Ethical Objectivism



Avoiding Mistakes in Ethics•

Dr. Charles K. Fink

Miami Center for Ethical Awareness

Miami Dade College

This tutorial examines some common mistakes people make in their moral thinking. It is intended primarily as a resource for teachers, but various parts can be adapted for use in the classroom. There are footnotes throughout which suggest possible teaching strategies. At the end of this tutorial, you will find a glossary and a list of recommended resources, including books, documentary films, and websites. (All boldfaced terms are included in the glossary.) Also, this tutorial presupposes familiarity with some elementary logical concepts. A brief review of these concepts, along with exercises, is included as an appendix.

The material is divided into the following sections:

1. Ethics Survey 6. Ethical Objectivism Reconsidered

2. Does Morality Have an Objective Foundation? 7. Fallacies in Moral Reasoning

3. Is Morality Personal? 8. Speciesism

4. Is Morality Based on Social Conventions? 9. Glossary

5. Are There Moral Facts? 10. Recommended Resources

Appendix: Evaluating Arguments

1. Ethics Survey

Which of the following statements do you agree with? Which do you disagree with? After completing this tutorial, revisit this survey and see whether you still hold the same opinions.[1]

1. Morality is a personal matter. What is right for me may not be right for you.

2. You should always do whatever you believe is right.

3. Morality has to do with people’s feelings. The statement “Abortion is wrong” is no more objectively true than the statement “Okra tastes bad.”

4. It is wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture.

5. Morality is entirely relative. For example, in Saudi Arabia it is right to cut off the hands of thieves, but in America this is considered barbaric.

6. Morality is entirely a matter of opinion. It is impossible to prove whether something is right or wrong.

7. If something is natural, then it is moral. For example, if human beings are by nature meat eaters, then there is nothing wrong with human beings eating meat.

8. If something is unnatural, then it is wrong. For example, bestiality is wrong because it is a perversion of nature.

9. We shouldn’t say that something is wrong if most people do it. For example, no one should criticize me for taking pencils, paper clips, or other office supplies. Who doesn’t?

10. The right thing to do is whatever most people think is right. For example, if most people approve of abortion, then it is right.

11. If something is traditional, then it should be preserved. For example, marriage has traditionally been an institution between a man and a woman. Therefore, gay marriages should not be condoned.

12. It is wrong to criticize others for their moral failures. No one is perfect, and as the saying goes, “People who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”

13. Religion is a reliable source of moral inspiration and guidance. If the Bible commands something, then it is right; if the Bible condemns something, then it is wrong.

14. All human lives have equal worth.

15. Human life is more valuable than any form of nonhuman life.

2. Does Morality Have an Objective Foundation?

Is there objective truth in ethics? Or is morality merely a matter of opinion? People often express skepticism about ethics. “What’s right for me may not be right for you.” “Who’s to say what’s right?” “It’s impossible to prove anything in ethics.” “What is right in one culture may not be right in another.” It is unclear, however, exactly what is meant by such skeptical comments, or whether something important is being said about the nature of morality. We will refer to the somewhat hazy idea that “morality is merely a matter of opinion” as Ethical Skepticism.

Ethical Objectivism is opposed to such skepticism. For the Objectivist, morality might be compared to mathematics. Human beings have the ability to grasp mathematical concepts, to understand numbers and relationships between numbers, but the facts of mathematics do not depend upon us. Mathematics has an objective foundation. According to the Objectivist, the same can be said about morality. Just as we have the ability to understand mathematical concepts, we also have the ability to understand moral concepts. And just as the facts of mathematics do not depend upon us, neither do the facts of morality. There are moral facts that hold independently of what people believe, or how they feel, or the conventions that people establish.

3. Is Morality Personal?

1. Morality is a personal matter. What is right for me may not be right for you.

2. You should always do whatever you believe is right.

3. Morality has to do with people’s feelings. The statement “Abortion is wrong” is no more objectively true than the statement “Okra tastes bad.”

People sometimes say “What is right for me may not be right for you.” What is meant by this? One possibility is Personal Relativism, which ties morality to people’s beliefs. For the Personal Relativist, there are no objective or independent moral standards; rather the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person believes is right. Since different people have different moral beliefs, it follows that what is right or wrong is relative and varies from one individual to another.

A similar view ties morality to people’s feelings rather than to their beliefs. According to Ethical Subjectivism, moral statements describe people’s feelings of approval or disapproval—feelings that vary from one individual to another. This is another way of understanding what is meant by “What is right for me may not be right for you.” When I say that something is right, what this means is that I approve of it. When you say that something is right, what this means is that you approve of it. On this view, moral statements are no different than statements about personal taste or preference. The statement “Abortion is wrong” is like the statement “Okra tastes bad” or “Opera is boring.” (Okra may taste bad to me, but not to you. Opera might be boring to me, but not to you. Abortion may be wrong for me, but not for you.)

