Contemporary Ethical Theory



Contemporary Ethical Theory

Philosophy 440: 49466R

Fall 2010

MW 2:00 – 3:15

John Dreher

Office: MHP 211

x05173

dreher@usc.edu

Hours: Aug 23 – Wed Dec 1

Mon 10:30 - 11:30

Wed 9:30 – 10:30

Hours: Dec 5 – Dec 13

TBD

Last Minute Review for Final Examination:

Fri Dec 10 1 – 2

Final Examination:

Fri Dec 10 2 - 4

Materials: 1. Cahn and Haber, 20th Century Ethical Theory, Prentice Hall, 1995,

ISBN 0-02-318031-5. Except for readings from R.M. Hare, Moral

Thinking and M. Smith, The Moral Problem, all required reading

assignments listed refer to Cahn & Haber.

2. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,

ISBN 0-19-824660-9

3. Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Inc,

1994, ISBN 0-631-19246-8.

Description: This course is an introduction to ethical theory in the twentieth century as it was carried on in the tradition of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The course emphasizes what is called ‘meta-ethics,’ meaning the study of the semantics of moral discourse and the rationality of moral belief. However, the course will not neglect the development of various substantive theoretical theories, including neo-Aristotelianism, neo-Kantianism and Utilitarianism. The readings from the pre-WWII era will be taken up in chronological order, to give a sense of the dialectic of the great debates of the twentieth century between cognitivist and noncognitivist theories. Readings from the post-WWII era will be organized thematically.

Requirements: There will be two midterm examinations during the course of the semester. These examinations will test for knowledge of the reading assignments as well as the expository and supplementary information delivered during class. There will also be a final examination. Class attendance is very strongly recommended. Students planning an absence should notify the instructor in advance and make arrangements with classmate to record the lecture.

A term paper is required and will be due on Wed, Dec the 1st. The term paper should not be merely expository, but rather should be an analytic piece examining a fragment of one of the themes developed in the course. For most topics, a suitable length will be ten to twenty pages. Please identify your topic well in advance of the Wed Nov the 3rd

deadline. Electronic submission of the paper is desirable. In case the paper is submitted electronically, comments will be returned electronically. Please enter the subject line of an electronic submission in the following format: PHIL 440 F 10 TERM PAPER. Papers that are late will be penalized as follows: up to 48 hours: 1/3 of a letter grade; for more than 48 hours: 2/3 of a letter grade. No term paper will be accepted after the final examination. In the event that a term paper is not submitted, the final COURSE grade will be lowered by one full letter grade. The grade of “IN” will be given only for documented illness or family emergency.

There will be a final examination held at the time and place indicated in the Schedule of Classes. Part I of the final examination will test for knowledge of material taken up after the second midterm. Part II of the final examination will be a comprehensive question, dealing with the main ideas of the course. The final grade will be calculated as follows:

Weighting of grades:

Midterm #1: 1/6

Midterm #2: 1/6

Term Paper: 1/3

Final Exam Part I: 1/6

Final Exam Part II: 1/6.

Grade scale:

94: A

90: A –

87: B +

84: B

80: B –

and so forth.

Please remember that the University strictly prohibits plagiarism, which can be the mere failure to acknowledge the work of another as well as the deliberate misrepresentation of the work of another as your own. You must acknowledge your indebtedness not only to the ideas of others but also to their words.

Schedule of Readings, Assignments and Examinations:

1. Mon, Aug 23: Introduction: Kantian and Utilitarian Background; Twentieth

Century Ethical Theory: Cognitivism/Noncognitivism;

Realism/Anti-Realism Introduction

2. Wed, Aug 25: G.E. Moore, ‘The Subject Matter of Ethics’ (from Principia

Ethica), pp. 12 – 32.

3. Mon, Aug 30: H.A. Prichard, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’

(from Mind, 21, 1912), pp. 37 – 47. W.D. Ross, ‘What Makes

Right Acts Right’ (from The Right and the Good),

pp. 87 – 107.

4. Wed, Sep 1: L. Wittgenstein, ‘A Lecture on Ethics,’ pp. 81 – 86.

5. Mon, Sep 6: Labor Day

6. Wed, Sep 8: J. Ayer, ‘A Critique of Ethics’ (from Language, Truth and

Logic), pp. 108 – 15.

9. Fri Sep 11: C. Stevenson, ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,’ (from

Mind 46, 1937), pp. 116 – 28; ‘The Nature of Ethical

Disagreement,’ (from Facts and Values, 1963, first published,

1941), pp. 138 – 144.

7. Mon, Sep 13: Review for Examination

8. Wed, Sep 15: Midterm Examination #1

9. Mon, Sep 20: J. Mackie, ‘A Refutation of Morals’ (from Australasian Journal

of Philosophy, pp. 1946. J. Mackie, ‘A Refutation of Morals’

(from Australasian Journal of Philosophy, pp. 1946), pp. 145 – 152.

