List of Tables - Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
-852170-969645Choosing Efficient Combinations of Policy Instruments for Low-carbon development and Innovation to Achieve Europe's 2050 climate targets3181350779462516786827903267center-1028700-977909183370 International competitiveness and markets The current policy mix (Task 2.8)AUTHOR(S)[Dr Onno Kuik, Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University AmsterdamFrédéric Branger, SMASH-CIREDDr Philippe Quirion, SMASH-CIRED, CNRS]With thanks to: Prof. Dr. Bernd Meyer, GWS Project coordination and editing provided by Ecologic Institute.Manuscript completed in [October, 2013]This document is available on the Internet at: [optional]Document titleInternational competitiveness and marketsWork PackageWP2Document TypeDeliverableDate31 October 2013Document StatusFinalACKNOWLEDGEMENT & DISCLAIMERThe research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union FP7 ENV.2012.6.1-4: Exploiting the full potential of economic instruments to achieve the EU’s key greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets for 2020 and 2050 under the grant agreement n° 308680.Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.Table of Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u 1Executive summary PAGEREF _Toc371069327 \h 72Introduction PAGEREF _Toc371069328 \h 73Competitiveness – analytical framework PAGEREF _Toc371069329 \h 83.1Introduction PAGEREF _Toc371069330 \h 83.2OECD analytical framework PAGEREF _Toc371069331 \h 93.3Competitiveness in EU legislation PAGEREF _Toc371069332 \h 123.4Indicators of competitiveness PAGEREF _Toc371069333 \h 134Climate policy and international competitiveness PAGEREF _Toc371069334 \h 154.1Introduction PAGEREF _Toc371069335 \h 154.2Definitions PAGEREF _Toc371069336 \h 164.2.1Carbon leakage PAGEREF _Toc371069337 \h 164.2.2Competitiveness PAGEREF _Toc371069338 \h 174.2.3Sectors at risk PAGEREF _Toc371069339 \h 184.3Positive impacts of climate policies on competitiveness and abatement in foreign countries PAGEREF _Toc371069340 \h 194.4Evaluation of carbon leakage PAGEREF _Toc371069341 \h 214.4.1Ex ante studies PAGEREF _Toc371069342 \h 214.4.2Ex post studies PAGEREF _Toc371069343 \h 244.4.3Synthesis PAGEREF _Toc371069344 \h 254.4.4Global approach PAGEREF _Toc371069345 \h 264.4.5Levelling down the cost of carbon PAGEREF _Toc371069346 \h 274.4.6Border adjustments PAGEREF _Toc371069347 \h 274.5Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc371069348 \h 305Effects of the current policy mix on key international markets PAGEREF _Toc371069349 \h 325.1Introduction PAGEREF _Toc371069350 \h 325.2Carbon market PAGEREF _Toc371069351 \h 325.3Renewable energy market PAGEREF _Toc371069352 \h 355.4Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc371069353 \h 396Conclusions PAGEREF _Toc371069354 \h 397References PAGEREF _Toc371069355 \h 41List of Tables TOC \h \z \c "Table" Table 1 Linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness PAGEREF _Toc371069356 \h 11Table 2 Leakage rate estimates in the literature PAGEREF _Toc371069357 \h 22Table 3 Overview and characteristics of ETS’s PAGEREF _Toc371069358 \h 32List of Figures TOC \h \z \c "Figure" Figure 1 Analytical framework on the linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness PAGEREF _Toc371069359 \h 10Figure 2 Daily EUA and CER prices (2008-2013) PAGEREF _Toc371069360 \h 34Figure 3 Export and Import of Renewable Energy Sector goods by EU27 in the period 2002-2012 (Euro billion, excluding intra-EU trade) PAGEREF _Toc371069361 \h 37Figure 4 Correlation between total installed capacity expressed as share of world market and export/import in 2005/2006. PAGEREF _Toc371069362 \h 38List of Boxes TOC \h \z \c "Box" Box 1 Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union PAGEREF _Toc371069363 \h 12Box 2 A step-wise approach to ‘competiveness proofing’ in EU Impact Assessment PAGEREF _Toc371069364 \h 12LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSAREAbatement Resource EffectBCABorder Carbon AdjustmentCCCarbon ContentCCSCarbon Capture and StorageCDMClean Development MechanismCERCertified Emissions ReductionCGEComputable General EquilibriumCOPConference of the PartiesCSPConcentrated Solar PowerEEGErneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (German Renewable Energy Act)EEREffective Exchange RateEITEEnergy Intensive Trade ExposedERUEmissions Reduction UnitETREnvironmental Tax ReformEUAEuropean Union AllowanceEU ETSEuropean Union Emission Trading SystemGDPGross Domestic ProductGHGGreenhouse GasGWGiga Watt JIJoint ImplementationMtMega ton (million tonnes, billion kg)OECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOPECOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesPVPhotovoltaicREERReal Effective Exchange RateRESRenewable Energy SectorRCARevealed Comparative AdvantageR&DResearch and DevelopmentRTBRelative Trade BalanceSMESmall and Medium-sized EnterprisesULCUnit Labour CostUNFCCCUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUSDUS dollarWTOWorld Trade OrganizationExecutive summaryFor the European Union, competitiveness is a central element in its 2020 Strategy. The dedication to the competitiveness of EU industry is enshrined in the European Treaty. While sustainability and protection of global climate system are also central elements, EU and Member State climate policies have often led to the fear of a loss of competitiveness by energy-intensive industries, and consequently of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness are the main arguments against ambitious climate policies in industrialised countries. Modest mitigation targets have gone hand in hand with policy packages intended to protect sectors at risk of carbon leakage. This report provides an analytical framework of competitiveness, and discusses indicators of competitiveness. Two important messages are: there are various channels in which environmental policies can affect the competitiveness of firms, both in positive and negative ways; indicators measure determinants or consequences of competitiveness, but as yet there is no complete theory that tells us how to select the most important determinants and consequences and how determinants and consequences are exactly related.Econometric studies that have estimated the consequences of the EU ETS with real data have so far not revealed any evidence of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness in sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage, such as cement, aluminium, and iron and steel. The current climate policy mix in Europe greatly contributed to the emergence of the global ‘carbon’ market, presently worth about € 114 billion, and also to the emergence of the global market for renewable energy technologies, presently worth about € 180 billion. EU industry has a strong position in the global market of renewable energy technologies, but the recent take-over of China as the leading country in solar PV shows how fragile a dominant position can be in industries featuring fast technological progress. IntroductionThis report assesses the effects of the current policy mix on international competitiveness and markets. The report firstly provides an analytical framework of competitiveness, largely based on work of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission. Secondly, it provides a comprehensive review of literature on the relationship between climate policy and industrial competitiveness, with a focus on Europe. Thirdly, the report assesses the effects of the current policy mix on emerging international markets, such as the international ‘carbon’ market and the international market for renewable energy technologies. The report provides empirical information but also discusses methodological and empirical challenges of identification and measurement of the effects of policy mixes on competitiveness and petitiveness – analytical frameworkIntroduction“Competitiveness is an elusive concept, much studied by business theorists and much invoked by politicians and commentators, but frequently dismissed as irrelevant or unimportant by economists. Krugman ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Krugman</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>111</RecNum><IDText>Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>111</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Krugman,P.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1994</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>28</Start_Page><End_Page>44</End_Page><Periodical>Foreign Affairs</Periodical><Volume>74</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Foreign Affairs</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(1994) famously called it a dangerous obsession in his critique of the first Clinton administration's flirtation with industrial policy. By contrast, Michael Porter of Harvard Business School has highlighted competitive advantage as the key to superior performance by firms, industries and economies as a whole. ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Porter</Author><Year>1990</Year><RecNum>306</RecNum><IDText>The Competitive Advantage of Nations</IDText><Prefix>See </Prefix><MDL Ref_Type="Book, Whole"><Ref_Type>Book, Whole</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>306</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The Competitive Advantage of Nations</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Porter,M.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1990</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>London, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Macmillan</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>2</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(See Porter, 1990). In part through his influence, many agencies now monitor national competitiveness, ranging from the World Economic Forum, which publishes an annual Global Competitiveness Report, to national bodies such as the U.S. Council on Competitiveness () and the Irish National Competitiveness Council (forfas.ie/ncc). These have produced much useful data and a great deal of helpful commentary, but mainstream economic theorists have for the most part paid little attention.” ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Neary</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>176</RecNum><IDText>Measuring competitiveness</IDText><Suffix>, p.3</Suffix><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>176</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Measuring competitiveness</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Neary,J.Peter</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2006</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>WP/06/209</Volume><Publisher>International Monetary Fund</Publisher><Title_Series>IMF Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Neary, 2006, p.3). In the above citation, J.P. Neary of the International Monetary Fund sketches the uneasy relationship between the concept of ‘competitiveness’ and economic theory. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, competitiveness is not a basic concept in economic theory such as ‘efficiency’ and ‘utility’, and any theories on competitiveness are not grounded in rigorous economic theory. Despite its somewhat suspect theoretical status, competitiveness is a very important concept in practical political and business affairs and a key concept in Europe’s 2020 Strategy. The term ‘competitiveness’ has been used in numerous studies, reports and articles and underlies economic policies. However, this concept is difficult to define and susceptible to ambiguities. As observed by Ekins and Speck ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Ekins</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>337</RecNum><IDText>Impacts on competitiveness: What do we know from modeling?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>337</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Impacts on competitiveness: What do we know from modeling?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ekins,Paul</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Speck,Stefan</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>377</Start_Page><End_Page>396</End_Page><Title_Secondary><f name="Calibri">Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation </f></Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Milne,Janet E.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Andersen,Mikael S.</Authors_Secondary><Issue>21</Issue><Pub_Place>Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Edward Elgar</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2012), the meaning of competitiveness varies with the level at which it is being considered. In this vein, OECD defined competitiveness at three levels ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Adams</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>143</RecNum><IDText>Environmental policy and competitiveness in a globalised economy: Conceptual issues and a review of empirical evidence</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>143</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Environmental policy and competitiveness in a globalised economy: Conceptual issues and a review of empirical evidence</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Adams,J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1997</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Title_Secondary>Globalisation and environment: Preliminary perspectives</Title_Secondary><Pub_Place>Paris</Pub_Place><Publisher>OECD</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Adams, 1997):At the firm level: ability of a firm to sell goods and services in the market and stay in business.At the sector level: aggregate competitiveness of firms that operate within a given sector in an economy, compared to international rivals.At the national level: ability of a country to increase its economic standard of living. According to the OECD, it is useful to think about competitiveness as ability. Ability is difficult to gauge (or measure); what we measure are determinants (productivity) or consequences (stock value; volume of activity; market share; trade flows; trade and investment flows and growth at the national level). These determinants and consequences are called ‘indicators’ of competitiveness. OECD analytical framework OECD ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>OECD</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>117</RecNum><IDText>Linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>117</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>OECD</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris</Pub_Place><Publisher>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</Publisher><Title_Series>OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 13</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2010) describes linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness and presents an analytical framework ( REF _Ref367797615 \h Figure 1). In this analytical framework, a distinction is made between two channels in which environmental policy (instruments) can affect a firm: 1) Environmental policy may influence the environmental performance of a firm and this may have consequences for its competitiveness. For example, energy savings policies may require the firm to invest in energy-saving equipment, produce savings in input costs, and result in a positive image among its stakeholders. This may all, directly or indirectly affects a firm’s competitiveness. 2) Environmental policy may have competitiveness impacts that arise directly from the policy itself rather than from the improvements in environmental performance. This is for example the case when a firm’s pollution is taxed or when the firm is obliged to buy emission permits, but does not change its environmental performance. It may also be the case that a rigid environmental policy is more expensive for the firm than would have been the case if the firm would have been allowed to improve its environmental performance by itself. This may be the case if the policy imposes technology standards on the firm. A certain policy measure may affect the firm’s competitiveness through both channels. The net effect of positive and negative effects of both channels determines the final competitiveness effect on the firm, and, in the aggregate, on the sector. Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1 Analytical framework on the linkages between environmental policy and competitivenessThe following positive and negative effects of policies, indicated by ±(#) in REF _Ref367797615 \h Figure 1, on competitiveness can be distinguished:+(1) Improvements in environmental performance may:Improve resource efficiency, reduce waste, and hence improve the overall efficiency of the firm ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Porter</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>144</RecNum><IDText>Toward a new concept of the environment-competitiveness relationship</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>144</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Toward a new concept of the environment-competitiveness relationship</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Porter,M.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>van der Linden,C.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1995</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>97</Start_Page><End_Page>118</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Economic Perspectives</Periodical><Volume>9</Volume><Issue>4</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Economic Perspectives</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Ambec</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>145</RecNum><IDText>Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>145</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ambec,S.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lanoie,Paul</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>45</Start_Page><End_Page>62</End_Page><Periodical>Academy of Management Perspectives</Periodical><Issue>November</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Academy of Management Perspectives</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Porter and van der Linden, 1995; Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).Improve stakeholder relations and hence reduce transaction costs with stakeholder groups. A good environmental reputation may also improve the firm’s ability to attract the best employees and may be reflected in a lower price for capital and insurance. Allow for product differentiation so that an ‘eco-premium’ can be earned in the market, for example through eco-labelling ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ambec</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>145</RecNum><IDText>Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>145</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ambec,S.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lanoie,Paul</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>45</Start_Page><End_Page>62</End_Page><Periodical>Academy of Management Perspectives</Periodical><Issue>November</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Academy of Management Perspectives</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ambec et al., 2008).Improve market access to markets or buyers with high quality standards [e.g. ISO 14001 certification]. An increasing number of companies is assessing their suppliers’ environmental performance ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ambec</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>145</RecNum><IDText>Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>145</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ambec,S.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lanoie,Paul</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>45</Start_Page><End_Page>62</End_Page><Periodical>Academy of Management Perspectives</Periodical><Issue>November</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Academy of Management Perspectives</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Johnstone</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>146</RecNum><IDText>Public environmental policy and corporate behaviour: Project background, overview of the data and summary results</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>146</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Public environmental policy and corporate behaviour: Project background, overview of the data and summary results</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Johnstone,Nick</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Serravalle,C.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Scapecchi,P.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Labonne,J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Title_Secondary>Environmental policy and corporate behaviour</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Johnstone,Nick</Authors_Secondary><Pub_Place>Cheltenham</Pub_Place><Publisher>Edward Elgar</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ambec et al., 2008; Johnstone et al., 2007).Create new business. For example in the context of REACH new business in ‘expert services’ of companies such as Ciba and BASF was created ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Lorenz</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>147</RecNum><IDText>The REACH Directive and its impact on the European chemical industry: A critical review</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>147</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The REACH Directive and its impact on the European chemical industry: A critical review</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lorenz,T.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lebreton,B.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>van Wassenhove,L.N.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>2008/53/ISIC</Volume><Pub_Place>Fontainebleau</Pub_Place><Publisher>INSEAD</Publisher><Title_Series>INSEAD Faculty and Research Working Papers</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Lorenz et al., 2008).-(2) In contrast, improvements in environmental performance may also:Increase direct production costs ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Jaffe</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>148</RecNum><IDText>Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>148</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Jaffe,A.B.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Peterson,S.R.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Portney,P.R.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Stavins,R.N.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1995</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>132</Start_Page><End_Page>163</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Economic Literature</Periodical><Volume>33</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Economic Literature</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Jaffe et al., 1995).Reduce productivity in more subtle ways, for example through less efficient processes and practices, switching costs, early retirement of capital assets, and the crowding-out of more productive investments and management resources ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Jaffe</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>148</RecNum><IDText>Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>148</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Jaffe,A.B.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Peterson,S.R.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Portney,P.R.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Stavins,R.N.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1995</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>132</Start_Page><End_Page>163</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Economic Literature</Periodical><Volume>33</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Economic Literature</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Jaffe et al., 1995).In some case, have adverse impacts on perceived product quality, e.g. organic fruit. +(3) Policies may have a direct positive impact on competitiveness by: Creating new demand, especially for the Environmental Goods and Services (EGS) sector.Raising rival’s costs, e.g. the impact of a carbon tax on the competitiveness of a hydropower producer ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Reinhardt</Author><Year>1999</Year><RecNum>149</RecNum><IDText>Market failure and the environmental policies of firms: Economic rationales for "beyond compliance" behaviour</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>149</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Market failure and the environmental policies of firms: Economic rationales for "beyond compliance" behaviour</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Reinhardt,F.L.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1999</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>9</Start_Page><End_Page>21</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Industrial Ecology</Periodical><Volume>3</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Industrial Ecology</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Reinhardt, 1999).Improving environmental quality. This may for example reduce the input costs of drinking water manufacturing firms, or stimulate tourism with a positive impact on the competitiveness of the associated tourism industry. -(4) In contrast, policies may have a direct negative impact by:Reducing demand, e.g. demand for chlorine by the Montreal Protocol.Increasing input prices, e.g. the effect of the EU ETS on electricity prices.Increasing transaction costs for negotiating, monitoring, measuring, and reporting.Introducing new cost elements: taxes, charges, expenditures for emission permits.Reducing productivity through barriers to entry, lock-in of capital, delay of investment and development due to uncertainty on future regulation ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Shadbegian</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>150</RecNum><IDText>Pollution abatement expenditures and plant-level productivity: A production function approach</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>150</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Pollution abatement expenditures and plant-level productivity: A production function approach</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Shadbegian,R.J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Gray,W.B.