Engagement CP: China - …



Engagement CP: China TOC \o "1-3" \u Engagement CP: China PAGEREF _Toc48296697 \h 1***1NC SHELL’S*** PAGEREF _Toc48296698 \h 1South China Sea/Relations: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296699 \h 1Miscalculation: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296700 \h 1Relations: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296701 \h 1South China Sea: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296702 \h 1South China Sea (2): 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296703 \h 1South China Sea/East China Sea: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296704 \h 1North Korea: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296705 \h 1***SOLVENCY*** PAGEREF _Toc48296706 \h 1Generic PAGEREF _Toc48296707 \h 1Commitment Traps/Chinese Aggression/US Resolve PAGEREF _Toc48296708 \h 1Linkage Diplomacy PAGEREF _Toc48296709 \h 1China Says Yes PAGEREF _Toc48296710 \h 1South China Sea PAGEREF _Toc48296711 \h 1***NET BENEFITS*** PAGEREF _Toc48296712 \h 1Assurance DA: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296713 \h 1Assurance DA: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48296714 \h 1Elections DA: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296715 \h 1Elections DA: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48296716 \h 1Deterrence DA: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296717 \h 1Deterrence DA: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48296718 \h 1Cooperation DA: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48296719 \h 1***ANSWERS TO*** PAGEREF _Toc48296720 \h 1Solvency Deficits PAGEREF _Toc48296721 \h 1China Cheats/Ignores Agreements PAGEREF _Toc48296722 \h 1Turn: Allied Backlash PAGEREF _Toc48296723 \h 1Turn: Deals Kill US Credibility PAGEREF _Toc48296724 \h 1Turn: Engagement Signals Weakness PAGEREF _Toc48296725 \h 1Turn: Containment Good PAGEREF _Toc48296726 \h 1Turn: Engagement Bad PAGEREF _Toc48296727 \h 1Turn: Conditions Bad PAGEREF _Toc48296728 \h 1Permutation: Do Both PAGEREF _Toc48296729 \h 1Permutation: Plan is the CP (Plan is a Grand Bargain) PAGEREF _Toc48296730 \h 1Permutation: Unilateral Concessions = Grand Bargain PAGEREF _Toc48296731 \h 1Permutation: Plan is a Pre-Requisite to the CP PAGEREF _Toc48296732 \h 1Permutation: Do the Plan, Then the CP PAGEREF _Toc48296733 \h 1Permutation: Do the CP, Then the Plan PAGEREF _Toc48296734 \h 1International Fiat Bad PAGEREF _Toc48296735 \h 1***1NC SHELL’S***South China Sea/Relations: 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to reduce maritime patrols in the South China Sea in exchange for the PRC agreeing to increase domestic protection of intellectual property rights and to jointly explore and develop contested territorial claims in the South China Sea. US-China grand bargain on the South China Sea, intellectual property, and market access reduces tensions and increases relations Lu, Distinguished Fellow at INSEAD, 11-28-18(Kevin, “The Pieces Are in Place for a Grand Bargain With China,” accessed 8-5-20, ) JFNWhen Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump meet for the third time in Buenos Aires this week, it will be the culmination of many intense months of work on both sides to try to overcome the current economic, political, and security tensions. Both sides have paid a sharp cost for these tensions, as have many of the countries caught in the conflict. The size and complexity of the relationship, and the sheer number of areas it touches on—from soybeans in Iowa to island-building in the South China Sea—demand a “grand bargain” between the two powers: a deal that involves multiple areas for an outcome that ultimately benefits both sides. Based on my conversations with senior figures on both the U.S. and Chinese sides, the key elements of this bargain are likely to be both boringly predictable in the directions the situation would have to move toward and potentially surprising in how some of these directions manifest themselves. First, it is likely that we will see substantially reduced military tensions in the South China Sea, through less confrontational U.S. Navy activities and plateaued Chinese installations on rocks and islands. By now, through intensified construction of maritime structures over the past few years, China has almost fully achieved its goal of firming up its presence in the disputed areas, which was paused by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s when the Chinese leader decided to “set aside dispute and pursue joint development.” In other words, while Deng intentionally paused the effort to maintain and to strengthen China’s long-standing historical claims to the “nine-dash line” area of the South China Sea during the initial decades of Chinese economic development, Xi caught up. It’s true that China has measurably intensified its quasi-military island-building activities in the South China Sea. While China’s claims are based on sovereignty, and there are some security interests, China’s main intention and interests in the region are principally economic. While it is perfectly normal for the United States to use “freedom of navigation” as the reason for its naval presence in the region and a seat at the table on the disputes, and Chinese rhetoric has sometimes been worrying, there has been no actual attempt by China to impede freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China places a lower emphasis on the strategic significance of the South China Sea than it does on the Taiwan Strait or the Korean Peninsula. The most beneficial solutions to all parties that have claims in the region are under the umbrella of joint exploration and economic development, not through military confrontation. To further understand Beijing’s perspective, it is useful to highlight that it understands well that military solutions never solve political or economic problems. China had spent a big stretch of the 19th and 20th centuries on the receiving end of colonialism and foreign military invasions, from the Opium Wars to the Japanese occupation during World War II. While nationalists use this history for a narrative of national humiliation, the real consensus in China is that while military superiority might temporarily prevail, it does not bring long-lasting solutions. From the U.S. perspective, its superpower status has been built on far more than its past willingness and ability to supply a security blanket to the rest of the world. Its dominance has also been grounded on the weight of its economy, the centrality of Wall Street in global financial markets, the use of U.S. dollars as the world’s main reserve and trade currency, the universal reach of its ideology and culture, and the advanced technologies accumulated in its defense industry, Silicon Valley, and research institutions. The supply of a security blanket to the world—especially to faraway territories with no direct strategic or security relevance to the United States— is the most expensive and least effective way to maintain its superpower status, as evidenced by the pointless interventions in many parts of the world. Softening such a stance in the South China Sea would cost the United States nothing and would in fact trigger a regional grand bargain among the claimants and neighboring countries based on shared economic interests. In short, to China, military presence in the South China Sea is a means to an end. To the United States, it is a means to no end. Reduced tensions, by both sides shrinking their military presence, serves both sides. Second, China has to stop the prevalent theft of intellectual property, but less so because of moral reasons and more because it is now in China’s self-interest to do so. Since the opening up and reform started in the late 1970s, the Chinese economy has operated for many years using “late-mover advantage” and by copy-and-paste rather than through innovation. The running joke in China is that the best Chinese business model is not B2B (business to business) or B2C (business to consumer) but C2C (copy to China). Such a development model no longer suits China’s next stage of development and its ambition to become a high-income country by 2025. China has consistently recorded double-digit patent application growth since 2003. In 2017, China was the second-largest filer of patent applications, with the United Nations forecasting that China would overtake the top spot from the United States in three years. While the quality of some of these patents is questionable, the efforts that China has put into technological innovations are clear. The three Chinese technology giants—Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent—have a combined market cap of $1 trillion, with Tencent surpassing Facebook in valuation last November. It is now in China’s self-interest to strengthen protection of intellectual property, whether foreign or Chinese. Third, the U.S.-China trade deficit will almost certainly come down, because it is the interests of both China and the United States to rebalance the trade dynamics. Additionally, it is long overdue for China to further open up its markets for foreign investments. For example, I believe the Chinese banking sector will open to 100 percent foreign ownership in the near future. China has been trying for years to promote domestic consumption, and the role of increasing domestic consumption in its economy is finally becoming visible. The savings rate came down from 52 percent in 2010 to 46 percent in 2017, and household leverage ratio—the ratio between debt incurred by families and gross domestic product—has increased significantly from 18 percent in 2008 to 49 percent in 2017. Chinese consumers have woken up to their spending power. These consumers range from retirees, who are now more confident of their pensions and health care as retirement, social security, and health care systems slowly mature, to millennials, who just want to spend and to experience life before they save. As the Chinese middle class continues to consume more and to improve their living standards, buying more American goods, sending more tourist dollars to the United States, and paying more for U.S. education is only natural. The Belt and Road Initiative will also create additional markets for Chinese goods and capacity in Africa, Central Asia, and other such markets, hence reducing China’s dependence on exports to the United States. Additionally, rather than manufacturing more iPhones in Chinese factories and receiving a miniscule share of the profits, China would be better off producing Xiaomi phones in the United States or in Vietnam, owning the design and core technology and getting a bigger piece of the economic pie. Upgrading Chinese industry is a bigger priority than keeping all productions domestic. As a result of all of these factors, China will buy more from and sell less to the United States. Fourth, while Trump’s economic team has repeatedly assailed Premier Li Keqiang’s “Made in China 2025” plan, I argue that it is here to stay. While the United States sees the state’s role in the Chinese economy as inefficient and the main basis for creating an uneven playing field between Chinese and foreign firms, China sees the role of state differently. The power of free markets fundamentally lies with the signals and feedback markets create. Such signals and feedback in turn improve the efficiency of resource and capital allocation. The Chinese political and economic system, however, has historically centralized far more power at the top and also has in practice installed elaborate feedback loops for both political and economic signals. The Chinese economic system after Deng took control in 1977 is also notoriously agile, allowing trial and error at all levels