On September 11, 2001, one of the most shocking events in ...
A Critical Inquiry Into US and European Security Efforts in the Post-September 11 Period
By Primož Šterbenc
On September 11, 2001, one of the most shocking events in the post-World War II period occurred: hijacked planes crushed into buildings of the World Trade Center in New York and caused their collapse and death of several thousand people. World has been shocked as well as enraged. It has realised how deep is animosity of some militant Islamic groups towards the United States (US) and the West in general.
A Saudi Osama bin Laden has been identified as the prime suspect for the attack.[1] The administration of George Walker Bush (henceforth the Bush administration) promptly announced comprehensive activities aimed at eradication of the terrorist networks all around the world, containing military, political, and economic measures. In the wake of September 11, the European allies of the US (France, Germany, the UK) pledged their full support of the measures aimed at destruction of global terrorism. It seemed that after months of disagreements between the Bush administration and the European allies due to different perceptions of several important political and strategic issues,[2] a new era of unity and co-operation has come. Thus, on September 12, 2001, a famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was for the first time in the history of NATO invoked as a basis for joint European-US action against the terrorist threat.[3]
However, in spite of the new, at least declared, unity displayed by the US and its European allies with regard to the fight against terrorism,[4] first signs of different views regarding the most appropriate action emerged. When the Bush administration was preparing for launching a military attack against training bases of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, there were some European voices emphasising a need for very cautious approach.[5] Nevertheless, at that time there was no more significant disagreement between the transatlantic allies in regard to measures against Islamic terrorism. Thus, successful military operation aimed at overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying training bases of al-Qaida was undertaken between October 2001 and January 2002.
Yet, as soon as the military operation in Afghanistan came to an end,[6] and even before, some important differences concerning response to the extremely complex problem of Islamic terrorism surfaced and that disagreements have persisted until today. In other words, the unified transatlantic policy which existed immediately after September 11, has almost disappeared. The present paper will deal with two issues which have caused considerable disagreements and even some quarrels between the Bush administration and the European allies in the post-September 11 period. Both of them are inherently linked to the very complex as well as sensitive topic of relations between the Islamic world and the West. The transatlantic allies have not been able to find more unified policies with respect to, first, possible extension of military action to Iraq, and second, dealing with the conflict in the Middle East.
The aim of this paper is to present differences in views of the Bush administration and the European allies regarding the above mentioned points and to evaluate them in the light of the wider context of relations between the Arab and the Islamic worlds on the one hand, and the West on the other. Moreover, by putting different views in the wider context of Western-Islamic (Arab) relations it will be possible to assess their appropriateness and to identify their weaknesses as well as strengths. Surely, one cannot properly evaluate the American and the European approaches to the problem of Islamic terrorism without going into a more profound exploration of historical, cultural, and societal characteristics of the Islamic and particularly the Arab world.
1. Possible extension of military action to Iraq
As far as military action against Iraq is concerned, the Bush administration and the European allies (with partial exception of the UK in the more recent period) have had very incompatible views. Ever since November 2001, the administration has been directly or indirectly promoting a policy of toppling Iraq's President Saddam Hussein by military operation.[7] In this respect, it has emphasised that Iraqi President has posed serious threat as allegedly he has been trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, he has been accused of co-operating with Islamic terrorists and even indirectly blamed for the September 11 attack.[8] On the other hand, the European allies have been highly sceptical about any kind of military action against Baghdad since they have considered such a move to have too great potential for destabilising the whole region.[9] The only exception has recently been British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who in the first half of March 2002 publicly backed Bush's stance on Iraq, saying the President was right to raise the issue of the threat posed to countries around the world by Saddam Hussein’s developing weapons of mass destruction.[10]
In evaluating the American and the European attitudes towards military action against Iraq, one has to consider all possible consequences of such a forcible move for relations between the Islamic and the Arab worlds on the one hand, and the West on the other. Accordingly, it is essential to assess how would a violent action against another Islamic (in addition to Afghanistan) as well as an Arab country affect perception of the Western world in the eyes of the Arabs and Muslims in general. In this regard, one has to take into account historical, psychological, symbolical and religious-political factors which have had profound impact on relations between the Islamic and the Arab worlds on the one hand, and the West on the other.
1.1. Historical factor
If the US would launch military attack against Iraq, this would be inevitably interpreted in the Arab and the Islamic worlds[11]in the certain historical context. In other words, it is impossible to attack Iraq without awakening collective memories of certain historical periods in the Arab and Islamic worlds.
First of all, one has to bear in mind that every more significant forcible move of the Western world against any part of the Arab world has been interpreted by the Arabs as a new Crusade.[12] In this respect, it is important to note that operation »Desert Storm«, which began in January 1991, has been perceived in the Arab world in such a terms.[13] Few events have had a more shattering and long-lasting effect on Muslim-Christian relations than the Crusades.[14] For Muslims, the memory of the Crusades lives on as the clearest example of militant Christianity, an earlier harbinger of the aggression and imperialism of the Christian West, a vivid reminder of Christianity's early hostility towards Islam. Throughout centuries, Muslims have spoken of the West's Crusader mentality and ambitions (Esposito 1992: 39-40). The Crusades gave the Arabs their first taste of the Western world. Without any provocation, the Christians of Europe declared war upon Islam and mounted a deadly campaign against people of the Middle East. They massacred,[15]defiled the holy places and drove the medieval Palestinians from their homeland (Armstrong 1988/2001: 125). Therefore, it should be no surprise that a declaration, issued in February 1998 by Osama bin Laden and other militant Islamists, has been titled »Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders«[16](Lewis 1998: 14). Besides, after US military operation in Afghanistan had begun, bin Laden often referred in his messages to »crusaders«.[17]
Another historical period which has profoundly influenced Arab (Islamic) perception of the West, was the period of colonialism/imperialism.[18] For many Muslims, colonialism conjured up memories of the Crusades; the European challenge and aggression was seen as just another phase of militant Christianity's war with Islam. Muslim images of a Crusader West were reinforced by the policies of colonial powers since they treated Islam as an inferior religion and culture[19] (Esposito 1992: 51-52).
It is extremely important to note that the colonial powers were constantly promoting the idea of incompatibility of development and Islam. The latter was systematically targeted as allegedly retrograde religion and culture. This ideology, which emphasises a necessity of secularisation, has been adopted by the post-colonial Muslim (Arab) states which have continued with pushing Islamic values out of the Arab and the Islamic societies. However, in economic terms, Westernised domestic elites have proved to be incompetent and have not improved standard of life for majority of population. This has resulted in discontent and anger of Arab (Islamic) masses and has substantially increased a popularity of radical Islamic movements (Nasr 1999: 564-568).
Finally, the social Westernization of the upper classes, without any corresponding change among the lower classes, weakened the complex network of loyalties, obligations, and shared values that had bound them together in the old order, and opened the way to new conflicts and new leaderships. Significantly, the Westernization, which took place during the period of colonialism/imperialism, widened the gap between rich and poor (Lewis 1995/2001: 299, 384). Consequently, masses in the Arab world have been extremely hostile to the West as well as their Westernised elites which have been seen as mere puppets of the Western masters.
1.2. Psychological factor
In the Islamic and the Arab worlds exists a deep feeling of frustration[20] and humiliation stemming to a large extent from the history. Namely, in the period from the seventh to the seventeenth centuries the Islamic world was clearly superior to the Western (Christian) world in terms of philosophy, science and culture in general. Medieval Europe learned and acquired many things from the vastly more advanced and more sophisticated civilisation of the Mediterranean Islamic world[21] (Lewis 1995/2001: 274-275). However, in the seventeenth century, the West started to surpass the Islamic world due to the process of its constant technological advancement which was based on knowledge of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Thus, from the seventeenth century on there was a constant declination of the Islamic (Arab) world. Simultaneously, the process of rapid European (Western) expansion took place. This profound change caused a shock in the Islamic world and produced intense self-questioning. Now for the first time the debate was conducted in terms of 'us' and 'them' and question asked: why were the miserable infidels, previously always vanquished by the victorious armies of Islam, now winning the day, and why were the armies of Islam suffering defeat at their hands?[22] (Lewis 1995/2001: 277). Needless to say, today the Islamic and the Arab worlds are in all possible terms completely inferior to the West.
The additional source of feeling of humiliation came in 1948, as the Arabs have seen the creation of the state of Israel as the ultimate colonial humiliation (Armstrong 1988/2001: 123). Last but not least, the overwhelming victory of Israeli army over armies of three Arab states in the Six Day War in 1967 only strengthened this unbearable feeling and caused revival of Islamism (Milton-Edwards 1996/1999: 6).
