggee wwee tthhoouugghhtt wwee hhaadd.. TThhaatt iis ssttiillll aabbssuurrdd..

SSoo wwee kknnooww aa lloott; kknnoowwlleeddggee mmuusstt bbee iinnffaallllible; yyeett wwee hhaavvee ffaalllible kknnoowwlleeddggee oorr nnoonnee ((oorr nneexxtt tto nnoonnee)).. WWee aare ccaauugghhtt bbeettwweeeenn tthhee rroocckk ooff ffaallibilism aanndd tthhee wwhhiirrllppooooll ooff sscceeppttiiccismm.. BBootthh aarree mmaadd!!

YYeett ffaallibilism iis tthhee leessss innttruussivvee mmaaddnneessss.. Itt ddeemmaannddss leessss ffrequueennt ccoorrrreeccttiioonnss ooff wwhhaatt wwee wwaanntt to ssaayy.. SSoo, iiff ffoorced ttoo cchhoooossee,, II cchhoooossee ffaallibilism. ((AAnndd ssoo ssaayy aall ooff uuss..)) WWee ccaann ggeett uusseedd ttoo it, aanndd ssoommee ooff uus hhaavvee ddoonnee.. NNoo jjooyy tthheerree -- wwee kknnooww tthhaatt ppeeooppllee ccaann ggeett uusseedd tto tthhee mmoosstt ccrraazzyy pphhiilloossoopphhiiccaall ssaayyiinnggss immaaggiinnaabbllee.. IIff yyoouu aarree aa ccoonntteenntteedd ffaallibilist, II immpplloorree yyoouu tto bbee hhoonneesstt,, bbee nnaaiivvee, hheeaarr it aaffrreesshh.. 'HHee kknnoowwss,, yyeett hhe hhaass nnoott eellimmiinnaatteedd aall ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess ooff eerrrroorr..'' EEvveenn iiff yyoouu''vvee nnuummbbeedd yyoouurr eeaarrss,, ddooeessnn''tt tthhiiss oovveerrtt, eexxpplliiccit ffaallibilism still ssoouunndd wwrroonngg??

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BBeetttteerr fallibilism thaann sceppticismm; bbuutt it wwoouulldd bbe bbeetttteerr still to dooddggee the chooice. I think wwee caann.. WWee wwiilll bbee alarmmiinnggllyy close to the roocckk,, anndd alsoo alarmmiinnggllyy closee to the wwhhiirrlppooool, bbuutt if wwee steer wwiitthh caarree,, wwee caann - j ujusstt bbaarreely - escappee themm bbootthh..

MMaayybbee epistemology is the cuullpprriitt.. MMaayybbee this exxtraoorrddiinnaarryy ppaassttimmee robbs uus off ouur kknnoowwlleeddggee. MMaayybbee wwee do kknnooww a lot in daaily life; bbuutt mmaayybbee wwhheenn wwee look hhaarrdd at ouur kknnoowwlleeddggee, it gooes awwaayy. BBuutt onnly wwhheenn wwee look at it hhaarrddeerr thaann the sannee ever do in daaily life; only wwhheenn wwee let ouurr ppaarraannooiidd fantasies rip. TThhaatt is wwhheenn wwee are forced to addmmiitt thhaatt there alwwaayyss are uunneellimmiinnaatteedd ppoossssiibbiillities off erroor, so thaat wwee hhave fallible kknnoowwlleeddggee or nnoonnee.

MMuucchh thaat wwee say is coonntteexxtt--ddeeppeennddeenntt,, in simmpple wwaayyss or suubbttllee wwaayyss.. Simmpple: 'it'ss eveningg' is truly said wwhheenn,, and only wwhheenn, it is said in the evening. Subtle: it could wweell be true, and not juusstt by luck, that Essendoonn played rottenly, the Easyybbeeaattss played brilliantly, yet Essenddoonn wwoonn. DDifferent contexts evoke different standdaarrddss of evaluation. Talkkinngg aboouutt the Eaassyybbeeaattss wwe applyy lax stannddaarrddss,, else wwee couuldd scarcelyy distinguish their betteerr days from their wwoorse ones. In talking abouutt Essenddoonn,, no such laxity is required. Essenddoonn wwoonn becauussee play that is rotten by demmaannddiinngg standdaarrddss suffices to beaat play that is brilliant by lax standdaarrddss..