of government economic policy, without ideological baggage. Accompanied by these feedback loops as well as trial and error, the state’s role in China’s economy is thoughtful and intentional. The state also directs resource allocation that may look economically inefficient but is socially necessary, for example to manage unemployment in a phased fashion. The Chinese economic system is a powerful one that combines a long-term mindset, top-down intentionality, bottom-up feedback loops, local experiments, and agility. It has worked for China for over four decades. This is not something Xi would abandon. A grand bargain that involves less tension in South China Sea, enhanced efforts by China to respect intellectual property, increased market access in China, and a reduced U.S. trade deficit without China having to fundamentally alter the role of the state in economic planning in the short term seems to be a reasonable package of give and take. The global economy and many countries in this region are better off with this deal than enduring continued uncertainty from the trade war.Solving for naval conflict and miscalculation is key to preventing US-China warDupont, Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation, 7-8-20(Alan, “The US-China Cold War Has Already Started,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN Although the new Cold War is playing out across the world, its geographic center of gravity is the Indo-Pacific, not Europe, because the epicenter of global commerce and trade has moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, reflecting Asia’s rise and Europe’s decline. The United States and China are both Pacific powers, so their rivalry will be felt most keenly in the Indo-Pacific, particularly at sea, where their interests collide and there are several potential triggers for military confrontation.Miscalculation: 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to adopt a declaratory policy of no nuclear first use, increase funding for Track Two diplomatic efforts and expert exchanges in exchange for the PRC agreeing to adopt a declaratory policy of no nuclear first use, increase funding for Track Two diplomacy and expert exchanges. Improved military to military communication solves for miscalculation and conflict escalation Shambaugh, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 8-1-20(David, “What the New Cold War Should Borrow From the Old One --- Amid a relationship of rivalry, the U.S. and China should establish buffers and guardrails to avoid outright conflict,” WSJ, accessed 8-7-20, p. Factiva) JFN As the relationship between the two major powers rapidly deteriorates, it is time to acknowledge the obvious: The U.S. and China are now engaged in a new Cold War. Historians will debate exactly when it started, but the signs were there long before staff members at the two consulates found themselves hastily destroying documents. Both sides urgently need to find ways to manage this new Cold War -- and to prevent it from getting hot. As in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War that dominated world politics for decades, both Washington and Beijing view the other as strategic adversaries. Both are engaged in a global competition, maneuvering in many regions -- and above all in Asia -- to cultivate partners and clients and deny them to the other side. Both conduct war games against the other and prepare for a possible direct clash or a proxy conflict. Both militaries procure weapons specifically to deter or fight the other. Both governments think that the other is trying to subvert its political system. Senior officials on both sides view the other with deep suspicion (as Mr. Pompeo said in his July 23 speech, "Distrust and verify"), and both governments collect intelligence against the other. Nor are the tensions just limited to governments. Academic exchanges and other U.S.-Chinese societal linkages are breaking down. News media and social media are increasingly scathing toward the other country, and public-opinion polls show all-time highs in unfavorable perceptions of the other. Trade and investment -- long the ballast of the U.S.-Chinese relationship -- are now subject to Cold War-type strictures. Most Americans now see a contentious competitive relationship with China as the new normal. Even if Joe Biden defeats Mr. Trump in November, his administration's tactics might differ, but its overall strategic approach would probably be strikingly similar to that of the Trump administration. For its part, the Chinese government needs to ask itself why it didn't see this major U.S. shift coming. China's America specialists and intelligence analysts badly failed to predict or understand the deep changes in U.S. thinking about China over the past decade, and they still fail to see any fault on China's side. For its part, the U.S. also engaged in wishful thinking about China's evolution and failed to forecast Chinese leader Xi Jinping's return to totalitarian rule. Important as such introspection is, the question now for the rivals is how to keep their Cold War cold and manage the mounting tensions. As in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the two countries need to adopt a framework of detente amid a relationship of rivalry. Even as they compete, they must establish buffers, guardrails and stabilizing mechanisms that can contain their enmity and deter provocative behavior. Of course, the conditions differ from the first Cold War; China's economy and global position are far stronger than their Soviet counterparts. Yet many of the lessons and instruments from the original Cold War are still useful. The U.S. and China are nuclear-armed powers, but unlike the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they have no bilateral strategic arms-control accords or "rules of the road" for managing conflicts. This is gravely dangerous. The priority must be to build communications mechanisms between the two militaries and national-security establishments, and to establish precise procedures to prevent, say, an accidental military encounter from escalating into full-scale war. A mutual pledge of "no first use" of nuclear weapons would be a good first step. During the original Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union also adopted various measures to build confidence, including cultural programs. Unofficial "track two" exchanges among experts helped to narrow mutual misperceptions. I vividly recall meeting with Soviet experts on the U.S. in 1986 and watching "Dr. Strangelove" together. The U.S. and China have had four decades of direct exchanges of experts and students. But the expert exchanges have atrophied badly in recent years and need to be rebuilt. Those that do continue tend to bring together committed proponents of U.S.-Chinese engagement and cooperation. The Chinese side is talking with the wrong Americans, and such discussions tend to create echo chambers of the like-minded. We need to get those on both sides who advocate vigorous competition in the room together for frank conversations, without propaganda slogans. To defuse tensions, some American scholars argue that the U.S. and China need to strike a "grand bargain," as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. But the relationship is too complex and fraught now for such overarching schemes. Over time, the sides could explore an agreement reminiscent of the 1975 Helsinki accords, which established a framework for Washington and Moscow to manage their differences on a range of issues, including human rights. The U.S. and China are going to continue to compete across the board. Their rivalry is only going to intensify over time. So we need to accept the new Cold War, even as we work pragmatically to manage and constrain it.Relations: 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to not place a nuclear missile shield in South Korea, stop assisting India in developing nuclear weapons and maintain its status quo stance on Taiwanese independence in exchange for the PRC agreeing to compel North Korea to pursue de-escalatory policies, condition aid to Pakistan on increased protection of its nuclear arsenal, and maintain its status quo stance on Taiwanese independence. US-China grand bargain on North Korea, Pakistan, and Taiwan solves for relations and reducing risk of conflict Etzioni, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 17(Amitai, “Toward a Grand Bargain With China,” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, accessed 8-7-20, p. ProQuest) JFNSeveral American analysts point to the modernization of the Chinese military; its development of anti-access, area denial capabilities; China's rapid economic growth; and its expansionist conduct, especially the building up of some islands in the South China Sea as indications that sooner or later the US will go to war with China. They hence advocate increased military budgets, placement of US troops and warships in the area, military alliances with nations on the border of China, and drawing a redline when it comes to the contested islands. As I see it, the Chinese military buildup is coming from a very low base, and is far from approaching that of the US. The difference is highlighted by the fact that China now has one aircraft carrier while the US has eleven. The anti-access, anti-ship missiles are mainly defensive weapons, of concern for anybody who wants to attack China but otherwise do not threaten the US or its allies. China's economic growth is slowing and its income per capita is and will be for decades well below that of the US. It is close to that of El Salvador. The fate of the contested islands should be settled as part of a much more all-encompassing bargain with China, rather than turned into a major issue in its own right, a test of China's good character or of US credibility and fortitude. Above all, I note that the US and China have many shared and complementary interests and very few real reasons for conflict. These shared interests include preventing the spread of terrorism (obviously a major concern for the U.S. and its allies but also for China where Uighur separatists have launched attacks against the government since the 1990s); non-proliferation of nuclear arms (China voted with the US in 2016 at the UN to board all ships on their way to or from North Korea to ensure that they do not carry nuclear materials); global financial stability; preventing the spread of pandemics; and environmental protection, in particular climate change. In addition, the US has a major interest in making major investments in nation building at home and not in continuing to increase military expenditures in preparing for a war with China. The remaining issues can be settled best if both sides focus on the issues most important to them. The US' number one security risk in Asia is a North Korea armed with nuclear and chemical weapons, long range missiles, and an unpredictable dictator. If it attacks South Korea or Japan, the US will be dragged into a war, which it is sure to win but only after devastating costs to its allies and its status. China has the leverage to compel North Korea to change course, but it has to be incentivized to proceed because of the costs to itself of twisting North Korea's arms. This is the case because first, China fears that if the regime in Pyongyang collapses, many millions of North Koreans will flee into China, and it will have to accommodate them. Second, that following the unification of Korea, the US will move its troops to the border with China. It is hence not enough for the US to call on China or try to shame China into pressing North Korea to give up its nuclear arms buildup. First of all, it has to informally negotiate an agreement with China that the area that