1.3. Symbolical, political and humanitarian factors
One has to point out that Iraq[23] has been of great symbolic importance to Sunni branch of Islam. In fact, it has been perceived by Sunni Muslims as the second most important country, only after Saudi Arabia. Namely, the seat of the Abbasid caliphate was for some 500 years (750-1258) located in Baghdad. In this period, except for a brief interlude in Syria, the centre of the Islamic world and the scene of its major achievements was Iraq. For Muslims, no piece of land once added to realm of Islam can ever be finally renounced, but none compares in significance with Arabia and Iraq (Lewis 1998: 16). In addition, two Sunni legal schools, the Shafi and the Hanafi, were founded in Baghdad (Horrie and Chippindale 1990/1991: 119-120).
In political terms, one has to consider the fact that the first major US-led military attack on Iraq in 1991 has been perceived by masses as well as many elites in the Islamic and the Arab worlds as a conspiracy against whole Arab and Islamic worlds aimed at further aggrandisement of American and Israeli power in the region. For example, in Pakistan the war against Iraq was seen as »the sinister design aimed at reintroducing imperialism through crushing the Muslim's balance of power in the region by snatching their oil wealth and, at the same time, strengthening the hands of Zionists«.[24] In addition, the theory of »the trap« has been promoted stressing that by invading Kuwait in 1990 Iraq had acted on the advice of the US[25] (Ahmad 1991: 165). Indeed, there has been some room for such a interpretations since US policy with regard to Iraq's activities in August 1990 has been somewhat nebulous.[26]
Last but not least, in the eyes of Islamic and Arab masses, Iraqi population has become a kind of collective martyr since Iraq has been an object of full economic sanctions for more than a decade. Hence, it is no wonder that Osama bin Laden has strongly pointed out this aspect. In the Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders there is the following section:
Second-Despite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people
at the hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling
number of dead, exceeding a million, the Americans nevertheless, in spite
of all this, are trying once more to repeat this dreadful slaughter.
It seems that the long blockade following after a fierce war, the dismemberment
and the destruction are not enough for them. So they come again today
to destroy what remains of this people and to humiliate their Muslim
neighbours. (quoted in Lewis 1998: 15).
The Iraqi Government has constantly tried to exacerbate those concerns by displaying data showing destructive effect of the embargo.[27] As they were not allowed to conduct extensive surveys of their own, some international humanitarian agencies repeated the Iraqi figures[28] and thus have increased rage in the Arab and the Islamic worlds.
1.4. Assessment
In the event of Western attack on Iraq all the above elaborated factors would have enormous impact on perceptions of the Arabs and Muslims throughout the world. Due to the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab) conflict has reached extremely neuralgic level since September 2000, situation could easily become explosive. Furthermore, one has to take into account that military action in Afghanistan, one of the poorest Islamic countries in the world, has caused considerable concerns, if not irritation, in the Islamic world. It is important to note that in 1991, in spite of the secular nature of his Ba'thist regime, brutal policies against civilian population, and complete defeat in the battle with the US-led coalition, Saddam Hussein was acclaimed by millions of Muslims throughout the world as a Muslim hero. Although his air force and army embarrassingly took flight or dissolved, he gained in stature for standing alone against the mighty, principally American, military force arrayed against him (Piscatori 1991: 1-2). At that time he played his cards right as his rhetoric was clearly aimed at making the above elaborated factors work. The Iraqi President was especially emphasising issue of »Palestine« and used anti-Israeli allusions (Piscatori 1991: 3). In the recent period, it has been more than obvious that he has tried to do the same since he has put the accent on the problem of Palestine and used anti-American rhetoric.[29]
In conclusion, one has to stress that due to constant work of the above elaborated factors there should be no room for underestimation of Arab and Islamic resentment vis-à-vis the West. Accordingly, the appropriateness of an extension of military action to Iraq is really highly questionable. Surely, military operation against Baghdad would increase suspicions and fears of the Arabs and Muslims throughout the world concerning intentions of the Western world and consequently considerably hamper effective fight against Islamic terrorism. Put it differently, such a move would only strengthen Osama bin Laden's case in the eyes of an average Arab and Muslim since the West would confirm its alleged aggressiveness and hostility towards the Arab and the Islamic worlds. Thus, it has not been surprising that some most important Arab allies of the US have constantly warned Washington not to undertake military operation.[30] However, it seems that some senior members of the Bush administration are too confident and somehow ignorant in regard to this issue.[31]
2. Conflict in the Middle East
2.1. Importance
As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, one should point out its enormous importance regarding relations between the Arab and the Islamic worlds one the one hand, and the West on the other. Surely, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and its subsequent conflicts with the Arab world have been in the centre of Arab (Islamic) collective mind. Tellingly enough, the creation of the state of Israel has caused development of a new tradition in the Arab world which has become known as the Ilm al-Karitha (the Science of the Catastrophe). In this tradition, the Jewish state is seen as a crime against nature, as a »cancerous growth« in the Middle East and an alien intrusion of unspeakable evil (Y. Harkabi in Armstrong 1988/2001: 123). Moreover, the creation of the Jewish state has provoked a virulent anti-Semitism which has argued that all Jews are genetically and ontologically evil (Lewis 1986/1997: 123). Last but not least, the establishment of the Jewish entity has revitalised those parts of the Koran which are extremely hostile to the Jews and describe them as hypocrites as well as arrogant renouncers and falsifiers of God's Truth (Nettler 1987: 7).
Especially the Six Day War in 1967 has had enormous impact on the Arabs and Muslims throughout the world. For many in the Arab and broader Muslim world, 1967 proved to be a year of catastrophe as well as a historic turning point. Israel's quick and decisive defeat of Arab forces, the Israeli capture and occupation of the Golan Heights, Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, constituted a devastating blow to Arab/Muslim pride, identity, and self-esteem. Most important, the loss of Jerusalem, the third holiest city of Islam,[32] assured that Palestine and the liberation of Jerusalem would not be regarded as a regional (Arab) issue but rather as an Islamic cause throughout the Islamic world. For Muslims who retain a sense of membership in a transnational community of believers (the ummah), Palestine and the liberation of Jerusalem are seen as issues of Islamic solidarity (Esposito 1992: 12-13).
2.2. Impact on Islamic terrorism
As for Islamic terrorism, it is essential to note that the West has been inherently linked to the creation of the state of Israel and its conflict with the Arab and the Islamic worlds. Namely, the Arabs have regarded the Jewish state as an alien, Western presence in the Middle East. For many in the Arab and the Islamic worlds, the establishment and development of Israel was a continuation of the aggressive acts of Western imperialism against the Arabs and Muslims. In this perspective, Israel was created to serve as a bridgehead of Western influence, penetration and domination; Zionism was simply the tool of imperialism and Israel an instrument of Western power (Lewis 1995/2001: 373). The Ilm al-Karitha sees the Crusaders as the first Western imperialists and the Zionists as either neo-Crusaders or else tools of Western imperialism (Armstrong 1988/2001: 125).
Crucially, the US has been regarded as the main protector and strategic ally of Israel. For example, many in the Arab world believe that such a overwhelming victory of the Jewish state in the Six Day War could not be possible without decisive American military involvement[33] (Lewis 1986/1997: 189-190). Put it differently, Israel is seen as the representative of the US in the region (Armstrong 1988/2001: 122). Surely, the perception of the US by the Arabs and Muslims as the essential supporter of the Jewish state has been one of the most important reasons for their strong anti-American feelings. Consequently, it has not been surprising that in his statements and declarations Osama bin Laden has often referred to the issue of Palestine as the reason for relentless fight of all Muslims against Americans.[34]
2.3. Pre-September 11 developments
First of all, it has to be noted that the September 11 terrorist attack occurred amid extremely neuralgic situation in the Middle East, the second intifada, which had started in September 2000 and had already caused death of hundreds of Palestinians. Here, three points have to be stressed. First, it has been more or less clear that the second intifada was provoked by an extremely provocative visit of Ariel Sharon (than member of the Israeli parliament) to Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site of the Sunni Muslim world, on September 28, 2000.[35] This view has been implicitly confirmed by the international fact-finding committee (Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee), headed by a former US Senator George J Mitchell,[36] which presented its findings on April 30, 2001.[37] Second, the Israeli government was not willing to accept one of the most important recommendations of the Mitchell Report – freezing of all Israeli settlement activities in Gaza and the West Bank.[38] Finally, the Bush administration was not prepared to intervene diplomatically in the region, at least more seriously. In other words, it was not willing to push Israel on the settlement activities,[39] in spite of the findings of the Mitchell Report.[40] In general, the administration was acting rather indifferently with regard to the bloodshed in the region, thereby causing sharp criticism of the American allies in the Arab world.[41] As a result, on September 11, 2001, a strong anti-American sentiment was prevailing in the Arab world.[42]
Obviously, one cannot effectively deal with the problem of Islamic terrorism without properly addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the latter has had a profound impact on all political as well as societal developments in the Arab and the Islamic worlds. Even if Osama bin Laden and other Islamic militants have not been genuinely interested in the conflict,[43] there has always been a possibility for them to use this Arab and wider Islamic trauma in order to promote their extremist goals. As long as the problem of Palestine is not solved, their anti-American and anti-Western messages and appeals will always have considerable mobilising effect.[44] In other words, as long as the US and the West in general are seen in the Arab and the Islamic worlds as strongly pro-Israeli and consequently anti-Palestinian (Arab), there is a fertile ground for spread of all kinds of anti-American and anti-Western extremisms.