The argument in support of Personal Relativism runs as follows:

1) Different people have different beliefs about what is right.

Therefore:

2) There are no objective moral facts. What is right for one person may not be right for another.

For example, I might believe that it is right to be a vegetarian, whereas you see nothing wrong with eating meat. For me it is right to be a vegetarian, but not for you.

The premise of the argument is true—people do have different moral beliefs—but does the conclusion follow? That people have different beliefs about the facts does not mean that there are no facts. For example, I might believe in the existence of God, whereas you are an atheist. In some sense, “for me” God exists, whereas “for you” God does not. But clearly there is an objective fact of the matter, whether or not anyone knows what this fact is. Either it is a fact that God exists, or it is a fact that God does not exist. One of us is right and the other is wrong. In the same way, I might believe that it is right to be a vegetarian, whereas you see things differently. “For me” it is right to be a vegetarian, whereas “for you” it is not. It does not follow from this, however, that there is no objective truth concerning the morality of vegetarianism. It is still possible that one of us is right and the other is wrong. The above argument, therefore, does not prove Personal Relativism.

Like Personal Relativism, Ethical Subjectivism connects morality to people’s subjective states. But whereas Personal Relativism is a theory about the nature of moral standards, Subjectivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language. (The Subjectivist does not tell us what is right or wrong, but rather what it means to say that something is right or wrong.) In critically evaluating these views, consider the following two questions. First, is it possible for you to be mistaken about something in morality? Or are you morally infallible? Is it, for example, possible for you to do something wrong even though you believe that it is right? Second, can you know whether to judge an action right or wrong simply by exploring your feelings? Or should your moral judgments be based upon objective considerations?

Consider the first question. According to Personal Relativism, what makes it right for you to do something is simply that you believe it is right. Therefore, you can’t believe that it is right to do something and yet be mistaken in this belief. In this sense, you are morally infallible. Suppose, for example, you believe that it is right to bomb abortion clinics or to engage in other terrorist acts. Then, according to the Relativist, this would be the right thing for you to do. The mere fact that you believe that it is right makes it right. On the other hand, if it is possible for people to be mistaken in their moral beliefs, then Relativism is wrong. There must be facts, independently of what people believe, to be mistaken about.

The argument against Personal Relativism can be summarized as follows:

1) If Personal Relativism is true, then people cannot be mistaken in their moral beliefs.

2) People can be mistaken in their moral beliefs.

Therefore:

3) Personal Relativism is false.

Unlike the argument in support of Personal Relativism, this argument is sound. The premises are true and the conclusion logically follows from them. This proves that Personal Relativism is false.

Now consider the second question. Can you know whether to judge an action right or wrong simply by examining your feelings? (Couldn’t an unfeeling person make correct moral judgments? If so, then moral judgments cannot simply be descriptions of our feelings.) Suppose you learn that I took my neighbor’s ladder from his backyard. Can you know, just by inspecting your feelings, what to say about this incident? Or do you need to have additional information? Suppose you learn that I snuck into my neighbor’s yard late one night and took his ladder because I needed it to paint my ceiling. Then you would probably say that what I did was wrong. But suppose my house was on fire and I needed the ladder to rescue my child from a second-story balcony. Then you would probably say what I did was right. For the Subjectivist, however, such considerations are essentially irrelevant; the facts relevant to making moral judgments are facts about our feelings, not about the objective world. If you approve of an action, then you can truthfully say that the action is right. If you disapprove of it, then you can truthfully say that it is wrong.

We might summarize this objection to Subjectivism as follows:

1) If Subjectivism is true, then people can know whether an action is right or wrong simply by exploring their feelings.

2) People cannot know whether an action is right or wrong in this way.

Therefore:

3) Subjectivism is false.

Like the argument against Personal Relativism, this argument is sound. The premises are true and the reasoning is valid.

4. Is Morality Based on Social Conventions?

4. It is wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture.

5. Morality is entirely relative and varies from one culture to another. For example, in Saudi Arabia it is right to cut off the hands of thieves, but in America this is considered barbaric.