is now North Korea would not be occupied by either side and that the nuclear arms there now will be destroyed rather than added to China's arsenal. In return, the US has to commit itself to not placing a nuclear missile shield in South Korea. China has reasons to be concerned about such a shield because it could be used to undermine its nuclear deterrent. Other incentives may well be needed, for instance, stopping the near daily American intelligence flights up and down Chinese coastlines, which are of very limited use for the US and very antagonizing to China. The second major US security interest in Asia is to ensure that terrorists are unable to get their hands on nuclear weapons in Pakistan (something they have already tried six times). Given that China is the primary source of arms and investments for Pakistan, this second US security objective may be achieved if, as part of the grand bargain, the US agrees to stop helping India develop its nuclear arsenal and stops pushing its military build-up to counter China. Several additional examples follow. One may well dispute one or the other, but the main purpose is to illustrate elements of a grand bargain approach. Clarifying Intentions Regarding Taiwan Making explicit that which is viewed by many as an implicit understanding between China and the United States regarding the status of Taiwan would constitute a major step toward defusing tensions between the two powers. The governments of both the United States and China have already demonstrated considerable self-restraint in the matter of Taiwan. Beijing has not yielded to demands from those who call for employing force as a means of "reclaiming" Taiwan as part of the mainland; meanwhile, Washington has not yielded to Americans who urge the recognition of Taiwan as an independent country. These measures of self-restraint should be made more explicit by letting it be known that so long as China does not use force to coerce Taiwan to become part of China, the United States will continue to refrain from treating Taiwan as an independent state. One may ask whether it is not best to let sleeping dogs lie. One reason to clarify both sides' policies is that hawks in both nations use the cause of Taiwan to justify building up the United States' and China's respective military forces in an era in which it is necessary for both nations to focus on economic, social, and environmental issues at home. A 2013 report to Congress from the Department of Defense concurs, stating, "Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China's military investment."i Moreover, China carried out a military exercise in which the PLA simulated "a Normandy-style invasion" of Taiwan.ii In the United States, a 2003 report from the Council on Foreign Relations examined China's growing military power and held that "minimizing the chances that a cross-strait crisis will occur means maintaining the clear ability and willingness to counter any application of military force against Taiwan."iii Making an explicit commitment to maintain the status quo of Taiwan, unless the people of Taiwan freely and peacefully choose otherwise, would significantly reduce tensions between the United States and China. Cyberspace A grand bargain is particularly important for restraining the proliferation of weapons such as cyber arms that favor those who strike first. Such weapons are particularly destabilizing because they offer tangible incentives to strike before being struck, thereby increasing the probability that a country possessing them will escalate a situation. Cyber arms, roughly defined, are malicious computer programs designed to conduct espionage or to disable or destroy physical infrastructure. Because espionage has been a reality of international relations for as long as nations have existed and because "kinetic" cyber weapons remain rare, it seems likely that any new shared understandings of vetted self-restraint in the realm of information technology will center on those cyber tools capable of causing physical damage rather than those that collect intelligence. A draft code that seeks to forestall conflicts involving cyber arms has already been proposed. In September 2011, four countries China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan submitted an "International Code of Conduct for Information Security" to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The draft calls for a "consensus on the international norms and rules standardizing the behavior of countries concerning information and cyberspace at an early date." The document further asks states to pledge "not to use [information and communication technologies] including networks to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression and pose threats to international peace and security." iv Critics have found fault in this draft, suggesting the draft may lead to increased state censorship and control of the Internet; however, these critics have failed to propose an alternate text. It seems more constructive to amend and modify the suggested text rather than to dismiss it out of hand.South China Sea: 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to stop its diplomatic opposition to Chinese backed or financed energy pipelines in exchange for the PRC agreeing to decrease escalatory behavior in the South China Sea. US approval of Chinese energy pipelines solves for tensions in the SCS Etzioni, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 17(Amitai, “Toward a Grand Bargain With China,” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, accessed 8-7-20, p. ProQuest) JFNPathways China is highly dependent on the import of raw materials and energy, a great deal of which reaches China via the sea. China sees itself as highly vulnerable because the United States, which has a strong naval presence in the region, could readily block these imports.vii Some American commentators openly discuss the option of such a blockade, which is considered a moderate way of confronting China relative to the Air Sea Battle concept.viii In response to these concerns and as a result of its broader interest in commercial expansion, China increased its naval presence in the South China Sea and developed a network of ports termed the "string of pearls" in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.ix Additionally, China attempted to reduce the country's reliance on shipping lanes by developing plans, including new Silk Roads, for transporting oil and gas resources by land.x Indeed, a system of roads, railways, and pipelines now extends across continental Asia.xi Some Americans view these pathways as a sign of China's expansionist tendencies and interest in asserting global dominance.xii Meanwhile, some Chinese view American opposition to select pathways, for instance a pipeline from Iran to China, as attempts to contain China's rise. The United States should assume unless clear evidence is presented to the contrary that extending land-based pathways for the flow of energy resources and raw materials will make China less inclined to build up its military, particularly the naval forces needed to secure ocean pathways a win-win for both powers. Solving for naval conflict and miscalculation is key to preventing US-China warDupont, Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation, 7-8-20(Alan, “The US-China Cold War Has Already Started,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN Although the new Cold War is playing out across the world, its geographic center of gravity is the Indo-Pacific, not Europe, because the epicenter of global commerce and trade has moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, reflecting Asia’s rise and Europe’s decline. The United States and China are both Pacific powers, so their rivalry will be felt most keenly in the Indo-Pacific, particularly at sea, where their interests collide and there are several potential triggers for military confrontation.South China Sea (2): 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for the PRC agreeing to vest contested South China Sea natural resources in a multinational holding company whose ownership is shared among China and other claimant countries. China says yes to a deal that reduces US arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for China deferring sovereign claims in the SCS Wolf, Larson, and Graf, RAND Institute, 16(Charles, Eric, and Marlon, “Convergent and Divergent U.S.-China Interests,” February 2016, accessed 8-10-20, ) JFN Based on our preliminary work, we assess that several potential “win-win” outcomes can be reached by the United States and China through reciprocal concessions, such as U.S. reductions in arms sales to Taiwan, while China reciprocates by deferring sovereignty issues in the South China Sea (SCS) and instead agrees to vest SCS mineral and other resources in a multinational holding company whose ownership is shared among China and other claimant countries. 1 This broad concept and a preliminary outline of an appropriate method for implementing it resulted from discussions in 2011-2012 between RAND and our long-time collaborators in the China Reform Forum -- a research entity associated with China’s Central Party School.2 The intervening years since 2012 have been devoted to further planning for the project, to initial and longer-term fund-raising, and to drafting this document. The document represents an initial effort to test how the motivating idea might be implemented. It is to be expected that implementation may involve substantial changes, additions, and subtractions once the full-scale project gets underway.3South China Sea/East China Sea: 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to relax export controls on dual use technology to China and accord national treatment to Chinese firms in the US in exchange for the PRC agreeing to forgo assertion and enforcement of its Air Defense Identification Zones in the East and South China Sea, restoring international norms on information exchanges that apply to global air and sea commerce, and accord national treatment to US firms operating in China. China says yes to a deal that has China forge ADIZ’s while the US relaxes export controls to China and both countries accord “national treatment” to US and Chinese investors; solves for SCS and ECS tensionsWolf, Larson, and Graf, RAND Institute, 16(Charles, Eric, and Marlon, “Convergent and Divergent U.S.-China Interests,” February 2016, accessed 8-10-20, ) JFN China’s assertion and enforcement of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the 200- mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the two China Seas reflects a core security interest of 6 Complex details of legal empowerment, capital-generating, and regulatory authority to be subsequently developed by China and the U.S. in consultation with the other claimant governments. 