2.4. Post-September 11 developments
The aim of this section is to compare policies of the US and the EU with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the post-September 11 period. Namely, since the catastrophic attack in New York policies of those two political entities have been to a considerable extent different. In addition, policies of the US and the EU will be assessed, at least tentatively, in the light of the Arab world's constant claim that that the US has been biased (pro-Israeli) regarding the Middle East conflict.
In the period after September 11, one can identify differences in policies of the US and the EU in regard to the following issues:
1. Setting of preconditions for resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (talks);
2. Recognition of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people;
3. Drawing of parallels between suicide attacks of the Palestinian radical groups and global terrorism of Al-Qaida type;
4. Preparedness to address important political issues;
5. Efforts aimed at stopping Israeli disproportionate use of force.
2.4.1. Setting preconditions for negotiations
As far as setting of preconditions for negotiations (talks) between the Israelis and the Palestinians is concerned, one has to point out that this has been a constant demand of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He has practically all the time argued that there can be no resumption of talks without at least one week of total quiet. Surely, it is highly questionable whether such a demand is helpful since it can make any negotiations hostage to the extremists on both sides.
The Bush administration has shown much more preparedness than the EU to support such a stand and at some occasions there was a clear disunity of Washington and Brussels on this point. For example, on November 18, 2001, a delegation of the EU tried to persuade Sharon to drop his insistence on a seven-day period of total quiet before resuming negotiations, yet US Secretary of State Powell was not prepared to join the Europeans.[45] Tellingly, while rejecting EU's call, Ariel Sharon noted that the Bush administration had agreed to the seven-day period.[46]
There is another point concerning the precondition of several days of quiet which has to be stressed. Starting from December 16, 2001, the Palestinian side managed to attain even three weeks of quiet, however the Sharon government didn't want to use this opportunity, with the argument that after such a breathing spell Yasser Arafat would revert to his habitual terror. Washington seemed to have accepted the Israeli argument.[47]
2.4.2. Legitimacy of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA)
The Sharon government has been especially interested in political isolation (marginalisation) of Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PA, and PA itself. Thus, it has tried to stigmatise Palestinian leader, first by declaring him »irrelevant«[48] and later by accusing him of terrorism.[49] However, one can argue that Yasser Arafat has become a kind of symbol of Palestinian striving for an independent state and therefore it would be much harder, if not impossible, to reach a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Middle East crisis without his political involvement. In other words, there has been no real alternative political leader on the Palestinian side.
The Israeli case for excluding Arafat politically has been to a large extent backed by constant pledge that he has not been doing enough to suppress Islamic militants' suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. Yet, it has really been very questionable whether Palestinian leader has been politically able to curb the radical Islamic movements (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) as Israel's disproportionate use of force has caused a high death toll on the Palestinian side and consequently provoked radicalisation of views of Palestinian population.[50]
The Bush administration has proved to be much more susceptible to the Israeli argument concerning »political irrelevance« of Arafat than the EU. Thus, in the period from the end of January to March 2002 the US pursued a policy of ignoring Arafat as a political leader of Palestinians. On January 25, 2002, President Bush said that he was »very disappointed with Mr Arafat« and accused him of »enhancing terror«.[51] In addition, on January 27, 2001, Vice-President Cheney stressed that the escalating violence in the Middle East, much of it prompted by Palestinian suicide bombs, »raises serious questions whether Mr. Arafat is in fact really interested in moving forward with the peace process«.[52] Consequently, the administration stopped its diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving piece, in spite of demands of the PA.[53] In February 2002, the US was still sticking to this policy of isolating PA as Secretary of State Powell rejected Palestinian calls for renewal of Washington's diplomatic activities.[54] Even in March there were some signs of administration's attempt to marginalise the Palestinian leadership as Vice-President Cheney declined meeting with Arafat during his Middle East tour. However, he held talks with Ariel Sharon.[55]
The EU, on the other hand, opposed isolation of the Palestinian leadership. In February 2002 Brussels tried to launch a peace initiative containing a plan for holding Palestinian elections aimed at obtaining a fresh mandate for Yasser Arafat's PA.[56] Already on December 16, 2001, EU leaders, meeting in Laeken, insisted that Israel needed Mr. Arafat »as a partner to negotiate with in order to eradicate terrorism and to work towards peace.«[57]
Needless to say, the US policy provoked a sharp criticism of the main Arab allies in the region. On January 25, 2002, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were joining forces to persuade Washington that isolation of Arafat's PA would end up bolstering radicals in the region.[58] A Saudi response was particularly strong, clearly indicating a pro-Israeli bias of the US.[59]
2.4.3. Fight against terrorism
Ever since September 11, the Israeli government has been trying to draw parallels between global terrorism of al-Qaida type, which organised attack on the World Trade Center, and suicide attacks of the radical Palestinian groups against Israeli civilians. Certainly, there is some truth in the view emphasising that the Sharon cabinet's aim has been a discreditation of the legitimate Palestinian demand for exercise of right to self-determination, i.e. establishment of an independent as well as viable Palestinian state.[60]
On this issue, too, there has been a considerable gap between policies of the Bush administration and the EU. Namely, by taking certain decisions, Washington has, at least implicitly, shown some support for the Israeli argument. On December 4, 2001, the administration closed down three Hamas-controlled groups in the US which had been raising funds for charity purposes in Palestine.[61] One has to mention that Hamas has not been active outside the Middle East and therefore there has been no real ground for placing the organisation in the same group with al-Qaida.
The EU has been clearly resisting such parallels. For example, at the beginning of April 2002, US Secretary of State Powell defended huge Israeli military operation in the West Bank by saying that it was aimed at »rooting out terrorists« and destroying »infrastructure of terrorism«. That position provoked unusual criticism from the UK as Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stressed that the Israeli drive into the West Bank could not be excused as being part of the global »war on terrorism«.[62] Tellingly, on May 3, 2002, the EU blocked the assets of 11 international terrorist organisations, however Hamas and Lebanese Hizbollah were not on the list, in spite of American pressures.[63] Again, Washington's policy has ran counter to the views prevailing in the Arab and the Islamic worlds.[64]
2.4.4. Important political issues
Ever since the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000, there has been a constant talk about security aspects, confidence-building measures and other immediate concerns. For most of the time, the political debate has concentrated on suicide attacks of the Palestinian radical groups and Israeli military activities in the territories formally administered by the PA. However, issues which have latently provoked tensions as well as violence, have been the political ones. As already mentioned, one cannot effectively deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without addressing inherently political issues: the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and creation of an independent as well as viable Palestinian state.[65] In other words, one cannot expect Palestinians to end their fight without giving them something valuable in return.
As for the Jewish settlements, it is important to note that the Sharon government has begun work on at least 30 new settlements during its first year in power,[66] thereby constantly undermining any possibility of building trust among the Palestinians. Therefore, it has been vital to press Sharon on this issue in order to achieve peace. The Bush administration has been somehow less prepared to do this than the EU. In the period between September 11, 2001, and April 2002, there was only one occasion when Washington highlighted the issue. On November 19, 2001, Secretary of State Powell, while presenting his plan for the Middle East, said that the construction of Israeli settlements in the territories had »severely undermined Palestinian hopes«. Moreover, he twice described Israel's hold on the West Bank and Gaza as an »occupation«.[67] This had been an important attempt to push peace process forward, however it ended soon since later the administration proved to be reluctant to repeat it.
