A Promised Land: - Stanford University



Edge Final Paper

Bruce Lusignan

3/12/04

The Promised Land:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1896-2004

By Andrew Cross

In what many consider to be the single most pressing social problem on Earth today, the signals of history portend trouble in the future. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which had its formal origins in 19th century imperial style, is a microcosm for the mistakes made by political leaders throughout the course of modern world history. In addition, it rests at the center of enormous cultural issues surrounding the future of the Middle East, the eventual compromise of Western and Islamic society, and the single most potent factor motivating young, impressionable boys to follow the route of Islamic terrorism. Clearly, the conflict should be thoroughly understood, and the historical underpinnings that form the core of the debate should be well documented. In a sense, this conflict represents the single most important flaws of western society in the modern sphere, and as an example, it tells an astounding tale of outright robbery. This essay intends to show how the colonial mold shaped the decisions of Israeli leaders throughout the 20th century to, for lack of better words, screw the native Palestinian people over royally. Also, it is the contention of this author that the conflict, as it now exits in March 2004, is one that cannot and shall not be resolved by a conventional dialogue of any kind, nor will the necessary concessions ever be pondered. The conflict shall remain, bloody and merciless, without hope of reprieve, so long as current social, cultural, ethnic and political institutions, on both sides, remain in place.

In parallel to the idea of culpability comes the notion, rightly expounded by philosophical thinkers, that in truth, both sides are always right and always wrong in certain ways. While this essay intends to demonstrate how Israel and its leadership have, since the idea of a Jewish state in the Middle East were even forwarded, moved to systematically and illegally remove the Palestinians from the land they occupied, it does not preclude the understanding that the Palestinians themselves have acted very selfishly and stupidly at times. It also does not imply that the state of Israel does not have many factors on its side that support its conclusions, and its opinion on this matter. Both sides are right in some ways and wrong in some ways, as is the case in all disputes. With that having been said, the Israelis, as the reader shall vividly come to understand, have flouted international law and reasonable opinion at every turn in their single-minded drive to settle to Jewish people in their Biblical homeland, regardless of the human costs involved.

To begin, it is important to have some historical background to the situation, and therefore much of this essay will be designated to shed light on past events, throughout the 20th century, that were instrumental in shaping the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as it exists today. The beginning of an organized Zionist movement came in 1896, with the publication of Der Judenstat by Theodore Hertzl, which would become the idealistic framework of modern Zionism. In this essay, Hertzl outlined a plan that would settle the Jews in the Middle East and allow them to escape the persecution that European society had always inflicted on them. The plan called explicitly for the colonization of the ‘primitive people’ living in the area, and the establishment of a buffer of ‘civilization’ between the Europeans and the Ottoman Turk empire, which was the single, dominant political force throughout the region at the time.

“Let sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe…To create a State is neither ridiculous nor impossible. Haven’t we witnessed the process in our own day, among nations that were not largely middle class as we are, but poorer, less educated, and consequently weaker than ourselves…Is Palestine or Argentina preferable?…Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland. The very name would be a marvelously effective rallying cry. If his majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake the complete management of the finances of Turkey. We should there form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization in barbarism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all of Europe, which would have to guarantee out existence.”[1]

As the previous quotation clearly demonstrates, the history of the state of Israel itself has its origins in flagrant European colonialism, common during the era in question, but nonetheless regarded today with universal scorn and derision. It is important to note that this essay directly reflects the ambivalence that pervaded much of the Zionist movement in early times in regard to where the proposed Jewish state might actually come to exist, and indeed, “Like Pinster, Hertzl was not committed to Palestine, although he did not discount it as the ideal solution. Rather, he preferred to accept empty territory that might be offered, such as sections of Argentina.”[2] This seriously undermines the validity of the claims made by the Israeli government in regard to all its practices, because it cannot logically deal with the fact that the land was annexed illegally and the rights of the Palestinians, from square one, were flatly ignored.