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2005</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>196</Start_Page><End_Page>208</End_Page><Periodical>Ecological Economics</Periodical><Volume>54</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Ecological Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Shadbegian and Gray, 2005).+(5) Finally, anticipated or observed impacts on competitiveness may feedback to the design or implementation of the environmental policies. REF _Ref367797087 \h Table 1 below summarises the potential positive and negative impacts of environmental policies on the competitiveness of firms through both channels of influence. Table SEQ Table \* ARABIC 1 Linkages between environmental policy and competitivenessImpacts of improved environmental performanceDirect impacts of environmental policyPositiveNegativePositiveNegativeImproved resource efficiencyIncrease in production costsCreating demands for the firm’s outputsReduced demand for the firm’s outputImproved stakeholder relationsReduced productivityRaising rival’s costsIncreasing input pricesProduct differentiationAdverse impacts on perceived product qualityImproving environmental qualityImposing transaction costsImproved market accessImposing new cost elements on a firmThe creation of new businessAdversely affecting productivitySource: ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>OECD</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>117</RecNum><IDText>Linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>117</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Linkages between environmental policy and competitiveness</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>OECD</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris</Pub_Place><Publisher>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</Publisher><Title_Series>OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 13</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(OECD, 2010)Competitiveness in EU legislation For the EU, competitiveness is a central element in its 2020 Strategy. The European Commission ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>EC</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>173</RecNum><IDText>An integrated industrial policy for the globalization era: Putting competitiveness and sustainability at centre stage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>173</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>An integrated industrial policy for the globalization era: Putting competitiveness and sustainability at centre stage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>EC</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>COM(2010) 614</Volume><Pub_Place>Brussels</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Commission</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(EC, 2010) sets out the EU’s approach to integrated industrial policy under the motto “putting competitiveness and sustainability at centre stage”. The dedication to the competitiveness of EU industry is enshrined in the European Treaty ( REF _Ref367868441 \h Box 1).Box SEQ Box \* ARABIC 1 Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Article 173(ex Article 157 TEC)1. The Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at:— speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes,— encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings, — encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings,— fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development.In order to assess the impacts on industrial competitiveness of proposed EU policies, the Commission’s 2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines, include a set of competitiveness-related questions. For further guidance, the Commission has developed a ‘competitiveness proofing’ toolkit for use in Impact Assessment ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>EC</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>172</RecNum><IDText>A "competitiveness proofing" toolkit for use in Impact Assessments - Operational guidance for assessing impacts on sectoral competitiveness within the Commission impact assessment system</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>172</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>A "competitiveness proofing" toolkit for use in Impact Assessments - Operational guidance for assessing impacts on sectoral competitiveness within the Commission impact assessment system</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>EC</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>SEC(2012)91 final</Volume><Pub_Place>Brussels</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Commission</Publisher><Title_Series>Commission Staff Working Document</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(EC, 2012a). REF _Ref367869323 \h Box 2 presents the recommended step-wise approach to assess impacts of proposed policies on the competitiveness of EU firms. It starts with establishing the rationale for competitiveness screening for the specific policy under consideration. If this rationale can be found, it proceeds with a qualitative screening to get an indication of the size and severity of the impacts. If the qualitative screening gives reasons for concern, a quantitative assessment is proposed. In accordance to the provisions of the EU Treaty ( REF _Ref367868441 \h Box 1), special attention is paid to the impacts on the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Box SEQ Box \* ARABIC 2 A step-wise approach to ‘competiveness proofing’ in EU Impact Assessment StepQuestion/ActionGetting Started1Does your IA require specific analysis of impacts on sectoral competitiveness?2How deep should we go?Qualitative screening3Which are the affected sectors?4What is the effect on SME competitiveness?5What is the effect on cost and price effectiveness?6What is the effect on the enterprises’ capacity to innovate? 7What might be the effect on the sector’s international competitiveness?Quantifying the impacts: data sources8Provide evidence on the structure and performance of the directly affected sector(s)8aTake stock of existing sectoral studies and ex-post evaluations8bUpdate existing data9Provide data evidence on indirectly affected sectors10 Quantify additional compliance and/or operational costs related to the assessed initiative11Quantify the expected impacts on the capacity of affected enterprises to innovate12Quantify the expected impacts on affected sector’s international competitivenessSource: ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>EC</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>172</RecNum><IDText>A "competitiveness proofing" toolkit for use in Impact Assessments - Operational guidance for assessing impacts on sectoral competitiveness within the Commission impact assessment system</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>172</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>A "competitiveness proofing" toolkit for use in Impact Assessments - Operational guidance for assessing impacts on sectoral competitiveness within the Commission impact assessment system</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>EC</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>SEC(2012)91 final</Volume><Pub_Place>Brussels</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Commission</Publisher><Title_Series>Commission Staff Working Document</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(EC, 2012a)Indicators of competitivenessThe European Commission publishes an annual report on European competitiveness ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>EC</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>174</RecNum><IDText>European competitiveness report 2012: Reaping the benefits of globalization</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>174</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>European competitiveness report 2012: Reaping the benefits of globalization</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>EC</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Brussels</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(EC, 2012b) in which it describes trends in the competitiveness of EU industrial sectors, illustrated by a number of indicators. As was pointed out above, competitiveness is best understood as an ability. Ability itself is difficult to measure. Indicators of competitiveness are determinants or consequences of this ability. The annual report on European competitiveness presents sector-level indicators of competitiveness. Indicators that focus on the determinants of competitiveness are growth rates of labour productivity (per person and per hour worked), and unit labour costs (ULC), which is simply the ratio of labour costs to output. A somewhat more complex indicator in this category is the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). To explain this indicator, we start with the (nominal) Effective Exchange Rate (EER) for country j. The EER is the geometric mean of all bilateral (market) exchange rates of the currencies of competitor countries (ek,j), weighted by the importance of the competitor countries (wi): EERj=k=1N(ekj)wkThe Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is the EER adjusted by some similarly weighted measure of relative prices or costs. Using unit labour costs (ULC) the formula for REER becomes:REERj=k=1N(ULCjULCkekj)wk=k=1N(ULCjULCk)wk*k=1N(ekj)wkIndicators that focus on consequences include simple indices of production and employment, and the indices of relative trade balance, and revealed comparative advantage.The relative trade balance (RTB) for sector i measures net exports of a country (exports X minus imports M) as share of the total trade of that country (exports X plus imports M) in a certain period. In formula:RTBi=Xi-MiXi+MiRevealed comparative advantage (RCA) of sector i of country j measures its relative exports (exports Xi as a share of total exports ∑Xi) against the relative exports of sector i of a reference group of competitor countries k. In formula:RCAj,i=Xj,iXj,iXk,iXk,iThe indicators that focus on the determinants of competitiveness only measure quantifiable factors and not the non-price factors such as the quality of the workforce, infrastructure, innovative capacity, and the legislative, fiscal and regulatory environment, that can also affect the competiveness of firms, sectors, and nations ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ekins</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>337</RecNum><IDText>Impacts on competitiveness: What do we know from modeling?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>337</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Impacts on competitiveness: What do we know from modeling?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ekins,Paul</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Speck,Stefan</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>377</Start_Page><End_Page>396</End_Page><Title_Secondary><f name="Calibri">Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation </f></Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Milne,Janet E.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Andersen,Mikael S.</Authors_Secondary><Issue>21</Issue><Pub_Place>Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Edward Elgar</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ekins et al., 2012). Cost-based indicators have a limited ability to predict how overall competitiveness will change if one cost item, say an environmental tax on energy, is increased. This is especially true in the longer term when firms can optimally adjust to the tax. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, there is no simple relationship between cost-based indicators of competitiveness (e.g. unit energy costs) and consequences of competitiveness as measured by, for example, relative trade indices ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Miltner</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>396</RecNum><IDText>Trends in the competitiveness of selected industrial sectors in ETR countries</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>396</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Trends in the competitiveness of selected industrial sectors in ETR countries</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Miltner,A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Salmons,Roger</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Keywords>Europe</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Title_Secondary>Carbon-energy taxation: Lessons from Europe</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Andersens,M.S.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Ekins,Paul</Authors_Secondary><Pub_Place>New York, USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Oxford University Press</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Kee</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>395</RecNum><IDText>The effects of domestic climate change measures on international competitiveness</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>395</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The effects of domestic climate change measures on international competitiveness</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Kee,Hiau Looi</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ma,Hong</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Mani,Muthukumara</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010/6/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>820</Start_Page><End_Page>829</End_Page><Periodical>World Economy</Periodical><Volume>33</Volume><Issue>6</Issue><Publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1467-9701</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">World Economy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Miltner and Salmons, 2009; Kee et al., 2010). The indicators that focus on the consequences of competitiveness show important trends, but it is difficult (and often impossible) to identify causal relationships with determining factors. A practical problem, especially with international trade data, is that the product classification that is used for recording trade flows is not appropriate for the questions that are being asked from the data. The traditional classifications are based on industrial sectors but do not, as a rule, distinguish between conventional and ‘green’ goods and services. This is further discussed in Chapter REF _Ref368051943 \r \h 5. Climate policy and international competitivenessIntroductionClimate policies will remain sub-global in the years to come, and unilateral or regional policies, including regulations, subsidies, carbon taxes and carbon markets, have emerged as some industrialized countries (particularly the EU and some Member States) decided unilaterally to reduce their emissions. The top-down global Kyoto approach is shifting towards a bottom-up architecture with different CO2 prices ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Rayner</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>340</RecNum><IDText>How to eat an elephant: A bottom-up approach to climate policy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>340</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>How to eat an elephant: A bottom-up approach to climate policy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rayner,Steve</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>615</Start_Page><End_Page>621</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>10</Volume><Issue>6</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Weischer</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>341</RecNum><IDText>Climate Clubs: Can small groups of countries make a big difference in addressing climate change?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>341</Ref_ID><Title_Primary><f name="Calibri">Climate Clubs: Can small groups of countries make a big difference in addressing climate change?</f></Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Weischer,Lutz</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Morgan,Jennifer</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Patel,Milan</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>177</Start_Page><End_Page>192</End_Page><Periodical>Review of European Community & International Environmental Law</Periodical><Volume>21</Volume><Issue>3</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Review of European Community & International Environmental Law</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Rayner, 2010; Weischer et al., 2012).In a world with uneven climate policies, the carbon price differentials across regions modify production costs and may shift the production of energy-intensive goods from carbon-constrained countries to countries with laxer climate policy. Since a decrease in emissions in one part of the world leads to an increase in emissions in the rest of the world, this phenomenon is referred to as carbon leakage. The Pollution Haven effect, that is, the migration of dirty industries to countries with less stringent regulations, is one of the most contentious debates in international economics ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Taylor</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>342</RecNum><IDText>Unbundling the Pollution Haven Hypothesis</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>342</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unbundling the Pollution Haven Hypothesis</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Taylor,M.S.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2005</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Periodical>The B.E.Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy</Periodical><Volume>4</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><f name="System">The B.E.Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Taylor, 2005). A major difference exists between local pollutants, which constitute the overwhelming part of studies in the pollution haven literature, and CO2. CO2 is a global stock pollutant: the geographic location of emissions does not matter. A production shift would then reduce the environmental benefits of the policy while potentially damaging the economy. In the context of growing globalisation, environmental policies can also have a strategic role. The fierce competition to attract foreign direct investment or the threat of industrial relocation could lead to a ‘regulatory chill’ or even a ‘race-to-the bottom’, depending on the willingness of countries to downgrade environmental standards.Indeed, the fear of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness in energy-intensive industries are the main arguments against ambitious climate policies in industrialized countries. Modest mitigation targets have gone hand in hand with policy packages intended to protect sectors at risk of carbon leakage (mainly cement, iron and steel, aluminium and oil refineries). In the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), the biggest carbon pricing experiment so far, tradable allowances are distributed free of charge for these sectors. In the US, the Waxman-Markey proposal, which was adopted by the House of Representatives in 2009 but not by the Senate, would have introduced a nationwide carbon market with measures to face these issues: allowances distributed freely on the basis of current output (output-based allocation) and border carbon adjustment (BCA). The latter, aimed at ‘levelling the carbon playing field’, is widely discussed among politicians, business leaders and academics. However, it is often considered as protectionism disguised as green policy ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Evenett</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>343</RecNum><IDText>Resist green protectionism - or pay the price at Copenhagen</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>343</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Resist green protectionism - or pay the price at Copenhagen</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Evenett,Simon J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Whalley,John</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>93</Start_Page><End_Page>98</End_Page><Title_Secondary>The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G20</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Baldwin,Richard</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Evenett,Simon</Authors_Secondary><Issue>18</Issue><Pub_Place>London, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Center for Economic Policy Research</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Evenett and Whalley, 2008) among developing countries, and its compatibility with the rules of the World Trade Organisation remains contentious. The political outcome of its implementation is highly uncertain. BCA may increase the incentives of third countries to join the abating coalition but may also create international friction and lead to tit-for-tat trade retaliations ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Bordoff</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>344</RecNum><IDText>International trade law and the economic of climate change policy: Evaluating the legality and effectiveness of proposals to address competitiveness and leakage concerns</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>344</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>International trade law and the economic of climate change policy: Evaluating the legality and effectiveness of proposals to address competitiveness and leakage concerns</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Bordoff,J.E.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>35</Start_Page><End_Page>66</End_Page><Title_Secondary>Climate change, trade and competitiveness: Is a collision inevitable?</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Brainard,L.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Sorkin,I.</Authors_Secondary><Pub_Place>Washington D.C., USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Brookings Institution Press</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>IIFT</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>345</RecNum><IDText>WTO compatibility of border trade measures for environmental protection</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>345</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>WTO compatibility of border trade measures for environmental protection</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>IIFT</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Delhi, India</Pub_Place><Publisher>Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Bordoff, 2009; IIFT, 2010). The recent setbacks of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS are a reminder that any attempt to regulate emissions outside a country’s jurisdiction is extremely problematic: foreign airlines and governments complained about this inclusion, which pushed the EU to cancel the inclusion of international flights, pending a debate at the International Civil Aviation Organization. This Chapter provides a literature review on competitiveness and carbon leakage issues from an economic, political and legal perspective. First, Section REF _Ref367888232 \r \h 4.2 gives the definitions of the main terms involved. Section REF _Ref367888334 \r \h 4.3 discusses positive impacts on competitiveness and foreign abatement. Section REF _Ref367888412 \r \h 4.4 provides an evaluation of the carbon leakage risk, distinguishing ex ante Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling from ex post econometric studies. Section REF _Ref367888556 \r \h 4.4.3 synthesises the results. Section REF _Ref367888435 \r \h 4.5 examines the policies aimed at reducing carbon leakage and competitiveness losses with an emphasis on Border Carbon Adjustment. Section REF _Ref367888525 \r \h 4.6 concludes.DefinitionsCarbon leakageWhile competitiveness concerns and carbon leakage are often associated, they are two distinct phenomena. Carbon leakage is the increase of emissions in the rest of the world when a region implements a climate policy, compared to a situation where no policy is implemented ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Quirion</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>346</RecNum><IDText>Competitiveness and leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>346</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Competitiveness and leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Quirion,P.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>77</Start_Page><End_Page>94</End_Page><Title_Secondary>Climate change policies - global challenges and future prospects</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Cerdá,Emilio</Authors_Secondary><Pub_Place>Vigo, Spain</Pub_Place><Publisher>University of Vigo</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Quirion, 2010). It can be measured by the leakage rate or leakage-to-reduction ratio, which is the rise in emissions in the rest of the world divided by the abated emissions in the region that has adopted a climate policy. A 50% leakage-to-reduction ratio means that half of the mitigation effort is undermined by the increase of emissions in the rest of the world, and not the misguided interpretation that 50% of emissions have ‘leaked’ in the rest of the world. If this ratio is under 100%, emissions have decreased on a global scale, so the policy is environmentally beneficial. A ratio above 100% is theoretically possible, because the carbon intensity of CO2-intensive products can be higher in the rest of the world, but has only been found in one outlier model ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Babiker</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>347</RecNum><IDText>Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>347</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Babiker,Mustafa H.