HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ...

HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP

THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE

ON WAR COALITION FORMATION

-

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in Government

by

Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A.

Washington, DC

October 2008

Copyright 2008 by Alarik Morgan Fritz

All Rights Reserved

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The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the

official policy or position of the Center for Naval Analyses, the CNA Corporation, the

US Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

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HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP

THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE

ON WAR COALITION FORMATION

Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A.

Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Nations usually go to war to defend against a threat (balancing) or gain some

profit (bandwagoning). However, they sometimes join war coalitions without such

motivations ¨C or refuse to join them despite great pressure from the coalition leader. For

example, the US-led coalition against Iraq in 2003 was largely composed of states that

were not traditional US allies, were not threatened by Iraq, and had little to gain from the

invasion. Furthermore, the US surprisingly failed to enlist key allies in the coalition. Are

coalition formation dynamics different now than during the Cold War? This is an

important question because such war coalitions may be more common in the future.

This dissertation examines the impact of asymmetric security interdependence

between minor states and a superpower vis-¨¤-vis their war coalition choices. Shifts in the

global balance of power, such as from bipolarity to unipolarity, can lead to shifts in

security interdependence because the security motivations for the superpower and minor

states can become ¡®delinked¡¯ from each other. Some minor states become less concerned

about their relationship with the unipole (because they are no longer threatened by the

other bipole) while others become more concerned with it because of long-term regional

threats (they can no longer rely upon a bipolar ally to protect them). This shift, when

combined with the fact that the superpower-as-coalition leader values the contributions of

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some minor states more than others (due to its warplans) can lead to situations of

asymmetric security interdependence.

Such interdependence is a source of power ¨C thus it can determine which state is

more likely to have greater bargaining leverage, which one pays for a coalition

contribution, and how that contribution comes about. This explains many notable puzzles

of coalition formation, including the failure of the US to enlist a Turkish contribution in

2003 and why states like Poland went to great lengths to contribute to US-led coalitions

in 1990-91 and 2003. To test this, I examine three war coalitions (Operation Iraqi

Freedom, The Korean War, and Desert Storm) and US efforts to enlist the support of four

minor states (Turkey, Japan, Germany and Poland).

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