February 1, 2006 - World Bank
Environmental Management Plan
for the
Georgia Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project
Tbilisi, March 31, 2006
Table of Contents
Introduction and Summary
I. Global, regional and national sector issues
(a) Introduction
(b) Socioeconomic Context
(c) Key Issues
(d) The regional dimension
(e) The national dimension
II. Project Development Objective and Project Components
III. Policy context
(a) IDA/IBRD Safeguards Policy
(b) Georgian Legislation
(c) WHO and FAO/OIE Guidelines
IV. Project Region
V. Environmental Impacts and Mitigation Measures by Component
VI. Monitoring
VII. Institutional Arrangements and Budget
VIII. Public Consultation Arrangements
Annex 1: FAO/OIE AI Strategy
Annex 2: WHO AI Strategy
Annex 3: Bio-Safety Level Requirements
Annex 4: International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories
Annex 5-A: Mitigation Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial
Annex 5-B: Mitigation Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Incineration
Annex 5-C: Mitigation Plan for Laboratory Safety and Waste Management
Annex 6-A: Monitoring Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial
Annex 6-B: Monitoring Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Incineration
Annex 6-C: Monitoring Plan for Laboratory Safety and Waste Management
Annex 7: Map of High-Risk Areas for AI
Annex 8: Disclosure Procedures
Annex 9: Minutes of Disclosure Meeting
Introduction and Summary
1. The World Bank requires environmental assessment (EA) of projects proposed for Bank financing to help ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable, and thus improve decision making (OP 4.01, January 1999). The Bank favors preventive measures over mitigatory or compensatory measures, whenever feasible.
2. The Georgia Avian Influenza (AI) Project has been assigned World Bank environmental category B, since it involves moderate environmental impacts that can be managed during implementation of the project. Bank assistance is being provided through three different channels. First, emergency assistance of about US$ 1.6 million to provide urgently needed equipment and materials to enable the Government to implement monitoring and surveillance and to help prepare initially for an outbreak both in poultry and humans is being provided from four existing projects – the Rural Development Project (RDP), the Agricultural Research, Extension and Training Project (ARET), the Primary Health Care Project, and the Structural Reform Support (SRS) Project. Second, this proposed AI project is aimed at strengthening the capacity of both the animal health and human health agencies to respond to the threat of an HPAI outbreak, as well as potential outbreaks from other zoonoses. Included in the proposed project is a proposed PHRD implementation grant for US$ 1.2 million to help meet the technical assistance gaps. Third, the Bank is assisting the Government to coordinate donor response to the threat of an HPAI outbreak.
3. Although project activities supporting AI prevention, preparedness and planning, and response and containment are not expected to generate significant adverse environmental effects, they do present a moderate environmental risk from inadvertent spread of the AI virus and waste management. Overall the AI prevention and response-focused activities are expected to have a positive environmental impact, as the investments in facilities, equipment, and training for veterinary and public health service staff and laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety over existing avian influenza handling and testing procedures by meeting international standards established by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Health Organization. This would be reinforced by the mainstreaming of environmental safeguards into protocols and procedures for the culling and disposal of animals during AI outbreaks.
4. This environmental management plan addresses the moderate adverse environmental effects of the Animal and Human Health Components. For the Animal component, the EMP addresses zoonotic disease containment and waste management as pertain to disposal of special waste, emissions and materials at laboratories, and training for veterinary services workers, to include procedures for safe handling of AI materials, safe culling of infected and at-risk poultry and disposal of carcasses. For the Human Health component, the EMP focuses on equipment, refurbishing and training for reference and regional diagnostic laboratories to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management. The EMP provides mitigation plans and monitoring plans to ensure appropriate attention to environmental issues, and tracking progress or problems in their management.
I. Global, regional and national sector issues
(a) Introduction
5. The continuing outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), which begun in late 2003 in several Southeast Asian countries and have occurred more recently in Europe, have been disastrous to the poultry industry in the two regions and have raised serious global public health concerns. As of March 2006, more than 140 million domestic poultry had either died or been destroyed and over 174 people had contracted the infection (of which 94 have died). Recent increases in the number of known cases of avian influenza (AI) transmission have raised concerns over the potential emergence of a pandemic, which could have devastating effects on human health and livelihoods.
6. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that there are many uncertainties about whether and when a pandemic might occur, as well as about its potential impact. Humans are not very susceptible to the disease, but if infected with the Asian H5N1 strain, they could exhibit a high case fatality rate. The geographical spread of HPAI, the human dimension, and the potential enormous social and economic impact are unprecedented. Economic losses to the Asian poultry sector alone are estimated to date at around $10 billion. Despite control measures the disease continues to spread, causing further economic losses and threatening the livelihood of hundreds of millions of livestock farmers, jeopardizing smallholder entrepreneurship and commercial poultry production, and seriously impeding regional and international trade, and market opportunities. The rural poor, who rely for a larger share of their income on poultry, have been particularly hard hit with income losses.
7. It is impossible to anticipate when the next influenza pandemic may occur or how severe its consequences may be. On average, three pandemics per century have been documented since the 16th century, occurring at intervals of 10-50 years. In the 20th century, pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968. The pandemic of 1918 is estimated to have killed almost 50 million people in eighteen months, with peak mortality rates occurring in people aged 20-45 years. The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were milder, but many countries nevertheless experienced major strains on health care resources. If a major pandemic were to appear again, similar to the one in 1918, even with modern advances in medicine, an unparalleled toll of illness and death could result. Air travel might hasten the spread of a new virus, and decrease the time available for preparing interventions. Countries’ health care systems could be rapidly overwhelmed, economies strained, and social order disrupted. Through interventions as proposed in this Project, and in collaboration with other national and international partners, it should be possible to minimize a pandemic’s consequences in Azerbaijan through advance preparation to meet the challenge.
(b) Socioeconomic Context
8. The recent epidemics or outbreaks of animal origin (e.g. SARS, avian influenza, Lassa virus, Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Nipah virus, West Nile virus) have demonstrated the potential and real global impact of zoonotic diseases on the health and well-being of the public, as well as the enormous humanitarian, socio-economic, and trade damage that this group of diseases can cause to both developed and developing countries. They have also underscored the important role of official veterinary and public health services in disease prevention and control, as well as the importance of strengthening the capacity of these services in compliance with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) international standards (e.g. the local, regional, and global quarantine powers under the International Health Regulations; and the international standards, guidelines and recommendations under the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code). The epidemics have also demonstrated that there is an urgent need for a global response to improve the local and regional preparedness and rapid response capacity to the threat from zoonotic disease.
9. Influenza is a zoonotic disease (animal to human transmission) of international importance because of the ability of the virus that causes the disease to mutate for a potential wide-scale human-to-human transmission. Outbreaks of influenza in humans occur annually, as a result of antigenic drift in the Influence A virus with a severity which varies from year to year, but is typically moderate to mild. Nonetheless, these outbreaks occur in all countries and exert an impact primarily through morbidity and reduced economic productivity because of illness. In contrast, severe influenza pandemics occur infrequently, as a result of antigenic shift, but have been unprecedented in the number of infections and deaths caused over a short time-period. The worst such event in the 20th Century, the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918-19, had the highest mortality rate among healthy young people. Less severe pandemics occurred in 1957-58 and 1968-69, but still had high attack rates, high case fatality, and major impact on economic activity. The severity of these influenza pandemics resulted from infection with a sub-type of influenza virus to which humans had not been previously exposed and so had no immunity. Such a new sub-type of influenza (known as H5N1) is currently causing large outbreaks in birds and domestic poultry in East and Central Asia and Europe, creating widespread concern that the risk of a new and potentially severe human pandemic is high[1].
10. Addressing economic and social impacts must be an integral part of a comprehensive response. A pandemic would have devastating economic and social consequences, including large-scale loss of livelihoods as well as lives. The potential economic costs of avian influenza are apparent in countries such as Vietnam, where impacts are already evident on the poultry sector, associated input and distribution channels, and the rural poor who rely on poultry for a larger share of their income. Even if a pandemic does not occur, there could be important socio-economic effects resulting from the response to the perceived risks. Countries confront choices in balancing preparation versus action since both imply economic costs. At least three types of economic costs or impacts should be considered under a human pandemic scenario: (i) effects of sickness and mortality on potential output; (ii) private preventive responses to an epidemic; and (iii) public sector responses.
(c) Key Issues
11. A coordinated global response should involve three types of strategic activities: (i) preventing the occurrence and spread of the disease in domesticated animals, thus lowering the virus load in the environment, (ii) preventing and/or mitigating the effects of an outbreak in humans, and (iii) in the event of a pandemic, helping affected populations cope with its effects. There is a need to formulate a global response based on a common vision for undertaking these three sets of activities. Such a vision should entail immediate measures while ensuring that these measures fit within a coherent longer-term strategy with respect to both animal and human health considerations. Key issues that have been identified include:
• Prevention and control of avian influenza is multi-sectoral in nature. It involves many players, including those in the areas of health, agriculture, environment, economics, finance, and planning among others. At the country level, in particular, an integrated, multi and inter-sectoral response is needed based on shared objectives. Responses must address both the animal health and human health dimensions and also appropriate social measures (quarantines, transport restrictions, mass communication strategies).
• The risk of a human pandemic is real. The H5N1 strain currently affecting several Asian countries has proven highly fatal to humans. The risk that a pandemic virus will emerge depends on opportunities for human exposure and infection, which will persist as long as the H5N1 virus continues to circulate in animals. With the present situation, the potential of the HPAI virus to become transmissible among humans needs to be a serious concern. If the virus adapts itself to human-to-human transmission, lives may be threatened on a large scale.
• Avian Influenza virus is constantly evolving with unpredictable results. The HPAI viruses are of particular concern because they undergo constant genetic change that can have unpredictable results. The constant and rapid evolution of the virus necessitates a global approach to controlling the disease.
• Market conditions have caused HPAI to spread rapidly. The conditions for the emergence and local spread of HPAI have been exacerbated by the intensification and concentration of livestock production in areas of high-density human populations. The danger of international spread of HPAI has increased by the dynamics of regional and international trade and the movement of people. A global approach to avian influenza, therefore, will have relevance to strategic control of other livestock diseases, including zoonoses. Nevertheless, country strategies developed and owned by the governments facing the threat of avian influenza should be the foundation of a global response.
• The geographic coverage of a response should be determined by both immediate and anticipated needs. Asia is today the most affected region, but the disease is currently spreading to other areas of the world at an alarming rate and recent scientific evidence indicates that wild birds play a role in the spread of the virus from one country or region to another. The response should, therefore, combine control measures in countries where the virus has been already detected, with prevention measures in countries at risks (countries neighboring infected countries and/or in migratory bird fly way paths). A minimum level of preparedness is essential in all countries.
• An appropriate balance between short and long-term actions needs to be taken. Immediate action is needed in a number of areas. The immediate to short-term objective is to reduce the risk to humans by preventing further spread of HPAI in those countries that are currently infected. The long-term vision of the strategy is to minimize the global threat and risk of HPAI in domestic poultry and humans, through progressive control and eradication of HPAI. Achieving this goal will diminish the global threat of a human pandemic, stabilize poultry production, enhance a robust regional and international trade in poultry and poultry products, increase human and food safety, and improve the livelihoods of the rural poor.