MMaayybbee ascriptions of knowwledge are subtly context-deppeennddeenntt,, and mmaayybbee epistemology is a context that mmaakkeess them go false. Then epistemology wwoouulldd be an investigation that destroys its own subjecctt mmaatttteerr.. If so, the sceptical argummeenntt mmigghht be flawless, when we engage in epistemology - and only theenn!"1

If you start from the ancient idea that justification is the markk that distinguisheess knowledge from mere opinion (even true opinion), then you well might conclude that ascriptions of knowledge are context-dependennt because standaarrddss for adequate justification are context-depeennddeenntt.. As follows: opinion, even if true, deserves the name of

The suggestion that ascriptions of knowledge go false in the context of epistemology is to be found in Barry Stroud, 'Underssttaannddiinngg Human Knowledge in General' in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (eds.)),, Knowledge and Skepticism (Boulderr:: Westview Press, 1989); and in Stephen Hetherington, 'Lacking Knowledge and Justification by Theorising About Them' (lecture at the University of New South Wales, August 1992). Neither of them tells the story just as I do, however it may be that their versions do not conflict with mine.

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David Lewis

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knowwledge only if it is adequately suppoorrtteedd by reasons; to deserve that name in the especially demmaannddiinngg context of epistemology, the argummeennttss from suppoortingg reasons muusst be especially watertight; but the special standdaarrddss of justification that this special context demmaannddss never can be met (well, hardly ever). In the strict context of epistemology we know nothing, yet in laxer contexts we know a lot.

But I myyself cannot subscribe to this account of the context-dependence of knowledge, becauussee I question its starting point. I donn''tt agree that the mark of knowledge is justification. 22 First, because justification is not sufficient: your true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn't knowwledge, whatever the odds. Suppose you know that it is a fair lottery with one winning ticket and many losing tickets, and you know how many losing tickets there are. The greater the nummbbeerr of losing tickets, the better is your justification for believing you will lose. Yet there is no nummbbeerr great enough to transform your fallible opinion into knowledge - after all, you just might win. No justification is good enough - or none short of a waatertighht deductive argummeenntt, and all but the sceptics will agree that this is too much to demmaanndd?.'

Second, becauussee justification is not always necessary. WWhhaatt (non-circular) argumennt supppoorrttss our reliance on perceptionn, on memmoorry, and on testimonnyy??4' And yet we do gain knowledge by these meanns. And sometimmeess, far from having suppoortingg argummeennttss,, we donn''tt even know how we know. WWe once had evidence, drew conclusions, and thereby gained knowwledge; now we have forgotten our reasons, yet still we retain our knowwledge. Or we know the name that goes with the face, or the sex of the chicken, by relying on subtle visual cues, without knowwing whhaat those cues may be.

The link between knowledge and justification mmuusst be brokenn. But if we breakk that link, then it is not - or not entirely, or not exactly - by raising the standaarrddss of justification that epistemology destroys knowwledge. I need some different story.

To that end, I proposee to take the infallibility of knowwledge as my starting point?.' MMuust

infallibilist epistemology end in scepticism? Not quite. WWaaiit and see. Anywwaayy, here is

the definition. Subject S knows proposition PP ifff PP holds in every possibility left unelim-

inated by S'ss evidence; equivalently, iff S'ss evidence eliminates every possibility in

which not-PP.

The definition is short, the commmeennttaary upon it is longer. In the first place, there is

the propoossiitionn, PP. WWhhaatt I choose to call 'propositionnss' are individuated coarsely, by

necessary equivalence. For instancee, there is only one necessary propoossiitionn. It holds in

2 Unless, like some, we simply define 'justificationn'' as 'whatever it takes to turmn true opinion into knowledge' regardless of whether what it takes turns out to involvvee argument from supporting reasons.

3 The problem of the lottery was introdduucceedd in Henry Kyburg, Probaabbiilliittyy and the Logic of Rational Belieff (Middleettoowwnn,, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961)),, and in Carl Hempetl, 'Deductive-Nommoollooggiiccaall vs. Statissttiiccaall Explanation' in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minneessoottaa Studies in the Philossoopphhyy off Scienccee,, Vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesotaa Press, 1962). It has been much discussed since, as a problem both about knowledge and about our everyday, non-quantitativvee concept of belief.

4 The case of testimony is less discussed than the others; but see C.AA..JJ. Coady, Testimony: A PhilosoopphhiiccaallSStutuddyy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) pp. 79-129.

5 I follooww Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Skepticissmm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). But I shall not let him lead me into scepticism.

