System of Checks and Balances in the Philippine ...

Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 39-65, December 2014 ISSN: 2350-7020 (Print) ISSN: 2362-9436 (Online) doi:

System of Checks and Balances in the Philippine Presidential Form of Government

April Farell M. Relacion1 and Grace C. Magalzo2

1Social Sciences Department, College of Arts and Sciences, Misamis University, Ozamiz City, Philippines

2Department of Political Science, School of Law and Governance, University of San Carlos, Cebu City, Philippines

Corresponding author: April Farell M. Relacion, email: farellmrelacion@

Abstract

The dominance of any branch of the Philippine government is a threat to both principle of separation of powers and independence of each body which may lead to a constitutional crisis. Several studies pointed out the existence of executive supremacy, but a comprehensive study on how each branch interacts with other branches has not been delved into. This study analyzed the system of checks and balances as practiced by the three main branches of government in the post-EDSA period under the 1987 Constitution. Document analysis was employed to examine the political dynamics of the main governmental branches. The findings revealed that the system of checks and balances is ill-practiced in the Philippine presidential form of government resulting to the existence of executive supremacy. This hyperpresidentialism was a result of the political patronage and strong executive influence exercised by the president. This study may provide insight on the present status of accountability and the execution of power among the main branches of the government.

Keywords: accountability, hyperpresidentialism, patronage, power, supremacy

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Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 39-65, December 2014

Introduction

The essence of a presidential form of government is the adoption of the principle of separation of powers and a system of checks and balances (Ayson & Reyes, 2000; Heywood, 2002; Ranney, 2003). Legal luminaries are of the agreement that the monopoly of power is fatally inimical to the principle of democracy. This resulted to a tripartite structure of government in the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution: legislative, executive, and the judiciary. Each branch performs different functions, i.e. legislative makes, alters and repeals laws; executive implements laws; judiciary applies and interprets laws.

Under the separation of powers doctrine, governmental power cannot be possessed by one person or body only to prevent the concentration of power or group of persons as this may lead to its abuse and to tyranny (Manuel, 1999). In the Philippines, this doctrine occupies a safe place in our constitutional history. In his book, La Revolucion Filipina, Apolinario Mabini stresses the importance of soul-authority in a society. This authority needs the following to ensure a balance of government power: an intellect to direct it (legislative power), a will that is active and a resolve to make it work (executive power), and a conscience that judges and punishes what is bad (judicial power) (Ople, 1998).

Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the system of checks and balances. Montesquieu, a French political philosopher, believes that power should be a check to power. As stressed by Santiago (2000), the three separate branches of government cannot be compartmentalized. In the case of Francisco et al. v House of Representatives et al., G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003 (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003), the Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine of separation of powers is clearly related with the principles of checks and balances. This corollary principle is provided by the Constitution to secure coordination between and among the branches of government. In Vargas v. Rilloraza, the Supreme Court has used this principle in the resolution of conflict arising from acts that impinge on the mutual interdependence of the three branches of government (Candelaria & Gesmundo, 2012). However, the two

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System of Checks and Balances in the Philippine Presidential Form of Government

April Farell M. Relacion and Grace C. Magalzo

doctrines function distinctively and separately. When the doctrine of separation of powers is practiced well, it does not mean that the system of checks and balances is also observed. As in the Philippine case, the doctrine of the separation of powers is practiced, however, the system of checks and balances is ill-practiced because some constitutional and legal structures designed to check and balance the President are subverted (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2010). It happens when the president or any branch of government for that matter justifies its unilateral action by invoking the principle of separation of powers but when checked of its action, it still invokes the same principle.

According to Linz (1990), presidential governments create a strong and stable executive. This is reiterated by Rose-Ackerman et al. (2010) when they claimed that hyperpresidentialism or executive supremacy exists in the Philippines. Hyperpresidentialism is a condition wherein the executive branch becomes the most supreme among the branches of government. They demonstrate how determined presidents have repeatedly undermined institutional efforts to limit their powers either by finding legal loopholes or by pushing the boundaries of the law. In their studies, they have found the perils of presidentialism redux.