• Global and regional aspects of the response need to be addressed and coordinated. Actions to secure borders and control international trade/travel in the event of a pandemic, as well as measures to limit the effects of disease transmission by migratory birds, are trans-boundary issues requiring regional and/or international coordination. Global and regional efforts should build on existing mechanisms such as the joint OIE/World Bank initiative for the Prevention and Control of Global Emerging and Re-emerging Diseases of Animal Origin, and the joint Global Framework for Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs), a joint FAO/OIE initiative and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
12. The FAO/OIE’s Global Strategy. The long-term vision of the strategy prepared by FAO and OIE in collaboration with WHO is to minimize the global threat and risk of HPAI in humans and domestic poultry, through progressive control and eradication of HPAI, particularly that caused by H5N1 virus, from terrestrial domestic poultry. The global strategy will be implemented over three time frames: immediate to short (1-3 years), short to medium (4-6 years) and medium to long-term (7-10 years). During this period the spread of HPAI, mainly of the H5N1 strain, will have been progressively controlled in domestic poultry of all infected countries, and prevented from affecting those countries not currently infected, but at high risk. The strategy originally prepared to control HPAI in Asia is being revised by FAO and OIE to take into account the current spread on the disease outside Asia. The strategy will be complemented by more detailed country specific HPAI control plans. FAO/OIE have also issued specific recommendations for avian influenza and OIE has recently issued recommendations for each region, in addition to its standards and guidelines provided for the prevention and control of HPAI in animals.
13. The Recommended Strategic Action plan prepared by WHO for Responding to the Avian Influenza Pandemic Threat lays out activities for individual countries, the international community, and WHO to prepare for a pandemic and mitigate its impact. The objectives of the plan correspond to the opportunities and capacities to intervene and are structured in three phases: (i) pre-pandemic – supporting the FAO/OIE’s control strategy; increasing collaboration between animal and health services; strengthening EWS, (ii) emergence of a pandemic – containing or delaying spread at the source - and (iii) pandemic declared and spreading internationally – reducing morbidity, mortality and social disruption; conducting research to guide response measures. WHO has also prepared a global plan and guidelines for pandemic preparedness and is in the process of developing a model country plan that will allow countries to assess their state of preparedness and identify priority needs.
14. The Bank has developed a global facility through a multi-country adjustable program loan (MAP). In parallel, the Bank is discussing with the EU, WHO and FAO/OIE, and bilateral donors the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund (TF) that primarily supports country level activities in conjunction with a smaller and complementary role at the regional and global level.
(d) The regional dimension
15. Cases of the H5N1 strain of avian flu have already occurred in more than 30 countries in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Africa, including most recently in Georgia as well as Azerbaijan, Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Russia, and Turkey. There are also possible cases in Macedonia and Slovenia. The Russian outbreak of HPAI H5N1 has to date affected seven administrative regions, beginning in the Ural Mountains and moving west to within 200 km of Moscow. The countries in the Balkan peninsula and the Caucasus are at risk due to their proximity to two main flyways, the East Africa-West Asia Flyway and the Central Asia Flyway. Both flyways cross areas in North-eastern Europe, where avian influenza in wild and domestic fowl has been diagnosed. From a geographical point of view, the Caucuses and Central Asia represent a vast area in which introduction of AI is likely to occur, and where the sensitivity of the system for early detection of HPAI is low. All EU countries have plans to fight a possible avian flu pandemic. All countries in ECA have or are developing similar plans.
(e) The national dimension
16. Georgia experienced its first outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in wild water fowl on February 21, 2006. The Government moved quickly and decisively to contain the outbreak, declaring a state of emergency in the region where the outbreak occurred, restricted movement in and out of a 3 km area around the spot where the suspected case was found, and implemented culling of all domestic poultry within this zone. The Government even before the outbreak had organized local crisis teams in each of the 65 Rayons in the country to undertake monitoring and surveillance operations, collect samples from suspicious deaths, and prepare for rapid response in the event of an outbreak. The Rayon offices are linked to eight regional response centers and a national Avian Flu Crisis Center in Tbilisi. Georgia also is fortunate to have good capacity for diagnostic work based on an ongoing upgrading of both Animal and Human Health labs with US Government assistance. Finally, the Government has made considerable effort to inform the public about the risks of Avian Flu, and it has established functioning hot-lines in both rural and urban areas to take reports of suspicious bird deaths. Regular testing of water fowl has been initiated at lakes along major migratory routes.
17. Agriculture production is predominately small holder, though commercial farming is growing in importance. One growth area in agriculture is poultry production, both in terms of egg and meat production, though its contribution to the GDP is still quite small at about 1.6% of GDP in 2004. About 90 percent of poultry are owned by households, and contribute significantly to the income of rural, often poor households. The presence of poultry in close contact with households creates a high risk of spreading from domestic birds to humans, even though no human cases have been reported. Commercial production has grown by over ten fold in the last five years, with some 20 large to medium commercial poultry farms producing both eggs and meat. In all an estimated, 10,000 people are employed in commercial poultry production and trade.
II. Project Development Objective and Project Components
18. The overall development objective of the project is to minimize the threat posed to humans and the poultry industry in Georgia by HPAI and other zoonoses in domestic poultry, and to prepare for, control, and respond to influenza pandemics and other infectious disease emergencies in humans. To achieve this, three areas would be supported by the project: (i) prevention; (ii) preparedness and planning; and (iii) response and containment.
19. The Project consists of the following four components:
i) Animal Health
ii) Human Health
iii) Strategic Communication
iv) Project Implementation
III. Policy context
(a) IDA/IBRD Safeguards Policy
12. The World Bank requires environmental assessment (EA) of projects proposed for Bank financing to help ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable, and thus improve decision making (OP 4.01, January 1999). EA is a process whose breadth, depth, and type of analysis depend on the nature, scale, and potential environmental impact of the proposed project. EA evaluates a project's potential environmental risks and impacts in its area of influence; examines project alternatives; identifies ways of improving project selection, siting, planning, design, and implementation by preventing, minimizing, mitigating, or compensating for adverse environmental impacts and enhancing positive impacts; and includes the process of mitigating and managing adverse environmental impacts throughout project implementation. The Bank favors preventive measures over mitigatory or compensatory measures, whenever feasible.
13. EA takes into account the natural environment (air, water, and land); human health and safety; social aspects (involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural property); and transboundary and global environmental aspects. It also takes into account the variations in project and country conditions; the findings of country environmental studies; national environmental action plans; the country's overall policy framework, national legislation, and institutional capabilities related to the environment and social aspects; and obligations of the country, pertaining to project activities, under relevant international environmental treaties and agreements. The Bank does not finance project activities that would contravene such country obligations, as identified during the EA.
14. The Georgia Avian Influenza (AI) Project has been assigned World Bank environmental category B, since it involves moderate environmental impacts that can be managed during implementation of the project. The EA process for the AI project is addressed through this EMP. Key considerations to be taken into account during the EA process include:
• Generic initial screening to determine appropriate environmental assessment;
• Compliance with existing environmental regulations in Georgia;
• Linkages with social assessment;
• Analysis of alternatives;
• Public participation and consultation with affected people and organizations; and
• Disclosure of information.
(b) Georgian Legislation
15. Environmental legislation. Georgian Constitution (article 27) stipulates that the citizens of Georgia have the right to a healthy environment. The laws regarding environmental protection reflect Georgia’s position in this sphere, take into consideration requirements of international conventions and treaties, and cover the whole range of protective measures. Activities carried out under the project will conform to current laws in Georgia and sound environmental principles. The environmental laws relevant to the AI project include:
• Georgian Law on “Environmental Protection” (1996)
• Georgian Law on “Environmental Protection Permits” (1997)
• Georgian Law on “ State Ecological Expertise” (1997)
• Georgian Law on “Water” (1997)
• Georgian Law on “Ambient Air” (1997)
• Georgian Law on “Protection of Animals” (1996)
16. Georgian Law on Environmental Protection (1996). This Law determines the general environmental protection framework related to air and water pollution, sanitation and waste management, noise and other environmental issues. Also, it defines how the future environmental protection laws will be elaborated and approved.
17. Environmental Protection Permit and State Ecological Expertise (1997). These laws define economic activities, which require environmental protection permits; procedures for obtaining environmental clearance (including assessment of impact on environment) and procedures regarding review of permits application (the so called “State Ecological Expertise”). The Environmental Permission assesses broad ecological impact of the proposed facility operations, but does not define specific ecological impact limits for air and waters. The assessment is carried out upon the presentation of the application for receiving the relevant license.
18. Georgian environmental categories: Under Georgian law EA is grouped in four environmental categories (1,2,3, or 4) the first three of which are approximately equivalent to Bank environmental categories A, B and C. Georgian Category 4 relates to project activities that have no environmental impact but may need some form of permit. The AI project is considered to correspond to Georgian Category 2. The Georgian Category 2 is represented by an activity the scope, location and content of which can have a significant impact on human health and the nature of the region where the activity will be carried out.
19. The State Ecological Expertise (SEE) opinion may be positive or negative. The positive opinion of the SEE shall be issued in the cases when the evidential documentation:
1. is in compliance with the legislation of Georgia as well as the environmental norms and standards effective on the territory of Georgia;
2. the implementation of the activity outlined in it shall not cause irreversible qualitative and quantitative changes in the environmental condition and natural resources.
3. makes provision for measures reducing or evading the impact on the environment including the measures for liquidation of possible effects of emergency situations.
20. The Ministry of Environment of Georgia is requested to consider the AI project draft EMP as the equivalent to an EIA, and after review and agreement on the final version of the document to provide a positive SEE opinion based on the provision for reducing environmental impact in emergency situations.
21. Georgian Law on Waters (1997). This Law regulates environmental issues related to surface waters, underground waters, current spring waters and territorial limits and determines rules necessary for getting licenses regarding water intake and discharge. The water preservation standards whose objective is to preserve the water resources are specified in the surface water protection norms and standards (1996). The latter describes the methodology for calculation of the permitted limit of discharges.
22. Georgian Law on Ambient Air (1997). This Law regulates quality control norms of the living environment air and temporal methodology of air pollution limitation. Comparison of air quality with the relevant standards, which are based on the State Standards (see, State Standards 17.0.0. 09-79-17.2.6.02-85 (paragraph 18).
23. Veterinary and emergency regulations. The Georgian Government has moved quickly to respond to the threat of HPAI. In December 2005 a National Task Force on Avian Influenza was established under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and consisting of the Minister’s of Finance, Health and Social Affairs, and Agriculture and Food. Under the coordination of Task Force, the Government developed National AI Preparedness Plan (NAIPP). This plan provides a good basis for further preparatory work with a particular focus on development of contingency plans and conducive legal framework, that will enable the government to implement recommended disease detection, control, prevention, containment, and eradication measures in a uniform and effective way.
24. The relevant legislative and policy documents governing the State Veterinary Service provide for response to epizootic diseases. The most recent legislation is the amendments and addenda made to the Law of Georgia "On Veterinary Medicine" (2005). Article 23 provides for control by the Veterinary Service over execution of instructions and resolution adopted in regards with prevention and liquidation of hazardous infectious diseases common to animals, and for making arrangements for culling and disposal of dead animals in burial holes. Article 25 provides for quarantine measures by the State Veterinary Service, and Article 19 provides for private veterinary services to be contracted by the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Agriculture to carry out preventive-medical and quarantine-liquidation measures in regards with epizootic, zoonosic and zooanthroponosic diseases in accordance with the Charter approved by the Ministry of Agriculture of Georgia.