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EElluussiivvee KKnnoowwlleeddggee

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eevveerry ppoossssiibbiilliittyy;; hheennccee iinn eevveerryy ppoossssiibbiilliittyy lleefft uunneelliimmiinnaatteedd bbyy SS''ss eevviiddeennccee,, nnoo mmaatttteerr wwhhoo SS mmaayy bbee aanndd nnoo mmaatttteerr wwhhaatt hhiiss eevviiddeennccee mmaayy bbee.. SSoo tthhee nneecceessssaarryy pprrooppoossiittiioonn iiss kknnoowwnn aallwwaayyss aanndd eevveerryywwhheerree.. YYeett tthhiiss kknnoowwnn pprrooppoossiittiioonn mmaayy ggoo uunnrreeccooggnniisseedd wwhheenn pprreesseenntteedd iinn iimmppeenneettrraabbllee lliinngguuiissttiicc ddiissgguuiissee,, ssaayy aass tthhee pprrooppoossiittiioonn tthhaatt eevveerryy eevveenn nnuumm-bbeerr is tthhee ssuumm ooff ttwwoo pprriimmeess.. LLiikkeewwiissee,, tthhee kknnoowwnn pprrooppoossiittiioonn tthhaatt II hhaavvee ttwwoo hhaannddss mmaayy ggoo uunnrreeccooggnniisseedd wwhheenn pprreesseenntteedd as tthhee pprrooppoossiittiioonn tthhaatt tthhee nnuummbbeerr ooff mmyy hhaannddss is tthhee leeaasstt nnuummbbeerr nn ssuucchh tthhaatt eevveery eevveen nnuummbbeerr iss tthhee ssuumm ooff nn pprriimmeess.. ((OOrr iiff yyoouu ddoouubbtt tthhee nneecceessssaarryy eexxiisstennccee ooff nnuummbbeerrss,, sswwiittcchh tto aann eexxaammppllee iinnvvoolving eeqquuiivvaalence bbyy llooggic aalloonnee..)) TThheessee pprroobblleemmss ooff ddiissgguuiissee sshhaallll nnoott ccoonncceerrnn uus hheerree.. OOuurr ttooppiicc iis mmooddaall,, nnoot hhyyppeerriinntteennssiioonnaall,, eeppiistemmoollooggyy..66

NNeexxtt,, tthheerree aarree tthhee ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess.. WWee nneeeeddnn''tt eenntteerr hheerree iinnttoo tthhee qquueessttiioonn wwhheetthheerr tthheessee aarree ccoonnccrreettaa,, aabbssttrraacctt ccoonnssttrruuccttiioonnss,, oorr aabbssttrraacctt ssimmpplleess.. FFuurrtthheerr,, wwee nneeeeddnn''tt ddeecciiddee wwhheetthheerr tthheeyy mmuusstt aallwwaayyss bbee mmaaxxiimmaallllyy ssppeecciifficc ppoossssiibbiilliittiieess,, oorr wwhheetthheerr tthheeyy nneeeedd oonnllyy bbee ssppeecciifficc eennoouugghh ffoor tthhee ppuurrppoossee aat hhaanndd.. AA ppoossssiibbiilliittyy wwiillll bbee ssppeecciifficc eennoouugghh iiff iit ccaannnnoott bbee sspplliitt iinntoo ssuubbccaasseess iin ssuucchh aa wwaayy tthhaatt aannyytthhiinngg wwee hhaavvee ssaaiidd aabboouutt ppoossssiibbiilliities, oor annyytthhiinngg wwee are ggooing to say bbeefoore wwee are ddoonnee, appppllieess to sommee subbccaass-es anndd nnoot to oothheerrss.. FFoorr insstaannccee,, it shoouulldd nneevveer hhaappppeenn thhaatt pprrooppoossiittiioonn PP hhooldds in sommee bbuutt nnoot all subb--ccaasseess;; oor thhaatt sommee bbuutt nnoot all subb--ccaasseess are elimminnaatedd bbyy SS''ss eviddennce.

BBuutt wwee do nneeeedd to stipuulaattee thhaatt they are nnoot jjuusstt ppoossssiibbiilliities as to hhooww the wwhhoolle wwoorrlldd is; they also include ppoossssiibbiilliities as to wwhhiicchh ppaarrtt ooff the wwoorrlldd is onneesseellf, anndd as to wwhheenn it nnooww is. WWee nneeeedd these ppoossssiibbiillities ddee ssee eett nnuunncc bbeeccaauussee the pprooppoossiittioonnss thaat mmaayy bbee knnoowwnn include pprooppoossiittiioonnss dde ssee eett nnuunncc..7' NNoott only do I kknoww thaatt there are hhaannddss in this wwoorrlldd sommeewwhheerree anndd sommeewwhheenn.. I knoww thaatt I hhave haannddss,, or anywwaayy I have themm noww.. Suucchh pprooppoossiittiioonnss areenn''tt juusstt mmaaddee true or mmaaddee false bbyy the wwhhoolle wwoorld once and for all. Theyy are true for some of us and not for others, or true at some times and not others, or both.

Furthheerr,, wwe cannnoott limit ourselves to 'real' possibbilities that conform to the actual laws of naturee, and mmaayybbee also to actual passt history. For propoossitions abouut laws and history are contingeenntt, and mmaayyor mmay not be knowwnn.

