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Espionage & Tech DAShellUS remains dominant in space – but China is looking to take it awayGreg Autry ’19, director of the Southern California Commercial Spaceflight Initiative at the University of Southern California, “Beijing’s Fight for the Final Frontier” Foreign Policy, April 2, 2019, accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***U.S. President Donald Trump has declared that, “It is not enough to have an American presence in space—we must have American dominance in space.” At this moment in history, that dominance is America’s to lose. Its military space capabilities are peerless. NASA’s robotic craft have explored the entire solar system from Mercury to Ultima Thule, and the agency will launch its fifth Mars rover next year. The next few years will see the deployment of no less than five new U.S. orbital and suborbital human-rated spacecraft, four of them commercial.It’s hard to overstate the activity in the U.S. commercial space world today. Just down the road from my office in Los Angeles there’s Elon Musk’s SpaceX as well as a bevy of advanced small launch firms including Virgin Orbit (in Long Beach), Rocket Lab (Huntington Beach), and Relativity Space (El Segundo). These firms, several of them with foreign principals, have chosen to place their headquarters and manufacturing in the United States. They provide thousands of high-paying jobs for engineers, machinists, accountants, and support staff. There are also hundreds of U.S. satellite and space data firms receiving angel and venture-capital funding. According to Space Angels, $18 billion has been invested in entrepreneurial space firms by 534 companies. The value of successful space start-up exits also reached $40 billion. Bank of America predicts that the space economy will reach $2.7 trillion in 30 years.The Trump administration is well aware of the commercial and international factors in the space dominance equation. The 2017 First Space Policy Directive requires the government to “Lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercial and international partners to enable human expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities.” Vice President Mike Pence speaks regularly on this topic. The United States should welcome genuine space competitors from Japan, Israel, the United Kingdom, and other free nations. However, nominally commercial efforts from China are very concerning. They are often pawns in a wider government push by Beijing to dominate space, with the encouragement of President Xi Jinping. It is no surprise when nations favor their national space champions, but when Beijing’s frames state-backed firms using military technology as private enterprises, it should be concerning.I recently attended a workshop composed of thought leaders from industry, military, intelligence, and academia, where many anxieties were raised. The group was concerned that nearly every Chinese space “start-up” is either a state-owned operation, state-controlled spinoff from a state enterprise, or a virtual proxy of the Chinese army. For example, the new “commercial” line of Kuaizhou launch vehicles developed by the supposed start-up ExPace, billed as the first Chinese private rocket company, are actually built by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, a state-owned company that is a key part of China’s defense industry. Their rockets are multistage solid rocket systems launched from transportable erector launchers, basically mobile intercontinental ballistic missile systems but with economic payloads and targets. ExPace announced they will set launch prices for the new Kuaizhou 11 at just $5,000 per kilogram, about 20 percent of the prevailing market rate for small launchers. While nobody seriously believes ExPace can make money at that price, state-owned enterprises don’t need to. Their low prices may, however, scare investors out of backing Western start-ups. There are several ExPace look-alikes in the works, including OneSpace, Ispace, and Landspace. Given the rampant security paranoia in China at the moment, where even knives are given RFID tags to track them, I can’t believe that the Chinese government would allow truly independent actors to build missiles.Cooperation risks tech transfers that undermine U.S. securityMichael J. Listner, principle, Space Law and Policy Solutions and Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval War College, “Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation,” SPACE NEWS, 7—14—14, , accessed 2-29-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***There is precedent for this concern from China’s participation in the Galileo satellite navigation system. China’s technical partnership with the European Union on the Galileo project led to its application on China’s indigenous Beidou Phase 2 satellite navigation system. The accuracy of the Beidou signal came as a surprise to its European partners as such accuracy was unlikely to be obtained without taking shortcuts. Thus, what began as a cooperative effort between the European Union and China led to China reaping the technological benefit with the resultant national security implications. Such would be the case with a cooperative effort with the United States. Any effort would expose U.S. technology, and it stands to reason that no matter what safeguards were put in place China would acquire and benefit from that technology. Not only would the United States not benefit from a cooperative effort it would also sacrifice its technological advantage and compromise its national security.China views US weakness as an opening; U.S. needs CP to demonstrate resilience Dean Cheng ‘18, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: What the United States Must Understand About China and Space”, March 29, 2018, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Implications for the United StatesAs careful students of other people’s wars, the PLA has seen how the “American way of war” is characterized by precision long-range strikes, carefully coordinated joint operations, and a desire to minimize both adversary and American casualties. This approach, in turn, relies heavily on space systems to locate and track the enemy, create common situational awareness among participating American forces, and guide weapons. Therefore, degrading or otherwise disrupting space systems is likely to influence American effectiveness.As important in the context of deterrence, by reducing American effectiveness, it may be possible to at least delay American intervention (as the U.S. compensates for lowered capabilities), if not influence political decision makers. Chinese authors have questioned whether American decision makers would continue to intervene at the price of a reduced space infrastructure that would not only affect the immediate campaign, but would also reduce information support for American forces worldwide.The Chinese think of space deterrence as a means of achieving a pre-determined political goal, not to prevent actions in the space domain.This underscores the fact that the Chinese think of space deterrence as a means of achieving a pre-determined political goal, not to prevent actions in the space domain. Moreover, Beijing is currently engaging in space deterrence. The Chinese recently announced the test of a mid-course missile interceptor.10 The interceptor appears to be oriented primarily towards intermediate-range ballistic missiles—a system that is not deployed by the United States or Russia (as per the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), or Japan, Taiwan, or Vietnam. As important, the system is believed to incorporate elements that have previously been used with Chinese anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). The demonstration of this and other Chinese ASATs, including one capable of reaching systems in geosynchronous orbit, perhaps the most valuable real estate in space, is consistent with Chinese publications on space deterrence. For Chinese decision makers, deterrence, including in space, is a constant concern, rather than an action undertaken in time of acute crises.Recommendations for American Decision MakersGiven these growing challenges from the PLA, the United States needs to undertake steps that will demonstrate that attacks against American space systems will not paralyze or fundamentally degrade the overall military capability of the United States. By demonstrating this, it will signal to the Chinese leadership that the Chinese cannot achieve their political goals (the aim of Chinese weishe activities) through such attacks—which will not only make it less likely that the Chinese will attack American space systems, but also make it less likely that the PRC will challenge the United States in the first place. Such steps should include the following:Increasing American Space Resilience. The most immediate need is for the United States to demonstrate that it can perform certain space missions even in the face of attacks and interference with its current space systems. There are a number of approaches that can improve the resiliency of American space systems. One is to increase the use of commercial systems. Telecommunications satellites have long been run by commercial operators; indeed, some of the world’s largest owners and operators of satellites are commercial firms, such as Intelsat and Inmarsat. There are now companies that are discussing the deployment of hundreds, even thousands of satellites. Such constellations would provide an unprecedented level of coverage, with a satellite overhead every few hours, perhaps even every few minutes.Such commercial systems, however, are likely to be effective only if they ensure that there are redundant means of accessing their data, even in the face of intense intrusions and interference. This would require not only multiple downlink sites and mission control facilities, but also significant investment in cybersecurity, since the constellation can only be effective so long as there are means of controlling its operation.Another means of increasing resilience may be to disaggregate some of the various functions in future satellite systems. Current satellites are the size of Greyhound buses, often with a variety of instruments aboard to support a variety of functions. While this makes each multi-billion-dollar satellite more cost-effective, it also makes them much more lucrative targets for attack. Designers of future satellite systems may wish to pursue more single-purpose satellites, in order to make each satellite less attractive as a target. Coupled with a greater emphasis on smaller satellites, this may improve the survivability of key systems and, as important, the prolonged performance of key missions.The most immediate need is for the United States to demonstrate that it can perform certain space missions even in the face of attacks and interference with its current space systems.In this regard, Cubesats may offer a path to resilience. Individual Cubesats are 10 x 10 x 10 centimeters and weigh only about 1.33 kilograms each. They can be assembled, like Lego building blocks, into larger structures, however. Incorporating more advanced sensors, onboard processing, and cybersecurity software might allow for an individually less capable satellite that could be launched by a larger variety of platforms, perhaps in large numbers. Such military Cubesats could constitute a key bridge between current large, exquisite, but sparse platforms and ubiquitous but less secure commercial systems.Reducing Reliance on Space. While increasing resilience can reduce the impact of enemy attacks on American space systems, so long as the U.S. is reliant on space, its systems will be targeted. Therefore, alongside increasing resilience there must also be an effort to reduce reliance on space systems. Some small steps have already been undertaken in this regard. The U.S. Naval Academy, for example, has reintroduced instruction in “shooting the sun,” employing a sextant and charts. The Army, meanwhile, is reinvigorating training on land navigation, again without reliance on the Global Positioning System (GPS) network. Such measures need to be supplemented by training and practice in the conduct of more complex activities, such as joint air strikes, without the benefit of space-based communications, weather, and navigation systems.This should be further supplemented by the establishment of terrestrial alternatives for certain functions, including navigation and timing. The United States ceased funding for the LORAN-C system of radio navigation beacons in 2009 and did not fund the proposed e-Loran successor, in the belief that GPS had made terrestrial beacons obsolete.11 This decision has been questioned, and in 2017, there were efforts to reinstate funding for a new e-LORAN system, including the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2017. These efforts should be pursued, and Congress should fund “the development, construction, and operation of a backup to the Global Positioning System,” one which does not rely upon satellites.Practicing Operating Without Space Capabilities. While the provision of alternative systems and greater resilience may make American space systems less of a target, those systems will likely remain priority targets for an adversary for the foreseeable future. Consequently, American forces need to regularly exercise without space capabilities, including not only navigation satellites, but communications and reconnaissance systems as well. Indeed, the entire process of planning and implementing joint strike operations needs to be practiced without access to any space systems (including weather data). Only by publicly demonstrating that American forces can operate effectively without space systems is the threat to those systems likely to diminish at all.Expanding American Counter-Space Operations and Capabilities. Given that revisionist states such as the PRC are investigating how to deny American military forces information from space, it is essential that the U.S. be able to similarly deny an adversary information from space. The benefits of asymmetric access to space has been demonstrated from the first Gulf War, through operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan to the war in Iraq. U.S. forces operating without access to the strategic high ground of space would be operating at a perilous disadvantage if Chinese or other forces could retain access to that same domain. The United States therefore needs to demonstrate a capacity to neutralize any adversary’s space systems.The impact is global warsKenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O'Hanlon, senior fellows, Brookings Institution, "The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt," LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7—10—12, brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, accessed 5-25-16, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.UU.S. ahead nowUS can still win a space race Kwast, Air Force Lieutenant General, August 19, 2019 (Lt. Gen. Steve Kwast, 8-19-2019, "The Real Stakes in the New Space Race," War on the Rocks, , DOA 8/20/19, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)America has become complacent and mistakes its rapidly dissipating economic and military advantages as rights. The United States is making the same mistake that other fallen great powers have made. Namely, it is doubling down on the approach that made America successful in previous generations and discounting rising powers taking new approaches. While the U.S. government nibbles around the edges of game-changing technologies, the Chinese party-state is making huge investments in key areas to include:?hypersonics,?5G,?supercomputing,?artificial intelligence,?3D-printing,?quantum computing?, and?robotics. China is employing these and other leading-edge technologies in wholistic and new strategic ways that could render America a second-rate power.Most Americans, and many in Congress, have not had that broader picture painted. Congress is at a crossroads, but some of its members may not even know it. It is time to make a deliberate decision to compete with China or to surrender by default. While American companies are working on these new technologies (albeit in separate silos), real power lies in harnessing these technologies together from space in intentional and innovative ways to achieve a dominant competitive advantage. China is actively pursuing a plan to use space as the ultimate “high ground” to dominate the global economy and transform economic, military, and political power in its image. While the United States has used terrestrial based strategies to contain its adversaries in the past, China is positioning itself to surround the entire globe from space.The good news is that there is still a way to win. The United States can build on key competitive advantages: namely, superior cultures of creativity and innovation, rooted in an open society and a free market. The U.S. government should start with a vision that is both bigger than China’s and meaningful to America’s society and values. From there, it can write and implement a strategy that can secure the American way of life in this century and ensure the goods and promises offered by space are not dominated by a country disinterested in human freedom.The benefits of such a course of action would appeal to most Americans, and indeed most people, to include clean energy, ubiquitous and secure communications,?protection from space objects like the “city killing” meteor that hit Russia, deterrence capabilities that will render nuclear weapons obsolete, ensure the survival of humanity through expansion, and even?modifying the Earth’s weather using satellites to slow the effects of climate change.We are in a space race now—we can and will win in the status quoRoger Gran Harrison, former director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, “The Invisible Arms Race,” AMERICAN INTEREST, 4—29—16, 2016/04/29/the-invisible-arms-race/, accessed 5-19-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***An arms race is under way in space—insidious, invisible, and at this point probably inevitable. The Bush Administration’s dream that the United States could control access to earth orbit as the British had once controlled sea lines of communication has been, as the bureaucrats say, overtaken by events. So has the Obama Administration’s emphasis on international “cooperation” (the word appears 13 times in the first few pages of the Administration’s 2010 National Space Policy document), an approach that served chiefly to demonstrate that no international consensus on the future of space exists, and that none is likely. Even the sensible, if vague and entirely voluntary, “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” floated by the European Union and pushed hard by the State Department for most of a decade found only tepid support. It was easy for the Chinese and Russians to portray it all as just the latest example of Western imperialism. Earlier this year, the Code was quietly put to rest. Leading from behind on space, the United States has been outmaneuvered and left for dead. Not so the Chinese and Russians, who occupy the diplomatic high ground with their Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), all the time working feverishly to put their own weapons in space, and anywhere else they might do some damage, including, we can safely assume, in the cyber domain. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation describes a recent reorganization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) structure to emphasize “information dominance,” defined as the ability to exploit battlefield information while denying the enemy that same capability. The information satellites provide is key to power projection; there can be no “pivot” to Asia without satellites; so disabling or dismantling our space infrastructure is a high priority for Beijing. Kinetic hit-to-kill weapons like the one China tested in 2007 and again in recent years are one way of doing this, but hardly the most efficient. Far better in an “informationalized” war to ensure that the data satellites gather and transmit never makes it to the end user—or that it arrives there in a form that looks reliable but isn’t. It’s the perfect way for a country like China to leap over the present imbalance and arrive as a fully fledged and dangerous adversary at the next stage of conflict in space. The key words on this new battlefield are hack, dazzle, jam, and spoof. For their part, the Russians recently tested a small, maneuverable “Luch” satellite dangerously near a commercial communication satellite operated by Intelsat Corporation in geosynchronous orbit. Satellites that can maneuver freely in space have several legitimate functions; they can serve as space tugs, moving satellites from orbit to orbit, or refuel, inspect, or repair them. They might also be used to shadow national security satellites, modify their orbits, hit them with a burst of electromagnetic energy, collide with them or perhaps plant listening devices or limpet mines on them. Ten years from now, space will be filled with small, highly mobile satellites like this, many of them put into orbit by commercial operators for legitimate purposes, but many others by states for other, less benign reasons. Time to run up the white flag? Some Pentagon officials don’t think so, in large measure because the White House has quietly changed course in the face this evolving strategic challenge, first by admitting the problem (there isn’t enough international support for rules of order in space, and meanwhile the bad guys are catching up) and then by taking steps to do something about it. The vehicle for this change was the 2014 “Strategic Portfolio Review,” a bottom up reassessment of space policy that spawned dozens of action items now in the process of implementation. The Obama Administration hopes its revamped approach to space will provide a sound legacy for the next Administration and is working hard to build bipartisan support for its continuation and completion. The White House has forbidden talk of space weapons or space war, so Space Command commander John Hyten speaks instead of a more “muscular defense.” Particulars are highly classified, but enough hints have leaked into the public domain to indicate that muscular defense will include good deal of kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber offense —enough, it would seem, to satisfy congressional hawks, at least for the moment. Seismic changes are also afoot in how the Pentagon policy leadership views possible collaborators in space. The Defense Department’s key man on space policy, Deputy Assistant Secretary Doug Loverro, argues that in our space confrontation with the Chinese and Russians we have two trump cards: our greater ability to form alliances, and a burgeoning and innovative commercial sector that none of our likely adversaries can hope to match. Historically we have been better at building alliances than the Chinese and Russians, but coalitions depend on trust and a common perception of the threat, which are lacking in space. Perhaps now we have abandoned our hegemonic ambitions we will regain some of our old coalition-building chops, but in the meantime our opponents are having some success building coalitions against us, as they did in defeating the EU Code of Conduct. In particular, any initiatives aimed either explicitly or implicitly at the Chinese in space will have trouble garnering support. Space-capable nations, excepting Japan and a very few others, simply don’t see the Chinese threat as we do. The other supposed trump in the U.S. hand is more promising. Loverro argues for leveraging the burgeoning and innovative commercial sector to both multiply our capabilities and complicate the options of those who would dare try to cripple them. Two key figures in this evolution are former NASA Director Mike Griffen, who made some NASA money available for commercial space start ups, and Elon Musk, who used that money and a great deal of his own to bring Silicon Valley culture and entrepreneurial flare to the business of putting things in space. (Watch the video of his Falcon 9 first stage sticking the landing on a barge in the Atlantic to see how well he has succeeded.) In his considerable wake has come an explosion of commercial enterprises doing things in space that only governments used to be able to do; in some cases, they’re even doing them better. The advances in launch, surveillance, space situational awareness, and miniaturization have been astonishing, far beyond what heritage industry greybeards were predicting even five years ago. The Pentagon is now moving to take advantage. Consider space situational awareness (locating and tracking objects in orbit). The gold standard had been the government’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB. No more. Frustrated with the lack of data shared by JSpOC, the big commercial satellite operators formed something called the Space Data Association, which, in collaboration with the space tracking company AGI, has created a Commercial Space Operations Center (COMsPOC) that can map the location and movement of satellites more accurately than anyone has before. The Pentagon once tried to discourage all this. Now, like a hopeful hippo in ballet shoes, it has pivoted to exploit it, announcing earlier this month that the Air Force has signed up to receive a year of ComSpOC orbital data. In the long run, Air Force leaders hope to turn over responsibility for space traffic management and even GPS responsibilities to civilian agencies. Civil military cooperation has the potential greatly to improve space situational awareness, increase the carrying capacity of orbit, and allow the military to concentrate limited resources on the heavier strategic burden of contested space. The Defense Department thinks public/private collaboration will also improve satellite protection. The idea is to fill orbit with a multitude of government and commercial satellites providing communication, timing signals, images, and channels for command and control; then add the satellites of your friends and allies, making your hardware interoperable with theirs. It’s a variation on the nuclear strategy called “multiple aim point basing,” which is meant to complicate an adversary’s targeting options, deny them the expectation of success, and thereby persuade them not to attack at all. It might be called, if policymakers had a better sense of irony, the “thousand-points-of-light” approach to space.Space leadership is strong now—commercial activitiesBrian Weeden, technical adviser, Secure World Foundation, “Op-ed | American Leadership in Space 2.0,” SPACE NEWS, 10—5—15, , accessed 5-19-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***A lot of rhetoric has been thrown around over the last several years about how the United States is “falling behind” in space and ceding its leadership role. This rather pessimistic assessment is largely based on the status of U.S. government space programs. NASA’s current human space exploration program is perceived as a shadow of its glory days of the 1960s, and U.S. national security space capabilities no longer have the same relative advantage over near-peers as in the late 1990s and early 2000s after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, taking a broader perspective of space activities leads to a much different conclusion: The United States is doing more in space than ever before, and in ways that no other country can match. The main driver for this new leadership is the commercial space sector, not the U.S. government. Instead of attempting to recapture “Space 1.0” leadership by focusing purely on stronger U.S. government space programs, another possible strategy is to develop a “Space 2.0” approach and focus on encouraging, shaping and leveraging the commercial space sector to help propel it into the future. This new leadership approach is possible because we are currently in the beginnings of a revolution in commercial space activities. The revolution is based on a potent combination of Moore’s Law, spin-in technologies from the information technology (IT) sector, and cloud computing that has enabled small-satellite technology to change the price/performance ratio, fueled by a significant infusion of private venture capital. These drivers have spurred the creation of dozens of new American space companies and a rekindling of competitive spirit in many legacy companies. The end result has been an infusion of fresh ideas, new approaches, increased innovation and new excitement in the space world. Although it’s uncertain which commercial space companies will emerge from the competition and actually make it to space, we know for certain that humanity as a whole will benefit. The commercial revolution in space is radically reducing the costs of accessing data and services from satellites while simultaneously increasing the amount, frequency and quality of information gathered. At the same time, improved analytics are being developed to turn the raw data into useful information and increasing accessibility to a wider number of users. That in turn leads to more “eyeballs” examining and investigating data, which leads to more new insights and applications that no one else thought of. The end result is going to be vastly more knowledge about the world we live in and socioeconomic benefits we cannot even dream of today.The U.S. still has a substantial lead over China in spaceDean Cheng, Research Fellow, “Five Myths About China’s Space Program,” WEBMEMO n. 3379, 9—29—11, research/reports/2011/09/five-myths-about-chinas-space-program, accessed 4-6-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Myth #2: China is catching up with the U.S. in space. China is currently the only nation whose space program is on track to place people into orbit. The U.S. has decommissioned its Space Shuttle fleet, while the failure of the Russian launch of the unmanned Progress 44 supply mission raises the real question of whether Russia is up to the task of safely shuttling astronauts to and from the International Space Station. China’s space industry workforce is younger than the American one and substantially younger and healthier than the Russian one. Chinese leaders appear committed to sustaining their space efforts for the coming decades. Yet the U.S. still enjoys substantial leads over China in a variety of ways, whether it is the range of satellites it fields, the capability of certain types of payloads, and, above all, experience in space operations. American astronauts have clocked thousands of hours in space, substantially more than the Chinese have.The American commercial space sector is boomingBrian Weeden, Technical Adviser, Secure World Foundation and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN STRATEGIC DOMAINS, NBR Special Report n. 57, National Bureau of Asian Research, ed. T.Tanner & W.Dong, 4—16, p. 67-68. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In the midst of all this, the commercial space sector in the United States is currently undergoing a significant boom. Several companies continue to work on developing space tourism services, and three are competing for contracts from NASA to deliver personnel and cargo to the ISS. Dozens of U.S. companies, largely funded by private capital, have also announced plans to utilize small satellites to provide a variety of services, including significantly increased remote sensing of the earth, commercial weather data, tracking of ships at sea, and broadband Internet for the world.US is the status quo leader—can continue through development Morin, Vice President and Executive Director of the Center for Space Policy, 2018 (9/21/2018, "Sustaining American Space Leadership In An Age Of Disruption," Forbes, , DOA 8/20/2019, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)Since the dawn of the Space Age – and even earlier – visionaries have dreamed of routine spaceflight for science, exploration, and commerce. Achieving their dream would be a major milestone in culmination of humankind’s long history of gazing at the stars and contemplating the unknown. ?Today, we are in a period of transition: the dream of a vibrant space economy is on its way to becoming reality. The United States government and private industry both played a key role in making it happen, and the U.S. has the opportunity to continue its leadership during an ongoing period of disruption.The first source of disruption is the increasing democratization of space. New players are becoming active in space, and some may intentionally or unintentionally cause difficulties. Many countries now have access to technologies in which the U.S. formerly had a comfortable lead. Launch is a key example. Thanks to development of new indigenous launch systems and contracts with international public and private launch providers, where space once was the purview of government-funded space agencies,?today elementary school students can build satellites and find a ride into orbit. Where once only the superpowers and close allies could afford launch, now diverse countries have ambitious space programs; for example,?India has sent a science probe to orbit Mars,?Sri Lanka is preparing to launch its second satellite, and the United Arab Emirates is recruiting astronauts.A second source of disruption is the sheer scale of emerging space activity, yielding an increasingly crowded environment. Around the world, government and industry researchers are pursuing capabilities to support space-enabled businesses and national security. Increasingly, such capabilities are achieved with large numbers of small, short-lived satellites rather than small numbers of large, long-lived satellites. The downside is the?need to address growing space traffic?that includes thousands of active satellites and an even greater number of debris objects – many of them the legacy of past space projects that were conceived before protecting the orbital environment was a priority, and others the product of rising powers destructively?demonstrating their space warfighting capability. Efforts to address this challenge require international cooperation, and leadership from the United States will be essential in framing what a global space traffic management regime should look like.Space weapons tests underscore the third disruptive trend, in which space is becoming a militarily contested domain after being viewed as a “sanctuary” since the end of the Cold War. That is, space-based military capabilities will be threatened (and maybe civilian satellites as well), making the space environment riskier for all operators.? The precise directions of this trend depend on future choices, but increasing commercial activity in space depends on a safe operating environment, just as the global flow of trade could be greatly disrupted by a great power conflict at sea.Some fear this disrupted future. But the opportunity for American leadership is enormous, and should be cause for excitement, not fear. The fact that others are catching up to the United States was inevitable as observers around the world saw the advantages of space applications and began pursuing them in an age of rapid technology democratization. The United States is still dominant overall, and in an excellent position to shape the future of space.China Seeks Space DominanceChina seeks to use its space capabilities aggressively to secure its larger strategic objectivesDean Cheng ‘18, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: What the United States Must Understand About China and Space”, March 29, 2018, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***While China has engaged in nuclear deterrence since it exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1964, it has increasingly focused on “space deterrence” (kongjian weishe; 空间威慑) over the past two decades. This is partly due to China’s growing space capabilities, which began to expand in the late 1990s, and partly due to the simultaneously growing role of space forces in calculations of modern military power. The first Gulf War (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in 1990–1991) demonstrated the growing role of space systems in conventional warfare. Subsequent conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Middle East have only underscored the greater importance of space capabilities in waging war.As with Chinese views of nuclear deterrence, Chinese views of space deterrence occur within a very different context than Western views.1 The Chinese focus is on compellence, including coercion, rather than solely, or even primarily, on dissuasion. Thus, the idea of “deterrence” is seen in both coercive and dissuasive terms. Equally important, the Chinese see deterrence as a means to achieving political ends. There does not appear to be much focus on deterring or dissuading an adversary from acting in space. Instead, for Chinese decision makers, successful deterrence is ultimately a form of political activity and psychological warfare, whereby an adversary is constrained in his actions, allowing China to achieve its goals.2 In this regard, nuclear deterrence would seem to be the exception, with a general desire to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. Space deterrence, by contrast, is about employing space capabilities in order to achieve broader political ends, rather than deterring an adversary from engaging in space activities.Indeed, Chinese writings suggest that decision makers will focus not on deterring action in the space domain, but in securing the larger Chinese strategic objective (such as compelling Taiwan to abandon its quest for independence, and obtaining support for Chinese claims to the South China Sea). The purpose of deterrence is to help achieve a particular goal—deterrence is not the goal itself.Chinese Concepts of Space DeterrenceChinese writings since at least the late 1990s have repeatedly emphasized the importance of establishing “space dominance” (zhi taikong quan; 制太空权) as part of fighting “local wars under modern, high-technology conditions,” “local wars under informationized conditions,” and now “informationized local wars.” While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not necessarily reliant on space for its operations, its most dangerous adversary, the United States, is seen as dependent upon space systems. Denying an adversary the ability to exploit space, as well as securing it for one’s own use, is therefore integral to establishing space dominance.This, in turn, elevates the role of space deterrence, which is now seen as a vital mission for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) space forces. It is a relatively new task, arising in light of the rapid development of space technology, as well as the broad reliance on space systems in support of other military functions.In the Chinese view, space deterrence has several unique characteristics.3 One is “its broad impact” (quan fangwei xing; 全方位性). Effective space deterrence will affect not only space forces but terrestrial forces and operations as well. This reinforces the point that, from the Chinese perspective, “space deterrence” is not about deterring adversaries from acting in space, but exploiting space-related systems to achieve certain political and military aims (largely on Earth).Chinese writings since at least the late 1990s have repeatedly emphasized the importance of establishing “space dominance.”Related to this is the assessment that “space deterrence is unified” or “integrated” (yiti xing; 一体性). This is a reflection of the unified nature of space capabilities, which includes military, civilian, and commercial space systems, and which encompasses systems in orbit, terrestrial tracking and control facilities, and associated data links. Successful space deterrence will employ a variety of means, including land-based, sea-based, and air-based systems as well as space-based capabilities, and will include both offensive and defensive operations.China behind nowHarder for China to catch up by itself – Aff answers make false assumptionsGilli and Gilli 2019, Andrea Gilli senior researcher at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense College in Rome, Italy and Mauro Gilli senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 2019, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage”, International Security Volume 43 | Issue 3 | Winter 2018/19 p.141-189, Posted Online February 15, 2019 , accessed 8/13/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The imitation of military technology plays a central but unappreciated role in the literature on international relations theory.25 Internal balancing, for instance, often entails imitating foreign technology. Yet, international relations scholars have not investigated when and why efforts to imitate foreign weapon systems are successful.26 Instead, they have assumed that states' intentions or incentives to imitate will ipso facto lead to success.27According to Kenneth Waltz, for example, because of competition and socialization dynamics in international politics, the “weapons of the major contenders … come to … look much the same all over the world.”28 Similarly, Robert Gilpin argues that “there is a historical tendency for the military … techniques of the dominant state or empire to be diffused to other states in the system.”29 For P.W. Singer, “The problem for ‘first movers’… is that they have to pay heavily” when developing military technology. In comparison, imitating countries “can ‘free ride’ on the early cost, copy what works and focus all their energy and resources solely on improving upon what the first mover does.”30 Interestingly, even some of the scholars who have questioned the literature's conventional wisdom agree with the proposition that the imitation of military hardware is relatively easy. In the words of Emily Goldman, “Hardware is often easy to acquire.”31 Similarly, Michael Horowitz writes that “it is [not] difficult to copy … specific technologies.”32Many scholars further argue that globalization and information technologies have facilitated and accelerated the diffusion of technology in the military realm.33 Joseph Nye observes that, in the age of globalization, “technology … eventually spreads and becomes available to adversaries.”34 Some scholars claim that countries with advanced commercial industrial and technological capabilities can exploit their industrial and scientific base to develop state-of-the-art military technology.35 Other scholars have stressed that, since the early 1990s, commercial research and development (R&D) has supplanted military R&D as the main driver of innovation.36 As a result, many advanced technologies are now accessible on the global market at moderate cost, including those required for producing first-class military capabilities.37 For instance, Goldman and Richard Andres maintain that, in comparison to the industrial era, “revolutionary dual-use technologies, like computer and software capabilities,” can be imitated more quickly and more easily, because they “are not capital intensive and do not require a huge industrial capacity to exploit.”38 Horowitz warns that because of increasing synergies with the commercial sector, “military technology … could become increasingly ‘lootable,‘” allowing “militaries [to] quickly reverse engineer systems built by other countries.”39PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORYThere are three problems with the conventional wisdom in international relations theory regarding the ability of states to copy foreign military technology. First, if imitation is easy, why do states invest in military innovation at all? Why not simply wait for others to develop innovations and then copy them?40 Second, the assumption that imitation is easy is at odds with the literatures in economic history, economics, history of technology, management, science and technology studies, and sociology, which have sought to explain why some innovators retain a first-mover advantage, what the sources of industrial leadership are, and why very advanced companies sometimes fail to replicate an innovation, even with full access to original blueprints and designs.41 Third, imitating foreign technology also seems to be difficult in the commercial realm, where, according to international relations theory, it should be particularly easy. For instance, Google and Microsoft, two of the most advanced companies in the world, have struggled to cope with Apple's smartphone and tablet technology.42 In the following section, we explain why these trends are even more pronounced in weapons production.43Complexity and Military-Technological SuperioritySince the second industrial revolution, the complexity of military technology has increased exponentially. This dramatic increase has changed the nature of innovation and of imitation, making the latter much more difficult to PLEXITY AND THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGEComplexity generates incompatibilities and vulnerabilities.44 As complexity increases, the number and significance of incompatibilities and vulnerabilities also increase—exponentially.45 Anticipating, detecting, identifying, understanding, and addressing all possible technical problems when designing, developing, and manufacturing an advanced weapon system pose major challenges.46 Addressing them without creating new problems is an even greater challenge.47 More challenging still is the need for weapons producers to design platforms that can incorporate cutting-edge and yet-to-be-developed technologies, and to limit their vulnerability to subtle and effective enemy countermeasures and counter-systems.48Three developments help account for the increase in the complexity of military technology since the second industrial revolution. First, the number of components in military platforms has risen dramatically: in the 1930s, a combat aircraft consisted of hundreds of components, a figure that surged into the tens of thousands in the 1950s and to 300,000 in the 2010s.49 As the number of components expands, the number of potential incompatibilities and vulnerabilities increases geometrically. Ensuring the proper functioning and mutual compatibility of all the components and of the whole system thus becomes increasingly difficult.50Second, advancements in electronics, engineering, and material sciences have resulted in the components of major weapon systems becoming dramatically more sophisticated, leading military platforms to become “systems of systems.”51 Integrating large numbers of extremely advanced components, subsystems, and systems poses a daunting challenge. More sophisticated components have extremely low tolerances, which in turn require a degree of accuracy and precision in design, development, and manufacturing that was unthinkable a century ago.52 For instance, aircraft engines in the 1900s and 1910s were “crude” mechanical devices that self-taught individuals could design, assemble, and install in their own repair shops.53 In contrast, the production of today's aircraft engines is so technologically demanding that only a handful of producers around the world possess the necessary technical expertise.54 Consider that in turbofan engines, a “close clearance between [a rotary] part and its surroundings can be critical. One-tenth of 1 millimeter [i.e., 0.00393 inch] variation in dimension can have a significant impact on system compatibility.”55 The same is true of materials, electronics, and software, where minor imprecisions can have dramatic consequences.56 For example, in modern jet fighters, software controls everything, from the operation of radars to the supply of oxygen. The expansion of onboard software functions is reflected in the increase in the number of software code lines from 1,000 in the F-4 Phantom II (1958), to 1.7 million in the F-22 (2006), and to 5.6 million in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter/Lightning II (2015).57 Even a minor problem in those millions of lines of code could ground the aircraft or prove fatal.58 This level of sophistication explains why software engineering is responsible for most of the delays and of the problems seen in advanced weapon systems.59 Third, modern weapon systems can now perform in extraordinarily demanding environmental and operational conditions, thanks to improvements in all metrics (e.g., speed, altitude ceiling for aircraft, and collapse depth for submarines).60 These improvements, however, have increased the likelihood of technical problems.61 The more sophisticated a component is, the more likely minor environmental changes will affect its performance.62 In addition, as technological advances permit weapon systems to operate in once unfamiliar environmental conditions, designers and engineers are forced to deal with previously unknown physical phenomena.63CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF INNOVATION AND IMITATIONThe increase in complexity and the resulting integration challenges have brought about a change in the very nature of innovation. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, innovation was primarily the product of conjecture, creativity, ingenuity, and intuition, as was the case with two of the most revolutionary military technologies of the twentieth century: submarines (1900) and aircraft (1903).64 To move from intuition to military platforms, countries needed industrial facilities and managerial capabilities to supervise large production runs—what Alfred Chandler called “the Visible Hand” of industrial capitalism.65 Because of the increase in complexity, however, innovation has progressively been the result of scientific and engineering research, as well as of accumulated experience in design, development, and manufacturing.66 Consequently, arms producers working on the technological frontier have had to develop in-house technological knowledge bases, or systems integration capabilities—“the Visible Brain” as Keith Pavitt called it.67 Consider the evolution of submarines: from “crude, slow and probably as dangerous to their crews as they were to any potential enemy” in the early twentieth century, they are now so complex that “the only comparison you could draw would be a space shuttle.”68The increase in complexity has also made imitation more challenging. For imitators to have an advantage vis-à-vis innovators, two conditions are necessary. First, the capabilities required to exploit foreign know-how and experience in the production of weapon systems must be relatively easy to develop or to acquire, so that the imitator can swiftly translate foreign designs and blueprints into a working military platform; that is, there must be relatively low entry barriers. Second, the know-how and experience of the innovating country must diffuse with relative ease and with relative rapidity to would-be imitators. The growth in complexity observed over the past century has made these two conditions increasingly difficult to meet.During the second industrial revolution, imitating countries could exploit the know-how and experience of their most advanced peers to develop state-of-the-art military technology.69 In fact, intuition and conjecture could be transferred from country to country with relative ease.70 The main challenge these countries faced was to mobilize the necessary capital to launch production and to achieve the necessary economies of scale.71 For industrialized countries, this challenge was not insurmountable.72 Consider the naval rise of Imperial Japan. Because of its qualitatively modest domestic shipbuilding industry, in 1905 the Japanese navy mostly deployed British-made warships.73 Yet, through a policy based on “copy, improve and innovate,”74 involving the “purchase of specific foreign examples, the exhaustive analysis and testing of those models [and] their subsequent improvement,“75 by 1912–13, Japan was able to commission two super Dreadnoughts that surpassed their British counterparts in both speed and tonnage.76 And by the 1920s, ”the skills available at both naval and commercial dockyards made Japan capable of turning out a range of warships that in design and construction were equal or superior to those of any navy in the world.“77Over time, however, the increase in complexity of military technology has made the process of imitation much more difficult. Economies of scale and exorbitant capital investments still represent major barriers for most countries seeking to enter the defense sector. Yet, simply extracting and investing resources is no longer sufficient to close the technological gap with the most advanced countries. Lacking the necessary know-how for weapon systems production has, in fact, become a major obstacle for actors trying to imitate foreign technology—wealthy countries included.78 Japan's experience in the 1980s and 1990s offers a useful comparison to the Imperial era discussed above. As Stephen Brooks notes, despite Japan's then primacy in high-technology and despite several decades of collaboration on weapons production with the United States, its F-2 fighter proved to be “a white elephant: no better than the F-16C [Japan built upon and] at least twice as expensive to produce.”79Imitators need to develop a whole scientific/industrial baseGilli and Gilli 2019, Andrea Gilli senior researcher at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense College in Rome, Italy and Mauro Gilli senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 2019, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage”, International Security Volume 43 | Issue 3 | Winter 2018/19 p.141-189, Posted Online February 15, 2019 , accessed 8/13/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The increase in technological complexity over the past 150 years has exponentially raised the requirements to assimilate and imitate foreign military technology, thus canceling the first necessary condition for states to enjoy the advantage of imitation—relatively low entry barriers for the imitation of state-of-the-art weapon systems.To free ride on the R&D of a foreign country, a country must be able “to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment.”80 But as scholarship from other disciplines shows, knowledge and experience are not public goods that can be easily and cheaply appropriated.81 An imitator must possess an adequate absorptive capacity: material and nonmaterial capabilities such as laboratories, research centers, testing and production facilities, a skilled workforce, and a cumulative technological knowledge base (the stock of knowledge acquired through previous projects).82 Without such absorptive capacity, the imitator will have to develop an advanced industrial, technological, and scientific base before it can copy foreign technologies. In the next two sections, we explain how the increase in complexity has created massive and highly specific requirements for those seeking to imitate advanced weapon systems.Military technology too specialized for fast catch upGilli and Gilli 2019, Andrea Gilli senior researcher at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense College in Rome, Italy and Mauro Gilli senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 2019, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage”, International Security Volume 43 | Issue 3 | Winter 2018/19 p.141-189, Posted Online February 15, 2019 , accessed 8/13/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***FROM GENERIC TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTSSince the second industrial revolution, the absorptive capacity required to imitate foreign technology has become so specific that countries can no longer exploit their civilian industries to catch up technologically in the military realm. This change has further raised the entry barriers for imitating advanced weapon systems.generic requirements. In the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, manufacturing benefited from unprecedented and possibly unique synergies and economies of scope.102 The relatively low level of technological complexity imposed fairly loose requirements, permitting the adoption across different industries of the same machine tools, the same industrial processes, and the same know-how.103 For instance, problems related to automobile production were “not fundamentally different from those which had already been developed for products such as bicycles and sewing machines.”104 As a result, “the skills acquired in producing sewing machines and bicycles greatly facilitated the production of the automobile.”105 With mass production, the opportunities for synergies and economies of scope among different industries expanded even further.106 Automobile manufacturers during World War I could easily enter the business of aircraft and tank production by exploiting their existing industrial facilities and know-how.107 Within a year of starting to produce aircraft engines, Rolls-Royce was delivering a very reliable and high-performing engine (the “Eagle”). Similarly, during the war, the company adapted its “Silver Ghost” chassis, the same used by King George, into an armored car that proved effective during the British campaign in the Middle Eastern desert.108 Even during World War II, when the level of complexity of military technology was substantially higher than during World War I, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to convert their civilian manufacturing activities to military production at a pace and to a degree that would be unimaginable today109 As Richard Overy summarizes, “Manufacturing technically complex weapons … [such as] heavy bombers … with the methods used for Cadillacs … ultimately proved amenable.”110specific requirements. Opportunities for synergies and economies of scope, however, have diminished dramatically.111 Weapon systems increasingly rely on extremely advanced technologies, such as data fusion or stealth, that in many cases have no application in the commercial sector. At the same time, they operate under uniquely demanding environmental and operational conditions (e.g., flying at Mach 2). The resulting large number of subtle and challenging technical problems has led to an exponential increase in the required degree of accuracy.112 Consequently, imitators can no longer exploit their existing technological and industrial capabilities to assimilate foreign military technology: the absorptive capacity requirements have become progressively more specific.113 By “specific,” we mean that the laboratories, research centers, testing and production facilities, skilled workforce, and the cumulative technological knowledge base developed for a particular type of production cannot be easily redeployed for assimilating and exploiting foreign know-how and experience in weapon systems.114Espionage alone can’t overcome these barriersGilli and Gilli 2019, Andrea Gilli senior researcher at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense College in Rome, Italy and Mauro Gilli senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 2019, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage”, International Security Volume 43 | Issue 3 | Winter 2018/19 p.141-189, Posted Online February 15, 2019 , accessed 8/13/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***One could argue that through reverse engineering, industrial espionage, or cyber espionage, an imitating country could skip the design and development stages and manufacture a foreign weapon system using its existing industrial base. This argument ignores a key constraint: the increase in complexity has also made manufacturing processes more specific and possibly unique. Because of the requirements that military platforms need to meet, today's production processes must achieve stringent levels of precision that are alien to most industries.123 For instance, the low observability to radar of stealth aircraft will be compromised if “the heads of [just] three screws [are] not quite tight and extend … above the surface by less than an eighth of an inch.”124 In the words of the F-117 Nighthawk's program manager, “In building the stealth fighter, we had to tightrope walk between extreme care and Swiss-watch perfection to match the low radar observability of our original computerized shape.”125 In turn, developing, updating, and preserving this type of manufacturing skill calls for highly specific training, practices, and processes. In the shipbuilding industry, workers across all technical skills require “6–8 years to reach at least 90 percent of optimum productivity.”126The unique requirements of manufacturing weapon systems go well beyond skills and processes. Take, for example, machine tools. In the early twentieth century, as discussed earlier, disparate fields such as the automobile and sewing machine industries used the same machine tools. In contrast, since the end of World War II, the production of military aircraft engines has relied on machine tools with a degree of precision that no commercial company possesses or needs.127 For its part, the U.S. Navy has developed propellers that dramatically reduce the acoustic signature of its submarines.128 With help from the John Walker spy ring, the Soviet Union obtained information about how to manufacture U.S. propellers.129 Their production, however, required computer-controlled milling machines with a degree of accuracy that Soviet machines could not achieve.130 In short, the Soviets could not rely on their existing capabilities to exploit the information they had obtained through industrial espionage.131Technological KnowledgeThe second condition for the advantage of imitation requires that imitating countries acquire, relatively easily and quickly, the technological knowledge of how to design, develop, and/or manufacture a given military platform, so that they can take advantage of the innovator's advances before the platform becomes obsolete.132 The increase in the complexity of military technology, however, has made technological knowledge increasingly tacit and organizational in nature, which means that it does not diffuse to other countries either easily or quickly.Regardless of how advanced a country's industrial, scientific, and technological base is, the production of new military platforms requires work at the design, development, and manufacturing stages aimed at anticipating, identifying, and addressing inherent idiosyncrasies. These idiosyncrasies stem from the challenges related to the integration of state-of-the-art components, subsystems, and systems, as well as from having the platform operate under previously unexplored environmental conditions. As the director of Lockheed's Skunk Works division, Chief Engineer Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, recalled when discussing the SR-71, “Everything about the aircraft had to be invented. Everything.”133 We argue that the technological knowledge related to the production of advanced military platforms such as the SR-71 does not diffuse easily, because such knowledge is embedded in the organizational memory of the defense company that produced it.FROM CODIFIED TO TACIT KNOWLEDGEOver the past century and a half, weapons production has changed dramatically, as indicated by the increase in the development time of weapon systems from a few months to several years and even decades.134 As noted previously, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, innovations were the results of conjecture, creativity, ingenuity, and intuition (and sometimes of just plain luck or accidents).135 This meant that the knowledge of how to produce a given technology was relatively simple; it could be written down in terms of principles and rules—it was codifiable. Codifiability permitted the spread of knowledge. Because of the growing complexity of weapons systems, however, innovations have become the product of extensive prototyping, testing, experimentation, and refinement: as a result of this change, knowledge related to a given weapon system has become increasingly less codifiable—it has become tacit. As former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and coauthors have noted, “Tacit knowledge is a route for maintaining a technological edge in military systems: what cannot be written down can hardly be stolen.”136codifiable knowledge. During the immediate aftermath of the second industrial revolution, the knowledge behind most innovations was relatively simple: their logic and functioning were directly observable and understandable.137 As such, an innovation generally carried within itself the very know-how related to its production process.138 The simplicity of such know-how, in turn, allowed for the innovation's codification, and hence promoted its diffusion. This is what happened, for example, in manufacturing.In the mid-nineteenth century, the implicit knowledge of skilled craftsmen was partially codified, allowing semi-skilled workers to perform the manual tasks associated with the emergence of mechanized, standardized manufacturing of interchangeable parts.139 This trend was later reinforced with the development of the assembly line, which relied on the simplicity of the processes involved, and thus “the worker's implicit knowledge had to be made explicit.”140 Implicit knowledge was “gathered and analyzed” to permit the fragmentation of work into a multitude of extremely simple tasks.141 Beginning in the 1910s, the organizational and technical principles of the assembly line and mass production were codified in articles and books.142 The Ford Motor Company, the pioneer of the assembly line, also contributed to the codification of such knowledge when it decided to “have any part of its commercial, managerial or mechanical practice given full and unrestricted publicity in print.”143 Ford's transparency facilitated the diffusion of mass production processes to other industries.144A similar trend occurred with the emergence of modern science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as scientists began to understand, explain, systematize, and codify the body of knowledge developed by practitioners and on which many industrial processes were based.145 As a result of the progress of modern science and of its diffusion, implicit knowledge was translated into explicit knowledge, thus reducing and, in many cases, negating the advantages enjoyed by early innovators.146tacit knowledge. Because of the increase in the complexity of military technology, the technological knowledge of how to design, develop, and produce a given weapon system has become increasingly tacit. Tacit knowledge cannot be codified.147 It entails knowledge derived mostly from experience and hence is retained by people and organizations: for this reason, it does not diffuse either easily or quickly.148 Indeed, “the most effective way of [transferring tacit knowledge], despite telephone, video and other remote methods, is face-to-face interaction.“149 To replicate a given weapon system, an imitator needs direct access to the innovator's tacit knowledge—that is, access to the very people who worked on the system.150 Otherwise, it will struggle to figure out what each part does, the requirements it is intended to meet, how to produce it, and how it is connected to other components—in other words, its design, development, and production know-how.151 Moreover, disassembling a military platform into smaller components to observe and understand its functioning has become significantly more challenging. Today many weapon systems, such as jet fighters, ”comprise highly integrated subsystems that are extremely difficult (if not impossible) to decompose into independent modules.“152 The introduction of electronics has reinforced this trend, as the functioning of software is governed not by observable physical laws (in contrast, for example, to aerodynamics), but by the software's internal correctness and its perfect integration with the weapon system's hardware.153Three factors explain why design, development, and production know-how have become largely tacit. First, today designers, engineers, managers, and specialized workers face an infinite number of decisions, each entailing inherent trade-offs: from the choice among alternative designs; to the choice among different components, their materials, and their technical properties; to choices about manufacturing techniques and procedures.154 Identifying the most appropriate choices and solutions relies heavily on experience, judgment calls, and educated guesses—all of which are, by definition, tacit.155 As Marco Iansiti notes, “An employee with thirty years' experience in manufacturing will probably recognize that one design detail will be easier to manufacture than another, but she or he might not be able to articulate exactly why.“156 In fact, many choices are shaped by a subtle knowledge and understanding of existing capabilities, suppliers, and technical properties (e.g., ease of production or maintenance as well the availability of components); by idiosyncratic cultural, environmental, or operational needs; or by contingent factors within the development process (some problems can be solved without redesigning the whole platform).157 It follows that some of these choices might not be intuitive or rational. Hence, they might be hard to understand by people who have not directly participated in the process that led to them.158Second, identifying appropriate choices and solutions entails extensive experimentation, manipulation, prototyping, testing, and refinement (including a lot of tinkering) with constant back-and-forth among teams of designers, engineers, managers, and specialized workers. This process allows those involved in the production of a given weapon system to explore different options and potential solutions for the many kinds of problems encountered in such work and thus to understand what works and what does not.159 Because such knowledge is developed in a disorganized as opposed to systematized way, writing it down in terms of general rules and principles is extremely difficult, if not impossible.160 Consequently, the very act of developing this knowledge cannot be separated from the knowledge itself, because it reflects the personal experiences of those involved in each stage of production.161Third, even if a country had access to all the blueprints and designs of a given weapon system, many crucial aspects would still be lacking, because “the best efforts to describe complex technologies … cannot capture all of the details that engineers and technicians understand.”162 In modern weapon systems, relatively small details, such as the specific weight of fasteners or the chemical composition of rubber valves, can create huge operational challenges, possibly compromising the reliability and even survival of the platform.163 For this reason, just one of the many possible problems that weapons development entails can slow down and possibly even prevent a country from replicating a foreign weapon system, even when it has full access to blueprints and designs.164 For example, in the 1990s and in 2005, the U.S. Navy failed repeatedly to reproduce its material to refurbish its nuclear warheads—codenamed “Fogbanks”—because there were “few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s and almost all the staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency.”165 The Navy eventually succeeded, but only after ten years of extensive work and an expenditure of more than $90 million.166 From this experience, the U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded that “assumptions such as ‘we did it before so we can do it again’ are often wrong.”167F22 Proves Chinese Espionage fails to deliver military tech parityGilli and Gilli 2019, Andrea Gilli senior researcher at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense College in Rome, Italy and Mauro Gilli senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 2019, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage”, International Security Volume 43 | Issue 3 | Winter 2018/19 p.141-189, Posted Online February 15, 2019 , accessed 8/13/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***access to foreign technological knowledge. Unlike Imperial Germany and its efforts to imitate the Dreadnought battleship, China has benefited from massive access to foreign technological knowledge in its attempt to imitate U.S. advanced jet fighters.China has engaged more extensively in cyber espionage than any other country.275 In 2007, 2009, and 2011, Chinese hackers entered the servers of the Pentagon and gained access to some fifty terabytes of data containing the designs and blueprints of U.S. stealth fighters, as well as other critical information.276 China has also relied extensively on traditional industrial espionage, including the recruitment of former engineers and scientists who worked for Western aerospace organizations.277 Together, industrial and cyber espionage have given China extensive access to American know-how. Moreover, China managed to obtain an F-117 that crashed in Serbia in 1999, allowing it to inspect, analyze, and possibly reverse engineer the aircraft's stealth features.278Further, since the 1960s, China has benefited from significant transfers of technology from more advanced countries.279 In the 1970s, it had access to turbofan engines developed by Rolls-Royce.280 In the 1980s, Israel provided extensive “weapon-making know-how” useful in the design, fire control, avionics, and radar capabilities of China's fourth-generation aircraft.281 Through Pakistan, China gained access to U.S. F-16 Fighting Falcon jet fighters.282 After the end of the Cold War, China signed an agreement with Pakistan to coproduce Pakistan's fourth-generation fighter, itself the result of a co-production project with the American Grumman Aerospace Corporation (the F-7P Sabre II “Super 7”);283 it also reached a licensing agreement with Russia for the production of its fourth-generation aircraft (the Sukhoi Su-27).284 Russian experts have also provided Chinese workers and engineers “with the know-how to assemble Su-27 fighter aircraft using imported materials and equipment,” and have trained them to “domestically manufacture key materials.”285 China has also been purchasing engines, radars, and other systems and subsystems from abroad in order to analyze and possibly replicate them.286outcome. Nevertheless, China's aerospace industry has struggled enormously to imitate U.S. technology. In 2017, China commissioned the J-20 Black Eagle, a step that many analysts viewed as the end of the U.S. monopoly on fifth-generation fighters.287 Yet, serious doubts persist about whether the performance of the J-20 comes even close to that of the F-22. In fact, anonymous Chinese sources have admitted that China rushed the J-20 into service in response to increasing tensions in the South China Sea, despite capability gaps that make it inferior to the F-22.288First, because of design similarities between the U.S. F-22 and the Chinese J-20, many observers have concluded that China has been able to quickly replicate U.S. technology.289 A closer examination suggests otherwise. The J-20 displays several design flaws and non-stealthy features on the sides and in the rear of the fighter that dramatically increase its detectability to both radar and thermal sensors.290 These limitations would represent a critical liability in air-to-air engagements with U.S. fifth-generation jet fighters.291 Moreover, the J-20 displays two small wing projections (canards) forward of the main wings. Generally intended to help the longitudinal equilibrium, and static and dynamic stability, of an aircraft, the canards also increase its frontal radar cross section, thus limiting its overall capabilities.292 From an industrial perspective, that the J-20 carries canards suggests poor design.293 As noted, little can be done about poor designs, which, once adopted, can be improved only marginally294 These flaws and features convey a more important message: China has been unable to fully copy U.S. stealth designs and technology. Instead, it has had to engage in extensive experimentation, prototyping, and refinement, inevitably encountering problems in the process.295Second, China has faced enormous challenges in developing one of the most important systems of modern jet fighters—powerful and reliable thrust-vectoring turbofan engines capable of supercruise. According to experts, this failing represents probably “the most glaring weakness of China's aviation industry.”296 For this reason, China has so far relied on compromises. For its early prototypes, from 2010 to 2017, it relied on Russian underpowered engines that provide neither supercruise nor thrust-vectoring capabilities and that left a visible trail.297 Subsequently, China decided to commission the J-20 into service by mounting indigenous but older and underpowered engines that also lack supercruise and thrust-vectoring capabilities.298 This solution was intended to be temporary while work on the engines originally intended for the J-20 continued. These more advanced engines have experienced “critical problems,” however, including an explosion during a ground test in 2015.299 According to an anonymous source, as of 2018, “engineers ha[d] failed to find the key reason for the[se] problems,“300 and apparently ”there [was] no fundamental solution to overcome [them].“301 In November 2018, China switched back to Russian engines for three of the four J-20s that performed at the biannual Airshow China in Zhuhai—an event China uses to showcase its aerospace accomplishments. This decision suggests that the ”temporary“ indigenous engines are not deemed very reliable.302China's struggle to indigenously develop aircraft engines thus throws into question the growing belief among observers that China has closed the military-technological gap with the United States with respect to fifth-generation fighters.303 Possibly more important, it also illustrates that the advantages of imitation that China has enjoyed have inevitably been limited. As mentioned earlier, several factors significantly facilitated China's efforts to develop turbofan engines; and from 2010 to 2015, it spent some $22 billion to develop an indigenous engine for its combat aircraft.304 Yet, as of 2019, it continues to struggle.305 According to an executive with a Chinese engine manufacturer, “The road to success is filled with setbacks and failures,” and far from being able to take a shortcut, China has experienced the same problems of “each of the world's engine powers.”306 It is unknown how Chinese engines will perform and when they will be operational.307 According to defense industry experts Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas Mahnken, and Andrew Ross, they “lag one to two generations behind leading international competitors, and the near-term prospects of narrowing this gap are poor.”308 In fact, the engine China is developing might not be sufficiently powerful to make the J-20 a “viable … air combat fighter.”309Third, military experts agree that China is also lagging in another key realm of fifth-generation fighters—avionics.310 China's difficulties in this realm stem from the fact that aerospace sensors and software development currently pose some of the most daunting engineering challenges.311 Software problems, in fact, are very difficult to anticipate: testing and refining must continue until the software is perfected, given that when the aerospace software fails, it fails “cat-astrophically.”312 Because China has thus far been unable to copy U.S. aircraft design and engines, there is little reason to believe that it has been more successful in this much more challenging realm. An additional consideration supports this assessment. The complexity of modern aerospace software is unprecedented.313 Flight control software has become exponentially more complex, eliminating trade-offs in design—for example, between observability to radar and aerodynamic efficiency. In other words, complexity has moved from hardware to software.314 In addition, software has taken over an increasing number of more complex functions—most prominently, automatic long-range enemy detection, geolocation, high-confidence identification, and accurate target tracking.315 Little information is available on Chinese radar operation and data-fusion capabilities, but we can use available evidence on Chinese flight control as a proxy. This proxy is valid, because developing flight control software is far less demanding than software for radar operation and data fusion.316 According to Chinese media, the J-20 still faces problems with its flight control software. There is thus little reason to believe that China has been able to develop the most challenging part of the J-20s' onboard software.317Fourth, the difficulties that China has encountered with the development of less advanced fourth-generation fighters further corroborate our argument. Despite the significant transfer of technology and support that China has received from Russia, Israel, and various European countries, its industry has struggled in this domain.318 For instance, in 2004 China suddenly broke a licensing agreement with Russia on the Sukhoi Su-27, with the aim of exploiting the experience it had already gained to produce independently an indigenous version, the Shenyang J-11.319 The production process did not go smoothly, however. For example, at “one point the [Chinese engines] were reportedly requiring overhauls every thirty hours of flight time, compared to four hundred hours for … the Su-27.”320 Similarly, according to U.S. sources, some variants of this aircraft have been “in big trouble,” as technical malfunctions have led to several crash landings.321 Additionally, in 2016 China bought twenty-four new, heavily upgraded derivatives of the very aircraft it had copied from Russia (the Sukhoi Su-35).322 Although we do not know the reasons for this purchase, it is further indicative of China's inability to produce a copy of this aircraft—or even a more advanced one such as fifth-generation jet fighters.323 China has experienced similar problems with its carrier-based fighter aircraft, the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, a reverse-engineered version of a Russian fighter (the Sukhoi Su-33) that is more than thirty years old and that China purchased from Ukraine.324 Because of the thrust constraints of its engine, the J-15 can take off from an aircraft carrier ski-jump with only half a fuel load or with only four missiles, thus limiting either its range or its capabilities.325 Even the Chinese media criticized it as a “flopping fish.”326 Because of recurrent fatal accidents and crashes, China recently decided to look for a replacement for this aircraft.327Fifth, China has derived only limited cost and time advantages from its imitation efforts. According to Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, it is “reasonable to assume the J-20 has a unit cost of somewhere from US$100-to-$120 million … By contrast, the F-22 costs around US$143 million per plane.“328 These estimates show that China has derived a cost advantage of just 14 to 20 percent, which is hardly impressive given that China is the country that has relied most extensively on both industrial and cyber espionage, and that has benefited massively from the transfer of technology through FDI, mergers and acquisitions, and the purchase of foreign components. Such a cost advantage is even less impressive given that the F-22 is now twelve years old, that the J-20 has significant deficiencies, and that its costs will inevitably increase further as China attempts to fix its problems and improve its performance. The latter point is critical, because ”the final 10 percent striving towards maximum perfection costs 40% of the total expenditure on most projects.