(c) WHO and FAO/OIE Guidelines
25. The strategies for AI containment and response by the FAO/OIE and WHO are reviewed briefly in the section on global and sector issues above. More information on these guidelines is presented in Annexes 1 and 2 below.
IV. Project Region
26. The project will operate throughout Georgia, as it is fully possible that AI will appear in wild birds and domestic poultry in all areas of the country. Initial areas of concern are regions that host large populations of migratory waterfowl (see map attached as Annex 7 below).
V. Environmental Impacts and Mitigation Measures by Component
27. Activities under AI projects are not expected to generate significant adverse environmental effects as they are focused largely on public sector capacity building and improved readiness for dealing with outbreaks of avian influenza in domestic poultry and a potential human pandemic. These prevention-focused activities are expected to have a positive environmental impact as the Project's investments in facilities, equipment, and training for border inspection points and for veterinary and public health services and laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety over existing avian influenza handling and testing procedures. This would be reinforced by the mainstreaming of environmental safeguards into protocols and procedures for the culling and disposal of animals during AI outbreaks. In addition, waste generated in upgraded laboratory facilities will be managed using existing national guidelines that are consistent with international good practice.
28. The main areas of environmental risk from project activities are the inadvertent spread of the AI virus during culling, transport and disposal of carcasses, animal waste, litter, and used protective gear; contamination of surface and groundwater from use of disinfectants; and laboratory bio-safety and waste management. In addition, minor environmental disturbances may occur during renovation of laboratories and construction of inspection facilities at major border crossings. The project environmental mitigation plan is attached as Annexes 5-a, 5-b and 5-c.
i) Animal Health: Equipment, refurbishing and training for regional laboratories and border inspection to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management as pertain to special waste, emissions and materials; training for veterinary services and poultry sector workers to include procedures for safe handling of AI materials; safe culling of infected and at-risk poultry and disposal of carcasses. Formal compensation for culled animals should target owners/primary beneficiaries (e.g., specifically including women where they are the primary backyard producers).
ii) Human Health: Equipment, upgrading, refurbishing and training for national reference and regional diagnostic laboratories to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management; guidelines, equipment and supplies for hospital infectious waste management.
iii) Strategic Communications: No environmental issues, but an important component for design and delivery of communications tools for good hygiene, safe culling and disposal of animal carcasses, animal waste management.
iv) Project Implementation: No environmental issues; implementation and evaluation of the EMP will be monitored through this component.
29. Animal Health Component. This component will support strengthening of disease monitoring and surveillance, border controls and planning for containment measures in event of an outbreak, including preparation of plans for compensation. Immediate inputs required include cars, fuel, protective gear, disinfectant material, sprayers, rapid testing kits. Training, particularly for regional staff is required, along with technical assistance for the development of contingency plans, review of the legal and regulatory framework for response to an outbreak, and development of a mechanism to compensate poultry owners in the event that culling becomes necessary. These measures will be supported through the following sub-components:
A) Strengthening National HPIA Preparedness and Prevention Capability
A1 - Strengthening the Regulatory and Institutional Environment.
A2 - National Action and Contingency Plan
A3 - Establishment of a National Compensation Policy and Fund
30. These sub-components and measures are all supported through technical assistance, training and financing for the Compensation Fund. While these actions do not raise environmental issues, they will enable Georgia to the meet international standards set by the OIE and the recommendations developed by FAO for development of appropriate procedures and standards for the implementation and management of animal health measures and international veterinary certification activities. This in turn will help to provide the capacity for safe and environmentally sound management of culling and disposal of AI infected materials.
31. Further, the Animal Health Component will support:
(B) Strengthening Disease Surveillance, Diagnostic and Containment Capacity
B1 - Strengthening the Disease Monitoring and Containment System
B2 - Strengthening Diagnostic Capacity
B3 - Strengthening Animal Disease Information Systems
32. In addition to technical assistance and training, these sub-components will provide priority infrastructure and equipment (limited works, equipment, materials and supplies). Funding would be provided for essential first response equipment. This would include personal protection equipment, disinfectant equipment, vehicles, mobile incinerators, and materials for sampling and culling. Georgia’s laboratory capacity has been substantially strengthened over the past years and is largely equipped to diagnose all notifiable diseases including HPAI. Therefore, project support would be targeted primarily to strengthening the diagnostic capacity that needs to feed into the laboratory system. Essential equipment, consumables and reagents, staff training and technical assistance would be provided to complete the chain of response for disease surveillance.
33. Mitigation Measures for Animal Health Component: Disposal of infected materials by burial and biothermal composting. In Georgia, the existing animal carcass disposal method is digging of burial pits and use of quicklime to prevent earthworms bringing contaminated material to the surface after pit closure. This method is accepted in other countries (Australia, Canada) with due attention to factors such as the amount of material for disposal, location of the burial site, proximity to water catchment areas, soil characteristics, etc. Of particular concern however is the risk to groundwater from poorly sited pits.
34. Existing biothermal composting holes (Bekkari holes) will be renovated under the project and may also be used for carcass disposal. The holes are constructed at a dry, high-ground place with a low level of subsoil water, at least 300 m from the livestock sheds, processing facilities, rivers, ponds and wells, and the area is fenced to a height of not less than 2 m. The hole itself is 10-12 m deep, with a diameter of 2-3 m. The facility is constructed of moisture- and thermo-resistant material (bricks, ferroconcrete, wood and clay), with a hermetic cover and a ventilation system (see drawing below). 20 days after being loaded with animal carcasses the internal temperature rises to 650 C. The decaying process is completed within 35-40 days, with the formation of uniform and odorless compost, suitable for fertilizing. The biothermal hole has a significant advantage over burial grounds in that it causes fairly rapid destruction of many microbes. In the absence of rendering facilities, Bekkari holes provide effective carcass sterilization.
35. Other options for disposal include cremation, incineration, pit burning and rendering. Properly sited and constructed Bekkari holes and burial pits are valid disposal options in Georgia, particularly prior to availability of the mobile incinerators to be provided under the project, or if the quantity or location of material to be disposed of exceeds the capacity or availability of the incinerators. The Project aims to address the risks of inadvertent spreading of the virus during disposal of carcasses by burial through (i) training of veterinary services staff in proper handling of potentially infected materials; (ii) training for farmers and commercial poultry workers on proper burial pit construction and operation; (iii) provision of quicklime, PPEs and other supplies; (iv) ensuring guidance is provided from the Ministry of Environment regarding siting of burial pits to avoid groundwater contamination.
36. Mitigation Measures for disposal of infected materials using mobile incinerators. The project will support the purchase of mobile incinerators. Some minor construction work will be required for construction or rehabilitation and expansion of impermeable hardstanding and the catchment and containment of disinfectants used in the santisation of the equipment. The scope of the potential impact will be modest and will most likely only involve the laying of hardstanding and catchment tanks or minor modifications to existing structures. The Government’s standards for these constructions are consistent with the Bank’s policies for environmental aspects of minor construction.
37. The incineration facilities will be procured in compliance with the EU Animal By-products Directive and the process will be operated within established guidelines drawn from published documents in other countries. The key emissions to the air from operation of the incinerators are odour, particulate matter, hydrogen chloride, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds (from methane to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH)), and dioxins and furans (PCDD/F). There will also be noise when the incinerator is operating. In addition there is also risk from airborne release of virus as the dead poultry are loaded into the incinerator. The key actions of mitigation are to ensure that the formation of harmful substances is avoided through operation of the incinerator at the design temperatures and combustion air supply. The burning of materials e.g. polyvinyl chloride(PVC) that could lead to the formation of harmful substances when burnt will be avoided.
38. The key emissions to water from the incineration processes arise from the water and disinfectants that are used in sanitisation of the incinerator and the vehicle used in transport and slaughter of the poultry. There is also a risk from fuel spillage during transport and on site commissioning of the facility or overflow of fat from the incinerator. The key actions of mitigation are to provide adequate training and working materials to the incinerator operators, drivers and other personnel, and to ensure that sites are prepared in advance with hardstanding and catchment and containment of disinfectants.
39. Best Available Techniques (BAT) assessment supports the use of high environmental performance smaller incinerators to be deployed on farms as an alternative to the transport of material to a centralized fully Waste Incineration Directive (WID/EU) compliant high capacity incinerators. These units are able to meet the same emission standards as employed in the WID. The shortage of incinerator capacity in Georgia and the greater transport distances required to major centres where large incinerators could be built gives further strength to this as BAT.
|Table 1 Potential Environmental Issues arising from operation of mobile incinerators |
|Category |Potential Negative Impacts |Level of Significance |
|Hardstanding isolation and catchment |Rivers and Lakes Ecology |Moderate |
| |Protected areas |Low |
| |Geology and Soils |Low |
| |Landscape/Aesthetics |Low |
| |Land Acquisition |Low |
| |Loss of Crops, Fruit Trees and Household |Low |
| |Infrastructure | |
| |Noise pollution during refurbishment | |
| | |Moderate |
|Incinerator Flue gasses |Rivers and Lakes Ecology |Low |
| |Protected areas |Low |
| |Geology and Soils |Moderate |
| |Landscape/Aesthetics |Low |
| |Land Acquisition |Low |
| |Loss of Crops, Fruit Trees and Household |Moderate |
| |Infrastructure | |
| |Noise pollution during operation |Low |
| |Air quality | |
| | |Moderate |
|Ash handling and disposal to land |Rivers and Lakes Ecology |Low |
| |Protected areas |Low |
| |Geology and Soils |Moderate |
| |Landscape/Aesthetics |Low |
| |Land Acquisition |Moderate |
| |Loss of Crops, Fruit Trees and Household |Low |
| |Infrastructure |Low |
| |Noise pollution during operation |Low |
| |Air quality |Low |
|Wash down and sanitisation |Rivers and Lakes Ecology |High |
| |Protected areas |Low |
| |Geology and Soils |Moderate |
| |Landscape/Aesthetics |Low |
| |Land Acquisition |Low |
| |Loss of Crops, Fruit Trees and Household |Moderate |
| |Infrastructure |Low |
| |Noise pollution during operation |Low |
| |Air quality |Low |
| | |Low |
40. Decision capacity for the mitigation measures, operation, maintenance and monitoring of the process will be fulfilled through training and capacity building in this area. The environmental management plan matrix has been populated with hazard and mitigation actions. This assessment is presented at Annex 5-B.
41. Use of disinfectants. Contamination to surface and groundwater from use of disinfectants necessary for sanitization of infected premises will be mitigated by (i) promoting use of least toxic appropriate disinfectants (soaps and detergents), and (ii) providing training to veterinary services personnel and poultry growers on measures to limit use of toxic disinfectants and prevent untreated drainage or runoff into surface or groundwater systems.