6 China. But, ADIZ also entails a threat to core interests of US allies in the area and an acute security risk in the Asian region. To allay these risks, Portfolio I proposes major and reciprocal concessions by China and by the U.S. that provide compensatory benefits in return for reciprocal concessions by both countries. For example, China’s concession might forgo assertion and enforcement of ADIZs, and restore the normal rules and informational exchanges that apply globally to air and sea commerce, including acceptance of advance notification and conveyance of flight and sailing plans for ensuing transits. Juxtaposed to this concession, the U.S. would reciprocate with two major concessions intended to benefit China’s core interests. The first reciprocal U.S. concession is to relax U.S. export controls on high-tech, dual-use technology products and services that currently are applied on exports to China, but do not apply on exports to non-NATO members of the European Union (EU). This U.S. concession would provide calculable benefits for both China’s security interests and its economic interests. A second component of the reciprocal concessions in Portfolio I entails a formal agreement by China to accord “national treatment”7 to U.S. and other foreign firms and investments in China, while forgoing the special advantages for “national favorites” that China has sometimes invoked. Associated with this concession, U.S. reciprocity would accord equivalent national treatment to private Chinese firms and Chinese investors in the U.S.8 Where any of the 50 states within the U.S. offer special tax or other incentives to investors in those states, the federal government would seek by legislation and regulatory means to assure that Chinese investors have access to the same incentives.North Korea: 1NCThe United States Federal Government should offer the People’s Republic of China an agreement wherein the United States agrees to financially and logistically assist the PRC in the event the government of the DPRK collapses, respects Chinese investment in North Korea, and will withdraw US forces from the Korean Peninsula in the event of Korean unification in exchange for the PRC agreeing to compel the DPRK to pursue de-escalatory policies. US-China grand bargain on North Korea solves for stability on the Korean Peninsula Bandow, Cato Institute Senior Fellow, 4-17-17(Doug, “Time for a Better U.S.-China Grand Bargain on North Korea,” accessed 8-8-20, ) JFN Gaining the PRC’s cooperation remains the most obvious and effective means to apply increased pressure on Pyongyang. China accounts for upwards of 90 percent of trade with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Even more important, the bulk of the North’s energy and food come from the PRC. Which means if China stepped on North Korea’s economic windpipe, Kim and company would notice. The Trump administration has made an unsubtle attempt to browbeat Beijing, threatening to take military action against the DPRK, despite all the uncertainties and risks of doing so. President Trump also added a bit of equally crude bribery, offering better trade terms with Beijing if the latter acts as desired. However, these actions aren’t likely to convince the PRC to apply the sort of bone‐?crunching sanctions that almost certainly would be necessary to have much chance of changing North Korean policy. The first problem is that the administration has combined an unconvincing threat with an ambiguous offer, along with a request that Beijing do something not detailed in return. To abandon its traditional ally and strengthen America’s geopolitical position in return for a promise of unspecified future benefits would be foolish, if not foolhardy. And second, the Trump administration has not addressed the PRC’s greatest concerns. Applying extraordinary economic pressure on the North wouldn’t guarantee compliance. And if Pyongyang did not, the result could be regime collapse, a messy state implosion marked by political division, violent conflict, loose nukes, humanitarian crisis and mass refugee flows—all on China’s border. Which ultimately might turn into a unified Korea allied with America and hosting U.S. troops, a historic and geopolitical nightmare for a country that already believes Washington is attempting to surround it with American allies and bases. In fact, these concerns explain why Beijing has not acted previously, despite rising irritation with the North’s confrontational, even reckless behavior. For the PRC, stability is paramount. Moreover, China views the United States as being primarily responsible for the impasse, having implemented a “hostile” policy toward the DPRK, which encouraged the latter to pursue nuclear weapons. After all, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Serbia all demonstrated that small states typically lack the conventional means to resist U.S. military action. North Korea does not want to similarly end up on the ash heap of history. Although the Trump administration’s efforts to win Chinese cooperation so far have fallen short, the president’s trade offer could be viewed as a proposal for negotiation. In fact, Beijing may have responded accordingly. For instance, the semiofficial Global Times ran an article that suggested that “Chinese society will be willing” to support new restrictions, such as an energy cutoff, on the North if the latter runs another nuclear test. For years, U.S. officials have seemed bewildered that the residents of Zhongnanhai didn’t rush to fulfill U.S. demands and hand China’s sole military ally over to America. Washington ignored the fact that by doing so, the PRC would risk chaos blowing across the Yalu into China and strengthening the containment network encircling the communist state. After all, from America’s perspective these are benefits. The Trump administration appeared to start down the same road, when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson testified at his confirmation hearing that the United States needed to “compel” China to apply UN sanctions against the North. However, President Trump’s trade initiative suggests greater administration flexibility. Instead of attempting to coerce Beijing, Washington should play Let’s Make a Deal. Propose talks with Pyongyang over general security and political issues. Offer to assist the PRC if the North collapses and creates a humanitarian crisis. Respect China’s economic investments in North Korea. Withdraw U.S. forces in the event of Korean reunification. Neutralize the peninsula militarily. Include the Republic of Korea and Japan in a broader agreement. Economic benefits, as proposed by the president, are useful, but the DPRK plays an important political and security role in Chinese government calculations. Indeed, traditionally bilateral relations were managed by the Chinese Communist Party, not the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army has an outsize interest in the North’s survival, and resists proposals to abandon North Korea, now often promoted by academics and the public through social media. Washington needs to address the full range of North Korean issues as they affect China. President Trump’s attempt to scare the PRC and DPRK is more likely to frighten the South Korean people, who would suffer the most in any conflict. Nevertheless, he has gotten Beijing’s attention. But China’s leadership isn’t likely to sacrifice core security interests for better trade terms alone. President Xi Jinping and company might be willing to act if the United States agrees to deal with the PRC’s security as well as economic concerns. Even with Beijing’s aid, the United States might not be able to bring the isolated yet determined communist state to heel. But the possibility of success is a good enough reason to give negotiation a try. It is imperative to preserve peace on the peninsula.***SOLVENCY***GenericThe counterplan’s encouragement of US-China strategic dialogue spills-over and up to solve all key areas of dispute in the relationship Swaine, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1-16-19(Michael, “A Relationship Under Extreme Duress: U.S.-China Relations at a Crossroads,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN A first step in this direction should be the formation of a senior-level U.S.-China civil-military dialogue on crisis avoidance and crisis management, using input from relevant Track Two activities. But for such a dialogue to occur, both sides will need to step back from the current use of simplistic, demonizing slogans and self-serving platitudes to characterize the relationship. Instead, they must internalize the reality that, under current conditions, a serious political-military crisis between the United States and China has the potential to escalate to a major military conflagration.. Given this stark fact, each side must recognize that the other is not necessarily interested in provoking and manipulating a crisis to achieve a decisive advantage in the relationship and that any effort to do so would likely result in disaster. That recognition is essential for the initial good faith effort required to engage in a frank discussion of the potentialities of crisis mismanagement on either side. Beyond the development of leadership crisis management understandings and skills, a serious and sustained senior-level crisis management dialogue, if undertaken with relatively open minds, could also have much broader positive consequences by increasing overall levels of understanding and perhaps even trust between Chinese and American leaders. Such changes in perception would have positive implications for U.S.-China interactions not only in those areas most directly associated with political-military crises, but in many other areas as well.. Indeed, the development of more effective crisis management and confidence-building measures could promote efforts to deal more frankly with the major issues of serious contention in the relationship, including trade and investment tensions, technology development issues, military deployments and intentions, the threats posed by domestic influence campaigns, and even human rights disputes. In each of these policy areas, greater trust and understanding could facilitate less politicized efforts to discern the actual nature and extent of the differences between the two sides and the possible dimensions of any achievable middle-ground understanding. This would involve a willingness to “seek truth from facts” and, equally important, an acknowledgement that the criticisms of the other side, while in many cases greatly exaggerated, have some basis in truth.“Circuit breakers” like the counterplan are key to prevent a US-China cold war that ensures global instability Dupont, Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation, 7-8-20(Alan, “The US-China Cold War Has Already Started,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN Although a cold war is below the threshold of a major “hot” war, it could easily result in one unless carefully managed. Tensions between rising and incumbent powers often precede military conflict or an extended period of confrontation and instability. Without a circuit breaker, a ratcheting-up of Sino-U.S. tensions could worsen the emerging Cold War, foreshadowing an era of heightened strategic competition that would be enormously disruptive to international trade and world order. The historical record suggests that although a hot war is not inevitable, it is a distinct possibility. More likely, however, is a festering but contained rivalry between the United States and China that remains below the threshold of major war but is regularly punctuated by proxy conflicts, especially in cyberspace. Although more corrosive than explosive, this would usher in an extended period of great power competition that could roll back the gains from more than 70 years of trade liberalization, disrupt global supply chains, Balkanize the internet, and divide the world into two mutually incompatible political mitment Traps/Chinese Aggression/US Resolve Grand Bargain solves for commitment traps, reduces Chinese aggression, and signals US resolve to China and allies Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN If a grand bargain brought only risks and China was likely to break out of the bargain, then the United States should not pursue it. As I have shown, however, a grand bargain could bring a variety of benefits, including providing information about China’s aims, which would reduce the likelihood of a commitment problem; communicating U.S. resolve to protect American interests; and possibly contributing to a Chinese domestic consensus on limited aims. In