Epistemology : An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

[Pages:425]Epistemology

SUNY series in Philosophy George R. Lucas Jr., editor

Epistemology

An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

Nicholas Rescher

State University of New York

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

? 2003 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

Production by Michael Haggett Marketing by Anne M. Valentine

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rescher, Nicholas. Epistemology : an introduction to the theory of knowledge / Nicholas Rescher. p. cm. -- (SUNY series in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-5811-3 (alk. paper) -- ISBN 0-7914-5812-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. II. Series

BD161R477 2003 121--dc21

2003057270

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Preface

xi

Introduction

xiii

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS PROBLEMS

Chapter 1: Modes of Knowledge

3

IS KNOWLEDGE TRUE JUSTIFIED BELIEF?

3

MODES OF (PROPOSITIONAL) KNOWLEDGE

7

OTHER BASIC PRINCIPLES

10

Chapter 2: Fallibilism and Truth Estimation

15

PROBLEMS OF METAKNOWLEDGE

16

THE PREFACE PARADOX

19

THE DIALLELUS

22

AN APORY AND ITS RECONCILIATION:

K-DESTABILIZATION

23

COSTS AND BENEFITS

26

MORE ON FALLIBILISM

27

THE COMPARATIVE FRAGILITY OF SCIENCE:

SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS AS MERE ESTIMATES

30

FALLIBILISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN

OUR (PUTATIVE) TRUTH AND THE REAL TRUTH

34

Chapter 3: Skepticism and Its Deficits

37

THE SKEPTIC'S "NO CERTAINTY" ARGUMENT

37

THE ROLE OF CERTAINTY

39

THE CERTAINTY OF LOGIC VERSUS

THE CERTAINTY OF LIFE

41

v

vi

Contents

PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY

42

SKEPTICISM AND RISK

45

RATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE RISK

49

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION: COSTS AND BENEFITS

53

THE DEFICIENCY OF SKEPTICISM

56

Chapter 4: Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and

Naturalistic Perspective

61

EXPERIENCE AND FACT

61

PROBLEMS OF COMMON-CAUSE EPISTEMOLOGY

62

MODES OF JUSTIFICATION

64

THE EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT OF SENSORY EPISTEMOLOGY 68

RATIONAL VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION

69

AGAINST "PURE" INTELLECTUALISM

74

THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

76

CONCLUSION

78

Chapter 5: Plausibility and Presumption

81

THE NEED FOR PRESUMPTIONS

81

THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTION

85

PLAUSIBILITY AND PRESUMPTION

87

PRESUMPTION AND PROBABILITY

90

PRESUMPTION AND SKEPTICISM

92

HOW PRESUMPTION WORKS: WHAT JUSTIFIES

PRESUMPTIONS

96

Chapter 6:

Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective

101

THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF SHARING AND COOPERATING

IN INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT

101

THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION

103

BUILDING UP TRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

104

TRUST AND PRESUMPTION

106

A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERS

108

RATIONAL INQUIRY AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH

Chapter 7: Foundationalism and Coherentism

113

HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMIZATION: THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE

CYCLIC SYSTEMIZATION: THE NETWORK MODEL-- AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL

113 118

Contents

vii

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM

PROBLEMS OF FOUNDATIONALISM

123 128

Chapter 8: The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology

131

THE COHERENTIST APPROACH TO INQUIRY

131

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DATA FOR A COHERENTIST

TRUTH-CRITERIOLOGY

135

ON VALIDATING THE COHERENCE APPROACH

139

IDEAL COHERENCE

145

TRUTH AS AN IDEALIZATION

147

Chapter 9: Cognitive Relativism and Contexualism

151

COGNITIVE REALISM

152

WHAT'S WRONG WITH RELATIVISM

154

THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONTEXTUALISM OF REASON

155

A FOOTHOLD OF ONE'S OWN: THE PRIMACY OF OUR

OWN POSITION

159

THE ARBITRAMENT OF EXPERIENCE

161

AGAINST RELATIVISM

165

CONTEXTUALISTIC PLURALISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH

COMMITMENT ON PURSUING "THE TRUTH"

168

THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF RELATIVISM

170

Chapter 10: The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity

173

OBJECTIVITY AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL UNIVERSITY OF REASON

THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVITY THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING OBJECTIVITY WHAT IS RIGHT WITH OBJECTIVISM ABANDONING OBJECTIVITY IS PRAGMATICALLY

SELF-DEFEATING

173 175 177 180

182

Chapter 11: Rationality

187

STAGE-SETTING FOR THE PROBLEM

187

OPTIMUM-INSTABILITY

188

IDEAL VERSUS PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: THE

PREDICAMENT OF REASON

190

THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING RATIONALITY

193

THE PRAGMATIC TURN: EVEN COGNITIVE

RATIONALITY HAS A PRAGMATIC RATIONALE

196

 ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download