Different cultures adopt different standards of etiquette and there are no independent, absolute standards by which we might judge the behavior of all people. In America, people eat with forks and knives, whereas in India it is appropriate to eat with one’s bare fingers. There are no “correct” standards concerning what eating utensils people should use; there are just “different” standards. According to Cultural Relativism, the same can be said about the standards of morality. In America, it is acceptable to use cows for food, whereas in India this practice is considered an abomination. In some parts of Asia, people commonly eat dogs and cats, but in America and India this is considered wrong. According to the Cultural Relativist, it is not the case that one culture is right about the morality of people’s food choices, whereas other cultures are wrong. Rather what is right or wrong in morality is entirely conventional and varies from one culture to another. If this is correct, then the right thing for an individual to do is whatever that individual’s culture believes is right. Thus, it is wrong for an Indian to eat beef, but it is not wrong for an American to do so. And it is wrong for an American to eat dogs and cats, but it is not wrong for a Korean or a Vietnamese to do so.[2]

The most common argument for Cultural Relativism is based upon the observation that people in different cultures adopt different moral conventions:

1) Different cultures have different beliefs about what is right.

Therefore:

2) There are no objective moral facts. What is right in one culture may not be right in another.

The view expressed in the first premise is sometimes called “Descriptive” Cultural Relativism to distinguish it from “Normative” Cultural Relativism, which is the view we have been examining. There is an important difference between the two that is often overlooked or obscured. Descriptive Cultural Relativism is a theory about what people believe is right or wrong, whereas Normative Cultural Relativism is a theory about what really is right or wrong. The first is a theory about moral beliefs, whereas the second is a theory about moral standards themselves. The argument for Cultural Relativism, therefore, encounters the same logical problems as the argument for Personal Relativism, discussed earlier. For example, during the Middle-Ages, it was commonly believed that the sun (and all other heavenly bodies) revolved around the earth. We now know that the earth gravitates around the sun. Does it follow that people in the Middle-Ages lived in a different universe, one in which the sun revolved around the earth? The fact that people in the past have had different beliefs about the nature of the universe does not affect the nature of the universe itself. Why should we think that people’s beliefs about the facts of morality alter or influence what these facts are? People in the Middle-Ages may have believed that it was right to burn heretics at the stake, but from this it does not follow that it was right.

Descriptive Cultural Relativism is not nearly as controversial as Normative Cultural Relativism. The first view is compatible with Ethical Objectivism, but not the second. In evaluating Normative Cultural Relativism, consider the following two questions. First, is it wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture? Is it the case, in other words, that moral judgments can be made only from within a culturally established moral framework and have no objective validity? Second, is the essence of morality social conformity? Or does doing the right thing sometimes involve being critical of your culture? How must the Normative Cultural Relativist answer these questions? Are these answers plausible?

Let us explore both questions. First, is it wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture? Consider the treatment of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Until recently, women in Afghanistan were banned from schools and universities and, except in rare cases, from outside employment. Indeed, women were banned from all activities outside the home unless accompanied by a mahram (a father, a husband, or some other suitable male) and fully veiled in a burqa. Women who violated these restrictions, if only by having exposed ankles, were subject to public beatings and whippings. The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) identifies several other restrictions imposed on women by the Taliban, including: a “ban on the use of cosmetics”; a “ban on women talking or shaking hands with non-mahram males”; a “ban on women laughing loudly (no stranger should hear a woman’s voice)”; a “ban on women wearing high heel shoes, which would produce sound while walking (a man must not hear a woman’s footsteps)”; a “ban on women’s wearing brightly colored clothes,” which are regarded as “sexually attracting colors”; a “ban on women appearing on the balconies of their apartments or houses”; the “compulsory painting of all windows, so women cannot be seen from outside their homes”; a “ban on the photographing or filming of women”; a “ban on women’s pictures printed in newspapers and books, or hung on the walls of houses and shops.” Penalties, even for minor infractions, were brutal. For wearing fingernail polish, women had their fingers chopped off, and for the crime of adultery, women were publicly stoned to death.[3] Is there an objective basis for condemning such practices? Or is it the case that such practices are wrong only relative to the moral standards of Western societies?[4]

Second, is the essence of morality social conformity? If the right thing for a person to do, as the Relativist maintains, is whatever that person’s culture believes is right, then the moral saint is the social conformist. For the Relativist, the person who “follows the crowd” is assured of living a saintly life, while the dissident—from Jesus to Martin Luther King—who challenges the moral standards accepted by his or her culture, is necessarily immoral. Yet, clearly this is wrong. We cannot dismiss a dissident’s criticisms simply because that person disagrees with his or her culture. It is entirely possible that the dissident is right, which means that a culture cannot be the only source of moral standards.

The argument can be summarized as follows:

1) If Normative Cultural Relativism is true, then necessarily the social conformist is moral and the dissident is immoral.