10. Wed, Sep 22: J. Rawls, ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,’ 1951,

pp. 212 – 224.

11. Mon, Sep 27: R. Firth, ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,’

(from: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12:2, 1952),

pp. 225 – 46. K. Baier, ‘The Point of View of Morality’

(from: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1954), pp. 247 – 263.

12. Wed, Sep 29: Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy

13. Mon, Oct 4: P. Geach, ‘Good and Evil’ (from: Analysis 17, 1956),

pp. 300 – 306. G. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’

(Philosophy 33, 1958), pp. 351 -64.

14. Wed Oct 6: P. Foot, ‘Moral Beliefs’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, 59, 1958-59), pp. 365 – 77.

15. Mon, Oct 11: P. Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’ (from Virtues and Vices and Other

Essay in Moral Philosophy, Berkeley, University of

California Press, 1979), pp. 583 – 93.

16. Wed, Oct 13: Kantian Moral Philosophy

17. Mon, Oct 18: P. Foot, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,’

1972, pp. 448 – 456.

18. Wed, Oct 20: T. Nagel, ‘Moral Luck,’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,

50, 1976), pp. 573 – 582.

19. Mon, Oct 25: Review form Midterm #2

20. Wed, Oct 27: Midterm #2

21. Mon, Nov 1: J. Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ 1955, pp. 273 – 90.

22. Wed, Nov 3: Utilitarianism, T. Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ (from

Utilitarianism and Beyond, A. Sen and B., Williams, eds., New

York, Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 647 – 666.

Last Day to Identify Term Paper Topic

23. Mon, Nov 8: B. Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, (from Utilitarianism,

For and Against, edited, by J.J. Smart and Bernard

Williams, New York, Cambridge University Press,

1973), pp. 457 – 75. B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and

Morality,’ (from Moral Luck, New York, Cambridge

University Press, 1981),

pp. 634 – 47.

24. Wed, Nov 10: R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, pp. 1 – 86.

25. Mon, Nov 15: R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, pp 87 – 116.

26. Wed, Nov 17: M. Smith, The Moral Problem, pp. 42 – 59.

27. Mon, Nov 22: M Smith, The Moral Problem, pp. 42 – 69, 92 – 136; 147 - 49

28. Wed, Nov 24: Review and Discussion

29. Mon, Nov 29: Review for Final Examination

30. Wed, Dec 1: Review for final Examination

Term Paper Due

Study Questions

The questions below are designed to help you focus on the most important parts of the readings and lectures. Naturally the topics and questions addressed in the questions are the ones that are most likely to be included on the midterm and final examinations. There may be additions to the list of the study questions during the semester and the questions themselves may be modified.

1. What reason does Moore give for his contention that good cannot be a natural property? According to Moore, ‘propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic.’ (p. 15) What does Moore mean by this claim?

2. What is Moore’s famous “Open Question Argument”? What is it meant to prove? What is the mistake in reasoning that Moore calls the “Naturalistic Fallacy?”

3. What does Moore mean by a ‘real definition’? Suppose that the property yellow were defined as the color of objects that reflect visible light of wavelengths in the 570 nm range. Could this, according to Moore, be a successful real definition? Why or why not? What difficulties would arise, according to Moore, in giving a parallel ‘definition’ of the property good?

4. What according to Prichard is the “mistake” upon which all moral philosophy rests? What reason is there for thinking that ideal utilitarianism and Kantian moral philosophy rests upon the “mistake”?

5. Did Thrasymachus make a mistake when he asked why anyone should be just? In what sense is ‘just’ plausibly used in Thrasymachus’s question? Can Thrasymachus’s question be successfully generalized by Prichard to apply to whatever we ought to do?

6. In his paper ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest On a Mistake?’ Prichard claims that traditional moral philosophy, like traditional theory of knowledge, asks a question that cannot be answered and hence that neither of the two questions really makes sense. What are those two questions? What question or doubt about ethics is Prichard trying to relieve by drawing his famous analogy between ethics and theory of knowledge?

7. How, according to Prichard, should we answer someone who asks: “Why should I do what I ought to do?” Is his answer reasonable?

8. What according to Ross are the problems with utilitarianism and Kantian moral philosophy that force us to think of prima facia duties as parti-resultant attributes?

9. What problem in traditional ethics does Ross attempt to address by his theory of prima facie duties? How does that problem arise for ideal utilitarianism? How does it arise for Kantian ethics?

10. Can Ross’s approach generate a decision procedure for ethics? If so, how? If not, does it follow that ethics is in some way subjectivist? If so, what way? If not, how is the appearance of subjectivity to be explained away?

11. In ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ Wittgenstein distinguishes between relative judgments of value and absolute judgments of value. What is this distinction, and what, according to Wittgenstein, is its significance for ethics? How is the Verifiability Theory of Meaning relevant to Wittgenstein’s distinction between absolute and relative value?

12. According to Wittgenstein, in what ways do we attempt to extend our frame of reference when we use religious or moral language? What difficulties do those attempts raise for understanding moral and religious discourse?