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2005</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>421</Start_Page><End_Page>445</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of International Economics</Periodical><Volume>65</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of International Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Babiker, 2005). Estimates of leakage rates are typically in a range of 5%-20% depending on many factors (see below). Carbon leakage occurs through two main channels: the competitiveness channel and the international fossil fuel price channel ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dr?ge</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>348</RecNum><IDText>Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>348</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dröge,Susanne</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Climate Strategies</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dr?ge, 2009). The root of the competitiveness channel is that the cost of compliance gives a comparative disadvantage for regulated firms vis-à-vis their competitors. This change of relative prices can lead to a change of the trade balance (less exports and more imports). In the short term, this would correspond to a change of the utilisation rate of existing capacities (operational leakage), while in the long term, it would correspond to a change in production capacities (investment leakage). These changes induce a shift of production, and then of emissions, from the regulated part of the world to the unregulated part of the world.Besides, abating countries almost necessarily have to cut their fossil fuel consumption, which drives down the international prices of carbon-intensive fossil fuels: coal, oil and, perhaps even more, non-conventional fossil fuels ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Persson</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>454</RecNum><IDText>Major oil exporters may profit rather than lose, in a carbon-constrained world</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>454</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Major oil exporters may profit rather than lose, in a carbon-constrained world</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Persson,Tobias A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Azar,C.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Johansson,D.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lindgren,K.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007/12</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Oil</Keywords><Keywords>OPEC</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>6346</Start_Page><End_Page>6353</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>35</Volume><Issue>12</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Persson et al., 2007). This decrease in prices reduces the net cost of climate policies in fuel-importing abating countries since a part of abatement is borne by fossil fuel exporters who lose a part of their rents. However it leads to a rise of their consumption in countries with less stringent policies. Because of international energy markets, the shrink in consumption in one region involves an increase in consumption in the rest of the world, causing carbon leakage through the international fossil fuel price channel. Yet two caveats are in order. First, CO2 capture and storage (CCS) does not reduce fuel consumption. Quirion et al. ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Quirion</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>349</RecNum><IDText>How CO2 capture and storage can mitigate carbon leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>349</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>How CO2 capture and storage can mitigate carbon leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Quirion,P.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rozenberg,Julie</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Sassi,Olivier</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Vogt-Schilb,Adrien</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Periodical>FEEM Working Papers</Periodical><Pub_Place>Milan, Italy</Pub_Place><Publisher>FEEM</Publisher><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">FEEM Working Papers</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2011) show that for this reason, CCS brings down carbon leakage compared to a climate policy providing the same abatement without CCS. Second, the world oil market is dominated by OPEC, and alternative assumptions about OPEC’s behaviour lead to opposite results regarding leakage through the oil market, which can even become negative ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>B?hringer</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>350</RecNum><IDText>Unilateral climate policy: Can OPEC resolve the leakage problem?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>350</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unilateral climate policy: Can OPEC resolve the leakage problem?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rosendahl,Knut Einar</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Schneider,Ja</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Periodical>USAEE Working Paper</Periodical><Volume>13-121</Volume><Availability><f name="Times New Roman">Available at SSRN: or name="System">USAEE Working Paper</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(B?hringer et al., 2013).The same reasoning applied to the whole world but with two temporal periods is known as the Green Paradox ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Sinn</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>351</RecNum><IDText>Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>351</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Sinn,Hans-Werner</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>360</Start_Page><End_Page>394</End_Page><Periodical>International Tax and Public Finance</Periodical><Volume>15</Volume><Issue>4</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">International Tax and Public Finance</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Eisenack</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>453</RecNum><IDText>Resource rents: The effects of energy taxes and quantity instruments for climate protection</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>453</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Resource rents: The effects of energy taxes and quantity instruments for climate protection</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Eisenack,Klaus</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Edenhofer,Ottmar</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Kalkuhl,Matthias</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/9</Date_Primary><Keywords>Rent-seeking</Keywords><Keywords>Resource extraction</Keywords><Keywords>Supply side</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>159</Start_Page><End_Page>166</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>48</Volume><Title_Secondary>Special Section: Frontiers of Sustainability</Title_Secondary><Issue>0</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Sinn, 2008; Eisenack et al., 2012) which could be considered inter-temporal leakage: a rising CO2 price would be seen as a future resource expropriation by fossil fuel owners who would then increase resource extraction. 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007; Fischer and Fox, 2009; Weitzel et al., 2012; Boeters and Bollen, 2012). CompetitivenessAt a firm or sectoral level, competitiveness can refer to ‘ability to sell’ or ‘ability to earn’. Competiveness as ‘ability to sell’ is the capacity to increase market share, and can be measured through indicators involving exports, imports and domestic sales ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Alexeeva-Talebi</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>168</RecNum><IDText>The value-added of sectoral disaggregation: Implications on competitive consequences of climate change policies</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>168</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The value-added of sectoral disaggregation: Implications on competitive consequences of climate change policies</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Alexeeva-Talebi,Victoria</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Löschel,Andreas</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Voigt,Sebastian</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S127</Start_Page><End_Page>S142</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>Supplement 2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012). Competitiveness as ‘ability to earn’ is the capacity to increase margins of profitability, and can be measured with indicators involving some measures of profit or stock values. Distinguishing these two notions is useful since the same climate policy can have different impacts on both. For instance, distributing free emission allowances based on historic data only, as is the case in the US SO2 ETS ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Schmalensee</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>302</RecNum><IDText>From 'Green Growth' to sound policies: An overview</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>302</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>From 'Green Growth' to sound policies: An overview</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Schmalensee,Richard</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/11</Date_Primary><Keywords>Green economy</Keywords><Keywords>Green growth</Keywords><Keywords>OECD</Keywords><Keywords>UNEP</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S2</Start_Page><End_Page>S6</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34, Supplement 1</Volume><Title_Secondary>Green Perspectives</Title_Secondary><ISSN_ISBN>0140-9883</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Schmalensee, 2012), increases the ability to earn but not the ability to sell, since an operator can close a plant and continue to receive the same amount of allowances. Hence, only competitiveness as ability to sell may generate leakage.The notion of competitiveness at the national level is controversial, and is considered meaningless by some economists, such as Paul Krugman (1994). The main indicator is the balance of trade, that is, the difference between the monetary value of exports and imports, but an increase in the balance of trade may result from many factors, some of which are completely unrelated to the competitiveness of domestic firms, like a contraction in domestic demand. Whether climate policies have to protect competitiveness at a national level or at a sectoral level is a legitimate question. EU ETS sectors contribute 40% of EU emissions, but less than 5% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an even smaller share of its jobs ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ellerman</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>354</RecNum><IDText>Pricing carbon: the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book, Whole"><Ref_Type>Book, Whole</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>354</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Pricing carbon: the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ellerman,Denny</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Convery,F.J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>de Perthuis,Christian</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>European Union</Keywords><Keywords>Emissions trading</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Cambridge University Press</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>2</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ellerman et al., 2010). The sectors at risk of carbon leakage (see below) account for slightly more than 1% of GDP in the UK ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Hourcade</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>355</RecNum><IDText>Differentiation and dynamics of EU ETS industrial competitiveness impacts</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>355</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Differentiation and dynamics of EU ETS industrial competitiveness impacts</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hourcade,Jean-Charles</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Demailly,D.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Neuhoff,Karsten</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Sato,Misato</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Keywords>EU ETS</Keywords><Keywords>EU-ETS</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Climate Strategies</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Hourcade et al., 2007) and 2% in Germany ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Graichen</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>162</RecNum><IDText>Impacts of the EU emissions trading scheme on the industrial competitiveness in Germany</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>162</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Impacts of the EU emissions trading scheme on the industrial competitiveness in Germany</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Graichen,Verena</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Schumacher,K.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Matthes,F.C.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Mohr,L.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Duscha,V.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Schleich,J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Diekmann,J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>370741501</Volume><Publisher>Umweltbundesambt</Publisher><Title_Series>Umweltbundesambt Research Report</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Graichen et al., 2008). However, they account for a much higher share of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions so protecting their competitiveness in order to limit leakage cannot be discarded prima facie.Sectors at riskAll sectors do not face the same risk of carbon leakage. The risk is higher if the carbon cost is high and the international competition is fierce. Hence, in the attempt to classify sectors exposed to carbon leakage, two indicators are generally used, one measuring the carbon cost and the other the trade intensity. For the EU ETS, the carbon cost is measured by the value at stake, defined as the carbon costs relative to the gross value added of a given industrial sector. The trade intensity is measured by the ratio in values between imports plus exports and the EU total market size. A sector is considered at risk if one or both of these indicators is above a certain threshold (see Figure 1). The most vulnerable sectors, usually gathered around the common denomination of Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) sectors, include iron and steel, cement, refineries and aluminium.Figure SEQ Abbildung \* ARABIC \s 1 1 Sectors classified ‘at risk of carbon leakage’ in EuropeSource: Carbon Trust 2010. The size of the circles is proportional to the sector emissions.The EITE sectors are well-organized and constitute a strong lobby that has managed so far to influence climate policies. Indeed, all climate policies have provided more favourable rules for these sectors compared to others. In addition, these ‘specific rules’ are generally more favourable in the final amendments than in first drafts ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>CEO</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>356</RecNum><IDText>Industry lobbying on emissions trading scheme hits the jackpot: The cases of Arcelor Mital and Lafarge</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>356</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Industry lobbying on emissions trading scheme hits the jackpot: The cases of Arcelor Mital and Lafarge</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>CEO</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Emissions trading</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Brussels, Belgium</Pub_Place><Publisher>Corporate Europe Observatory</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(CEO, 2010). The classification of sectors in itself (which sectors are at risk and which are not), because of its economic impacts, is subject to political and academic controversy and face strong industrial lobbying ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Cló</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>357</RecNum><IDText>Grandfathering, auctioning and carbon leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new ETS directive</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>357</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Grandfathering, auctioning and carbon leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new ETS directive</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Cló,Stefano</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>2420</Start_Page><End_Page>2430</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>38</Volume><Issue>5</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Martin</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>358</RecNum><IDText>Industry compensation under relocation risk: A firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>358</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Industry compensation under relocation risk: A firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Martin,Ralf</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Muûls,Mirabelle</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>de Preux,Laure B.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wagner,Ulrich J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Emissions trading</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>1150</Volume><Pub_Place>London, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Centre for Economic performance, London School of Economics and Political Science</Publisher><Title_Series>CEP Discussion Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Cló, 2010; Martin et al., 2012).Positive impacts of climate policies on competitiveness and abatement in foreign countriesThough the political debate has focused on the negative impacts of climate policies, some authors argue that at least in some sectors or firms, stringent environmental regulations can force firms to be more efficient in their processes, and then more competitive. This is referred to as the Porter hypothesis ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Porter</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>144</RecNum><IDText>Toward a new concept of the environment-competitiveness relationship</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>144</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Toward a new concept of the environment-competitiveness relationship</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Porter,M.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>van der Linden,C.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1995</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>97</Start_Page><End_Page>118</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Economic Perspectives</Periodical><Volume>9</Volume><Issue>4</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Economic Perspectives</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Porter et al., 1995), which is highly controversial but has been corroborated in Europe by a recent econometric study ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Costantini</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>291</RecNum><IDText>On the green and innovative side of trade competitiveness? The impact of environmental policies and innovation on EU exports</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>291</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>On the green and innovative side of trade competitiveness? The impact of environmental policies and innovation on EU exports</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Costantini,Valeria</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Mazzanti,Massimiliano</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/2</Date_Primary><Keywords>Environmental policies</Keywords><Keywords>European Union</Keywords><Keywords>Export performance</Keywords><Keywords>Gravity model</Keywords><Keywords>Porter hypotheses</Keywords><Keywords>Technological innovation</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>132</Start_Page><End_Page>153</End_Page><Periodical>Research Policy</Periodical><Volume>41</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0048-7333</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Research Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Costantini and Mazzanti, 2012). Further, it is possible to highlight two mechanisms symmetrical of carbon leakage and competitiveness losses: climate spillovers and first mover advantage. 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Newell et al., 1999; Jaffe et al., 2002; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011). Diffusion of these technologies reduces emissions in non-abating countries and then creates negative leakage, or positive climate spillover PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkdlcmxhZ2g8L0F1dGhvcj48WWVhcj4yMDA3PC9ZZWFyPjxS
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Gerlagh et al., 2007; Di Maria and Werf, 2008; Golombek and Hoel, 2004; Bosetti et al., 2008). There is empirical evidence of climate spillovers, especially in energy-saving technologies ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Popp</Author><Year>2002</Year><RecNum>360</RecNum><IDText>Induced innovation and energy prices</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>360</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Induced innovation and energy prices</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Popp,D.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2002</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>160</Start_Page><End_Page>180</End_Page><Periodical>American Economic Review</Periodical><Volume>92</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">American Economic Review</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Popp, 2002), but also in renewables. Feed-in tariffs in Denmark, Germany and Spain generated a massive induced technical change in wind and solar technologies ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Peters</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>364</RecNum><IDText>The impact of technology-push and demand-pull policies on technical change - Does the locus of policies matter?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>364</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The impact of technology-push and demand-pull policies on technical change - Does the locus of policies matter?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Peters,Michael</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Schneider,Malte</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Griesshaber,Tobias</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hoffmann,Volker H.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1296</Start_Page><End_Page>1308</End_Page><Periodical>Research Policy</Periodical><Volume>41</Volume><Issue>8</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Research Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Peters et al., 2012) and are thus in part responsible for the spectacular development of windpower capacities in China, which became the world leader in terms of windpower installed capacities, shifting from 2.6 GW in 2006 to 75 GW in 2012 ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Roney</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>365</RecNum><IDText>Wind surpasses nuclear in China</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>365</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Wind surpasses nuclear in China</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Roney,J.-M.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C., USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Earth Policy Institute</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Roney, 2013).Another, yet even more difficult to quantify source of negative leakage is the international diffusion of climate policies: implementing any new policy involves some risks, and observing climate policies in other countries allows reducing these risks and possibly avoiding some mistakes. Just as the EU has closely observed the US SO2 cap-and-trade to set up the EU ETS, subsequent ETS developments have benefited from the EU ETS experience. The same stands for other climate policies such as renewable subsidies (especially feed-in-tariffs pioneered by Denmark and then Germany) and energy efficiency regulations.Finally, Fullerton et al. ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Fullerton</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>366</RecNum><IDText>Negative leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>366</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Negative leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Fullerton,Don</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Karney,Dan</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Baylis,Kathy</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>3379</Volume><Title_Series>CESifo Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Fullerton et al., 2011) have recently identified a new mechanism generating negative leakage, which they label the Abatement Resource Effect (ARE). The intuition is that when a climate policy reduces emissions in one part of the economy, it may draw factors of production away from other, carbon-intensive activities. The authors show that if this effect is strong enough, an economy may exhibit negative net leakage in response to the policy change. While the possibility of negative leakage through this mechanism is not disputed, Carbone ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Carbone</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>367</RecNum><IDText>Linking numerical and analytical models of carbon leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>367</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Linking numerical and analytical models of carbon leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Carbone,Jared</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>326</Start_Page><End_Page>331</End_Page><Periodical>American Economic Review</Periodical><Volume>103</Volume><Issue>3</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">American Economic Review</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2013) as well as Winchester and Rausch ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Winchester</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>368</RecNum><IDText>A numerical investigation of the potential for negative emissions leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>368</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>A numerical investigation of the potential for negative emissions leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Winchester,Niven</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rausch,Sebastian</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>320</Start_Page><End_Page>325</End_Page><Periodical>American Economic Review</Periodical><Volume>103</Volume><Issue>3</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">American Economic Review</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2013) have recently assessed the ARE in more complex models and conclude that the negative leakage due to the ARE is more than offset by positive leakage mechanisms. Technological knowhow in climate-related technologies gained by domestic firms could be used to capture market share in emerging markets (first-mover advantage). If other countries join the abating coalition, these firms have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis their competitors. This ability to gain market share by being the first to develop a technology is the first mover advantage. Emerging in models ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Summerton</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>370</RecNum><IDText>A model-based assessment of the first mover advantage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>370</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>A model-based assessment of the first mover advantage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Summerton,Philip</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Pollitt,Hector</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Klaassen,Ger</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Prague, Czech Republic</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 19th Annual Conference</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Summerton et al., 2012), it could be considered a long-term competitiveness factor. The clearest case concerns the EU wind industry, which is the dominant supplier in all word markets except China, due to the already mentioned feed-in-tariffs implemented in the 1990s. However, while Germany benefited from a first-mover advantage in the Photovoltaic (PV) industry until 2011, the German PV industry has since been largely surpassed by China, showing how fragile a dominant position can be in industries featuring fast technical progress ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Kazmerski</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>371</RecNum><IDText>Solar Photovoltaics: No longer an outlier</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>371</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Solar Photovoltaics: No longer an outlier</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Kazmerski,Lawrence</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>48</Start_Page><End_Page>80</End_Page><Title_Secondary>Global dynamics in the green industry: A new engine for growth</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Fesharaki,F.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Kim,N.Y.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Kim,Y.H.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Zhang,Z.X.</Authors_Secondary><Pub_Place>Seoul, Korea</Pub_Place><Publisher>Korean Energy Economics Institute</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Kazmerski, 2011).Evaluation of carbon leakageEx ante studiesClimate change mitigation policies are diverse and include various forms of regulations, subsidies, carbon taxes and emission trading systems (ETS). Yet carbon leakage has mostly been assessed for ETS and carbon taxes. There is extensive literature assessing ex ante carbon leakage from hypothetical carbon taxes or ETS that can be traced back to Felder and Rutherford ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Felder</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>393</RecNum><IDText>Unilateral CO2 reductions and carbon leakage: the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>393</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unilateral CO2 reductions and carbon leakage: the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Felder,S</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rutherford,Th.F.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1993</Date_Primary><Keywords>Leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>162</Start_Page><End_Page>176</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</Periodical><Volume>25</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Felder and Rutherford, 1993). 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (B?hringer et al., 2012b; Mattoo et al., 2009; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Dissou and Eyland, 2011; Lanzi et al., 2012; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012; Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Peterson and Schleich, 2007), while global structural econometric models are also used ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Lutz</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>462</RecNum><IDText>Environmental and economic effects of post-Kyoto carbon regimes: Results of simulations with the global model GINFORS</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>462</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Environmental and economic effects of post-Kyoto carbon regimes: Results of simulations with the global model GINFORS</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lutz,Christian</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Meyer,Bernd</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/5</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Economic effects</Keywords><Keywords>Economy<f name="Symbol">G</f>Çôenergy<f name="Symbol">G</f>Çôenvironment modelling</Keywords><Keywords>International policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1758</Start_Page><End_Page>1766</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>37</Volume><Issue>5</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Lutz and Meyer, 2009). To asses sector-specific rates of leakage partial equilibrium models are used PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkdpZWxlbjwvQXV0aG9yPjxZZWFyPjIwMDI8L1llYXI+PFJl
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Gielen and Moriguchi, 2002; Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004; Monjon and Quirion, 2011; Demailly and Quirion, 2006; Demailly and Quirion, 2008). CGE models, which simulate the behaviour of entire economies, are pertinent to study the effect of policies on trade in different sectors ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Kehoe</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>415</RecNum><IDText>Frontiers in applied general equilibrium modeling: In honor of Herbert Scarf</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book, Whole"><Ref_Type>Book, Whole</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>415</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Frontiers in applied general equilibrium modeling: In honor of Herbert Scarf</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Kehoe,T.J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Srinivasan,T.N.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Whalley,J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2005</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Cambridge University Press</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>2</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Kehoe et al., 2005) but they generally rely on more aggregated data (almost exclusively the Global Trade Analysis Project database) that may hide impacts on more specific sectors ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Siikam?ki</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>416</RecNum><IDText>Climate policy, international trade and emissions leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>416</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Climate policy, international trade and emissions leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Siikamäki,Juha</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Munnings,Clayton</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ferris,Jeffrey</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Morris,Daniel</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>international trade</Keywords><Keywords>Leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington D.C., USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Resources for the Future</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Alexeeva-Talebi</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>168</RecNum><IDText>The value-added of sectoral disaggregation: Implications on competitive consequences of climate change policies</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>168</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The value-added of sectoral disaggregation: Implications on competitive consequences of climate change policies</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Alexeeva-Talebi,Victoria</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Löschel,Andreas</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Voigt,Sebastian</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S127</Start_Page><End_Page>S142</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>Supplement 2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Siikam?ki et al., 2012; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012). Moreover, most CGE models feature a zero-profit condition so cannot assess competitiveness as ability to earn. An exception is Goulder et al. ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Goulder</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>417</RecNum><IDText>Impacts of alternative emissions allowance allocation methods under a federal cap-and-trade program</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>417</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Impacts of alternative emissions allowance allocation methods under a federal cap-and-trade program</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Goulder,L.H</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hafstead,Marc A.C.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dworsky,Michael</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>161</Start_Page><End_Page>181</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Environemntal Economics and Management</Periodical><Volume>60</Volume><Issue>3</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Environemntal Economics and Management</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2010) whose model features capital adjustment costs, which implies that capital is imperfectly mobile across sectors and allows the model to capture the different impacts of policy interventions on the profits of various industries. Assessing a hypothetical federal ETS in the US, the authors conclude that freely allocating fewer than 15% of the emissions allowances generally suffices to prevent profit losses in the most vulnerable industries. Freely allocating all of the allowances substantially over-compensates these industries. While CGE models are usually calibrated on a limited set of data (often only one year), structural econometric models employ a richer set of time series data. While CGE models derive behavioural assumptions in production and consumption almost directly from micro-economic theory, structural econometric models can derive their assumptions from empirical evidence. While this is a serious advantage, it also makes them very dependent on good data (and efficient estimation techniques) which perhaps explains the relative scarcity of such models, especially at the world level. Partial equilibrium models often do not take account of all intersectoral linkages and lack macroeconomic closure, but they can provide rich descriptions of technological possibilities and market structure that can make them an appropriate tool to study sector-specific leakage (e.g. leakage from the steel sector). These models provide a wide range of estimations for leakage and competitiveness losses (as ability to sell). First, results depend on scenario hypotheses: the bigger the abating coalition, the smaller the leakage rate while the more ambitious the target, the higher the leakage rate. Linking carbon markets within the abating coalition ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Lanzi</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>376</RecNum><IDText>Alternative approaches for levelling carbon prices in a world with fragmented carbon markets</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>376</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Alternative approaches for levelling carbon prices in a world with fragmented carbon markets</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lanzi,Elisa</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Chateau,Jean</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dellink,Rob</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/12</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon markets</Keywords><Keywords>Climate mitigation policy</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Keywords>General equilibrium</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S240</Start_Page><End_Page>S250</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34, Supplement 2</Volume><Title_Secondary>The Role of Border Carbon Adjustment in Unilateral Climate Policy: Results from EMF 29</Title_Secondary><Issue>0</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0140-9883</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Lanzi et al., 2012), authorizing offset credits ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>B?hringer</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>372</RecNum><IDText>Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>372</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Carbone,Jared</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rutherford,Thomas</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S208</Start_Page><End_Page>S217</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>Supplement 2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(B?hringer et al., 2012b) or extending carbon pricing to all GHG ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ghosh</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>380</RecNum><IDText>Border tax adjustments in the climate policy context: CO2 versus broad-based GHG emission targeting</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>380</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Border tax adjustments in the climate policy context: CO2 versus broad-based GHG emission targeting</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ghosh,Madanmohan</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Luo,Deming</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Siddiqui,Muhammad Shahid</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Zhu,Yunfa</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/12</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border tax adjustments (BTAs)</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S154</Start_Page><End_Page>S167</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34, Supplement 2</Volume><Title_Secondary>The Role of Border Carbon Adjustment in Unilateral Climate Policy: Results from EMF 29</Title_Secondary><Issue>0</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0140-9883</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ghosh et al., 2012) increases economic efficiency and then reduces leakage. 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Monjon et al., 2011; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012; Balistreri et al., 2012). The former indicate to what extent a decrease in fossil fuel demand reduces the fuel price, while the latter represent the substitutability between domestic and foreign products.A recent comparative study of 12 different models gave the most robust results so far ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>B?hringer</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>389</RecNum><IDText>The role of border carbon adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29)</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>389</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The role of border carbon adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29)</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Balistreri,Edward J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rutherford,Thomas F.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/12</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border carbon adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Unilateral climate policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S97</Start_Page><End_Page>S110</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34, Supplement 2</Volume><Title_Secondary>The Role of Border Carbon Adjustment in Unilateral Climate Policy: Results from EMF 29</Title_Secondary><Issue>0</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0140-9883</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(B?hringer et al., 2012a). The estimate of leakage is 5-19% (mean 12%) when Annex I countries (except Russia) abate 20% of their emissions through carbon pricing without taking any measure to protect EITE sectors. The loss of output in these sectors is 0.5%-5% (mean 3%) in the coalition and an output gain of 1%-6.5% (mean 3%) is observed in the rest of the world. Some results of leakage estimates can be seen in REF _Ref368059230 \h Table 2.Table SEQ Table \* ARABIC 2 Leakage rate estimates in the literatureArticleAbating Coalition TargetSectors and Gases CoveredLeakage RefLeakage BCABCA FeaturesB?hringer et al. 2012Annex I except Russia20%*All sectors CO25-19% (mean 12%)2-12%(mean 8%)Foreign CCExport RebatesEITE sectorsGhosh et al. 2012Europe20%*All sectors (incl. Agri)12%-8%Foreign CCExport Rebates Lanzi et al. 2012Annex IKyoto* All sectorsCO24%-17%Foreign CCExport RebatesB?hringer et al. 2012Annex I except Russia20%*All sectorsB?hringer et al. 2012Annex I except Russia20%*McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2009USPrice instrument ($20 in 2010 to $50 in 2050)All sectors3%-30%China CCOnly importsPeterson and Schleich 2007Annex IKyotoAll sectors25%23%Domestic CCKuik and Hofkes 2010EuropePrice instrument(20€)EU ETS sectors11%10%Domestic CCOnly importsWinchester et al. 2011Annex I except Former USSR31% (US)All sectors10%7%Domestic (US) CCOnly importsMathiesen and Maestad 2005Annex IKyotoSteel only(partial equilibrium)26%-18%Foreign CCExport rebatesMonjon and Quirion 2011Europe15%EU ETS sectors(partial equilibrium)11%-4%Foreign CCExport rebatesEU ETS (except electricity)Source: authorsEx post studiesFor ex post analysis, CGE models, structural econometric models, and econometric time series analysis can be used. The first studies assessing empirically the impacts of environmental regulations on trade dealt with local pollution issues PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkthbHQ8L0F1dGhvcj48WWVhcj4xOTg4PC9ZZWFyPjxSZWNO
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Kalt, 1988; Tobey, 1990; Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Jaffe et al., 1995). They showed little evidence to support the ‘pollution haven’ effect: their estimates of the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows were either small or insignificant. However, recent studies have shown some evidence of the pollution haven effect in small proportions ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dean</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>392</RecNum><IDText>Are foreign investors attracted by weak environmental regulations?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>392</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Are foreign investors attracted by weak environmental regulations?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dean,Judith M.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lovely,Mary E.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wang,Hua</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2005</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C., USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><Title_Series>Policy Research Working Paper Series</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Levinson</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>158</RecNum><IDText>Unmasking the pollution haven effect</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>158</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unmasking the pollution haven effect</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Levinson,A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Taylor,M.S.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2008</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>223</Start_Page><End_Page>254</End_Page><Periodical>International Economic Review</Periodical><Volume>49</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">International Economic Review</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dean et al., 2005; Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Paradoxically, dirty industries seem less vulnerable, because of capital intensity and transport costs ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ederington</Author><Year>2003</Year><RecNum>393</RecNum><IDText>Footloose and pollution-free</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>393</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Footloose and pollution-free</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ederington,Josh</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Levinson,Arik</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Minier,Jenny</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2003</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>9718</Volume><Publisher>National Bureau of Economic Research</Publisher><Title_Series>Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ederington et al., 2003). The empirical validity of the pollution haven effect continues to be contentious in the debate regarding international trade and environment ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Kellenberg</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>394</RecNum><IDText>An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>394</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Kellenberg,Derek K.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/7</Date_Primary><Keywords>Environmental policy</Keywords><Keywords>Foreign direct investment</Keywords><Keywords>Intellectual property rights</Keywords><Keywords>Multinational firms</Keywords><Keywords>Pollution havens</Keywords><Keywords>Strategic trade policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>242</Start_Page><End_Page>255</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of International Economics</Periodical><Volume>78</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0022-1996</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Journal of International Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Kellenberg, 2009). Nevertheless a massive environmental relocation has never been observed.Environmental tax reforms (ETR, i.e. carbon taxes whose revenues are used to cut other taxes, mostly on labour income) established in some European countries offer another natural experiment to empirically treat these questions. Kee et al ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Kee</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>395</RecNum><IDText>The effects of domestic climate change measures on international competitiveness</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>395</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The effects of domestic climate change measures on international competitiveness</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Kee,Hiau Looi</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ma,Hong</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Mani,Muthukumara</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010/6/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>820</Start_Page><End_Page>829</End_Page><Periodical>World Economy</Periodical><Volume>33</Volume><Issue>6</Issue><Publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1467-9701</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">World Economy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2010) analyse the evolution of imports and exports in energy-intensive industries, comparing countries which did and did not implement a carbon tax. The authors find a statistically significant negative impact on exports of a carbon tax only in the cement sector while, strangely enough, they find a positive impact on exports in the paper as well as iron and steel sectors. No statistically significant impact was found on imports for any sector. Miltner and Salmons ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Miltner</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>396</RecNum><IDText>Trends in the competitiveness of selected industrial sectors in ETR countries</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book Chapter"><Ref_Type>Book Chapter</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>396</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Trends in the competitiveness of selected industrial sectors in ETR countries</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Miltner,A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Salmons,Roger</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Keywords>Europe</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Title_Secondary>Carbon-energy taxation: Lessons from Europe</Title_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Andersens,M.S.</Authors_Secondary><Authors_Secondary>Ekins,Paul</Authors_Secondary><Pub_Place>New York, USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Oxford University Press</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>3</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2009) found that, out of 56 cases (seven countries and eight sectors studied), the impact of ETR on competitiveness was insignificant in 80% of the cases, positive in 4% and negative for only 16%. 