2) It is not necessarily the case that the social conformist is moral and the dissident is immoral.

Therefore:

3) Normative Cultural Relativism is false.

The premises of this argument are true and the reasoning is valid. Perhaps Descriptive Cultural Relativism is true, but this argument disproves Normative Cultural Relativism.

5. Are There Moral Facts?

6. Morality is entirely a matter of opinion. It is impossible to prove whether something is right or wrong.

The Ethical Objectivist maintains that there are objective moral facts. Skeptics, who reject this claim, believe either that (1) there are moral facts, but they are not objective in nature, or that (2) there simply are no moral facts. So far, we have considered different ways of defending (1). For the Relativist, there are moral facts, but these facts depend upon us—upon what individuals believe or upon the conventions established by different cultures. For the Subjectivist, there are moral facts, but these are facts about people’s feelings. Other skeptics take a different route, arguing that morality has no factual basis at all. This is what is meant by Moral Nihilism.

One way of defending Moral Nihilism is to draw a sharp line between facts and values. For the Nihilist, morality is concerned with values, not with facts. To judge something to be good or bad, right or wrong is to ascribe a negative or a positive value to it. It is not to describe a fact about it. People, in a sense, “attach” values to things, but things in themselves, independently of human judgment, are neutral. For example, it is a fact that hurricanes destroy property and cause floods, injuries, and deaths. But, according to the Nihilist, it is not a fact that hurricanes are bad. Rather people judge hurricanes to be bad.

One argument for Moral Nihilism focuses upon the problem of establishing truth and falsity in ethics and resolving moral disagreements. Suppose you and I disagree about some moral issue, such as the morality of war. I might believe that war is morally permissible, whereas you are a pacifist. If there is objective truth in ethics, then it should be possible for us to determine who is right and who is wrong. But how can we do this? This question has no obvious answer. According to the Moral Nihilist, the fact that there are irresolvable moral disagreements proves that there is no objective truth in ethics.

Succinctly stated, the argument runs as follows:

1) If there are moral facts, then it should be possible to prove things in ethics.

2) It is not possible to prove things in ethics. (According to a popular sentiment: “Who’s to say what’s right?”)

Therefore:

3) There are no moral facts.

The reasoning is clearly valid, but both premises can be challenged. Is it the case that all facts can be proven? Is it true that moral opinions cannot be rationally as well supported as other opinions?

Let us concentrate on the second question. To prove something (whether inside or outside the domain of ethics) is to provide good reasons for believing it. Is it possible to provide good reasons for a moral belief? If we consider only complex moral problems, such as the morality of war, then it is tempting to accept the premise that it is impossible to prove anything in ethics. But most of the moral claims that people make are not about such complex issues, but about comparatively simple matters. For example, suppose I borrowed a book from you and promised to return it the following day. Is this something I ought to do? Assuming that there are no other relevant facts to consider, don’t you have good reasons for believing that I ought to return it? If I announced the next day that I loaned the book to someone else or that I sold it to a used bookstore, wouldn’t you think I did something wrong, and wouldn’t you have good reasons for thinking this? Most of the moral claims people make are about uncomplicated issues such as this one. If we have good reasons for making such claims, then it is possible to prove things in ethics.

Consider some additional examples. Might there be good reasons for believing that the following moral claims are true? What might these reasons be?

1. Your car has a dead battery, and you need a jump. Your neighbor should help you start your car.

2. You have found someone’s wallet lying on a sidewalk. You ought to return it.

3. While you were shopping in a supermarket, someone backed into your car, damaging the rear bumper. This person should accept responsibility for the accident.

4. Someone at work is spreading unfounded and malicious gossip about you, and this is wrong.

5. You suspect that your husband is having an affair. He should be honest with you.

Consider the first claim. Suppose you have been a helpful neighbor. Just last week, when your neighbor’s car wouldn’t start, you drove her to work. Her car is now in good working condition, and she has a pair of jumper cables. Assuming that there are no other relevant facts to consider, don’t you have good reasons for saying that your neighbor should help you start your car? (Of course, you might also have good reasons for saying that the above claims are false, but this does not count against the point that we can often produce good reasons for the moral judgments that we make.)[5]

6. Ethical Objectivism Reconsidered

We have discussed alternatives to Ethical Objectivism and considered some of the reasons for rejecting these alternative accounts. Have we not, along the way, developed a positive argument for Objectivism? The following observations have emerged from our discussion:

1) It is possible for you to be mistaken about some of your moral beliefs. You might believe that something is morally acceptable, such as abortion or capital punishment, even though it is wrong.