Thus, on December 15, 2001, when a special conference regarding the Geneva conventions was convened by Switzerland in order to stress obligation to respect the documents, the US, alongside Israel, didn't attend it arguing that the gathering was an unhelpful politicisation of humanitarian principles. Importantly, the participating states (114) agreed a declaration reaffirming the illegality of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. In contrast, the EU's fifteen member states were among participants.[68] In addition, in March 2002, when a special US envoy to the Middle East Anthony Zinni was re-sent to the region, he was under strict orders to avoid basic political questions – settlements, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem.[69] President Bush demanded freeze of the settlement activities as late as April 2002, amid Israeli military offensive in the West Bank, and only after strong criticism of the EU.[70] Brussels had urged Israel to freeze settlement activities already in December 2001.[71]
As far as establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state is concerned, Washington has indeed made some very important steps. Importantly, the Bush administration has pointed out a need for creation of a Palestinian state. In this respect, it has been the first administration using word »Palestine« to describe the future Palestinian state.[72] Furthermore, in March 2002 it sponsored[73] UN Security Council resolution envisioning creation of an independent Palestinian state.[74] Yet, the US initiatives in regard to an independent Palestinian state have lacked more concrete elements. More specifically, they have fallen short of clearly indicating on which territory such a state would be established. One has to take into account that in the history of the Middle East conflict details regarding the territorial issues have proved to be extremely important as well as contentious.[75]
2.4.5. Israeli disproportionate use of force
In the period from March 29 to April 21, 2002, Israel undertook a huge military operation in the West Bank, during which it attacked towns under administration of the PA (Nablus, Bethlehem, Jenin, Ramallah, and others). A declared aim of the operation was a destruction of infrastructure of the radical Palestinian organisations,[76] however Israeli army clearly pursued some other goals. Namely, there have been many indications that Israeli armed forces were systematically destroying infrastructure of the PA, thereby indirectly targeting a possible creation of an independent Palestinian state.[77] In addition, the military operation took place almost exactly at the time when the Arab states were offering Israel a possibility to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict,[78] thus provoking strong suspicions about the real motives of the Sharon government.[79] Finally, by all accounts, Israeli army used highly disproportionate force in Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin, thereby causing deaths of large number of Palestinian civilians.[80]
The Israeli military operation provoked strong protests in the Arab and the Islamic worlds with potential of destabilising moderate Arab regimes.[81] However, in spite of Arab warnings,[82] the Bush administration showed only limited preparedness to press Israel in order to make him withdrawing from Palestinian towns. In the beginning of the operation, President Bush even remained supportive of the Israeli activities stressing that the Jewish state had the right to defend itself. Besides, the administration argued that a withdrawal was possible only after a cease-fire, a position that was at odds with other members of the UN Security Council and Kofi Annan, the UN's secretary-general.[83] In contrast, from the very beginning of the operation, the EU demanded a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian towns. Consequently, Brussels was very critical of Washington's behaviour. Thus, on April 3, in an uncharacteristically blunt language, Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, said at the news conference: »Mediation efforts have failed and we need new mediation. There is not enough action by the US. This is the reality. This is the truth.«[84]
It was only after the strong European criticism that President Bush started to put some pressure on Ariel Sharon. On April 4, he urged Israel to withdraw its forces from Palestinian towns, yet at the same time he harshly criticised Yasser Arafat for failing to confront terrorists.[85] Moreover, in the following weeks it was obvious that the Israeli Prime Minister was not willing to listen to the Washington's demands, in spite of repeated Bush's requests. On April 8, in direct defiance of the US, Sharon said that Israeli army would press on with its offensive in the West Bank.[86] There were also some attempts to bring about Israeli withdrawal by Secretary of State Powell however it has seemed that all of them were made only pro forma as they clearly lacked use of real pressure on the Jewish state.[87] On the other hand, the EU was politically marginalised, despite some attempts to press Israel.[88] It has been evident that the Bush administration didn't use all means at its disposal to force Israel to end its violent policy. Importantly, no threat of reducing the enormous economic aid was made.[89]
2.5. Consequences and explanations
The expected result of such a US policy has been a deepening of the anti-American sentiments in the Arab and the Islamic worlds. Again, the Arabs have been convinced that Washington has not dropped its pro-Israeli policy, in spite of different announcements after September 11.[90] Even moderate Arab regimes have been disillusioned with Washington's policy.[91] Perhaps most importantly, in the Arab world a new generation of children is growing in the conviction that the US has been an accomplice in Israeli massacres of innocent Palestinians.[92] In such an atmosphere of conflict and hate, political radicalisation of Arab masses as well as influential religious establishment has taken place.[93]
One has to point out that as long as there is such a situation in the Middle East, fight against Islamic terrorism will be much harder, if not impossible. For example, even if arguments in favour of attack on Iraq would prevail, it is obvious that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it stands now, would not allow it.[94] In this respect, there is an important question as to why Washington has not pursued more unbiased policy with regard to the Middle East conflict in order to bring about conditions for effective neutralisation of the Islamic terrorists' messages?
Quite predictably, the answer lies within American political system as some pressure groups have all the time lobbied for almost unconditional support of Israel. Ever since the second intifada began, and especially after September 11, the Jewish lobby in the US has been exerting its enormous influence in order to promote Israel's interpretation of the conflict. Its presence has been particularly strong in Congress which has consequently put constant pressure on the administration.[95] Surely, the Jewish lobby has succeeded in persuading the congressman to draw parallels between September 11 and the Palestinian suicide attacks.[96] It is revealing that the lobby has openly praised President Bush for his policy regarding the Middle East.[97] Equally revealing, the EU has been blamed for allegedly being anti-Jewish, and almost anti-Semitic.[98] On May 6, Javier Solana, the high representative of the EU for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, publicly rejected views expressed in certain articles in the US, that Europe was becoming anti-Semitic.[99]
However, the Jewish lobby has not been the only source of support for Israel in the US. The other two have been the (neo)conservatives and the Religious Right, both of them republican groups with considerable influence in Congress. They have continuously pressed the administration.[100] While the latter has been traditionally pro-Israeli,[101] the former started to lean towards the Jewish state during the Reagan presidency.[102]
Last but not least, within the Bush administration there have been considerable tensions between the Department of State and Pentagon in regard to the Middle East policy. While Secretary of State Powell's approach has been more neutral, taking into account Arab anger and frustration over Israeli uncompromising policies, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld has persistently seen fight against the Palestinian radical groups as a part of broader war on terrorism. Importantly, the latter has had more influence as in the Bush administration Pentagon has assumed a role of inter-agency co-ordination over the Middle East conflict. In addition, Vice-President Cheney has been backing Rumsfeld's views, thereby causing frustration in the State Department.[103]
3. Conclusion
One can argue that with a view to successful fighting against Islamic terrorism, the policies promoted by the European allies have been much more appropriate than those of the Bush administration. The EU member states have to the considerably greater extent taken into account the extremely complex context of relations between the Islamic world and the West. In this respect, the EU has somehow realised that effective dealing with the problem of Islamic terrorism demands very careful approach since relations between the Islamic world and the West have been burdensome due to the impact of historical, psychological, and contemporary political factors. In other words, one cannot eliminate destructive forces within the Islamic world without bearing in mind the heavy legacy of the past and solving contemporary traumas of the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Washington, in contrast, has tried to »solve« the problem of Islamic terrorism by using mainly military means, thereby ignoring sensitivities of the Islamic world. Crucially, the administration has not been aware of the significance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for effective dealing with hostile Islamic forces. Obviously, internal political factors have prevented it to consider the Middle East conflict in a more unbiased way. Above all, there has been a need to look at the conflict through Arab and Islamic eyes, i.e. more empathetically, in order to understand sources of resentment which have bred Islamic extremisms. At best, the policy of use of military force, promoted by the Bush administration, would eliminate violence only in the short run. In the long run, however, it would create even greater possibility of more serious conflict between the Islamic world and the West. Therefore, one has to eliminate sources of Islamic terrorism and not only its symptoms.
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[1] There was some amount of evidence that pointed towards Islamic extremists, including the date itself. September 11, 1922, was the day when a British mandate came into force in Palestine, in spite of fierce Arab opposition. 'The new enemy', The Economist, September 15th-21st 2001, p. 15.
In the beginning of October 2001, the British government revealed a document allegedly containing evidence against Osama bin Laden. It emphasised that of the 19 hijackers at least three had had links with bin Laden's group al-Qaida. In addition, the attack was considered similar, both in its ambition and intended impact, to previous attacks undertaken by Osama bin Laden. 'The Evidence Against Osama bin Laden', International Herald Tribune, October 5, 2001, p. 3.
