HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ...
HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP
THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE
ON WAR COALITION FORMATION
-
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Government
by
Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A.
Washington, DC
October 2008
Copyright 2008 by Alarik Morgan Fritz
All Rights Reserved
ii
The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Center for Naval Analyses, the CNA Corporation, the
US Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
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HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP
THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE
ON WAR COALITION FORMATION
Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A.
Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
Nations usually go to war to defend against a threat (balancing) or gain some
profit (bandwagoning). However, they sometimes join war coalitions without such
motivations ¨C or refuse to join them despite great pressure from the coalition leader. For
example, the US-led coalition against Iraq in 2003 was largely composed of states that
were not traditional US allies, were not threatened by Iraq, and had little to gain from the
invasion. Furthermore, the US surprisingly failed to enlist key allies in the coalition. Are
coalition formation dynamics different now than during the Cold War? This is an
important question because such war coalitions may be more common in the future.
This dissertation examines the impact of asymmetric security interdependence
between minor states and a superpower vis-¨¤-vis their war coalition choices. Shifts in the
global balance of power, such as from bipolarity to unipolarity, can lead to shifts in
security interdependence because the security motivations for the superpower and minor
states can become ¡®delinked¡¯ from each other. Some minor states become less concerned
about their relationship with the unipole (because they are no longer threatened by the
other bipole) while others become more concerned with it because of long-term regional
threats (they can no longer rely upon a bipolar ally to protect them). This shift, when
combined with the fact that the superpower-as-coalition leader values the contributions of
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some minor states more than others (due to its warplans) can lead to situations of
asymmetric security interdependence.
Such interdependence is a source of power ¨C thus it can determine which state is
more likely to have greater bargaining leverage, which one pays for a coalition
contribution, and how that contribution comes about. This explains many notable puzzles
of coalition formation, including the failure of the US to enlist a Turkish contribution in
2003 and why states like Poland went to great lengths to contribute to US-led coalitions
in 1990-91 and 2003. To test this, I examine three war coalitions (Operation Iraqi
Freedom, The Korean War, and Desert Storm) and US efforts to enlist the support of four
minor states (Turkey, Japan, Germany and Poland).
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