2) There are moral beliefs, and some moral beliefs are true and others false. Moreover, it is often possible to prove that a moral belief is true by providing good reasons for believing it.

3) Whether an action is right or wrong is a fact about the action, not about our feelings or other subjective states.

4) Doing the right thing sometimes requires acting contrary to culturally established conventions. For example, it would not be right to support the practice of slavery even if one lived in a slaveholding culture; rather the right thing to do would be to oppose this practice.

It does not necessarily follow from any one of these statements that Ethical Objectivism is true, but it does follow from all of these statements taken together. From (1) and (2), it follows that there are moral facts. You cannot be mistaken about something in morality, for example, unless there are facts for you to be mistaken about. From (3) and (4) it follows that the facts of morality do not depend upon us—upon what we believe, or how we feel about things, or the social conventions that we establish. If there are, in this sense, objective moral facts, then Ethical Objectivism is true.

7. Fallacies in Moral Reasoning

A “fallacy” is a logically defective argument. Logicians catalogue fallacies so that we can avoid such mistakes in reasoning. The following are some common fallacies associated with moral reasoning.[6]

Appeal to Nature

7. If something is natural, then it is moral. For example, if human beings are by nature meat eaters, then there is nothing wrong with human beings eating meat.

8. If something is unnatural, then it is wrong. For example, bestiality is wrong because it is a perversion of nature.

This fallacy, as illustrated by the above two examples, occurs whenever it is argued that something is moral because it is natural, or that something is immoral because it is unnatural. These arguments are fallacious because there is no conceptual connection between what is natural and what is moral. (The first category has to do with how things are, whereas the second has to do with how things ought to be.) For example, it is natural for women to experience pain and suffering during childbirth. Does this mean that such suffering is good, or that it is wrong for women to have some form of pain-relief during childbirth? It is unnatural for human beings to fly. Does this mean that it is morally wrong for people to travel by airplanes?

Appeal to the People

9. We shouldn’t say that something is wrong if most people do it. For example, no one should criticize me for taking pencils, paper clips, or other office supplies. Who doesn’t?

10. The right thing to do is whatever most people think is right. For example, if most people approve of abortion, then it is right.

We commit this fallacy whenever we attempt to support a moral belief by appealing to the opinions or practices of the masses. In one form, this fallacy occurs whenever it is argued (as in the first example above) that something is right or permissible because many people practice it. In another form, this fallacy occurs whenever it is reasoned (as in the second example above) that something is right simply because many people believe that it is right. What lies behind this fallacy is Cultural Relativism: the theory that the right thing to do is to follow the crowd. We have seen that Cultural Relativism is not defensible. This explains why the Appeal to the People is a logical fallacy.

Appeal to Tradition

11. If something is traditional, then it should be preserved. For example, marriage has traditionally been an institution between a man and a woman. Therefore, gay marriages should not be condoned.

This fallacy occurs whenever it is reasoned that something is permissible because it has been practiced for a long time, or that something is wrong because it is contrary to tradition. This is fallacious because the mere fact that people have engaged in some practice for a long time does nothing to justify that practice. After all, people have conducted war, genocide, and slavery since the dawn of human civilization.

Argumentum Ad Hominem

12. It is wrong to criticize others for their moral failures. No one is perfect, and as the saying goes, “People who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”

The Latin ad hominem means “at the man.” The ad hominem fallacy occurs whenever an argument is directed at a person rather than at the person’s views. There are several forms of the fallacy. In one form (what is referred to as tu quoque, meaning “you too”), the fallacy occurs whenever someone attempts to deflect moral criticism by pointing out that the person making the accusation is guilty of similar offenses. For example, suppose someone criticizes you for lying. You respond, “Who are you to tell me not to lie? The other day you told your wife that you were working late at the office when you were really down at Moe’s Tavern belting back some Duff beer.” Does it follow from this that it is not wrong for you to lie? Of course not, but this is the conclusion you are arguing for. (It may be hypocritical to criticize others for their moral failures while making excuses for one’s own, but even the hypocrite can correctly point out other people’s faults.)

Appeal to Religion

13. Religion is a reliable source of moral inspiration and guidance. If the Bible commands something, then it is right; if the Bible condemns something, then it is wrong.

