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Operational Logic and Identifying Soviet Operational Centers of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa, 1941

A Monograph by

Major David J. Bongi Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Second Term AY 93-94

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

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ABSTRACT OPERATIONAL LOGIC AND IDENTIFYING SOVIET OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY DURING OPERATION BARBAROSSA, 1941, by HAJ David J. Bongi, USA, 54 pages.

This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas: (1) German planning for Operation Barbarossa; (2) the operational objectives selected for the second phase of the campaign.

The second phase was selected because it was during this phase that the focus of the German military effort became diverse. Two competing strategies within the German political and military command structure caused this. While political-ideological and economic factors influenced one, purely military concerns influenced the other. In the end, the Germans diluted combat power in phase two towards three operational objectives: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine.

Thus, the research question for this monograph is: Which, if any, of the German operational objectives for the second phase of the campaign were also Soviet operational centers of gravity?

The analysis of operational objectives uses Colonel William Mendel's ami Colonel Lamar Tooke's analytical model called "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." Potential centers of gravity are analyzed using a validity and a feasibility test.

This monograph concludes that Moscow was the operational center of gravity for the campaign by virtue of its direct and intrinsic relationship to the strategic center of gravity--the Soviet Military.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maior David J. Bonai Title of Monograph: Operational Logic and Identifying Soviet

Operational Centers of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa. 1941

Approved by:

LTC Robert L. Mayes -jC\AAj/)r^^

COL Gregory Ftfntenot, MA, MMAS

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Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 6th day of May 1994

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