THE FOKKER SCOURGE - musketmedia



Introduction

During World War I, in the last half of 1915, for a period of about six months, the German Air Force claimed the first real measure of air superiority in history and ushered in a new era for aerial warfare. This period of time, known as the ‘Fokker Scourge’ to the allies, was both omen and precursor to future coordinated efforts at air superiority and the air-to-air mission. The genesis of the Fokker Scourge was a combination of tactical need, technology, and early airpower visionaries. The air-to-air mission was first conceived and developed by men like Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann while flying the Fokker Eindecker.[1]

“Several of the early Aces started their careers in Eindeckers during the summer and fall of 1915 and the damage done to Allied morale, to say nothing of the Allied air services, was considerable. There’s and old saying that reflects the army’s tradition of stoicism in the face of disaster, “The situation’s not bad, it’s downright serious.” The situation was so serious for the RFC that the last half of 1915 was known as the period of the “Fokker Scourge.”[2]

In the last half of 1915, many lessons were learned about the employment of fighters and the need for air superiority. In the near term, the Germans would use this information in early 1916 to some small success during the offensive at Verdun. In the long term, the lessons learned from this period about air-to-air fighting and air superiority remain relevant today.

Early Air Missions

The first missions developed for the airplane were generally poorly conceived. What exactly an army would need, or do with, an airplane was not known and seldom pondered. It was a new machine at the outbreak of the war and severely limited as a weapon. Aircraft at the outbreak of the war were slow, often difficult to fly, and had poor range, ceiling and carrying capacity. These vices served to limit the imagination of the ground based commanders who were also hindered by centuries of military thought on exactly what an army should consist of and how it would be used.

“It has often been said that there was little realistic conception of how air power might be used-what air forces like to call doctrine. This is true, but also understandable. The air weapon was after all distinctive, indeed unique. Of all the “new” weapons of the Great War, it alone had no predecessor and no precedent.”[3]

Reconnaissance

Almost naturally (so it seemed at the time), the airplane was initially relegated to a supporting role. Obvious uses, such as spotting and scouting, sprung up as initial missions for the airplane. Early uses in Tripoli and Mexico[4] seemed to prove the airplane’s capability in these missions. It’s usefulness as a scout and spotter was proven, but was it a weapon in and of itself? The question would not be fully answered until the end of World War I when the capability, and impact of the machines were seriously studied. Unquestionably, the aircraft’s existence as a weapon would be verified by the same war. During that conflict the airplane would develop into a weapon of considerable importance. Its role would be considerably more than the supporting role most saw it in before the hostilities. Eventually, it would have many functions such as scout, fighter, bomber, and even terror weapon, to name a few. But like any new weapon introduced to the battlefield, the opposition quickly began to think of ways to counter it. The best counter was another aircraft.

The need for an air-to-air mission

Initially, spotting and observation missions made up the bulk of the aircrafts perceived purpose in war. The machine’s limitations on speed, lifting capability, endurance and structural strength restricted it to a supporting role. However, not all early proponents of aircraft were blind to the need for an air-to-air capability. Major Fredrick Sykes, commander of the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps, said in 1912 after military maneuvers:

“Personally, I think there is no doubt that before land fighting takes place, we shall have to fight and destroy the enemies aircraft. It seems to me impossible for troops to fight, while the hostile aircraft are able to keep up their observation. That is to say, warfare will be impossible until we have mastery of the air”.[5]

Early spotting and observation missions from the opposing sides often passed each other along the front while going about their business. There are even instances of waves being exchanged between pilots. But that naïve notion of brotherly aviators soon passed as the situation on the ground began to affect the situation in the air. The stalemate below, along with the realization that enemy aircraft overhead were likely aiding his ground forces in some manner, turned the friendly waves to gunfire. The war had found its way to the air, and predictably, hostilities were exchanged. Early weaponry consisted of whatever could be carried by the limited machines. Bricks and flechettes[6] were dropped in clumsy attempts to harm enemy aircraft and crews. Pistols and carbines were fired at passing enemy aircraft. Initial losses were light; indeed they were negligible. The concept that airplanes needed an effective means for defense, and even the ability to harm enemy airplanes, was realized before long. By early 1915, aircraft were commonly firing at each other as they carried out their missions of spotting and observing. Soon, each side ascertained that denying the other his prying eyes over the front would aid their respective war efforts. It is here, around the middle of 1915, that two separate missions can first be distinctly seen.