People often appeal to religion to support their moral beliefs, but this is deeply problematic. First, different religions accept different scriptures as authoritative: Christians accept the moral authority of the Bible; Muslims, the Koran; Hindus, the Bhagavad-Gita; and there are many other sources to choose from. Is one religion right and all the others wrong? How can we know? Second, even if we did know that one religious document, such as the Bible, was an accurate account of God’s revelation to humanity, people often disagree about how such documents are to be interpreted. Peter S. Wenz explains the problem:

Theocrats believe that society should follow God’s commands, as theocrats understand them, to know with certainty the difference between right and wrong. I find this view untenable in part because religious people differ among themselves about God’s will and the conduct He requires…. Consider first the influence of disparate group traditions on interpretations of the Bible, the Old and New Testaments. In Deuteronomy 12:23, God tells people when they eat meat they should not eat blood; ‘for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh.’ Traditional Jews interpret the verse to require that meat be cooked well done. But the traditional interpretation among Jehovah’s Witnesses holds that the verse forbids life-saving transfusions of whole blood. Jehovah’s Witnesses often refuse blood transfusions because they think violating God’s command jeopardizes their immortal souls. The tradition among most Christians, by contrast, is to ignore this passage.[7]

Finally, if there is development and progress in our understanding of morality (as there is, for example, in our understanding of mathematics), then any religion established hundreds or thousands of years ago (which includes all of the world’s major religions) is likely to contain some rather primitive moral notions. In the Bible, for example, we find the following passages:

If two men are fighting and the wife of one of them comes to rescue her husband from his assailant, and she reaches out and seizes him by his private parts, you shall cut off her hand. Show her no pity (Deuteronomy 22:11).

If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable. They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own heads (Leviticus 20:11).

A man or woman who is a medium or spiritualist among you must be put to death. You are to stone them; their blood will be on their own heads (Leviticus 20:27).

The point of quoting these passages is not to denigrate the Bible, but rather to illustrate that we can never morally justify a practice simply by arguing that the Bible (or some other religious document) condones it. The argument “Capital punishment is justified because it says so in the Bible” is logically indistinguishable from the argument “Homosexuals should be put to death because it says so in the Bible.” Both arguments rely upon the unstated but assumed premise that if the Bible says that something is right, then it is right.[8]

Test your understanding of these ideas by trying to identify the following fallacies.[9]

1. I learned in anthropology that male primates are by nature polygamists. So I guess there is nothing wrong with a married man fooling around with other women.

2. The Bible says, “Thou shalt not kill.” Therefore, abortion is wrong.

3. Abortion should be legal because most Americans believe that a woman has the right to choose.

4. You say that it is wrong for me to cheat on my income taxes. But who are you to criticize me? On your tax return, you claimed your vacation to Hawaii as a business expense.

5. You say that it is wrong for me to cheat on my income taxes. But all Americans cheat on their income taxes.

6. It is human nature to be selfish. So there is nothing wrong with always putting yourself first.

7. People have been using narcotics for thousands of years. How could there be anything wrong with it?

8. You say that it is wrong to eat meat. But I see that you are wearing leather shoes and a leather belt, so no one should listen to what you have to say.

8. Speciesism

14. All human lives have equal worth.

15. Human life is more valuable than any form of nonhuman life.

The racist is someone who believes that race-membership in itself is morally important in deciding how individuals should be treated. Most people recognize that this is a serious moral mistake. If two people are alike in all respects except race-membership, morality requires that they be treated the same. For example, it would be wrong for an employer to pay one employee more than another simply because they belonged to different races. It would be wrong for a judge to sentence one criminal to ten years in prison but to release another on parole simply because the first criminal was black but the second white. The moral principle that condemns such racist practices is known as the Principle of Equality: that different individuals should be treated the same unless there are morally important differences between them. Race-membership, most people will agree, is not in itself a morally important difference between individuals.

What about species-membership? For example, can it be right to use chimpanzees in biomedical research even though it would be wrong to treat human beings as research tools? Clearly, there are important differences between normal, adult human beings and normal, adult chimpanzees. But there are also human beings who are mentally no more developed than chimpanzees. Consider a profoundly retarded human being permanently at the intellectual level of a six-year-old child. Could it be right to treat a chimpanzee—who, according to some accounts, is about as intelligent as a six-year-old child—as a research tool, but wrong to treat the retarded human being in the same way? All that can be said in defense of this practice is that a chimpanzee is just an animal, whereas the retarded human being is still a human being. But is this any more plausible than the racist’s claim that a black man is just a black man, whereas a white man is still white? Why should species-membership in itself have moral weight and importance but not race-membership? On the surface, speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism. Both involve the claim that, regardless of the similarities or differences between individuals, it is a being’s group-membership that is important in deciding how that being should be treated.

A more coherent position is this: if the members of two groups are alike in all other respects, it cannot be right to treat the members of one group in ways in which it would be wrong to treat the members of the other group. For example, if it would be wrong to treat mentally defective human beings as research tools, then it would be wrong to treat chimpanzees in this way. The mere fact that a human being belongs to one group but a chimpanzee to another has no moral importance. If this is correct, then speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism (or any other form of prejudice based simply upon group-membership).