[2] The US and the European allies had had different opinions about the National Missile Defence (NMD), the Kyoto Protocol, the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, and the International Criminal Court. In general, the Bush administration had appeared to be considerably inclined to more unilateralist way of conducting foreign policy.
[3] The North Atlantic Council held three emergency meetings within 36 hours of the attack. Lord Robertson, NATO's secretary-general, held a rare joint meeting with the EU’s foreign ministers. Senior NATO officials acknowledged that under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, all members would be obliged to »take such action as is deemed necessary including the use of armed force« in common defence of NATO territory. 'Old friends, best friends', The Economist, September 15th-21st, 2001, p. 21.
[4] Chris Patten, the EU's commissioner for external affairs said a week after the attack: »We stand four-square with our American allies and friends«. This statement was echoed by scores of politicians across the continent. 'Solid, but for how long', The Economist, September 22nd-28th 2001, p. 32.
[5] On September 20, 2001, the EU pressed the Bush administration to explore all diplomatic channels and build as broad a coalition as possible before it launches any retaliation. Judy Dempsey, 'EU urges US to build broad coalition', Financial Times, September 20, 2001, p. 6. On September 16, 2001, Even British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the most vocal ally of the US, called on Washington for caution and said it was premature to talk about the exact nature of a military response. Barry James, 'Some Governments Temper Support for U.S. Retaliation', International Herald Tribune, September 17, 2001, p. 4.
[6] In fact, the military operation in Afghanistan is still going on as some units of al-Qaida and the Taliban movement have been able to survive and to wage guerrilla war against US and other Western troops.
[7] On November 26, 2001, President Bush urged Iraq to accept inspections on possible development of weapons of mass destruction. When he was asked what would happen if Saddam Hussein refused to allow the inspectors to return, he replied, »He'll find out.« John Vincour, 'Allies Caution Bush On an Iraq Campaign', International Herald Tribune, November 29, 2001, p. 1.
On January 29, 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush placed Iraq, together with Iran and North Korea, on an »axis of evil«, thereby suggesting that for the US military action against Baghdad was legitimate. Brian Knowlton, 'Bush's 'Axis of Evil' Draws Fire', International Herald Tribune, January 31, 2002, p. 1.
In March 2002, US Vice-President Dick Cheney made 10-day Middle East tour, reportedly in order to assess regional views on any action aimed at ousting Saddam Hussein. Edward Alden and Roula Khalaf, 'Cheney's tour adds to doubts over Iraq action', Financial Times, March 20, 2002, p. 3.
At the end of April 2002, The New York Times reported that the US administration was preparing military action against Iraq in the beginning of 2003, involving 70.000-250.000 troops. Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, 'Pentagon sees attack on Saddam next year', International Herald Tribune, April 29, 2002, p. 1.
[8] The Bush administration has been pointing out that Mohammed Atta, a ringleader of the attack, met twice in April 2001 with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague.
[9] On November 28, 2001, speaking during a Bundestag debate, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said: » All European nations would view broadening to include Iraq highly sceptically – and that's putting it diplomatically.« On the same day, French Defence Minister Alain Richard said that besides Afghanistan, »There is no other nation whose leaders have been active accomplices of terrorist actions. So we do not believe that it is today necessary to take military action against other sites.« John Vincour, 'Allies Caution Bush On an Iraq Campaign', International Herald Tribune, November 29, 2001, p. 1.
[10] However, Tony Blair has been strongly criticised by his own Labour party for such a stand. Warren Hoge, 'Blair faces revolt over backing U.S. against Iraq', International Herald Tribune, March 9-10, 2002, p. 5.
[11] In this paper, if not indicated otherwise, a reference to the Arab or the Islamic world implies Arab (Islamic) masses, »the Arab (Islamic) street«, and not a very narrow segment of the Westernised population (elites).
[12] On September 16, 2002, while speaking about mesures planned with regard to the war on terrorism, President Bush even used this kind of terminology. He said: »This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a long time.« (June 13, 2002).
[13] As soon as the first bombs dropped on Baghdad, the attack was condemned as »al-Salibiyyah!« »A Crusade!« (Armstrong 1988/2001: vii).
[14] The Crusades, which take their name from the »cross« (crux in Latin), were a series of eight military expeditions extending from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries in which the Christian world attempted to conquer lands in the Middle East (Runciman 1951/1991; Runciman 1952/1990; Runciman 1954/1990).
[15] During the first Crusade (1095-1099) the Crusaders committed some most horrible acts against Muslims. On July 15, 1099, when they conquered Jerusalem, they for three days systematically slaughtered about thirty thousand Muslims and Jews. The streets literally ran with blood (Armstrong 1996/1997: 273-274). In December 1098, the Crusaders even practised cannibalism, after they had conquered Syrian city of Ma' arra (Maalouf 1984: 38-40).
[16] Declaration was published on February 23, 1998, in Al-Quds-al-Arabi, an Arabic newspaper published in London (Lewis 1998: 14).
[17] At the beginning of November 2001, the Arab language television network Al Jazeera broadcasted his videotape in which he accused the UN of taking side with the »crusader« interests of the West and against Muslims. Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, 'Bin Laden's Hostile Message Hightens Security Concerns for UN', International Herald Tribune, November 9, 2001, p. 6.
[18] At the end of the eighteenth century the West again started to penetrate militarily into the Arab world. In 1798, a French army commanded by General Bonaparte landed in Egypt, then an Ottoman province, and occupied it with little difficulty. It was for the first time since the Crusaders that a military expedition was launched against the heartlands of the Middle East (Lewis 1995/2001: 283). Subsequently, Western Powers gained political control over significant parts of the Middle East: France in Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, the British in Arabia in 1830s and Egypt in 1882. After World War I the French and the British divided remaining parts of the region among themselves in form of mandates (Lewis 1995/2001: 283; Esposito 1992: 51).
[19] For example, Thomas Babington Macaulay, senior imperial official in India, once said of the cultural worth of the East: »(A) single shelf of European books (is) worth the whole literature of India and Arabia«. Evelyn Baring Cromer, head of the British imperial administration in Egypt, opined: »The European is a close reasoner… he is a natural logician… The mind of the oriental (Arab), on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description… (they) are singularly deficient in the logical faculty.« (Nasr 1999: 563-564).
[20] For example, as Ajami (2001: 9) points out, Egyptians have long been dissatisfied with their country's economic and military performance. This dissatisfaction has been a result of the gap between Egypt's exalted idea of itself and the poverty and foreign dependence that have marked its modern history.
[21] Some Arab scientists, for example geographer al-Masudi, regarded Europeans as ignorant and even stupid (Lewis 1958/1993: 180).
[22] Bernard Lewis (1995/2001: 276-277) stresses that a kind of turning point had been a defeat of the Turkish army at Vienna in 1683 which led to the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 in which the terms were for the first time dictated by the Christian Power.
[23] More accurately, the today's territory of Iraq, since the state has been an artificial political entity created in 1921 by the British from Shia, Sunni and Kurdish parts of the former Ottoman empire (Tripp 2000: 30).
[24] Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly, 25 January 1991, p. 9. Quoted in Ahmad 1991: 165.
[25] For example, Safar al-Hawali, one of the most prominent Saudi dissidents, has argued that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was orchestrated and planned as part of a grand strategy to gain a foothold for Western troops in the region. He has stressed that after Saudi Arabia refused to accept a formal military alliance during the early 1980s, the US looked for other ways to establish itself militarily in the region. In Hawali's opinion, the decline of the Soviet Union and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait opened the door for US troops to flood into the area (Fandi 1999/2001: 70-71).
[26] On July 25, 1990, Saddam Hussein sought advice from the US on his intentions to reclaim Kuwait. He met with US Ambassador April Glaspie, who told him: »I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait… I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship not confrontation, regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait's borders?«
Hussein explained that, while he was ready to negotiate his border dispute with Kuwait, his design was to »keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be.« This shape, of course, included Kuwait, which Hussein considered still a part of Iraq. He asked: »What is the United States' opinion on this?«
Glaspie replied: »We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, like your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasise the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwaiti issue is not associated with America.« (Marrs 2000/2001: 118-119).
Philip Gordon and Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution, have argued that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait only after the US suggested it would tolerate such an action. 'Dealing with Iraq', Financial Times, November 30, 2001, p. 15.