Initially, the allies got the best of the exchange. Their aircraft, generally superior to German early types, combined with the aggressiveness of the French and British pilots, gave them the edge. Allied leadership also seemed to grasp the need for the air-to-air mission more readily than the Germans. The French general Joffre, speaking of roles that aircraft could take, said one such role is, “chasing and destroying enemy aircraft.”[7] The need for an air-to-air weapon was realized. Indeed, the need for air superiority as a prerequisite for ground operations was perceived. Enemy aircraft must not be allowed to carry out their missions unhindered. None of the first generation of Allied or German aircraft and weapons combinations was fully satisfactory. The fledgling air forces needed a wholly new type of weapon.

Creation of an air-to-air weapon

The requirement for an effective air-to-air weapon was established with the belated realization of the need for the air-to-air mission. As the mission itself seemed to be an afterthought, so too did the development of the early aircraft and weapons. Initially, counter air operations had to rely on whatever pre-war aircraft and weapon combinations were available. Many were ill suited for the task of carrying weapons. “There was the problem of aiming and firing any sort of gun as in many aircraft the crew was surrounded by a mass of support and control wires”.[8] The weapons themselves were often limiting factors. Bricks and flechettes were hardly effective in destroying enemy aircraft. The pistol and carbine proved no better. The eventual weapon of choice would be another relatively new technology, the machine gun.

Aircraft as a weapon

The first attempts at carrying the early machine guns met mixed results. Aircraft could be considered at this point to be weapons carriers, not necessarily weapons in and of themselves. Their main role continued to be observation, with the possibility of air-to-air combat if the opportunity presented itself. The problem with the machine gun was twofold. First, the weight was prohibitive, both because most machines lacked the lifting power to carry much weight, and the fact that early machine gun models were very heavy. This was soon rectified by the invention of lighter machine gun models such as the Lewis, Hotchkiss and Parabellum.[9] The combatants now had lighter machine guns that could be carried easily by their more sturdy aircraft types. The second problem with the machine gun was how to affix it to the aircraft. Several options were explored. On aircraft with a pilot and spotter, it naturally fell to the spotter to man the machine gun. Generally the machine gun was affixed to the aircraft in some semi-flexible manner and the gunner was limited by the firing arcs afforded by his position in the aircraft and the traverse of the guns mount.[10] Deflection shooting in this case is not always intuitive, and the difficulty of firing, and hitting, a moving target in three dimensions while it is also moving in three dimensions is extraordinary.[11] A French pilot named Roland Garros first touched on the ultimate solution to the aircraft/machine gun marriage. He believed that for a machine gun to be effective, it must be mounted in such a way as to make aiming it easier, and more intuitive. Garros thought he had the solution, which was to mount the machine gun along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft,[12] in front of the pilot, where he could both easily aim the gun and un-jam it if required.[13] Such a mounting would turn the aircraft itself into a weapon. By aiming the whole aircraft, and firing through the propeller, Garros could more simply aim his aircraft at the opponent and fire his much more stable gun. It was, however, an imperfect solution, as Garros’ answer to the problem of bullets hitting his propeller was to install deflector plates on the blades. Deflecting bullets off a rapidly spinning propeller was less than ideal, because the bullets could end up almost anywhere, and the vibration often damaged the engine or its mount. Still, on April 1st 1915, Garros began what would eventually become the standard method of air attack when he downed an Albatross two seater. “Finally, means were found to fix the gun to the aircraft and fire it through the propeller arc without shooting one’s self down. Thus pilots were then able to aim their whole aircraft at the target without trying to fly and manipulate a gun at the same time.”[14] Garros went on a mini rampage, shooting down 6 German aircraft. In that early period of air-to-air fighting development it was an impressive score, and the German air service was understandably very concerned. They were not sure exactly what was happening. Fortunately for the Germans, Garros was forced to land behind their lines after the 6th victory. Unable to set fire to the machine before he was captured, the secret of his weapon/machine combination was revealed.

