The Dispersal of the Topeka Legislature

[Pages:14]The Dispersal of the Topeka

Legislature

A Look at Command and Control (C2) During Bleeding Kansas

by Tony R. Mullis

This is the most painful duty of my whole life. --Colonel E.V. Sumner, First Cavalry

Much has been written on the significance of Kansas in understanding the political crises of the 1850s. James Malin, Alice Nichols, James Rawley, and Michael Holt are among the many who have addressed the political, economic, and social issues related to Bleeding Kansas.1 Francis Paul Prucha, Edward Coffman, Robert Coakley, and Durwood Ball have expanded the discussion to address the army's role in Kansas and its mission on the western frontier. Few, however, have taken a detailed look at how the army functioned as a peacekeeping force during those turbulent years in territorial Kansas.2 And no one has offered an explanation

Tony R. Mullis is a member of the International Security and Military Studies Department at the United States Air Force, Air University, Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Kansas and has lectured on U.S. and military history. His forthcoming book, Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army Operations in Bleeding Kansas, is due out in July 2004.

1. Examples include James C. Malin, John Brown and the Legend of Fifty-Six (1942; reprint, New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1971); Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978); James A. Rawley, Race and Politics: "Bleeding Kansas" and the Coming of the Civil War (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969); Alice Nichols, Bleeding Kansas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954). For an excellent analysis of the ideological and economic issues associated with Bleeding Kansas, see Gunja SenGupta, For God and Mammon: Evangelicals and Entrepreneurs, Masters and Slaves in Territorial Kansas, 1854 ? 1860 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996); Nichole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). For a superb historiography of Bleeding Kansas, see Gunja SenGupta, "Bleeding Kansas: Review Essay," Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 24 (Winter 2001 ?2002): 318? 41.

2. "The role of the military in Kansas territorial history, puzzlingly, has been largely ignored," observes Dale Watts in "Plows and Bibles, Rifles and Revolvers: Guns in Kansas Territory," Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 21 (Spring 1998): 42. See Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815 ? 1860 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953); Prucha, Sword of the Republic:

Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 27 (Spring?Summer 2004): 62? 75.

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KANSAS HISTORY

Colonel Sumner and troops dispersing the free-state legislature in Topeka, July 4, 1856.

of how the federal government controlled army operations from Washington or how existing communication capabilities helped or hindered President Franklin Pierce's attempt to construct a temporary peace in Kansas. An analy-

The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783 ? 1846 (London: Macmillan Co., 1969); Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784?1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848 ? 1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001). For an excellent example of a historian who has looked at the army's role in peacekeeping, see Robert W. Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789? 1878 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Center of Military History, 1988).

sis of the army's dispersal of the free-state legislature in Topeka on July 4, 1856, sheds light on these issues.

The Topeka dispersal is particularly instructive because it demonstrated many of the frustrations and problems related to the use of federal troops as peacekeepers. Pierce's use of the regular army to enforce what many Americans perceived to be "bogus" territorial laws was politically risky. To use military force to disperse a peaceable assembly of American citizens was even more hazardous. If Franklin Pierce really wanted to make popular sovereignty the preferred solution to the slavery extension

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63

question without blatantly violating his hands-off approach to territorial affairs, why did the army forcibly disperse the Topeka legislature? If Pierce and the Democrats were willing to use the army to pacify Kansas before the 1856 national elections, how did they plan to control those forces? If pacifying Kansas was so critical, why was it so difficult to use existing communication capabilities to fa-

The loyal and dedicated Colonel Edwin V. Sumner became the "man in the middle" of the Topeka incident in July 1856.

cilitate better command and control (C2)? Last, given the political sensitivity associated with Bleeding Kansas, why was the existing communications process not more responsive to political and military necessities?

An examination of the territory's most senior military officer's understanding of the president's intent and an analysis of existing C2 processes offers one explanation.3

When Colonel Edwin V. Sumner first began moving forces to Topeka on June 28, 1856, he believed that his initiative was justified by the guidance he had received from those civilian authorities empowered to direct his actions--the president, Franklin Pierce; the secretary of war, Jefferson Davis; and the territorial governor, Wilson Shannon. Basing his decision on piecemeal guidance received since the so-called Wakarusa War of December 1855, Sumner concluded it was imperative that he use federal troops to prevent this "illegal legislature" from meeting.4 The consequences of this decision, however, generated severe political repercussions. It also illuminated the difficulties civilian officials in Washington had in communicating their political and military objectives to military subordinates, and it highlighted the Pierce administration's failure to employ modern technology to facilitate more effective C2.