The next 50 years saw the inflow of Jews into the Palestine over the growing condemnation of Arab leaders in the area, and various ultimatums indicating that the settlement of an organized Jewish state would not be tolerated. Throughout the course of the early 20th century, two World Wars occurred, the Ottoman Empire fell, and large swaths of Palestine came to be owned and organized by Jewish settlers buzzing with aspirations toward independence and domination of the growing sphere of Jewish influence. Throughout, European dominance insured that the Jewish settlers had adequate protection to keep their ideas alive and growing.

In 1948, the next major phase of the Israeli inquisition occurred with the declaration of independence of the state of Israel following the 1948 war. In the wake of the Holocaust, the cause of Zionism gained a huge boost in support, and along with the infirmity of the British Empire after the war and its inability to govern the Palestinian territories, the time was ripe for an Israeli seizure of the land. With a decisive forcefulness, and in the face of determined resistance throughout the Arab world, the Jewish settlers, using the militias and terrorist organizations that had formed in the support of a Jewish state, waged the 1948 War to secure boundaries of a nation that would be politically autonomous from the vast Arab majority, which would eventually be forced into either poverty or exile.

“Compared to the Palestinians, the Zionists had much superior leadership and organization as well as many soldiers who benefited from the experience and training they received during WWII. Although the Irgun and the LEHI were not absorbed into the Hagana, they coordinated activities with it on many occasions, especially in the spring of 1948. In general they specialized in bombing crowded Arab areas and other tactics designed to terrorize the Arab community. The Jewish community had a slight manpower advantage over the Palestinians among males in the twenty to forty-four age group.”[3]

As the above quotation demonstrates, the military might of the Israelis, from the beginning of Israel as an independent state, was considerably more powerful than that of their opponents. This distinguishing characteristic has endured since that time, and indeed today the Israeli military dominates the Palestinian rabble with an iron fist, imposing martial law and random searches on the Palestinian people at will, and with the specific goal in mind of subordination. It is also important to note that this era of military accomplishment already distinguishes the violence and forcefulness with which the Israeli army has ravaged any remnants of dissent within the Palestinian community. The missile strikes and targeted assassinations that are characteristic of the conflict today have their origin in the ‘Hagana’ and ‘Irgun’, Jewish militias of hardened soldiers that were institutionalized because of their role in the 1948 war.

“Eretz-Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and the restoration in it of their political freedom.”[4]

The above quotation is important for the reason that it demonstrates the tremendous motivations, the kind of epic and historical sentiments were summoned by the Jewish people in the establishment of their state. It is extremely important when analyzing this conflict to be aware at all times of the fanaticism that can be seen on both sides, and in this way the impasse that the situation becomes is readily apparent. While the world has seen very clearly the devastation that can be wrought by the fanaticism of the Islamic suicide bomber, it has not been made so public the fanaticism of the Israeli citizen, whose own declaration of government enshrines biblical importance and transcendent value to the state of Israel, and the objective observer can only imagine the sort of unremitting devotion that sort of sentiment breeds.

The final event of major historical value in the understanding of the modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the one that is of most contention today, and therefore it is particularly pertinent to this discussion. The 1967 war has gained recognition even among lay-people in America because of the fact that it, more than any other single factor, has been the principle motivator of modern Palestinian disputes and terrorist actions. It is the contention of many scholars that the 1967 war, beyond simply being avoidable, was in fact a shameless grab for power by the Israeli government at a moment when they rightly perceived that the circumstances were right for massive expansion, and the fulfillment of the State of Israel to its Biblical borders, from the Mediterranean to the banks of the Jordan River. This contention, while incomplete, is essentially correct in its supposition that the Israeli leaders at the time knew exactly what they were getting into, meaning they knew they were picking a fight with a drastically weaker opponent (the group of Arab nations, including Egypt and Syria etc.). In the matter of 6 days, the Israelis had pounded the weaker Arab forces into total submission, and annexed the West Bank and Gaza, as well as large swaths of the Golan Heights and Galilee, all in all a wild success for Israel, but leaving the Palestinians still living in these territories in the impossible spot of being political non-entities under the jurisdiction of a foreign power.