42. Laboratories and border crossing facilities. The Animal Health Component of the Project will finance essential equipment, consumables and reagents, staff training and technical assistance for regional laboratories and selected major border crossings. The project will address laboratory waste management by basing training and upgrades to laboratory infrastructure and equipment on guidelines such as “International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories” developed by the US National Institutes of Health. The guidelines are attached below as Annex 5-C. Design of upgrades for border crossing points will include facilities for safe disposal of wastes and contaminated materials, and staff training for border security personnel will address safety measures during inspections and appropriate waste disposal. Construction and renovation works associated with rehabilitation of laboratories and border crossings will be carried out in accordance with Georgian regulations and practice regarding construction permitting and environmental, health and safety permits
43. Mitigation Measures for Human Health Component. This component will address short and medium terms needs with respect to core public health functions. The Project will help to operationalize some elements that are contemplated as part of the GPAI, expanding and intensifying the responses rapidly. As it is unlikely that the global spread of a pandemic influenza virus could be prevented once it emerges, the emphasis is on reducing its impact. Several tools will help achieve this aim: (i) year-round surveillance; (ii) effective and accurate methods of diagnosis; (iii) planning for social distancing interventions; (iv) anti-viral drugs; and (v) strengthened medical services. The interventions supported under the Project will be based on Georgia’s epidemiological and programmatic needs, and well-assessed options for meeting them. The interventions will be grouped in two sub-components: (a) Enhancing Public Health Program Planning and Coordination, and (b) Strengthening of National Public Health Surveillance Systems. The component will provide equipment upgrades and supplies to the existing national public health reference laboratory (NRL) in Tbilisi and the regional public health laboratory in Batumi for rapid diagnosis and cell culture, as well as equipping the NRL with a mobile laboratory. The NRL will be upgraded to BSL-3, which is suitable for work with infectious agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal diseases as a result of exposure by the inhalation route. Guidance on specific requirements for BSL-2, -3, and -4 is attached at Annex 3. Other laboratory improvements financed under the project will include training on safety and waste management in accordance with the guidelines at Annex 4.
44. Hospital waste management. Subcomponent C3 - Medical Services will provide assistance to the health care system for preparedness planning and strategy development to provide optimal medical care and maintain essential community services. To this end, sub-component will finance: a) technical assistance for the development of plans to establish specialized units for AI patients in selected hospitals and increase bed availability in case of a pandemic, b) development and/or updating of treatment guidelines and hospital infection control guidelines and measures, including hospital waste management, antibiotic stocks, mobilization of additional health personnel, c) training of health personnel, d) provision of equipment, drugs, vaccines, and other medical inputs, diagnostic reagents, including kits, and e) minor renovation of specialized units in selected hospitals.
VI. Monitoring
45. The environmental monitoring and evaluation guidelines for the project were developed to monitor environmental performance and identify any implementation problems so that these can be addressed promptly. These guidelines provide clear and functional roles and responsibilities, and provide monitoring indicators in order to measure the success of the mitigation measures. The monitoring plan is attached at Annex 6.
46. An environmental specialist working with the Project Coordinating Center (PCC) at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) will be responsible for monitoring of the implementation of mitigation measures for the Animal Health Component of the AI project. The specialist will also handle environmental oversight under the Human Health Component and provide periodic monitoring reports to the AI Project Implementation Team (PIT) and to the Ministry of Environmental Protection during implementation, and will notify the relevant authorities in the event of problems or issues connected with the mitigation measures. Monitoring of the EMP implementation will form a part of the overall project monitoring and evaluation system.
47. Monitoring for Incineration Disposal under the Animal Health Component. The environmental monitoring and operation guidelines for the incineration facilities are based upon published guidelines for facilities up to 1 tonne per hour capacity. Extracted information relevant to Georgia is shown at Annex 6-B. These were developed to monitor performance and emissions from incineration plant designed to destroy animals according to the EU Animal by-Products Directive 1774/2005 2003.
48. In the Directive 94/2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC, Article 48 requires that the cleansing, disinfection and treatment of holdings and any materials or substances contaminated or likely to be contaminated with avian influenza viruses are carried out under official supervision in accordance with:
a) the instructions of the official veterinarian; and
b) the principles and procedures for cleansing, disinfecting and treatment set out in Annex VI of the directive.
49. The Georgian government has adopted the general principles of the Directive and its predecessor Directive 92/40/EEC within its strategic response. These guidelines and the legal statutes for the Georgian response provide clear and functional environmental/social issues monitoring and evaluation roles and responsibilities, and provide monitoring indicators in order to measure the success of the mitigation measures. The monitoring indicators include the maintenance of the operating temperatures of the incinerator facilities to that will ensure that the destruction of harmful products of combustion. This will demonstrate that the incinerator is operated correctly and in a way that minimizes harmful emissions.
|Table 2:Summary of control techniques |
|Source |Substance |Control techniques |
| | | |
|Flue gas |Odor |Good combustion temperature |
| |Particulate matter |Good combustion if necessary abate |
| | |emissions |
| |Particulate matter |Good combustion |
| |Sulphur oxides |Limit sulphur in fuel oil abate if |
| | |necessary |
| |Carbon monoxide |Good combustion |
| |Hydrogen chloride |Abate if necessary |
| |Volatile organic compounds | |
| |Dioxins |Avoid combusting precursors. Good |
| | |combustion |
|Ash |Particulate matter |Contain |
Table 3: Emission limits, monitoring and other provisions
[pic]
50. Monitoring of the interception of liquid run off from disinfecting and wash down of the incineration facilities, containers and vehicles is required to demonstrate that biocide contaminated water is intercepted and that none is able to enter ground water via soak away or surface drainage. The monitoring plan for incineration is shown at Annex 6-B.
VII. Institutional Arrangements and Budget
51. The AI PIT, PPC and PIU are responsible for ensuring adequate budget and procurement of goods, works and services for implementation of the EMP mitigation and monitoring measures, and for supervision. The AI PIT is also responsible for full coordination with the Veterinary Service, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and Cabinet of Ministers on matters connected with implementation of the EMP.
52. Budget for implementation and monitoring of the EMP is provided under Component 4, Implementation Support and Monitoring and Evaluation
VIII. Public Consultation Arrangements
53. The draft EMP will be publicly disseminated in Georgian by the AI PIT through the Ministry of Environment (MoE) by posting on the Ministry’s website, announcing availability of the document in local press and on the government agency websites, and by making paper copies available in the MoE’s Public Information Center.
54. The AI PIT will organize and conduct at lease one public briefing and consultation on the draft EMP not later than March 31, 2006. The place, time and purpose of the consultation will be announced in the local press at least one week in advance of the meeting. In addition to the public announcement of the meeting, invitations will be sent to environmental NGOs, commercial poultry growers, farmers associations, local officials from regions prone to AI, Cabinet of Ministers staff, Ministries of Environment, Health, Agriculture, and Emergency Situations, and local representatives of international organizations including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Union, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and USAID.
55. The draft EMP will be revised after the meeting to take into account inputs from the consultation, as appropriate. The final version of the EMP will be made publicly available in Georgia, provided to the World Bank, and used by the government agencies in the implementation of the project.
Annex 1
Summary of the FAO and the OIE Global Strategy for the Progressive Control
of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
1. Vision and goal. The long-term vision of the strategy is to minimize the global threat and risk of HPAI in humans and domestic poultry, through progressive control and eradication of HPAI, particularly that caused by H5B1 virus, from terrestrial domestic poultry in Asia. Achieving this goal will diminish the global threat of a pandemic, stabilize poultry production, enhance a robust regional and international trade in poultry and poultry products, increase human and food safety, and improve the livelihoods of the rural poor.
2. A phased approach. The global strategy will be implemented over three time frames: immediate to short (1-3 years), short to medium (4-6 years) and medium to long term (7-10 years). During this period the spread of HPAI, mainly of the H5N1 strain, will have been progressively controlled in domestic poultry of all infected countries of Asia, and prevented from affecting those Asian countries not currently infected, but at high risk.
3. The immediate to short-term objective is to reduce the risk to humans by preventing further spread of HPAI in those countries that are currently infected by H5N1.
4. Over the medium to long-term (7-10 years), a more focused approach to HPAI will be mounted to progressively eradicate the disease from the remaining compartments of infected domestic terrestrial poultry in the region. The medium-to-long term strategy will consider all control measures, including vaccination, zoning and compartmentalization as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. For the long-term success of this strategy, restructuring of the poultry sectors in the region will need to be seriously considered.
5. To prevent the threat of HPAI from spreading to avian influenza-free countries, the long-term strategy supports the development of active surveillance programs and emergency preparedness plans for non-infected, at risk countries. The application of OIE standards relating to the international trade of poultry and poultry products will further assist in preventing the spread of HPAI virus across continents.
6. Capacity building. Inadequate capacity in many countries is the principal limiting factor for effectively and quickly stamping out and controlling infectious diseases. Thus, the strategy suggests building a strong and sustainable human and physical resource capacity in the countries, to respond in a more effective and timely manner in stamping out not only HPAI outbreaks, but also other newly-emerging infectious zoonotic and trans-boundary animal diseases. Capacity building will be wide ranging and include all aspects of disease control as well as policy development and socio-economic impact analysis.
7. Strategic research. The global strategy recognizes that the dynamics of the current rapid spread and persistence of HPAI remain unclear. Therefore, the strategy will facilitate strategic research to investigate the epidemiology of avian influenza, evaluate the efficacy of vaccines in domestic ducks to reduce the virus shedding in domestic duck reservoirs, and work in close collaboration with regional and international advanced research institutions to promote the development of improved vaccines and rapid diagnostic tests. Risk analysis of various poultry production systems and along marketing chains will be carried out to better target effective disease control.
8. Implementation. Implementation will be at the national, regional and international levels. At the national level, well-defined country specific projects will be formulated, which will be underpinned by the formation of sub-regional HPAI support units. Through these units, sub-regional disease diagnosis and surveillance and socio-economic and policy analysis networks will be established. These sub-regional networks will provide the lead in the development of harmonized technical standards and regional policies related to the management of live animal movement, compensation plans, capacity building, disease reporting requirements and long term planning to restructure poultry sectors.
9. At the international level, coordination of the national programs and sub-regional networks will be under the umbrella of GF-TADs (global framework for the control of trans-boundary animal diseases), a joint FAO/OIE initiative. The international coordination will provide technical backstopping to the sub-regional networks and national programs, promote international cooperation, and mobilize and coordinate resources for HPAI control.
10. Partners. The main partners in implementation of the strategy will be infected and non-infected at-risk countries, and regional organizations, all of which are committed to controlling trans-boundary animal and zoonotic diseases. Given the zoonotic nature of the HPAI, and the complex interface between farming systems, livestock trade, food safety and public health, a strong international partnership among FAO, OIE and WHO will be continued. A number of other partners will be involved, important among these would be the private sector, NGOs, and regional national agriculture extensions systems (NARES).
11. Resources. The implementation of the strategy will require funding to support the national, regional and international HPAI control programs as outlined above.
Framework for Implementation
12. A Framework for Implementation has been developed by FAO/OIE, promoting national, regional, and international initiatives. It includes the following:
National initiatives:
• Development of a National Strategy for each country specific to its own conditions. It would address farming systems, presence/absence of ducks, presence of human cases or not, trade orientation, implementation capacity, and wildlife migration patterns;
• Preparation of contingency and emergency preparedness plans;
• Development of economic impact and policy frameworks;
• Prevention of avian influenza to non-infected at-risk countries through awareness, reporting, and early detection; and
• Improvement in epidemiological information on source of infection and transmission dynamics in farming system and marketplaces.