addition, as explained above, the United States should pursue policies that would contribute to preserving the grand bargain and reducing the costs if it fails, including maintaining military capabilities sufficient to protect its allies, which should help convince China that breaking the agreement would harm its interests. Because neither the ability of the United States to protect its allies nor its credibility for doing so would be significantly diminished by the grand bargain or its unraveling, and because China’s goals could well be sufficiently limited that the United States does not actually face a commitment problem, the grand bargain has good prospects for increasing U.S. security.Linkage DiplomacyLinkage diplomacy is empirically successful Harman, Wilson Center President, 12-24-18(Jane, “How the U.S. and China can reset relations and get results,” WP, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN But linkage has worked more recently. Two years ago, the United States lifted a ban on sales of military equipment to Vietnam. President Barack Obama announced it as part of normalizing relations between our two countries. Left unstated, however, was the fact that Vietnam granted the United States access to its deep-water port at Cam Ranh Bay. That last part gave us some strategic advantage in the South China Sea. The 2018 National Security Strategy states that our security policy needs to refocus on geopolitics after almost two decades of making counterterrorism our highest priority. It asserts that competition with China and Russia is the new frame. Clearly, geopolitics is back. If Trump wants to make deals and get results in this more “complicated” world, linkage is needed now more than ever.China Says Yes Linkage diplomacy creates conditions where the US gains leverage over China and compels them to say yes and follow the deal Yetiv, Old Dominion Univ. IR Prof., 1-22-17(Steve, “The risks of confronting China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN There is another problem of strong-arming China that Trump's team should consider: Retaliating against China may well weaken U.S. influence with Beijing on myriad non-trade issues such as security. This is likely not only because bilateral tensions would complicate matters, but also because, as political economist Albert Hirschman suggested decades ago, the side that gains more from economic interaction and trade loses political influence because it would suffer more if the relationship were hurt. Since the annual U.S. trade deficit with China has averaged more than $300 billion since 2010, Beijing has a lot more to lose if the relationship falters, which gives Washington some leverage. If China were to gain less from U.S. trade (and broader economic engagement with the United States) due to rising bilateral tensions and punitive trade measures, America would probably lose leverage to gain China's cooperation. That would hurt such efforts as to contain a belligerent North Korea where China holds a lot of the cards; to manage a resurgent Iran to which China has sold significant technology and arms; to curb cyberwarfare where Beijing has excelled in troubling ways; to address terrorism which requires intelligence-sharing; and to limit China's excesses in the South China Sea, where the stakes are high. Indeed, Rex Tillerson, Trump's nominee for secretary of state, recently asserted that China should be denied access to the artificial islands that it has built there, setting up a possible confrontation. Trade tensions or conflict could also undermine the U.S. ability to engage in linkage diplomacy. As any diplomat will attest, countries that want to achieve their national goals peacefully sometimes link two separate issues in a trade-off of benefits. For instance, according to The New York Times, then-President Barack Obama sent a secret letter to Russia's president in February 2009 indicating that if Moscow helped stop Iran from developing long-range weapons, Obama would be less likely to deploy a new missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Or, as another example, the U.S. threatened not to support China for special trade status if Beijing vetoed the November 1990 United Nations war resolution against Iraq. China would be less likely to respond to American linkage strategies on myriad issues in the face of trade conflict. The loss of U.S. influence with China would produce costs that are not readily apparent, but are real. Foregone cooperation can alter the course of history just as much as actual cooperation. But does the potential downside of a trade conflict mean that Trump should ignore China's infractions? Of course not. He should address them, preferably with multilateralism and in a non-confrontational manner. If that fails, then stronger measures may be necessary. Yet, the Trump team should carefully sketch out how trade tensions or conflict will potentially hurt China's cooperation on unrelated issues and to what extent Washington can fashion policies to make up for that lost cooperation. If these costs are expected to be high, perhaps confronting China on trade won't make sense or perhaps other approaches may work better. Imagine, for instance, helping China exploit its huge shale gas deposits in lieu of dirtier coal, in exchange for Beijing limiting some of its adventurism in the South China Sea or not dumping steel in American markets or cooperating more on intellectual property rights. To be effective in foreign affairs, Trump, like any leader, must appreciate the broader context and spillover effects of his actions. If history teaches us anything, it is that failure to appreciate the big picture has real consequences, and that even the strongest countries have struggled to translate their superior capabilities into positive influence.China says yes to a deal with the US that includes positive inducements for changing positions Packard and Jensen, Marine Corps Univ. Profs., 6-9-20(Nathan and Benjamin, “WASHINGTON NEEDS A BOLD RETHINK OF ITS CHINA STRATEGY,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN As national security professionals, we need to do a better job of thinking things through. Threat inflation and groupthink don’t make for good strategy. It is time to press pause and revisit our strategic logic with respect to China. First, Washington will fail if it hangs its strategy on forcing Beijing to back down across a full range of policies without offering positive inducements to do so or taking a collective balancing approach involving multiple stakeholders. Pressure absent bargaining risks triggering fear, honor, and interest. The Chinese Communist Party’s top priority is maintaining its hold on power, and appearing weak is not something Chinese leaders will do. Even if President Xi Jinping wanted to pull back in a crisis, how could he sell that to his people? At present, Washington’s strategy does not leave Beijing a way out that doesn’t concede weakness. It also presents China as 10 feet tall, everywhere at once, and able to project power that never ends. American thinking fails to take into account that the Chinese economy has weakened this year, and unemployment appears to be a serious challenge. Washington needs to develop a theory of competition that factors current Chinese political and economic realities.China is always willing to engage with the US, even on difficult issues Fan, China Foreign Affairs Univ. Vice President, 6-21-19(Wang, “China Still Holds Out Good Faith and Sincerity,” accessed 8-14-20, ) JFN First, in the wake of the trade tensions provoked by the US, China has demonstrated its sincerity and commitment to resolve the two sides’ differences, in line with China’s long-term stance as the defender and promoter of Sino-US relations, as evidenced in China’s handling of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the airplane collision incident of 2001. Invariably, China’s patience and will to compromise and accommodate US concerns saved the day in times of challenging difficulty for Sino-US relations, and thus kept bilateral ties on an even keel. Even in extreme circumstances such as the 9/11 attack against the US and the 2008 financial crisis, China lent a helping hand and never resorted to rubbing salt in the wound. China’s commitment to keep relations on the right track is unmistakable and laudable.South China SeaChina will agree to SCS conflict resolution deal with the US Kreuzer, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 15(Peter, “Facing China: Crises or Peaceful Coexistence in the South China Sea,” accessed 8-10-20, ) JFN For the time being, the maritime and territorial conflict defies resolution. Agreeing on a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea is the utmost to be expected. Any such code brokered by ASEAN, however, would bind China and the various other claimants, but not the United States. It would limit Chinese but not US military options in the South China Sea. Therefore, in order to gain Chinese consent to a binding code of conduct, it would have to include some concession from the US so as not to appear as a weakening of China’s national security. This could either be achieved through a unilateral concession or an accession of the US to the code of conduct that then would have to be framed in a way that also limits the strategic options open to the US.***NET BENEFITS***Assurance DA: 1NC Grand bargains don’t link to assurance DA’s because insisting on Chinese concessions demonstrates US resolve; only the AFF’s unilateral concessions link to the DA’s Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.Assurance DA: Extensions Maintaining status quo alliance commitments is vital to the success of any Grand Bargain strategy with China and avoids links to the assurance DA Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of the United States’ policy toward Northeast Asia. When uncertain about an adversary’s motives or when facing a state with mixed motives—a combination of security seeking and greed—a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies.107 Maintaining and enhancing U.S. commitments to the region would provide some of the necessary balance in the overall policy of the United States. These components of U.S. policy would be necessary and appropriate even if China were unwilling to make the types of concessions discussed above, but they would become even more important in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the United States to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies. As already discussed, to help accomplish this, the United States could commit additional forces to the region, forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall U.S. military capabilities, and increase the integration of alliance military planning. These measures would provide the additional benefits of helping to offset increases in China’s military power and to sustain the grand bargain by enhancing the U.S. ability to deter China from breaking the agreement. There is a potential downside, however: increased U.S. capabilities would likely appear threatening to China. But this danger would be reduced by America’s ending its commitment to Taiwan because a U.S. buildup would no longer threaten this vital Chinese interest and would therefore be more clearly intended only to defend U.S. allies. If, however, China wants to push the United States out of the East Asia, then it would be strongly opposed to, and provoked by, these measures. In this case, though, given the priority that U.S. grand strategy places on preserving the United States’ alliances in East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security.Elections DA: 1NCUnilateral US concessions to China are politically unpopular McElwee, Univ. of Oxford