“The plane went to Berlin, and the German authorities invited a young Dutch designer and aircraft manufacturer named Anthony Fokker to have a look at it. Fokker was building a single-wing plane much like the Morane; perhaps he could duplicate the deflector mechanism as well”.[15]

Anthony Fokker would create the final piece of the modern fighter puzzle. The combination of his new monoplane design, the Eindecker E I, and the invention of a workable interrupter gear would give rise to the period known as the Fokker Scourge. It would also be the technological impetus for creation of the air-to-air mission.

Anthony Fokker's Contribution

The Germans had captured Garros’ aircraft and the mystery of his success was solved. German authorities turned to a Dutch aircraft designer and pilot named Anthony Fokker. Fokker was building aircraft for the Germans. He was ostensibly from a neutral country and had in fact tried to sell some of his designs to the Allies. When the German authorities turned over Garros’ aircraft with the deflector gear to Fokker, he was already building his new Eindecker.[16] German authorities wanted to know if he could copy the idea or improve upon it. Fokker’s resolution to the problem of firing through the propellers, added to his new aircraft the Eindecker, would start a six-month dominance of the skies above German lines. It would also be the technological catalyst, along with the contributions of several notable individuals, for the creation of the air-to-air mission.

Interrupter Gear

Fokker’s Eindecker was a fine aircraft. It was not, however, initially designed to be a fighter. The Eindecker was considered a fast scout, and at first there were no provisions for arming it. The technology that turned the Eindecker from unarmed scout, to formidable fighter, was the interrupter gear. The gear, combined with Fokker’s new single seat aircraft and the new lightweight Parabellum[17] machine gun, would produce the first true fighter aircraft the world had ever known. The Dutch designer studied Garros’ machine and knew immediately that the deflector gear was not the answer to firing through the propeller. Bullets would eventually damage the propeller or the aircraft.

“The technical problem was to shoot between the propeller blades, which passed a given point 2400 times a minute, because the two bladed propeller revolved 1200 times a minute. This meant that the pilot must not pull the trigger or fire the gun as long as one of the blades was directly in front of the muzzle. Once the problem was stated, it’s solution came to me in a flash”. – Anthony Fokker[18]

Fokker’s solution was to interrupt the firing of the Parabellum machine gun each time one of the propeller blades passed in front of the gun. This was done with a series of cams and linkages from the propeller to the gun itself. While it was not truly a ‘synchronized’ machine gun it had the same effect. The pilot could now safely fire the gun through the propeller, and Fokker had just the aircraft to affix it to.

Eindecker Monoplane

The Eindecker was a single seat monoplane with an 80 hp Oberusel rotary engine, a ceiling of 11,500 ft and a top speed of 83 mph. Its overall performance was better than most allied designs of the time. The aircraft was light, maneuverable, and could dive at steep angles and high speeds without its wings coming apart.[19] Initially designed as a fast scout, it was not intended to be an air-to-air weapon. The aircraft had a remarkable resemblance to the Morane Saulnier type N monoplane that Roland Garros had been flying.[20] Both aircraft were monoplanes, and used wing warping for controlling flight. As advanced as it was, the Eindecker still used some older technology. Yet, it was not just the airframe itself that made it such a fearsome foe. It was a combination of the airframe, which Fokker had already been building, and the addition of the Parabellum with a workable interrupter gear that made the Eindecker the first true fighter.

Selling the Idea

Despite the success Fokker had in putting the new weapon together, in a short span of three days, the German authorities were not initially impressed. Fokker demonstrated the aircraft on the ground with the propeller running. They said it was sheer luck, or perhaps the short bursts he was firing, which kept the bullets from shearing off the propeller. Fokker then demonstrated the aircraft in the air, firing at a target on the ground. This too failed to impress the gathered observers, although they were scattered by the ricocheting bullets. Still not thoroughly convinced of the Eindeckers worth, “Major Thomsen, chief of the Idflieg (Army Air Force Inspectorate) promised Fokker an Iron Cross if he could bring down an enemy machine in combat.”[21] Amazingly, Fokker agreed to this proposal in order to sell his plane. He went to the front near Verdun and spent several weeks flying and looking for a victim. When he finally spotted a French observation plane, he balked at the prospect of killing the crew. Returning to base he later wrote, “I was flying merely to prove that a certain mechanism I had invented would work… Let them do their own killing!”[22] It would not be Fokker himself who would verify the worth of his creation. That would be left to others. He did, nonetheless, agree to teach a few German pilots how to fly the aircraft so they could “do their own killing.” These first fighter pilots would begin the development of fighter tactics, and the air-to-air mission.