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Barker et al., 2009; Barker et al., 2011), e.g. a taxation shift from labour to pollution may stimulate economic growth as well as reducing pollution ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Goulder</Author><Year>2002</Year><RecNum>398</RecNum><IDText>Environmental policy making in economies with prior tax distortions</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Book, Whole"><Ref_Type>Book, Whole</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>398</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Environmental policy making in economies with prior tax distortions</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Goulder,L.H.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2002</Date_Primary><Keywords>Environmental policy</Keywords><Keywords>Environmental policies</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cheltenham, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Edward Elgar Publishers</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>2</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Bento</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>399</RecNum><IDText>Ricardian rents, environmental policy and the 'double-dividend' hypothesis</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>399</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Ricardian rents, environmental policy and the 'double-dividend' hypothesis</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Bento,Antonio M.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Jacobsen,Mark</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Keywords>Environmental policy</Keywords><Keywords>Environmental policies</Keywords><Keywords>Double dividend</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>17</Start_Page><End_Page>31</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</Periodical><Volume>53</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Goulder, 2002; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007). Aichele and Felbermayr ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Aichele</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>36</RecNum><IDText>Kyoto and the carbon footprint of nations</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>36</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Kyoto and the carbon footprint of nations</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Aichele,Rahel</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Felbermayr,Gabriel</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>336</Start_Page><End_Page>354</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</Periodical><Volume>63</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2012) econometrically assessed the impact of having an emission target under the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. being a developed country and having ratified the Protocol) on CO2 emissions, the CO2 footprint and CO2 net imports, using a differences-in-differences approach on a panel of 40 countries. To account for a potential endogeneity bias (the fact that countries with an expected low or negative growth in emissions may be more likely to have ratified the Protocol) they use the International Criminal Court participation as an instrumental variable for Kyoto ratification. They concluded that countries with a Kyoto target reduced domestic emissions by about 7% between 1997-2000 and 2004-2007 compared to the countries without a target, but that their CO2 footprint did not change (CO2 net imports increased by about 14 %). These results imply that domestic reductions have been fully offset by carbon leakage. However two caveats are in order. First, China became a member of the WTO in 2002, just when most developed countries ratified the Protocol. Since most CO2 net imports are due to trade with China ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Sato</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>400</RecNum><IDText>Embodied carbon in trade: A survey of the empirical literature</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>400</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Embodied carbon in trade: A survey of the empirical literature</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Sato,Misato</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013/4/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Embodied carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Embodied emissions</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>n/a</Start_Page><End_Page>n/a</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Economic Surveys</Periodical><ISSN_ISBN>1467-6419</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Journal of Economic Surveys</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Sato, 2013), the rise in net imports may well be due to China WTO membership rather than to Kyoto. 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Reinaud, 2008; Ellerman et al., 2010; Sartor, 2012; Quirion, 2011; Branger and Quirion, 2013a). More studies will undoubtedly be conducted in the following years, for the EU ETS and the other carbon markets that have emerged, as more hindsight will be provided. So far, the empirical results are in sharp contrast to the ‘exodus of EU industry’ claimed by the European Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Oxfam International</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>403</RecNum><IDText>Crying wolf: Industry lobbying and climate change in Europe</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>403</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Crying wolf: Industry lobbying and climate change in Europe</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Oxfam International</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Europe</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Oxford, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Oxfam International</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Oxfam International, 2010). SynthesisEx ante modelling studies vary in their results because of policy scenarios (size of the coalition, abatement targets) and some crucial model parameters (Armington elasticities for the competitiveness channel, and oil supply elasticities for the international fossil fuel channel). A meta-analysis of recent studies which details the role of these factors is provided in Branger and Quirion ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Branger</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>404</RecNum><IDText>Would Border Carbon Adjustment prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>404</Ref_ID><Title_Primary><f name="Calibri">Would Border Carbon Adjustment prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies</f></Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Branger,Frederic</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Quirion,P.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border carbon adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris, France</Pub_Place><Publisher>CIRED</Publisher><Title_Series>Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2013b). In the absence of BCA, most of these studies suggest leakage rates in the range of 5-20%. Conversely, ex post econometric studies have not revealed empirical evidence of these issues. Why such a difference?In the first place, the empirical evidence on carbon leakage and international competitiveness in both ex ante studies and in ex post econometric analysis is not (yet) strong. Second, effects of carbon taxation are always in practice compensated by ‘policy packages’. Because of carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns, sectors at risk in the EU ETS received allocations free of charge while in every case of CO2 tax, they benefited from lower tax rates or exemptions. In addition, aluminium producers and other electricity-intensive industries, protected by long term electricity contracts, have not always suffered the pass-through of carbon costs to consumer by electricity companies ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Sijm</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>405</RecNum><IDText>CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>405</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Sijm,J.P.M.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Neuhoff,Karsten</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Chen,Yishu</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2006</Date_Primary><Keywords>Power sector</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>49</Start_Page><End_Page>72</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>6</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Sijm et al., 2006). Moreover, in the case of the EU ETS, the CO2 price has been below €14 for the majority of the time since the launch of the system, arguably too low a value to entail noticeable impacts.Further, empirical studies have focused so far on operational leakage and not investment leakage (change in production capacities), which could be studied through the analysis of foreign direct investments. Over time, new carbon markets are launched and time series get longer, giving more room for empirical research. However, assessing the ‘true’ impact of asymmetric carbon pricing will always be hampered by the compensation measures aimed at reducing competitiveness losses.Another reason for the gap between ex ante predictions and ex post analysis could be that models generally do not (or only vaguely) take into account positive aspects of climate policies, such as climate spillovers and first mover advantages.More research understandings of the positive aspects of climate policies would be useful when exploring the climate and competitiveness linkages. There is also a need for better empirical validation of economic models, and their key parameters and behavioural assumptions. Policies to address leakage and competitiveness concernsThe elaboration of policy tools designed to ‘level the carbon playing field’ has led to an extensive body of literature. One can classify these measures in three broad categories: a global approach, levelling down the cost of carbon and border adjustments ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dr?ge</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>348</RecNum><IDText>Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>348</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dröge,Susanne</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Climate Strategies</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Grubb</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>448</RecNum><IDText>Tackling carbon leakage - Sector-specific solutions for a world of unequal carbon prices</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>448</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Tackling carbon leakage - Sector-specific solutions for a world of unequal carbon prices</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Grubb,Michael</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Counsell,Thomas</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>The Carbon Trust</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dr?ge, 2009; Grubb and Counsell, 2010). Each of these categories has many variants and a combination of different tools could also be considered. The next sections discuss their specific features, pros and cons. None of these instruments seems to be a ‘magic bullet’ to address economic efficiency, equity and practical feasibility concerns ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>B?hringer</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>372</RecNum><IDText>Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>372</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Carbone,Jared</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rutherford,Thomas</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S208</Start_Page><End_Page>S217</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>Supplement 2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(B?hringer et al., 2012b). Some argue that policies to address this problem should be sector-specific ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dr?ge</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>348</RecNum><IDText>Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>348</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dröge,Susanne</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Climate Strategies</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Grubb</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>448</RecNum><IDText>Tackling carbon leakage - Sector-specific solutions for a world of unequal carbon prices</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>448</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Tackling carbon leakage - Sector-specific solutions for a world of unequal carbon prices</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Grubb,Michael</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Counsell,Thomas</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>The Carbon Trust</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dr?ge, 2009; Grubb et al., 2010), but so far tools that have actually been implemented or considered to address competitiveness and leakage concerns only distinguished sectors ‘at risk’ from the others: see Table 2 for Europe (EU ETS phase II and III), the US (Waxman-Markey amendment), Australia (Clean Energy Legislative Package), the California ETS and the New Zealand ETS.Global approachThe first-best solution would be the existence of a uniform carbon price allowed by international climate agreements and flexibility mechanisms. 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Houser, 2008; Zhang, 2012; Hamdi-Cherif et al., 2011) but much confusion remains regarding what they should be. Developed countries favour the form of industry targets and timetables, and diffusion of performance standards, thus addressing leakage and competitiveness concerns. Conversely, developing countries such as India are suspicious of the imposition of binding targets through sectoral approaches and interpret sectoral agreements as a catalyst for technology transfer ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Meckling</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>409</RecNum><IDText>Sectoral approaches to international climate policy: A typology and political analysis</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>409</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Sectoral approaches to international climate policy: A typology and political analysis</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Meckling,J.O.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Chung,G.Y.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Cambridge, MA, USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Meckling and Chung, 2009). Levelling down the cost of carbonLevelling down can be achieved through investment subsidies, sectoral exemptions or free allocation of permits, so as to decrease or even suppress the carbon cost for targeted sectors. All are equivalent to subsidies, and are then subject to the agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization. Exempting the most vulnerable sectors was implemented in Norway ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Bruvoll</Author><Year>2004</Year><RecNum>410</RecNum><IDText>Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: do carbon taxes work?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>410</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: do carbon taxes work?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Bruvoll,Annegrete</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Larsen,Bodil Merethe</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2004/3</Date_Primary><Keywords>Applied general equilibrium model</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon taxes</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>greenhouse gas emissions</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>493</Start_Page><End_Page>505</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>32</Volume><Title_Secondary>An economic analysis of climate policy: essays in honour of Andries Nentjes</Title_Secondary><Issue>4</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004) and Sweden ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Johansson</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>411</RecNum><IDText>Climate policy instruments and industry-effects and potential responses in the Swedish context</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>411</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Climate policy instruments and industry-effects and potential responses in the Swedish context</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Johansson,Bengt</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2006/10</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon taxes</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Emission trading</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>2344</Start_Page><End_Page>2360</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>15</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Johansson, 2006) when their carbon taxes were introduced. It solves the competitiveness and leakage concerns but at a substantial economic cost PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPlJpdmVyczwvQXV0aG9yPjxZZWFyPjIwMTA8L1llYXI+PFJl
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Rivers, 2010; B?hringer et al., 2012b): since emissions in these sectors will not be reduced, to reach a given aggregate target, more abatement must take place in the others, including less cost-effective options. Instead of auctioning, three main options for allocating free allowances have been considered: historic, output-based and capacity-based allocation (used in the EU ETS). These free allocation methods induce side effects: in order to prevent competitiveness issues, other distributional and cost-effectiveness issues are created. In case of historic and capacity-based allocation the ability to pass-through carbon costs creates windfall profits for the operators of covered installations ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Sijm</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>405</RecNum><IDText>CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>405</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Sijm,J.P.M.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Neuhoff,Karsten</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Chen,Yishu</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2006</Date_Primary><Keywords>Power sector</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>49</Start_Page><End_Page>72</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>6</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Morris</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>413</RecNum><IDText>Losing the lead? Europe's flagging carbon market</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>413</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Losing the lead? Europe's flagging carbon market</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Morris,Damien</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Europe</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Publisher>Sandbag</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Sijm et al., 2006; Morris, 2012). Nevertheless, simulations indicate that output-based allocations seem more efficient to counteract leakage and protect industrial competitiveness while assuring political acceptability PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPlF1aXJpb248L0F1dGhvcj48WWVhcj4yMDA5PC9ZZWFyPjxS
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Quirion, 2009; Rivers, 2010).Border adjustmentsBorder Carbon Adjustments (BCA) consist of reducing the carbon price differentials of goods traded between countries, inspired by measures in place for Value Added Tax. Based on theoretical grounds to improve the cost-efficiency of subglobal climate policies ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Markusen</Author><Year>1975</Year><RecNum>142</RecNum><IDText>International externalities and optimal tax structures</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>142</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>International externalities and optimal tax structures</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Markusen,J.R</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1975</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>15</Start_Page><End_Page>29</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of International Economics</Periodical><Volume>5</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of International Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Hoel</Author><Year>1996</Year><RecNum>216</RecNum><IDText>Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>216</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hoel,M.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1996</Date_Primary><Keywords>carbon tax</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>17</Start_Page><End_Page>32</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Public Economics</Periodical><Volume>59</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Journal of Public Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Markusen, 1975; Hoel, 1996), BCA were also considered a way to ‘punish’ the US for free-riding the Kyoto Protocol ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Hontelez</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>415</RecNum><IDText>Time to tax the carbon dodgers</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>415</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Time to tax the carbon dodgers</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hontelez,John</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Publisher>BBC</Publisher><Availability>;(Hontelez, 2007). Later, the US incorporated BCA in the Waxman-Markey amendment, aiming mainly at Chinese products ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>van Asselt</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>416</RecNum><IDText>Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>416</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>van Asselt,Harro</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Brewer,Thomas</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>42</Start_Page><End_Page>51</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>38</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(van Asselt and Brewer, 2010). However the fierce criticism of China and India led President Obama to dissociate the US administration from this proposal (declaring “We have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals”, ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Broder</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>418</RecNum><IDText>Obama opposes trade sanctions in climate bill</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>418</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Obama opposes trade sanctions in climate bill</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Broder,John M.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Reprint>On Request 09/26/13</Reprint><Publisher>The New York Times (29-06-2009)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Broder, 2009) ). 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Cosbey et al., 2012; Monjon and Quirion, 2010), which are not inconsequential technical details, but would determine the viability of this option under international laws:? Covered sectors. There is a general consensus that only sectors at risk should be covered by the scheme; however, the classification of sectors at risk may be controversial (for example for the third phase of EU ETS, see ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Cló</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>357</RecNum><IDText>Grandfathering, auctioning and carbon leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new ETS directive</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>357</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Grandfathering, auctioning and carbon leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new ETS directive</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Cló,Stefano</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>2420</Start_Page><End_Page>2430</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>38</Volume><Issue>5</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Martin</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>358</RecNum><IDText>Industry compensation under relocation risk: A firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>358</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Industry compensation under relocation risk: A firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Martin,Ralf</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Muûls,Mirabelle</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>de Preux,Laure B.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wagner,Ulrich J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Emissions trading</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>1150</Volume><Pub_Place>London, UK</Pub_Place><Publisher>Centre for Economic performance, London School of Economics and Political Science</Publisher><Title_Series>CEP Discussion Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Cló, 2010; Martin et al., 2012). ? Covered countries. Country exceptions may occur, for example, for Least Developed Countries for equity purposes or, as in the Waxman-Markey bill, for countries that have taken ‘comparable action’ on climate policies. However climate policies are so various, being a mix of carbon pricing, regulation and subsidies, that comparing different climate policies is not easy. One can distinguish two principles: ‘comparability in effectiveness’ as in the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute or ‘comparability of efforts’ as in the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities principle.? Inclusion of indirect emissions. Taking into account the indirect emissions from electricity consumption is relevant for industries with high electricity costs, such as aluminium, but highly complicates the calculation of adjustment factors. The energy mix differs among countries, and calculation of emissions from electricity consumption is contentious, because of differences between marginal and average specific emissions. ? Inclusion of export rebates. They are useful to level the playing field also in third countries markets, but their WTO compatibility is not guaranteed.? Carbon content. One can consider four options: exporter's average emissions, home country's average emissions, self-declaration or best available technology (BAT) based on benchmarks. A reliable knowledge of the carbon content of every foreign product seems out of range because of information asymmetry and administrative costs. To avoid a WTO challenge because of discrimination, these estimations should be rather conservative, which favours benchmarking on the best available technology, or a choice between home country's average emissions and self-declaration ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ismer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>422</RecNum><IDText>Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission trading</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>422</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission trading</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ismer,Roland</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Neuhoff,Karsten</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border tax</Keywords><Keywords>Emission trading</Keywords><Keywords>F18</Keywords><Keywords>H23</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>K32</Keywords><Keywords>K33</Keywords><Keywords>WTO law</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>137</Start_Page><End_Page>164</End_Page><Periodical>Eur J Law Econ</Periodical><Volume>24</Volume><Title_Secondary>European Journal of Law and Economics</Title_Secondary><Issue>2</Issue><Publisher>Springer US</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>0929-1261</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Eur J Law Econ</f></ZZ_JournalUser2><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). ? 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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Godard, 2009; Grubb, 2011; Springmann, 2012). ? Timing. A period of good faith could be offered to third countries before the implementation of such measures. Clear conditions for phasing out must also be decided. Among all these features, some are incorporated as scenario alternatives in models, such as the covered sectors PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkdob3NoPC9BdXRob3I+PFllYXI+MjAxMjwvWWVhcj48UmVj