Colonel Sumner was the proverbial "man in the middle" of the Topeka incident. The colonel was a loyal, dedicated, yet occasionally petulant officer from Boston, Massachusetts. He received his commission directly from civilian life in 1819 and had served with distinction since. He was brevetted twice for gallant conduct during the Mexican War and served admirably as the military governor of New Mexico in 1852.5 Based on his experience, the army could not have chosen a more qualified individual to lead federal troops in Kansas. Unfortunately for Sumner, his vast knowledge of territorial affairs would not serve him well in the politically sensitive and potentially explosive situation that evolved in Kansas between the conclusion of the Wakarusa War in December 1855 and the convening of the Topeka legislature on July 4, 1856.

Sumner's civilian counterpart was Governor Wilson Shannon. The governor was a staunch Democrat, native Ohioan, former congressman, and former minister to Mexico. Shannon's breadth of experience proved fortuitous in December 1855 when he employed his diplomatic skills to prevent a pitched battle between free-state elements and proslavery forces near the free-state stronghold of Lawrence. Before Shannon negotiated the armistice, however, he had asked Colonel Sumner to send the First U.S. Cavalry to separate the opposing factions before hostilities began. Lacking written orders from the president, Sumner

3. The phrase "commander's intent" or "president's intent" is used throughout this article to reflect the Pierce administration's desired outcome regarding the Kansas question. Commander's intent usually reflects written or verbal guidance detailing why military force is authorized and for what purpose. The communication means (mails, telegraph, special messengers) employed in relaying that intent constitute part of the command and control (C2) process.

4. Wilson Shannon to Edwin V. Sumner, June 23, 1856, "Governor Geary's Administration," Kansas Historical Collections, 1886?1888 4 (1890): 422 ? 23; Sumner to Daniel Woodson, June 28, 1856, ibid., 446; Woodson to Sumner, June 30, 1856, ibid., 447.

5. Memorandum for Mr. Childs, November 29, 1940, Sumner Family Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

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KANSAS HISTORY

was reluctant to comply with the governor's petition. Without the army to impose peace, Shannon telegraphed the president for authority to use federal troops when conflict appeared likely. Pierce was empathetic but denied the governor his request.6 In sum, the Wakarusa War significantly influenced Shannon's and Sumner's views on how to handle future crises in the territory. Now painfully aware of the volatility of the situation they faced, the two concluded it would be necessary to field a strong but impartial police force to avert similar outbreaks of violence.

work, they realized that federal power, in the form of the army, would be necessary to make it happen.

Four days after Pierce's proclamation, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis dispatched official orders to his field commanders: Colonel Sumner at Fort Leavenworth and Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke at Fort Riley. He provided the following guidance:

B y January 24, 1856, Pierce had changed his mind regarding the use of the army in Kansas. The president acknowledged that

federal force was necessary to uphold the law and

suppress insurrectionary activities within the terri-

tory. The president's altered policy was no doubt

related to his condemnation of the free-state legis-

lature as treasonable.7 Subsequently, Pierce issued a

proclamation that revealed both his frustration

with the Kansas problem and his intent to take ac-

tion. He insisted "all persons engaged in unlawful

combinations against the constituted authority of

the Territory of Kansas, or of the United States, to

disperse and retire peaceably to their respective

abodes." If "unauthorized bodies"--the free-state

legislature and the New England Emigrant Aid Society--continued to interfere in the local affairs of Kansas, he threatened the use of local militia and, if

Complicating matters was an uncertain chain of command providing piecemeal, and at times contradictory, guidance for Colonel Sumner.