Tactics

The tactics of air-to-air combat were born and spent their infancy during World War I. With no real grasp of how to employ air power, both sides started to use aircraft in roles that made sense to a ground based doctrine. Spotting and observation took center stage. Early aircraft designs seemed fairly well suited to carry out these missions. However, men recognized that the war fought below would be fought in the air as well. The airplane itself was proving to be the best counter to the enemy air force. The questions were, what type of aircraft, and how should they be used? When Roland Garros showed the effectiveness of the tractor aircraft combined with a forward firing machine gun, the answer of what type of aircraft was at hand. Seizing on the idea, the Germans created the first true fighter aircraft, improving on Garros’ idea with Fokkers invention. Now that the tool had been invented, it was up to the men using it to figure out how to best utilize the weapon in the air-to-air mission.

Development

The air-to-air mission had little historical precedent, except for the idea that one must send fast moving projectiles through his opponent’s machine, or body, while denying him the ability or opportunity to do the same. Everything, from the individual maneuvers, up to how best to use the fighter in an operational or strategic sense, must be invented. For example, the ideas of formation flying, mutual support and deflection shooting were developed, through trial and error, which was often costly in lives and machines. Many early aces were ‘lone wolf’ pilots, men who hunted alone with little organization or coordinated effort. Statistically, this type of pilot did not live long. More often than not, they passed on few of their lessons before they died, though some scored well before meeting their demise. Major Oliver Stewart, in his book The Strategy and Tactics of Air Fighting, wrote about this particular problem in 1925, only six years after the war itself.

“It must be recalled that a pilot learnt to fly and went to France without possessing the remotest understanding of the science of fighting in the air, already a science more complex than fighting on the ground or the sea… This was simply because pilots started their fighting careers in a state of complete ignorance of air fighting. The experts were not vocal and, although they knew how to fight themselves, they were unable or unwilling to impart that knowledge to others.”[23]

Happily, a few exceptional pilots were teachers and mentors. Men who realized that in order for their air forces to be effective, they needed to train and teach new pilots how to best employ this new weapon. During the last half of 1915, when the Germans first began to realize the capability of the Eindecker, two men stand out as pioneers of fighter tactics and air-to-air fighting. Those two men were Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann.

“It is with Boelcke, and his great rival Leutnant (Lieutenant) Max Immelmann, that the history of air fighting really begins. Up to the end of 1915 air combats had been spasmodic, unplanned affairs. This was all to change now. Boelcke realized the importance of carefully planned tactics and concerted action by a number of pilots, and was soon placed in a position in which he could implement his ideas.” [24]

Armed with the new Eindecker I aircraft, Boelcke and Immelmann began what the British would call the ‘Fokker Scourge’ and in so doing set the framework for the air-to-air mission and the possibilities of air superiority. They would not find all the answers, and in fact they may have raised more questions by the time they were done, but they certainly deserve credit for starting the process.

Oswald Boelcke

Oswald Boelcke was one of the first German aces. Boelcke learned to fly in 1914, and received his pilot’s certificate two weeks before the outbreak of the war. While flying observation aircraft with his brother as observer for the first few months of the war, he racked up an impressive 50 observation sorties.[25] In April 1915, Boelcke helped create a new flying section called, Fliegerabteilung 62, flying two seaters. German aircraft were starting to be armed for defense as the war in the air was heating up, and the allies were having the best of the Germans early on. Boelcke immediately began to exploit the offensive possibilities of the machine gun, although the difficulties of getting the observer in position, and then actually hitting anything were enormous. Boelcke was already showing a proclivity at aerial aggressiveness. “Instead of being content to fire a shot or two at any enemy aeroplanes that came nosing around in the hope of scaring them off, the born hunters went after them, jockeying the machines about to give the observers a clear shot”.[26] He must have been somewhat frustrated by the difficulty of maneuvering his observer into position to fire. As fate would have it, Fokker delivered the first of his Eindeckers to Boelcke’s airfield, and he was given the job of testing the aircraft. It would not be long before Boelcke began to run up his score.[27] He quickly realized the importance of disciplined attack techniques.[28] It is not only Boelcke’s contribution to individual tactics, which makes him so important to the early development of the air-to-air mission. His real and lasting importance lies in his awareness that once learned, the tactics of fighter employment must be passed on.