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Ghosh et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2007; Mattoo et al., 2009; Winchester et al., 2011), the inclusion of indirect emissions ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Monjon</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>386</RecNum><IDText>Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: Border adjustment or output-based allocation?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>386</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: Border adjustment or output-based allocation?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Monjon,Stéphanie</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Quirion,Philippe</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Keywords>EU ETS</Keywords><Keywords>EU-ETS</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1957</Start_Page><End_Page>1971</End_Page><Periodical>Ecological Economics</Periodical><Volume>70</Volume><Issue>11</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Ecological Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Monjon et al., 2011), the inclusion of export rebates PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkxhbnppPC9BdXRob3I+PFllYXI+MjAxMjwvWWVhcj48UmVj
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Lanzi et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2012; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012), the carbon content PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPk1jS2liYmluPC9BdXRob3I+PFllYXI+MjAwODwvWWVhcj48
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (McKibbin et al., 2008; Kuik et al., 2010) and the use of revenues PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkJvZXRlcnM8L0F1dGhvcj48WWVhcj4yMDEyPC9ZZWFyPjxS
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Boeters et al., 2012; Rivers, 2010). However, both technical difficulties and administrative costs (as input-output matrices for carbon content are ‘available’ in models) and legal challenges (as they go beyond energy-economy modelling) are under-evaluated in these models.Border adjustments are effective to reduce leakage through the competitiveness channel (but obviously not leakage through the international fossil fuel price channel): in model simulations, the leakage rate decreases by about 10 percentage points on average ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>B?hringer</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>372</RecNum><IDText>Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>372</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Böhringer,Christoph</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Carbone,Jared</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rutherford,Thomas</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon leakage</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>S208</Start_Page><End_Page>S217</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>Supplement 2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(B?hringer et al., 2012b). They are also very effective to protect competitiveness but they shift a part of the mitigation burden to developing countries ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Bao</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>427</RecNum><IDText>Impacts of Border Carbon Adjustments on China's sectoral emissions: Simulations with a Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>427</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Impacts of Border Carbon Adjustments on China's sectoral emissions: Simulations with a Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Bao,Quin</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Tang,Lin</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Zhang,ZhongXiang</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wang,Shouyang</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border carbon adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Computable general equilibrium</Keywords><Keywords>General equilibrium</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Start_Page>77</Start_Page><End_Page>94</End_Page><Periodical>China Economic Review</Periodical><Volume>24</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">China Economic Review</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Bao et al., 2013). With a CGE model, Mattoo et al. ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Mattoo</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>373</RecNum><IDText>Reconciling climate change and trade policy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>373</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Reconciling climate change and trade policy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Mattoo,A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Subramanian,A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>van der Mensbrugghe,D.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>He,J.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>5123</Volume><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C., USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><Title_Series>Policy Research Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Mattoo et al., 2009) find that strong BCA imposed by US would depress India and China manufacturing exports between 16% and 21%. However, it must be remembered that China will in all likelihood consume domestically more than 98% of its steel production and 99% of its cement production: the effects of BCA on Chinese production would then be very small. BCA might conflict with the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities of the UNFCCC ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dr?ge</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>428</RecNum><IDText>Using border measures to address carbon flows</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>428</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Using border measures to address carbon flows</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dröge,Susanne</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011/8/24</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border measures</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1191</Start_Page><End_Page>1201</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>11</Volume><Title_Secondary>Climate Policy</Title_Secondary><Issue>5</Issue><Publisher>Taylor & Francis</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1469-3062</ISSN_ISBN><Date_Secondary>2013/9/27</Date_Secondary><Misc_3>doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.592671</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dr?ge, 2011). Its effect on international negotiations is unclear: they could be used as a ‘strategic stick’ to force other countries to join the abating coalition ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Lessmann</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>429</RecNum><IDText>The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>429</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lessmann,Kai</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Marschinski,Robert</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Edenhofer,Ottmar</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/5</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Coalition stability</Keywords><Keywords>International cooperation</Keywords><Keywords>Self-enforcing international environmental agreements</Keywords><Keywords>Trade sanctions</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>641</Start_Page><End_Page>649</End_Page><Periodical>Economic Modelling</Periodical><Volume>26</Volume><Issue>3</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0264-9993</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Economic Modelling</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Lessmann et al., 2009), but they could also trigger a trade war because of ‘green protectionism’ suspicions ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>IIFT</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>345</RecNum><IDText>WTO compatibility of border trade measures for environmental protection</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>345</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>WTO compatibility of border trade measures for environmental protection</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>IIFT</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Delhi, India</Pub_Place><Publisher>Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(IIFT, 2010). For example, China strongly opposes BCA and claims that energy-intensive exports are already taxed ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Voituriez</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>430</RecNum><IDText>Getting the carbon price right through climate border measures: a Chinese perspective</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>430</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Getting the carbon price right through climate border measures: a Chinese perspective</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Voituriez,Tancrede</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wang,Xin</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011/8/24</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border measures</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1257</Start_Page><End_Page>1261</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>11</Volume><Title_Secondary>Climate Policy</Title_Secondary><Issue>5</Issue><Publisher>Taylor & Francis</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1469-3062</ISSN_ISBN><Date_Secondary>2013/9/27</Date_Secondary><Misc_3>doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.601615</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Voituriez and Wang, 2011). Climate coalition countries have an incentive to deviate from the optimal carbon tariff rate to change their terms of trade ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Weitzel</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>353</RecNum><IDText>Fair, optimal or detrimental? Environmental vs. strategig use of border carbon adjustment</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>353</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Fair, optimal or detrimental? Environmental vs. strategig use of border carbon adjustment</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Weitzel,Matthias</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hübler,Michael</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Peterson,Sonja</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>S198</Start_Page><End_Page>S207</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Weitzel et al., 2012), and even with good-quality data, there is room for judgement discretion in carbon content estimation and hence disguised protectionism ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Holmes</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>431</RecNum><IDText>Border carbon adjustments and the potential for protectionism</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>431</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Border carbon adjustments and the potential for protectionism</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Holmes,Peter</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Reilly,Tom</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Rollo,Jim</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011/3/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border carbon adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>883</Start_Page><End_Page>900</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>11</Volume><Title_Secondary>Climate Policy</Title_Secondary><Issue>2</Issue><Publisher>Taylor & Francis</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1469-3062</ISSN_ISBN><Date_Secondary>2013/9/27</Date_Secondary><Misc_3>doi: 10.3763/cpol.2009.0071</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Holmes et al., 2011). Some argue that the ‘carrot’ of technology transfer would be more effective than the ‘stick’ of BCA ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Weber</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>432</RecNum><IDText>Climate change policy and international trade: Policy considerations in the US</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>432</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Climate change policy and international trade: Policy considerations in the US</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Weber,Christopher L.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Peters,Glen P.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/2</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border tax adjustments</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change policy</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>Tariffs</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>432</Start_Page><End_Page>440</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>37</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Weber and Peters, 2009). Further, the benefits of internal improvements of emission trading systems within the abating coalition like linking markets and extending sectoral coverage could outweigh those of BCA PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPlNwcmluZ21hbm48L0F1dGhvcj48WWVhcj4yMDEyPC9ZZWFy
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Springmann, 2012; Lanzi et al., 2012). The most controversial aspect of this measure is its compatibility with the WTO, which has led to extensive literature on the subject PFJlZm1hbj48Q2l0ZT48QXV0aG9yPkJpZXJtYW5uPC9BdXRob3I+PFllYXI+MjAwNDwvWWVhcj48
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ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Biermann and Brohm, 2004; Goh, 2004; Frankell, 2005; De Cendra, 2006; Bhagwati and Mavroidis, 2007; van Asselt and Biermann, 2007; Ismer et al., 2007; Pauwelyn, 2007; Green and Epps, 2008; Sindico, 2008; Quick, 2008; Bordoff, 2009; Low et al., 2011; Zhang, 2012). If there is a consensus among legal experts, it is that all the technical points discussed above are key for BCA's WTO consistency. The shrimp-turtle case teaches us that the exception regime of the WTO can rule, that this institution takes seriously into account the attempt to conclude international agreements before implementing trade measures ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Tamiotti</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>443</RecNum><IDText>The legal interface between carbon border measures and trade rules</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>443</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The legal interface between carbon border measures and trade rules</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Tamiotti,Ludivine</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011/8/24</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border measures</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1202</Start_Page><End_Page>1211</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>11</Volume><Title_Secondary>Climate Policy</Title_Secondary><Issue>5</Issue><Publisher>Taylor & Francis</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1469-3062</ISSN_ISBN><Date_Secondary>2013/9/27</Date_Secondary><Misc_3>doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.592672</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Tamiotti, 2011), and that flexibility was the cornerstone of WTO dispute panel decisions ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Zhang</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>407</RecNum><IDText>Land competitiveness and leakage concerns and border carbon adjustments</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>407</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Land competitiveness and leakage concerns and border carbon adjustments</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Zhang,ZhongXiang</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Keywords>Border adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Border carbon adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Periodical>FEEM Working Papers</Periodical><Volume>80.2012</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">FEEM Working Papers</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Zhang, 2012). However the degree of legal complexity of BCA is far beyond a simple ban on shrimps. The setbacks of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS show us that countries are deeply reluctant to relinquish some of their sovereignty, especially when financial consequences are at stake. Then, BCA implementation would probably involve a strong diplomatic and economic response, especially from the developing countries.International institutions state that free trade has a role to play in climate policies by promoting clean technology transfer and suppressing murky subventions to dirty sectors, but remain ambiguous concerning the legality of BCA ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>444</RecNum><IDText>International trade and climate change - Economic, legal and institutional perspectives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>444</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>International trade and climate change - Economic, legal and institutional perspectives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>World Bank</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>UNEP</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Keywords>UNEP</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C., USA</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>WTO</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>445</RecNum><IDText>Trade and climate change</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>445</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Trade and climate change</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>WTO</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>UNEP</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>UNEP</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Pub_Place>Geneva, Switzerland</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Trade Organization</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(World Bank and UNEP, 2007; WTO and UNEP, 2009). The joint UNEP-WTO report ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>WTO</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>445</RecNum><IDText>Trade and climate change</IDText><Suffix>, p.89</Suffix><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>445</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Trade and climate change</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>WTO</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>UNEP</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>UNEP</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Pub_Place>Geneva, Switzerland</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Trade Organization</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(WTO et al., 2009, p.89) reads: “the general approach under WTO rules has been to acknowledge that some degree of trade restriction may be necessary to achieve certain policy objectives, as long as a number of carefully crafted conditions are respected”. Legal experts are also divided on the subject, the bottom line of most analyses is that legal acceptability and political feasibility of BCA would depend on the specific designs of such measures ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Tamiotti</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>443</RecNum><IDText>The legal interface between carbon border measures and trade rules</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>443</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The legal interface between carbon border measures and trade rules</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Tamiotti,Ludivine</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011/8/24</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border measures</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1202</Start_Page><End_Page>1211</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>11</Volume><Title_Secondary>Climate Policy</Title_Secondary><Issue>5</Issue><Publisher>Taylor & Francis</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1469-3062</ISSN_ISBN><Date_Secondary>2013/9/27</Date_Secondary><Misc_3>doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.592672</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Tamiotti, 2011). There is no guarantee of the legal success and political acceptability of BCA, but two features would help. First, in-depth discussions with third countries to identify the potential points of conflict, rather than unilateral imposition of trade measures, are desirable ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Low</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>442</RecNum><IDText>The interface between the trade and climate change regimes: Scoping the issues</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>442</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The interface between the trade and climate change regimes: Scoping the issues</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Low,P.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Marceau,G.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Reinaud,Julia</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Volume>ERSD-2011-1</Volume><Publisher>WTO</Publisher><Title_Series>World Trade Organization Staff Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Low et al., 2011). Second, flexibility must be a central piece of the policy package, which could mean allowing third countries national ‘comparable action’ instead of systematic border carbon pricing. Even with all these legal precautions, one can reasonably assume that, if BCA were to be implemented, third countries would publically condemn it as ‘green protectionism’ or ‘eco-imperialism’ ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dr?ge</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>428</RecNum><IDText>Using border measures to address carbon flows</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>428</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Using border measures to address carbon flows</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dröge,Susanne</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011/8/24</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border measures</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Climate Policy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1191</Start_Page><End_Page>1201</End_Page><Periodical>Climate Policy</Periodical><Volume>11</Volume><Title_Secondary>Climate Policy</Title_Secondary><Issue>5</Issue><Publisher>Taylor & Francis</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>1469-3062</ISSN_ISBN><Date_Secondary>2013/9/27</Date_Secondary><Misc_3>doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.592671</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">Climate Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dr?ge, 2011). WTO and UNFCCC share the unpleasant fact of being bogged down in international negotiations blockage (the next step of the Kyoto Protocol for UNFCCC, and the Doha round for WTO), and a clash between climate and trade regimes would be detrimental to both global trade and climate agreements. If BCA are not likely to be implemented in the following years, they will undoubtedly be considered more and more, as abatement targets gaps are growing among countries. A ‘weak’ version of BCA, based on best available technologies benchmark with the handing back of revenues, would seem the most preferable option, offering less vulnerability to a potential WTO dispute and giving certain compensations to other countries ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Godard</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>423</RecNum><IDText>L'ajustement Aux Frontières, Man?uvre Protectionniste Ou Pivot D'un Nouveau Régime International??