necessary, federal troops to maintain the legitimacy

of the existing, duly recognized territorial government.8

If, therefore, the governor of the territory, finding the

With this proclamation, Pierce had committed himself to a military solution to a largely political problem. If the president and the Democratic Party were to achieve their primary political objective of making popular sovereignty

ordinary course of judicial proceedings and powers vested in the United States marshals inadequate for the suppression of insurrectionary combinations or armed resistance to the execution of the laws, should make requisition upon you to furnish a military force

to aid him in the performance of that official duty,

6. Wilson Shannon to Edwin Sumner, December 1, 1855, Daniel Woodson Collection, Library and Archives Division, Kansas State Historical Society; Shannon to Sumner, December 4, 1855, ibid.; Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 148 ? 49; see also John H. Gihon, Geary and Kansas (Philadelphia: C. C. Rhodes, 1857), 59; Shannon to Franklin Pierce, December 11, 1855, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 1855, H. Ex. Doc. 1, serial 893, 63?64. For more on Governor Shannon, see "Biography of Governor Wilson Shannon," Kansas Historical Collections, 1883 ? 1885 3 (1886): 279?83.

7. James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789?1897 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), 5: 358.

8. Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 150; see also Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, vol. 2, A House Dividing, 1852 ? 1857 (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1947), 444; D. W. Wilder, The Annals of Kansas (Topeka: Kansas Publishing House, 1886), 91.

you are hereby directed to employ for that purpose such part of your command as may in your judgment consistently be detached from their ordinary duty.9

9. Jefferson Davis to Edwin Sumner and Philip St. George Cooke, February 15, 1856, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1856, Sen. Ex. Doc. 97, serial 823, 2; John Baltzly Garver Jr., "The Role of the United States Army in the Colonization of the Trans-Missouri West: Kansas, 1804 ? 1861" (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse University, 1981), 2: 571; see also Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 150 ? 51; Marvin Ewy, "The United States Army in Kansas Border Troubles, 1855 ? 1856," Kansas Historical Quarterly 32 (Winter 1966): 389; Gihon, Geary and Kansas, 72.

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65

Davis's instructions confirmed Shannon's authority to use regular troops but detailed the limits placed on the governor's authority. The governor could only request the army to perform two operations -- suppress insurrectionary combinations and counter armed resistance to the execution of law. Davis's intent was clear, but his written guidance was ambiguous. Both Pierce and Davis desired

asked if "all armed bodies, coming either from Missouri or from a distance, north or south, are to be resisted whatever their proposed objects may be, and made to relinquish their military organizations, and pass in to the territory as peaceful citizens."10 If this was Davis's intent, Sumner thought it was a sound policy because it should keep all armed bodies out of the territory and minimize the opportunity for conflict. Davis, however, did not mean for the army to disarm all armed bands entering Kansas. He reminded Sumner that

the question as to where the men may come from, or whether armed or unarmed, is not one for the inquiry or the consideration of the commanding officer. It is only when armed resistance is offered to the laws and against the peace and quiet of the territory, and when under such circumstances, a requisition for military force is made upon the commanding officer by the authority specified in his instructions, that he is empowered to act.11

In June 1856 Governor Wilson Shannon instructed Colonel Sumner to disperse the assembly of an illegal body, "peacefully if you can, forcibly if necessary."

to pacify Kansas and to affirm the popular sovereignty doctrine espoused in the Kansas?Nebraska Act, and both saw the army as a last resort to achieve those objectives. Despite the clarity of the popular sovereignty objective, significant questions remained regarding the army's instructions. What exactly constituted an "insurrectionary combination," and, perhaps more important, who was to make that determination?

Between the mid-February flurry of guidance and the dispersal of the Topeka legislature, several events further complicated Sumner's understanding of what his superiors wanted him to do. In March 1856 the colonel asked the War Department for clarification on what constituted an "insurrectionary combination." More specifically, Sumner

The message was clear. Under no circumstances was Sumner to take the initiative to disarm armed bodies without direction from higher authorities. The territorial governor could make such a request but only if "armed resistance" occurred. There was to be neither a preemptive assault nor a concerted effort to prevent potentially hostile persons or groups from entering the territory. Further, Sumner was not authorized to determine who or what constituted an insurrectionary combination; only the territorial governor could make that judgment. The army was not to be used as a police force but was to be employed only when appropriate civil authorities had exhausted all other options. Since Shannon possessed the authority to call upon federal troops when he determined an insurrection to exist, Sumner had to defer to the governor's authority in such matters. Civilian control of these delicate peacekeeping operations was paramount.