13. If ethical discourse is to be understood as simile (or metaphor), then what is ethics a likeness of (or a metaphor for)?

14. According to Ayer, what is the subject matter of ethics? Where have others gone wrong in identifying the subject matter of ethics?

15. According to Ayer, how does his own positivist understanding of ethical discourse differ from more traditional subjectivist theories, like purely idiosyncratic theories or conventionalist theories?

16. According to Stevenson, how are the purposes of moral language related to the meanings of moral terms? In your answer be sure to explain Stevenson’s concept of emotive meaning and how it is related to dynamic uses of moral language.

17. How, according to Stevenson, can apparent moral disagreement be addressed?

18. What is anti-realism in ethics? What arguments does Mackie present for his version of anti-realism? How do anti-realism and non-cognitivism differ? Is one view better equipped to explain moral language than the other?

19. How are the privileged observer theories of the 50s by Rawls, Firth and K. Baier related to Hume’s theory, which is that a quality or action is good if and only if it elicits the sentiment of moral approbation in the (disinterested) observer who takes the “general and steady point of view”?

20. What is the role of explications within Rawls’ description of a decision procedure by which we may for a time reach agreement, if not consensus, about moral issues?

21. In what ways does Firth’s ideal observer theory make use of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals? What difficulties do they cause in the application of Firth’s theory?

22. To what extent must K. Baier’s theory allow for moral relativism?

23. How does Geach argue for the claim that an adjective like ‘big’ is a “logical attributive”?

24. Why, according to Geach, is it impossible to judge a person to be good simpliciter? In what sense does Geach’s view about ‘good’ commit him to Aristotelian ethical theory?

25. According to Anscombe, what insurmountable obstacle must modern moral philosophy overcome?

26. For Anscombe, what remains of moral philosophy once we have given up its claim to law-like commands?

27. How does Foot attempt to deal with the two-component view of thick moral terms?

28. What, according to Foot, is a moral virtue? What role do the virtues play in human life? Are the virtues essential to a ‘good’ life? What, for a neo-Aristotelian, can we mean by ‘a good life’?

29. According to Foot, does the fact that moral virtue makes right action easy diminish or increase the moral worth of moral virtues and the right actions that they facilitate

30. J.L. Mackie argues that it is possible to be a moral skeptic at the second order level but a conventionalist at the first-order level. What does this mean? Is it plausible?

31. Mackie argues that there are two reasons to believe in ethical skepticism: The Argument for Disagreement and the Argument from Queerness. What are these two arguments; how are they related to each other?

32. In “Two Concepts of Rules,” Rawls distinguishes between the legislative and juridical roles played by moral theory. What is this distinction, and why is it significant?

33. According to Rawls in “Two Concepts of Rules,” is it possible to punish a person that one knows to be innocent? Why or why not?

34. According to Williams, utilitarianism is open to the objection that it doesn’t adequately count the importance of moral integrity. What is Williams’s argument for this dramatic claim? Is it plausible?

35. According to Williams, one’s personal projects are important in defining one’s own identity. In what way does this attachment to one’s own integrity tend to undermine Kantian moral thinking, at least according to Williams? Does Kant have anything to say in response?

36. What, according to R.M. Hare, are the three defining characteristics of moral claims?

How do these defining characteristics enable us to draw substantive conclusions about how to think about morals rationally?

37. What is the role of the concept of suffering in R.M. Hare’s preference utilitarianism?

What according to Hare are the advantages of preference utilitarianism over hedonic utilitarianism?

38. How does Hare deal with the fact that now-for-then preferences seem to underestimate the value of then-for-then preferences; what is the consequence for preference utilitarianism? What simplifying assumption does Hare introduce to facilitate his elegant statement of preference utilitarianism?

39. What according to Michael Smith is “the moral problem”?

40. What is a network analysis of moral terms, and what is the permutation problem that it faces? How does Smith’s summary style non-reductive analysis hope to improve upon a network analysis?

41. What, according to Smith, is the externalist challenge to moral theory? How is it related to his conception of “the moral problem”?

42. According to Smith, there can be moral reasons for modifying our desires. How is this claim relevant to the “practicality platitude” and to Smith’s solution of “the moral problem”?

43. What is radical subjectivism in ethics? State and evaluate one attempt to overcome radical subjectivism in ethics by post-WWII philosophers.

44. Is it possible to draw conclusions about first order moral questions from meta-ethical premises alone?

45. What role does epistemological access play in contemporary ethical theory?

46. How did the development of Logical Positivism influence the development of meta-ethics in 20th century moral philosophy?

47. Can 20th century versions of Aristotelian virtue ethics avoid making objectionable metaphysical assumptions about human nature?

48. How is the distinction between relativist and absolutist ethical theories relevant to the distinctions (a) between real and anti-realist theories and (b) between cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories?

49. Is relativism objectionable on the ground that it cannot accommodate the “fact” of moral disagreement?

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