[27] According to the 1997 general census, Iraq's population in October that year reached 22.017.983. The Iraqi Statistical Bureau claimed that this number was far smaller than it should have been: had it not been for the international oil embargo, the population of Iraq would have been 23.517.983. Namely, some 1.5 million were considered excessive deaths, the result of the embargo (Baram 2000: 195-196).
[28] For example, UNICEF reported from Baghdad that, by September 1995, some 1.5 million people of all ages had died as a result of the embargo (Baram 2000: 196).
[29] On April 8, 2002, Saddam Hussein suspended Iraqi oil exports to protest Israeli incursions into areas under administration of the Palestinian Authority. He said the move would last 30 days or until Israel withdraws its forces. Moreover, he emphasised that his action was taken »against the Zionist entity and the American aggressive policy and not against anyone else.« Brian Knowlton, 'Iraq suspends oil exports but no allies join in', International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2002, p. 1.
On April 22, 2002, he issued another call for the Arabs to use their oil weapon. In a TV broadcast, he urged Arab producers to halve their exports and ban all oil sales to the US and Israel. David Buchan, 'Oil dips after Saudi pledge to counter Iraq shortfall', Financial Times, April 23, 2002, p. 5.
[30] On September 31, 2001, Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, cautioned against extending military operation to Iraq. Roula Khalaf, 'Saudi Arabia denies agreeing to aid strikes', Financial Times, October 1, 2001, p. 1.
On November 21, 2001, Prince Turki ibn Faisal, Saudi Arabia's former intelligence chief, stressed that his government had seen no evidence that the Iraqi government had provided support to Osama bin Laden's Qaida network. He said: »You target Saddam Hussein (in a secret operation) and no one will boo or hiss or object. But bombings like the ones we saw against Iraq in 1998, or like the ones we've seen now in Afghanistan, with so-called collateral bombings, when bombs hit innocent people, will have strong resonance and very bad implications for relations with the West«. Douglas Jehl, 'Ex-Saudi Chief of Intelligence Casts Doubt on Iraq-Qaida Tie', International Herald Tribune, November 22, 2001, p. 4.
On March 10, 2002, Jordanian king Abdullah II warned that »striking Iraq represents a catastrophe to Iraq and the region in general and threatens the security and stability of the region.« Howard Schneider, 'U.S. warned by Turkey and Jordan on Iraq war', International Herald Tribune, March 11, 2002, p. 4.
[31] Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and their senior aides have contended that Arab leaders would publicly protest but secretly celebrate Saddam's downfall. They have also believed that warnings of uprisings among Arab populations are overblown and have compared them to similar warnings before the Gulf War. Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, 'Pentagon sees attack on Saddam next year', International Herald Tribune, April 29, 2002, p. 4.
[32] Jerusalem occupies one of the central roles in the Islamic faith because it is believed to be connected to two extraordinary journeys of the Prophet: »nocturnal journey« (isra) and ascension to heaven (mi'raj) (Piscatori 1991: 4-5).
[33] Unable to understand how the Israelis could have destroyed his air force so swiftly and so totally, Egyptian President Naser attributed its destruction to the participation of American and British planes operating from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and air bases in Cyprus (Kaufman 1996: 59).
[34] In early July 1996, he gave an interview to Robert Fisk of Independent in which he stressed: »The explosion in Khobar did not came as a direct reaction to the American occupation but as a result of American behaviour against Muslims, its support of Jews in Palestine, and of the massacres of Muslims in Palestine and Lebanon-of Sabra and Chatila and Qana-and of the Sharm el-Sheikh (‘anti-terrorist’) conference.«
In mid-February 1997 he issued a call to arms: »I confirm that all the youth and the whole nation should concentrate their efforts on the Americans and the Zionists because they are the head of the spear that has been pointed at the nation and delivered into the nation's heart, and that every effort concentrated on the Americans and the Zionists will bring good, direct, and positive results. Therefore, if someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting his energy on other matters.« (Bodansky 1999/2001: 190, 199).
On October 7, 2001, only hours after American military intervention in Afghanistan had begun, he issued a video in which he declared: »I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine and before all the army of infidels departs the land of Muhammad.« 'Keeping all options open', The Economist, October 13th-19th 2001, p. 22.
[35] On September 29, 2001, Sharon's visit provoked protests of young Palestinians. They threw stones on Jewish targets, including people praying at the Western Wall. The Israeli police replied with live ammunition and »rubber« bullets and killed five Palestinians and injured 200. Palestinians took to the streets, however the Israeli army used anti-tank missiles and helicopter gunships. By beginning of October, 60 people were killed, all but three of them Palestinians. 'War in Palestine' and 'The road to war?', The Economist, October 7th-13th 2000, pp. 17 and 61.
[36] Henceforth The Mitchell Report.
[37] Although the Mitchell Report has found out that »The Sharon visit did not cause the Al-Aqsa intifada«, it has also added: »But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.« ('What Happened?').
[38] 'Yes to a ceasefire, no to a halt on settlements', The Economist, May 26th-June 1st 2001, p. 47.
[39] Surely, ever since 1967, construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories has been one of the essential undermining factors regarding Israeli-Palestinian (Arab) relations. By continuous building of settlements, Israel has been implicitly expressing its determination not to withdraw from the West Bank (in Israeli vocabulary 'Judea and Samaria'). This has caused profound frustrations of Palestinians which have striven to establish their own independent state on the territory of the West Bank and Gaza. In the period from 1982 to 1991 alone, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza increased from 25.000 to 112.000 (Thomas 1999: 216, 280). According to Palestinian data, in 2000, there were already 200.000 Jewish settlers in both territories (The Mitchell Report, 'Why did it happen?').
By building settlements, Israel has ignored series of UN Security Council resolutions: 446 (March 1979), 452 (July 1979), and 465 (March 1980). UN Security Council resolution 465 states, inter alia, that Israeli settlement activities »constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.« Article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war (12 August, 1949) reads: »The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.« (Human Rights 1994: 819-820).
[40] Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, endorsed the Mitchell Report however stopped short of endorsing its part on the Jewish settlements. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon praised Powell for emphasising that the commission's call for a cease-fire was not dependent on the recommended settlements freeze. 'Yes to a ceasefire, no to a halt on settlements' and 'A toe in the water', The Economist, May 26th-June 1st 2001, pp. 47-48.
[41] On September 1, 2001, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah sent a tough letter to President Bush in which he warned that failure of the US to address the conflict and adopt a more even-handed policy towards the Palestinians was putting the kingdom in an impossible position. In early summer of 2001, Crown Prince declined an invitation to the White House for the same reasons. Roula Khalaf, 'Kingdom faces a tough test of sympathies' and 'War on terrorism strains ties with US', Financial Times, Survey Saudi Arabia, October 29, 2001, pp. I and IV.
[42] In the wake of the September 11 attack, Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were celebrating. 'Mixed emotions', The Economist, September 15th-21st 2001, p. 20. There was also an unmistakable sense of glee and little sorrow for the US in Egypt (Ajami 2001:9).
[43] For such a view, see for example: Steven Simon and David Benjamin, assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 'Myths of American misdeeds', Financial Times, October 2, 2001, p. 17; 'The unblessed peacemaker', The Economist, October 6th-12th 2001, p. 19.
[44] A Saudi intelligence survey of educated Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41, taken in mid-October 2001, showed that 95 percent of them supported bin Laden's cause. Prince Nawaf ibn Abdulaziz, director of the kingdom's intelligence service, attributed the support to people's anti-American feelings which in his opinion were result of American unflinching support of Israel. Elaine Sciolino, 'Saudi Warns U.S. to Respect Arafat', International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2002, p. 1.
At the beginning of October 2001, a joint meeting of Muslim and Christian religious leaders was organised in Rome in order to highlight co-operation between the two religions. However, the very first speaker at the conference, Yusuf Qaradawi, a theologian and director of the Sunna Research Center in Qatar, began his speech with the following words: »We Arabs are among the most sensitive to this because of the evil inflicted on us by arrogant Zionists. We go to sleep at night and get up in the morning in a Palestine transformed into a continuous funeral. We refuse terrorism but don't consider it terrorism to defend one's own home.« Melinda Henneberger, 'Sharp Words At a Forum For Religious Cooperation', International Herald Tribune, October 5, 2001, p. 2.
[45] Powell said: »I didn't impose the seven days, so therefore I can't waive it.« Judy Dempsey, Avi Machlis, Peter Spiegel and Roula Khalaf, 'Sharon comments frustrate EU hopes', Financial Times, November 19, 2001, p. 5.