S uch was the state of affairs when the infamous "sack of Lawrence" occurred on May 21, 1856. Shannon did not call upon federal troops to intervene until after Sheriff Samuel Jones and his proslavery posse had destroyed two newspaper facilities and burned the Free State

10. Edwin Sumner to Adjutant General, March 8, 1856, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 1856, Sen. Ex. Doc. 10, serial 878, 1 ? 2; see also Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 151.

11. Samuel Cooper to Edwin Sumner, March 26, 1856, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1856, Sen. Ex. Doc. 97, serial 823, 3.

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KANSAS HISTORY

Hotel. By then, of course, it was too late to use the army. Shortly after the sack of Lawrence, John Brown and his followers perpetrated the massacre of five proslavery settlers near Pottawatomie Creek. As a result of these two incidents, the territory edged closer to the precipice of civil war. On the heels of these territorial crises--and the earlier caning of Senator Charles Sumner--came the Democratic National Convention that convened in early June. Pierce's bid for re-nomination did not withstand Bleeding Kansas and "Bleeding Sumner." The Democrats instead chose a presidential candidate untainted by the recent violence. Although rejected by his party, Pierce remained committed to the Democrats' cause.

While Pierce and the nation awaited additional news from the territory, Congress took the initiative and offered a proposal to resolve the violence in Kansas. The basic strategy of Senator John J. Crittenden's June 10 resolution was to send the army's commanding general, Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, to the beleaguered territory. Legislators hoped that Scott, armed with virtual dictatorial powers, could bring peace. For the Democratic leadership, however, this alternative simply was out of the question. Davis hated Scott and probably resented the suggestion that the irascible old general could handle military affairs in Kansas better than he. Moreover, Pierce could not stomach sending a Whig to Kansas, especially one he had defeated for the presidency in 1852, and it was likely that he resented congressional interference in what was an executive branch concern.12

In response to the Crittenden Resolution, Davis offered a rather interesting counterproposal at a June 16 cabinet meeting. He suggested that the army be withdrawn from the territory altogether. Kansas residents could resolve their concerns without federal interference, and the army could do what it was established to do--punish recalcitrant Indians and protect vital lines of communication. Davis's argument was congruent with Pierce's original policy of federal noninterference in territorial affairs; however, the president had long ago abandoned that position. Pierce rejected Davis's proposal and opted to maintain the present course. He was firmly committed to resolving the

Kansas issue with military force, although specifics on when and how much remained undetermined.13

While the national leadership debated the territory's fate, Shannon and Sumner pursued a preventative strategy that exceeded the parameters of Davis's original guidance but offered a pragmatic solution to the escalating violence. Representative of this strategy, Sumner advised his military superiors in late June that he had stationed five companies near the proslavery community of Westport, Missouri. Sumner explained his intent to "indicate plainly to all that the orders of the president and the proclamation of the Governor will be maintained."14 Sumner's "show-offorce" operation clearly was outside the limits of Pierce's and Davis's earlier guidelines. Civilian authorities had not taken the lead in dispersing these armed bands entering Kansas from Missouri nor had they encountered any resistance to the execution of the law. Since Pierce and Davis apparently were pleased with the results, however, Sumner received no reprimand for going beyond the scope of his original instructions.

With territorial affairs relatively calm, Shannon informed Sumner on June 23 that he was leaving the territory for about ten days, heading to St. Louis on official business. He expressed concern over the possibility of the free-state legislature convening in Topeka on July 4 and instructed Sumner to disperse the group if it tried to meet. "Two governments cannot exist at one and the same time in this Territory in practical operation; one or the other must be overthrown; and the struggle between the legal government established by Congress and that by the Topeka convention would result in civil war." Shannon surmised that "[s]hould this body reassemble and enact laws, (and they have no other object in meeting,) they will be an illegal body, threatening the peace of the whole country, and therefore should be dispersed." Shannon told Sumner he should disperse the assembly "peacefully if you can, forcibly if necessary."15 Shannon also assured Sumner, per

12. "Crittenden Resolution," Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1856: 1381?95. See Roy F. Nichols, Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), 474.