Regional initiatives:
• Standardization of diagnosis and reporting techniques among countries;
• Sharing of disease information between countries;
• Development of a regulatory framework for management of animal movements; and
• Promotion of adherence to OIE guidelines to facilitate regional trade.
Global initiatives:
• Strengthening of partnerships (FAO, OIE, WHO, UNDP, donors);
• Support for global networks (OIE Global Service Center supported by WB/DGF and donors);
• Support for sub-regional networks -- OIE/FAO epidemiology collaborating centers and Avian Influenza Network (OFFLU);
• Further development of control strategies for trans-boundary animal diseases (utilizing the GF-TADs mechanism);
• Development of a Global Early Warning System (FOA/OIE/WHO);
• Coordination of research on improved tools for avian influenza control;
• Provision of global vision for avian influenza control; and
• Mobilization of resources through donor liaison and advocacy.
Annex 2
Summary of the World Health Organization (WHO) Strategy
1. The strategic plan lays out activities for individual countries, the international community and WHO to prepare for a pandemic and mitigate its impact. The objectives of the plan correspond to the opportunities to intervene and are structure in the following three phases:
Phase - Pre-Pandemic:
(i) Reduce opportunities for human infection. An immediate priority is to halt spread in poultry to reduce human exposure to the virus. More intensive collaboration is needed between the animal and health sectors. Communication activities targeting stakeholders, particularly rural poultry holders, should be strengthened. Workers carrying out the culling of poultry must be protected against infection by clothing and equipment.
(ii) Strengthen the early warning system. To assess risks to public health and guide protective measures, information is needed on the extent of influenza infection in animals and humans and on circulating viruses. National surveillance systems must be improved urgently in potentially affected countries. When outbreaks in animals occur, active human case detection should be pursued by a coordinated animal-human health team.
Phase - Emergence of a Pandemic:
(iii) Contain or delay spread at the source. Aggressive containment measures such as isolation and prophylactic use of antiviral drugs may slow pandemic spread and allow time for response measures. An international stockpile of antiviral drugs for an emergency response should be established, starting with a stockpile for targeted early use.
Phase – Pandemic Declared and Spreading Internationally:
(iv) Reduce morbidity, mortality, and social disruption. Although mass vaccination is the preferred intervention, serious issues related to the time lag between emergence of the virus and vaccine production as well as production capacity constraints must be addressed. Anti-viral supply and production capacity are also limited. Therefore, the main responses in the immediate term should be classic “social distancing measures” such as quarantine, bans on mass gatherings, and travel restrictions, backed up by a well-designed communication strategy. For the longer term, options with industry to improve antiviral and vaccine capacity need to be explored.
(v) Conduct research during pandemic. Research is needed for policy development and adjustments for current and future epidemics. The main elements include: assessing the epidemiologic characteristics; monitoring the effectiveness of the interventions; and evaluating the medical and economic consequences.
Recommended Strategic Actions
2. In view of the immediacy of the avian influenza threat, WHO recommends that all countries undertake urgent action to prepare for a pandemic. Advice on doing so is contained in the recently revised WHO global influenza preparedness plan (2005) and a new WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness planning (2005). Table 1 describes the phases of increasing public health risk associated with the emergence of a new influenza virus subtype that may pose a pandemic threat, and the overarching public health goals under each phase.
Table 1: Phases of Increasing Public Health Risk Associated with the Emergency of a New Influenza Virus Subtype that May Pose a Pandemic Threat
PHASES OVERARCHING PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS
Interpandemic period
Phase 1. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness
in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human at the global, regional, national and
infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the sub-national levels.
risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low.
Phase 2. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected Minimize the risk of transmission to humans;
in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus detect and report such transmission rapidly
subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. if it occurs.
Pandemic alert period
Phase 3. Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no Ensure rapid characterization of the new virus
human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread subtype and early detection, notification
to a close contact. and response to additional cases.
Phase 4. Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human Contain the new virus within limited foci or
transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that delay spread to gain time to implement
the virus is not well adapted to humans. preparedness measures, including vaccine
development.
Phase 5. Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread,
localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly to possibly avert a pandemic, and to gain
better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully time to implement pandemic response
transmissible (substantial pandemic risk). measures.
Pandemic period
Phase 6. Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in Minimize the impact of the pandemic.
general population.
a The distinction between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on the risk of human infection or disease resulting from circulating strains in animals. The distinction is based on various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge. Factors may include pathogenicity in animals and humans, occurrence in domesticated animals and livestock or only in wildlife, whether the virus is enzootic or epizootic, geographically localized or widespread, and/or other scientific parameters.
b The distinction between phase 3, phase 4 and phase 5 is based on an assessment of the risk of a pandemic. Various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge may be considered. Factors may include rate of transmission, geo-graphical location and spread, severity of illness, presence of genes from human strain (if derived from an animal strain), and/or other scientific parameters.
Source: WHO 2005
3. In order to accomplish the public health goals described for each phase, WHO recommends strategic actions that can be undertaken to capitalize on each opportunity to intervene. Given the many uncertainties about the evolution of the pandemic threat, including the amount of time left to prepare, a wise approach involves a mix of measures that immediately address critical problems with longer-term measures that sustainably improve the world’s capacity to protect itself against the recurring pandemic threat.
4. The strategic actions are:
Reduce opportunities for human infection, including:
• Support to the FAO/OIE control strategy;
• Intensify collaboration between the animal and public health sectors;
• Strengthen risk communication to rural residents; and
• Improve approaches to environmental detection of the virus
Strengthen the early warning systems, including:
• Improve the detection of human cases;
• Combine detection of new outbreaks in animals with active searches for human cases;
• Support epidemiological investigation;
• Coordinate clinical research;
• Strengthen risk assessment;
• Strengthen existing national influenza centers throughout the risk-prone regions; and
• Give risk-prone countries an incentive to collaborate internationally.
Contain or delay spread at the source, including:
• Establish an international stockpile of anti-viral drugs;
• Develop mass delivery mechanisms for anti-viral drugs; and
• Conduct surveillance of antiviral susceptibility.
Reduce morbidity, mortality and social disruption, including:
• Monitor the pandemic in real time;
• Introduce non-pharmaceutical interventions;
• Use of antiviral drugs to protect priority groups;
• Augment vaccine supplies;
• Ensure equitable access to vaccines; and
• Communicate risks to the public.
Conduct research to guide response measures, including:
• Assess the epidemiological characteristics of an emerging pandemic;
• Monitor the effectiveness of human interventions; and
• Evaluate the medical and economic consequences.
Annex 3
Guidance on the Bio-Safety Levels for Laboratories
| |Bio-Safety Level |
|REQUIREMENTS OF THE LABORATORY |2 |3 |4 |
|A) Laboratory siting and structure |
|Not next to known fire hazard |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|Workplace separated from other activities |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Personnel access limited |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|Protected against entry/exit of rodents and insects |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Liquid effluent must be sterilized | |Yes and monitored |Yes and |
| | | |monitored |
|Isolated by airlock. Continuous internal airflow | |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Input and extract air to be filtered using HEPA or equivalent | |Single on extract |Single for input, |
| | | |double for extract |
|Mechanical air supply system with fail-safe system | |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Laboratory sealable to permit fumigation | |Yes |Yes |
|Incinerator for disposal of carcasses and waste |Available |Yes |Yes on site |
| | | | |
|B) Laboratory facilities |
|Class 1/2/3 exhaust protective cabinet available |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Direct access to autoclave |Yes |Yes with |Yes with |
| | |double doors |double doors |
|Specified pathogens stored in laboratory |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Double ended dunk tank required | |Preferable |Yes |
| | | | |
|Protective clothing not worn outside laboratory |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Showering required before exiting laboratory | | |Yes |
| | | | |
|Safety Officer responsible for containment |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Staff receive special training in the requirements needed |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|C) Laboratory discipline |
|Warning notices for containment area |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|Laboratory must be lockable |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|Authorized entry of personnel |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|On entering all clothing removed and clean clothes put on | |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|On exiting all laboratory clothes removed, individual must wash and| |Yes | |
|transfer to clean side | | | |
|Individual must shower prior to transfer to clean side | | |Yes |
| | | | |
|All accidents reported |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|D) Handling of specimens |
|Packaging requirements to be advised prior to submission |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Incoming packages opened by trained staff |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
|Movement of pathogens from an approved laboratory to another |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|requires a license | | | |
|Standard Operating Procedures covering all areas must be available |Yes |Yes |Yes |
| | | | |
(Source: OIE)
Annex 4
International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories[2]
|Procurement / Transport |
|Minimize acquisition / quantity of hazardous materials, minimize storage time needed |
|Identify mechanism of waste disposal before acquisition |
|For chemicals, have Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) accessible/confine deliveries to areas that are equipped to handle them (and train |
|relevant personnel) |
|Ensure container is intact and appropriately labeled (US regulations detail how hazardous materials have to be identified, packaged, marked,|
|labeled, documented and placarded) |
|Transport in appropriate (secondary) containers |
|Use triple packaging system for infectious and potentially infectious substances |
|Adhere to international air transport regulations |
|Storage / Management |
|Inventory should have name as printed on the container |
|For chemicals: include molecular formula for further identification and to provide a simple means of searching chemicals; include CAS |
|(Chemical Abstract Service) registry number for unambiguous identification of chemicals despite the use of different naming conventions |
|Source |
|Size of container |
|Hazard classification, as a guide to safe storage, handling, and disposal |
|Date of acquisition, to ensure that unstable chemicals are not stored beyond their useful life, and Storage location |
| |
|Procedures |
|Dispose of materials anticipated to not be needed within a reasonable time frame |
|Use approved containers; make sure storage containers remain intact and sealed |
|Dispose of chemicals prior to expiration date, monitor reactive chemicals |