[46] James Bennet, 'Sharon Insists He won't Budge', International Herald Tribune, November 19, 2001, p. 8.
[47] This point has been stressed by Gideon Samet, a member of the editorial board of the Israeli newspaper Ha 'aretz. 'But the Time for Creative Peacemaking Is Now', International Herald Tribune, February 5, 2002, p. 8.
The same point has been stressed by Marwan Barghouti, general secretary of Fatah on the West Bank and an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 'To Get Deserved Security, End the Occupation', International Herald Tribune, January 18, 2002, p. 6.
[48] The Sharon government took this decision as early as December 6, 2001. 'Sharon strategy, if he has one', The Economist, December 22nd-January 4th 2002, p. 45.
[49] Ariel Sharon began to stress this argument in January 2002, when Israeli security forces captured a ship full of weapons. Sharon has been emphasising that the cargo was planned to be delivered to the PA. James Bennet, 'Sharon Shows Weapons From Raid on Ship and Calls Arafat a Bitter Foe', International Herald Tribune, January 7, 2002, p. 2.
[50] Number of killed people has constantly been considerably higher on the Palestinian side. In early December 2001, there were 758 Palestinians and 223 Israelis killed. Lee Hockstader, '2 Boys Killed As Israelis Aim Missiles At Militant', International Herald Tribune, December 11, 2001, pp. 1 and 4.
As of early October 2001, support among Palestinians for the Islamist groups rose to 31 percent, up from 23 percent in September 2000. On the other hand, support for Arafat's Fatah organisation dropped to 20 percent, from 33 percent. On December 6, 2001, the Palestinian police tried to put Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, under house arrest, however this sparked violent Palestinian protests. James Bennet, 'In Hamas, a Rising Peril to Arafat', International Herald Tribune, December 7, 2001, pp. 1-2.
[51] Roula Khalaf, Richard Wolffe and Avi Machlis, 'Arab allies urge US not to abandon Yassir Arafat', Financial Times, January 28, 2002, p. 5.
[52] Elaine Sciolino, 'Saudi Warns U.S. to Respect Arafat', International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2002, p. 1.
[53] Ibid.
[54] On February 17, 2002, Powell reiterated that the Middle East envoy Anthony Zinni would not return to the region despite escalating turmoil there until Palestinians did more to curb anti-Israeli violence. Joel Greenberg, 'Israeli police kill 2 Palestinians and foil suicide bombing', International Herald Tribune, February 18, 2002, p. 4.
[55] This provoked protests of Palestinians. Saeb Ereqat, a senior Palestinian negotiator, said: »I wonder how Cheney can say he's pursuing peace between the Palestinians and Israelis by meeting the leader of one side and not the other.« Harvey Morris, 'Israeli withdrawal plan fuels ceasefire hopes', Financial Times, March 19, 2002, p. 7.
[56] French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stated: »It (the plan) is a political response to a consistent and insidious effort by Israel to sap the basis of the Palestinian authority.« Judy Dempsey, 'EU aims to launch radical Mideast peace plan', Financial Times, February 11, 2002, p. 4.
[57] Judy Dempsey, 'US pressure on EU over Mideast resolution', Financial Times, December 17, 2001, p. 4.
[58] A senior Arab official said: The US's three main Arab allies are speaking with one voice and saying to the US that it's extremely dangerous to think of suspension of ties with the PA or alternatives to Yassir Arafat.« Roula Khalaf, Richard Wolffe and Avi Machlis, 'Arab allies urge US not to abandon Yassir Arafat', Financial Times, January 28, 2002, p. 5.
[59] Prince Nawaf ibn Abdulaziz, director of the kingdom's intelligence service, called Yasser Arafat »a man of peace« and said : »All the governments, the people of the region, believe that America is supporting Israel whether it is right or wrong, and now if something happens to Yasser Arafat, the feeling against American policy will be stronger.« Elaine Sciolino, 'Saudi Warns U.S. to Respect Arafat', International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2002, p. 1.
[60] For example, this point has been made by Henry Siegman, a senior fellow on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. 'Israel: Palestinian Moderation Isn't What Sharon Is Seeking', International Herald Tribune, January 4, 2002, p. 6.
[61] Richard Wolffe, 'Bush swings US firmly behind Sharon's hard line', Financial Times, December 5, 2001, p. 3.
[62] Brian Knowlton, 'U.S. won't call Arafat a terrorist, Powell says', International Herald Tribune, April 3, 2002, p.1.
[63] Michael Mann and Edward Alden, 'EU moves to block assets of 11 terror organisations', Financial Times, May 3, 2002, p. 4.
[64] At the conference of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in the beginning of April 2002, foreign ministers adopted declaration saying: »We reject any attempt to link terrorism to the struggle of the Palestinian people in the exercise of their inalienable right to establish their independent state with al-Quds-al-Sharif as its capital.« 'Muslims deadlocked on defining terror', International Herald Tribune, April 3, 2002, p. 3.
[65] This point has been stressed by the leading Palestinian politicians as well as independent analysts. See: Yasser Arafat, 'The Palestinians Have a Vision of Peace With Justice', International Herald Tribune, February 4, 2002, p. 5; Marwan Barghouti, 'To Get Deserved Security, End the Occupation', International Herald Tribune, January 18, 2002, p. 6; Henry Siegman, 'Israel counter-terrorist folly', Financial Times, February 15, 2002, p. 13; Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Wanted: A U.S. Blueprint for a Middle East Peace', International Herald Tribune, January 26-27, 2002, p. 4; Marwan Bishara, 'Palestinians will go on fighting for independence', International Herald Tribune, April 4, 2002, p. 8.
[66] Daniel Williams, 'Israel began months ago to fence out Arabs', International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2002, p. 4.
[67] Brian Knowlton, 'U.S. Seeks to Spark Mideast Peace Talks', International Herald Tribune, November 20, 2001, pp. 1 and 4.
[68] Judy Dempsey and Frances Williams, 'EU seeks to reassert Mideast influence', Financial Times, December 6, 2001, p. 3.
[69] Lee Hockstader, 'Zinni trip to Mideast: Mission impossible?', International Herald Tribune, March 9-10, 2002, p.1.
[70] Brian Knowlton, 'Bush deepens role of U.S. in Mideast', International Herald Tribune, April 5, 2002, p. 1.
[71] Harvey Morris, 'EU tells Sharon to stop the assassinations', Financial Times, December 12, 2001, p.3.
Traditionally, the EU has been critical of any attempts of Israel to acquire new territories through the building of Jewish settlements. For example, in 1996, when the Likud government came to power, the EU took a firm position in support of the Palestinians. The EU member states adopted several declarations which called on the Likud government to stop the building and expansion of settlements in the occupied territories which was regarded as an important obstacle to peace (Soetendorp 1997: 112).
[72] Brian Knowlton, 'U.S. Seeks to Spark Mideast Peace Talks', International Herald Tribune, November 20, 2001, p. 1.
[73] Colum Lynch, 'Palestinian state endorsed', International Herald Tribune, March 14, 2002, p. 3.
[74] UN Security Council resolution 1397, adopted on March 12, 2002, states in the Preamble: »Affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,…« S/RES/1397 (2002).
[75] The Preamble of UN Security Council resolution 1397 recalls resolutions 242 and 338 which have been the most important basis with regard to territorial design of a possible Palestinian state. However, there have been considerably different interpretations of 242 since it calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces »from territories occupied in the recent conflict« and not from all the territories. This ambiguity has inspired some interpretations stressing that Israel has not been obliged to withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967, i.e. Gaza, the West Bank, Sinai, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. In April 1982, the Jewish state completed its withdrawal from Sinai which had been by far the largest part (90%) of the occupied territories. For such an interpretation, see for example: Rostow 1993: 500-502.
[76] Ariel Sharon took a decision to launch military incursion after Palestinian suicide attack in Israeli town Netanya which had killed 21 people. Lee Hockstader, 'Arafat seeks truce as Israel positions tanks for assault', International Herald Tribune, March 29, 2002, p. 1.
[77] In Ramallah, the temporary capital of the future Palestinian state, soldiers invaded PA ministries, denuded land registries of maps, raided courts, broke into banks and stole money, and trashed non-governmental offices servicing health, human rights and commerce. On April 4, 150 soldiers went into the Ministry of Education and took the hard drive from every computer, containing essential information about Palestinian system of education. 'After the assault', The Economist, April 27th-May 3rd 2002, p. 41.