“Oswald Boelcke, ever the teacher, considered flying a fighter an exercise in scholarship. He studied fighter tactics, he noted weaknesses in German designs and training, and he recommended improvements”.[29]

Boelcke’s leadership was a fortuitous development for the early German air effort. He toured many German fronts taking his ideas with him, and passing them on to the new fliers. Additionally he recruited many of the more promising young fliers to create elite fighting squadrons called Jagdstafflen.[30] Boelcke was the first to begin writing and teaching rules for formations and aerial combat. In so doing Boelcke spread his hard earned knowledge to many other German pilots who then used that knowledge to become more effective at destroying allied aircraft. Max Immelmann, one of Boelcke’s students, was another early German pioneer of air-to-air combat.

Max Immelmann

Max Immelmann was one more of the early German aces. Known as the ‘Eagle of Lille’,[31] he ran up an impressive score with the Eindecker. At the outbreak of the war, he applied for aviation duty when he learned his infantry unit was not to be sent immediately to the front. He was posted to Boelcke’s unit, Fliegerabteilung 62, in early 1915. When the Eindeckers arrived, Immelmann was allowed to fly the older machines after Boelcke was finished with them. Soon the pair was flying together, forming one of the first flight lead/wingman teams. Immelmann was one of Boelcke’s first, and brightest students. His greatest contribution to the early development of air-to-air fighting was his study and improvement of fighter tactics and maneuvering. His name is used in conjunction with an aerial acrobatic maneuver, the ‘Immelmann turn’. There is some controversy over exactly what the maneuver was.[32] Precisely what the maneuver was is not as important as the fact that Immelmann was working out how best to employ the new fighter.

“Very vaguely it was being rumoured that this young officer (who had already brought down the incredible number of six machines) had invented a new method of turning. As a matter of fact I believe he never did any such thing, but he certainly had a remarkably clever way of throwing his machine around so as to appear suddenly, almost sitting on his enemy's tail, with his machine-gun banging away straight through the propeller. The 'Immelmann Turn' it was beginning to be called, and it opened up a new set of problems in aerial fighting.”[33]

Employing the Eindecker in air-to-air combat required the pilot to aim the entire aircraft. As the gun was fixed along the longitudinal axis, only aircraft directly in front of the airplane could be engaged. The problem Immelmann encountered was thus; how to best maneuver his aircraft in a three dimensional environment. He never knew at which altitude or angle the enemy would be spotted. Once spotted, he needed to maneuver his aircraft into position, which would likely necessitate a change in altitude or direction, or usually both. Because air fighting is a three dimensional environment, it took a three dimensional maneuver to put his aircraft in firing position. Immelmann’s ‘turn’ was likely any number of climbing or diving turns which put him in position to fire.[34] Additionally, once in position to fire, the adversary, unless taken unawares and shot down, would likely attempt to get away or turn the tables. From that point, some type of maneuvering was required to stay behind the enemy. In Immelmann’s case, he seemed to prefer a diving attack in which he dove below the enemy airplane to the stern, and using the speed he had gained, climbed to attack the vulnerable belly.[35] If he failed to down it, he turned away, dove or climbed as the case warranted, and came back to attack again. Immelmann was inventing the art of aerial combat, a battle fought in three dimensions. He seemed to have a natural ability to grasp the concepts of air-to-air combat. “Max Immelmann was ever the student… He found his pleasure in striving for absolute perfection at his task.”[36] As long as the Eindecker out performed its opponents, these tactics worked well. But Boelcke, Immelmann and the Fokker Scourge, would not last forever; in reality, the dominance of the Eindecker only lasted for 6 months.