“329 The same is true with regard to time. The F-22 became operational in 2005—about twenty years after the project started.330 Launched in the late 1990s and tested in 2010, the J-20 was officially commissioned in the fall of 2017.331 Still, it is not yet fully operational and remains inferior to the F-22 on several dimensions: in other words, after more than twenty years, China has not yet closed the gap with the United States.332A skeptical reader might wonder whether a more advanced country would have accomplished better results than China in imitating the F-22. The hardest case for our theory would be if the imitating country had the same aerospace capabilities as the United States and if it had access to all the technological knowledge related to the F-22. This case exists. In 2011, the U.S. government interrupted production of the F-22. In 2017, the U.S. Air Force commissioned a study to understand how much it would cost to restart production. In other words, the United States wanted to know what it would take to copy its own technology from just six years before. The findings are sobering: the same country that created the F-22 would have to spend $10 billion to restart the production of its fifth-generation fighter—equivalent to 25 percent of the total procurement cost for 194 aircraft.333In sum, over the past twenty years, China has made impressive accomplishments in modernizing its aerospace industry. Given the extent to which it has benefited from globalization and cyber espionage, however, the evidence casts serious doubt on the claim that these two factors have brought about a revolutionary transformation that makes the imitation of foreign weapon systems much easier than it used to be.334Wolf AmendmentWolf Amendment here to stayRonci ‘18, Robert Jay. "Dividing heaven: investigating the influence of the US ban on cooperation with China on the development of global outer space governance." Master's thesis, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, ?s, 2018, , accessed 8/20/19 tog, p.42-44 "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***An interesting aspect of the Wolf amendment is that it must be renewed every year. Each annual budget requires new legislation to determine how each government program will be funded. However, due to the highly complex and politically challenging process of negotiating how government funding is disbursed, congress generally prefers to amend the previous year’s bill rather than re-writing the spending bill entirely. In this process, previously passed amendments are carried over and renewed in the next year’s budget if no congressman takes the initiative to remove them. NASA administrator Bolden stated that collaboration with China was inevitable (Selding, 2015b), indicating a tacit expectation that once the Wolf amendment’s author and primary supporter had retired, the amendment would likely fail to be renewed in the next budget bill. However, this expectation was imperative on Congressman Wolf’s successor holding different views.Instead, his successor as Chair of the committee was, and continues to be, Representative John Culberson. Culberson not only shares Wolf’s opinions on China, but he had also attempted to introduce a predecessor of Wolf’s amendment in 2010 (Culberson, 2010). Regarding his stance on the Wolf amendment Culberson stated, “I intend to vigorously enforce the longstanding prohibitions designed to protect America’s space program.” (Smith, 2015). Thus, despite Wolf’s departure, his amendment has continued to remain in effect as those Congressmen responsible for NASA’s budget continue to support it. Rather than diminishing in influence as Bolden had 43 predicted, the most recent proposed draft of the amendment includes a major new restriction. Released on May 8th of 2018, this version adds the newly recommissioned National Space Council to the list of government bodies restricted from conducting bilateral dialogue without congressional approval (Committee on Appropriations, 2018). So instead of trending towards fading away, the amendment is trending towards increased restrictions. This suggests that without a major political shift, the Wolf amendment will remain in place for the foreseeable future.However, such political change may be on the horizon. The mid-term election of November 2018 could usher a Democratic majority into congress for the first time since the Wolf amendment originally passed into law. This would cause a change in subcommittee leadership, and potentially install a Representative with fewer reservations about collaboration with China. Under these circumstances, the Wolf amendment could potentially be removed in the next appropriations bill cycle. However, it is unclear how much resistance to this change would persist even with a change in appropriations subcommittee leadership. Furthermore, even if the Wolf amendment were to be removed, its influence may continue for at least the remainder of the Trump administration.In April 2018, congress narrowly voted to accept Representative Jim Bridenstine as the new NASA administrator. During his tenure in congress, Bridenstine expressed concerns over China’s plans in space and his support of the Wolf amendment. In a 2016 congressional testimony, Bridenstine critiqued the Obama administration’s policies toward China, and expressed support for Representative Wolf’s legislation: “Unfortunately, NASA under this Administration seems more focused on forcing partnership with China than in maintaining our leadership. Former Chairman Frank Wolf was a leader on, and our country is grateful for his work. He first codified restrictions on cooperation with China in space. On top of their belligerent space activity, China is run by a brutal regime that imprisons dissidents and persecutes minorities. State-sponsored cyber-crimes have robbed our companies of billions of dollars of intellectual property, doing untold damage to our economy. When does it stop is the question?” (Losing to China?, 2016) As NASA administrator, Bridenstine has vowed to compete, rather than cooperate, with China in space activities (Huang, 2017). If the principles of the Wolf amendment reside with the 44 administrator of NASA, then it is unlikely that an appeal of the amendment would do much to ignite a more cooperative relationship with China. Additionally, mistrust of China is common throughout congress (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2018b). A recent congressional proposal to label American university-based Confucius institutes as foreign operators shows that current misgivings toward the Chinese government remain strong in U.S. political circles (AllenEbrahimian, 2018a). Thus, it is unlikely that there exists strong congressional support to create new working ties between the U.S. and China in space activities. Based on these findings, it is likely that the Wolf amendment’s restrictions will continue at least through the Trump Presidency. A key point remains that the Wolf amendment is only a small part of a much larger relationship dynamic between the U.S. and Chinese space programs, much less the U.S.-China relationship as a whole. It is additionally not the only legislation that bars cooperation between U.S. and Chinese space entities. Thus, to better identify and understand how the Wolf amendment impacts the larger system of global space governance, it is necessary to evaluate the broader U.S. – China space relationship.Squo Space Policy BadSquo Space Policy MyopicFabian 2019, Christopher David, graduate US Air Force Academy 2013 – dissertation submitted for Masters of Science at University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455, , p4-5, tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In the years since the Cold War, the United States has largely failed to integrate space policy and national strategy. American politicians have tended to focus on replicating Kennedy’s grand vision of space travel and mirroring his nationalist rhetoric to score political victories rather than focusing on the mechanics of competitive strategy. President Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative and the 2004 Bush space vision fell hopelessly short of stated goals while American strategists became increasingly myopic, concentrating on the tactical military utility of space systems at the expense of other aspects of national power.15 The counterproductivity of the U.S. space policy can be exemplified with three post-Cold War initiatives: withdrawing from the ABM treaty, export control legislation, and space dominance doctrine.16American strategic planners during the Cold War had the luxury of operating in a bipolar environment where multi-order effects could ultimately be accounted for in the context of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power. However, with an increasingly complex geopolitical environment in which China is emerging as the United States’ primary competitor and the rest of the world is developing parity with American technological capabilities, U.S. strategy must become more economical. It is of vital importance that the core tenants of competitive strategy be applied to the development of a similarly effective strategy in East Asia. 17. This must be accomplished while avoiding the common pitfall of fighting the previous war. 18 The space domain is a microcosm of the broader strategic picture, one that is becoming increasingly complex, with more states fielding space capabilities, rapid technological advancements, the rising importance of space as an element of national power, and the meteoric rise of China. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine space policy in order to integrate it with a competitive strategy for East Asia.US vulnerable because of loss of space leadership to ChinaDean Cheng ‘18, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “In a War With China, the U.S. Could Lose”, November 19, 2018, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Taking a more expansive view of security than the National Defense Strategy Commission, but also more specifically focused on China, this year’s U.S.-China Commission report highlights several new threats arising from China’s economic and security policies.The report’s very first finding, for example, is that “China’s state-led, market-distorting economic model presents a challenge to U.S. economic and national security interests.” Chinese economic policies place foreign firms at a disadvantage due to Beijing’s financial and political backing for its companies. Indeed, state influence over the economy is growing, rather than shrinking.Meanwhile, the report concludes, the modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has increased China’s ability to militarily challenge the United States. Like the National Defense Strategy Commission report, the U.S.-China Commission report calls into question the American assumption that it could secure air, maritime, and information dominance in an Asian conflict.Indeed, the report flatly states, “with the advances made by the [People’s Liberation Army] Air Force, the United States and its allies and partners can no longer assume achieving air superiority in an Indo-Pacific conflict.”The report also concludes that growing U.S. reliance on China for information and communications technology, especially as it relates to the “Internet of Things,” is creating potential vulnerabilities to American critical infrastructure. In particular, the scale of Chinese state support for the creation of 5G networks and technology creates “enormous economic, security, supply chain, and data privacy risks for the United States.”These reports independently confirm what The Heritage Foundation had separately concluded—that the U.S. military is far weaker than is commonly appreciated. As the 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength notes, “as currently postured, the U.S. military is only marginally able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.”All of these reports conclude that under-investment in research and development, limited innovation, and sustained engagement in the Middle East have left the United States far more vulnerable than is generally recognized, especially in the face of China and Russia’s sustained efforts to catch up.LinkSBSPChina will use SBSP to gain hegemony through both tactical maneuverability & dominance over energy markets Peter Garretson, July 1, 2019, Peter Garretson is an independent strategy consultant who focuses on space and defense. He was previously the director of Air University’s Space Horizons Task Force, America’s think tank for space, and was deputy director of America’s premier space strategy program, the Schriever Scholars, “Why the next Space Policy Directive needs to be to the Secretary of Energy” accessed 8/31/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***At the center of China’s plans to surpass the United States as the leading spacepower by 2045 are vast ambitions for space energy dominance. China’s military has already begun a peacetime strategic offensive to secure a position of energy dominance. Within this grand plan are four separate initiatives that demand a response:Energy maneuverability dominance using space sourced propellantGlobal energy dominance with space solar power and space power beamingDeep space maneuver advantage with nuclear propulsionFusion energy advantage with helium-3While there is significant capability within both NASA and the DoD, the majority of our nation’s expertise that can be brought to bear to respond to the People’s Republic of China’s peacetime military offensive lies within our Department of Energy. To secure America’s continuing advantage in the space domain, the President must tap the Secretary of Energy to develop (in concert with NASA and the US Space Force) an immediate and sustained response to secure space energy dominance. To ensure continued focus, the DoE must reorganize internally and sit on the National Space Council.Energy maneuverability dominance using space sourced propellantUS Air Force fighter pilot John Boyd was the first to introduce the concept of Energy Maneuverability Theory as an explanation of maneuver advantage. Reducing energy costs are key to reducing cost and time to market for in-space transport of materials for in-space construction. Energy maneuverability advantage is also key to both combat advantage and military logistical advantage. There are certain positions within the Earth-Moon system that provide significant maneuver advantage. The ability to source rocket fuel from the Moon or asteroids is a significant force multiplier. The lunar poles are equivalent to forward coaling stations during our nation’s naval expansion, and propellant depots offer force extension analogous to aerial refueling. The PRC’s strategically wise push to secure access to the “great lakes”of frozen water ice (600 million metric tons) must be met in kind with our own national resolve to access lunar propellant to build on-orbit propellant depots and refuelers.The newly formed US Space Command is already behind the PRC in lacking its own peacetime strategic military offensive, and will be derelict in its duty if it does not immediately specify the requirements to the Pentagon’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council and National Space Council for space-sourced propellant, in-space refueling, and in-space transport to meet the PRC challenge.As a remedy for this situation, the Administration should task the Secretary of Energy to coordinate with the NASA Administrator, Commandant of the US Space Force, and Secretary of Commerce, to build a plan to retire all technical risk for a cryogenic hydrogen/oxygen propellant depot with reversible fuel cells for electrolysis, and a parallel plan for a Lunar Industrial Facility (LIF) to produce and launch the required water-ice to replenish it. The plan should establish goals and standards for refueling of reusable lunar landers.Global energy dominance with space solar power and space power beamingCentral to the PRC’s plans is to develop the technology to build extremely large on-orbit power stations capable of capturing gigawatts of power and beaming it to Earth and anywhere in the Earth-Moon system. Even at the megawatt class planned for their 2030 prototype, this is a game-changing dual-use technology. The United States at present has, at most, 100 kilowatts of power on the International Space Station.The DOE program should seek, via public-private partnerships, to retire the technical risk toward commercially viable utility-scale space solar power.The tactical threat, though, pales in significance to the strategic threat. The PRC’s strategic plan to usurp US hegemonic power is to create—through sustained national effort—the technology to build solar power satellites, and then to use the material from the Moon to build them cheaply to become the major supplier of Earth-based energy. Power that is city-baseload appropriate, that can scale to the entirety of global demand, that can be sent anywhere on Earth as needed, and that is 100 percent green and non-carbon producing will be attractive to most nations. Today the Persian Gulf and the few chokepoints for oil are the strategic center, with the key energy producers—the US, Russia, OPEC—having substantial coercive power. If the PRC succeeds in its plans, it will be the major energy supplier to planet Earth, and with that, enormous economic power to force others to submit to their geopolitical designs.To meet this strategic challenge, the administration should task the Secretary of Energy, at a minimum, to maintain parity and seek strategic advantage with respect to commercial space solar power and beamed energy production. This program should not look like the DOE’s fusion science program, which has no timeline or goal for commercial energy production. Rather, the DOE program should seek, via public-private partnerships, to retire the technical risk toward commercially viable utility-scale space solar power.Central to this goal should be a companion and parallel strategy to develop multiple public-private partnerships at a Lunar Industrial Facility (LIF) with the goal of mining, benefacting, and launching 90 percent of the structural mass required to build a prototype megawatt-class solar power satellite prototype in geostationary orbit ahead of the PRC plans for 2035—the aim should be a 100-megawatt facility in GEO by 2034.Allowing China to lead on SBSP would let it dominate the energy market – leading to world dominationMalcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 2 Apr 2019, “Space-Based Solar Power and 21st-Century Geopolitical Competition”, accessed 8/31/18 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***China is now indicating a desire to develop an SSPS capability in coming decades, emphasising a gradual approach of developing larger and more powerful satellites that are assembled in orbit by large space-based 3D printers. Using on-orbit manufacturing reduces the challenges of transporting large structures from earth into space. China’s investment in heavy-lift launch vehicles like the Long March IX, which will carry 140 tons into low-earth orbit, and its accelerating development of reusable rockets and spaceplanes, as well as the growth of its commercial space sector, could also support a Chinese SSPS network.The timetable for developing this capability, originally published in China’s Science and Technology Daily, extends through the next decade. Work has already begun on building a ground station in Chongqing to receive the microwave energy gathered by the SSPS. The next step is to test the system using high-altitude ‘stratospheric’ solar power balloons between 2021 and 2025, and then deployment of the first space-based SSPS in the second half of the next decade. The goal would be to construct megawatt-class satellites by 2030, and gigawatt-class satellites before 2050, which could weigh up to 1,000 tons.With on-orbit manufacturing for building large structures, the raw materials would need to come from mining lunar regolith rather than from earth. That ties in with China’s plans for a lunar base by the 2030s.China’s interest in pursuing SSPS has some significant geopolitical implications for 21st-century energy competition. Fundamentally, the country that achieves a viable SSPS network first can potentially reshape global energy markets and, in turn, have much greater control over economic activity on earth from space.I’ve noted previously that China has been promoting a ‘space Silk Road’ via its Beidou global navigation system to states that have signed up to its Belt and Road Initiative. That campaign appears to be designed to deepen those states’ dependency on China as a provider of information infrastructure provider. Adding an energy dimension would dramatically deepen Chinese control of any recipient society. China’s SSPS would be promoted as contributing towards interdependent co-development—the ‘win–win’ rhetoric of China’s foreign ministry—as well as easing dependency on fossil fuels that contribute to climate change. However, there’s no disguising the fact that it would be China that provides the energy to keep recipient states prosperous. That implies serious political leverage.A Chinese SSPS network would also need large rectenna farms at key locations to receive the beamed energy from orbit and then distribute it to local grids. Such facilities would clearly be critical infrastructure, constructed and operated by China within recipient states. That would further deepen Chinese investment and influence in BRI states.China isn’t the only country looking at this technology. Japan has made SSPS part of its future space exploration vision, though on a much smaller scale, and India has also expressed an interest in the concept. If it becomes clear that China is serious about SSPS and it makes significant progress in coming years, the U.S. is unlikely to sit back and accept that China will lead in this new technology. To do so would give Beijing global energy dominance by the middle of the 21st century.In the 1970s, SSPS foundered on its inability to compete with cheaper terrestrial technologies—albeit ones that led to the global climate change challenge we face today. Now, 50 years later, while there’s growing interest in a second look at SSPS, the U.S. isn’t leading the charge. Instead, it is focused on developing renewable technologies to meet its domestic energy demands and gradually phase out fossil fuels. Similar efforts are underway in Europe and other places, including Australia.Renewable technology is a highly diversified private-sector market. It’s not so easy for one state to dominate it. By contrast, SSPS would be a centrally controlled, state-based ‘big science’ endeavour that can be more easily exploited for geopolitical and astropolitical purposes. Renewable energy technology may offer part of the solution, but it doesn’t necessarily cancel out China’s potential to use SSPS for hegemonic influence.What emerges is the possibility of strategic jostling between competing approaches for ensuring 21st-century energy security and economic prosperity.Certainly, the U.S. and others can rise to the challenge. NASA has plans for a return to the lunar surface by 2024, and commercial space companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin emphasise a permanent lunar presence. That ‘moon first’ approach opens up the possibility of an SSPS race centred on ensuring access to the lunar ‘high ground’ to get the vital resources required for building large structures like satellites.EconCooperation will benefit China economically relative to the U.S.—inflates our deficit and undermines national securityMichael J. Listner, principle, Space Law and Policy Solutions and Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval War College, “Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation,” SPACE NEWS, 7—14—14, , accessed 2-29-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The same rationale applies to funding. Past cooperative efforts with geopolitical competitors has left the United States footing a substantial amount of the bill. Cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation have been and continue to be funded substantially by the United States with the other party to the cooperative agreement reaping most of the benefit. Projects such as the Apollo/Soyuz rendezvous mission during the Cold War and the current engagement with the international space station are examples where the United States has provided a disproportionate amount of funding. The current arrangement with the ISS in particular has seen the Russian Federation receiving substantial economic benefit from funding of modules, revenue generated from commercial activities, including space tourism, and revenue received from ferrying of NASA astronauts. It is conceivable that China would reap a similar economic benefit to the detriment of the United States in cooperative outer space activities. The likelihood is great that China would insist that any arrangement entered into be funded disproportionately by the United States. This in turn would take away from other programs, inflate the national deficit and even require more borrowing from China, which would have a cumulative effect on the national and economic security of the United States with little or no benefit.A strong space program bolsters China’s economy, CCP legitimacyMark A. Stokes and Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation, CHINA’S EVOLVING SPACE CAPABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and Project 2049 Institute, 4—26—12, p. 4. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made significant advances in its space program and is emerging as a space power. Senior leaders have established space as a national priority and are allocating significant resources toward enhancing the PRC’s space-related technology base. With preservation of its monopoly on power as an overriding goal, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bolsters its legitimacy through achievements in space. Policymakers view space power as one aspect of a broad international competition in comprehensive national strength and science and technology (S&T). Investments in space also serve as a stimulant for economic growth. The manned program in particular enhances CCP prestige and draws international attention to the country’s expanding technology base.China uses its space program to drive aerospace and defense exportsTate Nurkin, Senior Director, IHS Aerospace, Defense and Security Thought Leadership, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, sites/default/files/Nurkin%20Written%20Testimony%202%209%2015.pdf, accessed 4-15-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Before providing a more in-depth assessment of this active time for China’s space program , I first want to articulate two core assumptions. First, that China’s space program has several critical and generally consistent objectives driving its growth: prestige and supporting human advancement are important, of course, but the more fundamental goals are to support China’s comprehensive national development and the salutary objective of being the most technologically advanced country in the world by 2050. The program is also an important cog in China’s growing aerospace and defense export strategy. China is the seventh largest defense exporter in the world, according to IHS Jane’s--including exports of space technologies. It is increasingly seeking to establish export markets for its aerospace and defense products, less for the economic impact that these exports bring and more for the geopolitical influence and soft power they confer on China in countries that either hold natural resources or economic influence, border regional competitor India or are located in strategically vital region of the world. A cursory survey of active or planned space launches of foreign owned satellites in China includes launches on the behalf of Venezuela, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bolivia, Sri Lanka and Belarus while China has a long-standing space partnership with Brazil. China uses its space program to bolster its overall economyKevin Pollpeter, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson and Fan Yang, CHINA DREAM, SPACE DREAM: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, p. 19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In addition to military utility, China has also embraced its space program as a driver of economic and technological advancement. China’s 2006 space white paper states: “Since the space industry is an important part of the national overall development strategy, China will maintain long term, steady development in this field.” 91 China sees much potential in developing the space market. Revenue from the global space industry increased 7 percent to $304.31 billion in 2012. This is a 63 percent increase from $186.64 billion in 2005. Of this amount, 26 percent, or $78.44 billion, is made up of government space budgets, which increased just 1 percent in 2012. The largest portion of the space economy is commercial satellite services, which accounts for 38 percent of global space activity or $115.97 billion. This includes telecommunications, earth observation, and positioning services. China has identified four areas in which its space program brings economic benefits: 1) Creating a market for high technology; 2) The development of “spin-off” civilian technologies; 3) The use of satellite application technologies; and 4) The export of satellites and commercial launch services. Space activities bolster the Chinese economy—market creation and tech spinoffsKevin Pollpeter, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson and Fan Yang, CHINA DREAM, SPACE DREAM: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, p. 20. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***According to Chinese analysts, space has its most profound effect on high technology development, with investments in space technologies said to yield $10 in gross domestic product growth for every dollar spent. Space programs can be large endeavors requiring the participation of numerous government and commercial entities and involving many different technologies, including propulsion, electronics, computers, guidance, power supply, and materials. The demand created by space projects can spur advancement in computers, microelectronics, precision manufacturing, automatic control, new energy, and new materials. Chinese analysts point to the U.S. Apollo program as the best example of this, which is said to have led to advances in radar, radio-guidance, synthetic materials, computers, and biological engineering and laid a solid foundation for U.S. high-technology development and technology-based military innovation. Chinese analysts point to a similar effect in their country. China’s first computer was used to develop space technology. Of the 1,000 new materials developed in China, 80 percent are said to have resulted from research in space technology; and more than 2,000 space technology achievements have been reported in various sectors of the national economy and nearly 1,000 products developed by the space industry have been converted for civilian use. Finally, the work of the more than 3,000 enterprises involved in China’s human spaceflight program is said to have contributed to technological progress in electronics, new materials, and automatic control. The creation of markets for high technology products is also intended to support the development of China’s other strategic emerging industries through the introduction of spin off technologies―technologies originally developed for the space industry that have found a civilian application. This effort is conducted through eight industrial parks called “aerospace bases” formed through partnerships between the space industry and the governments of Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, Chengdu, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Shenzhen, and Hainan. These bases are not only designed to manufacture space products, but also to leverage the industry’s capabilities in space technologies to build civilian products. In doing so, the space industry focuses on technologies and products in areas identified as strategic emerging industries by the central government. These include high-end manufacturing, alternative energy, new materials, alternative energy automobiles, and new generation information technologies.Space power helps the Chinese economy—satellite applicationsKevin Pollpeter, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson and Fan Yang, CHINA DREAM, SPACE DREAM: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, p. 21. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***A second area where space can help improve the economy is in the satellite application market. Satellite application technologies refer to ancillary products designed to add value to the information provided by space technologies, such as satellite communications, remote sensing data, and satellite navigation products. Satellite communication applications include such services as satellite television and telephony. Remote sensing includes imagery of the earth in order to monitor agricultural use, environmental protection, or municipal planning. Satellite navigation products include satellite navigation receivers such as GPS receivers.Dual UseChina dual uses civilian space efforts to enhance military powerAlexander Bowe 2019, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States”, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, April 11, 2019, p. 4 accessed 8/13/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF), a new service of China’s armed forces established in late 2015, is responsible for most of the military’s space warfare mission alongside its responsibility for cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare.25 China’s military—especially the SSF and the Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department (EDD)—plays an important role in organizing and overseeing China’s space activities, meaning most of China’s ostensibly civilian space activities have dual-use applications. * 26 China’s space policy in effect allows Beijing to continue developing military space capabilities while publicly claiming to oppose militarization of space. 27 Both Beidou and GPS have capabilities that extend beyond civilian applications; for instance, Beidou has the potential to improve China’s missile guidance and ultimately reduce its reliance on GPS. 28 China’s activities with more direct military application include direct-ascent antisatellite missiles, which are capable of striking targets passing over China; co-orbital systems, or small space-based platforms that could be used for a variety of “rendezvous and proximity” counterspace missions; and advanced scramjet engines, which may be used in both hypersonic missiles and a future spaceplane.? 29China’s Civilian Space Development can rapidly morph to military including punitive strikesDean Cheng ‘18, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: What the United States Must Understand About China and Space”, March 29, 2018, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019*** Because of the steady increase in civilian space activities, and the concomitant rise in dual-use capabilities, many civilian space activities can rapidly morph into military ones. Thus, the article notes, launch of multiple satellites from one rocket and on-orbit satellite repair have military applications, and the conduct of such activities, even by civilian entities, is nonetheless a form of space deterrence.“Military space exercises” (kongjian junshi yanxi; 空间军事演习) are undertaken as a crisis escalates if displays of space forces and weapons are insufficient to compel an opponent to alter course. They can involve actual forces or computer simulations and are intended to demonstrate one’s capabilities but also military preparations and readiness. At the same time, such exercises will also improve one’s military space force readiness. Examples include ballistic missile defense tests, anti-satellite unit tests, “exercises demonstrating space strike” (kongjian tuji; 空间突击) capabilities, and displays of real-time and near-real-time information support from space systems.“Space force deployments” (kongjian liliang bushu; 空间力量部署) are seen as a significant escalation of space deterrent efforts. It occurs when one concludes that an opponent is engaged in preparations for war and involves the rapid adjustment of space force deployments. As with military space exercises, this measure is not only intended to deter an opponent, but should deterrence fail, is seen as improving one’s own preparations for combat. Such deployments, which may involve moving assets that are already in orbit or reinforcing current assets with additional platforms and systems, are intended to create local superiority of forces so that an opponent will clearly be in an inferior position. It may also involve the recall of certain space assets (such as space shuttles), either to preserve them from enemy action or to allow them to prepare for new missions. This may be akin to the evacuation of dependents from a region in crisis, as a signal of imminent conflict.Various space deterrence activities are unlikely to be undertaken in isolation. Rather, they will be coordinated with other, non-space activities.The Chinese term the final step of space deterrence as “space shock and awe strikes” (kongjian zhenshe daji; 空间震慑打击). If the three previous, non-violent (or less violent) deterrent measures are insufficient, PLA writings suggest that it may engage in punitive strikes, so as to warn an opponent that one is prepared for full-blown, comprehensive conflict in defense of the nation. Such strikes are seen as the “highest...and final technique” (zuigao xingshi he zui hou shouduan; 最高形式和最后手段) in seeking to deter and dissuade an opponent. Employing hard-kill methods, soft-kill methods, or a combination, one would attack an opponent’s physical space infrastructure or data links, respectively. If this succeeds, opposing decision makers will be psychologically shaken and cease their activities. If it fails, an opponent’s forces will nonetheless have suffered some damage and losses, facilitating the securing of space dominance in a wartime context.These various space deterrence activities are unlikely to be undertaken in isolation. Rather, they will be coordinated with other, non-space activities. Indeed, several Chinese analyses note that space operations enhance other forms of deterrence, including nuclear and conventional. By providing precise information on adversary forces (such as location), they make nuclear attacks more effective. Space dominance can be rapidly converted into advantages for one’s air, naval, and ground forces.8PLA is at core of China space capabilities, organizes and directs themDean Cheng ‘17, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “Responding to the Chinese Space Challenge”, January 6, 2017, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The white paper makes few references to China’s growing military space capabilities. No mention is made of anti-satellite systems, much less likely future tests, but even this carefully edited volume notes that space plays a vital role in national security considerations.What is clear is that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been steadily expanding its portfolio of space capabilities. The PLA is responsible for operating all of China’s space infrastructure, from launch sites to mission control facilities to tracking stations and ships. It has tested a number of anti-satellite systems, including not only the 2007 direct ascent kinetic kill vehicle that generated enormous debris, but also a weapon designed to destroy satellites in geosynchronous orbit.[2]These new capabilities are being incorporated into a new organizational structure. The recent PLA reforms unveiled at the end of 2015 and early 2016 include the establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). This new service (junzhong) brings together Chinese military space, electronic warfare, and network warfare capabilities and reflects the military’s holistic view of space. For the Chinese military, establishing space dominance is integral to the larger effort to establish information superiority. Consequently, the PLASSF is expected to coordinate space, electronic warfare, and cyber operations.China civilian companies are just a revolving door for China’s militaryJeff Foust ‘18, writes about space policy, commercial space, and related topics for SpaceNews, Space News February 22, 2018 “Council discusses space threats and opportunities posed by China”, accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, also discussed the threats posed by China’s space capabilities, both technical and organizational, during the panel discussion. “It is now exploiting not only new technologies to expand its space capabilities, but also undertaking new organizational approaches and innovations,” he said.He noted China’s space program was largely run by the military, including much of its industry. “China’s space industrial complex is not so much a revolving door as a broad atrium for Chinese aerospace engineers and managers amidst all these state-owned enterprises, and the result is far closer to a single integrated space enterprise, with relatively few demarcations between the military and the civilian,” he said.That also applies to the growing number of private space ventures in China that, at first glance, appear to be separate from that larger military-controlled industry. “Given the interest in melding civilian and military capacity, as well as past evidence of behavior in the telecom sector, it is vital to recognize that these private firms, at the end of the day, respond with alacrity to central government directives,” he said.MindsetPlan’s lock in of current mindset ensures China will overtake us in spacePeter Garretson, 7/11/19, is an independent strategy consultant who focuses on space and defense. He was previously the director of Air University’s Space Horizons Task Force, America’s think tank for space, and was deputy director of America’s premier space strategy program, the Schriever Scholars, “SPACE FORCE’S JUPITER-SIZED CULTURE PROBLEM”, accessed 8/31/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Current thinking about warfighting is at once both too bellicose and insufficiently war-like. It is too bellicose because current thinking understates the risk of major escalation and long-term environmental effects of even a limited engagement in space Unlike flak in the air, debris can stay in space for decades, impeding air travel, and unlike a dogfight, conflict in space can threaten nuclear command and control links. Space warfare is nothing to be taken lightly. On the other hand, concepts of space warfare seem constrained to notions of crisis or limited war, with insufficient plans and readiness for a single integrated operational plan for space denial in a prolonged major war. Space power should be much more like the Strategic Air Command — they spoke softly with the motto “peace is our profession” and carried a very big stick with a practiced capability for maximum war. It would be preferable for a democracy with a space force to have an arsenal of terrifying space weapons yet talk only of “ensuring stability” and “protecting commerce” than to for it to remain toothless yet assert its space force is for “warfighting.”Even the assertion of “warfighting” is a cage. “Warfighting” is less than half the problem. The United States faces a much greater strategic threat: the peacetime military offensive of the People’s Republic of China for space dominance. China aims to create a position of industrial and logistical advantage on the moon and its environs, termed cis-lunar space. China is attempting to gain a strategic position to control the key terrain and centers of value in what will be a vast, multi-trillion-dollar space economy, and to usurp America’s rule-making authority. China’s aim is not to come to blows with America, but to win without fighting by occupying a superior strategic position where it would be too costly for the United States to do anything but accept a second-class status. That is a strategic and military threat, perhaps even an existential threat, but it is not a “warfighting” threat. It will not be met with “lethality.” It requires a peacetime military strategy to check every advance and secure America’s own logistical and industrial advantage. Asserting “warfighting” and “multi-domain operations” is not going to bring America victory in its 21st century challenge. To do so is to mistake a multi-decade strategic, positional and technological competition for episodic airpower warfare. The stakes are so high that a myopic focus on tactical or even operational warfighting is potentially a fatal mistake for American strategy.Again, designing an integrated strategic campaign to secure continued logistical and industrial advantage in cis-lunar space is at odds with the “warfighting” culture that airpower thinkers still seeks to push on space professionals. Space professionals have not been trained for such a campaign; they have been trained for support, and are now being trained for warfighting. It will require courage and daring on the part of today’s space cadre to go against the grain and build the planning and integration functions to meet the actual threat.Link Magnifier – Development of Space force at crossroads; plan locks in a focus on satellites, which is myopic, and dooms long term loss of space to ChinaBrent Ziarnick 8/25/19, is an assistant professor of National Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. He is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute and a fellow of the British Interplanetary Society, “The battle for the soul of the Space Force”, The Hill, 8/23/19, accessed 8/25/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Finally, the debate that should have begun over a year ago has now arrived in earnest. Two different visions for the future of the Space Force have recently been presented to the public.One is from the president of the Air Force Association, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright. The other by the currently serving Air Force Lt. Gen. Steven Kwast.These two men encapsulate the two major factions that exist in the Space Force debate. Wright expresses the Air Force’s preferred “warfighting domain” school. Kwast is the most senior and vocal proponent of the maritime-inspired faction that has begun to call itself the “blue water” space school. Which school America chooses to first lead the Space Force will have serious repercussions to the United States for decades to come.Wright recently outlined a vision for Space Force. Wright claimed that the U.S. must “answer the rising threats posed by China and Russia against commercial, military, and intelligence satellites with unparalleled military capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat enemy threats in space.” Wright has identified Chinese anti-satellite weapons as the greatest space threat because they were developed to take away America’s current advantage in space, its system of satellites that allows the United States to dominate terrestrial combat.