13. Nichols, Franklin Pierce, 474. For Shannon's views on Davis's suggestion to withdraw the troops from Kansas, see Edwin Sumner to Wilson Shannon, June 23, 1856, "Governor Geary's Administration," 423.

14. Edwin Sumner to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the West, June 23, 1856, ibid., 444 ?45; Sumner to Samuel Cooper, June 23, 1856, Letters Received, Adjutant General `s Office, roll 547, M567, RG 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

15. Wilson Shannon to Edwin Sumner, June 23, 1856, "Governor Geary's Administration," 422 ? 23.

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the latter's request, that civil authorities would be present to legitimize his actions. Additionally, if Sumner needed reinforcements, Shannon directed him to ask Acting Governor Daniel Woodson to provide them from Fort Riley. Shannon's orders and intent were clear. The Topeka legislature was an illegal body whose existence threatened the territorial government's legitimacy; it could not be allowed

Even though President Franklin Pierce believed he had given specific guidance regarding military involvement in Kansas politics, he failed to appreciate the complex nature of effective command and control.

The colonel believed, like Shannon, that if the Topeka legislature convened, civil war could erupt. He also was cognizant of the need for civil authorities to take the lead in dispersing the legislature and advised Woodson of how he wanted to proceed. "In this affair," Sumner instructed Woodson, "it is proper that civil authorities should take the lead."16

Sumner himself had not planned to go to Topeka but changed his mind when Woodson asked him to participate. Woodson also informed the colonel that he had ordered Lieutenant Colonel Cooke to send forces from Fort Riley to aid in the Topeka operation and to interdict any hostile forces approaching the free-state community from the north. Judge Sterling Cato of the territorial supreme court would be there as well.17 Additionally, Woodson told Sumner that he had requested the presence of U.S. District Attorney A. J. Isaacs to implement the "necessary legal procedures."18 As Sumner readied for his journey, he notified the War Department of his plans and sent copies of the acting governor's orders by mail. Two hours before he departed, Sumner sent another note to Washington outlining his course of action for this "difficult and delicate operation." "I shall act very warily," Sumner informed the War Department, "and shall require the civil authorities to take the lead in the matter throughout. If it is possible to disperse [the free-state legislature] without violence it shall be done."19

Shortly after his arrival, a committee of free-state men asked Sumner his intentions. He responded on July 3, telling them that their assembly would endanger the "peace of the country." Sumner suggested that they not meet on the fourth as planned. If they attempted to do so, "the general government should be compelled to use coercive measures to prevent the assemblage of that Legislature."20 Ironically, as Sumner tried in vain to dissuade the freestaters from meeting, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to admit Kansas into the Union under the free-state

to meet. If it did, war between the competing factions might erupt. Given Washington's guidance and Pierce's and Davis's tacit approval of Sumner's preventative strategy, Sumner saw no reason why he should not carry out his orders.

On June 28 Sumner ordered Major John Sedgwick and two companies of the First U.S. Cavalry to Topeka to prevent the scheduled free-state meeting. Sumner notified Acting Governor Woodson of the troop's movement and his sanction of the operation. "[T]hat body of men," Sumner explained, "ought not to be permitted to assemble."

16. Edwin Sumner to Daniel Woodson, June 28, 1856, Letters Received, Adjutant General's Office; see also Leverett W. Spring, Kansas: The Prelude to the War for the Union (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1885), 130.

17. Judge Rush Elmore rather than Judge Cato attended the event. 18. Daniel Woodson to Edwin Sumner, June 30, 1856, "Governor Geary's Administration," 447. 19. Edwin Sumner to Samuel Cooper, July 1, 1856, ibid., 446; see also Spring, Kansas: The Prelude to the War for the Union, 131. 20. Edwin Sumner to Free State Committee, July 3, 1856, in Gihon, Geary and Kansas, 45 ? 46; see also Spring, Kansas: The Prelude to the War for the Union, 132.

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KANSAS HISTORY

constitution. The U.S. Senate, dominated by Democrats, rejected the House's action.21 Political tensions associated with the Kansas issue threatened the nation's existence on the eve of its eightieth birthday. Sumner's actions in distant Kansas could have grave repercussions if they were not handled appropriately.