Chronology of Events

Beginning of the ‘Fokker Scourge’

The Fokker Scourge would begin in July 1915, when Anthony Fokker delivered the first Eindecker to Boelcke’s airfield. Within three days Boelcke had downed his first victim. The Germans never fully realized that they had a potentially decisive weapon on their hands. They also did not realize that the advantage would be short lived.[37] What they did know was this. The allies had been using their observation planes to good effect over German lines. Spotters were spying out German movements, positions, preparations, and giving vital information to the allies. Allied aircraft were also having some success shooting down German aircraft. Therefore, when the Eindecker emerged as an extremely capable air-to-air fighter, they relegated it to a role that seemed to fix their immediate problems.

“The Eindecker was considered a military secret and special instructions were issued regarding its use, one such instruction being an injunction against flying it over enemy lines. It was hoped that specimens might thus be kept from falling into enemy hands.”[38]

The Germans were also leery of letting the ‘secret’ interrupter gear get into allied hands. Consequently, the new German fighter was employed in a purely defensive, counter air role. It was deemed necessary for the dual reasons that the Eindecker’s perceived usefulness lay in its ability to deny German airspace to allied observation planes, and because of the desire to keep its secret from the allies. The German air force was bringing to reality the, until this point, theoretical concept of air superiority.

The ‘Scourge’

For a period of approximately six months, the German Fokkers dominated the skies over German lines. Initially, they were assigned to escort observation planes on the German side of the lines, in an attempt to curtail the losses from allied aircraft. Parceled out in small numbers to the two-seater squadrons, they were at the outset of limited value. In time, with the influence of men like Boelcke, the Eindeckers were grouped in larger units. Seeing the effectiveness of the new fighter, and realizing the benefit of two to four Eindeckers operating together, German leadership allowed the pilots more freedom of operation. The effect of the new doctrine was immediate. Allied pilots, especially the British, who were bearing the brunt of the Eindecker operations on their front, began to fear the little German planes. Reaction by the British leadership was fairly quick, but without a comparable aircraft, the allied losses mounted. There were never many Eindeckers operating during the scourge. To be sure, they were far superior, and their tactical employment by the German pilots was a new and deadly development. But by October 1915, there were only approximately 58 operating, and by December the number had grown only to 83. The Eindeckers real effect was their psychological impact on the British, and the changes in strategy forced on their operations. The British were forced to escort each observation plane with three to four other aircraft for protection. It hampered their observation missions greatly, by cutting the number of missions and the fact that even with the escorts, the vulnerable British aircraft were still being shot down. Still, the Germans fought purely defensively, not realizing the possibilities of taking the air war to the British with their temporary advantage. They had achieved local air superiority, over their lines, and had little idea of what to do with it.

End of the Scourge

The end of the Scourge came when British units started to be equipped with new aircraft more up to the task of challenging the Eindecker. Aircraft such as the British D.H.2[39] came into service. They could match the Fokker in performance, although it is interesting that in the case of the British designs, they were mostly pusher aircraft with the propeller in the rear.

In addition to the new equipment, the British and French learned some of the same lessons that the Germans were learning. Important concepts for the achievement of air superiority such as grouping fighters together, better training, and basic fighter tactics were now being studied and implemented by the allies. By the end of 1915, newly introduced allied aircraft were on par with, or superior to, the Eindecker. The Eindecker ‘Scourge’ was over, but the lessons learned by the young air services were critical to their development.

Lessons Learned

The Germans took the knowledge gained from the last half of 1915 and used it to good effect at Verdun in February of 1916. They massed their aircraft near Verdun, set up defensive patrols, and then, in a reversal of prior policy, sent some aircraft over the lines to disrupt the enemy air. It was very effective; the German air force used its air-to-air fighters to gain local air superiority in support of their offensive operations on the ground.

“By the beginning of 1916, then, a new arm was clearly in evidence; but the full range of its capabilities had yet to be explored, and the tactics inherent in its use had not gotten beyond animated discussions in the squadron mess. But in the great struggles of 1916, at Verdun and along the Somme, the new air arm came into its own.”[40]

The German air force learned many other important lessons about air power from the last half of 1915. The aircraft was undoubtedly a weapon, and the air arm was something more than a supporting force. Organization and training of flying units, until this time a haphazard affair, was shown to be as important for the air force as it was for the ground forces. The art of air-to-air combat was developed. Hard lessons about mutual support, massing numbers and firepower, and how to best maneuver a fighter in three-dimensional space were learned. Lastly, the possibilities of air superiority, at least the localized version, were revealed by the German air force, when their Eindeckers controlled the skies above German lines.

