Bertrand Russell, Appearance and Reality - Kyoo Lee



Bertrand Russell, Appearance and Reality

Ch1 of Problems of Philosophy

Question:

Is there an—or the—indubitable reality?

The Key Point of the Answers:

Maybe yes, because even if things have difference appearances, they after all belong to some sort of thing that we call matter.

[PARAGRAPHS #]

[01-02] INTRODUCTION

[03-09] CONCRETIZATION

[10-16] CONCEPTUALIZATION

[17-20] CONCLUSIVE REMARK

1. [01-02] INTRODUCTION

a. [01] Posing the Question

b. [02] Drawing Attention: Everyday examples of ordinary beliefs about the world and how they are also ordinarily contradicted.

2. [03-09] CONCRETIZATION

a. [03-04] Zooming in on one concrete example: the case of the table

i. [03] How people look at one and the same thing (= reality) differently (= appearances).

ii. [04] Why the difference above is important.

b. [05] Drawing out the idea and form a skeptical hypothesis: The example above demonstrates that "the" reality may not exist: "the color"

c. [06-08] Reinforcing the skeptical idea above by introducing other relevant examples, step by step

i. [06] texture

ii. [07] shape

iii. [08] touch

d. [09] Reaffirming the conclusion/thesis: "Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as …"

"Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise: namely,

(1) Is there a real table at all?

(2) If so, what sort of object can it be?"

3. [10-16] CONCEPTUALIZATION

a. [10-11] Definitions of Terms

i. [10] Sense-data and Sensation

ii. [11] Physical Object and Matter

So the same question, put more precisely and thoroughly "is: (1) Is there such a thing as matter?

(2) If so, what is its nature?"

b. [12-15] Other Philosophers' Views on the Issue

i. [12] Berkeley: matter is nothing but ideas that God put in us.

ii. [13] Berkeley denies matter, that is, something independent of our ideas.

iii. [14] Other than Berkeley

iv. [15] Leibniz, another Idealist, holds the view that matter is a collection/community of minds.

c. [16] Evaluating/Interpreting Philosophical Views

i. Both Berkeley and Leibniz say yes, indirectly, to (1)

ii. But Berkeley and Leibniz differ on the question of how (2), i.e., how reality/matter appears to us.

4. [17-20] CONCLUSIVE REMARK

a. [17] Stating the key point conclusively, drawing on the discussions above: it is reasonable to suppose that there is a reality, "a real table at all."

b. [18] Summary of the Argument

c. [19] Showing, honestly and rigorously, what are the unresolved questions: the chair "has become a problem full of surprising possibilities.": "it is not what it seems."

d. [20] Pushing the force of the question further: "[…] doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all."

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