“The ability to fight concurrently across multiple domains,” Wright argues, “will advantage our defenses and confound adversaries should we ever need to take the offensive.” Wright stresses interdependence between the Space Force and the Air Force — at one point using the term “Space Force Airmen” — because his Space Force’s strategic focus would be warfare on Earth. Wright’s vision for the Space Force, like the “warfighting school,” is to defend America’s satellites from military threats in order to preserve America’s terrestrial combat advantage.Kwast outlined his own vision for the military branch. Kwast identifies China as America’s greatest threat in space. However, the space race with China “is about determining which values will dominate the future world order,” not solely securing America’s terrestrial military advantage.Space, Kwast believes, will be a “multi-trillion dollar market” and the first great power to develop the infrastructure to harness the resources of space will become economically dominant on Earth. China’s anti-satellite weapons concern Kwast, but what concerns him more are Chinese plans to build bases on the moon and Mars, develop nuclear powered space shuttles, and build space solar power stations by 2040.To Kwast, China’s rapid technological development in hypersonics, 5G wireless internet, artificial intelligence and other technologies will eliminate America’s current advantages far more completely than their anti-satellite capability. Further, “China is actively pursuing a plan to use space as the ultimate ‘high ground’ to dominate the global economy and transform economic, military, and political power in its image” — an authoritarian image anathema to American values.Kwast’s Space Force would “defend all American interests to include commerce in space” and be completely independent from the Air Force “to ensure space has the attention and focus required” to “implement a strategy that can secure the American way of life in this century and ensure the goods and promises offered by space are not dominated by a country disinterested in human freedom.”The differences between Wright’s and Kwast’s visions are stark. Wright sees the Space Force operating in Earth orbit and below — the “brown water” of space — supporting the joint warfighter. Kwast wants the Space Force to harness the power of space, which requires extending into the “blue water” – the moon and beyond.Wright wants a Space Force focused on fighting a great power war with China. Kwast sees a Space Force that competes with China for economic and technological supremacy by defending America’s interest in space across all elements of national power. Wright argues for a satellite combat command. Kwast states the need for a frontier defense force. Wright’s strategic outlook assumes a zero-sum game that prioritizes protecting what America has. Kwast envisions an open system that America can capitalize upon to secure a future of increased peace and prosperity.Graham Allison’s concept of the Thucydides Trap, “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one,” is a useful analytical tool to explore the differences between these Space Force visions. The Thucydides Trap is often sprung when a dominant power declares war against a rising power it fears will soon overtake it. In our current circumstances, the United States is being threatened by a rising China. In this framework, Wright’s warfighting Space Force is intended to help win a catastrophic war against China to retain America’s dominance. Wright’s service would do very little to prevent China from threatening the United States’ position as the world’s dominant power.Kwast’s commerce-protecting Space Force, alternatively, is intended to outcompete China for economic, technological, and military dominance through the power of space so that a rejuvenated superpower America is never confronted with a Chinese Thucydides Trap in the first place.Link Magnifier/CP Solvency – Now is key time – military culture critical to space power & founding sets culture in placePeter Garretson, 7/11/19, is an independent strategy consultant who focuses on space and defense. He was previously the director of Air University’s Space Horizons Task Force, America’s think tank for space, and was deputy director of America’s premier space strategy program, the Schriever Scholars, “SPACE FORCE’S JUPITER-SIZED CULTURE PROBLEM”, accessed 8/31/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Military culture matters a lot. Cultures are those positive and negative feedback loops that encourage certain thinking and behavior in a society, group, or organization and dissuade or make taboo other thinking and behavior. The U.S. military has thus far failed to create a unique military space culture that encourages the focus, thinking, and behaviors required to maximize comprehensive national space power.Military culture varies widely across the five services, and for good reasons. Perhaps the strongest determinant of service culture is the “founder effect.” Author Howard Bloom explored in depth how the attitudes of founding leaders profoundly affected their organizations over centuries. Because of this strong effect, the attitudes that the first leaders of the Space Force display will resonate for generations to come. For America’s new space force to serve the needs of the United States well into the future, its culture must be defined by a “can-do” and not a not “compliance” orientation.Some military cultures, such as that of the forces responsible for nuclear operations, require exceptionally tight control because even minor accidents can have massively negative — and potentially existential — consequences. As a result, they develop a compliance-oriented culture, where mistakes are not tolerated and behavior that strictly complies with the tried and true regulations is rewarded. Others operate on the other end of the spectrum. For example, U.S. special operations forces are expected to exercise exceptional autonomy to make decisions in highly fluid environments beyond the reach of reliable communications. In other words, they have a “can-do” culture. There is a large middle ground between those extremes, from the Air Force’s “centralized control, decentralized execution” to the Navy’s “command by negation” (i.e. “you are allowed to do it unless specifically prohibited”).America’s space force is coming of age in a time defined by rapid technological innovation and experimentation. Moving forward will require risk-taking in systems and tactics development. That’s going to require a “can do” culture.Soft PowerSpace coop will allow China to deflect criticism on other issues—bolsters its global influenceRichard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf, accessed 4-10-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Furthermore, allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space corporations, or government institutions at this time presents two risks. First it could encourage China to advance an illusion of cooperation with the U.S. and the West while differences on Earth become sharper. This could become useful for Beijing to deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain leverage over U.S. options and actions. Second, as has been proven repeatedly, China will exploit any new access for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors. China’s increasing space power, however, like its growing economic and political power, cannot be “contained.” Russia appears ready to greatly expand space and military cooperation with China as part of a larger strategic alignment, while the European Space Agency is edging toward greater cooperation with China. These attractions may only increase if China has the only LEO manned space station in the mid-2020s. Already a top commercial space service and technology provider, China will use its gathering space diplomacy tools to aid its pursuit of economic, political and military influence in critical regions like Africa and Latin America. Growing Chinese space capabilities bolster its soft powerKevin Pollpeter, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson and Fan Yang, CHINA DREAM, SPACE DREAM: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, p. 114. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and economic capabilities, it can also work to increase China’s soft power. According to Joseph Nye, “soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.” Although measuring the effects of soft power is difficult, Nye writes that it rests “on the ability to shape the preferences of others.” China’s burgeoning space program is used as one of the many barometers of its rise as a military, economic, and political power. It reinforces the image that China is a dynamic country capable of doing things well and also a country with which relations can be beneficial. This could make China more attractive, especially to developing countries without strong democratic traditions. China’s strategy thus appears to be a combination of seeking cooperative activities with the main space powers while at the same time seeking leadership opportunities with lesser space powers through such activities as its leadership of APSCO and its agreements to build Beidou stations in several countries in Asia. These activities reinforce the image that China can interact with the major space powers as equals while also creating an “alternative universe” where China can lead space activities free from the interference of the other major space powers. ASPCO, for example, does not grant other countries observer status. Moreover, as China becomes more capable in space, it will become a more attractive partner for Europe, Russia, and smaller space powers. These activities may increase multipolarity by presenting another avenue for countries to participate in space in addition to―or without―the United States. This is especially true in the area of human spaceflight where the lack of an independent capability to launch humans into space by the United States has made China an attractive new partner for collaboration. Although Europe states that its collaborative activities with China do not mean a diminution of its activities with the United States, reduced budgets for space programs and the orbiting of China’s larger space station at the same time that the International Space Station will be nearing the end of its service life may result in increasing influence for China in space. SpyingChina engages in space espionage to change the balance of power in Asia.Eftimiades, Penn State Homeland Security Professor, 2018 (Nicholas, retired CIA, DIA, State Department, ?The Diplomat, 12-4-2018, "The Impact of Chinese Espionage on the United States," Diplomat, , DOA 8/19/19, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)Impact on U.S. National SecurityThe most important implication for U.S. national security planners is the loss of military technological advantage. China’s advances in weapons systems — including autonomous robotics, avionics, hypersonics, and naval systems — are based in large part on technology stolen from the United States and certain allies. This massive and sustained espionage campaign combined with two decades of increased defense spending provided China’s PLA Navy and Air Force with substantial power projection capabilities throughout Southeast Asia. The PLA Navy has achieved anti-access, area denial capabilities against its neighbors who also claim territories in the South and East China Seas.One of the most important targets for Chinese espionage is U.S. space capabilities. Several illegal export cases showed a focused and aggressive campaign to collect technologies relating to advanced optics, sensors, cryogenic coolers, composites, engine design, fabrication techniques, software, etc. In 2015, the PLA created a Strategic Support Force as its cyber, space, and electronic warfare branch. China is quickly becoming more capable in space and counterspace operations, eroding the U.S. advantage in this contested, congested, and competitive environment. The increase in PLA capabilities is significant because of the U.S. dependency on space capabilities for communications, economic strength, critical infrastructure safety and resiliency, and to project military power globally.China’s espionage activities that result in its increased power projection capabilities have geopolitical implications throughout Asia. As China’s offensive military power grows, it advances an assertive and coercive foreign policy that is changing the balance of power in Asia. China is now able to (and does) coerce, threaten, or employ military force to enforce its territorial claims in East and Southeast Asia.Implications for Political Institutions and GovernanceChina’s covert influence activities have received global attention in recent years. Covert influence campaigns in?New Zealand and Australia?resulted in those governments conducting investigations and passing laws designed to prevent China’s subversive actions. The United States has begun to investigate certain PRC institutions and individuals for compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Even some U.S. academic institutions have rebuffed Beijing’s covert and coercive attempts to stifle any negative discussions about the China’s actions or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of China’s covert (rather than overt activities) global influence campaigns on U.S. political processes. Efforts covertly funding political candidates, universities, business, and policy initiatives in other countries have been successful. However, media exposure of these actions frequently had severe consequences on interstate relations and public opinion. China’s covert influence campaigns are less likely to be successful in the American political apparatus due to the strong presence of lobbyists, citizens’ organizations, NGOs, and voter opinion.However, China employs more overt influence operations to include Confucius Institutes, friendship societies, student organizations, and media campaigns. Despite Beijing’s worldwide efforts,?Pew opinion polls?over the last decade consistently show a decline in favorable opinions of China in most developed countries. In the United States, the percentage of people with favorable opinions on China dropped has dropped over the last decade from the 50s to typically hover in the upper 30s.ConclusionChina has advanced its espionage efforts considerably over the last 20 years. It is unlikely to curb those efforts as economic and national security related espionage provides a cost efficient means to expand the economy, advance research and development, project military power, and meet China’s goals to become a world power.The United States has responded to China’s espionage activities with increased law enforcement, foreign policy initiatives, and more recently, trade policy. To date, these responses have proven minimally effective. There is no indication that U.S. actions have deterred, or will deter, China. Additional elements of national power will be necessary to abate China’s global espionage campaign — domestic education campaigns, global media campaigns, increased enforcement, expanded international coordination measures, and leveraging alliances could all be considered.China escalating its technology espionageDel Quentin Wilber ‘18, staff writer LA Times 11/16/18, “China ‘has taken the gloves off’ in its thefts of U.S. technology secrets”, accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Beijing over the last two years has significantly ramped up its swiping of commercial technology and intellectual property, from jet engines to genetically modified rice, as U.S. relations with China have grown more acrimonious under President Trump, according to U.S. officials and security experts.“They want technology by hook or by crook. They want it now. The spy game has always been a gentleman’s game, but China has taken the gloves off,” said John Bennett, the special agent in charge of the FBI’s San Francisco office, which battles economic spies targeting Silicon Valley. “They don’t care if they get caught or if people go to jail. As long as it justifies their ends, they are not going to stop.”60% of Chinese espionage attempts are targeted at US military or space assets—that reflects a knowledge gap.Eftimiades, Penn State Homeland Security Professor, 2018 (Nicholas, retired from 34 year career at CIA, State Department, and DIA, The Diplomat, 11-28-2018, "Uncovering Chinese Espionage in the US," Diplomat, , DOA 8/19/19, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)In intelligence terminology, information objectives identify the specific information (or technology) that is tasked for collection. These can number in the thousands and reflect the organization’s knowledge gaps. Simply put, if a country is continually trying to collect information on specific components of the F-35 aircraft, it is because it lacks the required information for its planned purposes.China’s information objectives are focused in priority sectors and technologies. The Director of National Intelligence report,?Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace?(2018) identifies key industries and technologies that are frequent targets of foreign espionage. The text in bold (see Figure 4) reflects multiple, concerted attempts by China to secure specific U.S. critical technologies.??Each of these technologies is identified as a?priority requirement?in China’s State Council?2015 strategic plan “Made in China 2025.”More than 60 percent of China’s attempts to illegally export U.S. critical technologies are targeted at military technologies or space systems.? These information objectives include systems, designs, components, radiation hardened chips, integrated circuits, software, manuals, precision optics, thermal imaging systems, production techniques, etc.The final aspects of Chinese espionage activities are their use of specific clandestine collection techniques commonly known as espionage “tradecraft.” Chinese government agencies, SOEs, companies and individuals employ varying levels of sophistication of espionage tradecraft. An analysis of?operational activities reveals a wide range of tradecraft practices (see Figure 5):No tradecraft, with parties using open communications and true names;Use of false names and/or third parties to transmit information and ship materials; Public and commercial encryption, hosting meetings in China to avoid detection; Tailor made devices or techniques, use of third countries, use of in-country cutouts to transmit information.As illustrated, the most frequently employed elements of tradecraft include using false names or documents to ship information or technology. These techniques were used approximately one-third of the time. In nearly 25 percent of cases, individuals employed encryption for communications and/or hosted meetings in China to avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement. In 54 cases, entities used no tradecraft or substantive attempts to hide the espionage activity. Individuals used true names and open communications including emails, text messages, and phone calls. Lastly, in 27 cases, roughly 9 percent of the total, case officers and/or agents displayed a more sophisticated level of tradecraft. These elements of tradecraft included specially designed smartphone software for secure covert communications (U.S. vs. Kevin Mallory); third country meetings, or use of third parties (cutouts) in the United States for communicating information between the in-country ‘handler” and recruited asset, or the in-country handler and Chinese intelligence services.Tradecraft Islands of ExcellenceThe wide variance in sophistication of espionage tradecraft implies the idea of “Islands of Excellence” (see Figure 6) ?— meaning China employs espionage tradecraft with varying degrees of sophistication and effectiveness. One might expect poor tradecraft from nonprofessional intelligence entities such as individuals, companies, and SOEs. However, cases attributed to the Ministry of State Security show an astounding nine cases where case officers and recruited agents demonstrated no discernible tradecraft. In these cases, persons conducted agent recruitment, tasking, communications, and data transfer openly, with no significant attempt to hide the activity. In another 22 cases, MSS operatives employed only simplistic or limited operational tradecraft. In only eight cases was there a sophisticated higher level of tradecraft employed.This wide variance in professional tradecraft likely indicates MSS suffers from lack of standardized training, security awareness, operational oversight, and case management. In addition, the same erratic performance by recruited agents illustrates nonstandardized agent training, protocols, and practices. The poor performance in oversight and case management is possibly due to the highly politicized nature (CCP management) of Chinese intelligence. If this is in fact the case then MSS performance is not likely to improve anytime soon.Analysis reveals several other interesting data points on the application of tradecraft. Private companies (and individuals) are most likely to employ no or minimal tradecraft. In these cases no (23 cases) or minimal tradecraft (21 cases) was employed. The minimal application of tradecraft is expected, as these cases typically do not involve professional intelligence operatives (either case officers or agents).SOE espionage activities show a wide variance in tradecraft. The operational details revealed in individual cases implies this phenomenon is due to the following factors: no training program for handlers or recruited assets, differences in the various SOEs, and the variables of espionage targets to include military, space, dual use, or industrial technologies.ConclusionSeveral high-level conclusions can be drawn from the cases representing the last 20 years of Chinese espionage operations. Espionage operations have expanded dramatically, increasing in the number of operations, personnel, government and SOE’s, and foreign targets sets. There is also a national construct in place (however redundant) to ensure intelligence information objectives are satisfied by collecting foreign information and technology. These information objectives are also tied to national defense and economic priorities. The only notable area in which China has shown minimal advancement has been in applying sophisticated espionage tradecraft. Lastly, China’s espionage activities continue unabated despite a large number of arrests, public exposure, and most recently, U.S. trade sanctions.If the US has valuable information, China will try to steal itHarrell, fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 2018 (Peter, December 12, "China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses” , DOA 8/19/19, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***What types of technology and information does China target?China has aggressively targeted technologies central to its Made in China 2025 industrial strategy, a fact that should come as little surprise given the importance China attaches to the strategy. In 2017 and 2018, suspected China-linked hackers have targeted U.S. firms operating in sectors including cloud computing, artificial intelligence, internet connected devices, biotechnology, energy, robotics, transportation, agricultural machinery and other agricultural technology, and high-end medical devices. The U.S. recently charged Chinese spies and companies with trying to steal trade secrets from the semiconductor industry, and charged a Chinese agent with collecting information on Chinese nationals working in the U.S. for possible recruitment by China’s spy agencies. Unsurprisingly, China is also targeting sectors critical to U.S. military dominance, like aerospace, according to a recent indictment.But China does not only steal corporate “crown jewels” like trade secrets: It targets a wide variety of information that can provide Chinese companies with commercial advantage. For example, U.S. prosecutors have accused Chinese hackers of stealing cost and pricing information from a U.S. solar company, which was probably intended to help Chinese competitors develop their own pricing strategy. The Department of Justice has even indicted Chinese spies for stealing strategy information from a U.S. labor union that strongly opposed Chinese trade practices. China has also tried to hack think tanks to understand policy and think tank engagement with government officials. Zach Cooper at AEI published a report on China’s cyber strategy this past fall that compiled dozens of examples of the kinds of information China tries to steal. The bottom line is that if there is information out there that China thinks is of value, the odds are that China has or will try to steal it.Chinese engages in tech espionage in violation of WTO rules and bilateral treaties—the plan reduces barriers which will allow China to vault into the leadMorici, University of Maryland Economics Professor, 2019 (Peter Morici, 6-24-2019, "A trade deal with China could put national security at risk," baltimoresun, , DOA 8/19/19, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In 2015,?China signed an agreement to end state-sponsored industrial espionage. Beijing simply redirected its endeavors toward more vulnerable targets in Asia and Europe and then, when President Barack Obama left office, resumed stealing American intellectual property.The?Justice Department indicted, for example, officials of Chinese cybersecurity firm Boyusec?for hacking Moody's Analytics, Siemens AG and U.S. global positioning system developer Trimble Inc., but too many Chinese businesses, their executives and state sponsors are?beyond the effective jurisdiction of American courts.Too much of the texts of WTO agreements pertain to practices that are quickly becoming ancient playing fields of competition — manufacturing major appliances, motor vehicles, merchant banking and motion pictures. Any government with a big enough checkbook can foster an industry in one of those.The real competition is in?super computing,?space exploration?and artificial intelligence that will deliver both commercial and military dominance by mid-century. Those offer possibilities for?explosive growth?akin to the spread of mass production and automation in the 20th?Century.The?same kinds of artificial intelligence?that permit smartphones and facial recognition to track web surfing and personal movements to generate targeted advertisements and for police to anticipate criminal acts, could enable the Chinese and Russian militaries to anticipate the tactics and?neutralize the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy and Air Forceand ultimately destroy American?civic institutions and markets?— if we let either vault into the lead.China supplements trade policies and?commercial espionage?with well-financed national strategies to accomplish dominance in super computing, space exploration and artificial intelligence by 2030. It's ludicrous to believe American negotiators can smother those ambitions with treaties that Beijing will violate at first opportunity.It's time to join the commercial war on China — for real. If China won't commit to real reforms, impose across the board tariffs that compel balanced trade with China by?auctioning quotas that limit imports to the value of exports to China. And finance aggressive?national strategies in advanced computing, space exploration and artificial intelligence that ensure national survival.All those require higher prices for apparel and appliances at Walmart and Best Buy and higher taxes, but national survival has no price too high.Coop with China undercuts U.S. space edge—threatens our militaryDean Cheng, research fellow, Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs than Benefits,” WEBMEMO n. 2670, 10—30—09, Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits, accessed 5-1-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China, therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages.Cooperation enables tech theft—NASA is a soft targetEric Sterner, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute, “OpEd: U.S.-China Space Relations: Maintaining an Arm’s Length,” SPACE NEWS, 3—6—09, , accessed 5-19-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Any potential partnership with also raises more specific concerns. Chinese espionage activities against high- tech American targets are well documented. Michelle Van Cleave, the nation’s first national coordinator for counterintelligence, recently noted: “The Chinese stole the design secrets to all – repeat, all – U.S. nuclear weapons, enabling them to leapfrog generations of technology development and put our nuclear arsenal, the country’s last line of defense, at risk. To this day, we don’t know quite when or how they did it, but we do know that Chinese intelligence operatives are still at work, systematically targeting not only ‘s defense secrets but our industries’ valuable proprietary information.” Unfortunately, NASA is a soft target compared with the nation’s nuclear labs. The U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission’s most recent report noted that in 2005 Chinese hackers targeted NASA and stole files on spacecraft propulsion, solar panels and fuel tanks – all useful for military systems. More recently, a contract engineer was indicted last year for stealing technologies associated with the space shuttle and Delta 4 launch vehicle on behalf of the People’s Republic of China. A close partnership would only increase the potential for greater technology transfer, to the net harm of the national security interests of the United StatesChina will use NASA cooperation to bolster its own space capabilitiesEric Sterner, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute, “Op-ed | China, Talk and Cooperation in Space,” SPACE NEWS, 8—6—15, , accessed 5-19-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***NASA leads civil space activities in the United States. But, as space policy expert Marcia Smith points out, the agency and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy are statutorily prohibited from expending any funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” In short, the State Department just agreed to discuss civil space activities that the relevant U.S. agencies are legally prohibited from pursuing. It is clear what the Chinese might seek from institutionalizing and deepening a cooperative civil space relationship with the United States. Accelerating Beijing’s learning curve when it comes to space technologies and operations, intelligence collection, technology transfer and political prestige all flow from working with the world’s most advanced space power. Most space technology is dual-use, meaning hardware, applications and systems developed for civil or commercial purposes have military uses. China recognizes this and often pursues bilateral cooperation in order to enhance its own economic and defense capabilities, not for mutual benefit. The Defense Department notes that “China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy continues to center on its civil-military integration policy as a means to leverage dual-use technologies to improve its defense industries. Despite improvements to its own indigenous technology development and industrial capacity, China continues to rely on the acquisition of critical advanced and Western dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how. These acquisitions manifest in the form of joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and close business partnerships with, and technology imports from, highly developed countries, primarily of the West, that offer access to critical advanced technology sectors.” Consequently, the administration appears poised to put the U.S.-Chinese civil space relationship on a path that could eventually benefit the Chinese defense industry as soon as the congressional restrictions expire.Tech AccessU.S. currently acting to exclude China from key supply chains, increasing coop means increasing Chinese suppliers – gives China espionage access; creates vulnerabilityTETSURO KOSAKA ‘18, Nikkei senior staff writer, Nikkei Asian Review, “China may be spying, but it learned from the best -- the US”, 12/23/18, , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***TOKYO -- The U.S. government is increasingly fearful of Chinese carrying out cyberattacks and building "backdoors" into telecommunications gear to steal military secrets. Its fears are likely justified, as China learned its spy techniques from the best in the business -- the Americans themselves.Cases of alleged espionage by Chinese are abundant. On Dec. 20, the U.S. indicted two Chinese nationals for carrying out cyberattacks. The Department of Justice said the men stole intellectual property and confidential business information from more than 45 technology companies and government entities in the U.S., including the Navy and the NASA space agency.Espionage has a long history. "The Art of War," the ancient Chinese military treatise, says that employing skillful espionage is more effective than unleashing many troops, and goes on to describe various types of human intelligence, or "humint" -- the use of secret agents -- to learn the enemy's movements. History books are filled with examples of how spies have plied their trade behind the scenes through the ages.In modern times, however, humint has largely been replaced by spy schemes using hardware or software.A technician works at a nuclear-related facility in Iran. A sophisticated cyberweapon jointly developed by the U.S. and Israel threw nuclear facilities in Iran into confusion, in attacks that came to light in 2010. ? APIn the early 1980s, during the Cold War, the U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union was secretly sounding out Western sources to acquire software for controlling pipelines. The CIA, which not only gathers information from around the world but also engages in lethal covert activities in enemy states, provided the Soviets software that had been programmed to make pipelines go haywire. Unaware that the U.S. was behind the transaction, the Soviet Union installed the software in a pipeline system in Siberia.In the summer of 1982, the pipeline became uncontrollable and exploded as planned. It was said to have been the biggest non-nuclear man-made explosion ever.The installation of spying functions in hardware and software has grown along with the global spread of computers.Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm that emerged in 2010, is alleged to have been developed jointly by the U.S. National Security Agency and Israel's intelligence agency. It is known to have temporarily shut down uranium-enrichment facilities in Iran, which has an antagonistic relationship with both countries.The U.S. is a pioneer when it comes to rigging hardware and software to spy on enemies. China, which has been honing the art of espionage since ancient times, has merely taken a page from the U.S. playbook and is enthusiastically putting its new skills into practice.U.S. President Harry Truman, right, wanted a monopoly on nuclear weapons, but Soviet leader Josef Stalin, left, used spycraft to quickly end that dream. ? APThis reality needs to be taken into account when considering the U.S.