The argument presented here can be summarized as follows:

1) Speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism.

2) Racism is morally indefensible.

Therefore:

3) Speciesism is morally indefensible.

The crucial premise is the first. If species-membership, unlike race-membership, is morally important, why? If we discovered creatures on another planet who were indistinguishable from human beings except that they were not biologically human, would be justified in treating them differently simply because of this biological difference? Would we be justified in treating them as we now treat nonhuman animals?

If the above argument is sound, it has important implications. One implication concerns the value of human life. The claim that all human life has equal worth may sound morally elevated, but given the many differences among us, this could be true only if the value that a human life has derives simply from its biological classification. Another implication concerns the comparative value of human and nonhuman life. Perhaps the life of a normal, adult human being has greater value than the life of any nonhuman animal, but we cannot maintain that human life invariably has greater value than nonhuman life, for there are “marginal” human beings whose intelligence and other capacities do not distinguish them from some animals.

As a matter of fact, nonhuman animals are treated in ways in which we would never condone treating human beings—even marginal human beings. But assuming that species-membership in itself has no moral importance in deciding how an individual should be treated, it follows that we are morally justified in treating a nonhuman animal in some way only if we would be justified in treating a human being comparable in all other important respects in the same way. For example, if we would not be justified in using a profoundly retarded human being for medical research (or for food, or confining such a person in a cage for the entertainment of spectators, or hunting such a person for sport), then we would not be justified in treating a comparable nonhuman animal in this way.[10]

9. Glossary

Appeal to Nature: The fallacy of reasoning that something is moral because it is natural, or that something is immoral because it is contrary to nature.

Appeal to the People: The fallacy of reasoning that something is moral because most people approve of it, or that something is immoral because most people disapprove of it.

Appeal to Religion: The fallacy of reasoning that something is moral because a religion condones it, or that something is immoral because a religion denounces it.

Appeal to Tradition: The fallacy of reasoning that something is moral because it has been practiced for a long time, or that something is immoral because it is contrary to an established practice.

Argumentum Ad Hominem: The fallacy of directing an argument at a person rather than at the person’s views. In the tu quoque form, this fallacy occurs whenever someone attempts to deflect moral criticism by pointing out that the person making the accusation is guilty of similar offenses.

Cultural Relativism: According to “Descriptive” Cultural Relativism, what people believe is right or wrong varies from one culture to another. According to “Normative” Cultural Relativism, moral standards themselves vary from one culture to another: the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person’s culture believes is right.

Ethical Objectivism: The view that there are objective moral facts. Objective moral facts are facts that hold independently of people’s subjective states (beliefs and feelings) or the conventions that people establish.

Ethical Skepticism: The view that morality has no objective or independent foundation. For the Ethical Skeptic, either (a) there are moral facts, but these facts are subjective or conventional in nature, or (b) there simply are no moral facts.

Ethical Subjectivism: The skeptical theory that moral statements describe people’s feelings of approval or disapproval.

Moral Nihilism: The skeptical theory that there are no moral facts.

Personal Relativism: The skeptical theory that the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person believes is right.

Speciesism: The belief that species-membership in itself is important in deciding how an individual should be treated.

10. Recommended Resources

For a book-length discussion of Moral Skepticism, see Russ Shafer-Landau’s Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Another excellent source of information on many of the theories discussed in this tutorial is James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007).

For internet resources on ethics, consult and usna.edu/ Library/Ethics/Ethicinternet.

For a defense of Cultural Relativism, see Ruth Benedict’s “In Defense of Moral Relativism,” available online at mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/ DionysianBehavior.

The documentary film Shackled Women: Abuses of a Patriarchal World (available through Films for the Humanities and Sciences) examines the treatment of women in several Third-World countries.

In Taking Darwin Seriously (New York: Prometheus, 1998), Michael Ruse argues that the moral sense is a product of evolution and shaped by natural selection.

Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, Second Edition (New York: New York Review, 1990) is an indispensable source of information on animal ethics.

For additional discussion of the value of human life, see Peter Singer’s “In Place of the Old Ethic, Writings on an Ethical Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2000).

The documentary film To Love or Kill: Man vs. Animals (available through PETA) explores animal agriculture and animal experimentation. It also examines the treatment of animals in various cultures.