A lthough many of its key leaders were absent for fear of being arrested for treason, the free-state legislature attempted to convene as intended. In response, U.S. Marshal I. B. Donalson read Woodson's proclamation forbidding the illegal assembly. He followed Woodson's edict with a recitation of Pierce's February 11 proclamation. Some freestaters complied, but others ignored Woodson's proclamation and attempted to assemble. Once the legislature tried to convene, Sumner felt obliged, as he explained to the War Department, "to march my command into the town, and draw it up in front of the building in which the Legislature was to meet."22 The colonel first dispersed the free-state house of representatives. He "informed them that under the proclamation of the President, he had come to disperse the Legislature, which duty, though the most painful of his life, he was compelled to perform even if it should demand the employment of all the forces in his command."23 Once members of the lower house departed peaceably, he then dispersed the upper house. In accordance with his understanding of his commanders' intent, the policy and guidance issued from Washington, and his own preventative strategy, Sumner had accomplished his mission. He had reinforced the legitimacy of the territorial legislature while maintaining peace and preventing civil war. In light of his apparent success, Sumner could not have anticipated the political impact of his actions in Washington when news of the dispersal arrived on July 10.

In his after-action report Sumner recalled how, under Woodson's direction, he had prevented the Topeka government from meeting without spilling the blood of his fellow citizens. With the Topeka issue behind him, he sought additional guidance regarding General William S. Harney's

21. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ed., The Almanac of American History (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1983), 269.

22. Edwin Sumner to Samuel Cooper, July 7, 1856, "Governor Geary's Administration," 448 ? 49.

23. Gihon, Geary and Kansas, 46; see also Spring, Kansas: The Prelude to the War for the Union, 135; William Phillips, The Conquest of Kansas by Missouri and Her Allies (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company, 1856), 404.

earlier requisition for troops to support peacekeeping operations along the Oregon Trail. Sumner had heard nothing since his initial May 28 query to the War Department. If he did not receive any guidance soon, he planned to support Harney's manpower request and leave Kansas affairs to the territorial government. Sumner's concluding remarks left the impression that life in the army would return to more traditional activities. He was wrong.

Even before the political fallout of the Topeka incident had reached its climax, the new commander of the Department of the West, Brigadier General Persifor F. Smith, had placed Sumner on extended leave. Although Smith saw nothing improper regarding Sumner's action at Topeka, many perceived the colonel's leave as a punishment for inappropriate conduct. According to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston, commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth, Sumner left the fort "in high dudgeon." And, Johnston stressed, Sumner regarded himself as "ill-used by an ungrateful administration." The colonel's sixty-day holiday began on July 15.24 Davis did not see Sumner's July 7 report on the Topeka incident until the nineteenth. He read Sumner's account of the dispersal and forwarded several questions regarding the incident, expressing concern that the colonel's actions were unauthorized. Davis demanded a solid justification from Sumner in light of his earlier guidance.

Ironically, Sumner answered Davis's query before receiving the secretary's letter. Davis's inquiry did not reach Fort Leavenworth until after Sumner had departed for New York. Either Davis was unaware of Sumner's extended leave and his departure from Kansas, or he intended to delay Sumner's response long enough for the political clamor in Washington to subside. Sumner learned of Davis's concerns by reading an account of the Senate's recent proceedings. He wrote to Davis stressing his complete impartiality during his tour of duty in the territory and vehemently denied having usurped the peoples' right to assemble. His command had targeted only the "illegal" legislature, dispersing it in accordance with the direct orders of the acting governor, the wishes of Governor Shannon, and his interpretation of the president's proclamation.25 Sumner, a loyal and dutiful soldier of thirty-seven years, was only doing what he firmly believed was his profes-

24. Joseph E. Johnston to George B. McClellan, August 10, 1856, McClellan Papers, Library of Congress; Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800 ? 1916, Fort Leavenworth, July 1856, M617, RG 94.

25. Edwin Sumner to Samuel Cooper, August 11, 1856, "Governor Geary's Administration," 450 ? 51.

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