NNeeither can wwe limit ourselves to 'epistemic' possibilities for S - possibbilities that S does not know not to obtain. Thhaatt wwoouuld drain our definition off contennt. Assummee only that knowwledge is closed unddeerr strict implication. (We shall consider the mmeerrits of this assummppttioonn later.) Remmemmbbeer that wee are not distinguishing between equivalent propositions. Then knowwledge of a conjunction is equivalent to knowwledge of every conjunct. PP is the conjunction of all propositions not-W, where W is a possibility in which not--PPo. That suffices to yield an equivalence: S knows that PP iff, for every possibility W in which not-P, S knows that not-W. Contraposing and cancelling a double negation: iff every possibility which S does not know not to obtain is one in which P. For short: ifffP holds throughouut S's epistemic possibilities. Yet to get this far, we need no substantive definition of knowledge at all! To turn this into a substantive definition, in fact the very definition we gave before, we need to say one more thing: S's epistemic possibilities are

6 See Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA:: MIT Press, 1984) pp. 59-99. 7 See my 'Attitudeess De Dicto and De Se', The Philloossoopphhicicaal l Review 88 (1979) pp. 513-543; and

R.M.. Chisholm, 'The Indirect Refleexxiivvee'' in C.. Diamond and 1J. Teichman (eds.), Intennttiioonn and Intennttiioonnaalliityty:: Essays in Honour offG.E.M. Anscombe (Brighton: Harvester, 1979).

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just those possibilities that are uneliminated by S'ss evidence. So, next, we need to say whhaat it means for a possibility to be eliminated or not. Here

I say that the uneliminated possibilities are those in which the subject's entire perceptual experience and memory are just as they actually are. There is one possibility that actually obtaaiinnss (forr the subjeecctt and at the time in questioonn));; call it actuality. Thenn a possibility W is unelimmiinnaatteedd iff the subject's perceptuuaal experience and memmoory in W exactly maatchh his perceppttuuaall experience and memmoorryy in actuality. (If you waanntt to include other alleged forms of basic evidence, such as the evidence of our extrasensory faculties, or an innate disposition to believe in God, be my guest. If they exist, they should be included. If not, no harm done if we have included them conditionally.)

Note well that we do not need the 'pure sense-datumm language' and the 'incorrigible protocol statemmeennttss'' that for so long bedevilled foundationnaalist epistemology. It matters not at all whheethheerr there are words to capture the subjecct's perceptual and memmory evidence, nothingg moore and nothingg less. Iff there are such woorddss, it maatters not at all whheethheerr the subject can hit upon them. The given does not consist of basic axioms to serve as premmises in subsequueenntt argummeennttss.. Rather, it consists of a match between possibilities.

WWhheenn percepptuuaall experience E (or memmoorryy) eliminates a possibility W,, that is not because the propoossitionaal content of the experience conflicts with W.. (Not even if it is the narroww conteenntt..)) The propoossiitionnaall content of our experience could, after all, be false. Rather, it is the existence of the experience that conflicts with W:: W is a possibility in which the subject is not having experience E. Else we would need to tell some fishy story of how the experience has some sort of infallible, ineffable, purely phenommenal propoossiitionnaall content.. ... WWhhoo needs that? Let E have propoossitionaal content P. Suppose even - something I take to be an open question - that E is, in some sense, fullyy characterized by PP. Then I say that E eliminates W iff W is a possibility in which the subject's experience or memmory has content different from PP. I do not say that E eliminates W iff W is a possibility in which PP is false.

MMaybe not every kind of sense perception yields experience; maybe, for instance, the kinaestheetic sense yields not its own distinctive sort of sense-experience but only spontaneous judgemmeennttss about the position of onee'ss limbs. If this is true, then the thing to say is that kinaestheetic evidence eliminates all possibilities except those that exactly resemble actuality with respecctt to the subjeecctt''ss spontaanneeoouuss kinaessthheettiicc judggeemmeennttss.. In saying this, we would treat kinaesthetic evidence more on the model of memory than on the model of more t.tyyppiiccal senses.

Finally, we muusst attend to the word 'every'. WWhhaatt does it mean to say that every possibility in whhicchh not-PP is eliminated?? Ann idiom of quanntificaatioonn,, like 'everyy', is normally restricted to some limited dommaain. If I say that every glass is empty, so it's time for another round, doubtless I and my audience are ignoring most of all the glasses there are in the whole wide world throughhoouutt all of time. They are outside the domaain. They are irrelevant to the truth of whhaatt was said.

Likewise, if I say that every uneliminated possibility is one in which P, or words to that effect, I am doubtless ignoring some of all the uneliminated alternative possibilities that there are. They are outside the domaain, they are irrelevant to the truth of whhaat was said.

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