</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>423</Ref_ID><Title_Primary><f name="Calibri">L'ajustement Aux Frontières, Manœuvre Protectionniste Ou Pivot D'un Nouveau Régime International??</f></Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Godard,Olivier</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Start_Page>214</Start_Page><Periodical>Regards Croisés Sur L'économie</Periodical><Volume>6</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Regards Croisés Sur L'économie</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Ismer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>422</RecNum><IDText>Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission trading</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>422</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission trading</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ismer,Roland</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Neuhoff,Karsten</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Keywords>Border tax</Keywords><Keywords>Emission trading</Keywords><Keywords>F18</Keywords><Keywords>H23</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Keywords>K32</Keywords><Keywords>K33</Keywords><Keywords>WTO law</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>137</Start_Page><End_Page>164</End_Page><Periodical>Eur J Law Econ</Periodical><Volume>24</Volume><Title_Secondary>European Journal of Law and Economics</Title_Secondary><Issue>2</Issue><Publisher>Springer US</Publisher><ISSN_ISBN>0929-1261</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Eur J Law Econ</f></ZZ_JournalUser2><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Godard, 2009; Ismer et al., 2007).ConclusionThe reality for the foreseeable future is that climate policies will remain sub-global. Different mitigation targets among countries are legitimate under the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Zhang</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>407</RecNum><IDText>Land competitiveness and leakage concerns and border carbon adjustments</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>407</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Land competitiveness and leakage concerns and border carbon adjustments</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Zhang,ZhongXiang</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Competitiveness</Keywords><Keywords>Border adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Border carbon adjustment</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Periodical>FEEM Working Papers</Periodical><Volume>80.2012</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">FEEM Working Papers</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Zhang, 2012), but too uneven climate policies are less efficient if they cause carbon leakage and are unlikely to survive the national policy-making process if they entail significant competitiveness losses. These concerns are among the main arguments against the implementation of stringent climate policies in industrialized countries. How worrying are they?Ex post studies have not shown significant evidence of leakage to date, but arguably the climate policies implemented so far may have been too moderate to allow measurement of such effects. Ex ante studies indicate a leakage in the range of 5 to 20% in case of unilateral climate policies without measures to mitigate leakage. However, the induced diffusion of climate-friendly innovations generates abatement even in regions without climate policies, which may well compensate for leakage. Thus, leakage is clearly not a convincing argument against climate policies, although it invites actions to complement carbon pricing with specific measures in order to maximise their efficiency.Is competitiveness a more convincing argument against climate policies? Carbon costs matter, but they are one factor out of many (capital abundance, labour force qualification, proximity to customers, infrastructure quality, etc.) contributing to the competitiveness of an industry ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Monjon</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>446</RecNum><IDText>Mondialisation et Environnement</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>446</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mondialisation et Environnement</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Monjon,Stéphanie</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Hanoteau,Julien</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007</Date_Primary><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Publisher>Cahiers Français</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Monjon and Hanoteau, 2007). Massive environmental relocations in case of stringent policies announced by Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) trade associations are not realistic: because these industries are very capital-intensive, they are less prone to relocation in general compared to ‘footloose’ industries ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ederington</Author><Year>2003</Year><RecNum>393</RecNum><IDText>Footloose and pollution-free</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>393</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Footloose and pollution-free</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ederington,Josh</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Levinson,Arik</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Minier,Jenny</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2003</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>9718</Volume><Publisher>National Bureau of Economic Research</Publisher><Title_Series>Working Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ederington et al., 2003). In the case of the EU ETS, competitiveness concerns have led to an over-allocation of permits, a generous use of offsets from the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation and finally a crash in carbon price. At this time the European Commission is struggling to tackle the growing structural supply-demand imbalance. The modest proposition of back-loading 900 million of allowances was adopted by the European Parliament only after an initial rejection, mainly for competitiveness reasons. Hence, competitiveness, which was called a “dangerous obsession” for macroeconomic policy by Paul Krugman ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Krugman</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>111</RecNum><IDText>Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>111</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Krugman,P.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>1994</Date_Primary><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Start_Page>28</Start_Page><End_Page>44</End_Page><Periodical>Foreign Affairs</Periodical><Volume>74</Volume><Issue>2</Issue><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Foreign Affairs</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(1994), may be so for climate policy as well.That said, because of the influence of EITE industries in the policy process, specific measures to protect these sectors are part of every realistic policy package. Moreover, they may allow countries in the abating coalition to raise the ambition of their climate policy, and also extend the size of the climate coalition, as they would lessen the incentives of free-riding. Simply exempting these sectors is too costly to be justifiable: since emissions in these sectors would not be reduced, more abatement should take place in the others, including less cost-effective options. On purely economic grounds and from the point of view of the abating coalition, economic analysis favours the implementation of BCA, but from a legal and diplomatic point of view, the situation is much less clear-cut. If properly discussed with emerging economies, a BCA based on best available technology benchmarks, with revenues earmarked for climate-related projects in developing countries, may be the best solution. A fall-back option is to distribute free allowances in proportion to current output of EITE industries (output-based allocation): although less cost-effective, it could be an acceptable compromise between efficiency and feasibility. However, just as free allowances based on historic or capacities, the option implemented in the EU ETS, it could generate massive lobbying and competitive distortions since every industry tries to receive as much allowances as possible. Besides, the WTO compatibility of output-based allocation is not more granted than that of BCA ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>James</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>447</RecNum><IDText>A harsh climate for trade: How climate change proposals threaten global commerce</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>447</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>A harsh climate for trade: How climate change proposals threaten global commerce</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>James,Sallie</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Climate change</Keywords><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Volume>No. 41</Volume><Publisher>CATO Institute</Publisher><Title_Series>Trade Policy Analysis</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(James, 2009).Effects of the current policy mix on key international marketsIntroductionThe chapter discusses the effects of the current policy mix in Europe on two international markets: the carbon market and the market of renewable energy technologies. The chapter discusses the structure and size of these markets, the importance of the EU and EU companies in these markets, and finally, the contribution of current EU and Member State policies to market development and the competitiveness of European firms. Carbon market The global carbon market consists of a number of regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes (ETS’s), the international emissions trading mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol (Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI), International Emissions Trading (IET)), other emerging schemes such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation, Forest Degradation and sustainable forest management (REDD+), and voluntary emissions trading schemes ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013). Parts of this global market are connected, but market integration is far from complete ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Mizrach</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>313</RecNum><IDText>Integration of the global carbon markets</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>313</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Integration of the global carbon markets</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Mizrach,Bruce</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Keywords>Carbon markets</Keywords><Keywords>Cointegration</Keywords><Keywords>Emission allowances</Keywords><Keywords>Greenhouse gases</Keywords><Keywords>Market architecture</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>335</Start_Page><End_Page>349</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Economics</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0140-9883</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Mizrach, 2012).In early 2013, ETS’s around the world cap at least 3.3 GtCO2e/y, or 7% of global emissions ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013). REF _Ref366751087 \h Table 3 below present an overview of current and emerging ETS’s. Table SEQ Table \* ARABIC 3 Overview and characteristics of ETS’s Name of ETSStart yearStatus (I/0)Cap MtCO2eCoverage of regional/ national emissions (%)RemarkEU2005I225045California2013I16335In 2015 coverage will be increased to 395 Mt CO2eKazakhstan2013I16850New Zealand2008I3250RGGI2009I8320Quebec2013I2330In 2015 coverage will be increased to 65 Mt CO2eTokyo2010I1020Australia carbon pricing mechanism2012I33060Switzerland2008I310Beijing pilot20130N/A50Sjanghai pilot2013011045Tianjin pilot201307860Chongqing pilot20130N/AN/AGuangdong pilot20130214N/AHubei pilot20130N/A35Shenzen pilot201303240Korea20150N/A60British ColumbiaNo date yet0N/AN/ATurkeyNo date yet0N/AN/AUkraineNo date yet0N/AN/AChileNo date yet0N/AN/ABrazilNo date yet0N/AN/ASource: ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013)In financial terms the size of the global carbon market grew from € 11 billion in 2005 to € 176 billion in 2011 ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>317</RecNum><IDText>State and trends of the carbon market 2011</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>317</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>State and trends of the carbon market 2011</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>World Bank</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>318</RecNum><IDText>State and trends of the carbon market 2012</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>318</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>State and trends of the carbon market 2012</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>World Bank</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2012) after which it contracted by 35% in 2012 for various reasons (see below). The EU ETS is the “engine of the global carbon market” ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>318</RecNum><IDText>State and trends of the carbon market 2012</IDText><Suffix>, p.9</Suffix><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>318</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>State and trends of the carbon market 2012</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>World Bank</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(World Bank, 2012, p.9). In its third phase (2013-2020) it starts out with an emissions cap of 2,250 MtCO2e, or 73% of the global cap ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013). It is the dominant and sometimes exclusive market for the Kyoto mechanism credits. The financial value of EU Allowances (EUA) was € 148 billion in 2011 ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>318</RecNum><IDText>State and trends of the carbon market 2012</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>318</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>State and trends of the carbon market 2012</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>World Bank</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(World Bank, 2012). The global carbon market was created by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. But it was the EU ETS, starting in 2005, that truly ‘fuelled’ the global carbon market. In 2010, the share of the global carbon market primarily driven by the EU ETS was 97% ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>317</RecNum><IDText>State and trends of the carbon market 2011</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>317</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>State and trends of the carbon market 2011</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>World Bank</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2011</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>The World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(World Bank, 2011). The EU ETS is also a great field experiment with benefits to global society. The experience gained from the functioning of the EU ETS is used for the development of ETS’s and alternative carbon pricing initiatives in other regions and countries ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Wr?ke</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>199</RecNum><IDText>What have we learned from the European Union's Emissions Trading System?</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Magazine Article"><Ref_Type>Magazine Article</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>199</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>What have we learned from the European Union's Emissions Trading System?</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wråke,Markus</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Burtraw,Dallas</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Löfgren,Åsa</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Zetterberg,Lars</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>12</Start_Page><End_Page>22</End_Page><Periodical>Ambio</Periodical><Volume>41</Volume><ZZ_JournalFull><f name="System">Ambio</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>16</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Newell</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>303</RecNum><IDText>Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New Challenges</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Abstract"><Ref_Type>Abstract</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>303</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New Challenges</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Newell,Richard G.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Pizer,William A.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Raimi,Daniel</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013/2/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>mitigation</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>123</Start_Page><End_Page>146</End_Page><Periodical>The Journal of Economic Perspectives</Periodical><Volume>27</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><Misc_3>doi:10.1257/jep.27.1.123</Misc_3><Web_URL> name="System">The Journal of Economic Perspectives</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>4</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Wr?ke et al., 2012; Newell et al., 2013).The global carbon market faces a somewhat uncertain future. In the first place, there is uncertainty in international policy making. The international community failed to make new binding emission reduction agreements for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2013-2020). Instead, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2012 in Doha, Qatar, agreed on a timetable and milestones for further negotiations (in the so-called Durban Platform), foreseeing the adaption of an international agreement in 2015, to be implemented in 2020. Only a handful of countries have submitted emissions reduction targets for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Other countries have submitted non-binding emissions reduction targets or action for 2020, but it is unclear whether these targets create demand for international carbon credits through new carbon market mechanisms ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013). In the second place, there is currently an oversupply of allowances in the EU ETS market. In a market report of the European Commission in November 2012 ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>EC</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>314</RecNum><IDText>The state of the European carbon market in 2012</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>314</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>The state of the European carbon market in 2012</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>EC</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>COM(2012) 652 final</Volume><Pub_Place>Brussels</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Commission</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(EC, 2012c) estimated a surplus of 1.5 to 2 billion allowances at the start of Phase III of the EU ETS. This estimate was later confirmed when emissions data were released in April 2013 ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013). Some analysts expect that the surplus will persist throughout most or all of Phase III ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013). The proposal of the European Commission to (temporarily) decrease the surplus by limiting the volume of auctioned allowances in the early years of Phase III (the ‘backloading’ proposal) was initially rejected by the European Parliament, which adopted it only on the second attempt; at the time of writing, it still has to be negotiated between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. In addition, new technical requirements for emissions trading in Phase III have effectively decreased the demand for CER’s from CDM projects and ERU’s from JI projects. In the third place, there is uncertainty about the future of some carbon pricing initiatives. Analysts expect that Australia’s current carbon pricing mechanism will be repealed within a year because of the change of government in Australia. It is uncertain if and by what the current mechanism will be replaced ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Parkinson</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>319</RecNum><IDText>Markets bet on carbon repeal ... and a new carbon price</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>319</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Markets bet on carbon repeal ... and a new carbon price</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Parkinson,Giles</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Reneweconomy (11 September 2013)</Pub_Place><Publisher>[Online] Available at , Accessed at 12 September 2013</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Parkinson, 2013). The oversupply of allowances in the EU ETS and the general uncertainty on the future of climate change mitigation has led to a sharp decline of EUA and CER and ERU prices in 2013, as shown in REF _Ref366766576 \h Figure 2. CER prices have hit rock-bottom and their future recovery is uncertain. Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 2 Daily EUA and CER prices (2008-2013) Source: ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecofys</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>316</RecNum><IDText>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>316</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Mapping carbon pricing initiatives</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecofys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Carbon</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Washington, D.C.</Pub_Place><Publisher>World Bank</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Ecofys, 2013) Renewable energy marketThe global market for renewable energy and renewable energy technologies is thriving. Annual investment in new renewable energy technology was € 180 billion (USD 244 billion) in 2012. Total renewable energy capacity reached 1470 GW (including hydropower), supplying an estimated 19% of global final energy consumption ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>REN21</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>320</RecNum><IDText>Renewables 2013: Global status report</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>320</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Renewables 2013: Global status report</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>REN21</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris, France</Pub_Place><Publisher>Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(REN21, 2013). The largest addition to renewable energy capacity in 2012 was wind power (39%), followed by hydropower (26%) and solar PV (26%) ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>REN21</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>320</RecNum><IDText>Renewables 2013: Global status report</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>320</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Renewables 2013: Global status report</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>REN21</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris, France</Pub_Place><Publisher>Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(REN21, 2013). In the EU, renewable energy accounted for 70% of additions to electric capacity in 2012, mostly in the form of solar PV and wind. In Germany, renewables accounted for 22.9% of electricity consumption in 2012 ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>REN21</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>320</RecNum><IDText>Renewables 2013: Global status report</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>320</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Renewables 2013: Global status report</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>REN21</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris, France</Pub_Place><Publisher>Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(REN21, 2013).EU industry has a strong position in the global market of renewable energy technologies, especially in that of modern technologies. The following industry information is from the 2013 Renewables Global Status Report ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>REN21</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>320</RecNum><IDText>Renewables 2013: Global status report</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>320</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Renewables 2013: Global status report</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>REN21</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Paris, France</Pub_Place><Publisher>Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21)</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(REN21, 2013). Among the world’s top ten wind turbine manufacturers in 2012, capturing 77% of the global market, four are European: Vestas (Denmark, #2), Siemens Wind Power (Germany, #3), Enercon (Germany, #4), and Gamesa (Spain, #6). Together, these four European firms capture 37.8% of the world market. Among the world’s leading hydropower technology and manufacturing firms are Alstom (France) and Andritz (Austria). Alstom is also investing in ocean energy industry, through acquisition (Tidal Generation Ltd, UK) and by taking a 40% interest in the Scottish AWS Ocean Energy Ltd. Spanish companies (Abengoa, Acconia, ACS Cobra, Torresol) dominate the world market of concentrated solar power (CSP) technologies. They have ownership-interest in almost three-fourth of CSP capacity world-wide and more than 60% of capacity under development in early 2013. European firms