-China relationship and the friction between the countries. As China comes under mounting pressure from the U.S. it may snap but claim that it is merely copying spying techniques developed by the U.S.China's alleged espionage would not be the first time the U.S. has been burned by its own technology.In the closing days of World War II, classified information on nuclear weapons technology developed by the U.S. was stolen through Soviet espionage operations under dictator Josef Stalin, making President Harry Truman's dream of a U.S. nuclear monopoly short-lived.The U.S. has been slow to learn lessons from history. More than once, new American military technologies developed at a huge cost have been immediately stolen by China through espionage operations. This is massively damaging to the U.S. and its allies.Washington is making serious efforts to end this cycle; it has been pressuring allies to exclude Chinese suppliers as they build out next-generation 5G telecommunications networks.Western contractors have been taken aback on a massive scale. But inaction could pave the way for the Chinese, fully armed with U.S. technology, to destroy crucial infrastructure and undermine military capability, experts say.Tech competition is a zero sum game and consensus is that China steals to win itThe Economist, 2019 (May 16, “Special Report: China and America: Competing in technology: America still leads in technology, but China is catching up fast”, , DOA 8/25/2019, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)A rare thing?happened in an industrial park near Washington,?dc,last November. Construction began on a $3bn extension to a semiconductor foundry owned by Micron Technologies, a maker of advanced memory chips, based in Idaho. “A few years ago, opening that sort of extension would have people saying, well, that is going to be moving to China soon, isn’t it?”, observes James Mulvenon, an expert on Chinese cyber-policy and espionage.Not now. Instead, that Micron foundry is a glimpse of the future. Trust in China has collapsed among American government and business bosses, and a consensus has grown that Chinese firms have closed the technological gap with Western rivals with indecent speed and by illicit means.Today’s tensions make the original cold war look simple. In 2018 China accounted for 57% of Micron’s net sales. In the 1960s and 1970s American tech companies did not rely on Soviet customers. But Micron is a symbol, several times over, of how commercial competition is turning into a zero-sum contest, in which one side wins at the other’s expense. In 2015 Micron rebuffed a $23bn takeover bid from a Chinese state-backed investment fund, saying that it thought such a deal would be blocked on national-security grounds by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (cfius). In 2018 the Department of Justice indicted a state-owned Chinese firm, its Taiwanese partner and three individuals on charges of stealing trade secrets relating to Micron’s memory chips—technology worth tens of billions of dollars. That followed lawsuits and countersuits in which the accused Chinese firm asserted that it owned the relevant patents in China and was therefore Micron’s victim. A Chinese court sided with it, then Micron was hit with an antitrust probe.China hawks in Washington say the zero-sum game is about broken laws. “Put plainly, China seems determined to steal its way up the economic ladder at our expense,” declared Christopher Wray, the director of the?FBI, on April 26th, adding that nearly all the agency’s 56 field offices are working on economic spy cases “that almost invariably lead back to China”. Between March and November 2018, the Department of Justice indicted a dozen individuals and entities it says were directed by the Chinese government to obtain commercial secrets from 15 companies, predominantly in aerospace and high technology.Others say the zero-sum game involves broken promises to American workers. They recall American political leaders assuring workers that high-value manufacturing would stay in America, even as globalisation carried cheap jobs to China.Using his chairmanship of the Senate committee on small business and entrepreneurship as a bully pulpit, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida in February issued a report condemning China’s plans to become a global powerhouse in ten high-tech fields, from artificial intelligence (ai) to aviation, as laid out in the “Made in China 2025” (mic2025) plan issued by the State Council in 2015. Should America let China become the global leader in innovation and manufacturing, “this would be an unacceptable outcome for American workers,” Mr Rubio writes in his report.In a mark of these populist times, Mr Rubio is not afraid to argue that government has a direct role to play in defending blue-collar factory jobs. Manufacturing provides more stable employment than services, the Rubio report avers. It urges America to use industrial policies, including tax changes and export controls, to defend industries from robotics to tractor-making.It’s a stealNot all senators are as vocal as Mr Rubio, nor as keen on export controls. But deepening distrust of China is a bipartisan norm in Congress. The views of American businesses in China are a bit more nuanced, as shown by the 2019 business-climate survey of the American Chamber of Commerce there, issued in February. Nearly 70% of firms say they are profitable. Still, there are warning signs. In the AmCham survey, half of all American technology firms say they limit investments in China because of inadequate protection of intellectual property (ip), even after years of Chinese promises to get serious about it.China has become tougher on acts of piracy, from fake consumer goods to breaches of patents. But foreign executives still tell horror stories about pressure to share secrets with local partners and cyber-attacks on company servers back home. Depressingly, 13% of member firms in the AmCham survey said that their greatest ip?risk was theft by their own employees.There are several ways in which economic competition can become zero-sum, and all can be seen in China today. Theft is just one. Another is the pursuit of import substitution, aiming to replace imports with domestic alternatives, by fair means or foul. America is in a funk about losing its edge, but it is still home to global champions from aerospace and semiconductors to software and self-driving vehicles. Its officials worry that?mic2025 commits China to being world-class in all those sectors.Since 2015 supporting plans and road maps published by government research agencies set out hundreds of market-share targets for Chinese firms, declaring, for instance, that 80% of electric or hybrid “new energy” vehicles sold in China must be domestically produced by 2025. Chinese officials, facing a worldwide backlash, now downplay those targets. Strictly-censored state media have stopped using the term?mic2025. But the policy itself has not been repealed. Speeches by party chiefs ring with calls for “self-reliance” and “indigenous innovation”. Other Chinese technology sectors are being encouraged to comply with a policy called “civil-military fusion”, a national strategy backed by top leaders and funding from opaque national-security budgets.That militarisation of some Chinese technology imposes costs as well as benefits, notes Mr Mulvenon. Those costs include the risks for Western firms of doing work that supports the brutal techno-dystopia that China has built in Xinjiang. “The good news is that the Chinese are going to discover that autarky is hard,” says Mr Mulvenon. Americans have watched China stealing and reverse-engineering one generation of technology, he says, then having to steal the next after failing to master the underlying science. “That model is incredibly inefficient.”China is willing to spend what it takes, showering would-be champions with billions of dollars in subsidies and prodding local firms to place orders. Among the beneficiaries is the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, whose?c-919 commercial airliner is intended as a direct competitor to Boeing’s 737. State planners have set a goal of a 10% domestic market share for Chinese airliners by 2025. The?c-919 has had teething troubles, making that timetable ambitious. But success for China could quickly feel zero-sum in America, whose top export category to China in 2017 was civilian aircraft, worth $16.3bn. The Rubio report laments that at least ten American firms supply vital parts to the?c-919.China has created big brands in such fields as electric vehicles and batteries, in part by shutting foreign rivals out. Protectionist barriers have also allowed Chinese internet firms to grow. In 2009 the ten largest internet companies by revenue were American. Now several are Chinese (see chart).Still, it is a mistake to exaggerate China’s strengths in big-data analysis and?ai, according to Dieter Ernst of the East-West Center, a think-tank in Hawaii. A near-total lack of privacy protection may help sweep up lots of data, but American firms are better at advanced algorithms that make?ai less dependent on big data sets, Mr Ernst wrote. Big Chinese applications are still mostly powered by American-designed chips, which remain world-beating.America has other advantages. Joy Dantong Ma of MacroPolo, the in-house think-tank of the Paulson Institute, examined the origins of leading speakers at the most prestigious?ai?gathering. Most came from American universities and tech firms, she found. Crucially, though, more than half those American stars were foreign-born. Team Trump’s visa clampdown imperils that.Some forms of competition can be fair but still end with the gains going mostly to one side. Notably, some technological fields give a “first-mover advantage” that offers huge rewards to countries or businesses that take an early lead, allowing them to set standards that later entrants have little choice but to follow. In April the Defence Innovation Board, a Pentagon advisory committee of Silicon Valley luminaries, issued a report warning that China is on track to pull off this feat in the race to dominate 5g?mobile telecommunications. This next generation of wireless technology promises to revolutionise existing industries and invent whole new ones with data speeds about 20 times those of 4g.A decade ago American firms took an early lead in 4g, setting standards for new handsets and applications that spread worldwide. That dominance helped Apple, Google and other American businesses generate billions of dollars in revenues. China learned its lesson, investing $180bn to deploy 5g?networks over the next five years and assigning swathes of wireless spectrum to three state providers. In America the same part of the spectrum is largely off-limits commercially because it is used by the federal government. American firms are experimenting with a different part of the spectrum that has some advantages under laboratory conditions but is easily blocked by buildings and trees. For this reason, in spite of American pressure on allies, much of the world is likely to adopt China’s handsets, chips and standards, the Pentagon board concludes. Since America’s armed forces are expected to operate worldwide, they must prepare to send data through a “post-Western” world of wireless technology and through “zero-trust” networks, studded with components from such Chinese firms as Huawei. That will mean more focus on encryption and security.Home of the splinternetSome technology contests look more benign. As China and America wall off their respective digital markets from one another, each will look for growth in the rest of the world. A divided world wide web, or “splinternet”, is already a reality, as China’s internet grows behind a great firewall of censorship. American champions like Amazon are promoting payment services in India. China’s Alipay service is active in Brazil. China is exporting surveillance systems and censorship algorithms to police states from Ethiopia to Venezuela. With a change in direction, America could make a virtue of an internet that respects privacy. Western biomedical firms and gene-editing laboratories could make a virtue of stricter ethics.It is unhelpful that Mr Trump is a techno-curmudgeon. He has proposed budgets that slash scientific-research funds, though Congress reversed them. After two recent crashes of Boeing 737 Max airliners, he tweeted that “airplanes are becoming far too complex to fly”. Still, last year Mr Trump signed a bipartisan bill authorising $1.3bn for quantum-computer research. The aim is to keep ahead of Chinese work on computers that harness the laws of quantum physics to achieve processing speeds out of a science-fiction film. America leads this field, but Xi Jinping deems it a national priority, quizzing scientists who have returned from quantum laboratories in America and Europe. Should China succeed, it could develop almost unhackable satellite communications and quantum radar to detect the stealthiest planes and submarines.Such a success would turn a technology contest into an arms race. America would then have to decide whether this China can be deterred or whether one day it might use its new capabilities.Coop—GeneralCooperation will only bolster China’s efforts to control spaceChristopher Stone, staff, “U.S. Cooperation with China in Space: Some Thoughts to Consider for Space Advocates and Policy Makers,” SPACE REVIEW, 2—25—13, article/2246/1, accessed 3-1-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In the last few years, one of the biggest opponents of engagement with the Chinese in space has been Congressman Frank Wolf, a Republican representing Virginia’s 10th district, outside Washington. Following the visit of NASA Administrator Charles Bolden to China in 2011, Congressman Wolf stated during a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: I want to be clear: the United States has no business cooperating with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to help develop its space program. We also should be wary of any agreements that involve the transfer of technology or sensitive information to Chinese institutions or companies, many of which are controlled by the government and the PLA. His reasoning behind this was stated as well in his remarks: Space is the ultimate “high ground” that has provided the U.S. with countless security and economic advantages over the last 40 years. As the victor of the Cold War “space race” with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has held an enormous advantage in space technology, defense capabilities, and advanced sciences—generating entirely new sectors of our economy and creating thousands of private sector jobs. China has developed its own space program at a surprising pace, having gone from launching their first manned spacecraft to launching components for an advanced space station in just 10 years. But the Chinese space program is being led by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and to state the obvious, the PLA is not our friend as evidenced by their recent military posture and aggressive espionage against U.S. agencies and firms. “China will use cooperation in space to advance its national objectivesChristopher Stone, staff, “U.S. Cooperation with China in Space: Some Thoughts to Consider for Space Advocates and Policy Makers,” SPACE REVIEW, 2—25—13, article/2246/1, accessed 3-1-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In Chinese thinking, diplomacy becomes a crucial complement to both economic development and national survival. As an example, an SAIC report notes, Chinese energy diplomacy aims, among several objectives, to “protect China’s existing energy access to meet its growing demand for imported oil, to ease tensions in critical oil producing regions of the world… and to promote Chinese interests in other parts of the world to increase China’s [energy supplies] and foreign resource base.” The Chinese, according to their own words, are also looking beyond their gains and investments globally in oil, rare earths, and the like, and aiming for cultivation of resources in space. Thus it is not surprising to see space-based solar power and development of space resources addressed in white papers and reports from the Chinese Academy of Space Technology. These national goals and ambitions, and the role of space, are done with the Chinese national interests in mind, “regardless of the cost to other nations.” Because of these objectives, “it is a sound assumption that China would employ multiple means, including the possibility of strategic deception and perception management, to help achieve these three basic national objectives-survival, development and influence.” Put another way, as mentioned before, these are the three Thucydides concepts of security, prestige, and wealth. National power and influence are still alive and well in the world and in space, and the United States and space advocacy groups alike would be wise to acknowledge this and plan their space and energy strategies accordingly. As an SAIC report puts it, “it’s better to understand how the Chinese government does business and pragmatically engage with it while maintaining a healthy skepticism.” When developing plans or statements of the supposed need to engage with China, given other allied spacefaring states in the Asia-Pacific region like Japan and Australia, “U.S. representatives should have information about Chinese strategic deception and perception management at their disposal” and in their minds.Coop means working with the Chinese militaryDean Cheng, Research Fellow, “Five Myths About China’s Space Program,” WEBMEMO n. 3379, 9—29—11, research/reports/2011/09/five-myths-about-chinas-space-program, accessed 4-6-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Myth #4: China’s space program is civilian in nature. The reason for concern about Chinese access to technology is that the Chinese have not separated their civilian and military space programs. Instead, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is intimately involved in Chinese space efforts. Unlike the Kennedy Space Center in Florida or the Johnson Space Center in Houston, China’s space facilities are all manned and operated by elements of the PLA. Similarly, Chinese reporting about their human spaceflight program (the Shenzhou and Tiangong programs) and lunar exploration missions (the Chang’e program) all include senior PLA officers as “commanders” of the effort. Space cooperation with China will almost inevitably mean cooperation with China’s military. In this light, any technology that is transferred to China, openly or as a result of espionage, is likely to benefit the PLA. This is exacerbated by the lack of transparency into China’s space program. For example, there are no good estimates of how much China spends on its space program. Similarly, why China decided to shoot down a weather satellite in 2007, and who was involved in that decision, remains a mystery.Space cooperation will only benefit the PLADean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 4—9—14, research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation, accessed 4-6-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.China is trying to force the U.S. to cooperate to its own benefitRichard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf, accessed 4-10-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***China’s space diplomacy approach toward the United States, as with Russia, has been to try to use all doors — the front and the back and sides. Despite occasional opportunities for discussions between space officials, largely due to post-Tiananmen sanctions, China and the U.S. did not engage in space-technical cooperation as China and Russia did starting in the early 1990s. The U.S. was not selling, but Russia was, so China was able to import significant Russian space technology to accelerate its 921 Program manned effort. China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider space cooperation with the United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of responding to over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its behavior on Earth, or in space, China’s basic space-diplomacy strategy is to wait out the Americans. They are relying on China’s accumulation of space power to convince enough U.S. power centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China must proceed despite real risks. It is a strategy that has worked well for Beijing in both economic and military realms. Competition with China good; drives investment in U.S. space tech; plan reversesRonci ‘18, Robert Jay. "Dividing heaven: investigating the influence of the US ban on cooperation with China on the development of global outer space governance." Master's thesis, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, ?s, 2018, , accessed 8/20/19 tog, p.52-53 "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Competition as Rocket FuelIn Dr. Johnson-Freese’s 2017 book Space Warefare in the 21st Century she describes a series of polls concerning American perspectives on NASA funding. One 2007 poll showed the average American believed NASA received 25% of the U.S. tax budget, a dramatic misperception as in 2007 NASA received just 0.58 percent of the U.S. tax budget (Dittmar, 2007). In 2013, Explore Mars and Boeing asked the public if they would support 1 percent of the U.S. budget going to a Mars mission (effectively doubling the NASA budget). 76% of respondents agreed. Yet in polls that ask whether the U.S. should spend more or less on space, the majority of respondents say less. Thus, there is a clear indication that the American people are largely unaware of what resources the U.S. is spending on space activities. Educating the public on the benefits and necessity of space activities is important, though often challenging. 53Dr. Neil DeGrasse Tyson, astrophysicist and Director of the Hayden Planetarium, famously educates the public about space, though he has a more difficult time advocating for space science missions compared to the relative ease experienced by space security advocates in selling the urgency of preparing for a “space Pearl Harbor” (Johnson-Freese, 2016, p.172). In an episode of Dr. Neil deGrasse Tyson’s podcast StarTalk Radio, he has a particularly revealing conversation about whether the U.S. needs competition to develop space technology. In the episode “Let’s make America smart again: the future of NASA” (Matsos & Tyson, 2017, min 15:22), Dr. Ellen Stofan, former chief scientist at NASA, suggests that perceived competition with China is indeed maintaining political support and drive that encourages more space projects. They both agreed that the public drive to explore the cosmos is not as strong without such a clear challenge, and that a perceived rivalry with China can encourage increases in space program funding. This would correlate with an increasing U.S. national space budget and a return of interest for space issues in the American public discourse.Increased public interest in space exploration appears to be coming from two fronts. On one hand, private companies such as SpaceX have been a huge source of public interest in space development. The recent successful launch of the massive SpaceX falcon heavy rocket, complete with live footage of Elon Musk’s personal vehicle being fired off into an orbit in the direction of Mars, captivated audiences like few space events have in recent decades. History may remember the falcon heavy launch as equivalent to a second moon landing in terms of its ability to inspire the American public. Simultaneously, the launch marked a turning point where the private sector proved it could compete with national governments in space development. The other factor is increasing rhetoric of protecting American space dominance, which has been discussed in this section. Therefore, it can be recognized that trends from the U.S. side of the U.S.-China relationship are developing competitive and conflictual patterns of interaction, while the Wolf amendment is restricting cooperative patterns. These systemic patterns are embedded within the larger system of global space governance. The patterns occurring in this larger system suggest that conditions will be sensitive to these developments in the U.S.-China relationship.Impact - WarSpace cooperation only enables Chinese dominanceRichard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf, accessed 4-10-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is that cooperation in space with China cannot be separated from China’s ambitions on Earth or out into space. Likewise, for the United States to “wall off” space cooperation with China and to treat it as a “special” realm only plays into China’s game. As long as it is ruled by the CCP, China is not likely to alter its ambitions to end the democracy on Taiwan, militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North Korea, like Pakistan, become nuclear missile states, or facilitate wars which challenge U.S. and Western security interests, merely to advance cooperation in space. It is imperative for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges -- and countering China’s expanding military ambitions in space --, are more important to U.S. security than is space cooperation with China. War likelyChinese growing nationalism guarantees conflict with the U.S.Randall Schweller 2018, Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003, p.34-36 accessed 8/18/19 tog #ADAPacket2019# "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Explanations of China’s new assertiveness have focused on both international structure and China’s domestic politics, that is, on both third-image and secondi mage causes. Regarding international structure, pundits claim that, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese leaders perceived a dramatic shift in the global balance of power—an unprecedented transfer of power and wealth from West to East and South.39 The perceived decline of American power and onset of a more multipolar world, so the argument goes, have emboldened Chinese leaders to be ‘more confident in ignoring Deng Xiaoping’s longtime axiom not to treat the United States as an adversary, and in challenging the United States on China’s interests’.40 Here, China’s new assertiveness is consistent with the classical realist principle that nations expand their political interests abroad when their relative power increases. Or as Robert Gilpin explains the dynamic correlation between power and the national interest: ‘The Realist law of uneven growth implies that as the power of a group or state increases, that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over the environment. In order to increase its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control, it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests.’41 In this view, China’s new assertiveness is a predictable consequence of its changed (more exalted) position within the international system.Relatedly, Suisheng Zhao argues that China’s post-2008 ‘strident turn’ is explained by the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy: ‘Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests.’42 Such popular nationalism in China is very much a product of the country’s historical legacy ‘of a long and glorious past, unjust treatment at the hands of foreigners from 1840 to 1949 (and beyond), a desire to regain international respect and equality, an imperative for territorial reunification, and a wish to reaffirm their collective greatness as a people and nation’.43 A shared sense of shame and humiliation with respect to China’s experience of having been a playground of foreign (Western and Japanese) intervention and encroachment is particularly a potent driver of Chinese nationalism and its current behavior.44 Indeed, shame has been a stimulant, a call to action, for generations of Chinese leaders and intellectuals. Though it may sound odd to most Western ears, feeling shame was (and remains) the path to escape the bitter reality of China’s humiliating past. ‘To feel shame is to approach courage,’ reads an inscription in the Temple of Tranquil Seas in Nanjing, where China signed one of its most unequal treaties with a foreign power. China ‘carries the self-image of a “victim nation,” albeit a nation with aspirations finally on a path toward greatness restored. This victim complex, coupled with China’s aspirations and growing power, creates a sense of entitlement—a combination that makes Beijing prickly in its dealing with the United States’ and its neighbors.45We see this cantankerous and touchy mood not only in Beijing’s increasingly tough diplomacy but in the violent demonstrations over the past several years staged by Chinese nationalists against Japanese companies with operations in China, causing some of those companies to relocate to Vietnam. Today, more than ever, Chinese public displays of nationalism and outrage—whether set off by perceived unfair treatment by the West, US–South Korea naval exercises, or insults from the Japanese—appear genuine rather than manufactured. Moreover, whereas nationalism was traditionally confined primarily to young Chinese and to some soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it has spread to Chinese businesspeople, academics, and elite politicians.46 This diffusion of Chinese nationalism is the product of China’s rise and its domestic political system becoming more participative, with different factions fighting among each other, and China’s public sphere growing more dynamic, fueled by the Internet and social media. ‘Beyond the party’s control,’ notes Jayshree Bajoria, ‘the emergence of the Internet in the last two decades has given nationalists more power to vent their anger after particular incidents. It has also brought the huge Chinese diaspora in places like Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Europe, and North America, into closer contact with those residing within China’s borders’, facilitating the continuous flow and escalation of nationalist rhetoric and propaganda.47 And because social media can be used to organize large-scale, nationalist protests in Beijing and other cities against foreign governments, the continued expansion of information technologies throughout the population promises to accentuate the role of nationalism in Chinese policymaking; it also threatens to raise Chinese nationalism to dangerous and unstable levels of hypernationalism.48Given China’s determination to avenge its past, there is every reason to expect that Chinese nationalism will continue to grow in lockstep with the country’s increased power. This phenomenon is already evident among Chinese policymakers, military officials, and average citizens. The consensus is that China must eventually become more internationally assertive to the point where it, like the United States, is willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries to protect its far-flung interests abroad.49 Moreover, some suggest that the goal of global dominance lies at the core of China’s journey from humiliation to rejuvenation. The notion of national rejuvenation, according to the conservative Chinese analyst Yan Xuetong, ‘conjures “the psychological power” associated with China’s rise “to its former world status”. The concept assumes both that China is recovering its natural position and that this means being the “number one nation in the world”’.50Sino-U.S. war scenario uniquely unstable – space assets are a key factorFabian 2019, Christopher David, graduate US Air Force Academy 2013 – dissertation submitted for Masters of Science at University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455, , p14-15, tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Robert Haddick’s Fire on the Water is relevant to this thesis in that it combines an understanding of East Asian geography, the current state of military technology and doctrine, and national motivations to perform a holistic analysis of the Sino-U.S. strategic balance. Although China has substantial coastline, it is viewed as a continental power rather than a maritime one due to the cramped nature of the South China and East China Seas. A series of island chains create a physical barrier that serves to constrain Chinese naval expansion and offers the opportunity for hostile nations to stage attacks into mainland China. China’s traditional fear of encirclement, its quest for resources, and unresolved national sovereignty creates incentives for maritime expansion.44 On the other hand, fear of China’s expanding influence among nations along China’s periphery has resulted in rebalancing in order to contain China. Furthermore, China’s expanded influence threatens U.S. interest in the region, creating the potential to limit access to sea lines of communication and coerce trading partners. This creates a struggle where China must demonstrate the capability to deny U.S. military assets access to the area close to China’s maritime borders while the U.S. seeks to maintain the ability to project power into the region and strike at Chinese strategic interests.This dynamic has two important implications for this thesis. Due to the emphasis on systems warfare and information systems, the current overall military balance lacks first-strike stability. Also, the cost of offensive capabilities is far lower than the capabilities they are designed to defeat. American surface ships and 5th generation air assets are orders of magnitude more expensive and harder to produce than the Chinese anti-access missiles designed to interdict them. Haddick’s assessment of an offensive dominant condition is bleak considering Jervis’s observations about how an environment that favors the offense heightens the security dilemma.More importantly, the tyranny of distance has created an overreliance on space assets in East Asian military operations. It is clear to see through Haddick’s analysis that space operations and terrestrial geography are interrelated. He paints a bleak picture where, in the event of hostilities, the area within 2000km of the Chinese mainland would turn into a dead zone where the cost of performing military operations is prohibitive aside from limited probing actions.45 The United States will likely be deprived of traditional land, sea, and air assets used for performing ISR used for targeting mainland China, which greatly reduces the coercive capability of the U.S. military. The resulting reliance on space assets to perform these functions increases their value as military targets. Likewise, China uses space-based capabilities for targeting U.S. military assets between the Chinese mainland and the second island chain. Aided by their continental position, China’s space and ground based ISR assets create a redundant architecture with which to threaten U.S. assets.46 This creates an asymmetric advantage for China that makes space warfare a possible tool of coercion and deterrence. However, for the Chinese, as the theater of operation’s distance from the mainland increases their reliance on space assets is proportionally raised. Therefore, projecting power beyond the first island chain becomes a difficult proposition without space power. Due to the importance of space assets in the East Asian military balance this thesis argues that they will likely be considered as first-strike options by both nations. Risk of Miscalc leading to nuclear war increasingFabian 2019, Christopher David, graduate US Air Force Academy 2013 – dissertation submitted for Masters of Science at University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455, , p20-21, tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased.Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia.Space KeySpace Key to Heg and China organizing their space efforts under their military to pursue itDean Cheng ‘18, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “Assuring American Access to the Ultimate High Ground: President Trump and the New U.S. Space Force”, July 10, 2018, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The implication is clear. In the event of future conflict with a major peer competitor, space will be a key battleground. Not only will all sides exploit space to support their forces’ operations, but they will also be incentivized to deny others that same support—and will have the means to do so.Securing “space dominance” or “space control,” however, is more than just a matter of possessing space weapons. There must also be organization (someone to wield the weapons) and doctrine (understanding how those weapons can best be employed). Both China and Russia have been pursuing efforts along these lines.In 2015, Russia established the Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily, or Russian Aerospace Forces. The forces combine the Russian air force, the Russian Aerospace and Missile Defense Forces (which in turn control both Russia’s nuclear missile force and its strategic missile defenses), and the Russian Space Force (which apparently manages Russia’s military satellites and associated tracking and control networks).That same year, China engaged in a massive reorganization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which saw, among other things, the creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). Whereas the Russians combined their air force with their Strategic Rocket Force and space elements, the Chinese pursued a very different approach. They brought their electronic warfare, network warfare (including cyber warfare), and space warfare forces together into a single service. If Russia’s Aerospace Force is intended to fight for control of the air-space continuum, the PLASSF is apparently aimed at controlling the information domain, with space being an essential conduit for the collection and exploitation of information.In both cases, the creation of these space-oriented organizations is likely to support the development of a doctrine governing their respective approaches to military space operations. For both the Russian and Chinese militaries, doctrine occupies a central role in their approach to warfighting, as they tend to adhere to it closely.For the United States, though, it is not clear that the creation of a “space force” is necessarily the right solution. While a space force is intended to focus American military energies and efforts when it comes to space, the personnel and infrastructure costs associated with such an effort are far more likely to become all-consuming.1 Moreover, whereas Russian and Chinese space efforts are dominated by the military and by state-run or state-directed space industrial complexes, the United States has a range of civilian agencies that also play a role in space. Similarly, the American space-industrial complex is privately run, with a variety of new entrants arising from such entrepreneurs as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos.Impact HegemonyUS leadership prevents a collapse of the global orderKagan 2017 - Senior Fellow @ Brookings Robert, "Backing Into World War III," Feb 6, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident. In recent years, both pillars have been shaken. The democratic order has weakened and fractured at its core. Difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, and a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism have together produced a crisis of confidence not only in the democracies but in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project elevated universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and to the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and facilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism, an increasing focus on the Other in all societies, and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We are witnessing the opposite of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.” History is returning with a vengeance and with it all the darker aspects of the human soul, including, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of confusion and incoherence. The Dark Ages 2.0 This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable, a recurring phenomenon produced by inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy. In the 1930s, economic crisis and rising nationalism led many to doubt whether either democracy or capitalism was preferable to alternatives such as fascism and communism. And it is no coincidence that the crisis of confidence in liberalism accompanied a simultaneous breakdown of the strategic order. Then, the question was whether the United States as the outside power would step in and save or remake an order that Britain and France were no longer able or willing to sustain. Now, the question is whether the United States is willing to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power or whether Americans are prepared to take the risk — if they even understand the risk — of letting the order collapse into chaos and conflict. That willingness has been in doubt for some time, well before the election of Trump and even before the election of Barack Obama. Increasingly in the quarter century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always clearly served — and when the United States seems to be making all the sacrifices while others benefit. Few remember the reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century. The millennial generation born after the end of the Cold War can hardly be expected to understand the lasting significance of the political, economic, and security structures established after World War II. Nor are they likely to learn much about it in high school and college textbooks obsessed with noting the evils and follies of American “imperialism.” Both the crises of the first half of the 20th century and its solution in 1945 have been forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing that global role have worn thin. Whereas previous unsuccessful and costly wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as with the energy crisis and crippling “stagflation” of the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2008 have. Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but his core strategy was retrenchment. In his actions and his statements, he critiqued and repudiated previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests. The Obama administration responded to the George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq and Afghanistan not by restoring American power and influence but by further reducing them. Although the administration promised to “rebalance” American foreign policy to Asia and the Pacific, in practice that meant reducing global commitments and accommodating revisionist powers at the expense of allies’ security. The administration’s early attempt to “reset” relations with Russia struck the first blow to America’s reputation as a reliable ally. Coming just after the Russian invasion of Georgia, it appeared to reward Moscow’s aggression. The reset also came at the expense of U.S. allies in Central Europe, as programs of military cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic were jettisoned to appease the Kremlin. This attempt at accommodation, moreover, came just as Russian policy toward the West — not to mention Putin’s repressive policies toward his own people — was hardening. Far from eliciting better behavior by Russia, the reset emboldened Putin to push harder. Then, in 2014, the West’s inadequate response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, though better than the Bush administration’s anemic response to the invasion of Georgia (Europe and the United States at least imposed sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine), still indicated reluctance on the part of the U.S. administration to force Russia back in its declared sphere of interest. Obama, in fact, publicly acknowledged Russia’s privileged position in Ukraine even as the United States and Europe sought to protect that country’s sovereignty. In Syria, the administration practically invited Russian intervention through Washington’s passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it, thus reinforcing the growing impression of an America in retreat across the Middle East (an impression initially created by the unnecessary and unwise withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq). Subsequent Russian actions that increased the refugee flow from Syria into Europe also brought no American response, despite the evident damage of those refugee flows to European democratic institutions. The signal sent by the Obama administration was that none of this was really America’s problem. In East Asia, the Obama administration undermined its otherwise commendable efforts to assert America’s continuing interest and influence. The so-called “pivot” proved to be mostly rhetoric. Inadequate overall defense spending precluded the necessary increases in America’s regional military presence in a meaningful way, and the administration allowed a critical economic component, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to die in Congress, chiefly a victim of its own party’s opposition. The pivot also suffered from the general perception of American retreat and retrenchment, encouraged both by presidential rhetoric and by administration policies, especially in the Middle East. The premature, unnecessary, and strategically costly withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, followed by the accommodating agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, and then by the failure to hold the line on threats to use force against Syria’s president, was noticed around the world. Despite the Obama administration’s insistence that American strategy should be geared toward Asia, U.S. allies have been left wondering how reliable the U.S. commitment might be when facing the challenge posed by China. The Obama administration erred in imagining that it could retrench globally while reassuring allies in Asia that the United States remained a reliable partner. Nature abhors a vacuum The effect on the two great revisionist powers, meanwhile, has been to encourage greater efforts at revision. In recent years, both powers have been more active in challenging the order, and one reason has been the growing perception that the United States is losing both the will and the capacity to sustain it. The psychological and political effect of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the United States, which has been to weaken support for American global engagement across the board, has provided an opening. It is a myth, prevalent among liberal democracies, that revisionist powers can be pacified by acquiescence to their demands. American retrenchment, by this logic, ought to reduce tensions and competition. Unfortunately, the opposite is more often the case. The more secure revisionist powers feel, the more ambitious they are in seeking to change the system to their advantage because the resistance to change appears to be lessening. Just look at both China and Russia: Never in the past two centuries have they enjoyed greater security from external attack than they do today. Yet both remain dissatisfied and have become increasingly aggressive in pressing what they perceive to be their growing advantage in a system where the United States no longer puts up as much resistance as it used to. The two great powers have differed, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now been the more careful, cautious, and patient of the two, seeking influence primarily through its great economic clout and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of deterrence and regional intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature, with strategic objectives. And while Beijing has been wary of using military force until now, it would be a mistake to assume it will continue show such restraint in the future — possibly the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their objectives. As the trend lines draw closer, this is where the first crisis is likely to take place. Russia has been far more aggressive. It has invaded two neighboring states — Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 — and in both cases hived off significant portions of those two nations’ sovereign territory. Given the intensity with which the United States and its allies would have responded to such actions during the four decades of the Cold War, their relative lack of a response must have sent quite a signal to the Kremlin — and to others around the world. Moscow then followed by sending substantial forces into Syria. It has used its dominance of European energy markets as a weapon. It has used cyberwarfare against neighboring states. It has engaged in extensive information warfare on a global scale. More recently, the Russian government has deployed a weapon that the Chinese either lack or have so far chosen not to deploy — the ability to interfere directly in Western electoral processes, both to influence their outcomes and more generally to discredit the democratic system. Russia funds right-wing populist parties across Europe, including in France; uses its media outlets to support favored candidates and attack others; has disseminated “fake news” to influence voters, most recently in Italy’s referendum; and has hacked private communications in order to embarrass those it wishes to defeat. This past year, Russia for the first time employed this powerful weapon against the United States, heavily interfering in the American electoral process. Although Russia, by any measure, is the weaker of the two great powers, it has so far had more success than China in accomplishing its objective of dividing and disrupting the West. Its interference in Western democratic political systems, its information warfare, and its role in creating increased refugee flows from Syria into Europe have all contributed to the sapping of Europeans’ confidence in their political systems and established political parties. Its military intervention in Syria, contrasted with American passivity, has exacerbated existing doubts about American staying power in the region. Beijing, until recently, has succeeded mostly in driving American allies closer to the United States out of concern for growing Chinese power — but that could change quickly, especially if the United States continues on its present trajectory. There are signs that regional powers are already recalculating: East Asian countries are contemplating regional trade agreements that need not include the United States or, in the case of the Philippines, are actively courting China, while a number of nations in Eastern and Central Europe are moving closer to Russia, both strategically and ideologically. We could soon face a situation where both great revisionist powers are acting aggressively, including by military means, posing extreme challenges to American and global security in two regions at once. The dispensable nation All this comes as Americans continue to signal their reluctance to uphold the world order they created after World War II. Donald Trump was not the only major political figure in this past election season to call for a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. President Obama and Bernie Sanders both expressed a version of “America First.” The candidate who spoke often of America’s “indispensable” global role lost, and even Hillary Clinton felt compelled to jettison her earlier support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. At the very least, there should be doubts about the American public’s willingness to continue supporting the international alliance structure, denying the revisionist powers their desired spheres of influence and regional hegemony, and upholding democratic and free market norms in the international system. Coming as it does at a time of growing great-power competition, this narrowing definition of American interests will likely hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. The weakness at the core of the democratic world and the shedding by the United States of global responsibilities have already encouraged a more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers. That, in turn, has further sapped the democratic world’s confidence and willingness to resist. History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover, absent a rather dramatic shift of course by the United States. That shift may come too late. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the democratic powers made the most important and ultimately fatal decisions. Americans’ disillusionment after World War I led them to reject playing a strategic role in preserving the peace in Europe and Asia, even though America was the only nation powerful enough to play that role. The withdrawal of the United States helped undermine the will of Britain and France and encouraged Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia to take increasingly aggressive actions to achieve regional dominance. Most Americans were convinced that nothing that happened in Europe or Asia could affect their security. It took World War II to convince them that was a mistake. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict. In such times, it has always been tempting to believe that geopolitical competition can be solved through efforts at cooperation and accommodation. The idea, recently proposed by Niall Ferguson, that the world can be ruled jointly by the United States, Russia, and China is not a new one. Such condominiums have been proposed and attempted in every era when the dominant power or powers in the international system sought to fend off challenges from the dissatisfied revisionist powers. It has rarely worked. Revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. In fact, their very expansion creates insecurity, by frightening neighbors and leading them to band together against the rising power. The satiated power that Otto von Bismarck spoke of is rare. The German leaders who succeeded him were not satisfied even with being the strongest power in Europe. In their efforts to grow still stronger, they produced coalitions against them, making their fear of “encirclement” a self-fulfilling prophecy. Give ‘em an inch, they’ll take a mile This is a common trait of rising powers — their actions produce the very insecurity they claim to want to redress. They harbor grievances against the existing order (both Germany and Japan considered themselves the “have-not” nations), but their grievances cannot be satisfied so long as the existing order remains in place. Marginal concession is not enough, but the powers upholding the existing order will not make more than marginal concessions unless they are compelled to by superior strength. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by taking Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. They demanded much more, and they could not persuade the democratic powers to give them what they wanted without resorting to war. Granting the revisionist powers spheres of influence is not a recipe for peace and tranquility but rather an invitation to inevitable conflict. Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltic States, to the Balkans, and to the heart of Central Europe. And within Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, other nations do not enjoy autonomy or even sovereignty. There was no independent Poland under the Russian Empire nor under the Soviet Union. For China to gain its desired sphere of influence in East Asia will mean that, when it chooses, it can close the region off to the United States — not only militarily but politically and economically, too. China will, of course, inevitably exercise great sway in its own region, as will Russia. The United States cannot and should not prevent China from being an economic powerhouse. Nor should it wish for the collapse of Russia. The United States should even welcome competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes — economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the democratic system, even if it is not itself democratic. But military and strategic competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since World War II that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security and relative stability. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about “soft power” and “smart power,” they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to maintain the balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. Part of that willingness entails defense spending commensurate with America’s continuing global role. For the United States to accept a return to spheres of influence would not calm the international waters. It would merely return the world to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres. These unsettled, disordered conditions produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent as a powerful unified Germany took shape, and the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity and death on an epic scale. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of World War II that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. It will be more than a shame if Americans were to destroy what they created — and not because it was no longer possible to sustain but simply because they chose to stop trying.Hegemony key to preventing great power warTHE ECONOMIST 18 [“The growing danger of great-power conflict,” The Economist, January 25, 2018, ] "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***No longer. Last week the Pentagon issued a new national defence strategy that put China and Russia above jihadism as the main threat to America. This week the chief of Britain’s general staff warned of a Russian attack. Even now America and North Korea are perilously close to a conflict that risks dragging in China or escalating into nuclear catastrophe.As our special report this week on the future of war argues, powerful, long-term shifts in geopolitics and the proliferation of new technologies are eroding the extraordinary military dominance that America and its allies have enjoyed. Conflict on a scale and intensity not seen since the second world war is once again plausible. The world is not prepared.The pity of warThe pressing danger is of war on the Korean peninsula, perhaps this year. Donald Trump has vowed to prevent Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, from being able to strike America with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, a capability that recent tests suggest he may have within months, if not already. Among many contingency plans, the Pentagon is considering a disabling pre-emptive strike against the North’s nuclear sites. Despite low confidence in the success of such a strike, it must be prepared to carry out the president’s order should he give it.Even a limited attack could trigger all-out war. Analysts reckon that North Korean artillery can bombard Seoul, the South Korean capital, with 10,000 rounds a minute. Drones, midget submarines and tunnelling commandos could deploy biological, chemical and even nuclear weapons. Tens of thousands of people would perish; many more if nukes were used.This newspaper has argued that the prospect of such horror means that, if diplomacy fails, North Korea should be contained and deterred instead. Although we stand by our argument, war is a real possibility (see article). Mr Trump and his advisers may conclude that a nuclear North would be so reckless, and so likely to cause nuclear proliferation, that it is better to risk war on the Korean peninsula today than a nuclear strike on an American city tomorrow.Even if China stays out of a second Korean war, both it and Russia are entering into a renewal of great-power competition with the West. Their ambitions will be even harder to deal with than North Korea’s. Three decades of unprecedented economic growth have provided China with the wealth to transform its armed forces, and given its leaders the sense that their moment has come. Russia, paradoxically, needs to assert itself now because it is in long-term decline. Its leaders have spent heavily to restore Russia’s hard power, and they are willing to take risks to prove they deserve respect and a seat at the table.Both countries have benefited from the international order that America did most to establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law—as an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are now revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and look at their regions as spheres of influence to be dominated. For China, that means East Asia; for Russia, eastern Europe and Central Asia.Neither China nor Russia wants a direct military confrontation with America that they would surely lose. But they are using their growing hard power in other ways, in particular by exploiting a “grey zone” where aggression and coercion work just below the level that would risk military confrontation with the West. In Ukraine Russia has blended force, misinformation, infiltration, cyberwar and economic blackmail in ways that democratic societies cannot copy and find hard to rebuff. China is more cautious, but it has claimed, occupied and garrisoned reefs and shoals in disputed waters.China and Russia have harnessed military technologies invented by America, such as long-range precision-strike and electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise the cost of intervention against them dramatically. Both have used asymmetric-warfare strategies to create “anti-access/area denial” networks. China aims to push American naval forces far out into the Pacific where they can no longer safely project power into the East and South China Seas. Russia wants the world to know that, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, it can call on greater firepower than its foes—and that it will not hesitate to do so.If America allows China and Russia to establish regional hegemonies, either consciously or because its politics are too dysfunctional to muster a response, it will have given them a green light to pursue their interests by brute force. When that was last tried, the result was the first world war.Nuclear weapons, largely a source of stability since 1945, may add to the danger. Their command-and-control systems are becoming vulnerable to hacking by new cyber-weapons or “blinding” of the satellites they depend on. A country under such an attack could find itself under pressure to choose between losing control of its nuclear weapons or using them.Vain citadelsWhat should America do? Almost 20 years of strategic drift has played into the hands of Russia and China. George W. Bush’s unsuccessful wars were a distraction and sapped support at home for America’s global role. Barack Obama pursued a foreign policy of retrenchment, and was openly sceptical about the value of hard power. Today, Mr Trump says he wants to make America great again, but is going about it in exactly the wrong way. He shuns multilateral organisations, treats alliances as unwanted baggage and openly admires the authoritarian leaders of America’s adversaries. It is as if Mr Trump wants America to give up defending the system it created and to join Russia and China as just another truculent revisionist power instead.America needs to accept that it is a prime beneficiary of the international system and that it is the only power with the ability and the resources to protect it from sustained attack. The soft power of patient and consistent diplomacy is vital, but must be backed by the hard power that China and Russia respect. America retains plenty of that hard power, but it is fast losing the edge in military technology that inspired confidence in its allies and fear in its foes.To match its diplomacy, America needs to invest in new systems based on robotics, artificial intelligence, big data and directed-energy weapons. Belatedly, Mr Obama realised that America required a concerted effort to regain its technological lead, yet there is no guarantee that it will be the first to innovate. Mr Trump and his successors need to redouble the effort.The best guarantor of world peace is a strong America. Fortunately, it still enjoys advantages. It has rich and capable allies, still by far the world’s most powerful armed forces, unrivalled war-fighting experience, the best systems engineers and the world’s leading tech firms. Yet those advantages could all too easily be squandered. Without America’s commitment to the international order and the hard power to defend it against determined and able challengers, the dangers will grow. If they do, the future of war could be closer than you think.The alternative to hegemony is multipolarity—risks global warTwining, 17 - director of the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, based in Washington, DC, MPhil & PhD degrees from Oxford University (Daniel, "Abandoning the Liberal International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America…," Medium, 3-21-2017, ) "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The liberal world order is under assault. Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system. Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric, one in which smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-influence world?—?which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively attractive. But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict. In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order, however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear weapons; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of “fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II?—?even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee crisis since 1945?—?a stain on the consciousness of human civilization?—?and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a series of hot wars?—?in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen?—?the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse, harming the economies of every major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure?—?since U.S. allies are force-multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that reorder the international balance of power, including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out and assert regional dominion, knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them. The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran?—?all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order?—?would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it. It would also be ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself?—?one ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.Military primacy dampens security competition, deters aggression, and restrains alliesMiller 16 (Paul D., Associate Director of the Clements Center for National Security and Lecturer at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, Distinguished scholar with the Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University, M.P.P. from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, “Military, Intelligence, and National Security Decision Making”, American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy, Georgetown University Press, pp. 264-267) "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Our political judgment must also recognize what overseas military deployments are for, something the advocates of restraint generally misunderstand. Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky believe that US military forces are only useful to deter or defeat military challenges—and since the United States faces none, they believe, it needs only deploy enough military power to the Middle East to prevent a regional hegemon from seizing oil supplies. They are wrong about the absence of military challenges to the United States abroad, but they are also wrong about what military force is for. Military force is an instrument of diplomacy as much as war. It gives weight to a nation’s will, communicates seriousness of intent, provides insurance against uncertainty, deters aggressors, reassures allies, facilitates security cooperation, and affects the psychological environment in which it operates. US overseas deployments “prevent conflict, build the capacity of key partners, [tables omitted] maintain core alliances, and ensure the US military’s ability to secure American interests in critical regions.”13 The United States’ massive lead in military high technology makes it prohibitively expensive for anyone else to try to become a true rival, thereby reinforcing the United States’ conventional military predominance and dampening arms races across the world (although rivals still seek advantages through cyber and unconventional capabilities). It can help deter would-be challengers but also restrain allies. A team of scholars working to rebut Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky rightly argued that “by supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions.”14 In turn, the stabilizing effect of the US global deployments and security guarantees fosters global economic growth, freeing the world economy from the downward pull of great power wars, regional conflicts, and arms races.15 The United States should maintain a globally deployed military force because the world is rife with threats against the United States and liberal order but also because the military is a useful instrument for a wide range of purposes around the world. That said, the military is not the only tool, is often not the best tool, and overseas deployments do not necessarily have to be large to generate the benefits outlined above. Gholz and other advocates of restraint have a point when they argue that US military deployments abroad are not the best tool for fostering democracy or building liberal order. It is, after all, unusual for a state to permanently station large numbers of its military forces outside of its borders, except when they are exercising imperial control over another state. Using military deployments to uphold a certain kind of culture of world order is a relatively novel concept. There is not a direct connection between the culture of liberal order and overseas US military deployments: Liberal order does not spring spontaneously from the soil wherever a uniformed American soldier has stepped. There is, however, an indirect connection. US military deployments, when done right, foster stability, which is a favorable environment for vibrant markets and democratic transition. Global military deployments are best understood as a foundation on which the United States should layer all other tools of national power for the pursuit of its interests. As Henry Nau argues, military force should be employed in and with diplomacy, not afterward or instead of. Neither military deployments nor civilian aid, for example, are effective by themselves; in conjunction, they can be very powerful. That is why, as I argued in the previous chapter, a vast increase in civilian aid is probably the more pressing need for the achievement of a number of US interests around the world.Their criticism of hegemony is demagoguery—it plays into the hands of those looking to reinstitute misery and oppression both globally and domestically and ignores the massive benefits hegemony has had in resolving two world wars and maintaining global stability. Daalder and Kagan, 2016 (Ivo Daalder, U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, is president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. April 22, , DVOG) "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)The economic, political and security strategy that the United States has pursued for more than seven decades, under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, is today widely questioned by large segments of the American public and is under attack by leading political candidates in both parties. Many Americans no longer seem to value the liberal international order that the United States created after World War?II and sustained throughout the Cold War and beyond. Or perhaps they take it for granted and have lost sight of the essential role the United States plays in supporting the international environment from which they benefit greatly. The unprecedented prosperity made possible by free and open markets and thriving international trade; the spread of democracy; and the avoidance of major conflict among great powers: All these remarkable accomplishments have depended on sustained U.S. engagement around the world. Yet politicians in both parties dangle before the public the vision of an America freed from the burdens of leadership.What these politicians don’t say, perhaps because they don’t understand it themselves, is that the price of ending our engagement would far outweigh its costs. The international order created by the United States today faces challenges greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Rising authoritarian powers in Asia and Europe threaten to undermine the security structures that have kept the peace since World War II. Russia invaded Ukraine and has seized some of its territory. In East Asia, an increasingly aggressive China seeks to control the sea lanes through which a large share of global commerce flows. In the Middle East, Iran pursues hegemony by supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and the bloody tyranny in Syria. The Islamic State controls?more territory?than any terrorist group in history, brutally imposing its extreme vision of Islam and striking at targets throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.None of these threats will simply go away. Nor will the United States be spared if the international order collapses, as it did twice in the 20th century. In the 21st century, oceans provide no security. Nor do walls along borders. Nor would cutting off the United States from the international economy by trashing trade agreements and erecting barriers to commerce.Instead of following the irresponsible counsel of demagogues, we need to restore a bipartisan foreign policy consensus around renewing U.S. global leadership. Despite predictions of a “post-American world,” U.S. capacities remain considerable. The U.S. economy remains the most dynamic in the world. The widely touted “rise of the rest” — the idea that the United States was being overtaken by the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China — has proved to be a myth. The dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and people across the globe seek U.S. investment and entrepreneurial skills to help their flagging economies. U.S. institutions of higher learning remain the world’s best and attract students from every corner of the globe. The political values that the United States stands for remain potent forces for change. Even at a time of resurgent autocracy, popular demands for greater freedom can be heard in Russia, China, Iran and elsewhere, and those peoples look to the United States for support, both moral and material. And our strategic position remains strong. The United States has more than 50 allies and partners around the world. Russia and China between them have no more than a handful.For instance, one prime task today is to strengthen the international economy, from which the American people derive so many benefits. This means passing trade agreements that strengthen ties between the United States and the vast economies of East Asia and Europe. Contrary to what demagogues in both parties claim, ordinary Americans stand to gain significantly from the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the agreement will increase annual real incomes in the United States by?$131?billion. The United States also needs to work to reform existing international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, so that rising economic powers such as China feel a greater stake in them, while also working with new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to ensure that they reinforce rather than undermine liberal economic norms.The revolution in energy, which has made the United States one of the world’s leading suppliers, offers another powerful advantage. With the right mix of policies, the United States could help allies in Europe and Asia diversify their sources of supply and thus reduce their vulnerability to Russian manipulation. Nations such as Russia and Iran that rely heavily on hydrocarbon exports would be weakened, as would the OPEC oil cartel. The overall result would be a relative increase in our power and ability to sustain the order.The world has come to recognize that education, creativity and innovation are key to prosperity, and most see the United States as a leader in these areas. Other nations want access to the American market, American finance and American innovation. Businesspeople around the world seek to build up their own Silicon Valleys and other U.S.-style centers of entrepreneurship. The U.S. government can do a better job of working with the private sector in collaborating with developing countries. And Americans need to be more, not less, welcoming to immigrants. Students studying at our world-class universities, entrepreneurs innovating in our high-tech incubators and immigrants searching for new opportunities for their families strengthen the United States and show the world the opportunities offered by democracy.Finally, the United States needs to do more to reassure allies that it will be there to back them up if they face aggression. Would-be adversaries need to know that they would do better by integrating themselves into the present international order than by trying to undermine it. Accomplishing this, however, requires ending budget sequestration and increasing spending on defense and on all the other tools of international affairs. This investment would be more than paid for by the global security it would provide.All these efforts are interrelated, and, indeed, a key task for responsible political leaders will be to show how the pieces fit together: how trade enhances security, how military power undergirds prosperity and how providing access to American education strengthens the forces dedicated to a more open and freer world.Above all, Americans need to be reminded what is at stake. Many millions around the world have benefited from an international order that has raised standards of living, opened political systems and preserved the general peace. But no nation and no people have benefited more than Americans. And no nation has a greater role to play in preserving this system for future generations.Transition wars/Retrenchment won’t be peacefulBrooks and Wohlforth, 2016 (Stephen G., Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, America Abroad: The United States’ Role in the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, Published 8/23/2016, pg. 195-198 "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The Devil We Know Ultimately, the United States’ globe- girdling grand strategy is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged United States is the devil we don’t know. Retrenchment would in essence entail a massive experiment: How would the world work without a globally engaged America? That raises a critical question: What are the things that proponents of disengagement must presume will go right in order for their recommended strategic posture to really be less costly and less risky than deep engagement? Retrenchment proponents do not answer in any detail. This silence is telling, for their most penetrating criticisms of deep engagement are not about the cost/ benefit ratio of sustaining the grand strategy itself but are instead about the temptations of moving beyond it or responding to its challenges in a suboptimally escalatory manner. Any effort to pull back from the world would also present the United States with temptations and potential challenges of implementation; it is just harder to call them to mind because we have no relevant recent experience with this kind of foreign policy stance. Disengagement faces the same key potential pitfall as deep engagement: the temptation to overdo it. Just as deep engagement courts pressure from those who push for Washington to do too much, disengagement courts pressure from those who might want to do too little. And just as there are deep traditions and attitudes within the American body politic that periodically push policies that lie outside deep engagement’s logic, so too are there political forces and traditions that might push for policies outside the logic of the kind of strategic disengagement that retrenchment proponents advocate. Deep engagement’s critics in the academy are not isolationists. They favor decoupling the United States’ military commitments from Eurasia, but not pulling back from an embrace of economic globalization. But in the real world the political movement that might be attracted to retrenchment might not be so discriminating; the foreign policy pronouncements of Donald Trump on the campaign trail have made this evidently clear: on top of the same basic batch of new security policies that retrenchment proponents favor, he adds greatly augmented protectionism and immigration restrictions—which they have not advocated. The bottom line is that there is ample evidence today of powerfully inward- looking attitudes and preferences in the American body politic, and it is not hard to imagine where they might want to push a United States that had opted to pull back from the world. And if the United States did dramatically pull back, fixing the resulting mess might get very expensive indeed. As we noted in chapter 7, once the United States sheds allies, access, and military infrastructure abroad and at home, the costs of re- engaging in some key region, should it become necessary, escalate dramatically. And should the United States pull back from seeking to manage the world economy, should it decide again as it did in the 1930s to try to wall itself off from the vicissitude of global commerce, the damage might not be reparable. If it could be repaired, it would likely take an extremely long time; consider that it was not until the 1970s that global trade flows exceeded the level that existed just prior to America’s imposition of the Smoot- Hawley Tariff in 1930. It is all too easy to think of other ways retrenchment might be taken in directions unforeseen by its advocates, but even if it were implemented perfectly, it rests on what many might see as optimistic assumptions about the robustness of the current, and largely favorable, global order. Most important are the expectations that any disruptions to the order from the shock of a US pullback would be minor, borne mainly by others, and ultimately less costly to the United States than sustaining deep engagement. In other words, retrenchment proponents assume either that today’s economic and institutional order does not need to be backstopped by US deep engagement or, to the degree that it does, that it is just not important enough to the United Stated to warrant the cost of a deeply engaged grand strategy. This book has shown that the weight of scholarship casts strong doubt on those assumptions. Ending the US leadership role would put the institutional order— necessary for managing the global economy as well as other transnational issues— at risk. Withdrawing US security guarantees would raise security tensions in regions, potentially generating conflict that could harm US economic interests and ultimately its security as well. A newly insecure and leaderless world would be much more prone to nuclear proliferation. To their credit, a number of retrenchment proponents acknowledge these risks, just as we have acknowledged deep engagement’s potential pitfalls. The chief response of these analysts is that these risks are most likely to be borne by other states, and so the costs they might impose on the United States are likely to be less than the costs of sustaining deep engagement. To take that bet, one must believe that the United States is well insulated from potential disruptions abroad. This book shows that the odds on that bet are unfavorable across a range of issues. Retrenchment proponents discount some of these, like cooperation in international institutions, but they clearly agree that economic well- being is a basic US interest. And grand strategic retrenchment would be a wager on the proposition that economic globalization would not be disrupted by any regional security competition or war that emerged as a result of US withdrawal or that, if it is disrupted, US firms and investors can avoid being significantly harmed by any turbulence in the markets. Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press are the only retrenchment proponents who examine the global economy in any depth, and they have a noteworthy faith in economic globalization simultaneously being remarkably resilient and yet also highly adaptable. They argue that US firms and investors will be able to adapt, and that economic costs from any turbulence in the markets will be lower than the costs of deep engagement. Although they do not say why they expect this to be the case, they appear to presume cooperation on the global economy will continue relatively unhindered without a single leading state that can use alliance relationships to help broker favorable bargains. Finally, they predict that global oil markets will remain efficient and oil prices will always quickly stabilize if a conflict emerges in a major oil- producing region. Retrenchment thus depends in some measure on a belief that markets are resilient in the face of major geopolitical shocks, or that if they are not and market failures erupt, the United States would either be able to safely ride out the storm or quickly reengage before any widespread damage to its interests occurred. In our view, such confidence is misplaced. The United States once had ample breathing room because it was largely insulated from what happened overseas, but this is no longer the case; as we showed in chapter 10, the United States is now not just deeply intertwined with the global economy but is far and away the most important player in this economic system. This basic difference in assumptions about how well-insulated the United States can be from troubles abroad goes for international security as well as the global economy. Arguably the clearest difference in the arguments swirling around the choice between deep engagement and retrenchment concerns nuclear proliferation. Advocates of pulling back agree with us that there will be many more nuclear states if the United States disengages from the world, but they disagree with our assessment that this will be counterproductive for US interests. The reason is that arguments for retrenchment exude one or both of two kinds of “nuclear optimism”: that nuclear spread will promote peace because states are rational and nuclear deterrence works reliably, or that the costs of any deterrence failure that might occur will be borne by others, not the United States. We provided strong arguments and copious evidence against these optimistic assessments. As the number of nuclear states rises, so too does the risk of nuclear war and the risk of nuclear lea+kage to undeterrable nonstate actors. Decoupling the United States from its alliance commitments not only removes the security provision that arguably keeps a number of states from seeking nuclear weapons now; it vitiates the leverage the United States possesses for sanctions and other disincentives to would- be proliferators. And it is hard to be confident in the United States’ ability to ride out a nuclear deterrence failure somewhere abroad. Even a “small” regional nuclear war would likely produce a crisis in the global economy and disrupt the global environment in various ways, among other downsides.Cooperation won’t solve anything – revisionist powers will more likely undermine the global order than uphold it. Keck 1/24/2014 (Zachary, the Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, a researcher at the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, and an M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. Former Deputy Editor at e-International Relations; a foreign policy reporter at the Washington, D.C. edition of , a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. National Security Research Intern at the Center for a New American Security, a Research Assistant at the Center for Research, Regional Education and Outreach, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic? The end of the unipolar era will create new dangers that the world mustn’t overlook,” 1-24-14, ) "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Still, China’s relative rise and the United States’ relative decline carries significant risks, for the rest of the world probably more so than for Americans. Odds are, the world will be worse off if China and especially others reach parity with the U.S. in the coming years. This isn’t to say America is necessarily as benign a hegemon as some in the U.S. claim it to be. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has undoubtedly at times disregarded international laws or international opinions it disagreed with. It has also used military force with a frequency that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War or a multipolar era. Often this has been for humanitarian reasons, but even in some of these instances military action didn’t help. Most egregiously, the U.S. overrode the rest of the world’s veto in invading Iraq, only for its prewar claims to be proven false. Compounding the matter, it showed complete and utter negligence in planning for Iraq’s future, which allowed chaos to engulf the nation. Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War. The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governanceHeg SustainableAnd hegemony is sustainable – their warrants are based on the assumption Trump would be an isolationist and withdraw from international agreements – that’s wrong. Hal Brands 2018, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump, Google Books, KEL "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***But does America still enjoy that primacy, and can it sustain such an engaged and ambitious strategy in the future? The answer one increasingly hears is no. The world, many say, is rapidly entering a new era of multipolarity, and Washington has no choice but to retrench. “This time it’s real,” writes one scholar: American supremacy is vanishing fast. 18 This argument is not baseless, for America’s margin of superiority has slipped from its post–Cold War peak. In 1994, the United States accounted for nearly one-fourth of global GDP and 40 percent of world military spending, with those numbers rising even higher by the early 2000s. By 2015, however, these statistics had fallen—not dramatically, but not trivially—to 22.4 percent of global GDP and 33.8 percent of world military spending. The share of global wealth and power wielded by America’s core treaty allies had also declined, from roughly 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending in 1994 to roughly 39 and 25 percent, respectively, in 2015. Meanwhile, the share wielded by the chief challenger to American primacy rose dramatically. In 1994, China accounted for just 3.3 percent of global GDP and 2.2 percent of world military spending; by 2015 two decades of booming economic growth and double-digit annual increases in military spending had taken those numbers to 11.8 and 12.2 percent, respectively. 19 By these common measures of global power, the world is not as unbalanced as it used to be. As the global power gap has narrowed, Washington has also been faced with more—and arguably more severe—threats to its position and interests than at any time since the Cold War. Great-power competition has returned, as Russia and China test the contours of an order that they never fully accepted, and that they now have greater capacity—economic, military, or both—to challenge. Moscow and Beijing are seeking to assert primacy within their own regions, probing the distant peripheries of the U.S. alliance system, and developing military capabilities that severely threaten America’s ability to project power and uphold its security commitments in eastern Europe and the western Pacific. China’s antiship ballistic missiles and its coercion of its neighbors, like Russia’s hybrid-warfare activities and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, represent growing challenges to U.S. military superiority in key areas of Eurasia, and to the benign regional orders Washington has sought to maintain. 