Why Did Britain Appease Hitler



Why Did Britain Appease Hitler?

It was clear that Hitler would challenge the European balance of power in 1933. He committed Germany to a programme of rearmament, breaking Versailles and the inclusion in Germany of all German speaking peoples. In Mein Kampf he also spoke of winning Lebensraum in Russia. So why did Britain decide to follow a policy of appeasement towards Hitler in the 1930s?

Continuation of Revising The Treaty of Versailles:

Hitler certainly inherited a strong moral position from Stresemann, and there was a widespread feeling in Britain that Germany had been hard done by at Versailles and had legitimate grievances. Justice was justice despite the fact it was demanded by a dictator. Britain had spent much of the 20s revising the Versailles settlement so appeasement was in many ways a continuation of this. For British policy-makers this revision of the Treaty was a normal step to take. Furthermore Hitler had won much public respect for his anti-Communist stance once first elected. A stronger Germany would be a useful “buffer” against the Soviet Union, and Hitler was certainly preferred to Stalin. Britain remained deeply suspicious of the USSR.

As well as the Rhineland, and the Anchluss (self-determination), a good example of appeasement being dictated by revision of Versailles was the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty. Britain argued it was better for Germany to have a limited navy rather than allow its expansion to go unchecked. There was certainly an argument that Hitler’s policy up until 1938 was “reasonable”.

Rejection Of Pre-1914 Diplomacy:

There was also a feeling that an Entente policy (as followed before WW1) towards Germany might be counter-productive as had been the case in 1914. Grey’s policy of encircling Germany through alliances and agreements might cause her to lash out. A much more understanding approach was needed which took into account German grievances. This had shown itself in the 1920s;

• Reluctance to offer military guarantees to France

• Refusal to ally with USSR

• Reluctance to guarantee Germany’s eastern borders.

The rejection of this policy left only appeasement as a viable alternative.

The Attitudes of Other Countries:

The USA was wedded to isolation in the 1920s-30s so there was no chance of her wanting to get involved in European affairs, let alone European war if it broke out. The USA had played a crucial role in defeating Germany in 1918 but Britain could not rely on this again. In fact Neville Chamberlain once said;

“…count on nothing from the Americans but words.”

Furthermore;

• The USA passed a series of Neutrality Acts in the 1930s stating it would not sell arms or loans to other countries involved in war.

• USA did not even get involved when Japan threatened her commercial interests in the Far East.

More importantly the attitude of the Dominions made appeasement an attractive option. Most of the Dominions were reluctant to help Britain in another war, particularly after the heavy costs in lives paid by both Australia and South Africa in WW1. All of this would only contribute to the feeling of weakness in Britain.

With France being ruled by a series of weak governments in the 1930s, GB was alone in seeking to influence Germany’s government. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect Chamberlain’s government to risk war in this situation.

Dislike For Bolshevik Russia:

The historian Ruth Hethog suggests that a British pact with the USSR would have done more than anything else to avert war. However this pact was unlikely;

• Chamberlain and the Tories continued to distrust Communism, especially Stalin. This was unsurprising given that Stalin had killed far more of his own people than Hitler through his purges in the 1930s and gulag camps.

• Britain saw the USSR as a liability. Again unsurprising since Stalin had greatly weakened his army in the purges; e.g. 80% of senior army officers killed or imprisoned.

The Russian Foreign Secretary Litvinov and his successor Molotov were repeatedly snubbed by the British. As a result Britain left it too late to explore a deal with the USSR and was finally beaten to it by Hitler when he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939.

Economic Slump:

The post-war slump had the impact of making GB feel vulnerable. Despite some recovery this decline continued raising the prospect of bankruptcy if war was declared;

• Britain’s share of world manufacturing declined from 13.6% in 1914 to 10% in 1938.

• The collapse of British exports after WW1 led to a crisis in the balance of payments causing a reduction in gold and currency reserves.

Defence Cuts:

After WW1 Lloyd-George introduced the Ten Year Rule which allowed defence spending to be pared to the bare minimum. So much so that GB was at its lowest military strength in 1931/2. All governments had been responsible for this including Baldwin’s 1924-29 administration which included Winston Churchill as chancellor;

• Army drastically reduced – from 3.5 million men in 1918 to 370,000 in 1920. Furthermore, by 1930 defence spending was below that of 1910 and armed forces manpower below that of 1914.

• Naval supremacy had been sacrificed in the 1922 Washington Naval Agreement which gave parity to USA – 5:5:3:2:2 – USA, GB, Japan, France, Italy.

• The RAF had scrapped large numbers of planes but due to the high rate of obsolescence this was less relevant.

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