“The Security Council…Affirms that the fulfillment of charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles.

i) Withdrawal of Israel[i] troops from territories occupied in the recent conflict:

ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area, and their right to live in peace within the secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

2. Affirms further the necessity…

b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.”[5]

Upon issuing resolution 242, the U.N. made an important decision relating to the conduct of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that was simply to claim public support, in general, for the plight of the Palestinians, and asserted the illegality of the annexations that had characterized the 1967 conflict. Any pretense that Israel could stick to that the annexation of the land, which had been the unofficial policy of the Zionists since the 19th century, was still legally or rationally feasible was completely erased by this declaration, which in essence then put the onus on the Israeli government to return the land and right the wrongs done by the war. The Israeli response, defying the international community and arousing the smoldering hatred and mistrust of the Arab states, consisted of convoluted logical leaps and semantic nitpicking of the resolution language that can leave no doubt that the Israel had no intention of respecting the rights of the Palestinian people, many of whom were now displaced, and the rest isolated without political representation in occupied territory. This is the same territory still occupied today, and the dispute over the restoration of pre-1967 boundaries is the single most pressing Palestinian demand if they are to agree to a peace.

“1) Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

2) Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

3) The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their county in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will…

…5) The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father—whether inside Palestine or outside it—is also a Palestinian.”[6]

In response to the 1967 annexation of Palestinian land by the Israeli government, the Palestinians, returning with solidarity of purpose and a unified message, retorted with the above sentiment of resistance to the Israeli actions. By outlining an official policy rejecting categorically the assertions of Israel in regard to the territories acquired in 1967, and demanding that, at the very least, Israel must return to the 1948 territories from after the original war for independence, the Palestinians demonstrated that the conflict that had already taken so many lives would continue to be unsolvable.

One particularly thorny issue tied up in the 1967 is the fate of Jerusalem, a holy city for both Jews and Muslims, and an obvious flashpoint for tensions in the region. In 1967, one of the primary Israeli goals was to take Jerusalem and make it a Jewish possession, and this the Israelis did with tremendous gusto. The Palestinian inhabitants were quickly shipped out, and the idea was to make the city so Jewish in character so fast that regardless of how political wrangling would play out in the future the area would have to be retained by Israel because of changed circumstances. This is, clearly, wildly unfair and in direct contradiction to the official aims of international law. Jerusalem is perhaps the most clear cut example of how, on an issue by issue basis, this conflict delves into such deep undercurrents of animosity and passionate feeling that a reasonable solution brought about through diplomacy, without some sort of fundamental shift, seems almost laughably unlikely.

With the historical underpinnings in place, the current perspective on the conflict takes on a new and more ominous character. There are simply no such conflicts, in terms of depth and breadth and sheer violence, that modern Americans have to deal with that match the ferocity of the fighting in this one, and thus it initially seems a bit perplexing. But with the understanding that multiple wars, untold scores of lives and casualties, cultural and religious and political rifts and blood feuds of all kinds have shaped this conflict, and its participants throughout the century, it becomes more clear. In the 1990s, the end of the cold war and geopolitical competition in the Middle East between the United States and the Soviet Union allowed for the powerful nations of the world to turn their attention toward this conflict, and this culminated in the Oslo Accords of 1993. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Palestinian rebels led by Yassir Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, had fought for the independence of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and their efforts eventually won the attention of the leaders of the industrial world. Finally, in 1993, forces coalesced to the point where a principled accord was reached, and this would eventually prove to be the very closest to peace that the two sides could come before they again descended into violence with the beginning of the ‘intifada’ after the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000. Even though Oslo was a high point for the conflict, it still represented fundamental divides over fundamental issues, and in this sense was as incomplete as all other settlement offers that had failed in the past.