Doctoral Student, 11-17-18(Lily, “US-China Cooperation: The Shadow of Legitimacy,” accessed 8-10-20, ) JFN What is motivating U.S. skepticism? The answer is partially economic. The past two years have revealed increasing congressional frustration with China’s failure to act consistently with its international commitments, despite reaching a new stage of economic development that positions it to do so. Key to this is the belief that China has leveraged U.S. openness toward goods, capital, technology, and even people to its strategic advantage while not reciprocating back home. Of course, China’s failure to reciprocate is not a new concern for Washington. But, with China reaching a qualitatively new stage of development as of 2013, U.S. policymakers have begun to perceive lack of reciprocity as less justified than at any other point in China’s 40-year reform and opening period. Engagement, pursued with the unspoken hope of liberalizing China and improving reciprocity over time, has lost political support as a U.S. China strategy. With China flexing its might through large investments in U.S. strategic industries, and flaunting ambitions to swiftly dominate high-tech industries globally, U.S. patience has run dry for China’s insistence that it is a developing economy and deserves implicit concessions when it comes to international rules.Elections DA: Extensions US Asian alliances are domestically politically popular Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Diplomatically and politically, it is a given that the United States should work to protect and advance its long-standing interests in the Asia Pacific. Even when U.S. leaders express fatigue or frustration about overseas commitments, the American people through Congress and over the course of successive administrations have acknowledged the value of these commitments to U.S. interests by supporting U.S. alliances and other security arrangements.Deterrence DA: 1NCXi views unilateral concessions as a sign of weakness Tan, CNBC Reporter, 7-23-20(Huileng, “Beijing likely to retaliate, but analysts unsure of how far U.S., China will go in consulate fight,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN But it’s hard to predict how far U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping would go with this, said Daly. Both presidents seem “unwilling and inflexible” in making concessions, with Xi especially who identifies yielding as a sign of weakness, said Schell. He explained this denies him the flexibility that diplomats need to head off a “spiraling situation” like this one.Deterrence DA: Extensions Unilateral concessions are perceived as weakness by China and RussiaSchoff and Bin, senior fellow’s in the Carnegie Asia Program, 11-7-17(James and Li, “A Precarious Triangle: U.S.-China Strategic Stability and Japan,” accessed 8-14-20, ) JFN One U.S. workshop participant described “two schools of mutual vulnerability in the United States.” One accepts it is a fact of life, while the second rejects it publicly out of sensitivity to allies. Within the second group there are some who seek active efforts to minimize U.S. vulnerability for U.S. advantage and to reassure allies. Another argued that there is a third school of thought (at least in the Obama era), that was not willing to challenge mutual vulnerability. “We did not develop a posture to negate China’s nuclear force, but we were also not willing to deliver explicit reassurances . . . not because of Tokyo [i.e., for reassurance of Japan] but because of Beijing’s view.” The scholar explained that early efforts by the administration of president Barack Obama to signal reassurance to Beijing seemed to be received (by both China and Russia) as a sign of weakness and appeasement, prompting the Obama team to end that approach.Unilateral concessions destroy US credibility Stumo, Coalition for a prosperous America, 8-13-19(Michael, “Clinton USTR official, Jennifer Hillman, is Still Wrong on China,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN 7. Finally, the whole premise of Hillman’s article is that Americans are suffering some sort of harm due to the trade dispute that requires Congressional intervention. But we have the strongest economy of any G-7 country. Unemployment and inflation remain at historic lows, and we have over half a million more manufacturing jobs than we did in January 2017. The tariffs have been good for US economic, employment and wage growth. China’s economy, in contrast, appears to be feeling much more pressure. Under these circumstances, we should not panic and make concessions that will simply encourage China to bully us further in the future. If we aren’t willing to take a firm line now, when we have a golden opportunity to do so, China will never take us seriously.Cooperation DA: 1NC Unilateral US concessions are perceived by China as a sign of weakness and increase Chinese aggression and decrease bilateral cooperation FRIEDBERG, international affairs at Princeton University, 5-11-15(Aaron, “The Sleeper Issue of 2016 Is China,” accessed 8-14-20, ) JFN First, notwithstanding her subsequent toughness, Clinton’s initial approach to China was friendly to a fault. During her first visit to Beijing in early 2009 the Secretary of State reassured her hosts that she would not allow differences over human rights to “interfere” with efforts to address “the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis.” This was consistent with the new administration’s parallel attempts to improve relations with Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. The results were equally unimpressive. Instead of eliciting cooperation, Washington’s conciliatory stance appears to have been interpreted as a sign of weakness and it was followed by an increase in Chinese assertiveness towards U.S. friends and allies in East Asia.Strong US-China cooperation is key to ensure North Korean stability and prevent great power conflictJong Un, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, 4-29-20(Jung, “Trump Isn’t Ready for Kim Jong Un’s Death,” accessed 4-29-20, ) JFN Further, dealing successfully with North Korea will require China’s help. And yet Trump has been waging a war of words with the Chinese government over who’s more at fault in the coronavirus pandemic. There are plenty of reasons to be critical of Beijing’s suppression of information to hide the scale of the health crisis, but Trump might want to look more to the future: If Kim’s absence leads to a destabilizing power struggle or even internal collapse, China’s early cooperation will be necessary to stem a potential humanitarian crisis, secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons and avoid conditions that might spark armed conflict among the U.S., China and South Korea as the three sides move to protect their interests.***ANSWERS TO***Solvency Deficits Even “failed” grand bargains can help reduce security tensions between the US and China Goh, Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, 16(Evelyn, “Is a ‘Grand Bargain’ the Way Forward in Northeast Asia?,” December 2016, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN The bottom line is that a grand bargain is possible in Northeast Asia — but it will entail sea changes in attitudes and expectations on all sides. History suggests that groups of states find it very difficult to undertake transformational changes like this without the radical impetus or shock of war. But perhaps strategic diplomacy can help, at least by creating opportunities to stimulate what often seems to be the unthinkable between Washington and Beijing, and between Beijing and Tokyo — non-military co-operative modes of security behavior and non-zero-sum strategic interactions with each other.Even a “failed” grand bargain will enhance US-China mutual understanding that leads to successful deals on trade, North Korea, and Chinese aggression Harman, Wilson Center President, 12-24-18(Jane, “How the U.S. and China can reset relations and get results,” WP, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN A major component should be to establish a strategic dialogue with the Chinese. While we may not reach a grand bargain, perhaps a grand understanding could emerge — one that allows for a deal on trade, a reduction in China’s bad digital behavior and their help on the North Korean nuclear problem. Speaking at the Wilson Center in September, Kissinger himself suggested that China and the United States could agree on “concepts” and then work together toward achieving them. The president could actually enjoy a big win if he lets his administration set up such a dialogue in the right way. If he chooses a trade deal in isolation, he will leave a lot on the table. For example, if the president wants to solve North Korea, China must be on our side.China Cheats/Ignores Agreements China empirically respects and upholds international agreements Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Besides, the historical record shows that the international community actually has enjoyed considerable success at integrating China into various multilateral arrangements. For example, Beijing has joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, China has gone from being a nuclear and missile proliferator to participating in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In recent years, Beijing generally has avoided the use of force in international disputes and avoided conflict specifically over the sensitive topic of Taiwan. China’s behavior has improved over the past few decades in other respects as well. Beijing contributed critically to worldwide economic growth during the global financial crisis and has opened itself more to exports and investment from the United States and other countries, though not completely. Moreover, China has restored its global trade surplus to normal levels after an aberrantly high period following the financial crisis. Meanwhile, Beijing has cultivated productive diplomatic relationships with South Korea and Israel, a prospect that was previously considered anathema. Additionally, China has banned the trade of ivory and curtailed trade in endangered species; Beijing also signed—and is meeting—the terms of the Paris Agreement of the Convention on Climate Change. Separately, China reached an agreement with the United States in 2015 to curb commercial cyber theft, with reportedly positive results.78 And more recently, Beijing has made a new contribution to the global economy by establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which operates on terms that many consider an improvement on those of other international financial institutions in some respects.79China empirically follows the rules of the international system Thornton, former acting assistant secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 19(Susan, “Is American Diplomacy with China Dead?,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN The United States says China doesn’t follow the rules; but from China’s perspective, it has changed tremendously to incorporate international structures for the sake of international participation. We have seen great progress through decades of diplomacy on issues from nonproliferation to product safety, from contributing to solving regional conflicts to combating climate change. China has recently moved to a much more active and participatory profile on the international stage, something that the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations had held out as desirable in the “responsible stakeholder” concept to counter perceptions of China as a “free rider” on the international system. China is now making several efforts to contribute more to international public goods through, for example, increased contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations, efforts to combat pandemic disease in Africa and leadership in international organizations. It is providing infrastructure financing to the developing world through its creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative, both of which have been maligned by the United States but have been attractive to many countries. In short, China understands that it has benefited tremendously from its participation in the international system, and that the continuation of the system is crucial to China’s continued growth and development. It is prepared to contribute to the strengthening of the system.Turn: Allied Backlash Allies want the US to seek cooperative agreements with China while not threatening alliance commitments Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Prevailing views about the inexorable rise of China and a U.S. decline need to be adjusted to reality. The United States does not need to retreat from the Asia Pacific, and it can continue to protect and advance its interests there. But conditions have changed, and growing Chinese interests and influence will need to be accommodated as well. The United States must develop habits of negotiation and cooperation rather than dictation or confrontation. Attempting to contain China is not a practical option. Its neighbors are too diverse and invested in economic relations with Beijing to join in a Cold War–type policy of containment. But these neighbors do not want to live under China’s thumb either, and they will continue to welcome an outside partner to help balance its power.US allies support US attempts to engage with China Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Other scholars, however, view the prospect of a U.S. attempt to contain China as infeasible and unwise. Posen argues that it would be premature and wrong to do so, given Beijing’s limited capabilities and the unfavorable environment for Chinese dominance in a region where many neighbors already wish to keep their distance from Beijing.61 Furthermore, he suggests that containment could eventually backfire, given that other countries in the Asia Pacific would most likely reject a regional Cold War. Christensen argues that U.S. allies would not join efforts to contain China and that attempts to coerce them into joining such a coalition would do irreparable damage to the U.S. alliance system.62 He rejects the underlying premise of a zero-sum U.S.-China relationship and states that both sides have mutual interests they can pursue together. Nathan and Scobell similarly argue that containment would be too costly and would inevitably damage the mutually beneficial economic relationship between the United States and China.63US allies like India support increased US engagement with China while maintaining strong US credibility in the region Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Despite these aligned interests between India and the United States, interviews with distinguished Indian statesmen in May 2018 revealed a striking combination of wariness about Chinese ambitions to dominate the Asia Pacific and concern about U.S. staying power there.100 Many of them viewed the Trump administration’s concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific that binds together nations with common values and interests as more of a slogan than a coherent policy. These Indian thinkers believe the United States has more to gain from a different approach to China than that taken by the Trump administration. They advocate simultaneous U.S. efforts to engage bilaterally with China on contentious issues and to forge coalitions of like-minded countries to try to condition Beijing’s international behavior with respect to economics and other areas as well. The net takeaway of these interviews was that India would welcome a more proactive policy and greater investment from the United States in the region. But at the same time, until New Delhi sees concrete evidence of a U.S. commitment, India will primarily pursue a bilateral approach to China, taking advantage of cooperation with Washington when benefits outweigh the risks to relations with Beijing.Turn: Deals Kill US Credibility US making mutual concessions with China is not viewed as weakness or losing credibility Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Likewise, Goldstein argues that the United States and China should make mutual concessions and meet each other halfway since neither of them will dominate the Asia Pacific.67 This two-way pattern of accommodation based on incremental steps would likely minimize mutual suspicions and enhance security and stability in the region. Goldstein does not see U.S. concessions as a form of appeasement but rather as a bold step designed to trigger a cooperative spiral with China. He offers detailed scenarios that would involve the United States revising or reviewing its policy on one area of potential conflict, encouraging China to respond in kind. The United States should clarify its commitments to allies in the Asia Pacific so as not to be dragged into conflict with China over matters of little strategic importance. The best strategy, Goldstein proposes, is to continue offshore balancing and adopt a purely defensive posture.US diplomatic engagement with China is key to maintain and restore US credibility with allies Thornton, former acting assistant secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 19(Susan, “Is American Diplomacy with China Dead?,” accessed 8-13-20, ) JFN We could, of course, continue to shun diplomacy and stoke the escalatory cycle of strategic adversity. This seems to be the direction for the foreseeable future. Those promoting this approach say that Beijing only responds to force, that tension is a necessary feature of the relationship and that Chinese and U.S. interests are implacably opposed. But even if claims about a secret Chinese plot to bury the United States were accurate, it is difficult to see how an endless string of U.S. provocations without a strategy and absent coordination with others will achieve anything other than heightened suspicions, further recriminations and, likely, a premature crisis. This will do nothing to further U.S. interests, to say nothing of the interests of our allies around the world, and it will harm U.S. credibility and leadership. Allies and partners of the United States, many of whom rely on China’s economy as an engine of growth at home, are loath to see a rupture in Sino-American relations. They do not want to have to choose between the two biggest powers as they did during the Cold War. Some in the international community have even begun to voice fears that the United States, traditionally relied on to be the global guardian of peace and stability, has become ground zero for sowing disorder, instability and distraction. Not only is this not a productive strategy (or even a strategy—what is it meant to accomplish?), but it is playing into Chinese hands, undermining global confidence in U.S. leadership and squandering opportunities to reshape the international system in ways conducive to U.S. interests and power. The other possibility is to pursue a mix of engagement aimed at shaping and cooperation, while pursuing a policy of balancing and deterrence that has worked well for 40 years and shows few signs of being seriously challenged by China in the near term. First, we need to put the lie to the notion that China doesn’t change, that it won’t respond to diplomacy, that talking to China is a waste of time, that it disregards agreements and wants to overturn the international system. Diplomacy has fundamentally changed China over the past 40 years, and has been a major contributor to the peace and prosperity that East Asia has enjoyed over that same period.Turn: Engagement Signals Weakness Engaging with China doesn’t signal US weakness Edwards, Former US Senator, 06(John, “The Future of US China Relations,” accessed 8-14-20, ) JFN SENATOR EDWARDS: Well, first, to frame the issue: my belief is that Iran's effort to get nuclear weapons is a more serious security problem for the United States and the world than North Korea, for a multitude of reasons. And I think we've gotten to this place - it's important to understand how we've got to this place. We got to this place because the administration was obsessed with Saddam Hussein and Iraq, fighting a war - a just war - in Afghanistan. And they essentially left responsibility for dealing with the Iranian nuclear situation, they abdicated responsibility to the Europeans. And the result is - and in part because of some of the weaknesses in the NPT - that Iran was able to walk right up to the edge of having nuclear weapons. They got to this place in part because of some flaws in the international proliferation regime. But in addition to that, because we weren't engaged. And we need to be engaged. So that's how we got to this place. I don't personally understand this notion that being willing to talk to somebody is a sign of weakness. I mean, is it some macho bravado? I don't get it. I mean, everyone knows we're the most powerful nation on the planet. Being willing to talk doesn't mean you're not tough. It doesn't mean you don't have a high level of demands. But when it's clear that - and it's clear right now that not much positive is happening with the Iranians. I mean, the Russians offered to control the fuel cycle to provide nuclear materials to the Iranians. They rejected that. They're clearly biding their time. Every time a proposal is made they ask for months to respond. Ahmadinejad comes to the United Nations and essentially denounces the United States of America. I mean, I think it's a very, very volatile, dangerous situation. And I might add, when I was in Israel just a few months ago, talking to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister - this was just prior to the outbreak of violence with Hezbollah - but their focus, without any question, was the issue of Iran having nuclear weapons.Turn: Containment Good Containing China is not possiblePaal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN To begin, it is necessary to lay out several assumptions underlying this analysis. First, zero-sum thinking of the Cold War variety is not really an option for the United States. China is not the former Soviet Union; over the last thirty years, China has integrated with the rest of the world, not isolated itself. It is the world’s second-largest economy, top trading nation, and most populous country. It is one of the world’s leading exporters of high technology, much of which is American-designed and provides large profits for U.S. firms.13 Investment firms are betting U.S. pensions on the success of Chinese firms, many of which are registered on the New York Stock Exchange. Interdependence is deeply embedded in supply chains, in markets, and (increasingly) in the more remote domains of outer space and cyberspace. Delinking the two countries’ economies is not a realistic option. Neither can China be contained. Even if the United States tried to do so, China’s neighbors would not cooperate in the absence of a much greater threat to their own interests than has been evident so far.Turn: Engagement BadEngagement is key to the US economy and liberalizes China Zhao, Univ. of Denver Foreign Policy Prof., 19(Suisheng, “Engagement on the Defensive: From the Mismatched Grand Bargain to the Emerging US–China Rivalry,” Journal of Contemporary China, accessed 8-7-20, p. Taylor & Francis Online) JFN They have continued defense of engagement for good reasons. First, although engagement has been intrinsically difficult at times, it has served US interests better than attempting to isolate China would have. China was until the early 1980s a largely