are also in the forefront of developing innovative technologies for biomass and geothermal energy sources. On the world market for solar PV modules, European firms have lost ground in recent years. Increased supply from China and decreased demand due to the economic downturn, drove down prices and margins for manufacturers. Of the top 15 solar PV module manufacturers, capturing 50% of the global market, none is European. Some EU manufacturers went bankrupt or went out of the solar business (Q-Cells, Bosch Solar, and Siemens). In 2012, Asian countries (especially China) accounted for 86% of global production. Of the top 15 solar PV module manufacturers, nine are from China. Cao and Groba ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Cao</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>324</RecNum><IDText>Chinese renewable energy technology exports: The role of policy, innovation and markets</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>324</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Chinese renewable energy technology exports: The role of policy, innovation and markets</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Cao,Jing</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Groba,Felix</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>No. 1263</Volume><Pub_Place>Berlin, Germany</Pub_Place><Publisher>Deutches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)</Publisher><Title_Series>Discussion Papers</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2013) analyse the roles of policy, innovation and markets in the amazing export success of solar PV modules from China. Europe is the world’s largest cross-border investor in greenfield renewable energy projects. Over the period 2007-2011, foreign direct investment (FDI) in renewable energy projects by European multinational enterprises was USD 237 billion, including USD 121 outside of the EU. Total European FDI in renewable energy projects was thereby almost five times larger than that of the second-largest investor, the USA, and 63% of the world total ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>EC</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>174</RecNum><IDText>European competitiveness report 2012: Reaping the benefits of globalization</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>174</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>European competitiveness report 2012: Reaping the benefits of globalization</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>EC</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Pub_Place>Brussels</Pub_Place><Publisher>European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(EC, 2012b).It is not so easy to find precise data on the external trade performance of Europe in renewable energy technologies and related components. The main – statistical – problem is that the product classifications of trade statistics do not perfectly match renewable energy sector (RES) goods. To get a rough idea of the EU’s external trade performance, we made use of a mapping exercise of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) that identified HS 6-digit product category codes that include RES goods although they may not be restricted to RES goods ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Jha</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>321</RecNum><IDText>Trade flows, barriers and market drivers in renewable energy supply goods. The need to level the playing field</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>321</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Trade flows, barriers and market drivers in renewable energy supply goods. The need to level the playing field</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Jha,Veena</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>No. 10</Volume><Pub_Place>Geneva, Switzerland</Pub_Place><Publisher>International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development</Publisher><Title_Series>Issue Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Vossenaar</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>322</RecNum><IDText>Technology mapping of the renewable energy, buildings, and transport sectors: Policy drivers and international trade aspects</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>322</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Technology mapping of the renewable energy, buildings, and transport sectors: Policy drivers and international trade aspects</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Vossenaar,Rene</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Jha,Veena</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2010</Date_Primary><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>No. 12</Volume><Pub_Place>Geneva, Switzerland</Pub_Place><Publisher>International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development</Publisher><Title_Series>Issue Paper</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Jha, 2009; Vossenaar and Jha, 2010). To give an example, ‘ball bearings’ under HS 6-digit code 848210 include ball bearings used in the production of wind turbines but also ball bearings used for other purposes. While ICTSD did its best to only select those HS codes that contain at least a ‘significant’ share of RES goods, the trade volumes are thus inevitably overestimates of the ‘true’ volumes by an unknown margin. Bearing this caveat in mind, REF _Ref367365270 \h Figure 3 shows the exports and imports of RES goods by the EU27 over the period 2002-2012, excluding intra-EU trade. The value of exports increased by 147% from €16.5 billion in 2002 to €40.7 billion in 2012 (in nominal currency). The value of imports increased by 180% from €10.9 to €30.4 billion. The EU27 had a trade surplus in RES goods, except for the years 2010 and 2011 when imports rose sharply, surpassing exports. While the development of exports and imports in value terms showed a stable increase up to the year 2008, the financial crisis and its aftermath had a profound effect on trade flows (both exports and imports). Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 3 Export and Import of Renewable Energy Sector goods by EU27 in the period 2002-2012 (Euro billion, excluding intra-EU trade) Source: Own calculations on trade data from COMEXT database The top five EU member state exporters of RES goods in 2012 were Germany (35.7%), Italy (12.0%), France (8.6%), United Kingdom (6.8%) and Spain (5.5%). The increase of the share of EU exports from Spain (from 2.8% in 2002 to 5.5% in 2012), and to a lesser extent Italy (from 11.6% to 12.0%) are remarkable. Over the period 2002-2012, Germany increased its leading position as a RES exporter (from 32.0% to 35.7%). France and the UK lost some share in RES exports. The share of France went down from 13.6% in 2002 to 8.6% in 2012. The UK share went down from 11.7% to 6.8%. The export share of the new member states is small but increasing. Overall, the share in exports from EU12 increased from 2.4% in 2002 to 7.5% in 2012. In 2012, Hungary achieved the highest export share among new member states (1.7%), closely followed by the Czech Republic and Poland (1.7% and 1.5%, respectively). RES imports were increasingly sourced from China. With an import value of € 1.8 billion, the share of China in total RES imports was 16.1% in 2002. With the import value growing to € 13.7 billion, China increased its share in RES imports to 45.2% in 2012. At current market prices, policy incentives are necessary to increase the share of renewables in national energy mixes. From a welfare-economic point of view, such policy incentives can be justified by the lack of a full internalisation of the external costs of energy production and use that distorts the comparison of the social benefits and costs of different energy sources by the market. Governments have an array of policy instruments at their disposal. They range from subsidies for research and development (R&D) to disincentives for fossil energy sources and incentives that stimulate the market uptake and penetration of renewables. This has been amply discussed in the literature ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Ecorys</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>325</RecNum><IDText>Study on the competitiveness of the EU eco-industry. Final Report - Part 2</IDText><Prefix>see, e.g., </Prefix><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>325</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Study on the competitiveness of the EU eco-industry. Final Report - Part 2</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Ecorys</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009</Date_Primary><Keywords>Eco-industries</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Volume>ENTR/06/054</Volume><Pub_Place>Brussels, Belgium</Pub_Place><Publisher>Ecorys Research and Consulting</Publisher><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Bahar</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>338</RecNum><IDText>Domestic incentive measures for renewable energy with possible trade implications</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>338</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Domestic incentive measures for renewable energy with possible trade implications</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Bahar,H.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Egeland,J.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Steenblik,R.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>OECD</Keywords><Reprint>In File</Reprint><Volume>2013/01</Volume><Pub_Place>Paris, France</Pub_Place><Publisher>OECD</Publisher><Title_Series>OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers</Title_Series><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(see, e.g., Ecorys, 2009; Bahar et al., 2013) and elsewhere in the CECILIA2050 project. But will a successful policy that increases the share of renewable energy in a country’s energy mix also stimulate the development of a domestic renewable energy technology supply sector that is competitive on the world market? Lewis and Wiser ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Lewis</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>328</RecNum><IDText>Fostering a renewable energy technology industry: An international comparison of wind industry policy support mechanisms</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>328</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Fostering a renewable energy technology industry: An international comparison of wind industry policy support mechanisms</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lewis,Joanna I.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Wiser,Ryan H.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2007/3</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industrial policy</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>Renewable energy policy</Keywords><Keywords>Wind power technology transfer</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>1844</Start_Page><End_Page>1857</End_Page><Periodical>Energy Policy</Periodical><Volume>35</Volume><Issue>3</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0301-4215</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Energy Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2007) analyse the relationship between policy support and manufacturing success in wind energy technology in 12 countries. They find that in many instances there is a clear relationship between a manufacturer’s success in the home market and its eventual success in the global wind power market. Success in the home market depends on policies that support a sizable and stable market for wind power. Feed-in tariffs have so far offered the most successful foundation for wind manufacturing as they can offer a stable and profitable market. Lewis and Wiser further discuss several policy instruments that offer incentives for local manufacturing, such as local content requirements, financial and tax incentives, favourable custom duties, export credit assistance, quality certification, and research, development and demonstration. Lund ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Lund</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>327</RecNum><IDText>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>327</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lund,P.D.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Commercialization</Keywords><Keywords>Energy policy</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>Value chain</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>53</Start_Page><End_Page>64</End_Page><Periodical>Renewable Energy</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0960-1481</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Renewable Energy</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2009) analyses the relationship between policy support and manufacturing success in four different renewable energy technologies: wind, solar PV, solar heat, and biomass-pellets in a panel of 11 countries. Specifically looking at trade success (the balance of imports and exports), Lund confirms the ‘home market’ effect of Lewis and Wiser for wind energy, but finds the opposite relationship for the other technologies. For solar PV, solar heat, and biomass-pellets, the relative size of the domestic market (in terms of installed capacity) is negatively related to export success (see REF _Ref367784196 \h Figure 4). In the case of biomass-pellets and solar PV even small niche-type domestic markets can lead to exports, in the case of local advantages in manufacturing or production costs. Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 4 Correlation between total installed capacity expressed as share of world market and export/import in 2005/2006. Source: ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Lund</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>327</RecNum><IDText>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>327</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lund,P.D.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Commercialization</Keywords><Keywords>Energy policy</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>Value chain</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>53</Start_Page><End_Page>64</End_Page><Periodical>Renewable Energy</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0960-1481</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Renewable Energy</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Lund, 2009) Lund ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Lund</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>327</RecNum><IDText>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>327</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lund,P.D.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Commercialization</Keywords><Keywords>Energy policy</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>Value chain</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>53</Start_Page><End_Page>64</End_Page><Periodical>Renewable Energy</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0960-1481</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Renewable Energy</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2009) finds that a strong industrial position in renewable energy technology manufacturing is either associated with strong market deployment/home market policy incentives or with a strong industry basis and R&D support. Examples of the former are the German wind power industry, that took off since the EEG feed-in tariff law in 2000, and the more recent increase in the Spanish wind market. Examples of the latter are the PV industry in Norway, that has an insignificant home market and no major deployment policies, but that has created a strong PV industry, and, of course, more recently the huge expansion of the Chinese PV solar manufacturing industry that was, until recently at least, specifically targeting foreign markets ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Dunford</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>335</RecNum><IDText>Geographical interdependence, international trade and economic dynamics: The Chinese and German solar energy industries</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>335</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Geographical interdependence, international trade and economic dynamics: The Chinese and German solar energy industries</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Dunford,Michael</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lee,Kyoung H.</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Liu,Weidong</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Yeung,Godfrey</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013/1/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>International Trade</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>14</Start_Page><End_Page>36</End_Page><Periodical>European Urban and Regional Studies</Periodical><Volume>20</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><Web_URL> name="System">European Urban and Regional Studies</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Dunford et al., 2013). Recently, however, Chinese domestic demand is “is just starting to ramp up”, according to a research report of Deutsche Bank ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Vorrath</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>452</RecNum><MDL Ref_Type="Report"><Ref_Type>Report</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>452</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Deutsche Bank says China solar PV may reach 15GW in 2014</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Vorrath,Sophie</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2013</Date_Primary><Reprint>On Request //</Reprint><Publisher>Reneweconomy (1 October 2013)</Publisher><Web_URL><u> name="System">Energy Economics</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>24</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Vorrath, 2013), driven by attractive rates of return on solar PV projects resulting from recently announced feed-in tariffs. Lund ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Lund</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>327</RecNum><IDText>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>327</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Lund,P.D.</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2009/1</Date_Primary><Keywords>Commercialization</Keywords><Keywords>Energy policy</Keywords><Keywords>Industry</Keywords><Keywords>Renewable energy</Keywords><Keywords>Value chain</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>53</Start_Page><End_Page>64</End_Page><Periodical>Renewable Energy</Periodical><Volume>34</Volume><Issue>1</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0960-1481</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Renewable Energy</f></ZZ_JournalStdAbbrev><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(2009) concludes that renewable energy policies can greatly contribute to the expansion of domestic industrial activities even if the initial industrial base is weak, but that investment or R&D support to strong industries in related fields may also be a powerful way to create a competitive renewable energy manufacturing industry, irrespective of the domestic market situation. Several exogenous factors, including timing, size, geography, and general economic factors, influence industrial success. ConclusionAs a tentative conclusion on the impact of policy on global manufacturing success is that energy and climate policies matter, but that past experience has shown that there is not one single policy strategy that leads to success but rather that the appropriate policy instrument mix is dependent upon a host of country, industry, and technology-specific factors that can change over time. Integrated research in the area of innovation and geography is relatively young, but it is emerging and could provide new valuable insights into market development and competitiveness of carbon-mitigation technologies ADDIN REFMGR.CITE <Refman><Cite><Author>Coenen</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>334</RecNum><IDText>Toward a spatial perspective on sustainability transitions</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>334</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Toward a spatial perspective on sustainability transitions</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Coenen,Lars</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Benneworth,Paul</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Truffer,Bernhard</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/7</Date_Primary><Keywords>Economic geography</Keywords><Keywords>Geographies of transitions</Keywords><Keywords>Multi-level perspective</Keywords><Keywords>Technological innovation systems</Keywords><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>968</Start_Page><End_Page>979</End_Page><Periodical>Research Policy</Periodical><Volume>41</Volume><Title_Secondary>Special Section on Sustainability Transitions</Title_Secondary><Issue>6</Issue><ISSN_ISBN>0048-7333</ISSN_ISBN><Web_URL> name="System">Research Policy</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite><Cite><Author>Howells</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>333</RecNum><IDText>Introduction: Innovation and economic geography: a review and analysis</IDText><MDL Ref_Type="Journal"><Ref_Type>Journal</Ref_Type><Ref_ID>333</Ref_ID><Title_Primary>Introduction: Innovation and economic geography: a review and analysis</Title_Primary><Authors_Primary>Howells,Jeremy</Authors_Primary><Authors_Primary>Bessant,John</Authors_Primary><Date_Primary>2012/9/1</Date_Primary><Reprint>Not in File</Reprint><Start_Page>929</Start_Page><End_Page>942</End_Page><Periodical>Journal of Economic Geography</Periodical><Volume>12</Volume><Issue>5</Issue><Web_URL> name="System">Journal of Economic Geography</f></ZZ_JournalFull><ZZ_WorkformID>1</ZZ_WorkformID></MDL></Cite></Refman>(Coenen et al., 2012; Howells and Bessant, 2012). ConclusionsCompetitiveness is an ability. At the firm level it is the ability of a firm to sell goods and services in the market and stay in business. At the sector level it is the aggregate competitiveness of firms that operate within a given sector in an economy, compared to international rivals. The aggregate sector includes firms with different levels of competitiveness. The notion of competitiveness at the national level is controversial; in any case, its relationship with trade performance is somewhat opaque. ‘Ability’ is not easy to measure. Indicators of competitiveness either measure ‘determinants’ or ‘consequences’ of this ability. There is no complete theory on competitiveness that identifies the key determinants and how these determinants eventually result in consequences. Climate policies tend to increase the cost of energy. Unilateral implementation of such policies has led to the fear of a loss of competitiveness by energy-intensive industries, and consequently of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness are the main arguments against ambitious climate policies in industrialised countries. Modest mitigation targets have gone hand in hand with policy packages intended to protect sectors at risk of carbon leakage.Many ex ante (modelling) studies have been carried out to predict the rate of carbon leakage and the loss of competitiveness of energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors in the case of unilateral policy implementation, also for Europe. At current policy stringency, most of these studies show small to moderate rates of leakage and loss of competitiveness. Recently studies have started to econometrically estimate carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness ex post. The studies focusing on the EU ETS, the largest carbon pricing experiment so far, have not revealed any evidence of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness in sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage, such as cement, aluminium, and iron and steel. More studies will undoubtedly be conducted in the following years, for the EU ETS and the other carbon markets that have emerged, as more hindsight will be provided. The current climate policy mix in Europe fosters innovation and generates technological progress in GHG savings technologies. Diffusion of these technologies reduces emissions in non-abating countries, creating positive climate spillovers. There is empirical evidence of climate spillovers, especially in energy-saving technologies, but also in renewables. Feed-in tariffs in Denmark, Germany and Spain generated a massive induced technical change in wind and solar technologies and are thus in part responsible for the spectacular development of windpower capacities in China, which became the world leader in terms of windpower installed capacities.The current climate policy mix in Europe greatly contributed to the emergence of the global ‘carbon’ market, presently worth about € 114 billion (after a high of € 176 billion in 2011). The prospects of this global carbon market are uncertain. On the one hand, the number of regional carbon markets is growing, especially in Asia, on the other hand, the prices of carbon allowances in some of the main markets (including the EU ETS and the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms) are depressed because of oversupply and lack of demand. The current climate policy mix in Europe has also greatly contributed to the emergence of the global market for renewable energy technologies, presently worth about € 180 billion. EU industry has a strong position in the global market of renewable energy technologies. Among the world’s top ten wind turbine manufacturers in 2012, four are European capturing 37.8% of the world market. European firms are among the world’s leading hydropower technology and manufacturing firms and Spanish companies dominate the world market of concentrated solar power (CSP) technologies. European firms are also in the forefront of developing innovative technologies for biomass and geothermal energy sources. In the world market for solar PV modules, European firms have lost ground in recent years. Increased supply from China and decreased demand due to the economic downturn, drove down prices and margins for manufacturers. Of the top 15 solar PV module manufacturers, capturing 50% of the global market, none is European. 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