Appendix: Evaluating Arguments

Despite the skepticism people sometimes express about morality, people nonetheless have moral opinions and often try to support these opinions with reasons. In our discussion of Moral Nihilism, we saw that it is possible to prove things in ethics, and that moral beliefs can be rationally as well supported as other beliefs. How do we prove anything in ethics? In other words, how do we distinguish good moral arguments from bad ones?

An “argument” is something we advance whenever we engage in rational persuasion—whenever, that is, we try to persuade other people to believe something by providing them with reasons. When presenting an argument, what is argued for is called the “conclusion” of the argument, and the reasons given for believing the conclusion are called the “premises.” There are fundamentally two considerations involved in evaluating an argument. First, an argument is a good argument only if the premises are true. Therefore, one question we must ask when evaluating an argument is this: Are the premises true? Second, an argument is a good argument only if the conclusion “logically follows” from the premises. In the strongest sense, this means that the conclusion has to be true if the premises are true, in which case the argument is said to be “valid.” (Because even false statements have logical implications, whether the conclusion of an argument logically follows from the premises has nothing to do with whether the premises are actually true.) So another question we must ask when evaluating an argument is this: Does the conclusion of the argument logically follow from the premises? If the answer to both questions is “yes” then the argument is a good argument, or what is called a “sound” argument.

Test your critical-thinking skills by trying to evaluate the following arguments as valid or invalid.[11]

1. All Christians are monotheists. No monotheists are atheists. Therefore, no Christians are atheists.

2. All murderers are criminals. All criminals should be punished. Therefore, all murderers should be punished.

3. If lying is against the will of God, then it is wrong. Lying is wrong. Therefore, lying is against the will of God.

4. If there are no moral facts, then it is impossible for people to be mistaken in their moral beliefs. But this is possible. Hence, there must be moral facts.

5. All humanists are atheists. All communists are atheists. Therefore, all humanists are communists.

6. The moral standards which people should live by are the standards accepted by their society. There is no moral standard that is accepted by every society. Hence, there is no moral standard which all people should live by.

7. All college graduates are successful people. All successful people are millionaires. Therefore, all college graduates are millionaires.

8. If the butler didn’t do it, then either the gardener or the cook did it. Whoever did it was over six feet tall, and neither the gardener nor the cook is over six feet tall. So it must have been the butler.

9. All Libras are psychics. All psychics read tarot cards. No Capricorns read tarot cards. Hence, no Capricorns are Libras.

10. All Darwinians are evolutionists. No creationists are evolutionists. All fundamentalists are creationists. Therefore, no fundamentalists are Darwinians.

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• Special thanks to Dr. Amy Lund, my Co-Director at the Ethics Center, and Dr. Mark Neunder for their suggestions and critical comments.

[1] This survey can be used in the classroom to generate discussion about the topics covered in this tutorial.

[2] If you teach cultural anthropology, you might contrast and compare the ethical systems embraced by different cultures. Are there ethical principles that are more or less universally recognized? You might also discuss the work of socio-biologists concerning the evolution of moral behavior. (See Recommended Resources.) If you teach history, you might explore the question of moral progress. Is the United States, for example, a more moral nation today than at its inception because of the abolition of slavery, women’s suffrage, or the civil rights movement? If you teach political science, you might raise moral questions about different political systems. Is a democratic society morally superior to a theocratic one? If you teach economics, you might raise moral questions about different economic systems. Is a capitalist society morally superior to a socialist one?

[3] .

[4] To generate classroom discussion, you might show your students Shackled Women or some other documentary film which examines the status of women in the Third World. (See Recommended Resources.) Is a patriarchal society morally inferior to an egalitarian one? Or are such societies morally equivalent?

[5] A useful exercise is to have your students draw up a list of everyday moral judgments, and then ask them to provide possible reasons for these judgments.

[6] If you teach English composition, you might incorporate this material into your discussion of informal fallacies.

[7] Political Philosophies in Moral Conflict (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007): 41.

[8] If you teach a course on world religions, you might have your students identify and critically evaluate the moral pronouncements of different religions.

[9] The correct answers are: 1. Appeal to Nature; 2. Appeal to Religion; 3. Appeal to the People; 4. Argumentum Ad Hominem; 5. Appeal to the People; 6. Appeal to Nature; 7. Appeal to Tradition; 8. Argumentum Ad Hominem.

[10] To generate classroom discussion, you might ask your students to explain why they believe (assuming that they do) that it morally acceptable to use animals for food or for medical research. Do they have good reasons? (See Recommended Resources for additional information on this important and controversial topic.)

[11] The correct answers are: 1. valid; 2. valid; 3. invalid; 4. valid; 5. invalid; 6. valid; 7. valid; 8. valid; 9. valid; 10. valid.

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