[78] On march 28, 2002, Arab leaders met in the summit of the Arab League in Beirut and offered Israel a full normalisation of relations in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967. Howard Schneider, 'Arabs unite to offer broad peace plan to Israel', International Herald Tribune, March 29, 2002, p. 4.
[79] Avi Shlaim, a respected researcher on the Middle East conflict, has argued that Sharon's aim has been elimination of every moderate voice on the Arab side as such voices would press Israel to accept a compromise and withdraw from all the occupied territories. 'Sharon's dangerous designs', International Herald Tribune, April 5, 2002, p. 6.
[80] The Economist wrote that there were some signs indicating that Israeli forces had committed war crimes. 'Israel's »war crime«', April 20th-26th 2002, p.10. The Palestinians have compared events in Jenin to the massacres which occurred in 1982 in Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila in Beirut. James Drummond, 'At last they bury their dead in Jenin', Financial Times, April 17, 2002, p. 2.
[81] In Cairo, there were demonstrations in and around universities demanding break in diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, calls for the declaration of full scale war emerged. As the result, the Egyptian government declared cessation of all official relations with Israel on April 3. In Lebanon, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets to denounce Israel's raids. There were even protests in Jakarta, Indonesia. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit accused Israel of »genocide« against Palestinians. James Drummond, 'Cairo to cease official contacts with Israel', Financial Times, April 4, 2002, p. 2; 'Turk chief calls siege genocide', International Herald Tribune, April 5, 2002, p. 10.
[82] Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, meeting with Powell on April 15, spoke of the Arab anger sweeping the region and emphasised that the US had a very important responsibility to work for stability, security and peace in the Middle East. 'Iran defends the cross-border attacks by Hezbollah', International Herald Tribune, April 19, 2002, p. 7.
[83] Richard Wolffe and Carola Hoyos, 'Washington sends conflicting signals', Financial Times, April 3, 2002, p. 2.
[84] 'EU attacks 'inadequate' action by US', Financial Times, April 4, 2002, p. 2.
[85] Edward Alden, Carola Hoyos, Harvey Morris and Rosie Bennett, 'Bush urges Israel to halt offensive on West Bank', Financial Times, April 5, 2002, p. 1.
[86] Joel Brinkley, 'Defying U.S., Sharon vows to press ahead; Bush repeats demand', International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2002, pp. 1 and 9.
[87] Roula Khalaf, 'Powell visit fails to win concessions', Financial Times, April 18, 2002, p. 6.
[88] On April 10, 2002, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on member states to impose political and trade sanctions against Israel. However, sanctions were not imposed, due to refusal of some member states. Thomas Fuller, 'European legislators target Israel', International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2002, pp. 1 and 6.
In spite of its generous economic and financial assistance to the region, the EU has never played more important role there, due to refusal of Israel to allow Brussels to take more significant steps (Soetendorp 1987: 112).
[89] Former US President Jimmy Carter has stressed that in order to persuade Israel the Bush administration should have used economic pressure and the legal requirement to use American weapons only for defensive purposes. 'America can persuade Israel', International Herald Tribune, April 22, 2002, p. 8.
For example, in 1991, President George Bush Sr. turned down Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir who demanded $ 10 billion from the US for building of new settlements in the occupied territories (Thomas 1999: 263).
[90] For a description of profound disappointment in the Arab world over the US in the post-September 11 period see, for example: Howard Schneider, 'Did Sept. 11 Change U.S.? Many Arabs Still Lament a Pro-Israel Tilt', International Herald Tribune, February 4, 2002, p. 5.
At the end of April 2002, a group of 126 Saudi scholars published a public letter in which they wrote: »We consider the United States and its current administration a first-class sponsor of international terrorism and it along with Israel form an axis of terrorism and evil in the world.« Howard Schneider, 'Saudi prince to tell Bush of Arab ire', International Herald Tribune, April 25, 2002, p. 5.
[91] On April 8, when Colin Powell arrived to Morocco, he was asked by King Mohammed why he wasn’t go to Israel first. Ten days later, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak called off meeting with the Secretary of State. 'Powell gets chill wind in Morocco', International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2002, p. 9; Roula Khalaf, 'Powell visit fails to win concessions', Financial Times, April 18, 2002, p. 6.
[92] This point has been emphasised by Mary A. Kelly, former editor of Egypt Today magazine. 'Mideast atrocities draw children into conflict', International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2002, p. 9.
[93] Many Islamic theologians in the Arab world have defined Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli civilians as a legitimate activity. For example, in the beginning of April, Ahmed al-Tayeb, the newly appointed mufti of Egypt, decided that suicide attacks against Israeli settlers, including non-combatants, in the West Bank and Gaza, were »one of the highest levels of martyrdom«. Similarly, Yussif al-Qardawi, influential Sunni cleric based in Qatar, declared that all Israelis were in effect military targets. Previously, Muhammed Sayyid Tantawi, the Sheikh al-Azhar, had ruled that all attacks on civilians were forbidden. James Drummond, 'Debate over suicide and martyrdom points to harder line among Muslims', Financial Times, April 5, 2002, p. 3.
[94] In March 2002, during Dick Cheney's Middle East tour aimed at testing conditions for military action against Iraq, all visited Arab leaders were giving absolute priority to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over any kind of discussion on Iraq. Edward Alden and Roula Khalaf, 'Cheney's tour adds to doubts over Iraq action', Financial Times, March 20, 2002, p. 3.
[95] In the beginning of December 2001, 89 members of the Senate urged President Bush not to restrain Israel from responding to Palestinian terrorism and linked Israel's conflict to the US war on terror. In a letter to the President, the Senators drew a parallel between the events of September 11 and the »terrorism that Israel has been subjected to since its birth.« Harvey Morris, 'Israel reaps the rewards of lobbying drive in US', Financial Times, December 6, 2002, p. 3.
[96] For example, in April 2002, Senator Mitch McConnel, Republican of Kentucky, stated: »For us it happened one day. For them, it happens day after day. I think there is enormous sympathy for Israel.« Helen Dewar and Juliet Eilperin, 'Support for Israel rises in Congress', International Herald Tribune, April 4, 2002, p. 9.
[97] In April 2002, Howard Kohr, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) stated: »Friends of Israel feel a sense of deep appreciation for the stance that the administration, led by the president, is taking at this moment of crisis.« Alan Cooperman, 'Jewish groups in U.S. praise Bush for his stand on Israel', International Herald Tribune, April 5, 2002, p. 3.
AIPAC has been the most influential Jewish lobbying association in the US. It had been established in 1954 as the American Zionist Council of Public Affairs (AZCPA) and in 1959 renamed AIPAC (Tivnan 1987: 39).
Israel Shahak (1997: 39) has argued that organised Jews in the US are by far more chauvinist and fanatical than Jews in Israel. He has estimated that the proportion of organised Jews within the body of US Jewry is close to 50 percent. Ibid.
[98] In 'An Open Letter to the Nations of Europe', which was published as an advertisement in International Herald Tribune on April 11, 2002, 'Anti-Defamation League', an American Jewish group, after recalling the Holocaust and »assistance or indifference of many others throughout Europe«, wrote: »Today, in a very different world, the nations of Europe are once again playing a detrimental role in the face of the murder of Jews in Israel.«
[99] 'EU rejects anti-Semitism label', International Herald Tribune, May 10, 2002, p. 5.
[100] Allison Mitchell, 'U.S. conservative groups unite to support Israel', International Herald Tribune, April 22, 2002, p. 3; 'It works at home', The Economist, April 20th-26th 2002, pp. 49-50.
[101] In spite of having active support of only 8 percent of US population, the Religious Right has been very influential due to its extremely high organising abilities. Its pro-Israeli views have originated in a theological doctrine widely shared in fundamentalist and Pentecostal circles known as »Dispensationalist Premilleniarism«. In this view, a complete restoration of the nation of Israel, including the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, is a prerequisite to the end of the present age, which will usher in the Second Coming of Christ and the establishment of his millennial reign (Martin 1999: 72-73).
[102] In the beginning of April 2002, a group of more than 30 conservatives, including Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's defence policy board, sent a letter to President Bush, saying: »It can no longer be the policy of the United States to urge, much less to pressure, Israel to continue negotiating with Arafat, any more than we would be willing to be pressured to negotiate with Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar.« Richard Wollfe, 'The president breaks ranks', Financial Times, April 6/April 7, 2002, p. 7.
[103] Alan Sipress, 'Powell's lonely struggle', International Herald Tribune, April 27-28, 2002, pp. 1 and 3.
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