|Replace deteriorating labels before information is obscured or lost |
|Follow regulations for safe storage in stockroom or lab |
|Avoid storing chemicals on bench tops or lab hoods |
|Store volatile chemicals in ventilated cabinet (near hood) |
|If ventilation is not required, store in closable cabinet or on shelf with lip to prevent sliding |
|Do not expose stored chemicals to heat or direct sunlight |
|Observe all precautions regarding the storage of incompatible chemicals |
|Provide vented cabinets beneath hoods for storing hazardous materials |
|Use chemical storage refrigerators for storing chemicals |
|Have fire protection system (sprinklers) |
|Follow storage limits for flammable and combustible liquids |
|Restrict access to storage facility |
|Protocols / Facilities for Use in Research |
|Wear and use appropriate personal protection materials to minimize exposure |
|Wash hands |
|Reduce the possibility of creating splashes or aerosols |
|Contain in biological safety cabinets operations that generate aerosols |
|Use good housekeeping |
|Use mechanical pipetting devices |
|Promptly decontaminate work surfaces |
|Never eat, ring, smoke, handle contact lenses, apply cosmetics, or take medicine in the lab |
|Take special care when using sharps |
|Keep lab doors closed when experiments are in progress |
|Use secondary leak-proof containers to move or transfer cultures |
|Decontaminate infectious waste before disposal |
|Post appropriate warning signs |
|Mark emergency equipment, maintain it, inspect it; list telephone numbers to call in case of accident |
|Control access |
| |
|For Radioisotopes |
|Use only in designated areas |
|Allow the presence of essential staff only |
|Use personal protective equipment |
|Monitor personal radiation exposures |
|Use spill trays lined with disposable absorbent materials |
|Limit radionuclide quantities |
|Shield radiation sources |
|Mark radiation containers with the radiation symbol, including radionuclide identity, activity, and assay date |
|Use radiation meters to monitor working areas, protective clothing, and hands after completion of work |
|Use appropriately shielded transport containers |
|Remove radioactive waste frequently from the working area |
|Maintain accurate records of use and disposal of radioactive materials |
|Screen dosimetry records for materials exceeding the dose limits |
|Establish and regularly exercise emergency response plans |
|In emergencies, assist injured persons first |
|Clean contaminated areas thoroughly |
|Write and keep incident reports |
| |
|For Animal laboratories |
|Require good microbiological techniques |
|Establish policies and protocols for all operations and for access to vivarium |
|Establish appropriate medical surveillance program and supervision for staff |
|Prepare and adopt safety or operations manual |
|Post warning signs |
|Decontaminate work surfaces after use |
|Use appropriate biological safety cabinets or isolator cages; handle and decontaminate animal bedding and waste materials appropriately |
|Transport material for autoclaving or incineration safely, in closed containers |
|Treat, report, and record injuries |
|Training of Personnel |
|Employer develops Chemical Hygiene Plan containing (models available from U.S. government and from some professional societies) |
|Employee information and training about the hazards of chemicals in the work area: |
|How to detect their presence or release |
|Work practices and how to use protective equipment |
|Emergency response procedures |
|Circumstances under which a lab operation requires prior approval from the institution |
|Standard operating procedures for work with hazardous chemicals |
|Criteria for use of control measures |
|Measures to ensure proper operation of fume hoods and other protective equipment |
|Provisions for additional employee protection for work with select carcinogens and toxins |
|Provisions for medical consultations and examinations for employees |
|Labs should establish their own safety groups at the department level (include students and support staff) |
|Labs should provide training in safety and waste management for all lab workers, including students in laboratory classes |
|Labs should incorporate institutionally supported lab and equipment inspection programs into their overall health and safety programs |
|Review exit / evacuation routes |
|Know how to report fire, injury, chemical spill, or summon emergency response |
|Know first aid |
|Know location and use of emergency equipment such as safety showers and eyewashes |
|Know location and use of fire extinguishers and spill control equipment (have appropriate kits readily available) |
|Lab personnel should establish ongoing relationships and clear lines of communication with emergency response teams |
|Include information on safe methods for highly hazardous procedures commonly encountered by lab personnel that involve: |
|Inhalation risks |
|Ingestion risks |
|Risks of percutaneous exposures |
|Bites and scratches when handling animals |
|Handling of blood and other potentially hazardous pathological materials |
|Decontamination and disposal of infectious material |
|Segregation / Triage of Waste |
|Multihazardous waste – goal is reduction of waste to a waste that presents a single hazard. |
|Consider frequency and amount of waste generated; assess risk |
|Identify / characterize waste: |
|Physical description |
|Water reactivity |
|Water solubility |
|pH and possibly neutralization information |
|ignitability / flammability |
|presence of oxidizer |
|presence of sulfides / cyanides |
|presence of halogens |
|presence of radioactive materials |
|presence of biohazardous materials |
|presence of toxic constituents |
|Minimize waste’s hazards |
|Determine options for management of hazards |
|If appropriate, take steps to neutralize waste or render it non-hazardous |
|When possible, select a single management option |
|Establish procedures for dealing with unstable waste, or waste that requires special storage or handling |
|Store safely: |
|Designated room or facility modified to contain the waste (with ventilation and effluent trapping) |
|Protect workers |
|Minimize risk of fire or spill |
|Minimize radiation levels outside of area |
|Consider compatibility of materials being accumulated (e.g., aqueous and non-aqueous waste should be separated) |
|Give particular attention to the handling or cleaning of radioactive laboratory ware, and to the proper disposal of sharps. |
|Non-contaminated (non-infectious) waste can be reused or recycled or disposed of as general waste |
|Contaminated (infectious) sharps – collect in puncture-proof containers fitted with covers and treated as infectious; autoclave if |
|appropriate |
|Contaminated material for decontamination by autoclaving and thereafter washing and reuse or recycling |
|Contaminated material for direct incineration |
|Disposal |
|No activity should begin unless a plan for the disposal of hazardous waste has been formulated |
|Use appropriate disposal method for each category of waste |
|Use appropriate containers |
|Label and securely close waste containers |
|Separate wastes as appropriate |
| |
|For low level radioactive waste, options include |
|Storage time for decay and indefinite on site storage, |
|Burial at a low-level radioactive waste site, |
|Incineration, or |
|Sanitary sewer disposal |
| |
|For biological waste, options include |
|Disinfection |
|Autoclaving |
|For liquids, disposal in sanitary sewer; putrescible waste disposed of by incineration; needles and sharps require destruction, typically by|
|incineration or grinding |
| |
|Collection and storage of waste |
|At satellite area near lab: |
|should be clearly identified, ventilated if necessary |
|determine whether to recycle, reuse, or dispose |
|hold here for less than one year; when containment volume limits reached, move to central accumulation area – package appropriately |
|At central accumulation area: |
|separate according to compatibility, commingle solvents when appropriate |
|label clearly, store in appropriate containers |
|limit storage time to 90 days |
|(ensure that employees are trained to handle waste materials as well as contingency planning for emergencies) |
|When transporting, make provisions for spill control in case of accident; have internal tracking system to follow movement of waste |
|Ensure that all necessary records have been generated (Quantities and identification of waste generated and shipped; Documentation and |
|analyses of unknown materials; Manifests for waste shipping as well as verification of waste disposal; Any other information required to |
|ensure compliance and safety from long-term liability) |
|Disposal options: |
|Incineration – is method of choice for most wastes, but is most expensive |
|Normal trash – only where appropriate, must be clearly identified and appropriately labeled |
|Sanitary sewer – not commonly used; solutions must be aqueous and biodegradable, or low toxicity inorganics – make sure sewer doesn’t drain |
|into water supply inappropriate for waste disposal, and make sure waste is highly diluted |
|Release to the atmosphere – not acceptable; fume hoods must have trapping devices to prevent discharge to atmosphere |
|If hazardous and non-hazardous wastes are mixed, entire waste volume must be treated as hazardous |
|Preparation for transport to a treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) |
|Waste generator must obtain assurance (in terms of documentation, permits, records) that provider is reliable |
| |
|For infectious material |
|Decontaminate, autoclave, or incinerate in lab |
|Package appropriately (for incineration or for transfer to another facility for incineration) |
|Protect against hazards to others to those who might come in contact with discarded items |
Annex 5 - A
MITIGATION PLAN - Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial
|Phase |Hazard |Mitigation |Costs per location |Institutional |Comments |
| | |Measure | |Responsibility |(e.g. Secondary |
| | | | | |impacts) |
| | | |Install |Operate |Supervise |Operate | |
|1) Set up of the site | | | | | | | |
|Location of site |Indirect and direct pollution of |Base of pit minimum 1 m above the |$____ | |Local MAF; MoEnv |Poultry farmers | |
| |water |water-table and | | | | | |
| | |50m from water supply or well; MoE | | | | | |
| | |certifies soil characteristics suitable | | | | | |
| | |for burial | | | | | |
|Excavation |Direct pollution of water |Not into water table | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
| |Dust |Minor works | | | |farmers | |
| | |Suppression with water | | | | | |
|Disposal of soil |Loss of soil quality |Use as overfill | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
| | | | | | |farmers | |
|Secure site |Transfer of virus to humans or |Fencing | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
| |animals | | | | |farmers | |
|2) On site operations | | | | | | | |
|Transport of dead and |Emission of virus to air |Sealed covered container | | |Local MAF |Contractors | |
|slaughtered birds and | |Short transport distances; dispose on | | | | | |
|waste materials | |site if feasible | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| |Emission of virus & body fluids |Sealed covered container | | |Local MAF |Contractors | |
| |from dead stock | | | | | | |
| |Emission of virus on transport |Disinfectant used at recommended rates | | |Local MAF |Contractors | |
| |vehicles |Use of appropriate sprays for wash down | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| |Contamination of personnel |Mechanical handling | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | |farmers | |
| | |Disinfecting procedures | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
|Unloading of dead |Leaching of fluids |Operator training and supervision | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
|poultry |Release of virus to air |Use of mechanical loader | | | |farmers | |
| | |Carcasses in bags | | | | | |
|Burial of dead poultry |Release of virus to air during or |Operator training and supervision | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
| |after burial |Cover carcasses with 400mm soil first, | | | |farmers | |
| |Contamination of personnel |then apply lime, then complete filling | | | | | |
| | |Cover with minimum 2 m soil to ground | | | | | |
| | |level, plus overfill | | | | | |
| | |Disinfecting procedures | | | | | |
|Temporary storage for |Leaching of fluids |Enclosed building | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
|culled birds accumulated|Groundwater pollution |Shelter from weather | | | |farmers | |
|between transport runs |Release of virus to air |Operator training and supervision. | | | | | |
| |Rupture of storage units |Minimal storage times. | | | | | |
| |Rodent contact |Impermeable surfaces. | | | | | |
|Birds may not be |Serious animal welfare issues. |Supervision and monitoring | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
|effectively killed |Virus spread form escaped poultry |Slaughter Operator Training | | | |farmers | |
| | | | | | | | |
|3) Clean up of infected | | | | | | | |
|premises | | | | | | | |
|Disposal of waste from |Disinfectants contaminate surface |Minimal transport distances. | | |Local MAF |Contractors or | |
|infected premises |and groundwater |Covered loads | | | |farmers | |
| |Influenza virus release |Use appropriate disinfectants | | | | | |
| |Odour |Avoid drainage to watershed | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