20 Meanwhile, the long-standing challenge of handling rogue actors has also become more difficult as those actors have become more empowered. North Korea boasts a sizable nuclear arsenal and is rapidly developing a reliable intercontinental strike capability with which to underwrite its serial provocations. 21 Iran is fanning sectarianism, fighting multiple proxy wars, and destabilizing an already-disordered Middle East as it also emerges from punishing international sanctions. The Islamic State is losing ground militarily, but it has shown the capacity of nonstate actors to sow chaos across a crucial region while also spreading and inspiring terrorism across the globe. The world is ablaze, it sometimes seems. In virtually every key region, the United States confronts rising challenges to the post–Cold War order. The world ideological climate is now more contested as well. After being in retreat for decades, authoritarian regimes are increasingly pushing back against liberalizing currents, as the 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath have raised questions about whether democracies can deliver the goods. Russia, China, and other authoritarian regimes have meanwhile reentered the global ideological competition in significant ways, touting the virtues of centralized control and “state capitalism,” and pushing back against Western concepts of political liberalism and human rights. Even countries that are part of the U.S.-led alliance system have regressed politically. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orb á n has proclaimed the rise of the “illiberal state” as an antidote to the weaknesses of liberal democracy, and his example has gained admirers in Poland, Slovakia, and elsewhere. As a result of all this, although democracy remains very robust by historical standards, the advance of electoral democracy has stalled over the past decade, and some contend that a “democratic recession” is under way. 22 If history ever ended, it has restarted once more. In the realm of ideas, as in the realm of geopolitics, American primacy seems less daunting than before. Finally, there are questions about the trajectory of America’s own engagement with the world. The United States has experienced significant real declines in defense spending since 2011, forcing difficult trade-offs among force structure, readiness, and modernization. Indeed, Washington is increasingly facing a crisis of strategic solvency, as America’s undiminished commitments outstrip its shrinking capabilities. 23 At the same time, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have encouraged pro-retrenchment sentiments at home; they have also raised doubts regarding America’s judgment in starting wars and its ability to conclude those wars successfully. Overseas, U.S. partners in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia now appear concerned that America might undertake a broad-based withdrawal from key regions; for their part, Americans seem less convinced as to why the United States should retain such an assertive strategy when there is no obvious existential threat to national security to justify it. According to one poll conducted in 2013, 52 percent of Americans—the highest proportion in decades—believed that the country should now “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.” 24 Not least, there is the simple fact that a candidate who derided U.S. alliances and overseas commitments, who angrily denounced the pursuit of free trade and globalization, and who promised—on the stump, at least—major changes in American foreign policy was elected president in 2016. These factors have collectively fed into a narrative of national ennui and decline that is more pronounced than at any time since the 1970s. Yet if this narrative is not baseless, it is overstated. For the idea that the era of American primacy has passed—that we are now entering or have already entered a truly multipolar world—is far from the truth. By virtually all key measures, the United States still has substantial, even massive, leads over its closest competitors. In 2016 the United States claimed a nearly US$18.6 trillion GDP that was almost US$7.5 trillion larger than China’s, and it possessed a per capita GDP (a crucial measure of how much money a government can extract from its citizens to pursue geopolitical ends) roughly four times that of China. In the military realm, U.S. annual defense spending was still nearly three times that of China as of 2015—a reminder that although China is closing the gap on Washington in certain respects, the overall gap remains significant indeed. 25 In fact, America’s global lead is probably far bigger than indicated by simple numerical measures such as GDP and percentage of global military spending. GDP is a commonly used but problematic way of comparing U.S. and Chinese economic strength. It is merely a snapshot, rather than a fully explanatory measure of how wealth accrues over time; it does not account for factors such as the damage that China is doing to its own long-term economic potential through the devastation of its natural environment; it understates important U.S. advantages such as the fact that American citizens own significant minority shares in foreign corporations. By a more holistic measure of national economic strength—“inclusive wealth,” which takes account of manufactured capital, human capital, and natural capital—the United States was still roughly 4.5 times wealthier than China as recently as 2010. Add in the enormous long-term economic problems that China faces—from declining growth rates, to a massive asset bubble, to a rapidly aging population—and forecasts of coming Chinese economic supremacy become more tenuous still. 26 The U.S. military lead is even more extensive. As a recent study by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth concludes, although China’s ongoing military buildup presents significant, even severe, regional challenges for the United States, at the global level there is still simply no comparison. The United States possesses massive advantages in high-end power-projection capabilities such as aircraft carriers, fourth- and fifth-generation tactical aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, AWACS, and heavy unmanned aerial vehicles. These advantages have been amassed over decades, through enormous and accumulating investments, and so it will take decades—if not longer—for China to come close to matching the United States. These metrics, moreover, do not reflect the other, more intangible advantages that the U.S. military possesses—the years of recent experience in complex operations, the extraordinarily high levels of human capital, the flexible command-and-control structures that permit initiative and adaptation. “Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics,” Brooks and Wohlforth write, “everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come.” 27 Finally, any consideration of global power dynamics must evaluate the role of allies: the United States has dozens of them, whereas China and Russia have few, if any. (Those that they do have, countries such as Belarus and North Korea, make up a veritable international most-wanted list.) America’s allies give it geopolitical leverage, diplomatic influence, and military access that other countries can only envy; they add enormously to the overall weight of the Western coalition of which Washington remains leader. As of 2015, the United States and its core treaty allies in Asia and Europe accounted for roughly three-fifths of global wealth and global military spending—a share that was moderately diminished from twenty years earlier, but still very impressive by nearly all other historical comparisons. CP SolvesCP solvency: US unilateral action and protection of industry from China SolvesKwast, Air Force Lieutenant General, August 19, 2019 (Lt. Gen. Steve Kwast, 8-19-2019, "The Real Stakes in the New Space Race," War on the Rocks, , DOA 8/20/19, DVOG, "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***)The same will hold true with the marketplace of space. Recognizing this, China has shifted to a revolutionary footing. Unless America does the same, the consequences will be dire. Three presidents in history — Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Dwight Eisenhower — intervened at critical moments to drive revolutionary shifts in America’s national defense to defend our economy and country: Teddy Roosevelt with the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt with the bomber aircraft, and Eisenhower with the Cold War nuclear triad. It is now time for bold leaders to accelerate new capabilities in space to compete with a revolutionary threat to America’s interests and values.Unless Congress and the President act now, we will remain on the road to inferiority and submission to China’s power. America is only dipping its toe into the pool of the future, while China is already swimming furiously away. Losing this race means certain economic subordination, and the surrender of our liberty and our values. If we tap into the full power of our American spirit, however, we can save our future.What should be done? I humbly offer four recommendations: First, the Congress should write language into the National Defense Authorization Act that charges the Space Force to defend all American interests to include commerce in space. Second, the same law should provide complete independence from the Air Force to ensure space has the attention and focus required. Third, President Donald Trump should issue an executive order protecting America’s space industry from China’s predatory practices. Fourth and finally, the president should empower the Space Development Agency and direct it to follow the Fast Space Report blueprint to partner with private industry to rapidly develop new space capabilities. It is time for the United States to act with bold and visionary leadership. Half measures and incrementalism will leave the next generation in a world dominated by those who value neither American ideals nor its way of life.CP is NBCP solves DA – more investment in US activities key to maintain space leadershipDean Cheng ‘17, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center Heritage Foundation, “Responding to the Chinese Space Challenge”, January 6, 2017, Heritage Foundation , accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***How America Should RespondIt is clear that China will be pressing forward with the development of its space capabilities, including new satellites, launchers, and facilities. Even more important, however, Beijing clearly views space as one of the many tools it can and does employ to further its overall political goals.For the United States, including the incoming Trump Administration, it is therefore essential to keep from falling behind China’s burgeoning space efforts. It is equally vital that the United States integrate its space activities with its other political and diplomatic, economic, and military activities as part of its national strategy. Space policy should not be developed in a vacuum.To this end, American leaders should take several steps to ensure that our space program remains at the forefront of our strategic thinking.Incorporate American space achievements into our broader political messaging. The United States is not engaged in a space race with China or Russia, but that does not mean that space missions do not influence international perceptions. NASA is one of the world’s most recognizable brands, and space capabilities are part of America’s brand. The world views American space accomplishments, including the New Horizons mission to Pluto, the International Space Station, and the upcoming James Webb Space Telescope, as a reflection not only of our scientific curiosity, but also of our industrial and technological capabilities and as part of our political appeal. Consequently, our abilities and advances in space should be incorporated into American strategic messaging and public diplomacy efforts, reflecting our overall national will and capacity.Establish a clear road map for maintaining American space capabilities. Because of its wealth, the United States sustains four space-related programs. NASA focuses on space exploration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for providing essential information such as meteorological forecasting. In addition, there is the realm of national security space, where the U.S. Air Force and the intelligence community fly a variety of space systems to monitor global developments. Yet despite this substantial commitment of resources, the United States continues to rely on Russia for rocket engines and to place American astronauts in orbit. This dependence will eventually undermine American space superiority: If we cannot decide how and when to place payloads into orbit, how can we sustain our position?Sustain funding and provide programmatic stability for key space projects. It is incumbent on the incoming Administration and Congress to provide the wherewithal to support continued American leadership in space. In part, this entails providing sufficient funding over the long term to ensure that programs can be brought to fruition. The end of the Space Shuttle program has seen a variety of incarnations of rockets and crew capsules, but the consistent support from both the executive and legislative branches necessary to produce a working system has never materialized. Similar problems have marred the American weather satellite constellation to the point that the U.S. now depends on China for portions of its weather data.Encourage private-sector entrepreneurship and innovation in meeting civilian space demands. In some areas, such as communications satellites, private companies have long been dominant. Companies such as Intelsat are among the world’s largest operators of satellites, their constellations dwarfing many nationally owned and operated ones.ConclusionOne of the Obama Administration’s major innovations has been increased reliance on the private sector to produce new approaches to managing and even to launching satellites. Coupled with interest from such entrepreneurs as Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk, the result has been a surge of companies striving to fill the gaps in America’s space capabilities. This approach should be sustained in the coming years, especially as the companies’ products mature and become increasingly reliable. Encouraging entrepreneurship and unleashing private-sector innovation will be crucial to rebuilding America’s lead in space.Responses to AffA2 China just coop w/ othersEurope only limited cooperation with ChinasRebecca Arcesati ‘19 is an intern in the Foreign Relations program at MERICS. She holds a double Master’s degree in China Studies from the University of Turin and Yenching Academy of Peking University, “China’s space program is about more than soft power”, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2/21/19, accessed 8/20/19 tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The ESA has long been keen to work with China, particularly on scientific missions for which pooling resources is key to success. Last year, the European space industry expressed wariness of the Trump administration’s vision of US dominance in space. At first glance, with its rhetoric of cooperation and peaceful development, Beijing may appear like an ideal partner. ESA director general Jan Woerner told Xinhua News that the agency welcomed more cooperation with China. Aside from human spaceflight and lunar research, China and European countries collaborate on a variety of projects, from earthquake early warning to oceanography. But despite the undisputed scientific benefits of such cooperation initiatives, Beijing is far from being a reliable partner in space. The opaque role of the military in the country’s space program, coupled with China’s behavior in similarly uncertain legal spaces on earth, calls for a cautious approach in Europe. If Washington’s zero-sum posture fueled greater competition and mistrust with China, a soft approach may underestimate very real risks, such as the transfer of dual-use space technology to the PLA. Europe should limit cooperation efforts to shared scientific goals, for instance space debris mitigation. At the same time, it must use this opportunity to demand greater transparency from China. A2 Coop Moderate ChinaSpace cooperation will not moderate Chinese behaviorEric Sterner, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute, “China, Talk and Cooperation in Space,” SPACE NEWS, 8—6—15, , accessed 4-16-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***How might cooperation with China benefit the United States? Some hold that cooperation in space helps promote cooperation on Earth. Writing in SpaceNews in 2013, Michael Krepon argued “The more they cooperate in space, the less likely it is that their competition on Earth will result in military confrontation. The reverse is also true.” That sentiment is widespread and flows from the nobility of exploration. If only it were so. Unfortunately, a country’s space behavior appears to have little affect on its terrestrial actions. Russia’s multidecadal human spaceflight partnership with the United States did not prevent it from invading and destabilizing Ukraine when it moved toward a closer relationship with the European Union, many of whose members are Russian partners in the International Space Station. Space cooperation has not, and will not, prevent the continued worsening of the security environment in Europe, which flows from Russian behavior on Earth, not in space. Space cooperation with China is similarly unlikely to moderate its behavior. Tensions in Asia derive from China’s insistence on pressing unlawful territorial claims in the Pacific, most recently by transforming disputed coral reefs into would-be military bases. Ironically, civilian space technology has proved critical in documenting these aggressive moves. To further demonstrate the civil space cooperation does not promote cooperation on Earth, we need look no further than recent history. The NASA administrator’s visit to China in the fall of 2014 nearly coincided with China’s hacking of NOAA, with whom Beijing has a “partnership” in studying climate change. Military confrontation flows from the interaction of hard power in pursuit of competing national interests. Space cooperation falls into the realm of soft power. It has value in strengthening relationships among like-minded states with similar interests. China’s aggressiveness toward its neighbors, its human rights record and its cyberattacks on the United States strongly demonstrate that it and the United States are not of like minds. This is not the result of insufficient space cooperation, but of divergent national interests. The United States is a status quo power; China is not.Cooperation on space issues empirically does not change Chinese behaviorEric Sterner, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute, “China, Talk and Cooperation in Space,” SPACE NEWS, 8—6—15, , accessed 4-16-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***At the end of June, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, in the course of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, agreed to establish “regular bilateral government consultations on civil space cooperation.” Neither the purpose of these consultations nor the topics they will cover was immediately clear. The U.S. and Chinese governments already discuss satellite collision avoidance and conduct joint research into greenhouse gas monitoring, severe weather monitoring, space weather and climate science. This cooperation seems to produce little fruit. It certainly has not affected Chinese behavior vis-à-vis its relationship with the United States. Indeed, last fall, hackers in China attacked a U.S. partner to these cooperative relationships, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, leading the agency briefly to stop making satellite weather data available to the public. If this is what it means to cooperate with China in space, the United States is better off without it.China’s space program is closely tied to its military, and ties to it will not allow us to influence Chinese behaviorDean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 4—9—14, research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation, accessed 4-6-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***My comments today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in outer space. While the United States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at the same time, it is vital that cooperation occur with full understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that such cooperation serve American interests. In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed, and an asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two countries in this vital arena. To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics of China’s space program. First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with the United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA. Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any other foreign actor. These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront serious obstacles, and entail significant risks.Coop will not allow us to more readily influence China’s space programEric Sterner, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute, “OpEd: U.S.-China Space Relations: Maintaining an Arm’s Length,” SPACE NEWS, 3—6—09, , accessed 5-19-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Others will be tempted to promote a partnership in the vain hope of influencing the direction of China‘s space program. The simple truth is that China‘s space program exists to serve the interests – both domestic and foreign – of the ruling party in China. It is not merely an appendage of the U.S.-PRC relationship to be directed by western carrots and sticks. The Chinese people are immensely proud of their accomplishments in orbit, as well they should be. They represent technical prowess that once belonged solely to the superpowers and appear to resonate emotionally with the Chinese people in much the same way that Apollo once did with Americans. Space programs represent progress and the promise of a brighter future. Expanded civilian capabilities/use does not empirically cause China to be less aggressive in spaceAshley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Seapower and Projection Forces, 1—28—14, , accessed 4-27-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The idea that Chinese counterspace activities would diminish in intensity as Beijing slowly became a space power of significance has also proven to be illusory. Without a doubt, China is a major spacefaring nation today. The number of annual Chinese space launches currently exceeds that of the United States and it is believed that China presently operates some 105 satellites in space, just six short of the number required to surpass the Russian satellite inventory in orbit right now. Chinese satellites today span the gamut from weather and navigation platforms to communications and remote sensing, from electro-optical surveillance and synthetic aperture radar systems to electronic intelligence collection platforms. The Chinese space program more generally is attempting to push the boundaries of innovation with its manned spaceflight and lunar exploration components as well as through other development activities such as its spaceplane and hypersonic glide vehicle programs. Even as China has expanded these investments in space, however, its commitment to developing a wide range of counterspace capabilities—targeted principally at the United States but also applicable to other spacefaring powers—has not diminished. This antinomous dynamic is driven by two realities. First, even as China seeks to use space for its own national goals, it is determined to develop and employ counterspace technologies whenever necessary to neutralize the combat advantages enjoyed by its opponents in the event of a conflict, while at the same time utilizing these burgeoning capabilities to deter any adversary attacks on its own space systems. Second, although the goals of Chinese counterspace employment vis-à-vis a superior adversary, such as the United States, may subsist in tension with China’s own professed desire for a peaceful space environment, Beijing appears to have concluded that the “delta” between its own and Washington’s dependence on space for the fulfillment of their respective national aims favors China rather than the United States. In other words, although competing counterspace actions by both nations would be hazardous to their common interests, the United States would stand to lose more than China does, given the relatively greater American dependence on space for both civilian and military purposes. Based on such an assessment, prosecuting counterspace operations in a crisis may be rational for China in any significant Sino-U.S. conflict along its periphery, even though Beijing itself stands to lose considerably as a result of the expected American riposte.Space coop will do little to check any terrestrial conflictsRichard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf, accessed 4-10-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***This mirrors the CCP/PLA’s repeated refusal of U.S. requests to consider real nuclear weapons transparency and control, transparency over its nuclear and missile exports, and --from many of its neighbors and Washington -- fair settlement of territorial disputes which threaten war. The latter, especially in the South China Sea, is instructive. As it has gained military power in the South China Sea, China has sought to change the strategic environment and dictate new rules to increase its security at the expense of others. Once it gains commanding strength and position in space, will China do the same? For the United States, cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but it likely will have little impact on the direction and severity of terrestrial conflicts which will dominate relations with China. One can see the value of meeting with Chinese space officials, especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But at this juncture, before China has achieved levels of “space dominance”, it is crucial to link any real cooperation with China to its behavior in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S. security.Space cooperation does not improve relations—will only bring in the all the other disputesEric Sterner, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute, “OpEd: U.S.-China Space Relations: Maintaining an Arm’s Length,” SPACE NEWS, 3—6—09, , accessed 5-19-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***It is tempting to hold out space partnership as a tool to influence the broader U.S.- PRC relationship. In particular, those who view space as a means of influencing terrestrial politics will push for a partnership. By learning to live and work together in space, we can better live and work together on Earth, or so the theory goes. But, such an approach fails to grasp the nature of international politics, in which space policy is a tool of broader goals, and not the other way around. As a result, the broad U.S.-PRC relationship will affect how the two countries interact with one another in space, and not vice versa. In that context, it makes little sense to seek a space partnership with Chjna. The bilateral relationship is simply too unsettled with too many potential flashpoints, ranging from and human rights to labor practices and currency manipulation. Thus, a space partnership would only import all of the burdens of the broader geopolitical relationship into the space program, without necessarily benefiting the program in a meaningful way. Instead, sophisticated, multiyear cooperative projects would be at risk when Chinese behavior on human rights, toward its neighbors, in currency manipulation, or in proliferating dangerous technologies clash with American values, ideals or interests. Similarly, may counter moves to preserve a strategic balance in by imposing consequences on any bilateral space project, essentially holding American space interests hostage to broader issues.China will only agree to space cooperation to the extent that it serves to legitimize the CCP—view space policy through very political lensDean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 4—9—14, research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation, accessed 4-6-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Moreover, in keeping with the Chinese memory of the “Century of Humiliation,” Beijing will want any cooperative venture to be, at a minimum, on a co-equal basis. For the PRC to be treated as anything other than a full member in any program or effort would smack of the “unequal treaties” that marked China’s interactions with the rest of the world between 1839 and 1949. For the same reason, China has generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it was not party to negotiating. For the CCP, whose political legitimacy rests, in part, on the idea that it has restored Chinese pride and greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation. At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.” The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent. From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms.Coop would come at a price—would ask for big concessionsDean Cheng, research fellow, Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs than Benefits,” WEBMEMO n. 2670, 10—30—09, Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits, accessed 5-1-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas.China is trying to force the U.S. to cooperate to its own benefitRichard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf, accessed 4-10-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***China’s space diplomacy approach toward the United States, as with Russia, has been to try to use all doors — the front and the back and sides. Despite occasional opportunities for discussions between space officials, largely due to post-Tiananmen sanctions, China and the U.S. did not engage in space-technical cooperation as China and Russia did starting in the early 1990s. The U.S. was not selling, but Russia was, so China was able to import significant Russian space technology to accelerate its 921 Program manned effort. China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider space cooperation with the United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of responding to over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its behavior on Earth, or in space, China’s basic space-diplomacy strategy is to wait out the Americans. They are relying on China’s accumulation of space power to convince enough U.S. power centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China must proceed despite real risks. It is a strategy that has worked well for Beijing in both economic and military realms. Space weapons unlikely, not a threat—terrestrial weapons are the problemAshley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Don’t Panic About Space Weapons,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, 2—22—08, , accessed 5-4-16. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The biggest deficiency in the Russian-Chinese draft treaty is that it focuses on the wrong threat: weapons in space. There aren't any today, nor are there likely to be any in the immediate future. The threat to space assets is rather from weapons on earth -- the land- and sea-based kinetic, directed-energy and electromagnetic attack systems. The treaty entirely ignores these.Aff AnsU.S. primacy collapse is inevitable. Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Friedman Lissner 19. Mira, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a Fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and Director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Rebecca, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previous special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary at the U.S. Department of Energy. Held positions at the U.S. Mission to NATO, Albright Stonebridge Group, and Bridgewater Associates. May/June Edition. “The Open World.” Foreign Affairs. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Since the election of U.S. President Donald Trump in 2016, it has become commonplace to bemoan the fate of the U.S.-led liberal international order—the collection of institutions, rules, and norms that has governed world politics since the end of World War II. Many experts blame Trump for upending an otherwise sound U.S. grand strategy. They hope that once he is gone, the United States will resume the role it has occupied since the fall of the Soviet Union: as the uncontested hegemon ruling benevolently, albeit imperfectly, over a liberalizing world. It won’t. Washington’s recent dominance was a historical anomaly that rested on a rare combination of favorable conditions that simply no longer obtain, including a relatively unified public at home and a lack of any serious rivals abroad. American leaders must recognize this truth and adjust their strategy accordingly. Although the post–Cold War order was never a monolith, it aspired to a form of liberal universalism. U.S. leaders assumed that gradually, the rest of the world would come to accept the basic premises of the liberal order, including democracy, free trade, and the rule of law. And with a level of economic and military power unrivaled in human history, the United States could pursue a foreign policy that sought to preclude the emergence of great-power rivals. By 2008, however, the United States was stumbling. U.S. missteps in the Middle East, followed by the global financial crisis, signaled to would-be competitors that Washington was no longer invulnerable. Today, rival powers such as China and Russia actively participate in the liberal order even as they openly challenge the primacy of liberalism. Technological advances in computing and artificial intelligence (AI) are giving weaker actors the means to compete directly with the United States. And domestic divisions and global rivalries are making international cooperation harder to sustain. Liberal universalism is no longer on the table. Instead, the United States should make the defense of openness the overarching goal of its global strategy. This will mean preventing the emergence of closed regional spheres of influence, maintaining free access to the global commons of the sea and space, defending political independence, and abandoning democracy promotion for a more tempered strategy of democracy support. Washington should continue to pursue great-power cooperation where possible, through both global institutions such as the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regulatory regimes such as the one set out in the Paris climate accord. But in domains not already governed by international rules, such as AI, biotechnology, and cyberspace, it must prepare to compete with its rivals while working with its allies to establish new rules of the road. An openness-based strategy would represent a clear departure from the principles of liberal universalism that have guided U.S. strategy since the end of the Cold War. Instead of presuming the eventual triumph of liberalism, it would signal U.S. willingness to live alongside illiberal states and even to accept that they may take a leading role in international institutions. Such a strategy would preserve existing structures of the liberal order while recognizing that they will often fall short; and when they do, it would call on the United States and like-minded partners to create new rules and regimes, even if these lack universal appeal. Harboring no illusions about geopolitical realities, an openness-based strategy would prepare to defend U.S. interests when cooperation proved impossible. But it would define those interests selectively, sharpening the nation’s focus and eschewing the unending crusades of liberal universalism. Rather than wasting its still considerable power on quixotic bids to restore the liberal order or remake the world in its own image, the United States should focus on what it can realistically achieve: keeping the international system open and free. THE RETURN OF RIVALRY For nearly three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States had no significant geopolitical rivals. Today, it has two. The first, Russia, is a revanchist power, but its economic stagnation renders it more a spoiler than a genuine challenger. With an acute dependency on oil and a projected economic growth rate hovering around two percent, Russia is likely to see its international power decline over the next decade. Yet Russia is far more economically and politically stable today than it was in the 1990s, allowing it to project power far beyond its borders. And Russian President Vladimir Putin has played a bad hand well: he has integrated Russia’s significant hybrid warfare, cyberwar, and nuclear capabilities into an asymmetric defense strategy that lets the country punch well above its weight. Moscow will never truly challenge U.S. dominance, but it will disrupt the democratic processes of EU and NATO members and threaten former Soviet states for the foreseeable future. The United States’ second rival, China, is on track to become its only real peer competitor. During the 1990s and the first decade of this century, the United States benefited from Chinese leaders’ fixation on economic growth and internal stability at the expense of geopolitical power. But since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, Beijing has explicitly sought to reestablish its regional hegemony in Asia. China is now on track to be the world’s largest economy by 2030 in terms of GDP, and China’s technology sector already approaches that of the United States in both research-and-development spending and market size. By the early 2020s, China’s military power in Asia will rival that of the United States, although the U.S. military will retain considerable global advantages. Traditional measures of power are only part of the story, thanks to disruptive technologies such as AI. AI is likely to spread quickly but unevenly, and it may encourage escalation by lowering the costs of conflict, as militaries become less dependent on manpower and destruction becomes more precisely targeted. Countries such as China, with its government access to massive citizen databases, state control over media, and lack of privacy rights and other individual freedoms, may create new forms of “digital authoritarianism” that allow them to fully exploit AI for military and political uses. And although the U.S. technology sector is the most advanced in the world, there are signs that the U.S. government may have trouble harnessing it. Silicon Valley’s supranational self-image and global business interests make it skeptical of cooperating with the government—late last year, Google withdrew its bid for a $10 billion cloud-computing contract with the Pentagon, citing ethical concerns. Washington’s lack of technical expertise, meanwhile, could lead it to regulate Silicon Valley in unproductive ways. Tension between the U.S. government and the U.S. technology sector is one problem, but domestic polarization is a more fundamental issue. The virtual elimination of any middle ground between Democrats and Republicans means that nearly any issue—including foreign policy initiatives that used to be bipartisan—can get politicized by lawmakers, the media, and the public. This will not only foment dissension on the most consequential foreign policy choices, such as when and where to use military force; it could also generate dramatic foreign policy swings as the presidency passes from one party to the other, making the United States a persistently unpredictable global actor. And by ensuring that nearly every issue divides along partisan lines, polarization creates domestic fissures that foreign powers can exploit, as Russia did with its hacking and disinformation campaigns in the 2016 presidential election. Taken together, these domestic trends will make it harder for the United States to sustain a consistent global strategy and easier for its rivals to assert themselves. Although war will remain a threat, renewed great-power competition is more likely to manifest itself in persistent, low-level conflict. Post–World War II international law prohibits aggressive conventional and nuclear war but says nothing about coercion below the threshold of military force. States have always tried to pursue their interests through coercive means short of war, but in recent years, interstate competition has flourished in new domains, such as cyberspace, that largely operate beyond the reach of international law. China and Russia possess devastating conventional and nuclear capabilities, but both wish to avoid a full-scale war. Instead, they will pursue disruptive strategies through subtler means, including hacking, political meddling, and disinformation. Sustained competition of this sort has not been seen since the Cold War, and U.S. strategy will need to prepare for it. As new forms of conflict emerge, traditional forms of cooperation are unlikely to keep pace. The United States is striking ever-fewer formal international agreements. During the Obama administration, the United States ratified fewer treaties per year than at any time since 1945. In 2012, for the first time since World War II, the United States joined zero treaties, and then it did the same in 2013 and 2015. The international community has similarly stalled in its efforts to pass new multilateral accords. Issues such as digital commerce and cyberconflict remain un- or undergoverned, and their sheer complexity makes it unlikely that new international rules on them will be passed anytime soon. THE OPEN ROAD The emerging world order is one in which the United States will face major internal and external constraints. The country will remain tremendously powerful, continuing to dominate the international financial system and maintaining a level of military and economic power enjoyed by few nations in history. Yet its capabilities will be more limited, and the challenges it faces, more diffuse. A shrewd strategy must therefore be discerning in its priorities and guided by clear principles. Washington’s first priority should be to maintain global openness. Rather than attempting to spread liberal economic and political values, that is, the United States should focus on a more modest goal: ensuring that all countries are free to make independent political, economic, and military decisions. Geopolitically, a commitment to openness means that Washington will have to prevent a hegemonic adversary or bloc from controlling Asia, Europe, or both through a closed sphere of influence. If a competitor came to dominate part or all of Eurasia in a manner that displaced the United States, it would pose a direct threat to U.S. prosperity and national security. The greatest challenge to openness can be found in the Indo-Pacific, where China will increasingly assume regional leadership. In some respects, this is only natural for a country that has grown in power so much over the last four decades. But accepting Beijing as a regional leader is not the same as accepting a closed Chinese sphere of influence. China, for instance, has already become the dominant trading and development partner for many nations in Southeast Asia; if it were to use the artificial island bases it has built to block freedom of navigation in the South China Sea or attempt to coerce its partners using the leverage it has acquired through its infrastructure investments, a closed sphere would be in the offing. To keep the Indo-Pacific region open, the United States should maintain its military presence in East Asia and credibly commit to defending its treaty allies in the region, including Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It must also support regional states’ political autonomy by recommitting itself to regional diplomacy and working with multilateral coalitions to ensure that any rules that Beijing seeks to set are transparent and noncoercive. Major powers are inevitable---transition prevents prolif of cyber-weapons, space assets and next-gen nukes.Jeffrey D. Sachs 16. Professor of Sustainable Development and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, is Director of Columbia’s Center for Sustainable Development and of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. 