“Israel did not recognize any Palestinian right to a state. It accepted the PLO as the organization representing the Palestinian people, with whom it would negotiate, but the PLO’s status was left undefined, as was the goal of the negotiations. From a Palestinians rejectionist viewpoint, Arafat had done what they had always feared. He had recognized Israel’s existence without gaining mutual acknowledgment of a Palestinian right to self-determination. Conversely, from an Israeli rejectionist standpoint, the very fact that the existence of a Palestinian people had been acknowledged, let alone the PLO, was anathema and was seen as a prelude to a Palestinian state in areas they were determined to retain for Israel”[7]

As the above quotation indicates, the Oslo accords were seriously flawed, and it was not long before both sides were again at each other’s throats. The determination of sovereign nationhood, and the political designation of the Palestinian people are examples of complicated issues of subtle diplomatic flavor which in the case of Oslo were given token recognition but left largely unanswered, and as such the long-term effects of the Oslo Accords remain minimal, and more indicative of the seemingly hopeless character of the problem than of effective solutions.

By the end of the Clinton administration, America was in sufficient economic and political control of world affairs to attempt a formal, final end to the conflict under the guidance and care of the President of the United States. Though hailed by many as finally representing a positive and lasting breakthrough, the Camp David talks of 2000 in fact led only to a renewal of conflict, and in supremely bloody fashion, that has lasted until today and seems to be unbounded in its cruelty, and in the dedication of the two sides to fight to the bitter end. It is important to note, when looking at the Camp David summit, that both sides were supremely suspicious of the other, and Yassir Arafat in particular, was extremely nervous about again being forced into concessions that would lead to widespread criticism at home. After his mistakes at Oslo, the chairman was wary of any deals put on the table by Edmund Barak, the Prime Minister of Israel at the time. In the end, the talks stalled over the same issues of contention that had been the main stumbling blocks for years.

“The distance between the two parties, especially on the issue of Jerusalem and refugees, made it impossible to reach an agreement at the Camp David summit meeting in July, 2000. Although Barak offered a far more extensive Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank than any other Israeli leader had publicly considered, he insisted on retaining Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. This was unacceptable to the Palestinians and most of the Muslim world. Arafat left Camp David with enhanced stature among his constituents because he did not yield to American and Israeli pressure. Barak returned home to face political crisis within his own government, including the abandonment of coalition partners who felt he had offered the Palestinians too much.”[8]

Finally, after sifting through the startling mess that constitutes the history of this conflict, the objective observer arrives at the present form of the conflict, and it is still so shockingly similar to the past that little hope of imminent change can be hoped for. In 2004, the biggest item on the agenda is the security wall that Israeli government has begun building that will separate Israel proper from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, effectively sealing the Palestinian residents inside it and leaving them at the whims of the Israeli government, which is under no binding legal obligation, as it now stands, to respect their sovereign rights, even to the extent of travel through, let alone out of, the territories. Along with the litany of problems that human rights experts have with the plan, a new and potentially disastrous precedent is in the making, and this comes in the form of the deviations the wall is taking from the Green Line. The Green Line is the semi-official border demarcating the boundaries of the territories annexed in 1967, and although it is highly contentious in itself, it represents the very least of which the Palestinians are ever prepared to work with. By swiping large sections of land from inside the Green Line by putting the security fence around them, the Israeli government is again disregarding the concerns of the international community in its attempt to get everything human possible out of the land they have managed to acquire.

“On the face of it, the wall has some merit. If it could prevent suicide bombers…from entering Israel proper, well and good. Probably, however, it will not. And if it follows the pre 1967 Green Line that separates the West Bank—the bulk of any Palestinian State--from Israel proper, well and good too. But the route the wall is taking is quite different. It loops round Jewish settlements in the West Bank, biting huge chunks out of the Palestinians’ territory. Not only does it look like a land grab, it also makes a would-be Palestinian state look woefully unviable. At the same time, the wall will make it much harder eventually to cut the number of Jewish settlers on the West Bank, without which there will be no lasting peace. Worse still, this creation of sullen Palestinian enclaves humiliates ordinary Palestinians, thereby increasing the number of extremists, many of whom reject the idea of two states and hold to the aim of a single state between the Mediterranean and Jordan: in short, the end of Israel.”[9]

As the above quotation indicates, along with the new problems that are created by the security wall, another issue that hangs over this debate in the modern context is that of the Israeli settlers who day by day move into Palestinian land and slowly constrict the territories where Palestinians live tighter and tighter. The settlements are not only a contentious issue, they are an issue close to the heart of the current Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, a conservative coalition leader who has long supported the settler movement and is, because of both personal ideology and political reality, unlikely to ever crack down on the settlers, no matter how much their cause infuriates the Palestinians and halts the peace process.