|Hold solid waste for the|Transmission of Influenza virus by|Marked and fenced dedicated area | | |Local MAF |Site owner | |
|sanitary period of 42 |air, water, vermin |Covered heaps | | | | | |
|days. | |Impermeable surfaces | | | | | |
| | |Hold for sanitary period | | | | | |
|Use of disinfectants on |Biocides toxic to aquatic fauna |Block or intercept the flows in drains to | | |Local Environmental |Contractors or | |
|the surfaces of the |from drainage and surface run off |surface or groundwater. | | |Authority |farmers | |
|infected premises | |Collect and store the diluted disinfectant| | | | | |
| | |and organic material for the sanitary | | | | | |
| | |period of 42 days | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
Annex 5 - B
MITIGATION PLAN - Carcass Disposal by Incineration
|Phase |Hazard |Mitigation |Cost |Institutional |Comments |
| | |Measure | |Responsibility |(e.g. Secondary |
| | | |Costs per village except | |impacts) |
| | | |Install |Operate |Supervise |Operate | |
|1 Set up of the facility| | | | | | | |
|Location of unit |Indirect and direct pollution of |Use existing hardstanding if available |$8000 | |Local administration |MAF | |
| |water |Minimum 10 m from water or drain. |*per cluster of | | | | |
| | |50m from water supply or well |villages | | | | |
|Hardstanding |Pollution of water from run off |Provide lined catchment |N/A |N/A |Provincial government |MAF | |
|construction | | | | | | | |
|Excavations |Direct pollution of water |Not into water table |N/A |N/A |MAF |Contractors | |
| |Dust |Minor works | | | | | |
| | |Suppression with water | | | | | |
|Disposal of soil |Loss of soil quality |Spread top soil on land |N/A |$200 |MAF |Contractors | |
|Supply of materials |Environmental burden of extraction|Local supply where possible |N/A |N/A |MAF |Contractors |Environmental burdens |
| |and transport | | | | | |from manufacture of |
| | | | | | | |concrete small areas|
|2. On site operations | | | | | | | |
|Transport of slaughtered|Road traffic emissions from |Short travel for slaughtered livestock |N/A |N/A |MAF |MAF |Major advantage of |
|birds |Fuel use | | | | | |mobile incinerator |
| |Emission of virus to air |Sealed covered container |N/A |N/A |MAF |MAF | |
| | |Short transport distances | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| |Emission of virus & body fluids |Sealed covered container |$200 |N/A |MAF |MAF | |
| |from dead stock | | | | | | |
| |Emission of virus on transport |Disinfectant used at recommended rates |N/A |$10 |MAF |MAF | |
| |vehicles |Use of appropriate sprays for wash down | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| |Contamination of personnel |Mechanical handling |N/A |N/A |MAF |MAF | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| | |Disinfecting procedures | | | | | |
|Unloading of dead |Leaching of nutrients |Operator training and supervision |N/A |N/A |MAF |MAF | |
|poultry |Groundwater pollution |Impermeable hardstanding | | | | | |
| |Release of virus to air |Use of mechanical loader | | | | | |
| | |Close transfer | | | | | |
| | |Carcasses in bags | | | | | |
|Temporary storage for |Leaching of nutrients | |$1000 |N/A |MAF |MAF | |
|culled birds Accumulated|Groundwater pollution |Enclosed building | | | | | |
|between burning runs |Release of virus to air |Shelter from weather | | | | | |
| |Rupture of vessel or bags |Operator training and supervision. | | | | | |
| |Rodent contact |Minimal storage times. | | | | | |
| | |Impermeable surfaces. | | | | | |
|Birds may not be |Serious animal welfare issues. |Supervision and monitoring |N/A |N/A |MAF |MAF | |
|effectively killed |Virus spread form escaped poultry |Slaughter Operator Training | | | | | |
|Storage of fuel oil |Groundwater pollution |Bunded tank |Part of incinerator|N/A |MAF |MAF | |
| |Soil contamination |Impermeable surfaces |package | | | | |
| | |Run off containment tank | | | | | |
|Incineration |Gaseous emissions |Turkish law for incineration emissions |Part of incinerator|N/A |MAF |MAF |Personal protective |
| |Ash |2 second 850 oC secondary chamber or 1000 |package | | | |clothing in similar |
| |Fat |oC, 1 second for mobile units. | | | | |mass to body bags used|
| |Hot surfaces |Animal by products Directive guidance on | | | | |for pet cremation in |
| | |use and installation. | | | | |accordance with EU |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | |Directive 1774/2002 |
| | |Minimal burning of other wastes e.g. | | | | | |
| | |personal protective clothing. | | | | | |
| | |Restricted access to operators | | | | | |
| | |Tainting and operation manual | | | | | |
|Ash disposal |Particulate |Damping down |N/A |N/A |MoE |Local administration| |
| | |Enclosed container | | | | | |
| | |Regular de-ashing | | | | | |
| | |Animal by products Directive guidance on | | | | | |
| | |use and installation. | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
|Washdown processes |Disinfectant |Use at recommended rates. |N/A |$10 |MAF |MAF | |
|incinerator & vehicle |Organic liquor |Killed by biocide | | | | | |
|Transport containers |Influenza virus |Impermeable surfaces | | | | | |
|Transport vehicle | |Sealed catchment | | | | | |
| |Groundwater pollution |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| |Surface water pollution | | | | | | |
|Collection of effluents |Leaching of nutrients |Tank installed with connecting pipe at |$500 |MARA |MAF |MAF | |
|from washdown |Groundwater pollution |hardstanding | | | | | |
| |Avian influenza virus transmission|Tank enclosed | | | | | |
| | |Liquid stored until certified safe to | | | | | |
| | |spread to land | | | | | |
|Phase 3 clean up of | | | | | | | |
|infected premises | | | | | | | |
|Hardstanding remains |Contaminated water if used to | |$500 |$400 |MAF |Municipality |Assumes that the small|
|after incineration |store organic materials |Maintain as a clean area. | | | | |impermeable area will|
| | |Contain contaminated water in tank | | | | |remain |
|Handling of waste from |Disinfectants |Impermeable surfaces |$10 *holding |$500 |MAF |MAF | |
|infected premises |Leaching of nutrients |Drainage to impermeable vessel. | | | | | |
| |surface and groundwater pollution |Treatment on site | | | | | |
| |Influenza virus release |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| |Odour | | | | | | |
|Disposal of stored wash |Pollution of groundwater |Disinfectant used at recommended dilution.|$100 *holding |$1000 |MAF |MAF |A waste management |
|water with disinfectant |Toxicity to soil organisms |Further dilution by clean water | | | | |plan is required for |
|mixed in |Pollution of surface water |Degradation of biocide in storage | | | | |the spreading of the |
| | |10 m wide no spread zone near drains and | | | | |liquid and solid |
| | |watercourses. | | | | |wastes after the |
| | |Avoid slopes and spread according to a | | | | |sanitary period |
| | |waste management plan | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
|Removal of faeces from |Transfer of virus in faeces mixed |Minimal transport distances. |$100*holding |$1000 |MAF |MAF |Importation of |
|backyards and poultry |in the soils. Disinfectants |Covered loads | | | | |material to return |
|housing interior |surface and groundwater pollution |Operator training and supervision | | | | |surface levels |
| |loss of soil | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
|Hold solid waste for the|Transmission of Influenza virus |Marked dedicated area |$20 *holding |$1000 |MAF |Holding owner | |
|sanitary period. |by air ,water, vermin |Covered heaps | | | | | |
| | |Impermeable surfaces | | | | | |
| | |Removal of soil with waste. | | | | | |
| | |Sanitary period according to EU directive| | | | | |
| | |on AI | | | | | |
|Use of disinfectants on |Biocides are list 2 substances in |Block or intercept the flows in drains to |$500*holding for |$2000 |MAF |MAF | |
|the surfaces of the |the Groundwater Directive toxic to|surface or groundwater. |temporary tank | | | | |
|infected premises |aquatic fauna from drainage and |Collect and store the diluted disinfectant| | | | | |
| |surface run off |and organic material for the sanitary | | | | | |
| | |period of 42 days | | | | | |
| | |Operator training and supervision | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
Annex 5 - C
MITIGATION PLAN – Laboratory Safety and Waste Management
|Phase |Hazard |Mitigation |Costs per location |Institutional |Comments |
| | |Measure | |Responsibility |(e.g. Secondary |
| | | | | |impacts) |
| | | |Install |Operate |Supervise |Operate | |
|1) Assess labs needs |None | |$____ | |MoH/ MAF |Consultants |Refer to BSL |
|for training, equipment | | | | | | |requirements and |
|and physical | | | | | | |International Best |
|infrastructure | | | | | | |Practice in Safety of |
| | | | | | | |Research Laboratories |
| | | | | | | |(EMP Annexes 3 and 4) |
| | | | | | | | |
|2) Conduct training and |Operation of PCR below BSL-3 risks|Training and physical upgrades to BSL-3 | | |MoH/ MAF |Consultants, | |
|physical reconstruction |release of virus |prior to operation of PCR | | | |contractors | |
|to bring PCR lab(s) to | | | | | | | |
|BSL-3 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
|3) Procure equipment and|Release of virus |Training on new equipment | | |MoH/MAF |MoH/MAF, | |
|provide staff training | | | | | |contractors, | |
| | | | | | |consultants | |
| | | | | | | | |
|4) Ongoing laboratory |Inappropriate waste management |Training and upgrades to laboratory | | |MoH/ MAF |MoH/MAF, | |
|operations | |infrastructure and equipment based on | | | |contractors, | |
| | |International Best Practice in Safety of | | | |consultants | |
| | |Research Laboratories | | | | | |
Annex 6 - A
MONITORING PLAN - Disposal of Poultry in Burial Pits
|Phase |What parameter is to |Where |How |When |Why |Responsibility |
| |be monitored? |is to be monitored? |is it to be monitored/ type of |is it to be monitored |is the parameter to | |
| | | |monitoring equipment? |-frequency or continuous? |be monitored | |
| | | | | |(optional)? | |
|Construct |Site selection and pit|Burial sites |Observation; Design and |During construction |To ensure appropriate|MAF, Ministry of Environment, local |
| |construction | |construction to appropriate |After completion of |size and design |government |
| | | |standard |construction | | |
|Operate |Safe handling of |Burial sites |Observation and records. |During burial |To avoid spreading |MAF |
| |carcasses and | | | |the virus; | |
| |materials for | | |Hourly when operating |to avoid water | |
| |disposal; Disinfection| | | |pollution from | |
| |of workers and | | |During disinfection before|disinfectants | |
| |equipment | | |breaks and at end of day | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
|Closing |Burial pit |Burial sites |Observation and records. |After pit it closed |To ensure correct |MAF, local government |
| | | | | |closure to prevent | |
| | | | | |spread of virus | |
| | | | | | | |
Annex 6 - B
MONITORING PLAN- Disposal of Poultry by Incineration
|Phase |What parameter is to|Where |How |When |Why |Responsibility |
| |be monitored? |is to be monitored? |is it to be monitored/ type |is it to be monitored |is the parameter to be | |
| | | |of monitoring equipment? |-frequency or continuous?|monitored (optional)? | |
|Construct |Site selection and |Incineration sites |Designs and construction to |During construction |To avoid water |MoE |
| |impermeable hard | |avoid escape of liquid to |After completion of |pollution | |
| |standing | |water |construction | | |
|Operate |Incinerator |Incinerator flue stack |Integral instrumentation and |During incineration |To avoid air pollution | |
| |emissions |Effluent tank |records. | | |Incinerator operator |
| | | |Visual and olfactory |Hourly when operating | | |
| |Smoke odour | |assessments of emissions | | | |
| |CO, O2 | |Extractive |Continuous | | |
| | | | | | |MoE |
| |Temperature | | |Annual | | |
| |Particulate HCl, | | | |To avoid water | |
| |CO, SO2 | |Visual presence in open | |pollution | |
| |Washdown water | |channels | | | |
| |emmision |Drains near the site | |At washdown | | |
Annex 6 - C
MONITORING PLAN – Laboratory Safety and Waste Management
|Phase |What parameter is to |Where |How |When |Why |Responsibility |
| |be monitored? |is to be monitored? |is it to be monitored/ type of |is it to be monitored |is the parameter to | |
| | | |monitoring equipment? |-frequency or continuous? |be monitored | |
| | | | | |(optional)? | |
|Training and |Staff training; lab |location |Observation; records of |After completion of |To ensure |Qualified independent consultants |
|Construction |renovations | |training; Design and |training and construction |satisfactory |satisfactory to the Bank contracted by MAF|
| | | |construction to appropriate | |completion of |and MoH PIUs |
| | | |standard | |training and lab | |
| | | | | |renovations | |
|Procure and install |Installation and safe |location |Observation and records of |After installation, before|To avoid spreading |Qualified independent consultant |
|equipment |operation of equipment| |training. |operations |the virus |satisfactory to the Bank contracted by MAF|
| | | | | | |and MoH PIUs |
| | | | |Quarterly thereafter | | |
| | | | | | | |
Annex 7
Map of High Risk Areas
Annex 8
Disclosure Procedure
Records of the Public Disclosure of the Georgia Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project Environmental Management Plan
Prepared by:
Beka Tagauri, Local Environmental Consultant
Draft Environmental Management Plan (EMP) of the Project was prepared in English and Georgian.