12-29-2016. “Learning to Love a Multipolar World.” "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***NEW YORK – American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The United States has been an expanding power since its start in 1789. It battled its way across North America in the nineteenth century and gained global dominance in the second half of the twentieth. But now, facing China’s rise, India’s dynamism, Africa’s soaring populations and economic stirrings, Russia’s refusal to bend to its will, its own inability to control events in the Middle East, and Latin America’s determination to be free of its de facto hegemony, US power has reached its limits. One path for the US is global cooperation. The other is a burst of militarism in response to frustrated ambitions. The future of the US, and of the world, hangs on this choice. Global cooperation is doubly vital. Only cooperation can deliver peace and the escape from a useless, dangerous, and ultimately bankrupting new arms race, this time including cyber-weapons, space weapons, and next-generation nuclear weapons. And only cooperation can enable humanity to face up to urgent planetary challenges, including the destruction of biodiversity, the poisoning of the oceans, and the threat posed by global warming to the world’s food supply, vast drylands, and heavily populated coastal regions. Yet global cooperation means the willingness to reach agreements with other countries, not simply to make unilateral demands of them. And the US is in the habit of making demands, not making compromises. When a state feels destined to rule – as with ancient Rome, the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” centuries ago, the British Empire from 1750 to 1950, and the US since World War II – compromise is hardly a part of its political vocabulary. As former US President George W. Bush succinctly put it, “You’re either with us or against us.”No impact to heg decline - all statistical evidence indicates stability is independent of US powerFettweis, 2017 Christoher J., Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. in International relations/Comparative Politics from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace”, Security Studies, Volume 26, No. 3, pp. 423-451 "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe. In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history. The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it.No transition wars – institutionalized norms solve the transition – empirics prove. Zala, Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2017Benjamin, “Great power management and ambiguous order in nineteenth-century international society”, Review of International Studies, Volume 43, Issue 2 April 2017, pp. 367-388 "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Given the competing arguments today about whether a power transition is imminent, already under way, has already taken place, or is actually unlikely to take place at all, the idea of great power management as a social institution being on the decline seems straightforward. Yet the nineteenth century’s golden age of great power management actually provides reason to be cautious in declaring the end of the ‘great responsibles’. Whilst often being depicted in hindsight as an unending multipolar era, this was in fact a far more complex one in which the systemic picture is somewhat confusing and at times contradictory – not unlike today’s world. The historical analysis above has identified a number of points of friction in the conventional understanding of the great powers as being uniformly ‘known’ and accepted by the members of international society throughout the period. Holsti points out that even post hoc analysis is not always aligned here and it is therefore to be expected that contemporary ideas about great power status which gave international society its hierarchical form at any one point in time were similarly inconsistent. He notes that while Richard Rosecrance identifies four distinct systems between 1815 and 1890, Stephen Pelz sees only one (a multipolar order based on a classical balance of power). 126 For Holsti, the point is ‘not to take sides between Pelz and Rosecrance, but to illustrate that even long after the fact, rigorous scholars can disagree about whether systemic change took place’. 127 Through an analysis of the words and actions of key players in history, it becomes evident that some states are granted the special social station of great power status based not only on material capabilities but also relating to their historical claims to this status and also their diplomatic skill. Changes both within and of polarity can be perceived differently 128 and therefore should not be expected to structure ‘the horizon of states’ probable actions and reactions’ 129 uniformly and in totally predictable ways when it comes to great power management. The historiography of great power politics of the nineteenth century presented here paints a messy and complex picture of how great power status is perceived in international society. In particular, it suggests that geography, culture, and history have mattered in the construction of the great powers in the past. This is important not only for the way in which we tell the story of the expansion of international society, but also for how we use history when discussing the effect of different forms of polarity, power transitions, and historical world orders. The discussion has also suggested that, in line with more analytically eclectic approaches to International Relations theory, both material and non-material aspects are important in the granting of great power status which, in opening up the space for competing perceptions of status, should alert us to the possibility of greater ambiguity in history in terms of the polarity of the system. The analysis has highlighted that contradictory views can be held, even within one state, regarding the holders of great power status in international society at any one time. This strongly suggests that current approaches to understanding the way the great powers interact on key areas of war, stability, trade, cooperation, and governance must take into account the ambiguities inherent in the functioning of the social construction of world order. The point is not to be able to move beyond the multiplicity of understandings of the nineteenth century order and settle on a single story of great power status and polarity during this time. Rather, as scholars, we must become more comfortable with these contradictions, particularly if we are to understand the similarities and parallels with the current epoch. It also suggests that a single category of great powers is not a necessary requirement for, at least some degree of, great power management. 130 In this sense, it suggests that the seemingly more imprecise language of ‘major powers’ and ‘non-major powers’ can still capture the participants in various practices of global management. The more rigorous distinctions between regional, great, and superpowers are simply not uniformly applied by practitioners trying to make sense of the world around them. It is clear from the period that the practice of great power management was not rendered impossible by such competing perceptions. Partly this is to do with institutionalisation. Clark describes ‘the perception’ that a new order based around multiple poles of power having special rights and responsibilities ‘was also being conferred a quasi-legal basis’. 131 This is captured in what Gerry Simpson highlights as the ‘legalised hegemony’ of the Concert system which involved ‘a highly formalistic commitment to sovereign equality in relations between the hegemons’. 132 This commitment was institutionalised in the diplomatic practice of ‘the powers’ meeting at regular intervals which, despite the confusing and ambiguous picture of the interstate order that emerges from the analysis above, allowed the Concert system to facilitate the practice of great power management. This then would appear to challenge Justin Morris’s claim that ‘the conferment of recognition’ amongst the great power managers themselves ‘is dependent at the very least on: acceptance that each member of the club is of equal standing and esteem’. 133 At least in the nineteenth century, it would appear that perfectly equal and uniform status recognition was not always a precursor to the practice of great power management and that institutionalised forms of management were relatively durable even under conditions of ambiguity. The degree to which particular elements of great power management – for example, whether Bull’s first order task of managing relations between themselves as compared to his second order task of managing relations between the great and lesser powers – are affected differently by such ambiguity may well be a fruitful area of future research based on these findings. As is suggested by the discussion of the Eastern Crisis and the geopolitical manoeuvring in Northeast Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries discussed above, a greater degree of ambiguity (even at the margins of the great power order) would seem to shift attention from second order to first order great power management. If Adam Watson was correct and for international society to ‘function effectively, the dialogue between its major powers must be system-wide’, 134 then the way we theorise great power management and international society as a whole must be able to theoretically handle the kind of breakdowns in collective perceptions discussed in this article. It also tells us that given the way that competing narratives about the current shape of the interstate order are producing an ambiguous picture simultaneously involving images of unipolarity, US decline, a growing US-Sino bipolar rivalry, and an imminent multipolar ‘rise of the rest’, the conclusion that this spells the end of great power management is premature. What the nineteenth century tells us about the prospects for order in the future is that the social institution of great power management can endure even under an ambiguous interstate order.Transition theory is based in examinations of European history that are inaccurate when applied to China David C. Kang & Xinru Ma 2018, professor of International Relations and business at the University of Southern California, where he also directs the Korean Studies Institute and the Center for International Studies AND Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science and International Relations Program at USC, respectively, 3-26-2018, “Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia”, The Washington Quarterly, Accessed through Taylor & Francis online "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***This lack of expertise about Asia is a national security threat. It puts the United States at a severe disadvantage in dealing with a complex, ancient, and dynamic region. Americans do not understand Asia well. Its complex languages, varied religions, and cross-cutting tangle of conflicts are difficult to fully grasp. American scholars still focus more on other regions of the world. This strongly suggests that poorly informed U.S. action will have huge second-order effects that cannot be predicted. The squabbling by numerous countries over maritime claims lies at the margins of the territorial grid and does not pose a threat to the survival of any country. Neither Korea, Vietnam, nor Japan fears an actual Chinese military invasion. There are indeed numerous problems to be solved, and the United States and China need to figure out how to live together. Their relationship is more than simply an East Asian relationship—it is potentially global. There is a desperate need for quality scholarship that can help guide American policymakers as they navigate the complex relationships with China and other countries in East Asia. The United States and China may or may not end up in an unlikely war, but the scholarship that uses European history to explain Asia’s future does little to illuminate the issues at hand. The solution is not to double down on learning about Europe, but rather to invest deeply in the much more difficult task of learning East Asian languages, history, politics, and culture. Scholars who worry about power transitions are influential because threat inflation about U.S.-China relations is an easy sell these days. Pessimists are never accused of being na?ve, no matter how wrong they are. But talking ourselves into fear through theories based on biased and selective evidence from another continent harms U.S. foreign policy making and blinds us to the reality of East Asia today. Cooperation key to prevent space from triggering Sino-US warFabian 2019, Christopher David, graduate US Air Force Academy 2013 – dissertation submitted for Masters of Science at University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455, , p20-21, tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism.64 When imperfect rationality and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. China highly incentivized by space cooperationFabian 2019, Christopher David, graduate US Air Force Academy 2013 – dissertation submitted for Masters of Science at University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455, , p38-39, tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***China is highly incentivized by the prospects of mutual cooperation in space. Maintaining free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily guaranteed by U.S. military power. 110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive economic resurgence. 111 Similarly, there is evidence that China aims to take advantage of free access to space to continue its national rejuvenation into post-industrial future. In 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping announced the “China Dream” to rejuvenate China by building national pride, engineering an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military.112 Xi has linked a “space dream” as a means of fulfilling the “China Dream”.113 After the launch of the manned Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “The space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to explore further into space,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the Long March.114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon space will be strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”115 The connection between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones planned until 2045.116Cooperation between NASA and CNSA would solve the security dilemmaFabian 2019, Christopher David, graduate US Air Force Academy 2013 – dissertation submitted for Masters of Science at University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455, , p139-144, tog "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In order to leverage the proliferation of SST sensors, increased interest in orbital debris mitigation from the international community, and the extant U.S. technological advantage in SST, the U.S. needs to encourage a U.S. centric data sharing model. The first step in this process will be separating the SSA mission from its military origins. Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, issued by President Trump on June 18, 2018, indicates that the White House intends to act in that manner. The space policy directive orders the U.S. government to do the following: pioneer new SST technologies, encourage the commercial SST market, create SST data interoperability, develop STM standards and best practices, improve U.S. domestic space object registry, and encourage SST data sharing. All this will be accomplished primarily by the Department of Commerce, reducing the role of the DoD in the SSA mission.491 SPD-3 is absolutely in line with the recommendations of this thesis.While the United States is attempting to build bridges in the international space community, it may be burning others at an equivalent rate. In order to reduce Chinese fear of U.S. space domination, American decision makers must be careful to avoid inflammatory and militaristic rhetoric. The groundwork for space warfighting was set by the George W. Bush administration on the heels of the Rumsfeld Commission’s “Space Pearl Harbor” warning. The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy maintained the right to deny adversaries use of space if those capabilities are hostile to U.S. national interests. 492 Note that the policy does not say “deny adversaries use of space if those capabilities are hostile to U.S. space assets,” which would infer a natural right to self-defense. Rather, the language of the space policy suggests that the U.S. has the right to interdict an adversary’s space capabilities if they provide space effects that are disadvantageous to national security. This is consistent with the militaristic vernacular in the United States Space Command Vision for 2020, which promises to provide full spectrum space dominance hinging on space control capabilities. The Vision for 2020 compares space to other warfighting domains (land, air, and sea) and asserts that during the early 21st century, space power will evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare.493 This rhetoric, combined with technological developments during the Bush administration, made the prospect of U.S. space domination seem incipient to Chinese policy makers and reignited conversation about space weaponization.494The Obama Administration brought more moderate rhetoric by excluding inflammatory language in the 2010 National Space policy, recommending space arms control, suggesting TCBMs for space stability, as well as allowing Bush era technology programs expire.495 This policy was received very well in Asia, allowing the Obama administration to open high level strategic dialog about space cooperation with China and strengthen relations with East Asian allies.496 However, inflammatory and militaristic rhetoric returned with the Trump administration. Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and other top Air Force leaders resurrected the idea of space as a warfighting domain during testimony to Congress, saying that the Air Force needed to maintain its capability regardless of consensus on international norms.497 In 2017 Air Force Space Command created the National Space Defense Center to integrate space capabilities and C2 methods in order to help conduct a space war.498 President Trump echoed that space is a war-fighting domain by signing the Space Policy Directive-4 on 19 February 2019, which proposes the creation of a Space Force as the sixth branch of service.499 These reorganizations alone are not as inherently threatening or substantive as the weapons development programs pioneered during the early 2000s. However, the incendiary rhetoric that accompanied these reorganizations may have counteracted the potentially powerful TCBMs outlined in SPD 2-3. The White House should emphasize cooperative, collaborative space initiatives as part of future space policy directives, rather than set a course for unilateralist (America First) action. l. Pursue active cooperation. (Increase benefit of CC)The U.S. space community must pursue active cooperation with China in order to increase the potential benefit of a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome. Robust bilateral cooperation between 142 the U.S. and China could increase trust and transparency, as well as improve signaling by engendering repeated diplomatic and scientific interaction, increase interdependence by giving each country a stake in the success of the other’s space program, foster China’s interest in space sustainability, and give China and the United States insight into each other’s space program.500 China could benefit by learning from a more technologically advanced partner, while the United States learns about the capabilities and organization of a traditionally opaque bureaucracy.501 Collaboration may also have significant cost sharing benefits, especially considering that the ISS may be reaching end of life and funding is precarious.502 Additionally, active engagement with China on manned space exploration and deep space science may prevent the development of a China-led space station, which could solidify its diplomatic ties within Europe and East Asia.503 For these reasons, increased cooperation with China has the potential to yield great results; however, U.S. decision makers must take care to avoid pitfalls of past space cooperation projects when crafting Sino-U.S. policy.504China has showed an openness to bilateral cooperation, particularly between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) regarding manned space exploration and space science.505 In 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and other top NASA officials toured Chinese space facilities in a landmark visit on the invitation of Laiyan Sun, administrator of the CNSA.506 This event was followed shortly after by a second visit by NASA administrator Charles Bolden (Griffin’s successor) in 2010.507 Additionally, in October 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie emphasized the need for dialog about space security and bilateral TCBMs.508 This high level engagement could have marked a significant breakthrough in Sino-U.S. space relations, and been preceded by lowerlevel technical discussions, had the U.S. Congress not passed Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 in 2011, which banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China.509 Current NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine and CNSA administrator Zhang Kejian discussed SSA and deep space exploration as potential areas of cooperation in 2018, but this was not followed up by technical discussion.510In order to foster cooperation between China and the United States, domestic reforms need to be made. First, NASA should be the focal point for Sino-U.S. space cooperation: Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 should immediately be repealed to allow for NASA-CNSA engagement. Likewise, long-awaited domestic export control reforms would need to take place in order to streamline scientific and technical exchange and prevent further legal barriers to cooperation. 511Additionally, the U.S. must be prepared to make a long-term commitment to China-U.S. joint projects to assuage the fear of American political volatility.512 After these steps have been accomplished, the U.S. should clarify that joint NASA-CNSA projects will only take place for programs that have been removed from military control.513 The delineation between military and civilian control may address U.S. domestic concerns about technology transfer and set a groundwork for civilian control of space programs in China, potentially weakening the security dilemma by alleviating part of the dual-use conundrum.Other nations, including China, are increasingly willing to engage the U.S. on space policy—space science is a vital area for space cooperation, and it will help bolster relationsTurner Brinton, staff, “Experts: Opportunities Increasing for Space Engagement with China,” , 8—2—11, 12505-china-space-international-cooperation.html, accessed 5-18-19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The United States and Europe face barriers to effectively engage with China on space policy matters, but recent changes within the Chinese government and industry present an opportunity for dialogue and possible technical cooperation, a panel of experts agreed July 28. Among Washington space policy circles it is often said the motives behind Chinese space policies and actions are, at best, not transparent and, at worst, nefarious. These sentiments are in many cases inaccurate and reflective of a failure to communicate between both sides, three academic and policy experts said at an event here hosted by the Secure World Foundation. The Secure World Foundation and Chinese Academy of Sciences in May held a conference in Beijing to discuss Asian space policies within the context of the larger multilateral environment that included government and industry officials from China, India and Japan. A wide variety of technical and policy issues were discussed, and it was clear there is an increasing willingness among these nations to engage with the United States and Europe on space policies and processes, said Ben Baseley-Walker, an adviser on security policy and international law at the Secure World Foundation. "What really came out of this meeting was that the Chinese understand the American system as little as we understand the Chinese system, but not necessarily for reasons of trying to obfuscate the question," Baseley-Walker said. [Photos: China's First Space Station] China differs from the United States in that it does not have a well established community of space policy thinkers that convenes in public forums or shares its views abroad, he said. But this community is now growing in China, and international engagement is critical. "One of the things that we found is these communities, as they start to come together, are not internationally connected," Baseley-Walker said. "Connecting them with major space policy actors in Europe and in the United States we saw as one of the key next steps in creating a potential policy check on policymakers and diplomats in the space arena." An area where China can cooperate with the United States and Europe is in space science. Cooperative space development programs can be a key tool for moving forward these bilateral relationships, he said. The U.S.’s refusal to engage on space issues threatens the overall relationship—we need to act before things get worseBrian Weeden, Technical Adviser, Secure World Foundation and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN STRATEGIC DOMAINS, NBR Special Report n. 57, National Bureau of Asian Research, ed. T.Tanner & W.Dong, 4—16, p. 76-77. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Ultimately, improving U.S.-China relations in space may depend on resolving the great-power gap between the two countries in this domain. At the moment, they do not have much common language, and there is little cooperation and even direct rivalry. With Washington’s continued refusal to engage in Chinese proposals to limit what Beijing perceives as the U.S. militarization and weaponization of space, China has likely concluded that only by bolstering its own national security space capabilities can it bring the United States back to the negotiating table. Yet this strategy has many risks, the most worrisome of which is that it will likely heighten tensions and could lead to conflict. Thus, it would appear to be in the best interests of both countries to put in place mechanisms to increase positive engagement and potentially even enable cooperation before the situation gets dire.China-U.S. relations are key to solving every single problem—extinction otherwiseBanning Garrett, Director, Asia Program, Atlantic Council, “U.S.-China Relations: Gone Fishin',” THE GLOBALIST, 11—24—10, u-s-china-relations-gone-fishin/, accessed 5-18-19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Voicing our concerns about our policy differences is essential as we continue to struggle with China on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. But we also must try to keep the larger strategic picture in the forefront and try to land the elusive "big one" — a more cooperative U.S.-China relationship to deal with the great strategic challenges of the 21st century. While China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best, leaders of both countries have acknowledged that we are in the same boat when it comes to critical 21st century challenges. We are compelled to pull together to maintain a growing and stable global economy, mitigate climate change and adapt to its effects, ensure energy security and transition to a global, low-carbon economy, move to more sustainable economic models as resource scarcities loom as billions of people seek to join the global middle class — and combat terrorism, proliferation, piracy, international crime, pandemics, failing states and a host of other non-traditional threats. This summer’s unprecedented heat and forest fires in Russia and the massive, destructive floods in Pakistan may be the most recent warning signs that global warming is already altering our planet's climate, causing extreme weather and other first-order effects that will have cascading impacts on virtually all countries. The implications for the global economy, societies and governments and the security of nations and peoples are potentially destabilizing and even catastrophic. The United States and China — the two largest economic powers — will not be immune from the impact of climate change. Nor, as the biggest energy consumers and producers of greenhouse gases, will they escape blame from the rest of the world if they fail to act and to cooperate. In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S. interests. The Chinese leadership, for its part, and especially elements of the People's Liberation Army, is flush with a sense of their country's rapidly rising power, which has been turbo-boosted in the last two years by its superior performance in the global financial crisis. Beijing seems to be emphasizing narrow national interests and making a new push to gain recognition for an expanding list of "core interests" which now apparently includes China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese seem reluctant to place a priority on their "core interests" in ensuring their prosperity and security by cooperating with other nations, especially the United States, on long-term global challenges and threats. We should ask what the prospects are for human civilization in this century as well as for American and Chinese interests if the United States and China do not cooperate on global challenges — and even more ominously, if they have a highly competitive and antagonistic relationship, much less engage in actual military conflict. We may not have much time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United States and China need to change course soon. The two giants now seem caught in an eddy of deepening suspicion of each other's intentions — despite the stated conviction of the leaders of both countries that they need to work together.We need to engage with China to ensure the peaceful use of space and to protect our space assetsJoan Johnson-Freese, Professor, Naval War College, Testimony before the U.S.-China-Economic & Security Review Commission, 2—18—15, hsites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf, accessed 5-18-19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***In line with promoting responsible, peaceful and the safe use of space other elements requiring focused attention include resilience for military systems, increased transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs), increased space situational awareness (NSP, pp. 11-12) and a non-binding International Code of Conduct for Space Activities as supported by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 5 Air Force Space Command chief General William Shelton and Strategic Command chief General Robert Kehler7 in 2012. Strong international norms can also be a strong deterrent, further compelling pursuance. The interrelated nature of the strategic approaches requires implementation of all elements. Pursuing “deter, defend and defeat” through counterspace measures alone not only decreases the potential of strategic success, but can be counterproductive in much the same way export control laws consequent to the 1999 Cox Committee Report proved to be. Further, due to the “global commons” nature of the space environment and the importance of sustainability of that environment, the U.S. must seek common ground with China in areas of common interest. Consideration of what China is doing in space and why is useful in identifying these common interests. Civilian cooperation decreases the risk of miscalculation and space militarizationTim Fernholz, staff, “NASA Has No Choice But to Refuse China’s Request for Help on a New Space Station,” QUARTZ, 10—13—15, , accessed 5-18-19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The US has a long history of space diplomacy with opponents—as with the USSR during the 1970s. With US policy framing China as a peaceful competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current restrictions on consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASA in a tough spot with space scientists from outside the agency, some of whom have protested the ban by boycotting scientific conferences. If the desire for manned cooperation with the Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions, there’s also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite operators that a lack of coordination between burgeoning space programs will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in costly, in-orbit accidents. Civil space cooperation between the US and China could provide trust and lines of communication for de-escalation as fears of space militarization increase. And it’s not like there isn’t some cross-pollination already—SpaceNews notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.Cooperation is vital to avoiding an intentional or unintentional space conflictLee Billings, Editor, “War in Space May Be Closer than Ever,” SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 8—10—15, article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/, accessed 5-18-19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***Meanwhile, shifts in U.S. policy are giving China and Russia more reasons for further suspicion. Congress has been pressing the U.S. national security community to turn its attentions to the role of offensive rather than defensive capabilities, even dictating that most of the fiscal year 2015 funding for the Pentagon’s Space Security and Defense Program go toward “development of offensive space control and active defense strategies and capabilities.” “Offensive space control” is a clear reference to weapons. “Active defense” is much more nebulous, and refers to undefined offensive countermeasures that could be taken against an attacker, further widening the routes by which space might soon become weaponized. If an imminent threat is perceived, a satellite or its operators might preemptively attack via dazzling lasers, jamming microwaves, kinetic bombardment or any other number of possible methods. “I hope to never fight a war in space,” Hyten says. “It’s bad for the world. Kinetic [anti-satellite weaponry] is horrible for the world,” because of the existential risks debris poses for all satellites. “But if war does extend into space,” he says, “we have to have offensive and defensive capabilities to respond with, and Congress has asked us to explore what those capabilities would be. And to me, the one limiting factor is no debris. Whatever you do, don’t create debris.” Technology to jam transmissions, for example, appears to underpin the Air Force’s Counter Communications System, the U.S.’s sole acknowledged offensive capability against satellites in space. “It's basically a big antenna on a trailer, and how it actually works, what it actually does, nobody knows,” Weeden says, noting that, like most space security work, the details of the system are top secret. “All we basically know is that they could use it to somehow jam or maybe even spoof or hack into an adversary’s satellites.” For Krepon, the debate over the definitions of space weapons and the saber-rattling between Russia, China and the U.S. is unhelpfully eclipsing the more pressing issue of debris. “Everyone is talking about purposeful, man-made objects dedicated to warfighting in space, and it’s like we are back in the Cold War,” Krepon says. “Meanwhile, there are about 20,000 weapons already up there in the form of debris. They’re not purposeful—they’re unguided. They’re not seeking out enemy satellites. They’re just whizzing around, doing what they do.” The space environment, he says, must be protected as a global commons, similar to the Earth’s oceans and atmosphere. Space junk is very easy to make and very hard to clean up, so international efforts should focus on preventing its creation. Beyond the threat of deliberate destruction, the risk of accidental collisions and debris strikes will continue to grow as more nations launch and operate more satellites without rigorous international accountability and oversight. And as the chance of accidents increases, so too does the possibility of their being misinterpreted as deliberate, hostile actions in the high-tension cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space. “We are in the process of messing up space, and most people don’t realize it because we can’t see it the way we can see fish kills, algal blooms, or acid rain,” he says. “To avoid trashing Earth orbit, we need a sense of urgency that currently no one has. Maybe we’ll get it when we can’t get our satellite television and our telecommunications, our global weather reports and hurricane predictions. Maybe when we get knocked back to the 1950s, we’ll get it. But by then it will be too late.”A space conflict would be devastating—goes nuclear, destroys civilizationOmar Lamrani, Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor, “What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War,” NATIONAL INTEREST, 5—18—16, , accessed 5-18-19. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. While the United States and other nations are taking measures to better prepare for a potential war in space, their emphasis will likely remain on deterrence. This is an important notion to understand, not only for potential U.S. enemies but also for the United States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that technological advancements in the coming decades could allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash more quickly than the ever-more space dependent China or Russia. In such a scenario, the costs that a space war would have for the world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own space attack.Dialogues are key to strategic stability in space—need to be expandedJames P. Finch, Principle Director, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth,” JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY, 1st Quarter, 2015, p. 20. "**ADA Novice Packet 2019***At the government-to-government (so-called Track 1) level, there is not currently a productive venue for the United States and China to develop a mutual understanding of how space plays into crisis stability. While space security has been incorporated into existing diplomatic and defense dialogues, these steps in the right direction have been slow and tentative, and there is much work to be done. Recently, some engagements led by think tanks (known as Track 1.5 dialogues due to mixed delegations of government and academics) have begun to explore the issue, and it is clear that both sides harbor a lot of mistrust and misperception. The United States continues to raise questions about China’s military modernization and its potential coercion of regional neighbors over contested territory. China continues to question the implications of expanding U.S. missile defenses and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Suspicions about space activities fit within this broader geopolitical mistrust. The United States continues to express concern about Chinese space activities and China’s lack of transparency when it comes to unique space launch profiles or robotics experiments. China, for its part, expresses concerns about U.S. activities, such as the reusable experimental test platform known as the X-37B. These misperceptions are hard to resolve, both because of the inherent dual-use nature of space systems and the difficulty in creating transparency for a regime so far removed from terra firma. Resolving such suspicions and building trust take time and require a common understanding of the nature of the space domain and space systems. Returning to the formulation of Colby, recall that “in a stable situation . . . major war would only come about because one party truly sought it, not because of miscalculation.” Miscalculation is best avoided when each side understands the implications of its actions and understands how the other side will interpret and react to those actions. This situation does not exist in today’s environment regarding space systems and space weapons. We lack a common understanding of how space will contribute to, or come to define, potential crises between the United States and China. As both countries seek to define a “new type of great power relationship,” it would be wise to consider how new technologies and operational concepts are best managed during crises. Given both sides’ growing reliance on space systems to achieve their future military and political aims, a lack of understanding comes with great peril. We should strive to build a common framework now, using dialogues during peacetime, before provocative actions in space during a crisis imperil stability here on Earth. Alexey Arbatov (2019) Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:4, 151-161, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628475 ................
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