The rash of suicide bombings that have accompanied the intifada movement of the past several years indicates the increasing level of hopelessness and desperation that characterizes the Palestinians’ plight. As time passes, generations grow and become the leaders of their society, but for Palestinians today this is not something to be happy about. The generation of Palestinians that has come to adulthood in recent years are poorer and less educated than ever before. They have been humiliated and confined their entire lives, and they have watched with horror as the older generation slides further and further into apathy. They are a population that, even given a just lease on life, are increasingly incapable of seizing it because of poverty and ignorance. This also explains the surge in suicide bombings in recent times, and the disturbing trend of women suicide bombers, possibly the only new phenomena to happen to the conflict in some time. Particularly in the patriarchal Arab society, such a trend portends the worst, because if the women are doing it, then everyone is doing it, and a whole society is being taught that the only way for them to be heard is through widespread civilian violence.

Now, after having examined the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its origins through the present, what can be said about the future of this conflict? It seems clear that there is no solution, nor set of solutions will ever satisfy both sides completely, and even the chance of a painful compromise of sorts is highly unlikely. Simply put, the conflict runs too deep, the resentments are too fierce, and the collective wounds of so much war too painful for either side to forgive or forget. As it stands, with current social and political trends as they are, the only conclusion that an informed analysis can draw is that, at best, the two sides can maintain an awkward ceasefire, with the temporary cessation of violence as the most optimistic goal. To end this conflict will take nothing short of the collapse of one or both of the underlying societies. In 2004 neither Israel nor Palestine are safe from the forces of structural change. For the Palestinians, their poverty and heartache has been mirrored by the poverty and heartache of the Muslim world in general, which is racked by autocracy, corruption, human rights abuses, religious fundamentalism and flatly stagnant societies. It is the opinion of many observers Islamic society is on the brink of a major revolution, as the rest of the world speeds toward modernity, while most Arab countries do not even respect the rights of their own female citizens.

In the case of the Israelis, while they seem to be safer in the short-run, the long run holds trouble for them as well. Despite being a democratic, industrialized society, Israel suffers from deep resentment from all its neighbors, suspicion in the international community, and the simple fact that nations organized around religious/ethnic lines are becoming rarer and rarer. Sooner or later, Israel is going to slip, and the United Nations will not be there to support it, not after the repeated violations that the Israelis have unrepentantly committed in the face of international law.

In the near future, it is the conclusion of this author that the conflict will, unsurprisingly, continue to stagnate. As the Palestinians become poorer and poorer, their ability to enact change, never much to begin with, will further deteriorate. The Israelis are safe for now, owing to the fact that they enjoy the patronage of the United States and the most solid argument that they have on their side, that they are the only real democracy in a region that is otherwise considered to be still developing. However, neither, repeat neither of the sides is going to emerge finally and forever victorious. The crimes that have been committed on both sides have been too egregious, and in the end, both sides are going to have to pay the piper.

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[1] Hertzl, Theodore. Der Judenstat, 1896

[2] Smith, Charles. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2001

[3] ibid.

[4] “Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel” May 14, 1948.

[5] “U.N. Security Council Resolution 242” November 22, 1967.

[6] “The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council” July 1-17, 1968.

[7] Smith. 2001

[8] “The Middle East Research and Information Project” pcusa/wmd/ep/resources/mideast/conflict/merip-david2.htm

[9] “Break this Vicious Circle” The Economist Magazine, October 2003.

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