Distribution list was developed, which included local authorities (MOA, MOE, MOH), NGOs, local representatives of international organizations, and poultry growers.
On March 30, 2006, the draft EMP was distributed through an electronic bulletin of the Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN) to some 5,000 subscribers.
Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Levan Ramishvili was provided with the electronic and hard copies of the draft EMP and was briefed about the MOA’s input. Arrangements were made to post the draft EMP on the MOA web site.
Heads of the Departments of Integrated Environmental Management and of the Environmental Permits at the Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources were contacted and provided with the draft EMP. The department of Public Relations was also contacted with a request to post the draft EMP on the MOE web site. However, it turned out impossible at this moment, due to the limited space on the MOE's homepage. It is expected that after upgrading the MOE computer center next week it will be possible to post the draft EMP information on the MOE web site.
Representatives of the Department of Public Health of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Welfare were provided with the briefing materials and their attendance ensured on the public briefing.
On March 31, 2006 a public briefing of the draft EMP was held at the WB office in Tbilisi. It was attended by the representatives from the Ministries of MOA, MOH, MOE, NGOs, local representatives of international agencies, poultry farm, poultry trader and press.
Attached are:
1. Distribution list of the draft EMP.
2. List of participants of the public briefing of the draft EMP.
3. Minutes of the public briefing of the draft EMP.
|Attachment 1. Distribution List of the draft EMP |
|# |Organization |Name |Telephone |E-mail |
|1 |MOA |Levan Ramishvili |899-758866 | |
|2 |MOA, Vet. Department |Jambul Maglakelidze |899-711515; 397069 |J_maglakelidze@ |
|3 |MOH, Public Health Dep. |Kakha Nachkebia |899-513043 | |
| |Disease Prevention Dep. Head | | | |
|4 |MOH, Public Health Dep. |Robizon Tsiklauri | | |
| |Epidemiology Dep. Head | | | |
|5 |Hospital of Infectious disesases |Shota Gogichaishvili |899503540 |aids@gol.ge |
|6 |Center of Immunological diseases |Tengiz Tsertsvadze | | |
|7 |MOE, Permits Dep. |Irakli Kvashilava |893-597007 |irakli@.ge |
| | |Nick Chakhnakia |877-401972 | |
|8 |MOE, Integrated Env. Managm.Dep. |Nino Tkhilava | |ntkhilava@.ge |
|9 |MOE, Waste Management Dep. |Alverd Chankseliani | | |
|10 |USAID |Tamuna Barabadze |778541 |tbarabadze@ |
|11 |EU Food Security |Rati Shavgulidze |899-797812 |Rshavgulidze.fsp@dsl.ge |
|12 |UNDP |Nino Antadze |251128 |nino.antadze@ |
|13 |UN WFP |Inge Breuer |253667(8) |Inge.Breuer@ |
|14 |WHO |Nino Mamulashvili |998558; 998073 |whologe@.ge |
|15 |JICA |George Pipia |899654329 |jp_gpipia@ |
|16 |NGO CENN | |751903(4) |info@ |
|17 |NGO Nacres |Levan Butkhuzi | |stiped.hyena@ |
|18 |NGO Georgian Center for |Ramaz Gokhelashvili | |ramaz@ |
| |Conservation of Wildlife | | | |
|19 |NGO Center for Strategic |Lia Todua |899-577959 |liatodua@csrdg.ge |
| |Research and Development | | | |
|20 |NGO Green Alternative |Keti Gujaraidze | |ngujaraidze@ |
|21 | LLC "Poultry Georgia" |Beka Bekaia |433539 | |
|22 |LLC "Agrocorp Caucasia" |Irakli Chikhladze |877-717715 |Irakli.Chikhladze@ |
|23 |Sole Propr. "Elguja Nozadze" |Elguja Nozadze | | |
|24 |FAO |Mamuka Meskhi |877-403022 |FAO-GE@ |
|25 |UNICEF |Giovanna Barberis | |Gbarberis@ |
Annex 9
Minutes of Disclosure Meeting
MINUTES
Public Briefing and Consultation
on the draft Environmental Management Plan
Developed for Georgia Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project,
Proposed for Financing by the World Bank and the Government of Japan
31 March 2006
Tbilisi, Georgia
Present were -
The World Bank Task Team and the Consultant to it:
Frauke Jungbluth, Task Team Leader, ECSSD; Van Roy Southworth, Task Team Leader, Country Manager for Georgia, ECCGE; Tamar Gotsadze, Health Specialist, ICSHD; Ilia Kvitaishvili, Agricultural Specialist, ECSSD; Inga Paichadze, Communications Officer, ECCGE; and Beka Tagauri, Consultant.
The list of representatives of the Government and non-Government organizations and the private sector is attached separately.
The meeting was mediated by Mr. Beka Tagauri, who briefly introduced goal and the agenda of the meeting, the subject Project and the Environmental Management Plan prepared for it. All participants were given chance to introduce themselves and their employer organizations.
Mr. Levan Ramishvili, Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, emphasized that Avian Influenza is an international problem that should be regarded and responded to seriously. The first effective step for actions against the possible pandemic is prevention of the occurrence of this disease and its containment in poultry farms.
Mr. Ramishvili informed that the Government took preventive measures as early as in the last year by allocating 500,000 GEL for the purchase of technical and protective appliances. When the disease started to spread in the countries neighboring Georgia, the Government took all necessary measures against spreading the disease within the country. Immediate response followed the first reported case of H5N1 virus detection in a wild bird in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara.
Mr. Ramishvili emphasized the role of International Organizations, especially, the role of the World Bank, in the worldwide response to the Avian Influenza outbreaks. Elaboration of a long term program is very important for preventing the future spread of the decease. All actions against the virus should be taken respecting international standards.
Mr. Jambul Maglakelidze, Head of Veterinary Department outlined the importance of all preventive actions against the spread of disease. The measures taken in Achara for localization of the reported case of the Avian Influenza was a good example of the relevant responses carried out by the Government of Georgia. This case also allowed to gain experience in hand on action and to learn a lesson. Efficient work and action gave a positive outcome.
Mr. Maglakelidze outlined the importance of the Environment Management Plan as of a monitoring tool that would allow to coordinate activities against the spread of the disease throughout the country.
Mr. Ilia Kvitaishvili, Agricultural Specialist, the World Bank, briefed participants on the main components of the Project and on the importance of their successful implementation. He stressed the importance of the technical assistance and training to be provided under the Project. High priority will be given to the development of a National Preparedness Plan, to be deployed in case of the Avian Influenza outbreak in Georgia. The approximate amount of financing to be allocated for the Project makes 10 million USD.
Participants eagerly discussed the matters associated with laboratory safety and waste management, since they believe both play an important role in the combat against spread of the Avian Influenza. A suggestion was made to involve experts from the Scientific Research Institute of Biophysics, who have extensive experience in the hazardous waste management.
The discussion also covered the field of public relations and dissemination of information to the population. The debates led to an agreed upon idea of having a single coordinated body for disseminating the information in order to avoid spread of the disease as well as its potential negative economic and social impacts.
The importance of mitigating all possible negative environmental impacts of the Project implementation was emphasized by the representative of Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources, who expressed his readiness to contribute to the effective implementation of the Project .
In a conclusion all participants expressed their willingness to cooperate, get themselves closer acquainted with the proposed Project and its Environmental Management Plan and to send in their comments and suggestions within a week should such comments arise.
List of Participants of the EMP Public Briefing on March 31, 2006
|# |Name |Organization |Position |Telephone |e-mail |
|1 |Levan Ramishvili |MOA |Advisor to the Minister |899-758866 | |
|2 |Jambul Maglakelidze |MOA, Vet. Department |Chief Veterinarian Officer |899-711515; 397069 |J_maglakelidze@ |
|3 |Kakha Nachkebia |MOH, Public Health Dep. |Head of Department |899-513043 | |
| | | |of disease prevention | | |
|4 |Manana Beruchashvili |MOH, Public Health Dep. |Deputy Head of Department | | |
|5 |Paata Tsagareishvili |MOH, Public Health Dep. |Dep. of disease prevention | | |
|6 |Thea Kakabadze |Center of Immunological diseases |Doctor of infectious disease |893-259753 | |
|7 |Marina Makarova |MOE |Head of Department | | |
|8 |Rati Shavgulidze |EU Food Security Programme |Analyst |899-797812 |Rshavgulidze.fsp@dsl.ge |
| |Seamus o'Grady |EU Food Security Programme |Advisor | | |
|9 |George Pipia |JICA |Program Coordinator |899654329 |jp_gpipia@ |
|10 |Vaja Gigauri | LLC "Poultry Georgia" |Veterinarian |433539 |bekaia@ |
|11 |Inga Lagoshvili |NGO Agroservice |Director | | |
|12 |Maia Aleksidze |NGO Agroservice |Specialist | | |
|13 |Nino Khidesheli |Caucasus Press |Journalist | | |
|14 |Vano Grigalashvili |World Vision International |Program Coordinator |899-192455; 453551 |vano_grigolashvili@ |
|15 |Maya Baiadze |World Vision International |Program Assistant |877-430045 |maiko_baiadze@ |
|16 |Guranda Jishkariani |NGO Women and new Century |Chairperson |333925 |jishkarianiguranda@ |
|17 |Kakha Nadiradze |NGO World Poultry Science Association |Vice President | | |
|18 |Lali Durmishidze |WB RDP PIU |Project Manager |899-464344 | |
|19 |Nino Gamrkelidze |NGO Adults and New Millennium |President | | |
|20 |Inga Baliashvili |NGO Adults and New Millennium |Vice president | | |
|21 |Irma Simonia |NGO Adults and New Millennium |Vice President | | |
-----------------------
[1] Antigenic drift refers to a change in surface proteins of a given strain of influence virus in response to antibodies in human hosts who have been exposed to it. It occurs continually in both type A and B influenza strains, thus the reason to re-engineer the influenza vaccine on a regular basis to prevent seasonal outbreaks or epidemics. Antigenic shift refers to the reassortment of the animal influenza strain with the circulating human strain in the process of moving from an animal to humans. This antigenic shift is more of a concern since when it occurs, it results in pandemics due to generalized susceptibility to infection in humans.
[2] US National Institutes of Health
-----------------------
E1375
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related searches
- world bank unesco education
- world bank financial inclusion
- world bank poverty line 2019
- world bank financial inclusion 2020
- world bank business environment index
- world bank doing business 2020
- world bank ease of doing business 2019
- world bank doing business rankings
- world bank retiree portal
- world bank pension log in
- world bank retiree website
- world bank staff retirement plan