closed, hostile power with a desire to spread its Maoist model to others. ‘Despite recent setbacks, China remains vastly more open, globalized, and tolerant today than it was prior to engagement.’45 More importantly, engagement has morphed into a deep interdependence that the two countries can only thrive in tandem. Taking advantage of the US market, hardworking Chinese people provided low-cost goods that enabled income-constrained American consumers to make ends meet through the stagflation years of the 1980s. China-made goods have been a boon for American consumers ever since. Providing China growth anchors, the US benefited from China’s vast reservoir of surplus saving to sidestep the mounting perils of subpar saving and reckless fiscal policy. As the largest contributor to global economy in the last decade, China’s spectacular growth has contributed to American prosperity. While China needs the US market for its exports and plays on its comparative advantage in the global supply and value chain, the US shares an interest in maintaining and deepening the existing production chains and operation in Chinese markets.Engagement is key to Asian stability Zhao, Univ. of Denver Foreign Policy Prof., 19(Suisheng, “Engagement on the Defensive: From the Mismatched Grand Bargain to the Emerging US–China Rivalry,” Journal of Contemporary China, accessed 8-7-20, p. Taylor & Francis Online) JFN Second, engagement not only ended 23 years of diplomatic estrangement between the two countries but also laid the foundation for a peaceful and prosperous Asia after the Vietnam War. Pursuing strategies to draw maximum benefit from both the US and China, while minimizing the risks of angering either and preserving their independence, most countries in the region have remained receptive to US engagement. They are concerned about the Trump administration’s disengagement from the region and disdain for the multilateral institutions when economic interdependence between China and the rest of Asia has increased. East Asia’s intraregional trade share rose to 57.3% in 2016, while the EU, Japan and the United States collectively accounted for 29% of emerging East Asia’s total exports in 2015, down from almost 50% in 1990.56 As the region’s main production base, China is at the center of this growing intraregional trade. Every Asian country now trades more with China than with any other partner. As their economies rely on Beijing, East Asian countries cannot afford to offend it.Turn: Conditions BadNo Link: this isn’t a conditions counterplan. The CP reaches a mutual agreement with China and is implemented simultaneously. The counterplan doesn’t place conditions on the implementation of the agreement. Permutation: Do BothDoing both links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral US concessions to China signal weakness and lack of commitment to US allies Kehoe, Financial Review Senior Writer, 6-15-18(John, “China wins from Trump-Kim summit as US allies watch Asia retreat,” accessed 8-10-20, ) US President Donald Trump's tension-diffusing summit this week with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un delivered at least one clear winner. Though Xi Jinping was 4200 kilometres away from the historic meeting in Singapore – he was hosting foreign leaders at a security summit - the strongman Chinese President emerged victorious from the Trump-Kim encounter. Trump's unilateral concession to Kim – and implicitly China – to suspend joint military exercises with South Korea and perhaps in the longer term withdraw 28,500 American troops, stoked niggling fears among allies about the "America First" leader's commitment to the region.China pockets unilateral US concessions Tan, Univ. of New South Wales Associate Prof., 16(Andrew T.H., Handbook of US-China Relations, accessed 8-10-20, p. Google Books) JFN Another US skepticism about China’s proposal is that Beijing is using the phrase to get unilateral concessions from Washington on the issues concerning Chinese ‘core national interests’. As Michael Chase puts it, the new model ‘appears to require Washington to accommodate China’s interests and to do so largely on Beijing’s terms-apparently without reciprocal adjustments’. If Washington accepts this concept, it will be trapped in a process of de facto ‘unilateral concession’ to China. Andrew Nathan agrees with this view, arguing that the new model, as a slogan, is ‘Chinese code for the US preemptively yielding to what China views as its legitimate security interests’. Reduced US assurances among allies results in China saying no to the permutation Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNA fourth is an alliance strategy. China has few friends; the United States has many allies. The Chinese in the past have been more willing to make concessions when unified demands came from Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, Canada, and other Western countries. While our allies are suspicious of China and considering their own measures to reduce their economic exposure, we have not cultivated the potential alliance this could afford. The Chinese fear that we will do this, which is a good indicator of its utility, and the failure to build an alliance strategy is the greatest weakness of American negotiations with China.Doth both is impossible because grand bargains are inherently bilateral and involve two countries making multiple concessions at the same timeGlaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. Unilateral US concessions fuel Chinese aggression Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Although the probability of achieving a grand bargain may be low, the United States should not now unilaterally end its commitment to defend Taiwan. China appears too likely to misinterpret such a large change in U.S. policy, which could fuel Chinese overconfidence and intensify challenges to U.S. interests—most importantly, the U.S. security role in Northeast Asia. In large part, this judgment is informed by China’s more assertive regional policies and pronouncements over the past decade. I do believe, though, that this is a close call. Prior to 2008 or so, unilateral accommodation might have been the United States’ best option. Thus, a sustained moderation in China’s policies could support a different decision in the future. Finally, U.S. pursuit of a grand bargain would not prevent the United States from eventually moving to unilateral accommodation—if during U.S. pursuit of a grand bargain China made clear that agreement was impossible, unilateral accommodation would remain a fallback option.Permutation: Plan is the CP (Plan is a Grand Bargain)The permutation still links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. The plan is not a grand bargain because it’s not implemented bilaterally, simultaneously, and doesn’t’ involve multiple issues Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral US concessions to China signal weakness and lack of commitment to US allies Kehoe, Financial Review Senior Writer, 6-15-18(John, “China wins from Trump-Kim summit as US allies watch Asia retreat,” accessed 8-10-20, ) US President Donald Trump's tension-diffusing summit this week with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un delivered at least one clear winner. Though Xi Jinping was 4200 kilometres away from the historic meeting in Singapore – he was hosting foreign leaders at a security summit - the strongman Chinese President emerged victorious from the Trump-Kim encounter. Trump's unilateral concession to Kim – and implicitly China – to suspend joint military exercises with South Korea and perhaps in the longer term withdraw 28,500 American troops, stoked niggling fears among allies about the "America First" leader's commitment to the region.Permutation: Unilateral Concessions = Grand Bargain The permutation links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral US concessions to China signal weakness and lack of commitment to US allies Kehoe, Financial Review Senior Writer, 6-15-18(John, “China wins from Trump-Kim summit as US allies watch Asia retreat,” accessed 8-10-20, ) US President Donald Trump's tension-diffusing summit this week with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un delivered at least one clear winner. Though Xi Jinping was 4200 kilometres away from the historic meeting in Singapore – he was hosting foreign leaders at a security summit - the strongman Chinese President emerged victorious from the Trump-Kim encounter. Trump's unilateral concession to Kim – and implicitly China – to suspend joint military exercises with South Korea and perhaps in the longer term withdraw 28,500 American troops, stoked niggling fears among allies about the "America First" leader's commitment to the region.Reduced US assurances among allies results in China saying no to the permutation Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNA fourth is an alliance strategy. China has few friends; the United States has many allies. The Chinese in the past have been more willing to make concessions when unified demands came from Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, Canada, and other Western countries. While our allies are suspicious of China and considering their own measures to reduce their economic exposure, we have not cultivated the potential alliance this could afford. The Chinese fear that we will do this, which is a good indicator of its utility, and the failure to build an alliance strategy is the greatest weakness of American negotiations with China.Permutation: Plan is a Pre-Requisite to the CP Doing both links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Even if China likes the plan it doesn’t preclude the reality that they’ll pocket unilateral US concessions and perceive US concessions as weakness. The 1NC counterplan solvency evidence indicates China is willing to make deals with the US not involving the plan. The plan is not actually a pre-requisite to a grand bargain. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral US concessions to China signal weakness and lack of commitment to US allies Kehoe, Financial Review Senior Writer, 6-15-18(John, “China wins from Trump-Kim summit as US allies watch Asia retreat,” accessed 8-10-20, ) US President Donald Trump's tension-diffusing summit this week with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un delivered at least one clear winner. Though Xi Jinping was 4200 kilometres away from the historic meeting in Singapore – he was hosting foreign leaders at a security summit - the strongman Chinese President emerged victorious from the Trump-Kim encounter. Trump's unilateral concession to Kim – and implicitly China – to suspend joint military exercises with South Korea and perhaps in the longer term withdraw 28,500 American troops, stoked niggling fears among allies about the "America First" leader's commitment to the region.Permutation: Do the Plan, Then the CP Doing the plan first links to the net benefits because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Permutation: Do the CP, Then the Plan The permutation is severance because plan action is immediate and it’s a voting issue because severance permutations make the 2AC a moving target and make effective negative strategies impossible The Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).If doing the counterplan is the best policy option in the round, then you should vote negative because we’re the side that initially introduced the CP. It proves that there is no need for the plan. You can’t vote affirmative if the plan has proven to be a bad idea. International Fiat Bad No Link: the plan doesn’t fiat Chinese action. We read China says yes to the CP evidence. ................
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