In new democracies, Case (2011) observes that legislators are uninterested in rigorously checking the executive while the executives remain less tolerant of any checks that legislators might seek to impose. This situation is evident in the formation of an outsized majority, particularly in the Philippines, since most of the members of Congress join in support of the president's party despite the fluidity among political parties in the country.

In the part of the judicial department, the Supreme Court, under the 1987 Constitution, is relatively weak in the exercise of its power due to structural and contextual effects (Haynie, 2004). The author finds that the expanded power of the Supreme Court and its internal structure poses a problem. Accordingly, the increasing bureaucratic power of the High Court also increases the complexity of remaining independent. The High Court has become a "third component" of the legislative process because it litigates almost all issues that reach the Court and the appointments in the judiciary have been politically motivated. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has had little success in restraining

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Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 39-65, December 2014

excessive presidential power but only after these excesses have ripened into justiciable controversies (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2010). The authors have found out that some of these presidential excesses like the use of budgetary authority and the conduct of administrative reorganizations have remained unchallenged.

There were studies that pointed out the existence of executive supremacy (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2010; Case, 2011; Haynie, 2004). However, there is a need to provide a comprehensive study on how each branch interacts with other branches to have a clear understanding on the role of these branches in ensuring accountability and balance of power. Hence, this study aims to analyze the practice of the checks and balances among the three branches of government in the post-EDSA period which covers from the administration of Corazon Aquino until the present administration of Benigno Simeon Aquino III.

Materials and Methods

Document analysis was employed in this study with information obtained from secondary data sources from Philippine Supreme Court decisions, journals, books, and other scholarly research materials. Three rounds of analysis (Legislative vis-a-vis Executive; Executive visa-vis Judiciary; Legislative vis-a-vis Judiciary) were done on how the three branches of the government checked and counterchecked each other during the post-EDSA period which covers from the administration of Corazon Aquino until the present administration of her son, Benigno Simeon Aquino III.

Results and Discussion

Legislative vis-a-vis Executive Analysis of the system of checks and balances between the

legislative and executive branches revealed the existence of hyperpresidentialism as a result of the political patronage which is a common value system in the Philippine political culture where one gains favor, promotion or political appointment through affiliation or friendship. This political patronage is exercised by the president.

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System of Checks and Balances in the Philippine Presidential Form of Government

April Farell M. Relacion and Grace C. Magalzo

The legislative branch fails to exercise its specific checking powers that include power to override vetoed bills, power to reject appointments, and power to impeach.

The power of the legislative branch to override the veto power of the president could have been a real check to the executive's destructive participation in the law-making process, however, records showed that the legislative branch or Congress has never overridden any vetoed bill. As reported by Villanueva (2010), there have been 200 bills passed by the 15th Congress since July of 2010 and out of these 200 bills, 65 were vetoed by the President. Four of these vetoed bills are of national importance while the rest of the bills are only of local application particularly changing the names of streets and towns. The four vetoed bills of national significance are the following: Senate Bill 3328 (Centenarian Act), Senate Bill 2496 (The Magna Carta for the Poor), Senate Bill 3317 (The Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Act), and Senate Bill 3217 (An Act Repealing the Minimum Height Requirement for Applicants to the Philippine National Police [PNP], Bureau of Fire Protection [BFP], and Bureau of Jail Management and Penology [BJMP]. Among these vetoed bills, the Senate attempted only to override the Senate Bill 3217, however, this move did not succeed because of lack of support from other members.

In the Philippines where party politics matters (Kasuya, 2009; Case, 2011), overriding of vetoed bills is impossible to happen because members of Congress almost always cling to the political party of the incumbent president. The party politics results to the formation of an outsized majority (Case, 2011) and this majority always sides with the incumbent president. The set-up is due to the weakness of the party system of the Philippines where political turncoatism or party-switching is an established rule of the game. Turncoatism is another feature of Philippine political culture where a politician transfers to another party which he can benefit from.

The power of the legislative branch to confirm or reject appointments is also a constitutional check of the legislature over the executive through the creation of a 25-member Commission on Appointments. To ensure that the nominees personally selected by the President undergo a deliberative process of selection, the Commission

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