Conclusion

The air-to-air mission was first developed in the last half of 1915, during the Fokker Scourge. It was a result of necessity, technology and the contribution of a few notable personalities. Men like Fokker, Boelcke and Immelmann began a process that goes on to this day. The changes in air power use that they started would bring to reality the idea of air superiority.

“These changes are associated with an already-famous fighter pilot named Oswald Boelcke (he and his colleague Max Immelmann had earlier experimented with the two man patrol). Within a matter of days the Germans had made a practical reality of the hitherto speculative term “air supremacy.”[41]

During the last six months of 1915, the German air force created, deployed, and effectively used the world’s first fighter airplane. The lessons they learned and the concepts they pioneered are still relevant in the modern age of air combat.

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[1] Appendix 1

[2] Funderburk, Thomas, R. The Fighters, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1965, p 42

[3] Kennett, Lee. The First Air War 1914-1918, The Free Press, New York, 1991, pg 21

[4] For the Americans in Mexico and the British in Tripoli, the airplane’s performance gave a mixed message. They were assets, but on the other hand, the difficulties of operating them almost overcame their usefulness.

[5] Kennett, Lee, p 64

[6] Essentially, they were darts that could be tossed overboard.

[7] Kennett, Lee, p 66

[8] Franks, Norman. Aircraft Versus Aircraft, The Illustrated story of Fighter Pilot Combat Since 1914. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1986, pg 10

[9] British, French and German designs respectively

[10] There were many variations depending on aircraft design. With both tractor and pusher aircraft in each country’s inventories the weapons could be mounted in a variety of places

[11] As evidenced by the difficulty in bringing down enemy aircraft by B-17 gunners in WWII

[12] A French Monoplane design called a Morane Saulnier type N

[13] Early Machine Guns had a tendency to jam, and easy access to the gun was required

[14] Mets, David R. To Kill a Stalking Bird, fodder for your Professional Reading on Air and Space Superiority. Airpower Journal, 1998 Vol 12, No 8, p 72

[15] Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of Airpower. William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986,

p 43

[16] Originally designated the M5K/MG, It was renamed the Eindecker (One Wing) or E. I.

[17] A lightweight version of the Maxim, minus the water cooling and adding a perforated casing for air-cooling at altitude

[18] Franks, Norman, p19

[19] Additionally, the visibility from the aircraft was superb as there was only one wing to obstruct the pilots view

[20] This is not thought to be purely coincidence. Fokker had been caught sketching the aircraft when he was in France before the war

[21] Franks, Norman, p 26

[22] Stokesbury, James L, p 44

[23] Stewart, Oliver (Maj), The Strategy and Tactics of Air Fighting. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1925,

p 168

[24] The Encyclopedia of Air Warfare. Hamlyn Publishing group Ltd, London, 1974, p 24

[25] Pilot life expectancy was very low in early aviation

[26] Funderburk, Thomas, R., p 27

[27] Boelcke is credited with 40 aircraft destroyed

[28] Highham, Robert. Airpower: a Concise History. Sunflower University Press, Kansas, 1988, p 16

[29] Park, Edwards. Fighters, The Worlds Great Aces and their Planes. Thomasson-Grant, Virginia, 1990, p 33

[30] Hunting Squadrons

[31] A title given to him because many of his victories were near the town of Lille

[32] The modern form is a half loop, then rolling wings level on top. The Eindecker was probably not capable of the modern version

[33] Duncan Grinnel-Milne, Wind in the Wires,

[34] This is not an easy or instinctual skill. It takes USAF fighter pilots about 2 years of training to learn the ‘basics’ of aerial fighting

[35] With the additional benefit of being difficult to spot

[36] Park, Edwards, pg 34

[37] No precedent yet existed for the extraordinary advancement in technology and weaponry that the air war would provide

[38] Funderburk, Thomas, R , p 41

[39] Appendix 2

[40] Kennett, Lee, p 70

[41] Kennett, Lee, p 71

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